mecca chiesa

5/23/2018 Mecca Chiesa

1/128


2/128

RDICAL BEHAVIORISM: THEPHILOSOPHY AND

THE SCIENCE

MECCA CHES

uthors ooperative Inc., Publishers

BOSTON


3/128

DICAL BEHAVIORISMTHE PHI LOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCECopyright 1994 by Mecca Chiesa

All rights resered No portion of this book may bereproduced, by any process or technique, withoutthe express written consent of the publisher, exceptin the case of brief quotations embodied in criticalarticles or reviews

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 9373792

ISBN: 0962331 14-7

Authors Cooperative, Inc, PublishersP. O. Box 53Boston,M 02199

Printed in the United States of America

i"

To my parents

Catherine and Mario Chiesa


4/128

Preface

Psychoogy students consisteny note the ack of unity in the discipline

Psychology seems a moey and chaotic colection of ideas, practices, andcompeting theoretica and expanatory systems Putting together apicture of psychoogy and evauating approaches and systems is adaunting task. A singe theme, however, runs through psychology andthrough a psychologist's trainingan emphasis on experimenta meth-ods as a means of tackling questions and making assertions about peopeand their behavior Psychoogists claim that their assertions are scienti-caly derived and thus reiabe.

Like other psychoogy students, I was traieda an undergraduate inthe concepts and methods of hypothesis testing and statistical anaysis of

data And, ike other psychology students, I was invoved as a subject insome of the experiments that formed a part of our training in researchmethods. S omeing about those methods and the subsequent assertionswe were asked to make troubled me, athough at the time I could notarticuate my discomfort When we were instructed, on the basis of asignicance test, to assert, Event x aects behavior in this way," Iprotested that measures from some of the subjects in the group (oenincuding my own) contradicted this assertion. How coud I caim tohave demonstrated a scientic fact when I could see i n my own data thatit did not hod, that it simpy did not appy to some of the individuas

involved in the experiment? Since no one ese seemed troubled, Iassumed I had misunderstood some crucia aspect of methods trainingand tried hard to ignore my reserations about the scientic status ofpsychoogical assertions.

Turning to evaluations and critiques of research methods in psycho-ogy did not hep a great deal They seemed more concerned withundermining the scientic approach, with arguing, for example, thatscience is not an appropriate method for understanding human conductMany attempted to deveop alternatives to the scientic approach, but

Preface

these aternatives seemed only to add to the consing array of discoursesand to mutiply expanatory systems sti rther

The distinctive philosophy of radical behaviorism oered a scienticalternative to the methods that dominate psychoogica texts and jour-nals Its critique of concepts and methods and its examination of

psychology's practices heped give voice to my discomfort by directingme to consider some of the most ndamental of scientic issues Ratherthan worrying about whether there were enough subjects in a group orif they had been randomy assigned, it directed me to phiosophica issuesunderying the statistical treatment of human conduct and the scienticlogic and utiity of using arge numbers and group designs It ed me toquestion the forma restriction of hypothesis testing as a means ofdiscovering reguarities It encouraged me to ook at the kinds oftheoretica constructs that psychoogists use to explain behavior, to askquestions about the scientic status of those constructs, and thus to

examine concepts such as causation and explanation in science Radicabehaviorism's coherence as a phiosophica and scientic system hepedcear up many of my consions reating to scientic practices inpsychology

This book is my attempt to bring togethr and to articulate radicabehaviorisms position on issues reating to how we ask questions aboutbehavior and how it can be expained within a scientic frameworkSome may disagree with my interpretation, others may nd aspects of ithep to their own understanding Above a, I hope that this book wido for other students and practitioners of psychoogy what writing it hasdone for me: provide an integrative theme for evauating the mutipicityof theoretical approaches in psychoogy todayA the practice of scienceestablishes order out of chaos in the word, the theme of science providesa means for estabishing order out of chaos in psychoogy

It is my pleasure to acknowedge impotant contributions to theproduction of this book Derek Blackman of the University of Waes,Cardi, introduced me to radical behaviorism, guided and encouragedme through my doctora studies, and has continued since then to givegenerousy of his time by reading and commenting on pats of the

v


5/128

Preface

manuscrp Whou hs conssen suppor and enhusasm, sdoub ha hs proec would have been compleed, and I am sncereyrael o hm Andrew Belsey nroduced me o he fascnaons of hephosophy of scence and has heped o clar many ofhe phosophcalssues dscussed n hs book Marc Richelle of he Unversy of Lee,

Beum, oered encouran and hep commens on he docorahess from whch hs book s derved The nuence ofB F Sknnersschoarshp w be evden hrouhou In addon, he schoary worksof Ph Hnene, Vcki Lee, Jack Marr, Murray Sdman, and LaurenceSmh conrbued subsanaly o my apprecaon ofphlosophca andscenc ssues n radcal behavorsm and psycholoy as a whoe I amaddonay rael o Murray Sdman for hs enhusasm for hsprojec and for hs paen and carel edn My coleaue, SandyHobbs of he Unversy of Pasley, and Phl Elo ad an commeneon several chapers, and I beeve hose chapers are now cearer as a

resu Harry Chesa ave me o proofread and Mke Harres, ye aan,urned hdeousy clumsy senences no reconzable Enlsh

A shorer work exracn hemes from e book can be found n hespecal edon ofheAmerican Psychologis o B F Sknners feand work (November, 1 992)

On Refeences

Many ofB F Sknners papers are now pubshed n coleced works For

example, Cumulaive Record: A Secion of Papers (Sknner, 1972)conans papers dan back o 1 93 1 S o ha he reader s abe o paceSknners work n a hsorca as wel as phlosophcal conex, he papersreferred o n Cumulaive Record are also ven her ornal dae andher orna reference, alhouh quoaons and pae numbers are akenfrom Cumuive Record One exampe s Sknner (1950/1972) whchrefers o Are Theories of Leaing Necessa?Quoaons from hs paperare aken from Cumuive Recordand pae numbers refer o ha workBu he reader wl aso noe ha he paper was ornaly pubshed n

v

Preface

1950 and wll be abe o place he arumens heren n her hsorcalconex, n reaon o psycholocal debaes of ha me

Oher works, such as Erns Machs The Science ofMechanicsand DavdHumes Enquiries, carry he orna dae of pubcaon for he samereason In cases where a paper or oher work s separaed from s ornal

pubcaon dae by only a few years, has been deemed unnecessary ove he orna publcaon dae


6/128

Contents

Preface ............................................................................ vi

Chapter 1 : Introduction . 1Psychoogy and Science . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .... . . .... ...... 3Radical Behaviorism A Distinct Phiosophy f Science . . . . . . . . . . 6Recurring Errors: Behaviorism, Mechanism, Dualism .. . . . . . . ... 1 1

Chapter 2: Ordinary Language and Science .. ......... 23Coneptua Systems and Ordinary Language . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Mind in nage . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Leaing in nguage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30Language in nguage .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Grammar and the Syntx of Action . . .. . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . 33Grammatical categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Agents r actions ... .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Circumventing nguage aps ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Directional Tak

. . .

.

.

. . . . .

. . .

..

.

.

. .

. . . .

. . .

. . .

.

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

.

.. 40

Chapter 3: Science: Aims and Methods ....................... 45Methods in Contemporary Psychoogy ... .... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 46Hypotheses in Science . . . . . . . . . . .. ... . .... . . . .. . . . . ... . . 49Induction 53

eneralizingom specc instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Assuming continued unrmi . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54Induction to theories .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

x

Contents

Shiing Views of the Aims of Science . . ... . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 58The rst phase: etherial theories" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59The secondphase: a new epistemic criterion .. . . . . . . . . . . 62

Shared Archetypes in Contemporary Psychology . . . . 64The Context of Scientic Behavior .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Chapter 4: Aims, Methods, and the Individual ............. 71From Individual to Average . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72Psychoogy's Methodological Keystone" . .. . . . . . . . . . .. 76

Rigor and convention ... .. .. .. . . , ...................................... 77Fws in the body of knowledge: Type I error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79The staus of chance . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Ordery Reations and Experimental Contro . .. . . . . 82Working with individua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Generation and the individual ................................. 8

Scientic Pans . . .. . ... . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .. . 86Tracking wn variabili .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87Basic science problems, engineering problems . . . . .. .. .. .. .. 88

Chapter 5: Concepts of Causation ............................ 95The Behaving Person . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Determinism and Human Behavior . . . . .. . . . . . . . 100

The argumentom individuali .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . 102The argumentom complexi .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

The argumentom purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Causation in Science 105The chain metaphor .. .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Caal accounts and theoreical webs .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . .. 108Linksin-the-chain and mechanistic thinking . .. .. . .. . .. . 110

Causation in Radica Behaviorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1EstMach' nconal reons" ...... .......... ........ 112Multip causaon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114Selecton as a causal mode.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Beyond Lnks in the Causa Chain ... .. . . ... . . . 1 22


7/128

Contents Contents

Chapter : Interpretive Techniques andEplanatory Theories 125

Description and Functional Relations: Mach ............ ............ 26

Chapter Concluding Remarks 01Facing a Globa Crisis ............................................................ 204Science and Human Behavior ................................................ 207

Explanation and Theory: Mach ............................................. 28Description and Functional Relations: Skinner ...................... 133Eplanation and Theory: Skinner .......................................... 134 References

209Constructing a Theory ........................................................... 36 Index 223

Chapter Mechanistic Thinking in Psychology 14The Physiology of Behavior ................................................... 47The Psychodynamic Mode .................................................. 50Modelling Memory ................................................................ 153Motivation and Behavior ....................................................... 59

Physiological motivation Inrinsic motivation The nguage of movation Why does the rat press the ver? Causes of behavior

19th Century Physics and 20th Century Psychology .............. 172

apter Behaorism and Radical Behaviorism 1Introducing Behaviorism ....................................................... 174Ivan P. Pavlov ....................................................................... 176

Behavior and the nervous system 0

Stimulusresponse psycholo

John B. Watson ..................................................................... 184Dispensing with dualism Seknowledge and the verbal communi

dward C. Tolman ................................................................ 189SOR psycholo 0Coitive psycholo past andpresent Coitive psycholo and its consequences

Clark L Hull ......................................................................... 195Behaviorism as a historica marker ......................................... 98

XI x


8/128

Chapter 1

Introduction

Pofound changes have taen lace thoughout the hlosohy ofscence snce the tun of the centuy, when hyscs was thown ntotumol by evdence that the ncles ofN ewtonan scence evouslythought to be unvesal tuths could not be aled to cetan tyes ofhyscal henomena he hlosohes of the Venna Ccle (Logcal

Postvsts) attemted a ogam of denng the lmts of scentcexlanaton and elmnatng metahyscs fom such exlanatons Moelately, theosts le Kuhn (962) and Laatos (see Laatos and Musgave,970) have swet away oula notons of absolutes and ultmate tuthsn scence by ontng out that even n the ocess of valdatng scentcnowledge thee s a measue of abtay decson mang Snce Kuhnand Laatos, t s no longe feasble to ague that he wold s just sobecause scence clams t to be, and the ossblty of ue obsevaton(obsevaton ndeendent of theoy, unnfomed by bacgoundassumtons) has smlaly doed out ofthe mansteam of accetableonon (fo examle, see Hanson, 958)

he deloment of the socal scences has heled geneate newnsghts and ctques n the hlosohy of scence Indeed, homasKuhn acnowledged that hs concet of the aadgm aose atly out ofuzzlement ove the numbe and extent of the ovet dsageementsbetween socal scentsts about the natue of legtmate scentc oblems and methods (Kuhn, 962, v) when measued aganst theelatve coheson ofthe hlosohcal and methodologcal undennngs onatual scence At the end of the 20th centuy, hlosohes andscentsts contnue to debate the mlcatons of new vews of scence,and of new vews of natue gven by contemoay scence he mact

of such debates s neatly catued n the wods of Steve Woolga when

1


9/128


10/128

Chapte 1

processes, their potential as humans,the relation ofbiology to culture,

and so onThere is no generally agreed denition of the broad term, Psychology.

The discipline is best thought of s comprising a set of subdsciplines,each with its own view of the person, its own questions, and its own

methods for tackling those questions. here the discipline is given form,in introductory texts, it is usually organized around six major themesBiological, Ethological, Behavioral, Cognitive, Psychodynamic, andPhenomenological. Further demarcation adds social psychology,neuropsychology, physiological psychology, developmental psychology, articial intelligence, learning and memory, motivation and emo-tion, abnormal psychology, and others.

In the same way that the broad discipline has no generally agreeddenition, each subdiscipline also may not agree on te precise nature ofits subject matter or on a set of appropriate methods. There may even be

overlap between two areas that seem separate For example, a socilpsychologist may object to laboratory investigations on the gounds tatthe laboratory is itself a socil setting and that eld observation is the onlylogical and acceptable way of doing social psychology. Methodologically, this type of psychology overlaps with ethology, which is generallytaken to be the study of other species in their own environments.Similarly, developmental psychology contains at least to distincttrends, cognition and social learning. Recently, social/cognitive developmental psychology hs set about the tsk of uniing these two trends.The same overlapping and divergence can be found among many othersubdisciplines in contemporary psychology. The broad discipline lacksa unied framework or set of principles that dene the eld and guideresearch Beyond their everyday research, psychologists still debate thendamentals and contest the overall framework Vici Lee noted thatthe lack of unity in psychology is more ndamental than a simpleincompatibility between interpretations of particular experiments, Ithas to do with what counts a s the subject matter ofpsychology, with whatquestions we should ask about this subject matter, with how we shouldgo about nding answers to these questions, with the status of existingpsychological nowledge, and with whether psychology can be a scence

4

Introduction

Psychologists do not gree upon these basic matters" (Lee, 1988, pp. 23)Each subdiscipline garners its data using various techniques and measures those data against its own general framework or theory, with littlegeneralization of principles from one theoretical approach to another.

Perhaps the only uniing principle is a commitment to the practicesof science (in the broadest sense of that word). Psychologists look toscience for the means of settling philosophical questions and it is safe tosay, therefore, that they pursue an empirical epistemology The physicalsciences have demonstrated their power to understand, explain, predict,and manipulate the world around us, and the hope is that their methodswill prove equally powerl when applied to questions of humanpsychology. Bertrand Russell, among others, expressed this faith in thesuperior explanatory power ofscience over other methods of nowledgegathering: I have no doubt that, insofar as philosophical knowledge is

possible, it is by these methods (the methods of science) that it must besought. I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancientproblems are completely soluble" (Russell, 1946, p 788)

Some, however, feel that psychology has gone too far in its commitment to science and that this commitment has been allowed to overshadowthe real nature of its subject matter. Sigmund Koch, for example,argued, Ever since its stipulation into existence as an independentscience, psychology has been far more concerned with being a sciencethan with courageous and selfdetermining confrontation of its historically signicant subject matter. Its history has been largely a matter of

emulating the methods, forms, symbols of the established sciences,especially physics" (Koch, 1961, p 629). There are others who, whileretaining their commitment to a scientic approach, recognize themodern philosophy ofscience position that science is not the straightforward, logic pursuit it was once thought to be B F Skinner, forexample, wrote, If we are interested in perpetuating the practicesresponsible for the present corpus ofscientic knowledge, we must keepin mind that some ve important parts of the scientic process do notnow lend themselves to mathematical, logical, or any other formaltreatment We do not know enough about human behavior to know how

the scientist does what he does" (Skinner, 1959, pp. 360361). Still

5


11/128

Chapte 1

others caution that psychology must keep abreast of new developmentsin the physica l sciences in order not to model itself aer a form ofsciencethat no longer exists. In his 1955 address to the American PchologicalAssociation the physicist Robert Oppenheimer warned The worst ofall possible misunderstandings would be that psychology be inuencedto model itselfaer a physics which is not there any more which has beenquite outdated" (Oppenheimer 1956, p 134)

Given psychology's commitment to science (again in the broadestsense of that word) as a means of knowledge gathering the breadth ofdebates and disputes that the commitment engenders and the moderndebate in the philosophy of science generated by the shi from certaintyto uncertainty it is no exaggeration to claim that philosophy of scienceissues are ndamental concerns for contemporay psycholog. The arefundamental concerns also for a society relying on psychological asser-

tions. Psychologists' expertise is drawn upon in a broad range of settings:in education social work industrial selection practices and clinicalsituations where behavior has somehow gone wrong" bringing distressto individuals their families and friends and to legal and medicalinstitutions. As a scientic discipline psychology must be concernedwith current issues in the philosophy of science while continuing itsinternal debates over the nature of its subject matter and appropriatemethods of investigation A society that accords status and value toscientic assertions tat relies on claims made by psychologists ineducational social work clinical settings and so on must also be

concerned with the nature of science as it is practiced by psychologistsand thus with the nature of psychology's scientic claims.

Radical Behaviorism: A Distinct Philosophy of Science

It has already been argued that psychology is best thought of as a set ofsubdisciplines each of which garners data by various means and measures those data against its own general framework or theory. It has alsobeen noted that there is little or no generalization of principles across

theoretical approaches and that en wthin a subdiscipline there a be

6

Introduction

disagreement over the nature of the subject matter and the appropriateness of techniques. As such the philosophy of science of the broaddiscipline and even that of many of the subdisciplines is dicult tocharacterize Although a commitment to scientic method unites thesubdisciplines this does not mean that the commitment is to the same

kind of sciencePerhaps the most coherent philosophy of science in psychology today

is radical behaviorism the philosophy that informs behavior analysis (ornctional analysis as it is also known) Norman Malcolm for examplecorrectly described behaviorism as essentially a philosophicaldoctrine"(Malcolm 1964, p 144), and Hillix and Marx declared it to be theclosest thing to a school or paradigm among all modern positions"(Hillix &Marx 1974, p. 264) The denition given by Skinner himselfdescribes behaviorism not only as a philosophical position but specically as a philosophy of science: Behaviorism is not the scientic studyof behavior but a philosophy of sience concerned with the subject matterand methods of psychology" (Skinner 1969, p 221, emphasis added).

This philosophy of science (and the behavior analysis it informs) isdistinct within psychology in two major respects. First it is characterizedby a degree of internal coherence unmatched by other subdisciplines Itssubject matter is carefully dened and generally agreed upon by research-ers within the eld Its methods of data collection analysis andinterpretation are also agreed upon to an extent not found in other areasand it is this internal agreement among workers in the eld which

prompts Hillix and Marx to describe it as coming close to a school" orparadigm." Second it is distinct from the contemporary mainstream ofexperimental psychology in that its historical inuences have led to thedevelopment of a descriptive obserational and integrative system ofinductively derived principles in contrast to the theorydrivenhypotheticodeductively derived statistical principles of most branchesof experimental psychology. adical behaviorism and behavior anlysisgenerate a coherent and distinctive explanatory system within the broaddiscipline of psycholog

B F Sknner consistently supported the view that a scientic under

standing of human aairs would go a long way toward unravelling and

7


12/128


13/128

Cater

devoted to Sinners phiosophy of science and remains specic to theorigina research uestiona reassessment of the aiance beteenbehaviorism and ogica positivism

though not venturing far beyond the bounds set by the originaresearch uestion, Smith presents a we documented case against iningbehaviorism too cosey with ogica positivism His wor shoud naydispense with this oen cited and erroneous reference But Smithhimsef maes a in which, though it is common throughout suchiterature, may sere to perpetuate yet another errorthe notion that aphiosophica continuity is to be found among various strands ofbehaviorism though he caries some of the distinctions betweendierent behavioral traditions in his chapter on Snners psychoogy ofscience, this approach is discussed in a wor tracing strands of behaviorism through Toman and Hu before reaching the Sinnerian stancey reader woud be forgiven for assuming some ind of continuity inthese appoaches, but under cose examination the Sinnerian positionwi show ndamental divergences from earier behavora positionsTese diergences resut in a whoy distinct view of the subject matterand ead to dierent sets ofscientic uestions That this position comesunder the behaviorist heading at a wi eventuay be shown to be anaccident of histoy

A broader treatment ofthe reation between the Sinnerian system andother appoaches in contemporary psychoogy is given by Lee (988)Lee argues that, contray to popuar interpretation, contemporary

psychoogy is characterized by an underying inputoutput formuationofbehavior and that (again, contray to popuar interpretation) Sinner'sradica behaviorism hods the promise ofmoving psychoogy beyond thismechanistic framewor Lees wor shoud so hep dispense witherroneous interpretations of radica behaviorism, but there remains aneed to distinguish this position from other behaviora trends and toarticuate its phiosophy of science in a singe wor so that its distinctiveness from other behaviora traditions, as we as from other areas ofcontemporary psychoogy, may be understood Furthermore, cariingSnners phiosophy of science wi hep pace radica behaviorism in its

proper position in reation to the newwordview debate, for dispensing

10

Introduction

with erroneous interpretations (as Smith and Lee have done) wi aowparticipantsin the debate a better understanding ofradica behaviorismsreation to both the od and the new word view given by science inay,it wi aow other readers to assess the scientic caims made by behavioranaysts in their aboratory procedures and in the appication of their

science in the wide range of settings they share with other psychoogists

Recing Eos: Behavioism, Mechanism, Dalis

The rst and most ubiuitous error to be taced paces radica behaviorism in the tradition of SR or inpuoutput psychoogy This errorassumes that the term Behaviorism refers to a unied approach whosevarious adherents subscribe to the same denition of the subject matterof psychoogy, to the same phiosophy of science, to the same view ofthe

behaving person, and to the same form of data interpretation Sinnerand radica behaviorism are freuenty umped together under the sameheading as Pavov, Watson, Toman, Hu, Thorndie, Spence, Guthrie,and others, and subjected to the same critical anaysis as these othergures as if they shared a common phiosohica and theoreticaheritage

It has aready been noted that Smiths (986) incusion of Sinersphiosophica position in a wor tracing strands of behaviorism throughToman and Hu may hep to perpetuate the view that the Sinneriansystem is continuous with these other behaviora trends (although Smithhimsefrecognizes the distinctions) Macenzie (1977), in Behaviorismand the Limits of Scientc Metho discusses the Skinnerian system aongwith other behaviora accounts and appies broady the same critiue toradica behaviorism as to other inds of behaviorism Mahoney ( 989)aso aied radica behaviorism to other behaviora traditions by describing Sinner as having had a "preoccuation with inputoutput nctions (Mahoney, 989 p 373) In the same paper, Mahoney maesthe connection more subty by impying that a critiue of Pavovianconditioning aso functions as a critiue of Sinnerian psychoogy Henotes, "Respected scientists have] chaenged or resed radcal behaorist

1 1


14/128

Chat

ccunts fening (Mhney 989, p 37) nd cites seve ppess exmples By citing the ppe Pavlovian condioning: I no whayouhink i is (Resc 988) he impies tht chenge t vvinccunts f lening must s be chenge t Skinnen ccuntsEven the mst supeci eding f Skinne's wk ilusttes tht his

system dies in imptnt scientic nd philsphic wys fmvv's but Mhney's ssetin nd subsequent efeence impy theppsite

The secnd e this bk wil epi is the chge tht dicbehviism pvides mechnistic ccunt f humn behvi ndbelngs t the d wd view fNewtnin science This chge cmesfm within the psychlgicl litetue nd fm pticipnts in thedebte cncening the implictins f the new wd view given bymden physics

Skinnein philsphy hs been linked t the tditin fNewtnin

science in seve plces nd it i s cimed tht dicl behviism belngst wd view nd scientic pctice tht is nw utdted Mne(989), f exmpe sttes "The Newtnin ("bilid bl) fm fdeteminism s stidenty emulted by thdx behviists ws bndned by mst physicl scientists in the decdes flwing the 927Cpenhgen Intepettin f Quntum Mechnics (Mhney 989,p 373) Mhney st gues tht dic behviism is cmmitted tNewtnin custin which lws him t sset tht since this view fcustin is nchnistic dic behviism hs "isted itsef fmnd cme] t lg behind chnging pespectives n the ntue ndpctice f ptim scientic inquiy (Mhney 989, p 373) If theSkinnein system is indeed cmmitted t custin in the Newtninsense then Mhney's ssetin my wel be justied Ciing thefm f custin dvcted by dic behviism wil hweve shwtht Mhney's intepettin fits cus mde (Newtnin custin)is inccute nd his subsequent ssetin tht dic behviism "lgsbehind chnging pespectives is theefe ls inccute

Mced (970) s links Skinne's dicl behviism t theNewtnin scientic tditin Mced's gument pceeds in theflwing wy:

Introduction

Newtnin science ws the inspitin f gup fphilsphes "wh wee wiing t py with the ide thtthe elm f ntul w might encmpss the phenmen f humn mentity;

Jhn Lcke becme the spkespesn f the

"Newtnin cnceptin fmn when he gued tht itws pssibe t hve science f mind ngus t thescience f physicl ntue "This invved the ssumptin f menalelements ngus t physic pticlesnd the ssumptin tht t expin nything cmpex ist bek it dwn int its eements

Lcke's successs ttempted t demnstte "hw lthe cmpexities f humn expeience nd behvi cnbe educed t cbintins f ment behvieements (Nte tht withut wning the tems f thisdiscussin e expnded fm simpy "humn mentlity nd "ment eements t "l the cmpexities fhumn expeience nd behvi);

The "Newtnin cnceptin fmind ws elbtedin Bitin by the Bitish Asscitinists i Gemny byWundt Helmhltz nd thes in Russi by thevvins nd in the United Sttes by Jhn B Wtsn"nd his fiends (970, pp 209, 20)

In tcing the inuence f Newtnin science this wy nd byexpnding his temingy t incude nt ny mentl but s expei-enti nd behvi elements Mced mnges t ink Skinne t thecncept f Newtnin science cncuding tht "The mst bilintcntempyepesenttive fthe Newtnin dctine f mn is in mypinin B F Skinne (Mced 970, p 20) He impies ikeMhney tht the Skinnein phisphy f science is utmded ineltint cntempy physics: "It is inteesting t nte tht ng ethe physic sciences pdded by Einstein nd thes hve given up theeementistic exntin fphysic ntue we sti hve psychgists


15/128

hat

who insis ha a psychological expanaion mus involve he reduciono he complex o he simpe Macleod 970, p 20) Precsely whaMacleod means by eemenarisic expanaion is no cear bu presum-aby i reers o his previous asserion ha a science o ind concernedwih menal elemens anaogous o physica paricles was a goa for

Locke and his successors I his is he case Maceod is caiming habehavior anayic accouns are analogous o accouns of physica phenomena couched in erms of ineracing physica parices Again hiscaim wi be shown o be erroneous

Boh Macleod and Mahoney charge radical behaviorism wih aggingbehind" conemporary views o science and ofcingingo anachronismsThis argumen concerning new and od word views has been moshoroughy aricuaed by Merchan (1982) and Capra (1983), bohowhom aso reae radical behaviorismo he now oumoded Newonianmechanisic) world view

They argue ha Newonian science drew primariy on he machinemeaphor o naural phenomena a model ha oershadowed an olderorganic view o naure and derived is power from he success ofseveneenh cenury indusriaizaion Merchan describes machines assrucura modes or wesern onoogy and episemoogy Merchan982) and eaboraes hus:

The imagery iconography and ierary meaphor associaed wih machines exended he experiences o every-day ie o he realm ofhe imaginaion where machinesbecame symbos for he ordering o life isef Ou osuch symboic universes evove concepua universes asnew deniions ofreaiy repace he od he machineand cock increased heir symboic power as roo mea-phors in response o socieys changing needs wansand purposes he symboic orce of he organism decined in pausibiiy and he organic concepual framework underen a ndamena ransformaion Theimages and symbos associaed wih he machines o

Introduction

everyday ife helped o mediae he ransiion beeenframeworks p 227)

Capra also argues ha an oder organic view ofnaure gave way underhe inuence o he machine meaphor culminaing in a word view he

refers o as The Newonian WorldMachine Capra 983, p 37)The noion of an organic living and spiriua universe was repaced byha of he world as a machine and he wordmachine became hedominan meaphor of he modern era This developmen was broughabou by revoluionary changes in physics and asronomy culminaingin he achievemens ofCopernicus Gaieo and Newon Capra 983,p 38) Newonian science i is argued gave us a view of naure as a greamachine operaing in much he same way as he emerging indusriamachines o ha age Modern physics however reassers he organicmeaphor a meaphor ha speaks of naure as an inerrelaed wholeFurhermore modern physics chaenges he noion of he scienis asobjecive observer since he scienis oo is invoved in he inerreaions o he subjec maer The mechanisic world view ha hasdominaed he physica sciences and he social sciences which i isargued ake heir cue rom physical science) has passed is zenih and isgiving way under he pressure of modern scienic daa o an organicworld view

Merchan and Capra boh relae Skinnerian phiosophy o he od anddying mechanisic word view Merchan argues Aemps o reducehuman behavior o saisica probabiliies and o condiion i by suchpsychological echniques as hose developed by B F Skinner aremanifesaions of he pervasiveness of he mechanisic mode o houghdeveloped by he seveneenhcenury scieniss Merchan 982, p292) And o Skinner s approach Capra saes This hen is Newonianpsychoogy par excelence a psychoogy wihou consciousness hareduces a behavior o mechanisic sequences of condiioned resposesand assers ha he ony scienic undersanding o human naure is oneha remains wihin he ramework o cassica physics andbiology behavioriss sill adhere o he mechanisic paradigm and

5


16/128

Chater

oen defend t s the ony scentc pproch to psychoogy thus clerylmtng scence to the csscl Newtonn frmework (Cpr1983, p 181)

Mceod Merchnt nd Cpr cl for the dopton o new orgncconcepton ofnture to repce the Newtonn mechnstc concepton

Ech nterprets rdc behvorsm s n exmple of n pproch npsychoogy underpnned by te Newtonn world vew In clng for new concepton new underlyng metphor the oder mode s cted s root cuse of mny current buses of peope nd of nture. The oldmetphor must go t s rgued nd wth t must go the scences whchdopt tht metphor ncludng rdcl behvorsm

Agn, t wll be demonstrted here tht nterprettons ofrdclbehvorsm whchly tht phosophyto Newtonn scence nd tomechnstc ccount of behvor remsplced.Tey ttrbute hstorcnuence to the wrong scentc trdton nd togeter mss the

dstncton between Newtonn custon nd the cusl mode tht s thebss of rdc behvorsm. Thserror of nterpretton dopts thepevous error tht Behvorsm refers to uned pproch wthnpsychoogy ndssumes thtthe mechnstc ccounts gven by otherstrnds of behvorsm so chrcterze rdc behvorst ccountsBlrd bl custon s very much prt ofmodern psychology but notof behvor nyss

The thrd mor error tht w be repred ttrbutes hstorcnuence to Descrtes nd mpes tht rdcl behvorsm cceptsCrtesn mnd/body duty but gnores the mnd or conscousnessspect of tht duty Ths s nked to the rst nd second errorsmentoned nd rees on tem beng true If rdc behvorsm sphosophcly comptble wth other strnds of behvorsm then t sdustc snce other behvor trdtons ccept mnd/body seprtons n ntl ssumpton Furthermore f rdc behvorsm belongs to mechnstc word vew nd oers mechnstc ccount of humnbehvor then t s Crtesn n the sense tht Descrtes s gven s oneof the mor nuences on mechnstc thnkng

Merchnt nd Cpr cte both Descrtes nd Newton s the prmrymovers of mechnstc thnkng n scence nd n the rger world vew

16

Introduction

gven by the old scence whe Mhoney rgues tht Descrtes "hods revered plce n the hstory of behvorsm (Mhoney 1989, p 1373)Accordng to Mhoney t ws Descrtes who formlzed the mnd/bodydulsm of Greek phlosophy nd t ws hs "mechnstc theory ofbodly cton (Mhoney 1989, p 1373) nd hs ntcpton of the

reex rc tht "won hm respect mong 20th century behvorsts(Mhoney 1989, p 1373) It s n ths context tht Mhoney refers toSkinner s beng preoccuped wth "nputoutput nctons (Mhoney1989, p 1373)

hen he sserts tht Descrtes "hods revered pce n the hstory ofbehvorsm Mhoney refers to Rchlns ( 1970) Inoducion o Mode Behaviorism s source. On exmnng ths source t turns out thtchln refers to Descrtes nd to hs mechncl theory s hstorcnuence on the development of psychoogy as a who He rgues thtDescrtes hmsef ws s much nuenced by the domnnt theologcnterprettons n hs tme s modern psychology s nuenced bydulstc thnkng Descrtes undertook the study ofbehvor wthn thetheologcl terms nd ssumptons of hs own tme dvdng behvornto voluntry nd nvountry relms nd thus resovng the probem offree wll. Descrtes' dstncton survves n much of contemporrythnkng bout humn behvor nd t s ths pont Rchn emphszesn hs outne of the Crtesn nuence on psychology when he notes"The dulsm of Descrtes' psychology s the feture tht s essent toour understndng of the hstory of psychoogy (Rchn 1970, p 7)Rchn does not cte Descrtes s n nuence on the deveopment ofbehvorsm speccy but on the deveopment of psychoogy s whole Descrtes' mnd/body dusm contnues to nform much ofcontemporry psychoogy but not Sknnern psychoogy

Other errors re to be clred n ths book Sknner's poston onobectvty for exmple on the reton between observer nd obseredwl become cler The nterreton between scentst nd subject mtternd controlng vrbes of the behvor ofscentsts wl be shown to ben mportnt feture of the thnkng of rdc behvorsts who do notseprte obserer/observed or knower/known n the trdton wyScentc behvor n the rdc behvorst formuton s s much

1


17/128


18/128

Chapter 1

description is discussed Then, the chapter moves on to consider how theconcept ofcausation in science has moved away from popular notions ofcause as force, and ausa reations as sequential chains, o nctionalreations and causal webs or networks The substitution of function forcause is elaborated here Mechanistic accounts of behavior are reated in

this chapter to the chain metaphor of causation Radica behaviorism'scausa mode is traced to the phiosophy of Ernst Mach as well as to theDarinian principe of seection on variation It is argued that much ofcontemporry psychology neglects personal history because of a commitment to mechanistic, contiguous causation.

Chapter 6 (Interetive Techniques and Expnato Theories) deaswith the concepts of description, expanation, and theory Ernst Mach'sinuence on Skinner's phiosophy of science is at its most evident hereA distinction between description and expanation is traced to Mach'sdispute with theories invoking hypothetica constructs not contained indata, a dispute that took pace in the 9th century and was knwn as the"atomic debate A heuristics, such theoris have a place in Mach'sphilosophy of science. They become problematic, however, whenelevated to the status of explanation Further, they belong to a view ofnatural phenomena that Mach consistenty opposed: a wordasmachine view Skinner was less amenable than Mach to hypotheticaentities, but was as consistent as Mach in his opposition to mechanistictheories, theories that require links in a causal chain to mediate beteennctionaly reated events

Chapter 7 (Mechanistic Thinking in Psycholo) looks at selectedsystems in contemporary psychology to illustrate Mach's and Skinner'sscientic and phiosophica concerns about theoretica constructs notderived from data Such constructs tend to divert attention from thephenomena they were invented to account for, with their structure andnction becoming a focus of inquiry Reying on the chain metaphor ofcausation, they encourage a mechanistic view of the subject matterbehaving organisms This chapter iustrates the reevance to 20thcentury psychoogy of Mach' s 19th century views on interpretation and

20

Introduction

causa modes in physics, and demonstrates that Skinner's concernsremain relevant to psychology today

Chapter 8 (Behaviorism and dical Behaviorism) compares the workof key gures cited as behaviorists in the psychoogical literature. Thiscomparison demonstrates crucia dierences between Skinner's scien-

tic framework and those of Pavov, Watson, Tolman, and Hull In itsearliest days, radical behaviorism moved beyond the mechanistic,mediational framework established by Toman and Hul. Contemporary experimental psychology, however, continues to question andexplain its subject matter according to this framework. In this sense,much of today's psychoogy is behavioral. Behaviorism marks a chapterin psychology's history rather than an essential methodoogical orphilosophical unity; it is a historical rather than a philosophica marker.Its continued use as a abel for one of psychology's "major approachesobscures the fact that psychology stil reies on an eary behaviora input-

output formuation, while radical behaviorism has moved beyond thisformulation and relies on an integrative, reationa framework

Chapter 9 ( Concluding Remarksreturns briey to the newwordviewdebate and points out similarities beteen the concerns of Capra andSkinner Capra cals for the relationa approach to be adopted bydiscipines that have traditionally modeled themselves aer physics,citing mechanistic science as a source of contemporary probems Headvocates turning to "ways of knowing other than science as a means ofdeaing with these problems. Skinner argued that human behavior is thesource ofcontemporary problems, incuding the behavior ofpeople whouse and abuse science Science is our strength; it has led to the aleviationof much suffering, famine, and ilness Rather than turning away fromscience, its methods should be used to confront the source of theproblem, human behavior Mechanistic science, however, oers no wayforard because the constructs with which it purports to explainbehavior are intea, unobservable, and usualy hypothetical. Suchconstructs cannot be used to eect change A science concerned withhow organisms interact with their environment, with functional

21


19/128

Cha

laions bn bhavio an h conx in which i occus, povispacical mans fo analyzing an changing bhavio Examining scincas i is pacic in psychology monsas ha h laional famwok of aical bhavioism os possibiliis fo chang unmach byh mchanisic appoach.

Chapter 2

Ordinary Language and Science

Th laion bwn oinay languag an scinc uis spcialconsiaion in h bhavioal scincs Scinic isciplins ini asubjc ma an scib laions n pocsss occuing among isconsiuns wih hi own languag an minology Pa of h woof sciniss is o ini as pcisly as possibl h maning of ms ino o facilia communicaion wihin hi isciplin Nau is

ivi an classi accoing o som sysm o o an suiun in haings: physics, chmisy, biology, mchanics, asonomy, an so on In som ls, scinic languag consiss paly ofa symbol sysm such as mahmaics o h lmn an compounsymbols of chmisy In oh ls, scinic ms a iv fomou vyay languag, wih wos cally n o avoi confusionsabou h pa of nau o in of pocss bing iscuss

Much of vyay languag is alay consi o b scipiv ofbhavio W com o h scinc of bhavio alay shap by ouvbal communiy o scib bhavio in oinay languag ms ha

on lack h accuacy ofniion chaacisic ofa scinic accounOinay vbal bhavio pcs scinic vbal bhavio, an oinay languag ms povi ayma concpual classicaions hagui an ic h scinic invsigaion of bhavio Ou vyaylanguag conains pscinic assumpions an classicaions ha mayo may no b usl fo a scinic analysis of bhavio

impoan pa of h philosophy of scinc ha is aical bhavioism is concn wih h laion bn oinay languag msha a consi o b scipiv of bhavio an h way hos msinunc h scinic suy of bhavio Raical bhavioiss viw as

unwis h pacic of aoping oinay languag ms unciically,

3


20/128


21/128

Chapter2

Anasis of Psychological Terms (Skinner, 1945/1972b) is entirely con-cerned with this same problem and when he asked in another paper, Aretheories of aing necessa (950/1972b), he was careful to speciwhat was meant b the word, theory, for the purpose f that argumentIn Schedules ofReinrcement (1957), Ferster and Skinner claried key

terms in behavior analysis by providing a useful glossaryOther workers in the eld are equaly concerned with terminological

precision A C Catanias Leaing, now in its third edition (1992),carries etymologica notes at the beginning of each chapter. In Cataniasview: Consistencies in vocabulary are essentia to technical treatments,but the language must also grow and adapt to new ndings and newperspectives We must use our language of behavior with care, butperhaps we will be less likely to become rigid about it if we knowsomething of its origins" (Catania, 1992, p xiv) The Behavior Anastpublishes articles of genera interest in the eld of radical behaviorism

and regularly contains a section, On Terms, wherein contributorsattempt to clari contexts appropriate to the use of key terms Someexamles are: When we Speak ofKnowing (Hineline, 1983); StimulusConol Terminolo (Deitz &Mallone, 1985); A Ru r the Use of theTerm Rule Governed Behavior" (Brownstein & Shull, 1985); ObserverDr: A Dring Dnition (Smith, 1986); andMisdescribingthe Caeau:A Pexing Plurali (Gleeson & Latta, 1987)

Skinner (1985) examined the Report ofthe Research Bring Panel onCogniive Science andArtcial Inteigence (Estes et a, 1983) and foundthat report lacking in denitions of key terms such as intelligence, mind,

mental operations, imagination, reasoning, induction, understanding,thinking, and the like He concluded by accusing cognitive scientists ofrelxing standards of denition and logical thinking and releasing aood of speculation characteristic of metaphysics, literature, and dailytercourse, perhaps suitable enough for such purposes but inimical toscience" (Skinner, 985, p 300) A later paper came to the sameconclsion that the words people use in describing how they feel or whatthey are thinking are part of a living language that can be used withoutembarrassment by cognitive psychologists and behavior analysts alike in

26

Ordinary Lange and Science

their daily lives But these words cannot be used in their science!"(Skinner, 1989, p 18)

t is clear that radical behaviorists take a keen interest in the relationbeteen ordinary language and science But their concerns are notconned to denitions and proper usage Denitions may turn out to bethe least of the problems inherent in taking ordinary language intoscience The use of key terms can oen be stipulated for the purpose ofresearch or philosophica discussion, as when Skinner clearly dened hisuse of the terms behavior and theory for the purpose of his argumentOther problems in the relation beteen ordinary language and scienceare obscured by the ubiquity of language and buried so deeply withinlinguistic practices that only the most carel anaysis can bring them tolight Radical behaviorists are concerned with the controlling inuenceof severa features of ordinary language, features that guide the behaviorof scientists toward views of their subject matter and toward forms ofinterpretation that are at odds with a scientic analysis The remainderof this chapter will discuss three features of ordinary language that areproblematic for scientic psychology

The rst problem is that along with ordinary language, we inheritconceptual systems involving ways of thinking about people and theirbehavior that are not based on scientic anaysis and that encouragecertain kinds ofquestions and theoretical interpretations ofbehavior notnecessitated by scientic data The second problem is inherent in thestructure of ndoEuropean languages, specically in the syntactic

requirement ofproviding agents for actions The third problem concernsthe practice of accounting for action in dierent directiona modes(either from person to behavior or from environment to behavor)depending on whether the account is of our own or of someone e'sbehavior, and depending on the extent to which people respond iividualy or collectively to environmental events This problem speci-caly aects radical behaviorists because their accounts are structued ina directiona mode that violates cultura practice It will become ear thathese three features of ordinary language exert a powerl contrinuence on the behavior of scientists


22/128

Chater

Conceptal Systems and Odinay angage

Rdic behviorisms concern wih erminologicl precision nd isrejecion of uncriicl ccepnce or usge of he vernculr is essenilly

cpured in n ery pssge of Skinners "The imporn objecion ohe vernculr in he descripion of behvior is h mny of is ermsimpy concepu schemes I do no men h science of behvior is odispense wih concepul scheme bu h i mus no ke over wihoucrel considerion he schemes which underie populr speechSkinner 1938, p 7 Words re he medium hrough which behviorlscieniss express reions; hey re he "clcuus of behviorl scienceHineine 980 p 72 Unforunely his cculus ws no deveoedspeciclly for is purpose in he sme wy s he ccuus of physics ndis herefore no s clercu or unmbiguous This ccuus hs beeninheried ken ou of he rems of everydy discourse nd moed inohe lborory Is erms guide he invesigion of behvior bu lsodescribe he producs of hose invesigions I is no surprise hconsions nd inccurcies rise from his du ncioning Rdiclbehvioriss wih heir concern for scienic issues hve o be wry lesheir clcuus rise "he ghoss of ded sysems Skinner 1938, p 5)

Mind in nguage We inheri concepul sysem in he lnguge ofmind or men life h suuses everydy discourse When we mke noe o ourselves o remember somehing we sy we wil ber i in mind;when we cnno remember somehing we esily refer o hving menlbock Ifwe hve puzzled nd worried over problem we wil el friend"i hs been on my mind; we oer person wo or more lernives ndsk hem o mke up heir mind Insrucing someone o be creful wemy sy "mind how you go nd if we wn o pu someone ese were rying o pu heir ind res or simply eing hem "never mindIn everydy discourse s Skinner sid hese expressions re unproblemicnd my be used comforbly by l kinds of psychologiss Bu if wemove his erm mind nd is reed concepul sysem from our

everydy discourse o he lborory hen ry o serch for he mind we

8


ber hings in or he mind h is pu res or he mind we hve hdsomehing on we run ino he logicl probem of rying o submi oscienic nlyss erm h hs no physicl or spi referen

Skinner oered soluion o his ogicl probem "We cn see how heword is used nd wh peope seem o be sying when hey use i

Skinner 1989 p 17) In oher words when we exmine he nguageofmin we nd h we cn esily dispense wih he concep of mindwihou dispensing wih mening For exmple he bove phrsesinvoving he concep of mind my be rnsled in he following wys

MENTISTICSTATEMENT

I will ber i in mindI hve menl block

I hs been on my mind

Mke up your mind

Mind how you goI hs pu my mind res

Never mind

TANSLTION

I will remember his in he ureI cnno remember his

I hve been hinking bou his grede semen bou behvior);

This hs been worrying me semen bou feeings)

Mke decision; choose one of heseopions

Ac crely; wch your sepI cn sop worrying bou his

noher reference o feeings)Do no worry; sop worrying; i is

no imporn

In ech insnce no mening is los nd in ech he rnslion is closero behvior in h he semens rele o remembering hinkingchoosing nd feeling Exmining he lnguge of mind in his wybrings us coser o behviorl processes h we cansubmi o scienicnlysis The concepu sysem inheried in he lnguge of minddivers enion from hese behvior processes by impying mephysic or men pne h is no suscepible o direc scienicremen

2


23/128

Chate

Leaing in nage We inherit conceptu system so in thenguge oerning especiy in the kinds o questions tht re tpicysked bout erning. I the denition o erning is stricty mintineds ny retivey permnent chnge in behvior we re ikey to skquestions bout chnges in behvior. It is however more customr to

sk Wht hs this person erned? thn it is to sk Wht cn or doesthis person now do? The conceptu system suusing the nguge oerning directs us wy rom chnges in behvior towrd the thingerned nd the thing erned becomes n entity possessed by theerner. This wy o tlking or sking questions bout erning isgrounded in the metphor o storge nd retriev metphor thtinorms the cognitive or inormtion processing trditions in psychoogy rocessing inormtion is o course something peope hve doneor thousnds o yers. They hve mde records o things tht hppenon cy ties ppyrus veum pper mgnetic tpes nd now siicon

chipsnd they hve stored them retrieved them nd responded tothem gin more or ess s they responded to the origins. Cognitivescientists hve tken this prctice s mode or metphor (Sinner185, p. 22) In this trdition the orgnism is conceptuized s system tht tkes in inormtion rom the environment processes itstores it nd t some stge retrieves nd cts upon tht inormtion.

I the metphor is ccepted uncriticly (s it is by much o contemporr psychoogy) then the scientist is directed towrd stimuusorgnismresponse (SOR) ccount: environment stimui re tken inby the orgnism processed nd worked upon these intern worngsre then considered to guide responses. Skinner exmined the metphornd ound it cking: When physic records re stored the recordscontinue to exist unti they re retrieved but is tht true when peopeprocess inormtion? (Sinner 185, p. 24). He rgued tht storgebtte might be better metphor to guide psychoogy. ectricit is putinto btter but is not stored there. Rther the bttery is chnged ndit is chnged bttery tht puts out eectricity. In simir wy hergued n orgnism is chnged by its exposure to contingencies oreinorcement nd it is chnged orgnism tht emits behvior:Orgnisms do not cquire behvior s kind o possession they simpy

30


come to behve in vrious wys. The behvior is not in them t ny timeWe sy tht it is emitted but ony s ight is emitted rom hot mentthere is no ight in the ment (Skinner 185, p. 25)

The nguge o erning nd its metphor o storge nd retrievdirects scientic psychoogy in prticur wy when dopted withoutcritic exmintion. Once exmined however nd perhps n terntive metphor substituted new nguge cn direct inquiry to behvior processes tht cn be submitted to scientic nysis: Howorgnisms re chnged by contingencies o reinorcement is the ed o behviorl nysis. ht is hppening inside is question to benswered by neuroogy with its pproprite instruments nd methods(Sinner 185, p. 25)

Lanage in nguage We inherit conceptu system so in thenguge o nguge in the wy we ordinriy tk bout nguge Likemind the word nguge seems to eude both denition nd reerencewhen tken out o ordinry usge or the purpose o scientic ysis.Vicki Lee (181), or exmpe noted tht despite the miirity o theword nguge is notoriousy dicut to dene: eope know whtnguge' mens tht is unti they re sked to dene the word eithernominy by stting its deens or ostensivey by pointing to its reerentIt then becomes pprent tht the mening o nguge' despite themiiritynd useness o the word in everydy discourse is uncertinnd obscure (Lee 1 81, p. 2)

On the wy we ordinriy tk bout nguge Sinner noted Lnguge hs the chrcter o thing something person cquires ndpossesses. sychoogists spek o the cquisition o nguge' in thechid. The words nd sentences o which nguge is composed re sidto be toos used to express menings thoughts ide propositionsemotions needs desires nd mny other things in or on the speker'smind (Skinner 174, p. 88) The nguge o mind impies thing or pce the nguge o nguge impies thing or structure . thenguge o erning impies the possession o knowedge so the nguge o nguge impies compex progrm o words nd grmmtic

rues possessed by nd stored inside the person retrieved nd used s a

3


24/128

Chater

tool whe equied The metapho of stoage ad etieval has beediscussed above, ad a the questio may be added hee about its usei elatio to laguage, that is to say, about the suggesti that laguageis stoed, etieved, ad used as a tool

Coside a aalogy betee the laguage of wods ad what is ofte

called the laguage of dace We ae said to stoe wods, etieve them,ad use them to covey meaig I a dace cotext, we ca comfotablytalk about the laguage of dace coveyig meaig to a audiece Askilled wite, public speake, o lectue shaes seveal chaacteisticswith a skilled dace Each is a pefome, highly taied ove sevealyeas to behave i a paticula way Baig physical disability, eveyoeis capable of dacig ad speakig to some degee o othe I eachistace, the level ofskill ad subtlety will deed lagely o taiigadthe laguage ca eithe be pefomed o witte The aalogy is uselbecause it highlights the way we ae diected to study oe kid oflaguage, the laguage of wods, by the way we geeally tl about itWe would ot comfotably tak about the acquisitio of ace as thoughit wee a etity take i ad possessed; we would moe easily efe to thetaiig of a dace Neithe would we efe to stoage ad etieval:whee does the dace stoe a piouette, fo example, o a aabesque? aabesque is ot in the dace at ay time The piouette, the aabesque,come ito beig i pefomace These movemets ae ot domat,latet, stoed iside the dace awaitig ecall They ae tasiet evetsexistig i the momets of thei pefomace

We ae also likely to say that a dacepermsa piouette i pefeeceto usesa piouette, which helps to illustate Skies agumet that: Wehave o moe easo to say that a ma uses the wod wate i askig foa dik tha to say that he uses a each' i takig the oeed glass(Skie, 957, p 7). The way we takabout the laguage ofwods eedscaeful cosideatio befoe we allow its coceptual scheme to diect ouscietic iquiies

The laguages of mid, leaig, ad laguage illustate some of thediculties iheet i takig odiay, eveyday vocabulay as thestatig poit of a scietic aaysis of behavio Vebal behavio

pecedes scietic behavio ad wods theefoe cay with them

32

Ordinary anguage and Science

pescietic coceptual systems ad metaphos that ca block o hideaalysis by guidig scietists towad iteal, iaccessible popeties ofogaisms ad away fom moe accessible popetiesamely, elatiosbetwee behavio ad the cotext i which it occus

Grammar and the Syntax of ction

Coceptual systems ae ot the oly cotollig vaiables coceaed iodiay laguage Othe vaiables ae embedded, i a sese, moedeeply tha the coceptual systems discussed above Othe aspects ofodiay laguage also ecouage a paticula way of lookig at othikig about behavio, ad ae eve moe obscue tha the coceptualsystems of mid, leaig, o laguage because they compise the sytaxof ou laguage

Hielie (980) agues that Eglish gamma ad sytx imposecostaits o the way we view the subject matte of psychology,costaits that ae liguisticas opposed to logica (Hielie, 980,p 80). He ideties two liguistic costaits that guide scietiststowad a paticula way of dealig with behavio The st lies i thefailue of the Eglish laguage to maitai a stict distictio beteevebs (wods that deote tasiet evets) ad ous (wods that deotethigs o obects that edue ad have a kid of pemaece) Thesecod is the ea impossibility of speakig of actio i the Eglishlaguage without efeece to a aget

Grammaical caegoes. I his aysis ofiguistic costaits, Hieliedaws o the compaative liguistics ofBeami Lee Whof (see hof,956). fomed by his compaisos of gamma ad sytax i Eglishad seveal meicaIdia laguages, hof agued i LanageThough and Reali that Weste sciece dissects the physica woldalog lies laid dow by its laguage Stuctues ad pocesses ae otgive to Weste sciece by the physical wold but ae to some extetaeady peset i its laguage He agued that speakes oflaguages withdieet kids of gammas ae led to dissect the wold alog dieet

33


25/128

Cat

ines: "Formulation of ideas is not an independent proess strityrationa in the od sense but is part of a partiular grammar and diersfrom slighty to greaty between dierent grammars We disset natureaong lines aid down by our native anguage (Whor 956, p 23).

horf eamined the distintion between nouns and verbs in the

English language and found that the traditional distintion beteen"doing (or "happening) words and "thing words is not well maintained in praie and that many words whih should properly be in verbform beause they desribe transient events are in fat in noun formSimilarly some words denoting stable and long asting events whihbeause of those properties should be lassed as nouns are found to beverbs:

Ifit be said that "strike turn run ae verbs beause theydenote temporary or shortlasting events ie ations

why then is "st a noun? It is aso a temporary eventhy are "ightning spark wave eddy pulsation lamestorm phase yle spasm noise emotion nouns?Th If" d "h ey are temporary events man an ouse arenouns beause they are longlasting and stable eventsie things what then are "keep adhere etend projetontinue persist grow dwell and so on doing amongthe verbs? (Whorf 956, p 25).

Like sienti ategories grammatial ategories are not handed to us by

nature: "It wil be found that it is not possible to dene event objetthing relation and so on from nature but that to dene them alwaysinvolves a iruitous return to the grammatial ategories of the dener'sanguage (Whorf 956, p 25). Grammatial ategories of otheranguages suh as Hopi and Nootka epress objets transiene andduration in dierent ways from English Hopi for eample has a assof events roughly orresponding to our verbs that are grouped byduration ypeightning wave lame meteor pu of smoke pulsation whih in English are more like nouns

3


This grammatia tendeny to epress in noun form events that arepropery verbs guides psyhologists away from the study of what peopedo (proesses verbs) toward the study of strutures denoted by the nounforms Peope remember think talk see hear and feeall verbsWhen these ations are transformed into nounsmemory thought

language sensation emotionas is ommon in the English anguagethen sientists are enouraged to ook for the things denoted by thenouns In this way inspired by grammatia form psyhoogy beomesthe study of strutures (nouns) that are assumed to have some kind ofpermanene rather than the study of ongoing proesses or ativities

Agents r acons Another inguisti onstraint that Hineine drawsfrom horf is the syntati requirement of providing subjets for verbsor as Hineine puts it: "the near impossibility when speaking English ofepressing ation without imputing an agent of the ation (Hineine

98, p 8). To satis the requirements of Engish grammar our verbsmust have substantives they must have agents that perform the atdesribed by the verb For eampe "there is rain woud be an unusuaalthough more aurate way of desribing what is going on when we say"it is raining; for in ogial terms what is raning? The answer: rain israining or water i s raining from the sky The requirement of an agent isa linguisti rather than a ogia requirement In his study of the Hopianguage horf (956) found that:

Hopi an and does have verbs without subjets a fat

whih may give that tongue potentialities probabynever to be deveoped as a logial system for understanding some aspets of the universe Undoubtedly modernsiene strongly reeting western IndoEuropeantongues often does as we all do sees ations and foreswhere it sometimes might be better to see states On theother hand "state is a noun and as suh it enjoys thesuperior prestige traditionay attahing to the subjet or

35


26/128


27/128


28/128

Chapter2

inuence provides a means to counter control by alowing us to see theconstraints it paces upon us and by presenting possibilities or change.Changing the words in which we talk about behavior will guidebehavioral science in a dierent and perhaps more useul direction

Directional Tk

Inadditionto the ways ordinarylanguage inluencesourthinkng about

and investigatingbehavior, readers and istenersmay be discomortedby

whatHineine ( 1980) calls the"distinctdiaect oradicabehaviorism.

There are manyexamplesin the diaect of radica behaviorismof what

seemtobe unnecessariy convoutedexpressionsor quite simple events.

Hineline notes that theseemingy simple expression, "Knowing that we

can predict ture events,we actaccordingly,becomes at frst gance a

more convouted expression when transated into radica behavioristterminology: "Predictabiiy of events, apart from theevents themselves,

is a variabe thataects our behavior (Hineline, 1980 p 7 1) And the

simple phrase, "The child learns to catch someone's eyewhen eedingassistance or attention, becomes in the radical behaviorist's diaect,

"Eye-contact becomes both a reinforcer and a discriminative eventsetting the occasions on which the child's behavior is likely to bereinforced by another person (Hineline, 1980 p. 7 1) In each example,note thatthe behavioral dialect avoidsthe diculties involved in termslike knowing and learning and concentrates on simpler functional

relations between discriminativestimuli, setting conditions, andrein-forcement. Ironicaly, the seemingly more convouted sentenceactualyexpresses simper relationsthan thoseinvoved inthe conceptua systemsinherentin the language of "knowing and"learning.The phrases that

seemso compicated incomparisonto our everyday expressions, are inact less probematic in terms o their conceptual systems.

Another dierence beteen ordinary language and the anguage obehavior anaysis has to do with the tendency to alter the directionaity

40


implied in accounts o behavior depending on whether the interpretation is o our own or o someone else's behavior Again, Hineline (19901992) was the frst to point out this dierence as well as its controingvariables.

First, he notes that interpretations and expanations o behavior haveto characteristics; bipolariy and directionaity, with orms ike agentto action, cause to eect, independent to dependent variabe Second, henotes that psychologica accounts occur in two basic modes: personbased or environment based n the ormer mode, the direction is romperson (or some dispositiona aspect o the person) to behavior:

Person > Behavior

In the latter mode, the direction is rom some aspect o the environmentto behavior:

Environment > BehaviorHineine's analysis draws on the work o attribution theorists (orexampe, Jones and Nisbett, 1971; Storms, 1973) who ound that thedirection o action in interpretations or expanations o behavior diersaccording to the location o the person giving the account. here anaccount is given o the behavior o another person, the typica directiono action is rom person to behavior; an obserer tends to expain thebehavior oanother person by aluding to internal characteristics o thatother person as in some way causa. This tendency has become known

as the "ndamenta attribution error (Ross, 1977) When describingtheir own behavior-when the obseer and obsered are one personthe directional mode is picay rom environment to behavior. Peopleordinarily interpret their own behavior in terms o events or eecs in theexterna context and interpret the behavior o others in terms ocharacteristics or events internal to the person:

Interpreng the Behavor of Others

Person > Behavior

41


29/128

Inereng One' Own Behavior

Environmen > Behavior

Chater

Radical behavioriss inerpre he behavior ofohers using he direcionalmode normally resered for accouning for ones own behavior and soreverse his enency:

Inerpreing he Behavior o/ Ohersbehavior anaic accoun


such, behavior anayic accouns vioae a cuura norm This,

Hineine argues, may conribue subsanialy o cashes beween behavior analysis and oher viewpoins in psychology (Hinene, 199

Hineine maes a rher poin in his anaysis ofdirecional modes andhe disinciveness of behavior analyic accouns Aribuion horisshave aso described circumsances ha occasion a swich of direcionamode from environmen based o person based, even when he inerpreer of acion is boh observer and observed (when a person inerpreshis or her own behavior Hineine ilusraes his by comparing wopassages, one ha mainains he cuuraly pical paern and one hareverses i: have carried ou an eensive se of observaions, wihmysef as subec, and have discovered ha wine is sronger han beerBased on a comparabe se of obseraions, have discovered ha ammore aergic o uips han o roses Here an observer inerpres his orher own behavior, bu he direciona mode swiches from environmenbased for he rs observaion o person based for he second obseraionEach observaion refers o he suscepibiliy of he person o someenvironmenal even, and i urns ou ha he swich is occasioned by heeen o which an eec applies o many peope or o isolaed individuas(Hineline, 990 here siuaiona evens aec peope simiary,direcionaiy is environmen based:

2


ne is sronger han beer"


here no everyone is simiary aeced, where a response o siuaionaevens is more individual, direcionaiy is person based:

'am more allergic o ls han o roses"

erson > Behavior

Reversing direcionaiy ilusraes he convenion: have carried ouan eensive se of obseraions, wih mysef as subec, and havediscovered ha am more easily inoicaed by wine han by beer Based

on a simiar se of obseraions, I have discovered ha ulips are morealergenic han roses Hineine direcs us o consider how such saemens migh be received am more easily inoicaed by wine han bybeer (a person based inerpreaion of a genera effec is iey o bedismissed as an unineresing saemen since h reaive poency ofwine and beer is well nown and everyone is simiarly affeced Theobseraion, ulips are more allergenic han roses, an environmenbased inerpreaion of an individua eec, is iely o be proesed forprecisey he reason ha i is an individua effec and should no begeneralized seems ha where people are equally aeced, he direc

ional mode in ordinary parlance is environmen based, bu wherepeople are no equally affeced, he direcional mode is person based

Behavior anayic accouns aso vioae his cuural norm by referringo he behavior of individuas in he mode ordinarily resered forinsances in which everyone is reaed as being alie Behavior analyiceperimens as wel as educaiona and herapeuic inervenions concenrae on individuals raher han on groups, bu inerpreive accouns inhe Sinnerian radiion are couched in a language paern ha suggessha individuals are alie or are equly aeced ineine 1990 1992

3


30/128

Chatr

ugge ha hi violaion of a culural norm may alo caue dicomforby hreaening he individualiy of he reader or liener.

Apar from grammaical and ynacic conrain hen behavioranaly mu alo be concerned o noe ha he direcional mode in heirinerpreaion of behavior run couner o culural norm. Similarly

oher radiion in pychology hould alo be concerned wih deeprooed language paern ha inform and guide way of hinking andalking abou behavior wih he variable governing he direcionalmode of heir own accoun and wih he poibiliy ha vernacularlanguage paern may alo inuence heir repone o radical behavioriaccoun.

rdinary language i no neural wih repec o he ubec maer ofbehavioral cience and he cieni i no exemp from he inuence haordinary language exer on concepualizio of behavior and oninerpreive form. rdinary language erm and heir coepual y

em ncion no imply a inerpreaion of he ubjec maer bu aloa guide o he way he ubjec maer will be reaed. The concepualem nheren in he language of mind learning and language ielflead o a view ha he imporan relaion beween organi andenvironmen ake place he organim. Apar from hee concepualyem linguiic conrain alo draw cience oward he udy ofnoun (hing rucure) and away from he udy of verb (aciviieprocee paern). ur way of alking abou he direcion of acionappear o be inuenced boh by he locaion of he inerpreer and byhe locu of variabiliy a feaure ha e behavior analyic inerprea-

ion apar from he culural norm and ha may caue dicomfor o hereader or liener.Much more can be aid abou he relaion beween ordinary language

and cience. Much more be aid becaue iflanguage coninue obe he calculu ofbehavioral cience i praciioner need o underandi limi and conrain a well a he way i guide heir own behavioroward paricular view of heir ubec maer and aricular form ofinerpreaion.

Chapter 3

Science: Aims and Methods

Chaper noed ha alhough pychology i unied by a commimeno cienic mehod i ubdicipline are no all commied o he amekind of cience. Mehod and he general heoreical framework againwhich aa are inerpreed vary beween ubdicipline. Behavior analy-i i diinc from much of conemporary experimenal pychology inha i philoophical background radical behaviorim promoe acienic mehod ha i inducive raher han hypoheicodeducive.

The conemporary lieraure of mainream experimenal pychologygive lile recogniion o he fac ha here i more han one way oflegiimaely doing cience. Mehodology i ricly precribed wihin hehypoheicodeducive radiion (or he mehod of hypohei a i ialo known) looely adoping he logic of falicaion and emphaizingaiical analyi of daa a a way of conrolling for variabiliy inbehavior. Thee precripion and heir raionale are preened oucceive generaion of uden o a o eem he only legiimaemehod of cienic inquiry.

Chaper 1 alo noed ha Skinner did no ubcribe o he view ha

cience i a raighforward and ricly logical purui arguing ineadha ome very imporan apec of he cienic proce do no lendhemelve o formal reamen. In hi experience cience i rarely heformal proce ha hiorian and mehodologi claim and i onlyimperfecly decribed by he epbyep logic of he hypoheicodeducive approach.

Radical behaviori mehodology belong o a philoophy of cienceradiion ha doe no recognize he mehod ofhypohei a an eenialrequiremen of cienic inquiry. Mehodology i dicaed by a numberofconcern and in he cae of radical behaviorim i largely dicaed by

5


31/128

Chat

it view of the aim of cience it commitment to the individuaity oforganim and by the nature of it theoretical ytem A ater chapter wildeal in detail with type of theoretical ytem; thi chapter concern theditinction between hypotheticodeductive and inductive approache tocientic inquiry and demontrate that the dominance ofthehypothetico

deductive method today i not related to ogic or to the power of themethod but to the type of expanatory account (theorie) that dominate pychology Hypotheticodeduction i required only to tet particular type of theorie and i not an eentia requirement of cienticinquiry in general he method continue to be undermined by anepitemoogica problem: it cannot logicaly or empiricaly conrm omeof the kind of theoretical claim it i invoked to tet

Methods in Contemporary Psychology

Student of pychology today are uualy intoduced ary in theirtraining to a et of procedure that provide a yardtick for their cienticcommunity to evaluate reearch nding he community demandadherence to a rigorou ogic and train ucceive generation ofpychologit according to thi logic

For exampe tudent need to be famiiar with the rationae for uingthe ame or dierent group of ubect in experimental condition(between ubect within ubect or matched pair deign) he logicof uing a control group and an experimenta group in ome ituation

to tet the eectivene of a inge variabe ao become a baic part ofthe tudent' undertanding of reearch method laication of datainto parametric and nonparametric reated and unreated nominaordinal interva and ratio provide the bai for chooing a uitabetatitical tet a doe the baic ditinction of whether a reearch proectlook for dierence or correation between core

Student alo earn a rationae for the conduct of experiment thatconform to the hypotheticodeductive tradition and emphaize theneed for a forma hypothei A typica introductory text note At omepoint a reearcher wi want to tet out hi theory In order to do thi the

6

Science: Aims and Meods

reearcher wil make apredicionabout the kind ofbehavior which woudbe expected to occur if the theory i true A prediction of thi kind inown a the emenal ohesi (reen and D'Oliveira 1982, p 7)

he rationae of hypothei teting in pychology i ooely baed onthe ogic of falication In it tronget form thi aert that accumu

lated obervation of the conequence of a theory cannot how it to beright or true but that the ony route to condence in a theory i throughthe faiure ofrepeated attempt to fali it he more a theory withtandattempt to fali it the greater the condence a cientic communitymay have in it In other word the experimenter mut repeatedy et upituation capable of demontrating that a theory i wrong in omerepect: In order to carry out a tet of an experimental hypothei itmut in principe be poible for the predicted eect either to occur orno occur thi i a baic rule of experimental reearch If there i nopoibiity that an experiment might go againsexperimenta hypoth

ei then there i no point in doing the experiment at al onequenlyan experimental hypothei i teted againt a null hypohesis, that tatethat an experimenter wil no nd the experimental reult he or heexpect (reen and D'Oliveira 982, pp 78)

he nu hypothei in pychoogy i eentially a tatement that thereut of an experiment coud have occurred by chance hance i anelement added to the logic offaication and i attributabe to variationin behavior between individua hance form the bai of the rationaeof tatitical anayi he underlying notion i that any group of peopei made up of individua who wil how dierence in behavior on a

given meaure Since it i unlikey that individua in a group wiproduce exacty the ame tet core in an experimenta manipuationcontemporary pychoogy bae it condence in the ignicance ofdierent outcome between group or imiaritie between group a incorrelational deign on the tatitical aw ofchance It i againt chancethat the eectivene of an experimental variabe i meaured: According to the nu hothei any reut found in an experiment are due tochance uctuation in people' performance rather than to the predictedeffect of the variable the experimenter i intereted in (reen andD'Oiveira 1982, p 8

.


32/128


33/128

Chapter3

Regardess of the reaword accuracy of any statement in the argument, the concusion is ogicay vaid in reation to the premises.Veriing that Aice does have factor in her boodstream (obsering thededuced consequence) does not, however, veri the initia premise thatasthma is caused by factor in the boodstream.

Consider an exampe from psychoogy: a theoretica account ofmemory states that human memory is comprised of two stores, shortterm and ong term. This is an initia premise. A second premise mightbe that the short term store has a maximum capacity of nine items.Together, these premises predict that under conditions of immediaterec of items on a ist, most peope wi not be abe to recal more thannine items.

Premise:Human memory is made up ofa short term store and a ong term store.

Premise:The short term store has a mximum capacity of nine iems.

oncusion:Peope wi not be abe to reca more than nine items from a ongerist shorty aer presentation of that ist

If the prediction is conrmed (which it is ikey to be), the demonstration that most peope cannot remember more than nine items from aonger ist is not a demonstration that memory is made up ofa short termand a ong term store. that can be known from conrming a

prediction is that under a given set of conditions event C wi occur. Ifa researcher concudes from the demonstration of C that thereforeX istrue, this reverses the direction of vaidation and is an exampe of thefaacy of arming the consequent. In deductive ogic, premises vaidatea concusion, but a concusion does not vaidate premises.

Nonoccurrence of the predicted event and consequences ofthe theorynecessariy entais the fasity of the theory or of one or more of thestatements that comprise the theory. IfAlice does not have factor in herboodstream, the rst premise is fase; if peope reca more than nineitems from a onger ist, then at east the premise reating to so term

50

Science: Aims ad Metods

emory's capacity is fase. In these circustances, the experimenterust either reject the theory because it cannot account for the data orust modi the theory in some way that wi ead to further experimenta testing.

One of the consequences of this enduring probem, widey recognized

in phiosophy of science iterature but rarey considered in psychoogy,is simpy that no amount of conrming instances of a theory tested thisway can conrm its accuracy, but one disconrming instance guaranteesthe fasity of the whoe or some of its parts. This method is asymmetricain the sense that a theory can be shown to be fase but not to be true. Thus,a theory is ony as good as the number of times it has withstoodfasication and can ony be hed tentativey. Expanations of eventsgenerated by hypotheticodeduction stand ony as ong as a particuartheory withstands fasication.

Johnston and Pennypacker (1980) pointed out a practica dicuty

specic to behaviora and socia sciences, which is that the metod ofhypothesis requires for its success a cear correspondence betweentheoretica eements and empirica measures invoved in testing andveriing the theorys consequences. Psychoogy's theoretica base, incontrast to that of the physica sciences, retains categories that arethemseves the subject of continua debate and disagreement. Categoriesike emotion, arousal, personaity, memory, schemata, motivation,inteigence, stress, and many others comprising the discipine of psychoogy are at best vague in their denitiona and mensura outines andtherefore ack the predictive capabiity of theoretical categories in

physica sciences. The theoretica base informing, for exampe, physcs,chemistry, and the bioogica sciences consists of more ceary denedconceptua eements and reativey precise measurement techniques.These, to the extent of their coherence and precision, aow empiricaoutcomes to be compared to theoretica eements. Background know-edge in these sciences is extensive, so that outcomes are predicted froman aready wefounded data base. Psychoogy's data base in comparisonis inexact, acing the conceptua carity of these other sciences that havesuccessy empoyed hypotheticodeduction. At present, we cannot

51


34/128

Chatr

draw o wel esabsed beavora prcples w e same precso asoer aural sceces o predc wa soud occur a experme

a pracca evel, radcal beavorss are cocered a s meodeas wasage of bo eor ad daa Daa ed o be cosderedvaluable oy f ey coform o predcos, f resus are posve

favor of predcos If ey do o coform, ad a eory s rejeced orudergoes exesve modcao, e ose daa so carely coleced e researc proess ave le or o meag or value o eexpermeer: "Te workg ypoess of expermes desged ocorm predcos ake e geeral form, e x occurs, y wl occur'Que oe y fas o occur, ad le oe s ake of wa occurredsead oso & Peypacker, 1980, p 3 ) To e radca beavors seems wase o exped me ad eergy o researc suc away a some daa wl ur ou o be useess Sma ( 1960) argues areavey e s kow abou beavor ad erefore al daa are soe

sese sgca, o e sasca sese of a erm bu e sesea ey ell us someg more abou beavor: " e sgca daaave o ye ured up e aboraory Tere s a wea ofbeavoralpeomea s o be broug uder expermea corol for moreprecse sudy ad aayss Ta s, peraps, wy egave resuls seemwaseful (Sdma, 960, p 9)

Radca beavorss oe a may faces of beavor are sl oudersood ad e process of daa coleco ad examao secessary sow Te eorecal base a ow forms pyscal scecesdd o develop overg, or e udred or so years of psycoogy'ssory Uaswered quesos ay scece oe awa e deveopme or mproveme of meods ad srumes Sker pu ,"To ss a a scece of beavor gve a rgorous accou of sucpeomea [for exampe, magg, rememberg, emoo, sg] s prese sae of kowedge s ke askg e ber of 1600 oexpa a magec apler or e Faraday of 840 o expla supercoducvy (Sker, 1969, p 85) Radca beavorss coue paely w er scec eerprse, avodg wased eor ad egave daa

52

Science: Aims and Meods

Induction

e psycology sudes coue o be raed maly e formameods of ypoess esg ad falscao, radcal beavorsm scaracered by a ess forma ducve approac Ts seco seeks o

clar wa s mea we radcal beavorss refer o er approac asducve ad cosders some of e posopcal ssues geeraed byduco

Te erm, duco, as used by radcal beavorss refers prmary oa way of dog scece a gves promece o daa raer a oeory coras o e meod of ypoess, wc akes eory as ssarg po ad seeks o es e ru or approxmae ru of erva s daa, e ducve approac aemps o derve geera eorecaprcples daa Te smples way o lusrae e deecebewee eorydrve ad daadrve approaces s o dsgs e

kids of quesos asked by eac Hypoess esers ed o ask, "Is seory rue (or approxmaely rue? ad radcal beavorss ed o ask" woder wa woud appe f (Sdma, 960, p 8) Kowga peope ordarly recall up o e ems from a ls, a radcabeavors mg ask, "a woud appe f al ems e ls wererepeaed wce? Or "a would appe f recal was deayed for oealf our? Or "a woud appe fwe arraged words e ls bysemac caegores? I s way, e sces s ecouraged o look awa does appe, o colec formao abou beavor, raer a ocosder wa e daa reveal abou e sape or capacy of a poe

cal srucureSecod, duco refers o e process of reasog from sp

mecca chiesa

Documents