Security Cooperation: a ‘Plan Colombia’ for Iraq? page-1

Introduction: current situation. The current rush-to-consensus on applying Plan Colombia

may prove over time to be pre-mature and a product of group-think.1 In working with the Iraqi

government (GOI) to create a secure, stable and sovereign nation, the U.S. government (USG) must assist and support the GOI in avoiding three national catastrophes:

a regional war between Arabs and Persians fought on Iraqi soil; a civil war between the Arabs and Kurds; and,

a continuing relapse into civil conflict creating a culture of chronic conflict.2

The danger of the third point is clear: half of the failed states that emerge from civil war relapse into (often-times bloodier) conflict within ten years. Iraq may be starting to relapse. Why?

1. Iraq’s contentious factions remain trapped in a "security dilemma", complicating the prospects of long-term conciliation. (A security dilemma indicates that paramilitary and other armed groups outside the law tend not to surrender their weapons during

programs of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, or “DDR”.)3

2. Specifically, in Iraq, we do not know whether or not the Ministry of Interior really did weed out the death squads brought in during Bayan Jabr's tenure of 2005 and 2006 or

thought to be lingering in the Ministry of Defence.4

3. The Norwegian government and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning have documented an absolute surfeit of weaponry dispersed throughout the extra-legal fighting elements. Any actual surrender of arms is likely to be nominal.

4. The Maliki government has squandered the substantial progress of "DDR" afforded by the U.S. program of funding the Sunni ‘Awareness Movement’ with concerned local citizens (a/k/a CLCs). This surge-related program protected the Sunni population from possible sectarian genocide and, more importantly, began bringing disaffected elements into the political mainstream while establishing the fundaments of community policing.

5. Community policing re-frames the current insurgency as a crime wave -- not as an insurgency -- effectively to cut these murderers off at the source. Whether the rationale is ethno-sectarian or economic, people who kill people are still criminals. Neighborhood residents are the best eyes-and-ears for the police as demonstrated in the Kurdish cities.

6. Perhaps most important, there are too many guns with too much ammunition combusting with pervasive poverty throughout Iraq.

Review of Plan Colombia as a Template. Colombia and Iraq share compelling similarities -- high numbers of internally displaced people; drug (or illegal oil) trafficking as a source of funding primarily for government coddled militias; widespread corruption; human rights abuses; vulnerable oil infrastructure in need of protection; and, widespread homicide. A few crucial differences, however, trump these circumstantial parallels. Additionally, tactical gains against

revolutionary groups aside, the ultimate success of Plan Colombia remains contested.5

Plan Colombia was basically a de-novo militarization by the USG of the counter-insurgency in Colombia. Over six years, the United States invested $5-6 billion in military aid, a significant portion of which funded fumigation of millions of acres of arable lands producing illicit cash crops; not so in Iraq. Over a six year period, the USG allocated $18 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund. Thus, Iraq’s equivalent to Plan Colombia has likely taken place already.

With the funding and equipping to date of the Ministries of Interior and Defence (MOI and MOD) as well as the 100,000 CLCs exceeding $18 billion, $3-3.5 billion (60% equivalent of the Colombian aid since Iraq has 60% of Colombia’s population) of funding over six years should prove to be superfluous. Such a situation would be like Noah, on the thirty-ninth day of rains, walking top-side with a pitcher of water to tend to some plants on deck. Instead, such a USG

Security Cooperation: a ‘Plan Colombia’ for Iraq? page-2

posture would more likely spoil the prospects for long-term stability as U.S. policies would be perceived – as they are already – as taking sides in a civil conflict.

Training more men to kill other men, as suggested by using Plan Colombia, will not enhance the rule of law in Iraq. The police force exceeds reasonable levels already; current infrastructure can not handle the levels of security forces using it. One of every 25-30 Iraqis is in the security forces (i.e., the military and police; or, ISF), meaning more police per population than any of the world's five most dangerous countries. At the height of Plan Colombia, there were -- at least -- one hundred people for every member of the security forces.

Iraq lacks the extra-governmental institutions reaching all levels of its society. Colombia has the Catholic Church and many mature peace-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs), allied with wealthier benefactors in the U.S. and Europe, to build a climate of reconciliation that

can supplant a culture of conflict.6 Lastly, U.S. interests (i.e., the war on drugs and

“narcorruption” sweeping Northward from Colombia) were more immediate and vital with

respect to Colombia than they are with Iraq.7

A (Not-So) New Way for a New Day. The ideal end-state toward which U.S. can point Iraq includes the following elements:

police primacy through democratic, communally-based law enforcement; an end to ISF-sponsored violence against prisoners and detainees including torture,

false arrest and neglect during custody; widespread enforcement for the protection of fundamental human rights; and, ethno-sectarian tolerance strengthened through mutual support.

These elements define President Obama's idea of a stable, secure and self-sustaining Iraq (or the words actually used in briefings). It may be prudent not to assume an eventual stay-behind U.S. force. Such a residual force would be unwelcome and, given its small number and attenuated lines of communication (LOC), far more vulnerable. A possible exception might be small U.S. Army training contingents in Kirkuk, Baghdad and Basra. These units would prevent potential regional peace-keepers -- about 20,000 in all (if requested) -- from a land-grab of Iraq. NATO or U.N. troops might be better suited than the U.S. Army for this dual-purpose exception. Such a training and oversight force would tap into the peace-keepers’ LOC.

This alternative approach addresses the constraints mentioned earlier to culminate in a post-kinetic partnership between Iraq and the U.S. starting in 2012. This alliance will aim for peaceful co-existence within Iraqi society to address poverty and essential service shortages that would tend to undermine the GOI's legitimacy and rule of law. The security cooperation office, then, would ideally consist of a security assistance component (8-13 people) supplemented by liaisons with civilian agencies (27-32 people) harnessing USG and NGO-sponsored resources.

The Legacy Issue. For example, for every one of the uniformed military personnel deployed as trainers in Iraq from the U.S., NATO or the U.N. (i.e., up to 3,000), there would be at least five field-workers drawn from the Peace Corps and NGOs as well as from the Iraqi population. These volunteers and the uniformed military would cross-train each other in grass-roots economic development and civil-military operations.

Iraqis could then re-build their villages and their lives in practical ways that they would begin to

associate with the United States or the West over the long-term.8 The USG would strive,

through this radically different OSC sponsored by the U.S. Embassy, to impart a legacy of

democratic policing, law-&-order, human rights and communal self-improvement.9 The annual

cost of this legacy-building would total less than 10% of the average ISFF burden.

Security Cooperation: a ‘Plan Colombia’ for Iraq? page-3

REFERENCES

1. Irving Janis; Yale & Berkeley; 1972: who did extensive work on the subject, defined it as: A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation realistically to appraise alternative courses of action. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink)

2. Paul Collier; Oxford University 2004: “Around half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapses…The risks of

conflict relapse are very high during the first post-conflict decade – typically around 50%.” (http://www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf)

3. Matthew Kirwin; Michigan State, 2006

“There are several factors that have led to the conflagration of a security dilemma in Cote d’Ivoire. First, a weak state and economic crisis compelled certain groups to revert to a primordial attachment to ethnic and religious background, which supersedes national identity and creates intense power struggles. This reversion to ethnic identity caused the parties to identify each other as offensive threats. Due to the dire economic situation in states such as Cote d’Ivoire, the struggle for the control of resources has become intense. “Any economic improvement by one ethnic group is frequently perceived as an example by the center: the ethnic security dilemma has an economic component, as all sorts of motives and fears are read into any change in the economic status of each ethnic group (Saideman 1998: page-135).” Therefore the distribution of resources to one ethnic group and not another decreases the security of the latter and increases the security of the former. Control and distribution of resources is primarily the responsibility of the government. Political appointments therefore confer power to the appointee and his entourage, which in turn can be interpreted as a security threat to certain groups. At one point other ethnic groups assumed that the government of Gbagbo and his ethnic group had a stranglehold on the means of entry into the police and gendarmerie.” (http://www.njas.helsinki.fi/pdf-files/vol15num1/kirwin.pdf)

4. James C. Jones; U.S. Institute of Peace 2009; Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (page-365)

“Indeed doubts exist about the degree of real paramilitary [i.e., ‘government coddled militias’] demobilization. Recent reports…[cite]…the emergence of new groups, or reemergence of old ones, throughout the country. Moreover, investigations as well as informed testimony under the controversial Justice and Peace Law have revealed disturbing links between lawmakers – most of them [President] Uribe supporters [in favor of Plan Colombia’s militarized program] – and paramilitaries. And there is strong evidence of widespread paramilitary penetration of governmental institutions.” Please note that the writing of Dr Jones is likely to be biased against the government of Colombia (GOC); he was under investigation by the GOC for possible ties with leftist guerillas opposing the rightist paramilitaries. The Department of State gives the GOC higher marks but states in its 2009 narcotics report: “The GOC does not, as a matter of government policy, encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. While criminal organizations are greatly weakened, concerns remain over their corrupting influences. In September 2008, two CNP [i.e., Colombian National Police] generals, Antonio Gomez Mendez and Marco Pedreros, were fired as a result of alleged ties to narco-paramilitary leader, Daniel “El Loco” Barrera. Separately, several members of the GOC were found to have supported right-wing paramilitary groups. Seventy members of the 2006-2010 Congress and 15 current and former governors have been investigated in the “para-political” scandal, with 34 congressmen and eight governors jailed as a result of the aggressive investigations.” (http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/vol1/116520.htm) Deborah Haynes; The Times of London, 2009: “….in January the human rights office of the Defence Ministry found more than 1,000 detainees at three centres in Ninevah, northern Iraq, including about 550 who had orders issued for their release…Many prisoners were held in cramped and unhygienic conditions. More than 700 were eventually freed.” (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article6737870.ece)

5. Associated Content News; “Top 5 Nations Where Safety is Last” 2007:

“Colombia. Infamous for its guerillas, illegal cocaine "industry", and corrupt government, no wonder Colombia ranks as ‘The Most Dangerous Country in the World’. Bombings targeting civilians are common and terrorism is a way of life for most citizens who have grown accustomed to the chaos. It has a high rating for kidnappings with ransoms, with businesspeople, tourists, journalists, and scientists being frequent targets, though no one is actually excluded from kidnappings. Hot spots include ATMs, taxis, restaurants, and simply walking down the street. Those who try to resist robberies usually get shot and killed. Bogota, Baranquilla, Cartagena, and Medellin are statistically categorized as the most dangerous cities, with Medellin holding the title of the Drug Capital and ‘Most Dangerous City in the World’. With

Security Cooperation: a ‘Plan Colombia’ for Iraq? page-4

11 murders a day in a city of merely 2 million, its murder rates is quintupled that of New York City. In recent years, murders rates in Colombia have dropped, but not enough to pass the title to South Africa. Though what was previously mentioned [falling homicide rates] may be misinformation, as critics have accused President Uribe of manipulating the crime [rate], making Colombia seem safer than it really is. What is behind all the heinous crimes? An expanding drug market and a plethora of terrorist groups, and a government that does nothing about it. Colombia averages 47 murders a day in a nation of 45 million, giving it the crown of ‘Most Dangerous’.” (http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/159175/top_5_most_dangerous_countries_in_the.html?cat=9) U.S. Office on Colombia; 2009 “The…Working Group on Extrajudicial Executions has identified new modalities of extrajudicial executions where killings are no longer publicly reported, as happened in the case of false positives, but rather hidden, with measures taken to conceal the identity of those responsible. One example is the increase in cases of forced disappearances of human rights defenders and social leaders, with the person being subsequently killed and put into unidentified graves in the majority of these cases. In many of these cases members of the armed forces are alleged to have been involved either directly, through cooperation, or at the least through acquiescence with paramilitaries. According to a recent report by the National Commission for the Search for Disappeared People, between January 1 2007 and October 21 2008 alone, there was a total of 1,686 people forcefully disappeared.” (http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/uploads/application-pdf/2009-%20June%20EJE%20memo.pdf)

6. Arturo Carrillo; U.S. Institute of Peace 2009; Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War (pages 148-149)

“As a result, by 2000, the Colombian non-governmental human rights movement was a critical player…Colombian NGOs had powerful allies in the Colombian Congress as well as among foreign governments, intergovernmental organizations…[e.g., U.N.]…and, of course, international NGOs….”

7. Bruce Bagley University of Miami; 2001: “During most of the 1980s the Medellin cartel dominated the Colombian

drug trade and its principal trafficking routes passed through (or over) the Caribbean into the United States via south Florida and elsewhere along the U.S. Atlantic seaboard. As these "traditional" smuggling routes came under increasing pressure from U.S. drug enforcement over the second half of the decade, a gradual shift away from the Caribbean routes to new ones passing through Central America and Mexico and across the U.S. southwest border took place. By the early 1990s, 70 to 80 percent of the cocaine smuggled out of Colombia entered the United States from Mexico while only 20 to 30 percent continued to come in via the Caribbean.” (http://clas.berkeley.edu/Events/conferences/Colombia/workingpapers/working_paper_bagley.html)

8. Eugene Burdick and William Lederer; The Ugly American; 1958

“But despite the dual meaning, the ‘ugly American’ of the book title fundamentally does refer to the plain-looking engineer Atkins, who lives with the local people, comes to understand their needs, and offers genuinely useful assistance with small-scale projects such as the development of a simple bicycle-powered water pump. It is argued in the book that the Communists are successful because they practice tactics similar to Atkins'. According to an article published in Newsweek in May 1959, the ‘real’ Ugly American was identified as an ICA technician named Otto Hunerwadel, who served in Burma from 1949 until his death in 1952.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ugly_American)

9. Bonnie Bucqueroux; Michigan State, 2004

“By embracing strategies that decentralize and personalize police service, police departments that have adopted the community policing philosophy have been able to engage communities in comprehensive, collaborative, community-based problem-solving aimed at crime, fear of crime, and disorder. Many efforts involve assigning individual officers or teams to specific beat areas, to foster a sense of ownership and responsibility. The marriage of police and community brings together the power of the formal criminal justice system with the informal social control that communities can exert. Police departments have also been a catalyst in forging new partnerships with other professional and civic institutions (municipal agencies, non-profit groups, the business community, schools, and the faith community).“ (http://www.policing.com/articles/rcj.html) Ned McDonnell; Letter to President George W. Bush, 2006 “The three themes of this rationale – crime prevention, national sovereignty and economic development – are based on precedents in Afghanistan and New York City…The Ministry of Interior has been infiltrated by militias backed by Iran...Trustworthy policemen, vetted and approved by local inhabitants, will empower Iraqi citizens to turn over the insurgents who are nothing more than people enjoying the blood-sport of – and financial gain from – killing, destruction, kidnapping and mayhem. This plan will save time, energy and money which can then be better allocated to Afghanistan to complete Operation Enduring Freedom in support of a tenuous democratic government….”