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THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL 1990

Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, I989

FIJI

The year began with a pledge byInterim Prime Minister Ratu Sir Kami­sese Mara that a new consitution"acceptable to the majority of the peo­ple" would be promulgated before hisgovernment's term expired on 5December. The Constitutional Inquiryand Advisory Committee, appointedby cabinet in October 1988, continuedits public hearings on the so-calleddraft constitution in the first half of theyear, receiving a total of 209 submis­sions. This opportunity to commentpublicly on the draft constitutionserved as a catalyst for political mobili­zation at all levels of society.

The strong opposition voiced by theNational Federation Party/Labourcoalition and by many Indian organiza­tions was expected, since the draft con­stitution was designed to formally dis­criminate against the Indo-Fijianpopulation. But the criticisms of amuch wider cross-section of the public(including ethnic Fijians) must haveconcerned the government. There wasclearly no consensus on the constitu­tion, even among the traditionally con­servative Fijian provincial councils,some of which argued that it did not gofar enough to protect Fijian interests.

Two issues were of particular signif­icance in undermining Fijian unity, orperhaps more accurately, exposing themyth of Fijian unity. The first con­cerned the proposed "rights and repre­sentation" of Fijians from western VitiLevu (Fiji's largest island). Building ona long history of grievances stemming

from the domination of Fijian politicsby eastern chiefs, western leadersdeclared the creation of a fourth (west­ern) confederacy, the Yasayasa Vakara.This challenged the chiefly status quo,which was built on three confederacies.However, western Fijians were notunited over the issue. A group closelyaligned to the deposed coalition gov­ernment and its leader, Dr TimociBavadra, was strongly crictical of thedraft constitution's provisions for west­ern Fiji. Other advocates of the fourthconfederacy supported the interim gov­ernment and, with few reservations,the draft constitution.

This issue presented the interim gov­ernment with a dilemma. If the Councilof Chiefs was called into session to dis­cuss the confederacy proposal, the con­stitution could also be discussed. Butthis raised the question of whether thecouncil should be convened as threeconfederacies or four. (A restructuringof the council in 1987 meant that repre­sentation at council meetings was nowbased on confederacies.) The interimgovernment chose to shelve the issue toavoid a possible major confrontationbetween supporters and opponents ofthe fourth confederacy. Since theCouncil of Chiefs was to be the finalarbiter of the new constituion, thisdecision also served to delay any actionon the draft constitution.

The second divisive issue centeredon the role of Christian religion in theproposed new political system. Thecommitment to the "teachings of theLord Jesus Christ" in the preamble ofthe draft constitution reflected the

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wishes of Methodist fundamentalists,who wield influence in the army and inthe Fijian (taukei) nationalist move­ment. The interim government hadalso supported fundamentalist senti­ment by adopting a Sunday Observ­ance Decree that banned all publicactivity and work on Sunday. Pressureson the government to relax the decreehad led to some lifting of restrictions inlate 1988, a move bitterly opposed bysome Methodist leaders.

The rift within the Methodistchurch, between militant fundamental­ists and a more moderate faction, deep­ened in January when General Secre­tary Manasa Lasaro was dismissed fororganizing roadblocks to protest therelaxation of the Sunday ObservanceDecree. But in February, the militantfaction instigated a "palace coup,"replacing president Josateki Koroi withhardliner Isireli Caucau, suspendingthe church constitution, and installinga new governing council. Lasaro wasreinstated as general secretary.Attempts by the interim government toheal the rift failed, and Koroi won acourt order supporting his position aspresident. Lasaro was convicted ofcontempt of court for ignoring thecourt order, and in May received athree-month suspended jail sentence.

Largely to reassure cane farmers,the government suspended most of theprovisions of the Sunday ObservanceDecree on 30 May, although bans ontrading and organized sport remainedin force. The decision fueled the fires ofMethodist fundamentalism, or perhapsmore accurately, the power strugglewithin the church. Despite their sus­pended jail sentences, Lasaro and hisfollowers began a roadblock campaign

359

in the northern town of Labasa thatwas designed to disrupt the transportof cane on Sundays. Fifty-seven mili­tants were arrested and jailed for up tosix months in late July.

In early August General Rabukaauthorized the release of all the jailedmilitants under Compulsory Supervi­sion Orders. This dramatic interven­tion not only signaled Rabuka's defi­ance of Ratu Mara and governmentpolicy, and his own collaboration withthe Methodist militants, but also chal­lenged the integrity of the legal process.The expected showdown with RatuMara was averted as the interim gov­ernment turned its attention to thereport of the Constitutional Inquiryand Advisory Committee, which waspresented to the president at the end ofAugust, and to the visit by FrenchPrime Minister Michel Rocard in thesame month.

Although the committee's reportwas not publicly released until 20 Sep­tember, its contents were known wellbefore then. It recommended somechanges to "controversial" provisionsin the draft constitution. Theseincluded removing the army com­mander from government, diluting thereference to religion in the preamble,and checking the power of the execu­tive on the issue of citizenship. But thecommittee reaffirmed the "inevitabledisparity" of Fijian and Indian politicalrepresentation and recommended onlymarginal changes to the distribution of .seats in parliament. The communalelectoral system would remain the onlyform of voting. In an apparent conces­sion to the calls for greater "protection"of Fijian interests and greater powersfor the Fijian chiefs, the report recom-

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

mended a second chamber of parlia­ment, to be called the Senate of Chiefs.This would comprise nominees of theCouncil of Chiefs and have power ofveto over laws affecting Fijian land andcustomary rights. In addition, the com­mittee recommended the creation of atwelve-member President's AdvisoryCouncil comprising heads of the Con­federacies, former heads of state, andother "distinguished citizens."

Predictably, reaction to the reportwas mixed. Cautious voices advocatedsupport on the grounds that it was thebest that could be hoped for. Coalitionleaders, and later a constitutional sum­mit of Indo-Fijians, rejected the recom­mendations, as they had rejected thedraft constitution, for entrenchingracial discrimination and denyingequal rights to a majority of the citizensof Fiji.

Meanwhile, concern that the armymight take matters into its own handsmounted when a report that had beenpresented to the prime minister andpresident in May was leaked to thepress in late September. This detailedanalysis of Fiji's problems, by a groupof army officers led by GeneralRabuka, recommended that a newinterim government succeed the exist­ing one; elections be postponed for upto fifteen years; the army commanderbe given more executive authority;government be restructured based onthe Fijian administration and custom­ary law; a state religion be imposed;the trade unions be suspended; landtenure law be revised to favor land­lords rather than tenants; and thatforeign policy be reoriented towardSoutheast Asia, the United States, andFrance, and away from the British

Commonwealth. In the event, bothRatu Mara and General Rabuka indi­cated their support for the report of theConstitutional Inquiry and AdvisoryCommittee, but not what they woulddo with it.

On 29 September, Ratu Mara endedmany months of speculation bydeclaring his intention to stay in officefor up to two more years, at whichtime a new constitution would be putin place and elections held. This sug­gested that a constitution would not bepromulgated for at least a year. RatuMara's decision to postpone his retire­ment was contingent on GeneralRabuka and the other military officersin government choosing between poli­tics and the army. Within a week,Rabuka stated his intention to resign asminister for home affairs and return tothe barracks.

The prospect of a continuation ofthe political status quo was welcomedby the business community, which hadclearly been favored by the economicpolicies of the interim government.Wage restrictions remained in placewhile the government continued towithhold recognition of the Fiji TradesUnion Congress and encourage raciallybased splinter unions. Privatization ofstatutory bodies was promoted andderegulation of the manufacturingsector mooted. Tax-free factoriesflourished. The economy was expectedto grow by 3.7 percent in 1990.

However, discontent with the pros­pect of a continuation of Mara's rulewas apparent in other quarters. Thecoalition voiced its suspicion that RatuMara had no intention of relinquishingpower, noting his refusal to engage in adialogue with them regarding the con-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

stitution and possible power sharing.Far more troubling was the response ofextremists within the Methodist churchand Fijian nationalist movement.Opposed to both Ratu Mara and theConstitutional Inquiry and AdvisoryCommittee recommendations, theseextremists favored "solutions" similarto those proposed by the army officersin May. Their radicalism was demon­strated on 15 October when a Muslimmosque and three Hindu temples weregutted by firebombs in the western cityof Lautoka. These attacks were part ofa nation-wide campaign aimed ostensi­bly at opposing the relaxation of theSunday Observance Decree, but moregenerally at undermining the interimgovernment and perhaps at precipitat­ing military intervention.

To the Indo-Fijian population, theLautoka firebombings were violationsof immeasurable proportion. Commu­nal unity was forged. Shops, busi­nesses, and schools closed to demon­strate mourning and solidarity.University students stayed away fromclasses. Celebrations marking theHindu festival of light, Diwali, werecanceled. However, calm was main­tained and the feared spiral of violencefailed to materialize. Instead the coun­try was plunged into a different kind ofmourning by the death from cancer ofcoalition leader, Dr Timoci Bavadra,on 3 November.

No single event since the coup hashad such a momentous impact. DrBavadra's funeral at the chiefly villageofViseisei was witnessed by one of thelargest gatherings in Fiji's history. Upto sixty thousand people attended ortried to attend. The event was testa­ment to the strength of support for Dr

Bavadra as well as the cause withwhich he was identified.

The loss of Dr Bavadra's leadershipwas regarded as a major challenge andsetback for the coalition. However,within weeks Adi Kuini Bavadra, DrBavadra's widow and a high chief, wasnamed the movement's new leader.This bold and astute move promised toretain the coalition's multiracial fol­lowing and the loyalty that Dr Bavadrahad inspired.

If members of the interim govern­ment felt uncomfortable having torespect and accommodate the mourn­ing of the deposed prime minister itwas not evident. Both the presidentand the interim prime minister wereoverseas at the time. The army wasspared the embarrassing task of givinga state funeral to the prime minister itdeposed when Dr Bavadra's family andelders refused the cabinet's reluctantoffer.

The state funeral of the former gov­ernor general and Vunivalu (para­mount chief of Fiji), Ratu Sir GeorgeCakobau, preoccupied the army andthe government as the year drew to aclose. There were few murmurs of sur­prise when the interim government'sterm was extended another month (to 5January 1990) in deference to the pass­ing ofthe Vunivalu. Indeed, somewould recognize the move as the famil­iar political tactic of buying time.

SANDRA TARTE

NEW CALEDONIA

At the beginning of 1989 New Caledo­nia was more peaceful than it had beenfor many months. The Matignon

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

Accord, that had brought the pro-inde­pendence coalition, the Front de Liber­ation Nationale Kanake et Socialiste(FLNKS), and the "loyalist" Rassemble­ment pour la CaLedonie dans LaRepublique (RPCR) toward a tentativeagreement, had been signed andapproved in a national referendum;overt violence was no longer apparent;new financial benefits were tricklinginto the territory; and high worldnickel prices had rejuvenated the min­ing industry after years of depression.Both the FLNKS and the RPCR sought togain Melanesian support throughgreater economic development in ruralareas.

Inside New Caledonia, however, thestability was uncertain as there was dis­sidence within the FLNKS, notably fromYann-Celene Uregei's Front Uni deLiberation Kanake (FULK), and fromthe more radical Parti de LiberationKanake (PALIKA). The loyalist side wasalso under some pressure from theright-wing Front National, which hadexperienced renewed support in 1988.Early in the year the FLNKS stronglycriticized the French government's revi­sion of the electoral rolls, and objectedto the restricted roll being used only forthe 1998 referendum on independence,and not for intervening elections. Out­side New Caledonia there was strongsupport for the Matignon Accord.Vanuatu conceded that France had arole to play in the region. BothVanuatu and Australia drew closer toFrance, and France increased its aid tothe region, especially to Fiji. Forty­seven Kanak militants were releasedfrom jail, and New Caledonia entereda period of convalescence.

In the March municipal elections

there was increased support for thepro-independence parties and a setbackfor RPCR leader Jacques Lafleur inDumbea. The turnout was just under70 percent, rather higher than the 63percent for the previous year's referen­dum on the Matignon Accord. TheFLNKS improved on its performance inthe 1983 elections, winning twenty ofthe thirty-two municipalities. Althoughthe largest party in the FLNKS coalition,Jean-Marie Tjibaou's Union Caledo­nienne (UC), claimed about 53 percentof the pro-independence votes, itappeared to have lost ground toPALIKA, which emerged as the secondlargest party in the FLNKS. The FULK

scored poorly except in the LoyaltyIslands. The RPCR lost its monopoly inNoumea, with UC gaining a seat andthree right-wing parties gaining sevenseats (PR, 16 March 1989). DissidentWallisians and Futunans, who had usu­ally supported the RPCR, ran their owncandidates and did well in Paita. In theeast-coast towns of Poindimie andPonerihouen there were violent dis­putes between different parties withinthe FLNKS over the outcome of the elec­tions.

The prevailing mood of cautiousoptimism was rudely shattered by themurder of the president and vice-presi­dent of the FLNKS, Jean-Marie Tjibaouand Yeiwene Yeiwene, on 4 May 1989in Ouvea. They had gone to Ouvea fora custom ceremony to mark the end ofone year's mourning for the victims ofthe Ouvea violence. The two were shotby Djoubelli Wea, a local pro-indepen­dence leader, previously a member ofFULK and PALIKA, who was unhappywith the signing of the MatignonAccord and concerned that indepen-

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dence had effectively been postponedindefinitely. He was shot and killed byTjibaou's bodyguards.

The assassinations struck the politi­cal movement a grievous blow. In NewCaledonia, as elsewhere in Melanesia,politics is very much about personali­ties. The Melanesian leader who abso­lutely dominated New Caledonia poli­tics throughout the turbulent 1980swas Jean-Marie Tjibaou. Even the dep­uty leader of FLNKS, Yeiwene Yeiwene,was largely unknown outside NewCaledonia. Tjibaou was also leader ofthe UC, the longest established politi­cal party in New Caledonia, and theonly party with support throughout theterritory. Perhaps two-thirds of all pro­independence Kanaks are members.Throughout the five-year existence ofthe FLNKS, and even when the stageseemed set for an independent Kanaky,there were regional and other divisionswithin the coalition. Tjibaou was ableto cope with dissent and division andforged a united front on most of theissues that were crucial to achieving thetimetable for independence.

Tjibaou was born in 1934 in theTiendanite valley, inland fromHienghene, where he later becamemayor. He went to a Catholic school atCanala, studied sociology at the Sor­bonne, and attended a seminary inPaita. After a decade he dropped out ofthe priesthood, married Marie-ClaudeWetta, and became leader of the UnionCaledonienne in 1977. He was brieflyvice-president of the Territorial Assem­bly in 1982. Yeiwene was born in 1945in Mare. He became a member of theTerritorial Assembly in 1977, was thedeputy leader of the UC, one-timechairman of the Loyalty Islands region,

and chairman of the domestic airline,Air Caledonie.

Both the UC and the FLNKS faced thechallenge of finding new leaders, andparticularly of uniting the FLNKS for thelong and difficult road to indepen­dence. It proved to be an arduous taskfor a coalition that had for too longassumed that Tjibaou would always bethere. By the end of 1989 no decisionhad been made regarding the FLNKS

leader. The FULK was further margina­lized when it failed to condemn themurders. There was dissent on when acongress should be held, and strongviews that the leadership of the FLNKS

should come from a party other thanthe uc. The always hesitant unity ofthe FLNKS was severely threatened, as ithad previously been by the MatignonAccord, the municipal elections, andthe frustration of waging a long andbitter struggle with so little reward.Leadership is likely to impose severeburdens; few of the potential candi­dates have the stature of Tjibaou, areknown to be as moderate, and appearto be capable of achieving consistentunity.

Two weeks after the murders theexecutive of the UC chose as its newleader Fran~ois Burck, the last survivorof the group that in 1977 had led theUC to demand independence. The oth­ers, Tjibaou, Eloi Machoro, and PierreDeclercq, have all died in tragic cir­cumstances. Burck was born inNoumea in 1939, the son of a part­Melanesian father and a Europeanmother, thus claiming "Kanak rootsand European branches" (Le Monde,22 May 1989). Like his close friend Tji­baou, he was a former Catholic priest,and he promised to continue the poli-

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. FALL I990

cies of Tjibaou and Yeiwene. But bystressing that he sought "independencefor everyone," he distanced himselffrom the "Kanak independence" thathad previously been demanded.

New provincial elections were heldin June. Again nearly 70 percent of theelectorate took part in the poll, whichpredictably gave the RPCR an absolutemajority in the South (based onNoumea), and the FLNKS equally con­vincing majorities in the North and theLoyalty Islands. However, most of theprovincial seats were allocated to UCmembers, especially in the LoyaltyIslands, thus alienating members ofother parties in the FLNKS, principallyPALIKA. The presidents of the Northand Loyalty Islands, Leopold Joredieand Richard Kaloi, are both from theUC. With control of 27 of the 54 seats,the RPCR just failed to get an absolutemajority in the territorial congress.The FULK opposed the elections, but apromised active boycott failed to mate­rialize. The hard-line Front National,which had opposed the MatignonAccord, won three seats in the South;two other seats were won by theextreme right wing Caledonie Demain.Center parties had no impact, althougha new party, Union Oceanienne, repre­senting Wallis and Futuna Islanders,won two seats in the South, indicatingsupport for their view that migrantshad been ignored in the MatignonAccord.

The annual conference of the Uniondes Syndicats des Travailleurs etKanaks Exploites (USTKE) decided byan overwhelming majority to leave theFLNKS coalition, partly out of disap­pointment with the Matignon Accord,but primarily in order to focus on

industrial and employment issues.Since the Group des Femmes KanakesExploitees en Lutte (GFKEL) is nolonger active, and Liberation KanakeSocialiste (LKS) remains outside thecoalition, the FLNKS is now composedof UC, PALIKA, and the relatively smallUnion Progressiste Metanesienne(UPM) and Parti Socialiste de Kanaky(PSK). The FULK also remains a mem­ber, despite talk of expulsion becauseof its opposition to the Accord.

On the economic front, nickel min­ing expanded substantially as pricesremained at their highest levels for adecade, and the New Caledonian Con­gress introduced new fiscal measures toencourage the industry. Tourism con­tinued the revival that began in I988,but numbers were still well below therecord levels of I984. A large new hotelopened at Ouemo (Noumea), andother smaller hotels were completed inPoe (Bourail), and in the LoyaltyIslands. Under the provisions of theMatignon Accord there was progresstoward setting up a port city at Nepouiin the north, and expanding employ­ment and training in rural areas. Oneof the most surprising economic eventswas the purchase of the Banque d'!ndo­suez in both French Polynesia and NewCaledonia by the Australian bankWestpac. This expanded Westpac'sbanking interests in the Pacific substan­tially, and made it the first foreignbank in New Caledonia. There wereother facets of economic change. Anincrease in overt unemployment, espe­cially among young urban Melanesiansand Polynesians, was attributed to"galloping demography and an inade­quate job market" and resulted in a sig­nificant increase in juvenile delin-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

quency and urban violence. The 1989census revealed that the populationhad grown to 164,000, with Melane­sians representing 45 percent of thetotal. There was little progress on landreform, despite repeated promises.

The year drew to a close with thepardoning of 26 Kanaks jailed after themurder of four gendarmes in April1988, the incident that had precipitatedthe Ouvea violence. Although opposedby the right wing, the amnesty indica­ted the further distancing of New Cale­donia from the violence of the immedi­ate past. The year ended as peacefullyas it had begun. But it had added onemore violent chapter to the recent his­tory of New Caledonia, and witnessedwhat apppeared to be the declining for­tunes of the FLNKS, despite its contin­ued electoral support.

JOHN CONNELL

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

This was Papua New Guinea's mostdifficult year since independence in1975. On Bougainville Island more thanfifty people died and many more wereinjured in clashes between securityforces and militant landowners nearthe giant Panguna copper and goldmine, and in outbursts of ethnic vio­lence between Bougainvilleans andmigrants from other provinces. Theforced closure of the mine in May 1989had serious economic consequences,especially for government revenues andthe country's balance of payments.More important, however, were thepolitical and social implications of theBougainville crisis. The national gov­ernment was unable to negotiate or

impose a solution, while the undisci­plined behavior of its security forcesserved to exacerbate existing ethnicand separatist tensions.

Growing dissatisfaction withBougainville Copper Limited'sresponse to certain long-standing griev­ances had led some landowners toadopt militant tactics in late 1988. Theinitial campaign of bombing and arsondirected against company property wasorchestrated by a group of landowners,led by a former mine employee, FrancisOna, who had become disenchantedwith the leadership and approach oftheir representative body, the PangunaLandowners Association. However,Ona's group, associated with the so­called new Panguna Landowners Asso­ciation, and based in Nasioi villagesclose to the mine, was not the only oneactive in 1989. Acts of violence werealso committed by individuals andgIOUpS in broad sympathy with Ona'santicompany and secessionist senti­ments, but pursuing their own particu­lar agendas (May 1989,23-25). Most ofthe action, which included the topplingof power pylons and shooting at trafficon the Port-Mine Access Road, wasdesigned to put the mine out of produc­tion.

While some landowners, notablythe officers of the trust fund set up in1980 to invest compensation paymentson behalf of landowners, the RoadMining Tailings Leases Trust (RMTL),were prepared to negotiate a settle­ment, Ona's group was still sticking toits original demands at the end of theyear. These included 50 percent of thetotal revenues generated by the minesince production commenced in 1972,and KIO billion to compensate for envi-

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

ronmental and social disruption. A callfor a referendum on secession forBougainville was added early in 1989.

Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliucontinued throughout the year to pressfor a negotiated settlement. The culmi­nation of these efforts was the so-calledpeace package, first announced in lateApril, that included provisions for thetransfer of half of the government's 20

percent share of equity in the miningcompany to the provincial governmentand landowners; a greater share ofmining royalties to go directly to thelandowners; an unconditional annualgrant to the provincial governmentequivalent to I percent of the grossvalue of minerals produced in the prov­ince; and a five-year program of sup­port for development projects in theprOVince.

The North Solomons ProvincialGovernment was prepared to acceptthe offer, despite the recommendationsof a provincial select committee that allnational government powers, exceptforeign affairs, defence, and some cen­tral banking functions, should bedevolved to the province. Some land­owner representatives were also pre­pared to sign the agreement, althoughone group, led by the secretary of theRTML, Lawrence Daveona, floated a"counter-proposal" that sought taxconcessions for RTML and the freetransfer of all of the government'sequity in the mine to the landowners.Despite numerous approaches by gov­ernment representatives and intermedi­aries, offers of safe-conduct, and cease­fires, Ona's group continued to rejectthe package out of hand, making nego­tiations conditional on the withdrawalof all security forces from the province.

During the first half of the year,Namaliu managed to stand firmagainst regular calls from within andwithout his government for a "militarysolution." In March, members of thePapua New Guinea Defence Forcewere sent in, but to assist police to con­trol extensive rioting sparked byclashes between Bougainvilleans andmigrants. There was no determinedoffensive against the militants untilJune, when the government orderedsecurity forces to "flush out" Ona andhis men, and activated constitutionalprovisions for a state of emergency. InJuly, the government announced plansto introduce an internment bill (laterwithdrawn after protests from studentsand others), and the first of the fourAustralian-donated Iroquois helicop­ters arrived to provide logistical sup­port for the security forces.'

Support for a "military solution"increased significantly after the chair ofthe provincial select committee on thecrisis, John Bika, was murdered bymasked gunmen on 12 September. Twodays later Minister of State and formerDefence Commander Ted Diro author­ized the security forces to use minesand booby traps to counter further sab­otage attempts. By the end of the year,two soldiers had apparently fallen vic­tim to these devices. In October, Colo­nel Leo Niua, widely regarded as ahardliner, replaced Colonel LimaDotaona as deputy controller of thestate of emergency (Standish 1989, 10).

At year's end Ona and his key sup­porters were still at large. The financialcost of the crisis was already enor­mous, and no solution was in sight.The state of emergency itself was esti­mated to have cost more than twelve

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

million kina. At the end of December,Bougainville Copper Limited finallyannounced plans to layoff most of itsemployees and to place the mine on a"care and maintenance" basis. With themine out of production, Papua NewGuinea was deprived of 19 percent ofits government revenue, 30 percent ofits exports by value, and some K200million per year in foreign exchangeearnings.

Other costs were harder to quantify,but equally important. Nearly fourthousand villagers had been evacuatedfrom troubled areas and were living in19 "care centers" in and around Arawa.Many non-Bougainvilleans had left theprovince. There was a growing sense ofoutrage among Bougainvilleans at theconduct of the security forces, espe­cially the police. Some sixteen hundreddwellings had been destroyed in raidson villages suspected of harboring mili­tants. Provincial premier Joseph Kabuiand one of his ministers, MichaelLaimo, had been beaten by riot policein July, with Laimo losing an eye as aresult. In April 1989, the widelyrespected human rights group,Amnesty International, began docu­menting cases of ill-treatment, torture,and unlawful killing at the hands of thesecurity forces. By December they hadlaunched a letter-writing campaign cit­ing three particular cases of abuse, andaimed at the prime minister and hisminister for justice (TPNG, 14 Dec1989).

There were other examples of ill dis­cipline in the ranks of the police andthe army during 1989. On 8 Februarysoldiers marched on parliament,smashing windows and damagingproperty along the way, to protest the

size of their long-awaited pay increase.As a result of this incident, DefenceForce Commander Rochus Lokinapand the department secretary, StevenMokis, were suspended but subse­quently reinstated at the recommenda­tion of a Defence Force Board ofInquiry (PR, 12 Oct 1989). In March,police demonstrated at the house ofProvincial Affairs Minister JohnMomis after he called for the dismissalof the police commander in Bougain­ville, Paul Tohian. Then in June, policeshot dead a student on the campus ofthe University of Technology in Laeand were accused of committing crimi­nal acts on the Waigani campus of theUniversity of Papua New Guinea byVice-Chancellor John Lynch.

Security forces were called on todeal with riots in Port Moresby, Lae,Hagen, and Wabag during 1989. Twopeople died in Port Moresby in Marchas a "peace march" to protest the kill­ing of a youth leader and his wife, sup­posedly by migrants from anotherarea, turned violent. In July, riotsbroke out in Hagen and Wabag afterthe shooting death of CommunicationMinister Malipu Balakau, allegedly atthe hands of supporters of rival High­lands politician, Paul Torato. Early inSeptember, a curfew was imposed inLae after two days of violence followedthe shooting of a policeman and one ofhis relatives. The Morobe ProvincialGovernment, already under scrutinyfor gross mismanagement of publicfunds, was suspended at the same time.The Lae curfew remained in effect atthe end of 1989.

Prime Minister Namaliu managedto stave off several attempts to unseathis government during the year. Unde-

AW·

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

terred by an unprecedented public out­cry at the prospect of an early changeof government, the opposition gavenotice of a vote of no confidence inMarch, naming Paias Wingti as thealternate prime minister. The movegained momentum with the defectionof five members of the government,including Pangu Pati stalwart Tony Ila,but was preempted when the govern­ment adjourned parliament before avote could be taken. In the July sessionof parliament, the threatened votefailed to materialize when oppositionestimates indicated that they did nothave the necessary support. Yet an­other attempt to replace Namaliu inNovember ended in a resounding vic­tory for the government when, aftermuch wheeling and dealing, the oppo­sition withdrew its motion of no confi­dence at the last minute.

A major disappointment of 1989was the lack of progress on constitu­tional reforms designed to reduce thefrequency of votes of no confidence.But the Namaliu government did man­age to amend parliament's standingorders in November to require a voteof no confidence to go through a com­mittee stage, and to prevent its reintro­duction in the same session in which itwas withdrawn or defeated.

The Commission of Inquiry into theForest Industry, under the leadership ofJudge Tos Barnett, presented its finalreport to the prime minister in July.The lengthy report documents wide­spread corruption and mismanagementin Papua New Guinea's lucrative forestindustry. Included in the long list ofprominent leaders implicated by theinquiry are former Prime Minister andcurrent Foreign Minister Michael

Somare, and Minister of State TedDiro. In the first of many anticipateddisciplinary actions arising from thework of the commission, the Leader­ship Tribunal recommended in Octo­ber the dismissal of Housing MinisterGerard Sigulogo from parliament forcorruptly requesting K30,000 from aMalaysian logging contractor (PR, 12Oct 1989).

Despite the on-going Bougainvillecrisis, and depressed prices for PapuaNew Guinea's major agriculturalexports, the government promoted avery optimistic view of the state of theeconomy during 1989. Indeed, the 1990budget provided for a 5 percentincrease in public spending, increasedthe National Development Fund (the"slush fund" for individual members ofparliament) by K6.5 million, and setaside half a million kina to purchase anew executive aircraft. This increasedexpenditure was to be financed bydrawing heavily on the minerals stabili­zation fund, and by a substantialincrease in tax revenues and internalborrowings. However, the continuedclosure of the Bougainville mine makesa major revision of the 1990 budget,and some large cuts in public expendi­ture, inevitable.

There were some significant devel­opments in the mining sector outsideBougainville during the year. Theagreement to develop the giant Porgeragold mine was signed in May, withproduction expected to commence in1992. However, this was only after theminister for the environment had beenforced to withdraw his demand thatthe company build a tailings dam, andthe Enga provincial premier had modi­fied some of his demands for local par-

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

ticipation in the venture. The Misimagold mine commenced production inJune, some three months ahead ofschedule, and construction of the veryrich Lihir mine was expected to beginin 1990. Meanwhile, the Ok Tedi cop­per and gold mine continued to beplagued by mechanical and other prob­lems. The government's decision not torequire the company to build a perma­nent tailings dam was a major blow toenvironmentalists and villagers con­cerned about the apparent pollution ofthe Ok Tedi and Fly rivers.

In foreign affairs, the governmentopened a new consulate in the Indone­sian province of Irian Jaya in Septem­ber, and announced plans to appointhonorary consuls in Guam, Hawai'i,San Francisco, Hong Kong, and north­ern Australia. The Soviet Union agreedto establish an embassy in PortMoresby, but no opening date hadbeen announced by the end of the year.Meanwhile, the Peoples Republic ofChina made known its displeasure atthe apparent strengthening of relationsbetween Papua New Guinea andTaiwan.

Papua New Guinea suffered a majorloss with the death on the last day ofthe year of Sir Ignatius Kilage, electedas the country's fourth governor-gen­eral in March 1989. A Highlander andformer Roman Catholic priest, SirIgnatius was best known for his ten­year fight against corruption in govern­ment as ombudsman. In April 1989, hehad made his presence felt by placing afull-page advertisement in the newspa­pers appealing for the peaceful resolu­tion of the country's many conflictsand urging "breathing space" for thebeleaguered Namaliu government (PR,

13 April 1989). It seems unlikely thathis wishes will be realized in 1990.

TERENCE WESLEY-SMITH

References

May, R. J. 1989. Report on the Situation inBougainville. Typescript, June 1989.

Standish, Bill. 1989 Bougainville: Under­mining the State in Papua New Guinea.Pacific Research 2(4).

TPNG. The Times ofPapua New Guinea,weekly, Port Moresby.

PRo Pacific Report.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Prime Minister Ezekiel Alebua's 1988speech marking the tenth anniversaryof independence raised a number ofalarming issues that remained relevantin 1989. Alebua noted that populationwas increasing at a rate of 3.5 percentper annum, while the rate of economicgrowth was a mere 1.5 percent. Therate of inflation was estimated to be 20

percent in 1988, and may have been ashigh as 26 percent in 1989. The three­volume I987 Constitutional ReviewCommittee Report, published in 1988,alleged that the government was out oftouch with the people and advocatedfurther decentralization.

The teachers went on strike for apay increase just weeks prior to theFebruary 1989 general election. Ini­tially said to be illegal (STT, 17 Feb1989, I), the strike caused concernnationwide and became an importantelement in the elections. By February,schools were closed down, teachershad been sacked, and the Alebua care-

M

370 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

taker government was requiring themto reapply if they wanted their jobsback. People's Alliance Party (PAP)leader Solomon Mamaloni blamed theAlebua government for the strike andpromised to do something for theteachers if elected to government (SS,10 Feb 1989, 3). This may have boostedsupport for PAP at the polls.

More than two hundred fifty candi­dates, representing six political parties,contested the general election held on22 February. The result was a majorvictory for Solomon Mamaloni and thePAP, and a major defeat for the UnitedParty after four years in government.PAP improved considerably on its 1984total of six seats. It claimed the supportof eleven successful official party can­didates, and several more who had runas independents. On the other hand,only three of the eight United Partycandidates were successful, and eightformer ministers in the Alebua govern­ment lost their seats (PR, 2 March1989). Member for West 'Are'are,Andrew Nori's Nationalist Front forProgress won four seats, as did the newLiberal Party led by Bart Ulufa'alu, MPfor East Honiara. A Labour Partyfounded by Joses Tuhanuku, for yearsgeneral secretary of the SolomonIslands National Union of Workers,won two seats, including his own ofRennell and Bellona.

On 28 March Solomon Mamaloniwas elected prime minister by parlia­ment, easily defeating Bart Ulufa'aluby 25 votes to 10 (PR, 30 March 1989).Shortly before his election, Mamaloni,who had been prime minister from1981 to 1984, stated that he had been"struggling for twelve years to have thenumbers for a one-party government."

Although the fourteen members of thecabinet that he announced early inMay were all members of PAP, not allhad been official PAP candidates in theelection. For example, the former gov­ernor-general, Sir Baddeley Devesi,who became minister for foreignaffairs, had run as an independent; thenew deputy prime minister, Danny Phi­lip, had run as a member of the LiberalParty, and the new minister for trans­port, works, and utilities, MichaelMaena, had stood for the NationalistFront for Progress. Nevertheless,Mamaloni could claim with some accu­racy that "the policies and plans of theAlliance Party can now be carried outeffectively" (SS, 10 March 1989, 2).

Attorney General Frank Kabui wasPAP's choice for speaker of parliament,but his nomination was opposed by theambassador to the United Nations andthe United States and former secretaryto cabinet, Francis Saemala, on thegrounds that he had not resigned fromthe public service as required by theconstitution. As a result, Waeta Ben,MP for Northeast Guadalcanal, wasformally elected to the post (SS, 17March 1989, I). The by-election result­ing from Kabui's departure was won byPAP candidate and senior official in thelabour department, Hilda Kari. Shebecame the first woman elected to par­liament, and only the second involvedin national politics since the late LilyOgatina Poznanski was appointed tothe Legislative Council in the 1960s.

Between March and April 1989, theMamaloni government began toemphasize the weaknesses of the out­going government. According to

Mamaloni, "the whole governmentestablishment is untidy, disgraceful,

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

and has lost the sense of proper direc­tion" (SS, 14 April 1989, I). Since inde­pendence, he claimed, certain govern­ment ministries had grown too fat andcomplex, while others were too thin;officials at all levels were no longersure where their priorities should be;and the uncontrolled influx of foreignexpertise and sophisticated equipmentinto the public service had promotedchaos rather than stability. To increasegovernment efficiency, he announcedthe formation of a new ministry ofhousing and government services, to beheaded by the MP for North Choiseul,Allan Qurusu, and staffed by officersof "the highest calibre" (SS, 14 April1989,1).

The new government inherited achaotic financial situation, including amassive foreign debt of SI$280 million;a Solomon Islands dollar that haddeclined in value by 25 percent; veryhigh interest rates; a budget deficit ofSI$70 million; a demoralized businesssector; and some SI$5 million in uncol­lected taxes.

To monitor government spending, athree-man committee was appointed,headed by a member of the Freema­sons, Patrick O'Callaghan, with JohnLoli and Robertson Galo (SS, 5 May1989, I; 12 May 1989, 2). They soondiscovered that the government wasspending SI$25,000 a day.

To reduce the numbers of foreignersemployed in the civil service, the primeminister stated that Freemasons shouldhave their employment terminated(despite the fact that one of their mem­bers chaired the committee on govern­ment spending), and bilateral aidshould be temporarily halted (SS, 14April 1989, 6). This caused some con-

371

cern even among politicians, but wasjustified in terms of a general policy oftrimming national spending and reduc­ing dependence on foreign expertise(SS, 5 May 1989, I).

To increase government revenues,government agencies were encouragedto collect monies already owed, and toidentify other sources of income.Uncollected revenues for the period1985-1987 were estimated to beSI$36.14 million, while overspendingby some ministries for the same periodamounted to some SI$80.48 million.An act to impose surcharges on publicofficers came into force in the thirdweek of August. Minister for FinanceChristopher Abe stated that the actwould "enable the Government topenalize public officers who fail tocarry out their duties, are guilty of neg­ligence, damage government proper­ties, ... are responsible for financiallosses, fail to obey orders, or misusegovernment property" (SS, 18 Aug1989, I).

The new Ministry of Housing andGovernment Services started investi­gating more than six hundred compa­nies to ensure that their taxes were inorder (SS, 2 July 1989, I). A total ofSI$2,670,000 in missing funds waswritten off by means of AppropriationBill (No.3), which went through par­liament in "less than seven minutes"(SS, II Aug 1989, 2). The governmentalso announced plans to sell Solrice,the National Fisheries DevelopmentCorporation, and the Mendafia Hotel,to private enterprises. Kitano Com­pany of Japan later bought an 80 per­cent share of the Mendafia Hotel,which was worth SI$6.5 million (SS, I?Nov 1989, 2).

372 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

A joint venture between the govern­ment and the Commonwealth Devel­opment Corporation (CDC) to set up atimber plantation and processing com­pany at Kolombangara, Western Prov­ince, was signed on 10 January 1989.However, incoming Prime MinisterMamaloni raised some questions aboutthe extent of local participation in theventure later in the year (SS, 5 May1989,3). A project aimed at improvingsmallholder farming was also initiatedearly in the year with a $7.5 milliongrant from the EEC's STABEX fund.Meanwhile, a casino project inGuadalcanal was delayed because ofland disputes between the Kindapalaand Kakau tribes, who both claimownership of Poha, west of Honiara(SS, 27 Jan 1989, I).

In the area of foreign affairs, Solo­mon Islands signed a border agreementwith Papua New Guinea in February,and established diplomatic relationswith Israel early in September. Theborder agreement, which allows peoplewith relatives in areas near the borderto cross freely, was temporarily sus­pended when an official in Bougainvilledecided that arms could easily besmuggled to militants in Bougainvillefrom the Shortland and Treasuryislands. When the decision was chal­lenged by the deputy prime minister,officials in Port Moresby claimed thatthey had to authorize the change on atemporary basis (SS, 3 Nov 1989, I).

Solomon Islands strongly supportedthe movement spearheaded by theForum Fisheries Agency to ban driftnetfishing in the region, which culminatedin the November Wellington Conven­tion. Meanwhile, the Taiyo FishingCompany transferred its canning oper-

ations from the Tulagi area to Noroport, Western Province, where a newwharf had recently been built. The sup­ply of tinned fish was reduced fromMarch until July, when the Noro can­nery went into full production.

Some disparaging comments aimedat Malaitans and allegedly written byan individual from Rennell or Bellonasparked off an "ethnic riot" in Honiarain early November. The prime ministeragreed to pay the Malaita peopleSI$200,000 in compensation to quellthe violence. This sum, said to beexcessive by the member for NorthMalaita, Francis Saemala, did notreflect the real wishes of the people ofthat island, since the violence wasprobably politically motivated.

The new government indicated thatSolomon Islands "may" have free edu­cation up to Form 5 in ten years. Theselection system from Standard 6 andForm 3 will be abolished, and anotherthree high schools built by 1993 (SS, 15Sep 1989, 15). In December, however,the country found out that only 30 per­cent of Standard 6 children will be ableto attend either national or provincialhigh schools. The rest will become"dropouts."

Much of what developed after PAPtook over government was forecast bytheir Programme ofAction 1989-1993,launched in July 1989. Most noticeablewere the government's attempts torevive the economy. But by the end ofthe year inflation was still rising, andsalary increases in the public servicehelped to pump up the prices ofimports. While the prime ministerblamed the situation on lack of "politi­cal will" (SS, 15 Dec 1989, I), the minis­ter for finance expressed caution about

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

the prospects for 1990. The govern­ment's success or otherwise in salvag­ing the economy will be the top story of1990 (STY, 168, I).

ESAU TUZA

Additional information for this reviewwas supplied by Peter Larmour andMurray Chapman.

ABBREVIATIONS

IB Islands BusinessPIM Pacific Islands MonthlyPR Pacific ReportSS Solomon StarSTT Solomon Tok Tok

VANUATU

The year began with the ousting ofPresident Sokomanu from office fol­lowing a parliamentary vote accusinghim of gross misconduct. He was triedand jailed along with the five membersof the opposition who took part in hisinterim government. The six menappealed the decision before thesupreme court and were acquitted inApril 1989.

Various elections were held duringthe year. The opposition, a coalition ofthe Union des Partis Moderes and theMelanesian Progressive Party, won thePort Vila municipal contest in Febru­ary. The position of mayor, currentlyoccupied by Alick Noel, will remainunder their control for the next fouryears. In the regional elections ofAugust 1989, victory was shared aboutequally between the governingVanua'aku Pari and the opposition,with the latter showing substantialprogress since 1985. The low voter

373

turnout (averaging 60 percent) and theambiguity of the results made the out­come of the 1991 legislative electionsdifficult to predict.

Throughout the year, Prime Minis­ter Walter Lini and the Vanua'aku Patiattempted to consolidate their hold onthe republic. President Sokomanu wasreplaced by Fred Timakata, a highchief and member of parliament forEmae Island in the Shepherds group.Timakata, an ex-Presbyterian churchminister and ex-minister for health,was the official Vanua'aku Pati candi­date and won the election by 41 votesto 1. In contrast to Sokomanu, Tima­kata repeatedly emphasized the nonpo­litical and ceremonial nature of thepresidency and pledged to promote theunity of the nation.

Walter Lini and the Vanua'aku Patimight appear to have emerged strongerthan ever from the political events of1989. However, the young republic isundergoing a deep underlying socialtransformation which may modify itspolitical makeup profoundly. Thelong-standing and pernicious rivalrybetween the so-called francophone andanglophone factions, which hasresulted in violent confrontation attimes, is on its way out. Events in 1989served to dispel this legacy of theAnglo-French condominium govern­ment, making it appear more and moreartificial. During the crisis of 1988­1989, Walter Lini gained the support ofvarious francophones, particularly cer­tain young intellectuals home fromtheir studies in France. Conversely, thetraditional opposition, the Union desPartis Moderes led by Maxime Carlot,has been reinforced by the creation ofBarak Sope's Melanesian Progressive

i$P44RJ!Q"MPMM.

374

aw

THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· FALL 1990

Party. New alliances are replacing oldones and are increasingly determinedby local political issues rather than byexternal issues, such as relations withthe ex-colonial powers. Vanuatuappears to be slowly shedding its inher­ited neocolonial personality and begin­ning to define its own political identity.

In this vein, differences over rela­tions with France, including the NewCaledonian issue, have ceased to be themain divisive factor in ni-Vanuatu poli­tics. The neutrality observed by Frenchofficials during the recent crisis, andthe improvement of the political situa­tion in New Caledonia, have undoubt­edly prompted this development. Rela­tions with France are becoming a morerational foreign policy issue, ratherthan a focus of passionate internal divi­sion. This is the case despite a majorcrisis that erupted between the twocountries immediately after Jean-MarieTjibaou's assassination in May 1989.

Radio Vanuatu, which misinterpreted~ Radio Australia report of the event,accused France of instigating theKanak leader's murder. This state­ment, echoed by Hilda Lini, the primeminister's sister, was not reversed untilmuch later.

Minister for Foreign Affairs DonaldKalpokas and Marie Lini, Walter Lini'swife, met with French Prime MinisterMichel Rocard while attending Jean­Marie Tjibaou's funeral in Noumea.The ensuing frank dialogue preventeda complete break in relations betweenthe two countries. Following the ni­Vanuatu delegation's return to PortVila, Radio Vanuatu issued a state­ment concerning the true circum­stances of the assassination. WalterLini's government later officially

backed the Matignon Accord andcalled for normalization of relationsbetween the two countries. In ex­change, France agreed to send a charged'affaires to Port Vila. Donald Kalpo­kas and Secretary for Foreign AffairsNike Nike Vurobaravu's official visitto Paris in November 1989, at MichelRocard's invitation, signaled the onsetof more relaxed relations.

The happy resolution of this majordiplomatic incident helped alleviatepolitical instability within Vanuatu.But the young island state continues tobe plagued by political problems. Itsuffers from a chronic economic crisisassociated with the downturn in worldprices for copra and the steady increaseof unemployment in Port Vila. Theresource-rich island of Espiritu Santohas not recovered from its rebellion ofa decade ago and has been unable torecapture its role as a spearhead foreconomic development in the northernislands. Walter Lini has had to makesome concessions in attempting to rem­edy this situation. In February 1989, hemet for the first time with representa­tives of the local private sector, whohave been urging such consultationssince independence.

The 1989 budget was austere, withstringent cuts affecting education andhealth. However, the Vanuatu policeforce, whose loyalty to Walter Linihelped uphold his government in 1988,

although it subsequently threatened togo on strike, received an increase ofapproximately 20 percent over their1988 allocation. Various ministrieswere reshuffled in March 1989, withthe total number reduced from elevento ten.

Not all aspects of the economy were

POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA

entirely negative during 1989. An AirVanuatu service was launched with thepurchase of a Boeing 727 from Austra­lian Airlines for A$9.7 million, fundedin part by an Australian grant of A$6million. An A$I.5 million campaign topromote tourism filled previouslyempty hotel rooms. However, tour­ism's ability to help solve the economiccrisis remained to be seen.

Seeking to reduce tensions withneighbors as well as internationally,the Lini government has adopted anincreasingly pragmatic foreign policy.This trend was confirmed at theVanua'aku Pati congress in June 1989,where the need for a policy of "con­structive engagement" was stressed.Relations with Australia and NewZealand have recently been marked bygoodwill on all sides, reflecting the Linigovernment's new emphasis on eco­nomic issues.

In spite of these efforts, the eco­nomic crisis remains severe. While thebusiness circle of Port Vila has hardlysuffered, a large proportion of the pop-

375

ulation has fallen back on a traditionalisland lifestyle of self-sufficiency basedon the consumption of root crops, analternative rejected by many youngpeople. This has aggravated the gulfbetween the "bush" (the outer islands)and Port Vila, a situation which theopposition has sought to take advan­tage of while actively campaigning inthe outer islands. Other, older, culturaland geographic tensions existingbetween various islands, as well asbetween the north and the south of thearchipelago, have re-emerged, furthersharpening latent centrifugal tenden­CIes.

Although the events of 1988-1989resulted in a major defeat for theCarlot-Sope opposition, it has not lostits zeal. The leaders expect to win the1991 parliamentary elections, providedtheir parties remain unified. This timethey have chosen a legal means ofacceding to power.

JOEL BONNEMAISON

ELISE HUFFER