me lucci 1980

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DOI: 10.1177/053901848001900201

1980 19: 199Social Science InformationAlberto Melucci

The new social movements: A theoretical approach

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199-2

Theory and methods

Theorie et methodes

Alberto Melucci

The new social movements:A theoretical approach

1. The theoretical impasse

The theoretical debate about social movements has grown steadilysince the 1960s in response to the development of new forms of col-lective action in advanced capitalist societies, and to the advent ofexplosive social conflicts in the societies dependent on them. Thedifficulties confronting theorists in this area are evident from theimpasse experienced by two theoretical traditions which, in theirdifferent ways, have dealt with the subject of social movements:Marxism and functionalist sociology. The primary concern ofclassical Marxist analysis has been to define the preconditions ofrevolution by examining the structural contradictions of thecapitalist system. Centering its investigation on the logic of thesystem, it has underestimated the processes by which collective ac-tion ermerges, as well as the internal articulation of social

movements (mobilization, organization, leadership, ideology) andthe forms through which revolt passes in becoming a class move-ment. According to this view, the party, as a centralized organiza-tion emerges, as well as the internal articulation of social

expression of collective action, and the conquest of the apparatusof the state remains the first objective of this action. Every form ofaction which can not be reduced to the model of the party is therebydiminished in value or considered to be marginal. If the partybecomes the state, the new power is by definition the faithful inter-pretor of collective conflicts and demands. The creation of a

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totalitarian order and the emergence of Stalinism are, it is main-

tained, not the necessary consequences of Leninism, but certainlythe outgrowth of its presuppositions. Marxist reflection is beginn-ing to become aware of these limitations and to reexamine thetheoretical foundations from which they arise. The debate whichdeveloped in the 1970s within Marxism has shown that the majorsource of difficulty on the theoretical level is the separation ofanalysis of the system from analysis of the actors. As an analysis ofthe mode of capitalist production, Marxism defines the conditionsunder which the system enters a state of crisis. As a theory ofrevolution, it lacks the analytic instruments required for definingthe actors and political forms of socio-economic transformation.

In order to extricate itself from this theoretical impasse, theMarxist tradition must, therefore, move from a structural analysisof class relations and of the logic of the capitalist system towards adefinition, first, of class action, and, then, of political action.Reflection on social movements is a crucial theoretical issue that

can not be avoided.American sociology, for its part, has tackled the subject of social

movements from the point of view of collective behaviour, i.e. ofthe whole spectrum of types of behaviour ranging from the panic tochanges in fashion, from crowd behaviour to the revolution. Muchempirical research on the various ways in which people conductthemselves in groups has gone into the development and support oftheories of this kind. Studies of collective behaviour thus constitutean obligatory point of reference; but, at the same time, they displaythe limitations of an approach which finds the key to the explana-tion of behaviour in the beliefs of the actors and which, above all,places on the same level phenomena whose structural significancevaries immensely, for example, a panic and a revolution. The dif-ference between them, according to these theories, lies solely in themagnitude of the beliefs which mobilize the respective actions. Col-lective action, therefore, is always considered to be the result of astrain which disturbs the equilibrium of the social system. It is thisstrain which gives rise to the generalized beliefs which are thesource of the different types of collective behaviour and whose goalis the restoration of equilibrium. In the analysis of the theorists ofcollective behaviour, no reference is made to class relations or tothe mode of the production and appropriation of resources. Thewhole inquiry turns on adaptive reactions in the mechanisms whichensure the smooth functioning of the system.

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In advanced capitalist societies, social movements have challeng-ed the optimistic models which foresaw a gradual modernizationtaking place without rupture in the existing political and socialsystems. In explaining social movements, however, we can nolonger be satisfied with analyses which are confined either to thelogic of capitalist development or to dysfunctions in the systemsintegrative mechanisms. The current debate reveals the necessityof a sociology of collective action which is capable of linking actorsand system, class relations and incidents of conflict.

The theoretical question raised by the analysis of the socialmovements found in advanced capitalist societies is that of deter-mining if we are now confronted with a new series of class con-flicts. Beyond the interest one might take in the novelty of theforms and aims of the collective action under discussion, the cen-tral problem of a sociology of social movements remains the defini-tion of the conditions under which a class movement can appear. In

the present essay I shall not attempt to provide a satisfactoryanswer to this general question. Instead, I shall try to advance a fewsteps in the study of these problems by combining theoreticalreflection with some empirical observations on the new socialmovements.

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2. An analytic definition

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In order to leave the rather barren and undifferentiated field of col-

lective behaviour, it is necessary, at the start, to distinguish dif-ferent types of behaviour. There are some kinds that I do not con-

sider as belonging, properly speaking, to the field of collective ac-tion and of social movements. These may be termed examples ofcrisis behaviour or (as others call it) of aggregative behaviour(Alberoni, 1977). What we have in mind here are those ways ofbehaving in groups which (a) do not involve solidarity among theactors; (b) in which the phenomenon can be decomposed down tothe limit of the individual without losing its distinguishingcharacteristics and properties; and (c) in which, finally, thebehaviour is oriented exclusively toward the exterior and does notrefer to the group itself. Collective phenomena of this kind are the

response to the breakdown of the social system in a given area andresult from the simple aggregation of atomized individuals,facilitated by the diffusion of a generalized belief, in the sense in



202

which Smelser defines this concept (Smelser, 1963). The types ofempirical behaviour that may most easily be classed in this categoryare those that the sociology of collective behaviour has analyzedwith the closest attention, that is to say, crowd behaviour, the

panic, etc. Yet, what are involved here are empirical objects whoseanalytic significance can be multiple: beyond the response to crisis,one can discover conflicts about substantive issues. On the other

hand, in the social movements such as I will define them below,there are certainly dimensions of collective behaviour in the sensethat I have just proposed. The empirical object can never be ap-prehended as such, and its significance is always the result of thework of analytic decomposition.

I define collective action in the strict sense as the ensemble ofthe various types of conflict-based behaviour in a social svstem . Acollective action implies the existence of a struggle between two ac-tors for the appropriation and orientation of social values andresources, each of the actors being characterized by a specificsolidarity. This general definition indicates the first level of collec-tive action. To be complete, it requires the addition of a secondcondition, which also specifies the second level of collective action.Collective action also includes all the types of behaviour whichtransgress the norms that have been institutionalized in social roles,which go beyond the rules of the political svstem and/or which at-tack the structure of a societys class relations.

I call conflict-based action collective action which satisfies onlythe first condition. I call a social movement the type of collectiveaction which fulfills the first and the second condition. In this

sense, a social movement is an analytic construct and not an em-pirical object.

It should be noted that the second condition is subordinate to thefirst. The dimension of what may be termed behaviour &dquo;breakingoff the limits of the system being considered&dquo; can enter the analysisonly if the first condition, the existence of a conflict, is fulfilled. Inthis case only can one speak of a social movement. By contrast, themere existence of a conflict is not enough to qualify an action as asocial movement. If the conflict does not go beyond the limits ofthe political or organizational system under consideration, then oneis dealing, rather, with political competition or a conflict of interestswithin a given normative framework. I believe that the termconflict-based action best corresponds to this type of behaviour.On the other hand, the fact that rules are broken or that norms are



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rejected is not sufficient to identify a social movement; for the lat-ter requires a struggle between two actors seeking the same thing. Ifit is solely a question of the breaking of rules, we may speak of de-viance, in the proper sense of the word. In deviant types ofbehaviour there is a total absence of direct conflict between two ac-tors for the control of some specific resource or value. The actor isdefined by his marginality vis-A-vis a system of norms and reacts tothe control they exercise without challenging their legitimacy, that isto say, without identifying a social adversary and without in-dicating what is at stake in his struggle.The general categories of collective action ought now to be

specified with respect to the different levels of the social structure(class relations, political systems, role systems - Melucci, 1976,1977). One may speak of conflict-based organizational action orconflict-based political action when a conflict occurs within thelimits of a given organization or political system. One may not,however, speak of a class conflict-based action (in the sense givenhere to the term conflict-based action), because, by definition, ac-tion undertaken by a class goes beyond the institutional limits ofthe system and challenges its fundamental relationships. Since it at-tacks the foundations of the mode of production, action under-taken by a class always lies, as it were, beyond the norms of thesocial organization and the rules of the political game.As far as social movements are concerned, it is necessary first of

all to consider organizational movements. The types of collectivebehaviour found in this case are situated at the level of a givensocial organization and are directed against the power governing asystem of norms and roles. The action aims at a different divisionof resources, a functional adaptation of the organization, and aredistribution of roles. But, at the same time, it tends to transgressthe institutional limits of the organization and to go beyond its nor-mative framework. The conflict leaves the organization and movestoward the political system. Political movements are collective ac-tions which tend to enlarge political participation, and to improvethe relative position of the actor in the societys decision processes.But political movements do not act strictly within the existingpolitical system; they seek to surpass the system by opening newchannels for the expression of political demands and by pushingparticipation beyond the limits foreseen for it.The fundamental theoretical problem, however, is that of class

movements. Analytically, I define as collective actions which aim at



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the appropriation and orientation of social production (Touraine,1973). The analytic nature of the definition indicates that no con-crete social movement can be reduced purely to the demands madeby a given class; for collective action is always situated within agiven political and organizational framework. It is thereforenecessary to consider two theoretical questions, that of the articula-tion of the types of class behaviour in a system of roles and in a

political system; and that of the empirical criteria appropriate foridentifying class behaviour.

In an organization, the power which imposes the norms, whichassigns the statuses and roles, and which maintains an equilibriumbetween the functioning of the internal mechanisms and exchangewith the environment is never a simple functional authority. Powerin an organization is a transcription of class relations and securestheir reproduction. One may therefore speak of a class organiza-tional movement when the collective action within an organizationnot only goes beyond the limits of the organization and contests itsnorms but also attacks the source itself of power. What is then call-ed into question is the link between the organization and the in-terests of the dominant class, specifically, the gearing of theorganizations functioning (which is supposedly neutral) in such away that it best serves these interests.

In the political system, the existence of class relations ismanifested by the defense of the limits of the political game, whichis not allowed to disturb the bases of domination, as well as by thehegemonic control granted to the political forces, which act in amore direct manner in defending the interests of the dominantclass. Class political movements are collective actions which notonly aim at enlarging political participation, but which also directlychallenge the hegemony of the dominant political forces and theirlink with class interests.

It seems difficult to speak of class movements in the pure state,without any mediation by the political system or by the socialorganization. All the same, I believe that the present situation of-fers us a glimpse of transformations which are beginning to occurwithout the aid of such mediation, and I shall treat this topic atgreater length below. In societies which are characterized by a lowlevel of differentiation, and in which the state played a fundamen-tal role in unification and centralization, social movements couldnot be expressed without the mediation of a collective action linkedto the social organization or to the political system. The growing



205

differentiation of society and the increased autonomy of the dif-ferent systems which constitute it tend to bring about the separa-tion of class action from its institutional or organizational media-tion. One thus witnesses the appearance of nascent pure move-ments which raise the problem of the control of collective resources(nature, the body, interpersonal relations) in directly culturalterms. The lack of any mediation at all also reveals the weakness ofthese movements. Nevertheless, they seem to anticipate, in an em-bryonic fashion, the possibility of wildcat class movements whichwill refuse all mediation within the political or organizationalspheres. (Figure 1 illustrates the dimensions of collective action.)

FIGURE 1

Dimensions of collective action



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3. The identification of types of class behaviour

Let us return now to the problem of identifying the various types ofclass behaviour, considering that they always manifest themselvesby the mediation of a political system and a social organization ina concrete society. How, then, does one distinguish classmovements from organizational movements or politicalmovements? Obviously, the ideology and the views of the actorsare indicators that must be treated very cautiously and used onlyafter other conditions have been met. Without claiming to exhaustthe range of possible conditions, I shall employ the following em-pirical criteria:(a) First, it is necessary to analyze the mode of production and theproductive structure. It is possible to identify the actors involvedwith respect to the production and appropriation of resources? Orare they definable in an exclusive manner in terms of the system inwhich the action occurs (political actors, organizational actors,with definite roles);(b) next, the substance and form of the actions are of great impor-tance. A class movement generates actions which challenge thesystem of domination. The most significant indicator, in this case,is the non-negotiability of the movements objectives and the in-compatibility of the forms of its action with the mechanisms sus-taining both the hierarchy of power within an organization and thehegemony of the dominant interests in the political system;(c) the adversarys response. The manner in which the system ofdomination intervenes through repression and social control is avery important indicator of the significance of collective action.The dominant class reacts in those areas where it sees its intereststhreatened and where it cannot allow major errors in the interpreta-tion of the meaning of the collective action. When the action putsforward class demands, the adversarys response is usually displac-ed to a higher level than the one which is directly effected. A protestaction in the organizational sphere which directly attacks the seatof power within an organization provokes the intervention of thepolitical system and of the states repressive apparatus. A politicalmovement which goes beyond the limits of participation andmenaces the basic interests of the dominant class provokes thedirect reaction of that class (a freeze on investments, flight ofcapital, economic crises, foreign intervention);



207

(d) It is only at this point that one should consider the way in whichthe actors define their action, particularly how they definethemselves as a group and how they identify the adversary and thestakes involved in the conflict. A class movement tends to describethe situation, in the language of its cultural system, as a strugglebetween he who produces the social resources and he who ap-propriates them for himself. The stakes in this struggle will alwaysbe, whether directly or indirectly, the control and the distributionof these resources, that is to say, of the societys mode of produc-tion.One can make the same observations from a different perspective

by analyzing the variations in the dimensions of the conflict(Oberschall, 1973) as one moves from organizational movementsto political movements, and then on to class movements (see Figure2). First of all, with respect to the stakes involved in a conflict, onemay assume the existence of an increasing symbolic content and adecreasing divisibility of the stakes. A class movement fights forstakes which always directly concern the identity of the actors. Hereit is not simply a matter of material resources or immediate advan-tages, but also of an orientation of the social production, of adetermination to institute a distribution of the social resources dif-

ferent from the particular one effected by the dominant class. Forthis same reason, the more an action turns into a class movement,the less the stakes are divisible or negotiable. Conflicts within anorganization or within the political system more easily allow theadoption of partial strategies and partial negotiations. Anothercharacteristic that should be considered in this connection is the

decreasing reversibility of the conflicts as one moves fromorganizational movements to class movements. The resolution ofconflicts becomes all the more difficult as the stakes grow in impor-tance for the groups concerned. Another result is that the

calculability of the situation is diminished. The relationship bet-ween costs and benefits is clearer and the calculation of the conse-

quences of the different courses of action is easier when the stakesare more directly quantifiable and the solutions are predictable.Finally, the conflict tends toward a zero-sum resolution the nearerone comes to class movements. In the confrontations betweenclasses the stakes are not divisible, and the victory of one adversarymeans the defeat of the other. This does not happen in organiza-tions and in the political system; for there each party can hope for



208



209

partial advantages, and a victory establishes only a relative im-balance of losses and gains.With these few remarks I have tried to suggest a method for deal-

ing with the subject rather than to develop a systematic scheme.Within the complexity of empirical behaviour, class action isalways intertwined with other significations and other issues. It isno accident that the dominant class always tends to deny the ex-istence of class actions and to alter and diminish their meaningeither by labelling them as deviant or by placing them within theframework of organizational or political problems. Analysis ought,on the contrary, to treat collective action as a sign and to decipherits multiple significations.

4. The origins of a class movement

We must now return to the question raised at the start. A classmovement is a movement involved in a conflict over the mode of

production and over the appropriation and orientation of socialresources. However, if we do not wish, as it were, to naturalizesocial relationships, we must provide a foundation for class con-flict. In determining what this foundation is, our analysis will, atthe same time, indicate the conditions by which new class conflictscan be identified, because it will have established the logic govern-ing the structure of the formation of movements.The starting-point of a sociology of social movement is the

assumption that class conflict is a structural, synchronic dimensionof any given system. But the existence of structural antagonismmust be socially established, if one is to avoid attributing it to amechanical determinism, or to human nature. Otherwise, classconflict becomes an orginal, metaphysical dimension of society.And, in this case, one must fall back on the so-called necessary con-tradictions of the system (and where do these come from?), withthe result that social relations are reduced to the status of naturalrelations and thus deprived of their specific meaning. Or else onemust turn to some sort of anthropological view, to a philosophy ofman, whether this takes a positive form, with the notion of a revoltthrough which human nature reappropriates its own essence, or anegative form, with the view that homo homini lupus or that thereexists a natural inclination to dominate. The opposition betweenclasses is thus traced back to conflicts or to the essence of man, to



210

the nature of elites and of the masses. Determinism and humanism,positive or negative, are the negations of sociology.

It is essential, therefore, to accept that conflict is not an originalaspect of social existence, but a fact to be explained in terms ofsocial relations. This is equivalent to saying that it is necessary toconstruct an analytic space which precedes the notion of class rela-tions and from which these relations can be deduced. I call this

space a theory of production or of relationship to an object. In-dustrial capitalism has accustomed us to link class relations tomaterial production, to the work involved in transforming nature. Ibelieve that we must develop a theory of production conceived as asocial relationship to objects and, further, that this theory must beprogressively freed from its historical ties to industrial society andmade to correspond more closely to the conditions of productionprevailing in post-industrial capitalism.With the sole aim of presenting a clearer statement of the pro-

blem and of indicating an appropriate way of treating it, I shallproceed to give a more formal definition of this analytic space. Idefine production as the formation or transformation of objects,within the framework of certain social relations, by the applicationof certain means to a primary material. The analytic components ofproduction are thus: (a) an action; (b) a raw material; (c) means ofproduction; (d) a social relation. The formation or transformationof objects takes place within a social relation and in accord with atwofold non-social limitation which marks the anti-idealisticcharacter of the definition; in other words, there exist conditions

representing the system of constraints governing the production.The natural milieu of the action (the raw material) and the in-strumental basis of the action (the means of production) precludethe view that it is the voluntary product of mans essence. Socialproduction is a part of nature whose specific feature is that it is,simultaneously, the product of social relations. Production is anatural process, a transformation of the environment, but it is alsothe production of meaning and of social relations. The relation ofman to his works is the affirmation of an identity, that is to say, therecognition of the product as the result of the action of a producer.But the attribution of something to someone is at the same time asocial relationship, and it implies the reciprocity of this recogni-tion. Social identity is the attribution of the condition of belongingto; it is a relationship within which one both recognizes and isrecognized. Production is the social capacity of recognizing ones



211

own works; it is the will to appropriate and to orient a product. Butthis orientation is not founded on human nature or on some sortof original humanism of work; it is already a social relationship.Production is a relationship which implies the reciprocal recogni-tion of the (social and personal) identity of the producers andwhich permits, on this basis, an exchange to take place. Exchangeand, even more so, the gift, are social relationships which attestmore directly than does pure production to the existence of a situa-tion in which the producer both recognizes and appropriates hiswork. Exchange and gift-giving are possible because the producerrecognizes his works as his own and because there is a reciprocity inthis recognition. Production, recognition, appropriation and orien-tation are the analytic components of production conceived as asocial relationship. To produce also means to determine the orien-tation of production and of the product on the basis of thereciprocal recognition of the producers.The construction of this analytic level, which is meant to

precede the identification of class relations, enables us to reflect onthe process by which classes are formed and on their antagonism,as well as on the different forms that conflict between them cantake. On the analytic level, the formation of classes can always betraced back to the breakdown of reciprocity of recognition andtherefore to the separation between production and recognition,on the one hand, and appropriation and orientation on the other. Aknowledge of the various forms that the breakdown takes can comeonly from historical analysis and from the comparative an-thropology of human societies. One may suggest, by way of exam-ple, a possible account of the historical formation of class relationswithout thereby denying that societies display a large variety ofevolutionary paths. An increase in the division of labour arisesfrom a change in the relations with the environment, such as the ex-pansion of exchanges, the transformation of the natural conditionsof production, the exhaustion or discovery of resources, etc. Thischange implies a delegation of responsibility in the direction ofthose activities pertaining to the relations of production; which is tosay that it implies the control by one particular group over theorientation of the resources produced. This delegation of authoritypresupposes reciprocal recognition, between the two groups whichthereby emerge. As long as one of them maintains control over thespecific delegated function, the fourfold relationship comprisingproduction, recognition, appropriation, and orientation is per-



212

manent. When an increase in the division of labour and in the com-

plexity of the system reduces this control, the relationship breaksdown and reciprocal recognition disappears. Each party recognizesits own works but refuses to extend such recognition to the otherparty, tending, instead, to identify itself with the totality of thesocial field.

Classes are born, therefore, in the form of groups struggling toappropriate and orient social production. Their antagonism, un-balanced by the relation dominant group-dominated group, sets itsstamp on the structure of the social system and is the source of col-lective action.

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5. Social movements and social change ~ . ~.Most theories of collective action attribute the birth of socialmovements either to the breakdown of the social system or to the

formation of new interests or of new forms of solidarity and collec-tive identity (Tilly, 1975). Before entering upon a discussion of thisdichotomy, however, we may note a striking fact about the currenttheories: most of them, either directly or indirectly, presupposechange as a given factor. Whether collective action is ascribed tothe breakdown of the system or to the appearance of new interests,there is always a change whose nature and causes are left unexamin-ed by the model.The fact that change is taken for granted seems to me to be the

result of a kind of naive historicism which conceives of change as anatural and continuous process in society and which is concernedonly with the effects of this process. The theories to which I referare actually theories of the activation of the factors of collective ac-

tion, but they tell us nothing about the structural cause of thisphenomenon. They tell us how collective action is manifested butnot why. Some of them are explicitly theories of the activation offactors; in this case, change is correctly taken as the models pointof departure, as an input to be used in the construction of an ex-planation. Consequently, one can not reproach such a theory fornot explaining change (Tilly, 1970). But in the majority of cases theauthors claim to give a causal and structural explanation of collec-tive action. The link between change and collective action thenbecomes a device by which to hide the lack of a theory of change.Most of the current theories consider change as a variable which



213

is external to the explanatory system adopted. This means thatwhen instances of collective behaviour appear in a social system,the change which is supposed to be the source of this behaviour isalways assumed to be of external origin (Smelser, 1968; Davies,1962, 1971; Feierabend et al., 1973; Gurr, 1970; Graham and Gurr(eds), 1969; Olson, 1968). How should one explain, for example,the appearance of strain or of rising expectations, on the one hand,or disequilibrium in the means of responding to such phenomena,on the other hand? Economic progress is often a sort of deus exmachina which is made responsible for many transformations. Butit is clear that economic progress, in turn, remains in need fo ex-

planation. There are not many alternatives. Either one appeals ex-clusively to exogenous causes, reducing change in every case to anexternal variable, or else one accepts that change, too, has a causeinternal to the system. In the former case, it is necessary to denythe growing interdependence of systems and to consider as external,variables which in reality are inherent in the structure of the systemunder consideration. For example, using this approach it isnecessary to maintain that the action of a multinational corpora-tion in a given capitalist country is an external variable simplybecause the companys headquarters happen to be located in someother country. While this may be true from the point of view of thepolitical system, it is obviously difficult to consider this kind of in-tervention as an external variable from the point of view of classrelations. In the latter case, one admits to endogenous origin ofchange and thus is constrained to account for change by means ofthe same categories used to account for collective action. Other-wise, one will construct a contradictory explanatory system whichis incapable of justifying all the variables it introduces.The current theories, therefore, offer only two possibilities.

Either they attribute change solely to exogenous causes, therebyflying in the face of reality; or they view change as arising withinthe system, and then they are contradictory, since they are notcapable of explaining change by the same categories used intreating collective action.From a logical point of view, the central nexus of these dif-

ficulties lies, I believe, in a failure to distinguish between synchronyand diachrony, between structure and change. The theories in ques-tion are located, right from the start, in the realm of change (bypresupposing it) and offer a diachronic analysis rather than a struc-tural analysis of the origin of social movements. The same logical



214

difficulty is found in many Marxist analyses which ascribe theorigin of collective action to the contradiction between the forces ofproduction and the relations of production. The development ofthe forces of production is thought to bring to a head, at a givenmoment, the contradiction between these forces and the existingrelations of production. But how does the development of theforces of production come about in the first place? If one is toavoid a naive historicism, it is necessary to establish a link betweensynchrony and diachrony, between structure and change.Antagonism between classes is a synchronic dimension of a

system. The struggle undertaken by the dominated class for thereappropriation of the social production penetrates the socialstructure itself. This accounts for the necessity of controlling con-flict with which the dominant class is permanently confronted. Thescission, running throughout the entire social order, can be hiddenbehind societys apparent integration and can be denied by thedominant ideology. But the system of domination must constantlycome to grips with the reality of the conflict if it wishes to protectthe bases of its reproduction. If antagonism is a structural compo-nent of class society, the necessity of controlling it is just as muchso.

All the same, a concrete society does not coincide with a par-ticular mode of production, nor does it live only synchronously.Class relations manifest themselves in a political system and inthe forms of social organization. In a real society, synchronic op-position between classes does not give rise to pure types ofbehaviour; it must be deciphered in the societys history. As for thedominant class, its share in synchronic antagonism takes the formof a systemic action; only rarely manifest in a direct action, it ismuch more frequently expressed through the application of the in-struments of social integration. The dominant class intervenesdirectly only when there exists an explicit threat to the system ofdomination. Normally, its action is evident in categories of socialpractice, in the control of ideology, and in repressive manipulation.More important in this connection is the identification of thoseforms of behaviour of the dominated classes which indicate the

synchronic presence of conflict. Here I am referring to forms ofaction which - before, or indepedently of a collective mobilizationagainst class domination - are the embryonic testimony of a scis-sion in the society, evidence of the dominant class failure to im-pose total unity on the society. These forms of resistance, which



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may appear in the work situation, in an individuals refusal, or inpopular culture and folklore, are what I shall call deviant symp-toms of conflict or symbolic elaborations of latent conflict. The de-viant character and the flight into the realm of the symbolic are ob-viously dependent on the much more powerful opposing action ofthe apparatus of domination, which constantly impedes, blocks,and represses all manifest expression of class antagonism. Thepresence of these symptoms allows us to assert the synchronic ex-istence of conflict before, and independently of, the appearanceof those forms of behaviour which, through the necessary media-tion of the political system and of the organiztion, openly translateclass conflict in a concrete society.We have now arrived at the central problem. How does one pass

from a structural conflict to diachornic forms of behaviour rootedin a political system and in an historical society. The necessity ofcontrolling conflict obliges the system of domination to interveneconstantly at the different levels of the social structure in order tohold conflict on them within limits compatible with the fundamen-tal class relations. External factors (increase in the volume of ex-

changes, changes in the environment) are also elements of dise-quilibrium that must be controlled because of the effects they mayhave on the state of the class relations. The action of the exogenouselements is therefore never direct. Instead, it affects the system tothe degree that it can unbalance the societys class relations. Henceexternal factors also provoke actions at the different levels of thesystem, actions which are designed to keep the resulting effectswithin the respective limits of compatibility at each level. It is thus bymeans of adaptation that internal changes in the political systemand/or the social organization are generated, together with a cer-tain modernization of the relations of production. Disturbances inthe internal equilibrium at each level affected by the changes mayproduce contradictions. I define a contradiction as an incom-patibility between elements or levels of a structure. The actions re-quired to control structural conflict can create contradictions if thechange thereby introduced is incompatible with other elements orlevels of the system. The contradiction functions like a catalyst onthe latent structural antagonism. It sets in motion (diachronic)forms of collective behaviour which react to the contradiction and,at the same time, address themselves to the structural conflict. Col-lective action and social movements are the expression of class con-flict in a concrete political system and/or social organization.



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It is necessary at this point to formulate the concept of con-tradiction more precisely. The significance of structural incom-patibility varies according to the level at which it occurs. One mayspeak of incompatibility within a given level of society, of incom-patibility between levels, and of incompatibility with respect toclass relations. In the first two cases, the contradiction does not

directly affect the class relations. Elements of the political systemand/or of the social organization come into contradiction withthemselves and can mobilize behaviour aimed at reestablishing anew equilibrium within these systems. In the third case, elements ofthe political system and/or of the social organization come intocontradiction with the class relations and mobilize behaviour

originating within these systems which threatens the structure itselfof the class relations. It is in this perspective that the different typesof movements defined at the beginning of this essay must be con-sidered.We must now turn to the analysis of the relationship between col-

lective action and change. The forms of collective behaviouroriginating in certain contradictions come up against a certain stateof the structure (the situation of class relations, the state of thepolitical system and of the social organization). Collective actionwhich takes place in these different states can create new contradic-tions (incompatibilities). There thus exists a second stage in theresponse made by the system of domination. This new interventioncan take the form of modernization, of reform, or of repression.One basic type of response is the development of the forces of pro-duction.

At this point, the process may terminate with the absorbtion ofthe collective thrust, that is to say, with the introduction of new in-ternal changes. Or else, given the presence of certain determinateconditions (i.e. of certain structural states), the system may proveto be incapable of absorbing change. Failure of the political systemto open itself up, a crisis in the social organization, and the forma-tion of new groups linked to a nascent mode of production: theseare factors which can bring about the transition from one struc-ture to another, which is to say that they can cause structuralchange. This transition can occur through a sharp break in con-tinuity or in a much smoother fashion, depending on the specificconditions prevailing at the time. ,With these few remarks I have merely sketched out a theoretical

approach to the problem. I may conclude by observing that collec-



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tive action is, in reality, both a cause and an effect of change,though in distinct logical times or stages and on different analyticlevels. It is a cause, on the synchronic level, because the presence ofa conflict which is manifest in deviant and symbolic forms ofresistance, cultural revolt and individual refusal must be monitoredconstantly and obliges the system to make continuous adaptations.It is an effect, in a logically distinct time, because the adaptationsmade by the system disequilibrate it and create contradictionswhich, in their turn, generate diachronic forms of conduct in the

political system and in the social organization. It is, finally, onceagain a cause, in a third logically distinct time, inasmuch as thethrust of the collective action obliges the system to adapt itsorganization accordingly, to reform the political system, and tomodernize the productive structure. Otherwise, in the extreme case,change causes the system to burst asunder, thereby bringing aboutthe transition to a new structure.

Everything I have said so far shows that the alternative betweenbreakdown and solidarity, between collective action which arisesfrom disintegration and action which is born of solidarity, is, inreality, a false problem. The forms of class behaviour are, in fact,rooted in structural conflict, but they are activated by contradic-tions, which are always ruptures of, or at least states of dise-quilibrium in, the social order. In social movements there alwaysexists a link between contradiction and conflict, since thesemovements are located at the intersection of structure and change.The principal theoretical problem thus remains that ofdistinguishing these two levels of analysis (and the concepts ap-propriate to each of them) and, then, of establishing their interrela-tionship.

6. The new social movements

Returning to the question raised at the beginning, we may now askwhat changes in the system of production allow us to speak of newclass conflicts. In comparison with the industrial phase ofcapitalism, the production characteristic of advanced societies re-quires that control reach beyond the productive structure into theareas of consumption, services, and social relations. Themechanisms of accumulation are no longer fed by the simple ex-ploitation of the labour force, but rather by the manipulation of



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complex organizational systems, by control over information andover the processes and institutions of symbol-formation, and by in-tervention in interpersonal relations. The role of science and of in-formation systems is growing in advanced capitalism, but one sees,at the same time, the development of a capacity for interventionand transformation which extends beyond the natural environmentand exerts an influence on the social systems, on interpersonal rela-tions, and on the very structure of the individual (personality, theunconscious, biological identity).

Faced with these changes in the structure of production, onemust try to determine the significance of the new social movements.More and more, production no longer consists solely in thetransformation of the natural environment into a technical en-vironment. It is also becoming the production of social relationsand social systems; indeed, it is even becoming the production ofthe individuals biological and interpersonal identity. This produc-tion, which continues, however, to be controlled by a dominantclass, changes the form of the expropriation of social resources.The movement for reappropriation which claims control over theresources produced by society is therefore carrying its fight intonew territory. The personal and social identity of individuals is in-creasingly perceived as a product of social action, and therefore asthat which is at stake in a conflict between the exigences of thevarious agencies of social manipulation and the desire of in-dividuals to reappropriate societys resources. Defense of the iden-tity, continuity, and predictability of personal existence is beginn-ing to constitute the substance of the new conflicts. In a structure inwhich ownership of the means of production is becoming more andmore socialized, while at the same time remaining under the controlof particular groups, what individuals are claiming collectively isthe right to realize their own identity: the possibility of disposing oftheir personal creativity, their affective life, and their biologicaland interpersonal existence. The control and manipulation of thecenters of technocratic domination are increasingly penetratingeveryday life, encroaching upon the individuals possibility ofdisposing of his time, his space, and his relationships. Personalidentity - that is to say, the possibility, on the biological,psychological, and interpersonal levels, of being recognized as anindividual - is the property which is now being claimed and defend-ed ; this is the ground in which individual and collective resistance istaking root.

I _ at MARQUETTE UNIV on August 20, 2014ssi.sagepub.comDownloaded from


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The new social movements are struggling, therefore, not only forthe reappropriation of the material structure of production, butalso for collective control over socio-economic development, i.e.,for the reappropriation of time, of space, and of relationships inthe individuals daily existence. The new forms of class dominationare identified less and less with real social groups and are starting toshare the impersonal character of the various institutions. The newconflicts and the new movements are not manifested in the actionof a single class, in the sense of a social group identified by a par-ticular culture and way of life. In mass society, in which culturalmodels and ways of life tend to become homogenous, conflictsmobilize the categories and groups which are most directly affectedby the manipulation of socio-economic development. The absenceof a leading actor, however, does not mean that these conflicts havelost the character of class struggle.A certain number of characteristics shared by the recent forms of

collective action (Touraine, 1974, 1975; Pizzorno, 1975) seem toconfirm this hypothesis, which sees in the appropriation of identitythe key to understanding the new movements. There is, first of all,the end of the separation between public and private spheres. Thoseareas which were formerly zones of private exchanges and rewards(sexual relations, interpersonal relations, biological identity) havebecome stakes in various conflict situations and are now the sceneof collective action. At the same time, the field of the public andpolitical is subjected to the pressure of individual needs anddemands. Birth and death, illness and aging have all become criticalpoints capable of mobilizing collective action. These subjects haveentered the realm of public conflict and have become,simultaneously, objects whose reappropriation is claimed byvarious groups. Sexuality and the body, leisure, consumer goods,ones relationship to nature - these are no longer loci of privaterewards but areas of collective resistance, of demands for expres-sion and pleasure which are raised in opposition to the instrumentalrationality of the apparatuses of order.A second characteristic to be noted is the superposition of de-

viance and social movements. When domination impinges on dailylife, on the rules of existence, and on ways of life, oppositionnecessarily takes the form of marginality and of deviance.Advanc-ed societies are witnessing the proliferation of agencies chargedwith handling social demands and needs which might generateconflict: public intervention tends to absorb strains and reduce con-



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flicts to the status of pathology by subjecting all those who do noconform to the norms to preventive therapies or to rehabilitation.In this situation, social revolt which threatens the mode of produc-tion and the orientation of resources easily tends to merge withmarginality and deviance. This is so because such revolts are oftenthe work of minorities; because they tend to reject the regulatedmediation of the political system and become violent; or, finally,because the power structures control over the dissemination of in-

formation enables it to stigmatize all conflict-based behaviour asdeviant.

Another important characteristic of the new social movements isthat thev are not focused on the political system. Essentially, theyare not oriented toward the conquest of political power or of thestate apparatus, but rather toward the control of a field of

autonomy or of independence vis-A-vis the system. The newmovements have often been reproached for insisting upon the im-mediate satisfaction of their demands and for their lack of an

overall stragety. But these traits manifest, in my opinion, thespecificity of the new forms of collective action. The reappropria-tion of individual and group identity is achieved through the refusalto accept any political mediation. This obviously raises a crucialproblem for practice and for the development of the movements.

Particularism is the specific form of resistance to a power whichit itself generalized. Solidarity as an objective is anothercharacteristic of the new social movements. The struggle centresaround the issue of group identity; there is a return to the criterionof ascriptive membership (sex, race, age, locality) which is the formtaken by revolt against change directed from above. Themovements also have instrumental objectives and seek advantageswithin the political system, but this dimension is secondary in com-parison to the search for solidarity and in comparison to the ex-pressive nature of the relations found in them.We should mention, finally, direct participation and the rejec-

tion of representation. Since what is at stake is the reappropriationof identity, all mediation is rejected as likely to reproduce themechanisms of control and manipulation against which the struggleis directed in the first place. Hence the importance of direct actionand of direct participation, in other words, of the spontaneous,anti-authoritarian, and anti-hierarchical nature of the protestsoriginating in these movements. Hence, also, the risk of discon-



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tinuity and of fragmentation which constantly threatens the newmovements.

These characteristics are found in various forms in many con-

temporary movements. I cannot, within the limits of this essay,undertake an analysis of the specific issues which are essential inthe different movements. I shall restrict myself to indicating twoissues which seem to me to play a fundamental role in several con-temporary movements. The first element is the centrality of thebody, for example, in the womens, youth, and homosexualmovements, as well as in the counter-cultural practices which con-trast the body to what is often a stereotyped political discourse.This phenomenon seems to me to possess a multiple significance. Init we encounter, first of all, the notion of the body as a part ofnature, i.e. the realization that man is a part of nature andtherefore has the possibility of experiencing this body as a basicdimension of existence and not as a fall; and this implies, at thesame time, the possibility of taking possession of the nature whichhe is. Then there is the notion of the body as the seat of desires,i.e.the acceptance of drives and deep-rooted needs as aspects of dailyexistence and not as obscure forces of evil. Finally, there is the no-tion of the body as the nexus of interpersonal relationships, i.e. thediscovery of communication and of affectivity, which sexuality ex-presses and manifests. The body in its different significationsbecomes the cultural locus of resistance and of desire; it stands op-posed to rationalization and it authorizes delirium.

But the body is, at the same time, an object upon which the con-certed integrative and manipulative efforts of the system ofdomination are focused. A medicalized sexuality entrusted to theexperts, a body which has become a scientific object, an erosreified in the rules of fashion and in the exigences of industry: ad-vanced capitalism requires the notion of such a body, a body as ob-ject, deprived of its libidinal and aggressive charge, of its capacityfor eros and delirium. The body becomes a resource for use in theproduction of merchandise and in social reproduction. Its demandsmust be satisfied, provided that they are compatible with the ex-igences of economic and social development and that they do notimpede the advance of controlled rationalization. The body aslibido must be neutralized and deprived of its potential to menacethe system. There is no place for play and for eros, but only for theregulated pleasure of a sexuality which has become a kind of gym-nastic training for orgasm.

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The second element which seems to me to be fundamental in

many movements is the presence of what I shall call a regressiveutopia with a strong religious component. This phenomenon is, onthe one hand, a constant factor in the origin of movements. In theformative phase, the group defines its identity by referring to apast, to a global myth of a renaissance which is often of a religiouskind. But, on the other hand, the phenomenon possesses aspecificity which seems to me to be closely linked with the newsocial movements. The demands they make regarding identity anddaily life are becoming increasingly less political. Moreover, thegrowing secularization of society means that the legitimation of theestablished order is not of a sacred type, but is linked more andmore with instrumental rationalization. In this situation, the appealof religion, freed from the ritual and organizational apparatus ofthe churches, becomes one of the possible components of the newmovements. The religious component, functioning as a global mythcapable of providing a foundation for the construction of an identi-ty, can become the cultural form of resistance to the instrumental

rationality of the apparatus of domination. The desire for total in-tegration, which I call integralism, is the essential characteristic ofregressive utopias, and it can be seen at work in the reduction ofreality to the unity of a global principle, in the abolition of the dif-ferent levels and of the appropriate instruments of analysis, and inthe identification of the entire society with the sacred solidarity ofthe group. There exist several versions of regressive utopia: com-munal integralism, politico-religious integralism, and mystico-ascetic integralism. What is common to all of them is the fact thatthe basic concerns of the movement (which revolve around thereappropriation of identity) are transcribed in the symboliclanguage of a global myth of renaissance. As a result of theregressive and evasive aspects of these concerns, the movements inwhich the religious component predominates are more easilymanipulated by the power structure, and their protest tends todissolve into individual flight and into myth.

7. Towards a sociology of social movements?

The notion of nature has been reintroduced in advanced capitalismas a cultural definition of needs, which are presented as escapingthe grasp of the power structure. Nature becomes a sort of non-



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social raw material, in contrast to a social realm which penetratesall aspects of life in society. But there can be no doubt that we aredealing with a cultural definition of needs, and more specificallywith the form given by post-industrial culture to the new demandscreated by the new structure of production. The body, desire, theunconscious, identity: these are modes of social representation ofthat domain which, in the individual, resists domination and ra-tionalization. Hence, this recovery of nature is, at the same time,the realization that the nature which we are belongs to us, that it isnot external to social action. And this means that it can be

employed in a manner contrary to the one preferred by the existingorder and its apparatus of rationalization. This explains the am-biguity of the notion of nature and of needs which is found in thenew movements: it signifies both the rejection of a social realmmanipulated and controlled by the apparatus of the existing order(the cultural image of the spontaneity and purity of primary needs)and the assertion of the social realm as the locus of action which

consciously produces mans existence and his relations with othermen (demand concerning the right to life, to pleasure, and todesire).

Sociology is marked by this same ambivalence. On the one hand,it creates a conscious awareness of the way a society produces itselfand maintains, against the heritage of metaphysics and of thephilosophies of history, that social action produces social systems.But, on the other hand, when it is not a mere apology for the ex-isting order, it takes the side of movements for change. It translatestheir languages and problems, and it is often engaged in their strug-gles. I do not intend to enter here upon the debate about the role ofsociology. I shall simply point out two important tasks forsociological reflection.A sociology of class relations and of social movements must, in

the first place, seek to develop an understanding of changes in themode of production in advanced capitalist societies with a view tobetter defining the novelty of the issues raised by these movements.But it is even more necessary for it to pursue theoretical research on

classes and the conflicts between them. The problem brought up atthe start of the present essay is, I believe, of fundamental impor-tance. If class relations are original features of society, if there ex-ists no analytic space which precedes them, then the theoreticalpossibility of raising the question of change in these relations iseliminated. And in this case, the question of the possibility of a



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conscious intervention in the mechanisms of class formation and

reproduction (and not of the advent of a mythical classless society)is not one that can be raised within the limits of scientific discourse.I believe, on the contrary, that this question has a scientific statusand that the very fact of bringing it up for discussion ought to havean influence on the institutional organization and the role ofsociology. There exists a task of scientific anticipation that asociology of social movements can not evade. If sociology is not tobe the prophet of defeat or of the institutionalization of the newmovements, it must tackle, in a scientific manner, the problem ofchange in class relations and of control over the mechanisms ofthe formation and reproduction of classes, i.e. of the actors inthis kind of transformation. Between longing for a utopian,conflict-free classless society, pacified and fully responsive to in-dividual and group demands, on the one hand, and simply describ-ing the reproduction of the class system, on the other hand, there isperhaps room for discussing, scientifically, the possibility of asociety which acts on its class relations in such a way as to reducetheir ascendancy and control their reproduction.The second question concerns the effects of the new social

movements on the methods and practice of sociology. The newdemands pertain more and more to the individual - to his inner-most being, his needs, his unconscious. Sociology ought to in-tegrate in its analysis (and adapt its methods to) problems whichhave traditionally been thought to lie in the domain of psychologyand psychoanalysis. The problems of the individual and of the un-conscious have become collective problems because they are linkedeither with the manipulation of power or with the cultural formthat the new movements are assuming. Sociology should take thesenew dimensions of analysis into account and develop appropriatemethods for handling them, within the framework of its ownlanguage and categories. The situation is admittedly a difficult one,because the dominant class is already carrying out a converseideological manoeuver. There is an increasing trend toward non-differentiation and the reduction of problems to the level of the in-dividual. In other words, the dominant class is attempting topsychologize and medicalize the social realm in order to drain allpotential for conflict and collective action stemming from pro-blems of identity. It is necessary, therefore, to counteract thistendency by sociologizing the individual, by giving to the pro-blems of daily life, of relations, and of the unconscious the dimen-



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sion which in fact belongs to them in a programmed society. Inother words, it is necessary to show that these problems are whatare really at the heart of the new class conflicts.

This task, however, demands a considerable effort on thetheoretical plane, as well as the elaboration of methods of analysisand of ways of acting directly in the social realm. It is necessarycarefully to scrutinize the various aspects of the movements so as todistinguish between what pertain to the new class conflicts andwhat derives from organizational disputes and political struggles. Itis equally necessary, though, to scrutinize the heritage of thecategories and methods of a number of different disciplines(sociology, anthropology, psychology, and psychoanalysis) inorder to elaborate suitable ways for the sociologist to intervene inthe ambiguous territory of the new social movements.

Alberto Melucci (born 1943) is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at theUniversity of Milan. He is engaged in research on new social movements and col-lective violence in Italy. Recent publications: "Dieci ipotesi per Ianalisi delnuovi movimenti" ("Ten hypotheses for the analysis of new socialmovements"), Quaderni Pracentini 65-66 (1978); "Appunti su movimenti, ter-rorisrimo, societa italiana" ("Notes on movements, terrorism, italian society"), IlMulino 256 (1978). Authors address: Institute of Sociology, Faculty of PoliticalSciences, University of Milan, Via Conservatorio 7, Milan, Italy.

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Aalberoni, F.1977 Movimento e istituzione. Bologna, 11 Mulino.

Davies, J. C. 1962 "Toward a theory of revolution", American Sociological Review 27.

Feierabend, 1. K.; Feierabend, R. L.; Nesvold, B. A. 1973 "The comparative study of revolution and violence", Comparative

Politics (April).

Graham, H. D.; Gurr, T. R. (eds)1969 Violence in America. New York, Bantam Books.

Gurr, T. R.1970 Why men rebel. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.



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Melucci, A.1976 Movinienti di rivolta. Milan, Etas Libri.1977 Sistema politico, partiti e tnovinienti sociali. Milan, Feltrinelli.

Oberschall, A.1973 Social conflict and social movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-

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Olson, M.1968 The logic of collective action. New York, Schocken Books.

Pizzorno, A.1975 Marche, dmocratie, action collective. Paris, Institut dEtudes Politiques.

(Unplublished paper.)

Smelser, N. J.1963 Theory of collective behavior. New York, MacMillan.1968 Essays in sociological explanation. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall.

Tilly, C.1970 "The changing place of collective violence", in: M. Richter (ed.). Essays

in theory and history. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.1975 The rebellious century 1830-1930. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University

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Touraine, A.1973 Production de la socrete. Paris, Seuil.1974 Pour la socrologre. Paris, Seuil.1975 "Les nouveaux conflits sociaux", Sociologie du Travail 1.

me lucci 1980

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