meditations one and two

8/3/2019 Meditations One and Two

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Rene escartes1596-1650)

Descartes, born in La Haye now LaHayeDescartes), France, was educated at the Jesuitcollege in La Fleche. Owing to frail health, hewas allowed to stay in bed late into the morning, a habit he found most conducive to philosophizing and kept to all his life. Althoughthe school concentrated on traditional scholastic physics and mathematics, it was forward-looking enough to celebrate Galileo sdiscovery of the moons of Jupiter in 1611. After leaving La Fleche, Descartes studied lawat Poitiers, then traveled throughout Europe

for a decade, including three years in Paris,where he met the Franciscan, Mersenne, whobecame his mentor and go-between. n 1629,seeking tranquillity and solitude, he madeHolland his permanent home. His majorwork, Le Monde a scientific work based inpart on the Copernican hypothesis, was nearing publication in 1633, when the Inquisition s condemnation of Galileo prompted himto withdraw it. His Meditations on First Phi-losophy reprinted here, were published in1641. The Meditations resulted from interest


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in a section of an earlier work, Discourse onthe Method for Conducting One s Reason Rightlywhich contained three scientific essays (on op-tics, geometry, and meteorology) and a sec-tion designed to explain Descartes's method.t was inquiries concerning this section onmethod that prompted the Meditations. Des-

cartes's fame grew, and in 649 he reluctantlyaccepted the invitation of Queen Christina ofSweden to join her court. Forced to abandonhis lifelong habit of staying in bed in themorning engaged in philosophical reflection,he attended the queen at five o'clock in themorning. Within six months, he caughtpneumonia and died._ The Meditations do not constitute a sys-tematic treatise on philosophy, nor even a setof rigorous arguments. They are more like aset of mental exercises, as their title suggests,~ e s i g n e to break down the prejudicesagainst accepting the first principles of meta-physics. Such principles had to be seen to becertain and indubitable, if metaphysics, andthe new science of Galileo to which Descartesmade such an important contribution, wereto stand on firm ground and to progress.

Descartes greatly admired mathematics,for its certainty and its clear example ofknowledge gained through the understand-

ing rather than the senses. t wasn't the rigorof mathematical proof that inspired Des-cartes; he was more interested in the discov-ery of new truths than the proof of old ones.Rather, it was the intellectual certainty ofmathematical truths, their clarity and dis-tinctness, that he held in such high regard.He aimed to bring such intellectual certaintyto metaphysics and science. The method heused to attain such certainty is called the .Method of Doubt. As he put it in the earlierDiscourse on Method, he resolved to acceptnothing as true which I did not clearly recog-nize to be so: that is to say, carefully avoidprecipitation and prejudice in judgments,and to accept in them nothing more than waspresented to my mind so clearly and dis-tinctly that I could have no occasion to doubtit. In the Meditations, Descartes shows that,initially, nothing is immune to doubt exceptthe certainty of one's own existence. Usingthat as the basis for his metaphysical prin-ciples, Descartes initiated modern Westernphilosophy.Note on the text: Some additions to theoriginal Latin text found in the later Frenchtranslation are included here in squarebrackets.


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Meditations on irst Philosophy

Synopsis of the SixFollowing MeditationsIn the first Meditation I set forth the reasons forwhich we may, generally speaking, doubt about allthings and especially about material things, atleast so long as we have no other foundations forthe sciences than those which we have hithertopossessed. But although the utility of a Doubtwhich is so general does not at first appear, it is atthe same time very great, inasmuch as it deliversus from every kind of prejudice, and sets out forus a very simple way by which the mind may detach itself from the senses; and finally it makes itimpossible for us ever to doubt those things whichwe have once discovered to be true.In the s ~ c o n d Meditation, mind, which making use of the liberty which pertains to it, takes forgranted that all those things of whose existence ithas the least doubt, are non-existent, recognisesthat it is however absolutely impossible that itdoes not itself exist. This point is likewise of thegreatest moment, inasmuch as by this means a distinction is easily drawn between the things whichpertain to mind-that is to say to the intellectualnature-and those which pertain to body.But because it may be that some expect fromme in this place a statement of the reasons establishing the immortality of the soul, I feel that Ishould here make known to them that havingaimed at writing nothing in all this Treatise ofwhich I do not possess very exact demonstrations,I am obliged to follow a similar order to that madeuse of by the geometers, which is to begin by putting forward as premises all those things uponwhich the proposition that we seek depends be-

Reprinted from The Philosophical Works of Descartestrans. Elizabeth Haldane and G. R. T. Ross London:Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. 140-99.

fore coming to any conclusion regarding it. Nowthe first and principal matter which is requisite forthoroughly understanding the immortality of thesoul is to form the clearest possible conceptionof it, and one which will be entirely distinct fromall the conceptions which we may have of body;and in this Meditation this has been done. In addition to this it is requisite that we may be assuredthat all the things which we conceive clearly anddistinctly are true in the very way in which wethink them; and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Meditation. Further we musthave a distinct conception of corporeal nature,which is given partly in this Second, and partlyin the Fifth and Sixth Meditations. And finallywe should o n l ~ d e from all this, t h ~ t those thin_gswhich we conceiVe clearly and d1shnctly as bj:ll ngdiverse substances, as we regard mind and bodyto be, are really substances essentially distinct onefrom the other; and this is the conclusion of theSixth Meditation. This is further confirmed in thissame Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is divisible,while the mind cannot be conceived of exceptingas indivisible. For we are not able to conceive ofthe half of a mind as we can do of the smallestof all bodies; so that we see that not only aretheir natures different but even in some respectscontrary to one another. I have not however dealtfurther with this matter in this Treatise, both because what I have said is sufficient to show clearlyenough that the extinction of the mind does notfollow from the corruption of the body, and alsoto give men the hope of another life after death,as also because the premises from which the immortality of the soul may be deduced depend onan elucidation of a complete system of Physics.This would mean to establish in the first place thatall substances generally-that is to say all thingswhich cannot exist without being created by G o d are in their nature incorruptible, and that they cannever cease to exist unless God; in denying tothem his concurrence, reduce them to nought; and


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why it also cannotbut that the human body, inasmuch as it

ofof members and of other

human mind is notany accidents, but is a pure

the accidents of. mindhough, for instance, it think certainnot emerge from these changes anmind: the human body on the other hand

~ d i f f e r e n t thing from the sole fact thatfigure or form of any of its portions is found tothe humanmay indeed easily enough perish, but the

[or soul of man I make no distinction beis owing to its nature immortal.In the Third Meditation it seems to me that I

at sufficient length the principal arof which I make use in order to prove thenone the less, because I didwish in that place to make use of any compari

as much as I could the minds of readers fromperhaps have remained

obscurities which, however, will, I hope,by the Replies which I haveto the Objections which have been set beforeHow the idea in us of a being supremely

much objective reality (that isby representation in so many

and perfection) that it necessarilyThis is illustrated in these Replies by the

a very perfect machine, the idea offound in the mind of some workman. Forof this idea must have

workmanthat of some other from whom he has receivedidea, it is similarly impossible that the idea ofus should not have God himself

In the Fourth Meditation it is shown that alland distinctly

and at the same time it is exin what the nature of error or falsity con-

sists. This must of necessity be known both for theconfirmation of the preceding truths and for thebetter comprehension of those that follow. (But itmust meanwhile be remarked that I do not in anyway there treat of sin-that is to say of the errorwhich is committed in the pursuit of good andevil, but only of that which arises in the decidingbetween the true and the false. And I do not intend to speak of matters pertaining to the Faith orthe conduct of life, but only of those which concern speculative truths, and which may be knownby the sole aid of the light of nature.)In the Fifth Meditation corporeal nature generally is explained, and in addition to this the existence of God is demonstrated by a new proof inwhich there may possibly be certain difficultiesalso, but the solution of these will be seen in theReplies to the Objections. And further I show inwhat sense it is true to say that the certainty ofgeometrical demonstrations is itself dependent onthe knowledge of God.Finally in the Sixth I distinguish the actionof the understanding [ ntellectio] from that of theimagination [ maginatio]; the marks by which thisdistinction is made are described. I here show thatthe mind of man is really distinct from the body,and at the same time that the two are so closelyjoined together that they form, so to speak, asingle thing. All the errors which proceed fromthe senses are then s u r v e y ~ d while the means ofavoiding them are demonstrated, and finally allthe reasons from which we may deduce the existence of material things are set forth. Not that Ijudge them to be very useful in establishing thatwhich they prove, to wit, that there is in truth aworld, that men possess bodies, and other suchthings which never have been doubted by anyoneof sense; but because in considering these closelywe come to see that they are neither so strong norso evident as those arguments which lead us tothe knowledge of our mind and of God; so thatthese last must be the most certain and most evident facts which can fall within the cognizance ofthe human mind. And this is the whole matter thatI have tried to prove in these Meditations, forwhich reason I here omit to speak of many otherquestions with which I dealt incidentally in thisdiscussion.


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Meditations 5

I f the Things WhichBe Brought Within the Spherethe Doubtfulis n'ow some years since I detected how many

the false beliefs that I had from my earliestadmitted as true, and how doubtful was evI had since constructed on this basis; andthat time I was convinced that I must onceI had formerly accepted, and comanew from the foundation, if Ito establish any firm and permanent struc

in the sciences. But as this enterprise apto be a very great one, I waited until I hadan age so mature that I could not hopeI should be better fitted to

my design. This reason caused me to delayI should feel that I was doing wrongI to occupy in deliberation the time that yetthen, since very

plan I have in view I have de-my mind from every care [and am happily

no passions] and since I have procuredan assured leisure in a peaceable retireI shall at last seriously and freely address

my formerNow for this object it is not necessary that I

false- shallnever arrive at this end. But inasmuchpersuades me that I ought no

my assent from mattersnot entirely certain and indubitable than

appear to me manifestly to beif I am able to find in each one some reason

my rejectingAnd for that end it will not be requisite

in particular, whichan endless undertaking; for owing to

the destruction of the foundations ofwith it the downfall of the rest

in the first place attackupon which all my former opin

All that up to the present time I have acceptedas most true and certain I have learned either fromthe senses or through the senses; but it is sometimes proved to me that these senses are deceptive, and it is wiser not to trust entirely to anything by which we have once been deceived.But it may be that although the senses sometimes deceive us concerning things which arehardly perceptible, or very far away, there are yet

many others to be met with as to which we cannotreasonably have any doubt, although we recognize them by their means. For example, there isthe fact that I am here, seated by the fire, attiredin a dressing gown, having this paper in my handsand other similar matters. And how could I denythat these hands and this body are mine, were itnot perhaps that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebella are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of blackbile, that they constantly assure us that they thinkthey are kings when they are really quite poor, orthat they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who imagine that theyhave an earthenware head or are nothing butpumpkins or are made of glass. But they are mad,and I should not be any the less insane were I tofollow examples so extravagant.At the same time I must remember that I am aman, and that consequently I am in the habit ofsleeping, and in my dreams representing to myselfthe same things or sometimes even less probablethings, than do those who are insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to methat in the night I dreamt that I found myself inthis particular place, that I was dressed and seatednear the fire, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed At this moment it does indeedseem to me that it is with eyes awake that I amlooking at this paper; that this head which I moveis not asleep, that it is deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; whathappens in sleep does not appear so clear nor sodistinct as does all this. But in thinking over this Iremind myself that on many occasions I have insleep .been deceived by similar illusions, and indwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications bywhich we may clearly distinguish wakefulness


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that I am lost in astonishment. And my kind which only treat of things that are veryis such that it is almost capable of simple and very general, without taking greatI now dream. trouble to ascertain whether they are actually ex-fr: iow let us assume that we are asleetand that istent or not, contain some measure of certaintythat we open our eyes, and an element of the indubitable. For whether I

our head extend our hands and so on are am awake or asleep, two and three together al-false delusi


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re is nothing in all that I formerly believed to beof which I cannot in some measure doubtthat not merely through want of thought orlevity but for reasons which are very

and maturely considered; so that hence-ought not the less carefully refrain from

than to thatch is manifestly false if I desire to arrive at anyBut it is not sufficient to have made these re-

we must also be careful to keep them inFor these ancient and commonly held opin-ill revert frequently to my mind long andiliar custom having given them the right to oc-mind against my inclination and ren-almost masters of my belief; nor will I

the habit of deferring to them or of plac-confidence in them so long as I consideras they really are i.e. opinions in some mea-doubtful as I have just shown and at thetime highly probable so that there is mucheason to believe in than to deny them. That

why I consider that I shall not be acting amisstaking of set purpose a contrary belief I allowbe deceived and for a certain time pre-

that all these opinions are entirely false andry until at last having thus balanced mywith my latter [so that they can-divert my opinions more to one side than to

my judgment will no longer be domi-by bad usage or turned away from the right

am assured thatneither peril nor error in this coursethat I cannot at present yfeld too much to dis-since I am not considering the question of

but only of knowledge.I shall then suppose not that God who is su-and the fountain of truth but some

not less powerful than deceitful hasin deceiving me; I

that the heavens the earth colourssound and all other external things are

but the illusions and dreams of which thishas availed himself in order to lay traps forcredulity; I shall consider myself as having

hands no eyes no flesh no blood nor anys yet falsely believing myself to possess allthings; I shall remain obstinately attached to

this idea and if by this means it is not in my powerto arrive at the knowledge of any truth I may atleast do what is in my power [i.e. suspend myjudgment] and with firm purpose avoid givingcredence to any false thing or being imposedupon by this arch deceiver however powerful anddeceptive he may be. But this task is a laboriousone and insensibly a certain lassitude leads meinto the course of my ordinary life. And just as acaptive who in sleep enjoys an imaginary libertywhen he begins to suspect that his liberty is but adream fears to awaken and conspires with theseagreeable illusions that the deception may be pro-longed so insensibly of my own accord I fall backinto my former opinions and I dread awakeningfrom this slumber lest the laborious wakefulnesswhich would follow the tranquility of this reposeshould have to be spent not in daylight but in theexcessive darkness of the difficulties which havejust been discussed.

Meditation II. f the ature of theHuman Mind; and That t s MoreEasily Known Than the BodyThe Meditation of yesterday filled my mind withso many doubts that it is no longer in my power toforget them. And yet I do not see in what mannerI can resolve them; and just as if I had all of asudden fallen into very deep water I am so dis-concerted that I can neither make certain of settingmy feet on the bottom nor can I swim and so sup-port myself on the surface. I shall neverthelessmake an effort and follow anew the same path asthat on which I yesterday entered i.e. I shall pro-ceed by setting aside all that in which the leastdoubt could be supposed to exist just as if I haddiscovered that it was absolutely false; and I shallever follow in this road until I have met withsomething which is certain or at least if I can donothing else until I have learned for certain thatthere is nothing in the world that is certain. Archi-medes in order that he might draw the terrestrialglobe out of its place and transport it elsewhere


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only that one point should be fixed andovable; in the same way I shall have the rightam happy enough to

one thing only which is certain andI suppose then that all the things that I see

persuade myself that nothing has everll that my fallacious memory representsno senses; I imagthat body figure extension movement and

but the fictions of my mind. What thenis nothing in the world that is

But how can I know there is not somethingof which one cannot have the slightestIs there not some God or some other being

who puts these renot necessary for

not possible that I am capable of producingmyself? I myself am I not at least somehad sensesbody. Yet I hesitate for what follows fromI so dependent on body and senses that

without these? But I was persuadedin all the world that thereno heaven no earth that there were no

nor any bodies: was I not then likewisethat I did not exist? Not at all; of apersuaded myself

thought ofis some deceiver or otherand very cunning who ever ems his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then withoutI exist also if he deceives me and let him

much as he will he can never causebe nothing so long as I think that I am someSo that after having reflected well and careexamined all things we must come to thee conclusion that this proposition: I am Iis necessarily true each time that I proce it or that I mentally conceive it.But I do not yet know clearly enough what Iwho am certain that I am; and hence I must

do not imprudently takeother object in place of myself and thus that

not go astray in respect of this knowledge thatand most evident of

all that I have formerly learned. That is why I shallnow consider anew what I believed myself to bebefore I embarked upon these last reflections; andof my former opinions I shall withdraw all thatmight even in a small degree be invalidated by thereasons which I have just brought forward in order that there may be nothing at all left beyondwhat is absolutely certain and indubitable.What then did I formerly believe myself to be?Undoubtedly I believed myself to be a man. Butwhat is a man? Shall I say a reasonable animal?Certainly not; for then I should have to inquirewhat an animal is and what is reasonable; andthus from a single question I should insensibly fallinto an infinitude of others more difficult; and Ishould not wish to waste the little time and leisureremaining to me in trying to unravel subtleties likethese. But I shall rather stop here to consider thethoughts which of themselves spring up in mymind and which were not inspired by anythingbeyond my own nature alone when I applied myself to the consideration of my being. In the firstplace then I considered myself as having a facehands arms and all that system of members composed of bones and flesh as seen in a corpse whichI designated by the name of body. In addition tothis I considered that I was nourished that Iwalked that I felt and that I thought and I referred all these actions to the soul: but I did notstop to consider what the soul was or if I did stopI imagined that it was something extremely rareand subtle like a wind a flame or an ether whichwas spread throughout my grosser parts. As tobody I had no manner of doubt about its naturebut thought I had a very clear knowledge of it; andif I had desired to explain it according to the notions that I had then formed of it I should havedescribed it thus: By the body I understand all thatwhich can be defined by a certain figure: something which can be confined in a certain place andwhich can fill a given space in such a way that every other body will be excluded from it; which canbe perceived either by touch or by sight or byhearing or by taste or by smell; which can bemoved in many ways not in truth by itself butby something which is foreign to it by which it istouched [and from which it receives impressions]:for to have the power of self-movement as also offeeling or of thinking I did not consider to apper-


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on the contrary, I wasthat faculties similar toexisted in some bodies.

But what am I now that I suppose that thereif I may say so, malicious, who employs all

Can I affirm that Isaid pertain to the nature of body? I pause to

my mind,I find none of which I can say that it pertainst would be tedious to stop to enumerate

the attributes of soul and seeany one which is in me? What of nutri

or walking [the first mentioned]? But if it is soI have no body it is also true that I can neithernor take nourishment. Another attribute is

one cannot feel without body, andthought I perceived many thingssleep that I recognised in my waking monot having been experienced at all. Whatfind here that thought is an attributebelongs to me; it alone cannot be separated

howwhen I think; for it might possibly becase if I ceased entirely to think, that I should

do not nowanything which is not necessarily true: toaccurately I am not more than a thing whichthat is to say a mind or a soul, or an un-

or a reason, which are terms whosewas formerly unknown to me. I am,

and really exist; but whathave answered: a thing which thinks.And what more? I shall exercise my imagina

order to see if I am not something more]. Ia collection of members which we call thebody: I am not a subtle air distributedthese members, I am not a wind, a fire, a

or anything at all which I canor conceive; because I have assumed that

thatthat I only leave myself certain

am somewhat. But perhaps it isthese same things which I supposed wereunknown to me, are

not different from the self which I know. Isure about this, I shall not dispute about itjudgment on things that are

known to me. I know that I exist, and I inquirewhat I am, I whom I know to exist. But it is verycertain that the knowledge of my existence takenin its precise significance does not depend onthings whose existence is not yet known to me;consequently it does not depend on those whichI can feign in imagination. And indeed the veryterm feign in imagination proves to me my error,for I really do this if I image myself a something,since to imagine is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a corporeal thing.But I already know for certain that I am, and thatit may be that all these images, and, speakinggenerally, all things that relate to the nature ofbody are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. Forthis reason I see clearly that I have as little reasonto say, I shall stimulate my imagination in orderto know more distinctly what I am, than if I wereto say, I am now awake, and I perceive somewhatthat is real and true; but because I do not yet perceive it distinctly enough, I shall go to sleep of express purpose, so that my dreams may representthe perception with greatest truth and evidence.And, thus, I know for certain that nothing of allthat I can understand by means of my imaginationbelongs to this knowledge which I have of myself,and that it is necessary to recall the mind from thismode of thought with the utmost diligence in order that it may be able to know its own nature withperfect distinctness.

But what then am I? A thing which thinks.What is a thing which thinks? t is a thing whichdoubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies,wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels.Certainly it is no small matter if all thesethings pertain to my nature. But why should theynot so pertain? Am I not that being who nowdoubts nearly everything, who nevertheless un-derstands certain things, who affirms that oneonly is true, who denies all the others, who desires to know more, is averse from being deceived,who imagines many things, sometimes indeed despite his will, and who perceives many likewise,as by the intervention of the bodily organs? Isthere nothing in all this which is as true as it iscertain that I exist, even though I should alwayssleep and though he who has given me being employed all his ingenuity in deceiving me? Is therelikewise any one of these attributes which can be


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my thought, or which mightI who doubt, who under-

and who desire, that there is no reason hereadd anything to explain it. And I have certainly

happen as I formerly supposed) that none ofpower of imagining does not cease to be really

and it forms part of my thought. Finally, Ithe same who feels, that is to say, who per-by the organs of sense,

in truth I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat.be said that these phenomena are falsethat I am dreaming. Let it be so; still it is at

and that I feel heat. Thatt be false; properly speaking it is what is inand used in this precise senseis no other thing than thinking.From this time I begin to know what I am with

and distinction than before;nevertheless it still seems to me, and I can-prevent myself from thinking, that corporeal

whose images are framed by thought,the senses, are much more

known than that obscure part of menot come under the imagination. Al-really it is very strange to say that I know

understand more distinctly these things whoseto me, and which do not belong to me,others of the truth of which I am convinced,

known to me and which pertain to myin a word, than myself. But I see

how the case stands: my mind loves toand cannot yet suffer itself to be retained

the just limits of truth. Very good, let uswhen

the proper occasion for pull-up it may the more easily be regulated andLet us begin by considering the commonest

we believe to be the most dis-and see; not indeed bodies in general,but let us consider one body in particu-us take, for example, this piece of wax: it

has been taken quite freshly from the hive, and ithas not yet lost the sweetness of the honey whichit contains; it still retains somewhat of the odourof the flowers from which it has been culled; itscolour, its figure, its size are apparent; it is hard,cold, easily handled, and if you strike it with thefinger, it will emit a sound. Finally all the thingswhich are requisite to cause us distinctly to recog-nise a body, are met with in it. But notice thatwhile I speak and approach the fire what remainedof the taste is exhaled, the smell evaporates, thecolour alters, the figure is destroyed, the size in-creases, it becomes liquid, it heats, scarcely canone handle it, and when one strikes it, no soundis emitted. Does the same wax remain after thischange? e must confess that it remains; nonewould judge otherwise. What then did I know sodistinctly in this piece of wax? t could certainlybe nothing of all that the senses brought to my no-tice, since all these things which fall under taste,smell, sight, touch, and hearing, are found to bechanged, and yet the same wax remains.Perhaps it was what I now think, viz, that thiswax was not that sweetness of honey, nor thatagreeable scent of flowers, nor that particularwhiteness, nor that figure, nor that sound butsimply a body which a little while before appearedto me as perceptible under these forms, and whichis now perceptible under others. But what, pre-cisely, is it that I imagine when I form such con-ceptions? Let us attentively consider this, and ab-stracting from all that does not belong to the wax,let us see what remains. Certainly nothing remainsexcepting a certain extended thing which is flex-ible and movable. But what is the meaning of flex-ible and movable? Is it not that I imagine that thispiece of wax being round is capable of becomingsquare and of passing from a square to a triangularfigure? No, certainly it is not that, since I imagineit admits of an infinitude of similar changes, and Inevertheless do not know how to compass the in-finitude by my imagination, and consequently thisconception which I have of the wax is not broughtabout by the faculty of imagination. What now isthis extension? Is it not also unknown? For it be-comes greater when the wax is melted, greaterwhen it is boiled, and greater still when the heatincreases; and I should not conceive [clearly] ac-cording to truth what wax is, if I did not think that


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that we are considering is capablein extension than I

We must then grant that Inot even understand through the imagina-

what this piece of wax is, and that it is myalone which perceives it. I say this piece ofin general it is yet

what is this piece of wax which cannotunderstood excepting by the [understanding

t is certainly the same that I see, touch,and finally it is the same which I have

the beginning. Butparticularly be observed is that its per-an act of vision, nor of touch,of imagination, and has never been such al-it may have appeared formerly to be so,only an intuition of the mind which may be

and confused as it was formerly, or cleardistinct as it is at present, according as myor less directed to the elements

found in it, and of which it is composed.Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonishedI consider [the great feebleness of mind] and

proneness to fall [insensibly] into error; for al-without giving expression to my thoughts

my own mind words oftenme and I am almost deceived by the termswe say that we see theand not that we simplyit is the same from its having the same

and figure. From this I should conclude thatthe wax by means of vision and not simply

by chance Iwhen looking from a window and

men who pass in the street , I really dosee them, but infer that what I see is men justthat I see wax. And yet what do I see from

window but hats and coats which may coverYet I judge these to be men.similarly solely by the faculty of judgment

my mind, I comprehend that whichwith my eyes.A man who makes it his aim to raise hise above the common should be ashamedthe occasion for doubting from the forms

passand consider whether I had a more evident and

what the wax was when It perceived it, and when I believed I knew it by

means of the external senses or at least by the com-mon sense as it is called, that is to say by theimaginative faculty, or whether my present con-ception is clearer now that I have most carefullyexamined what it is, and in what way it can beknown. t would certainly be absurd to doubt as tothis. For what was there in this first perceptionwhich was distinct? What was there which mightnot as well have been perceived by any of the ani-mals? But when I distinguish the wax from its ex-ternal forms, and when just as i f I had taken fromit its vestments, I consider it quite naked it is cer-tain that although some error may still be found inmy judgment I can nevertheless not perceive itthus without a human mind.But finally what shall I say of this mind thatis, of myself, for up to this point I do not admit inmyself anything but mind? What then I who seemto perceive this piece of wax so distinctly, do I notknow myself, not only with much more truth andcertainty, but also with much more distinctnessand clearness? For if I judge that the wax is or ex-ists from the fact that I see it, it certainly followsmuch more clearly that I am or that I exist myselffrom the fact that I see it. For it may be that what Isee is not really wax, it may also be that I do notpossess eyes with which to see anything; but itcannot be that when I see, or (for I no longer takeaccount of the distinction) when I think I see, thatI myself who think am nought. So if I judge thatthe wax exists from the fact that I touch it, thesame thing will follow, to wit, that I am; and if Ijudge that my imagination, or some other cause,whatever it is, persuades me that wax exists, Ishall still conclude the same. And what I have hereremarked of wax may be applied to all other thingswhich are external to me [and which are met withoutside of me]. And further, if the [notion or] per-ception of wax has seemed to me clearer and moredistinct, not only after the sight or the touch, butalso after many other causes have rendered it quitemanifest to me, with how much more [evidence]and distinctness must it be said that I now knowmyself, since all the reasons which contribute tothe knowledge of wax, or any other body what-ever, are yet better proofs of the nature of mymind And there are so many other things in themind itself which may contribute to the elucida-tion of its nature, that those which depend on


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Rene Descartes

as these just mentioned, hardly meritinto account.But finally here I am, having insensibly repoint I desired, for, since it is now

not properlyknown by the senses or by the faculty of

but by the understanding only, andnot known from the fact that they

or touched, but only because they are unI see clearly that there is nothing whichknow than my mind. But be

is difficult to rid oneself so promptly ofopinion to which one was accustomed for sold halt a little at thisby the length of my meditation I may

on my memory this new

III fGodHe Existsnow close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I

my senses, I shall efface evenmy thoughts all the images of corporealor at least for that is hardly possible) I shallthem as vain and false; and thus holding

and considering mynature, I shall try little by little to reach a betand a more familiar acquain

am a thing that thinks,that is ignorant of many [that

that alsoand perceives; for as I remarked before,and imagine

perhaps nothing at all apart from me and inam nevertheless assured that these

thought that I call perceptions and, inasmuch only as they are modes ofht, certainly reside [and are met with] in me.And in the little that I have just said, I think Isummed up all that I really know, or at least

ordermy knowledge further, I shall nowaround more carefully and see whether I can-

not still discover in myself some other thingswhich I have not hitherto perceived. I am certainthat I am a thing which thinks; but do I not thenlikewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth? Certainly in this first knowledgethere is nothing that assures me of its truth excepting the clear and distinct perception of thatwhich I state, which would not indeed suffice toassure me that what I say is true, i it could everhappen that a thing which I conceived so clearlyand distinctly could be false; and accordingly itseems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive veryclearly and very distinctly are true.At the same time I have before received andadmitted many things to be very certain and manifest, which yet I afterwards recognised as beingdubious. What then were these things? They werethe earth, sky, stars and all other objects which Iapprehended by means of the senses. But whatdid I clearly [and distinctly] perceive in them?Nothing more than that the ideas or thoughts ofthese things were presented to my mind. And noteven now do I deny that these ideas are met within me. But there was yet another thing which I affirmed, and which, owing to the habit which I hadformed of believing it, I thought I perceived veryclearly, although in truth I did not perceive it at all,to wit, that there were objects outside of me fromwhich these ideas proceeded, and to which theywere entirely similar. And it was in this that Ierred, or, if perchance my judgment was correct,this was not due to any knowledge arising frommy perception.But when I took anything very simple andeasy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry intoconsideration, e.g. that two and three togethermade five, and other things of the sort, were notthese present to my mind so clearly as to enableme to affirm that they were true? Certainly if Ijudged that since such matters could be doubted,this would not have been so for any other reasonthan that it came into my mind that perhaps a Godmight have endowed me with such a nature that Imay have been deceived even concerning thingswhich seemed to me most manifest. But everytime that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought,I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him,

meditations one and two

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