mental state talk: a developmental · condillac and hdr husband dave. wrthout their boundleu...
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Mental State Talk: A Developmental Perspective
A thesir submittled in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
Department d Human Development and Applied Psychology Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the
University of Toronto
O Copyright by Shed L. fmll(2000)
53 uisitions and Acquisitions et 6' bgnphie Sewices ~nriœs b~Wiogmphques
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Mmhl Statib Tdk: A DmlopmenW Pmpecüve
Master of Arts, 2000
Shed Lynn Twell
Deparamit of Humn OIvrlopnwnt and Applied Psychology
Ontrrlo Instîtuto for Studles in Education of the
University d Toronto
ABSTRACT
We investigated the developmental traiedories of mental state talk (cognitive, desire
and feeling) in children, and influences on mental Mate talk Thirty-seven Caucasian
families, each with two parents and two children, pertidpated in this study over a two-
year period. Oeta wre collecteci during six 90niinute sessions in the participants'
homes. Each speaker tum was coded for the presenœ of mental state ternis and the
referent (e.g., seif, other).
Results indicated that cognitive state talk inaeases in children and parents as the
children get older. Mothers and older girls talked more than fathers and older boys
about the mental states of othrs. Finally, children with an older sibling, when
compared to those withwt older siblings are advantaged in their cognitive state talk at
age 4 after antrolling br MLU. Children with an older sibling are rot hawever
advantaged in t h i r tdk about ôesires and feelings.
First. I would like to thank Dr. knnifer Jenkins for teaching me so vey much about
the research process. This was a challenging project, requiring considerable teamwrk,
support and encouragement until the vefy end. Dr. Jenkins' insight and assistance will
never be forgotten. I also want to thank my second reaâer, Dr. Janet Astington, whose
research acumen was greetly appreciated, as were her words of encouragement,
particulariy as the project neared completion.
Secondly, I must thank Dr. Susan Lollis and Dr. Hildy Ross for allowing me access
to this substanüal database. In addition, a sinœre thank you to Yuiko Takei at Guelph
University, for the energy and devotion she demonstrated in helping my devise the
coding scheme and in coding a phenamenal amount of data.
Third, I must thank my farnily for suppofting and humoring me as I completed draft
after draft Mer draî?. This was a daunting process, which could not have bemn
completed without the endless love, patience and understanding from my husband,
Jerome, my father Charles, Ravel, and my mother-in-law Angela.
1 have reœived support from friends too numerous to mention them ail, but special
thanks to Tania, Narslk, Maggie and Carol, and al1 of my Riends a t b Hospital for Si&
Childmn. Much gratitude is extended toward Isabel and Fiona for ywr humour and
editonal eflorts.
Last, but œrteinly not Ieast, e simm d&t of gratitude to my dear Wend Rosemary
Condillac and hdr husband Dave. Wrthout their boundleu fiiendship. emrgy and
cornmitment, this thesis w l d never have barn tompleteâ.
iii
List of Tables
List d Figums
Chiptrr 1 : Intmduction
Develapment of childrm's mental state talk
Development of parents' mental state tak
Gender diferences in mental state talk
Diffemces between boys 8 girls
Oiffwmces be-n mothen 8 fathem
Referent of mental state talk
Effect of Siblings on mental state talk
A i m of Prisent Study
Chapter 2: Method
Participants
Procedure
* Behwiwral observstions
Codim for mental strtb U k
C d i ~ for refmnt
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vi
vii
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8
15
19
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22
23
26
31
34
34
35
35
37
39
42
42
42
Chaptei 3: Resultr
Conversational turns
Mean length of utterance
Relationship between MLU & mental state talk
Question #1
Youngei children
Older children
Parents
Cognitive, desire & feeling talk as a
percentage of mental state talk
Question #2
Parents
Younger children
Older children
Question #3
Chaptei 4: Dlrcu8sion
Relationship between MLU 8 mental state talk
Development of children's mental state talk
Development of parent's mental state talk
Gender differences in mental state talk
Referent of mental state talk
Effect of siblings on mental state talk
Reféwnces
List of Tables
Table 1. Means & standard deviations for changes in
conversation tums over time.
Table 2. Means & standard deviations for changes in
mean length of utterance over time.
Table 3. Correlations between MLU & younger children's speech. 48
Table 4. Correlations between MLU & older children's speech 48
Table 5. Means & standard error for changes
in children's mental state talk over time.
Table 6. Means & standard error for changes in parents'
mental state talk over tirne.
Table 7. Means & standard mors for gender
differences in talk about the 'other'.
Table 8. Means & standard error for the effect
of an older sibling on mental state talk.
List of Figures
Figure 1. Changes in younger siblings' mental state talk
over tirne.
Figure 2. Changes in older siblings' mental state talk
over time.
Figure 3. Changes in parents' mental state talk
over time.
Figure 4. Gender differences in parents' talk about 'other'.
Figure 5. Gender differences in oMer siblings' talk about 'other'. 60
Figure 6. Effect of an older sibling on mental state talk. 62
vii
1: INTROOUmolq
Developmental changes in children's talk about the mind have becorne a topic of
interest for investigetom over ment pan. To understand why people do what they do
requires that w& understand the events of the mind which pmvob bhaviow. As
adults, o u kliefr, desires, motivations and feelings &ive ouf actions. An examination
of children's production of mental state ternir aliows us to explore h w children's
unâerstanding and talk of mental events devdops over time. Existing studies point to
important trends in children's changing abilities to discuss various types of mental
states, however, there io still much to discover. For example, little is known about
developmental changes after four yeen of age. Furthemiore, the literatun provides
only a glimpse into the changes in parents' mental state tdk as thdr children grow and
develop. The pesent shrdy s d t s to uncover new information, Mich will extend whet is
already krown. We examine not only children's devdopmental changes in mental state
talk, but also that of their parents, as wdl as factors that may be associated with the
production of mental state tenns.
The Devdopment of Children's Mental State Talk
Previous research has provided us with trends in the devdopmental changes in
belief, desire and M i n g stata talk Thme studies are delcri*bd below in some deteil.
As Astington and Pelletier (1996) pointad out. talk about mental $tatas cen k divided
into many categories, such as perceptiont cognition, volition, morality, sbf@ct and
physiology. Howevert talk about Wids (e.g., think, know), deaires (8.g.. want, hop),
and fedings (e.g., Sad, happy) are mpwted to be cornmon components of al1 linguistic
taxonomies and are therefom, the foais of the present study. It is important to note
that there is little consistency in the way that the fbquency of mantal state tems is
presented in previous researh. For example, some studies calculate the fiequency os
a proportion of al1 utteranœs, while othen calculate mental state terms as a proportion
of only those utterances containing mental state tenns. The method employed by each
remarcher wiil be describeci.
Talk about Beliefs
Talk about beliefs or cognitions (these tems will bo uwd interchangeably)
generally does not appear in children's vocakrlary until the middle of the third year
(Furrow, Moore, Oavidge & Patriquin, 1992; Hughes 8 Dunn, 1998; Shatz, Wdlman &
Silber, 1983). For exampk, Shalr et al. fowsed on the development of cognitive
speech in one child over a W-year period. Findings revealed that cognitive state talk
first appeared betMHM 2 yean, 4 months and 2 yean, 11 months. This nsult was
corroborateci when the same authors studied 30 2-year old children over a sixinonth
period, and found that cognitive tems did not appar until the rniddle of the third year.
Once talk about cognitive States tuas been estaMished, it continues to inuease in
Wequency (Furraw et d., 1992; Hughes & Dunn, 1998). Fumw et al.. for example.
obscwved ninetmm mottiw4ild d y d s whm the childm wem between 2 and 3 years
old. Results indicated a signifiant imieam in the production d cognitive t e m
betwwn 2 and 3 years of age, as a perc8ntqp of il1 utterances producd at each time
pefiod.
Hughes and Dunn (1998) found that the fiequency of cognitive ternis inweased in a
sample of 50 dder children who were observd from the time they unre 3 years, 1 1
months to 5 years d age. Results indicateâ mat children used cognitive state ternis et
the initial observation petiod, and aiet the frequency inwased until the final
observation period. The authors pierented the quantity of mental state talk as the
number of ternis pmduced pw hour of observation. These studies provided important
information about the developmental changes in cognitive talk from its onset until age
five, but what do we kmw about children's talk about other mental states and their
respective developmental changer?
Talk about Beliefs and Desires
Desin tenns have been found in children's speech prior to cognitive tenns and are
more frequent until the third year. In an investigation of cognitive and desite state talk
in fourteen mothechild dyads, Moore, F U ~ W , Chiasson and Patriquin (1 994) reported
that desire temis mwo the most cornmon type of mental state talk until aie third year.
Between the third and fouai year, desin t m s leveld off while cognitive tems
increased and were more muen t thur desire tems. Moore et al. pfesented the
ftequency of mental state talk as a propoflion of participants' total number of
utterances.
Other studies that have examineci concomitant developmental changes in belief and
dasire &te talk have found that amnd the age of thm, childisn inmase their
production of bdief terms, hawsvw, &sire t m s rmain the most frequent type of
menW state talk (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Barbch and Wellman studieâ cognitive
I l
and desire talk in ten children from the time they were 1 W to 6 years old. When the
frequency of belief and desin tems were compared to each other, it was repted that
the onset of desire talk preceded belief talk. and was Vie most cornmon type of talk
between 18 and 72 months of age. This pattern emerged whether belief and desire
tenns were expressed as a percentage of al1 utterances wntaining refermces to
beiiefs and desiros, or as a percentage of the child's total utterances. While the
developmental changes in this study appear to contradict those of Moore et al. (1 994),
it is important to bear in mind that Bartsch and Wellman reported only on genuine
references to psychological states, whereas Moore and his colleagues did not
distinguish between various fundionr of mental state tems. The differences in the
inclusion criteria may have affeded the ftequency of mental state terrns for example, by
decreadng the freguency of cognitive tems in Bartsdr and Welhan's study. Oesires
and cognitions are two distinct types of mental state and, taken together, these results
indicate that diildren use dwire talk More they talk of beliefs. Moreover, the
production of cognitive tems increases from the age of three, both as a percentage of
al1 utterances and os a percentage of all mental state talk
falk about Feelings
Feeling talk ha8 been found to appear as earîy as 18 monais of age and to inuease
in frequency from that time (Dunn, Brethcwton & Munn, i987). This was examined in
two longitudinal studies. The fint study induded 43 motherchild dyads, when the
second-born childfen wem 18 and 24 months of aga The second study consisted of
16 mother4ild dyaâs whm the fimt-boln childm wmre 25 and 32 months of age.
00th studies yielded similar nrultr, with childm speaking more about feelings as thay
got older. The results Mered similar developmental trends whaher the frequency of
f-ling talk war presented as the number of uttefances or the numbr of conversation
turns that wntained a feeling bm. However, Dunn et al. only examineâ feeling taik in
children until the age of three and w could not provide details of developmental
changes after that time. Additionally, because only feeling terms were attended to, no
information was provided about changes in feeling talk in combination with changes in
cognitive and desire state talk.
Talk about Beliefs, Desires and Fmlings
In studies thet have examined concomitant changes in cognitive, desire and feeling
talk, results have indiatecl a prepandeance of desire terms, with both cognitive and
feeling ternis king less frequent, but inueasing with time, when each category of
speech was repoed relative to the remaining categories (Bretherton 8 Beeghly, 1982).
Bretherton and Beeghly obtained their results by training 30 mothen to record their
children's use of six cetegories of intemal state language in the home. The study was
longitudinal, beginning Men children wre 10 months of age and ending at 28 months
of age. Bretherton and Be8ghly assessed children's language production dwing four
situations (e.g., Srninute snack and S-minute play sessions) and found that these
scores wwe highly comlated udth rnotfmrs' reports of their children's mental state talk
Brown and Oum (1991) extended the work of Bmtnerton and Beeghly by studying
slightly older childm aged 24-36 monthr. The auVwm nporled that cognitive tc~mr
fint appmred at 30 monais of age, while feeling twmr w m pmmnt from 24 monüis.
60th types of mental state tak i m a d in hquency from the time they appeamd.
The results were expressed as mental state ternis per 100 conversation tums and
supported the findings of studies that have exarnined changes in either cognitive or
feeling talk (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Dunn et al., 1 987; Fumw et al., 1992; Hughes
8 Dunn, 1998; Moore et al., 1994). This study provided importpnt new information
about the interplay between various types of mental state talk.
Summary
To summarize, references to cognitive states have b e n rare until the third year end
have increased from that time (Bartsch 8 Wellman, 1995; Fumw et al., 1992; Hughes
& Dunn, 1998; Moore et al., 1994). Talk about desires appeared earlier than that of
cognitions and continued to be the most m m o n type of mental state talk until36
months of age (Brown d Dunn. 1991 ; Moore et al., 1994) and beyond (Battsch 8
Wellman, 1995). Finally, talk about feelings began as young as 18 months and
continued to increase in frequency; howcrver, it remained less cornmon than talk about
desires (Brown & Dunn, 1991). The aforemsntioned developmental changes have
been reliably reported despite mtioddogical dinarences.
Remaining Questions
While the previously r e v i d studies addressed important contbmporaneous
changes in cognitive, desin and fmling talk, them are several developmcmtd
questions that have becm kft unaôâfesseâ. First, we kiow little about the devetlopmcmt
of mental -ta talk kyond 36 months d Many 8tudies began masuring mental
state talk whn childm wmm a8 y a n g a8 two yeam of aga Wth only hno exceptions
ho~ever, (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Hughes & Dunn, 1 W8), developmental changes
have not been examined in children beyond four yean, of age.
Some researchers have observecl mental state talk as it occurs in a school context
(Hughes 8 Dunn, 1998), while othen have cfeated contrived situations in drildren's
homes (Furraw et al., 1992; Moore et al., 1994). Mentil state discourse in contrived
environments may be falsely elevated or reduced, as children are askd to participate
in conversations that rnay or may not be relevant to them, and with people they may not
know. Some studies have, howver, obsewed children in their own homes (Bartcich &
Wellman, 1 995; Shatz a al., 1 983). The home environment is where children can
interect with familiar people, in a familier and cornfortable place. Children rnay be more
likely to talk about things that interest them and engage in play situations that bettw
demonstrate their understanding of the mind when in their own homes.
Fathers have been consistently ignored both as a -pient of talk and as a generator
of talk in the study of childien's talk about the rnind. Children's mental state ta#< has
been examimd, almort exclusively, as it occurs with mothem (Furrow et al., 1992) or
peen (Hughes & Dunn, 1998). These studies have provided convecging evidence of
developmntal changes in mental state talk T h y Iaava unanswered, hmmver, the
infiuence of fathen.
The prasent study was designeâ to addms the pmvious methodological gaps in
several ways: 1) by studying the concomitant changes in cognitive, desire and fmling
talk, 2) by utiliting data cdl8ded in the hotne 3) by oûm ing conversations ocairring
between the target child, their sibling, mother and father, 4) by including children who
are 2 and 4 years old a time 1, and following them up Mer 2 years.
fha ûevelopnnnt of Purnts' Mental Shte Trlk
To more fully comprehend aie changes in children's understanding of the mind,
attention must be paid to the mental state terms that chiidren are 8xp0sed to in their
daily environments. Existing research has found that maternai talk about mental States
benefits children in a variety of ways. Specifically, positive correlations have been
found bebmen matemal mental state talk, children's use of mental state tems and
diildren's performance on measures of language production and comprehension
(Beeghly, Bretherton & Mervis, 1968). Additionally, Moore et al. (1 994) showed that
mothen' production of cognitive tems when children were two years old conelated with
children's language comprehension scores at age four. Given the apparent influence
that matemal mental state taik has on children's understanding of the mind, it is
important to map such developmental changes.
Talk about Beliefs
The resub of eadiw studies indicate that mothers tend to produce mors cognitive
tennr, as a proportion of al1 utteranœs, as theit childfen appmch 3 years of age.
Funow et al. (1992) reporteci thi8 trend mer studying patterns of mt8mBl cognitive
state talk in nineteen rnother&ild dyads when the childm ware two and t h m years of
age.
Talk about Oesires
When desire and cognitive state talk were exarnined simultaneously, desire talk was
reported to decrease and cognitive to increase, as children approached three years of
age. The changes in the frequency of mental state ternis were presented as a
percentage of total utterances. Moore et al. (1 994) explored the cognitive and desire
ternis produced by 14 mothen when their children were 2, 3, and 4 years old. It rnay
be that mothers increased the frequency and therefore, the saliency, of cognitive ternis,
just prior to children's' increased production of such terms.
The issue of directionality is both important and cornplex, and in its entirety, is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, one must consider that children may be
better able to understand cognitive terms as they gel older. As a result, children may
use more cognitive terms, which mothers may be mirroring in their own speech, or the
opposite may be true. Regardless of the position one favors, it does look as though
mothen exect an irnporlant influence on their children's developing knowledge about
the mind. The influence of mothen' speech on their children's speech must be
considered in light of the fact that mothers' production of cognitive terms, when children
were two yean old conelated with children's production of cognitive ternis at age three
(Moore et al., 1 Q94),
Talk about Feelings
Changes in matemal production of feeling terms were examined in one study, which
found that mothers increased their use of feeling words over t h e (Dunn et al., 1987).
Dunn et al. obsewed the naturally occumng speech of 43 mothen and their second-
born children Wen their childien wen 18 and 24 months of age. Obsewations were
also conduded with 16 mothen and their first-bom children, when the children were 25
and 32 months of age. As children approached 32 months of age, mothem increased
their production of feeling state talk, representeâ by the number of utterances and the
number of conversation tums containing a rderence to feeling states.
Talk about Beliefs, Desires and Feelings
Investigators have found that maternel references ta cognitive states increased,
while the patterns for desire and feeling talk were leu clear, when cognitive, desire and
féeling deto talk w i e observeci simultaneously. Bemghly et al. (1986) researched the
perception, physiologie, affect* desire. cognition and moral judgement terms used in
conversations behusen 26 motherchild dyads. Observations were mduded Men the
children wem 13,20 and 28 months of age. Results suggesteâ that cognitive state talk
increased, as a proportion of all mental dete talk, as children neared 28 months of age.
The patterns for desire and fwling $tate talk m e less obviour end did not change
significantly over time.
Brown and Dumi (1 991) obsenred six mother-child dyads in order to identify
changes in matemal ref-8 to cognitive, desire and feeling states. Obsewations
were conducted whm childm wre 24-26,2&50 snd 33-36 months of age. As others
have reported (Beeghly et al., 1986; Fuimw et al., 1992), moünin incrc~sed their
production of talk about cognitions u childm appmached 36 months of age. In
addition, the fnquency of talk about desires decreasd Mer children raich84 3û
months of age, 8nâ this wpported the findings of Moore et (il. (1994). who found desire
terms to be mort Vequent when children wenr two years old. It is important to note that
these results were consistent with pnviously established patterns, despite the fact that
Brown and Dunn presented mental state ërms p r 100 conversation turns, a method
dissimilar to other investigators. Finally, there was a non-significant increase in feeling
state talk as children approached 36 months of age. These tesults extended the
findings of Beeghly et al. (1 986) by providing a glirnpse into the develapmental
changes that occuned in maternal mental state talk as children went beyond 28 months
of age.
Summary
ln surnmary, metemal references to cognitive States have been fowid to increase as
children approach three years of age, while references to desires decreased (Furrow et
al., 1992; Moore et al., 1994). The pattern of change for feeling state talk is less well
establisheâ (Dunn et al., 1987). These patterns have emerged despite the fact that
some researchets have presented changes as a proportion of al1 uttefances (Brown &
Dunn, 1991 ; Funrnn et al., 1 892; Moore et al., 1 994) h i l e othen have expressed
changes relative to al1 mental state talk (Beeghly et al., 1986).
Remaining Questions
fhere are a small number of studies that have examined developmental changes in
maternal mental state talk. Many questions remain to k annnrered and we shall
addreu two of them in the pmmt study. Fint, axisting shrdiw have not addmsseâ
maternal changes in mental da8 talk aftw childmn am fow yeam of age. The pmsent
study indudes childmn from 8ge two to six in the hopes of extending what we know
about the developmental changes in mothen' mental state trlk. Second. we have
included fathers, as none of the previously desdbd studies have done so, leaving
unexplored fathers' influence on childm's developing understanding of the mind.
Gmder Dïffemnces in Talk about the Mind
In a review of emotional development, Brody (1 985) describecl emotionat
development according to socialcognitive theory, in which it is suggesteâ that one's
social environment can exert a significant infiuence over emotional development. In
adhmrence with this theory, Brody suggested that girls and boys would speak differently
about feelings and that this dflerence wwld stem from mothem and fathm gender-
specific socialization of their children's emotional expression. The study of the
relationship between gender and the development of talk about mental states has
produœd tonflicting resuk.
Gender Differences betW88n Girls and Boys
Some studbs t h 1 have exwnind gmdef d i f f e m s in how boys and girls talk
about the mind have found no evidence of gender 8ft8ds. Kuebli and Fivush (1 992)
involved both mothen and fathers, as they obsemeâ c o n v ~ i o n r about past events
with each parent and their chiid. The study involveâ 24 children and their parents when
the children wem 40 months of aga With regard to childrsn's talk about emotions, no
gender differenas wers fouid; howevw, the authors nportrd th& th childm
producd fw M i n g wwds overall, which may have pmvented wch a finding.
Cewantes and Callanan (1998) examinai feeling ternis in 84 children at age 2,3
and 4 in conversatiom with thrir mothen. Girls were found to speak more about
emotions than boys did. but only at age 2. The authors suggested that the la& of
genâer difference may have resulted from the fact that girls started off using higher
rates of ernotion talk than boys and did not show an increase in the frequency of feeling
words over tirne. Furthemore, Cervantes and Callanan postulated thet the gender
differences in 'starting points' of emotion words might have been due to differences in
language ability, and no sudi measures were included in the study.
Other studies of mental state talk have found that girls used mon emotion words
thon boys did. Kuebli, Butler and Fivush (1 995) investigated gender differences in 18
children with their mothers, speaking of past events. Children wen, 3 years, 4 months,
4 years, 10 rnmths and 5 yeam, 10 months at the time of the observations. Results
indicated that girls used mon motion words and a greater variety of emotion words
than boys did, and that this differenœ was most pronounced at the third observation
time.
Dunn et al. (1 987) eiamined feeling state talk, naturalistically in children a g a 18,
24,25 and 32 months. Gender difrences wem not examineâ when children w e 32
months of a- as only 16 diildren in that age group participated. At 24 months of age,
however, girls rebmd more Men to fWing states than did boys.
Thwe is rame evidenco that giils umd more cognitive temis t(lM boys did. Hughes
and Dunn (1998) invmtigated g e W diifimœs in cognitive state talk in 50 children
as they interacted with a peer. Obse~ations were conducted when the target chiid was
3 Yeats, i l rnonths, 4 yeafs, 6 months, and 5 yeam of aga Results indicated that girls
produced more re&wences to cognitive states than did boys and u s a a greater variety
of cognitive state tems. Gender difterences in cognitive state talk penisted even aftw
vocabulary scores (British Pidure Vocabulary Scale) wen covaried out of mental state
talk. This pattern of iesults is sirnilar to those reported for gender differences in feeling
state talk (Dunn et al., 1987; Kuebli et al., 1995).
Studies have revealed that mothers talk to daughters more than to sons about
motions and this may contribute to gender differences in how childien talk about
mental states. For exemple, Kuebli et al. (1 994) observed the way in which mothen
spoke to their children, who wem between 3 yean, 4 months and 5 yeen, 10 months.
Results indicated that mothen used more feeling tems with daughters than with sons
and that rnothers who used more emotion words in the first phase had children who
used more ernotion words during the final phase. Cetvantes and Callanan (1 998)
confirmed the findings of Kuebli et al., as they reported mothers spoke more to
daughters Vian to sons about feelings when children were 2, 3, and 4 years old.
Surnmary
Analyses of gender differenws in children's hlk about the mind have produœd
unclear resuîts, with some mporting gender differencer in motion talk (Cervantcis &
Callanan, 1998; Dunn et al., 1987; Kuebli et al., 1995) and cognitive talk (Hughes &
Dunn, 1998), while othem have not (KUebli & F i W , 1992).
Remaining Questions
The mixed pattm of gender differenœs in diildren's emotion talk may be a result of
the low frequency of femling ternis used by childmn in some studks (Kuebli CL Fivush,
1992), or the context in which children'i speech w s emmineâ. For example, Kuebli
and Fivush found gender dmrences Men asking Children to speak of past events.
With the exception of Kuebli and Fivush, studks of gender diflerences in mental state
talk have not included fathers. The present study hopes to address these
methodological differences by: 1 ) examining gender differences in natwally m m n g
speech, 2) including siblings, rnothers and fathers 3) obsming children over an
extemled p e d of time to offset the conœms exprersed by pnwious investigaton, that
the lack of gender differences in motion talk may be a rewlt of Vie low frequency of
such terms.
Gender Differences behween Mothers and Fathen
It has been repoRed that mothen and fathen do not talk difrerently about emotions.
Kuebli and Fivush (1992) reported on gander differmces between mothem and fathers
involved in canvemtiort about past events with their children, a g a 40 months.
Results indimted no difference in the numkr of motion mxds u s d by mothem and
fathem. These msub a n confuring, givem aie prcwrknt viw that wmen are more
emotionally expressive than mm am (Brody, 4985). Howmw, the s-c context
used in this study miy have contributed to the la& ofgendar diffemnœ in emotion talk
Summary
There is very little research that has investigated gender differences in parents' talk
about mental states. Kuebli and F ivush (1 992) conducted one such study and reported
that mothen and fathen did not diffw in tkir talk about emotions when interacting with
their children.
Remaining Questions
The present study will add new information to what is known about gender
differences in mental state talk First, we will contrast mothen and fathen on their
production of cognitive, desire and feeling talk.
Second, we will explore the possibility of gender differences in parents' speech as it
occurs naturalistically. This context will allow us to determine if parents are diffeiently
socializing an understanding of the mind during routine, daily interactions with their
children.
Finally, because wm have a $ample of childen age two to six, we can begîn to
addnss the issue of gender diffwnces ovw a broed developmental period.
ni. ReWent d Mental Stato Tdk
Gendw differemcms hava been examid not only in t m s of the fieqwncy of
mental state tdk, but also in how childm talk about the mental states of other people.
Giiligan (1982) propored thrt m m and w o m di* in the way in which they M n e
themselves and othen. She suggested that women define who they are in tems of
their relationships and connecteâness with others, and that women are more likely to
act out of cuncem for others. In contrast, men are more likely to act in a way that is
consistent with laws and rules.
It has been report& that the conversations betwwn girls are markedly different
than those between boys. Tannen (1990) examined videotapes of girls and boys in
grade 2,6 and 1 O, conversing with a best fn'end. In summarizing hei observations,
Tannen no td thet girls of al1 ages engaged in conversations that were relationship
oriented, Mile boys tendeâ to tease each other, and discuss reœnt events and sports.
Furthemore, girls tendeâ to share issues relevant to one girl at a time, whilo boys
tended to talk about their own issues. Given the importance of relationships for girls
and women, it is thought that girls and women may refer more to the intemal states of
others when compamd to boys and men.
Referent of Belief Talk
Gender differences have not bmn reporled in shrdies that have examined children's
talk about the mental sûates of 'othen'. Hughes and Dunn (1998) recently exomined
the cognitive state talk of 25 tafget childnm, in conversation with a friend. Three
cetegories d referent were u d : ' s e W (the speaker / child), 'othet (usually the ChiM's
friend) and 'child plus friemf. The authon collapseâ the latter two group together to
obtain a meawre of cognitive tems tM iduded a referenœ to "other' (othei than the
drild). The results did not support Gilligan's ümry, as no significrwit ~Wtd8f
diFerences uvefe found in fehmnœs to ''dhd. lt would be interesting to detmine if
the rewlts persisted if aie catqories of 'othd and 'child plw friend had not b e n
collapsed. providing an indication of how offen boys and girls refend to sotneone
other than themselves, without being wntaminateâ by shared references.
Referent of Feeling Talk
Gender diffemnces have not been found in either aiildren's talk or parents' talk
about the feeling states d 'others' (other than child). Kuebli and Fivush (1992) studied
the refennt of feeling state talk in 24 mothen, fathers, and their children, during
conversations about past events. The children, half girls and half boys, wece 3 years, 4
months of age. Referent was codd as 'child' (child or parent refem'ng to child), 'other'
(child or parent rderring to oaier then child) or 'group' (shared by child and other).
Results did not indicate that one gender spoke more about the feeling states of 'osiers'.
Summary
The rewlts of the previoudy desaibed studies, Mile consistent, hould be
considerd inconcIusive because of their low nurnbet and methodological differences.
Previous research has obsewd children whL talking about past events (Kuebli &
Fivush, 1992). We know vwy littk about gendet dwerenws btween girls and boys
and be- moaCm and fWws in how they Wk about the mental states of others
during natunlly ocarmng conversations in mir home environment. In addition, the
conversation partmm hava differed betWB(M dudies. Kueôli and Fivush (1 992)
obsewd children wRh their parents, *il8 Hughes and Dunn (1998) obsewed children
interacting with a fnend. Futthennom, 'oam' wu categorized d i i t l y in =di study.
Hughes and Dunn collapsed the cetegories of 'child plus ftiend' and 'othet, while
Kuebli and Fivush did not include shared references in their 'other' cetegory.
Remaining Questions
The present study hopes to wmplement previous work and provide new information
about gender-specific patterns of taik about others' mental states by: 1) examining aie
proportion of cognitive, desire and feeling state talk that refers to 'other than the child',
2) observing families during naturalistic observation periods, 3) by involving both
siblings and parents.
The Effect of Siblings on Mental Sfit. Trlk
In previous woik, investigators have concludd that being the oldest sibling is
advantageous in ternis of intelledual abilities. Belmont and Marolla (1973) conducteci
a retrospective examination of family size, birth order and intelligence, using the Raven
Progressive Matrices as a measure of intellectual ability. Results indicated that as
family size and birth order position increasd scores on the Ravm decreased,
suggesting a disadvantage of larger fmily size and of being the youngest child.
Zajonc and Markus (1975) described aie optimal birth position in ternis of
intelledual ability, as king the firstborn of two, with the younger sibling appearing
closely in time to the older sibling. In particulat, it was suggested that the younger
sibling should be bom, optimally, Men the older sibling ha8 reBCh8d su(licicwit
cognitive maturity to play the role of a teacher, which will, in tum, k sdvantsg.0~~ for
the older child's intelleetual abilities. H~owever, a specific gap in time between sibling
births has not been identifid.
Siblings and Theory of Mind
It has recently b e n reportecl that children from large families do better on theory of
mind tasks. Pemer, Ruffman and Leekam (1994) investigated the effects of family size
and age on pHormance on false belief tasks. Results indicated that older children and
those from larger families demonstrateâ superior performance on false belief tasks.
The nlationship was hrrttier investigated by disceming the role of younger verses older
siblings in false belief understanding. Analyses failed to reveal an advantage of
younger verses older siblings.
Additional studies have revealeû that children with an older sibling are advantaged
in their falss belid understanding. The data in Pemer et al.% study (1 994) was re-
examined by Ruffian, Pemer, Naito, Parkin and Clements (1998) for two parts of e
fourgart study. Farnily size was divided into hnro variables, the number d youngw and
number of older siblings. The numbw of older siblings predicted performance on false
belief tasks. Moreover, Rulhan et al. tested a $ample of children who had comparable
numben of younger and older siblings. Analyses of this data indicated a signifiant
Mect for oldw siblings, but mt for younger. The authors mnduded that older, but rot
younger, siblings exerted a hclitative d e in falw k l W understanding.
0t)m res8arCtHHs have rwealed that it w m n d simply having an oldw sibling that
wa8 advantaamus, but nthrr the number d oldef childm me intmcted with. Lewis,
Frwman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki and Berridge (1 996) exemind how the
number of kin and the number of daily interactions with those kin contributecl to false
belief understanding. Performance on false belief tasks favored thow children who
interaded with a greater number of older siblings the day prior to testing. When birai
order was considered, then, provd to be an advantage to being the thirdbom as
opposed to the secondborn, and of being a younger sibling verses being a first bom.
So, contrary to studies that addresseci the relationship between family sire, birHi order
and intelligence, then appeared to be an advantage of being the younger sibling in
terms of false belief understanding.
It has been reported by some that the advantage of having a sibling only applies to
children with lower language ability. Jenkins and Astington (1 996) sampled 32 girls
and 36 boys between the ages of 2 yean 11 months and 5 years 5 months, to
detemine the relationship between false belief understanding and a variety of cognitive
and family structure measures. Resulb were consistent with thpl of Pemer et al.
(1994), in that farnily size was a signifiant predictor of false belief understanding. The
authon suggested mat the presenœ of siblings in the home might advance false belief
understanding by providing a greater number of interactions duting which false bdief
understanding may k facilitated. In addition, language ability was also associated with
felse bdief understanding, in that false klief understanding was more strongly
associated with the pmsence dsiblingr for childm with laver language ability, thrn it
was for children with grnater languq8 ability. Furthemore, the nwl ts feild to
demonstrate a superiof W8d for olckr verses youngef riblin~s when falw bdief
understanding was wmpared in children with one older sibling verses one younger
sibling.
Sumrnary
Earlier studies have found that k ing the younger sibling is not advantagews in
tens of intellectwl ability (Belmont & Marolla, 1973; ajonc & Markus, 1975), whereas
discrepant trends have been identified for the development of theory of mind. Some
investigators have reporteâ an advantage in being the younger sibling (Lewis et al.,
1996; Ruffman el al., 1998), while others have not (Jenkins 8 Astington, 1996).
Remaining Questions
There were several methodological differences in the studies of sibling status and
theory of mind task performance, which impede a definitive conclusion. First, Ruthan
et al. (1 998) and Lewis et al. (1 996) did not include a measure of language ability, so
we do not know whether task performance w u influenced by an interaction behnreen
language ability and sibling status. Secondly, Rulhnan et al. found that the advantage
of an older dbling wcis @vident only for childrm over thme yean of age. Jenkins and
Astington did not provide s-c age8 of the children with either one older or one
younger sibling. Finally, cultural influencer on falm bdM understanding munt be
consided. Lewis et al. u s d a samplo of children living in the Ore& communities of
Cyprur and Crete, while Jenkins and Astingtm used a sample from Toronto, Canida.
It b as yet unclerir as to how diffisrent cultures may dbct family cohesion, intendion
and kin netirmrks, and how these f&tm may in tum nrSIii.ncs false ûelief
understanding.
The Ralationrhip k(nmn Oldw Siblings urd Mental State Trlk
It has been found that children with an older sibling tend to outperfom those without
on measures of false belief (Lewis et al., 1 996; Ruffman el al., 1 998). Furtherrnore,
passing false belief tasks has been associated with the frequency of mental state talk
(Brown et al., 1 QQ6; Hughes & Dunn, 1998). A natural extension of these associations
would be to study the relationship between having an older sibiing and the frequency of
different types of mental state talk.
Rernaining Questions
To date, there are no studies of which we are aware that have examined the
relationship between having an older sibling and mental Mate talk. The present study
aims to addresr the methodological issues that have h n identifid in past studies of
sibling order and theory of mind tasks. First, we have induded a correlate of langwge
ability, the Mean Length d Utterance (MLU) in order to determine whether the
advantage of an older sibling is related to language ability. Second, all of the children
we compare are over four yeam of qe , thus taking into account Ruthnan et al.'s
(1 998) finding that older siblings only bendit younger siblings over the ege of three.
The design of the present study complements that of other studies and may provide
answers to questions that have not previously h n asked. First, this study is
longitudinal, spanning a two-year period and including children from 2 to 6 years of
age. We focused on the naturally ocarning we of concomitant cognitive, desire and
feeling state talk. The conte* of the observations was consistent among families, in
that al1 observations were made in the farnily's home, duting naturally accuming periods
of both play and conflict. Unlike previous research, the present study examina
interactions between mothers, fathen, and sibling pairs, providing a comprehensive
examination of intemal state talk in families.
This study had Viree goals. The first was to map the relative changes in children's
cognitive. desire and feeling state talk be-n the agas of two and six. The data set
was such that the onset of talk about mental States could rot be examineci. Instead,
developmental trajectories wem examined using meastires of frequency. This
particular rnethodology does not dlow us to map the ôeginning of children's
understanding of mind. However, it does allow us to identify developmental changer at
an age *en children's pmdudion of mental state tems might be more ftequent.
Given the findings fmm pmvious mmarch, wa expected to find an incn,am in cognitive
talk over time for both ywnget anâ older siblings. In light of the contradidory findings
of Bartsch and Wellman (1995) ami Moore et al. (1994), w expected only that desire
tems would be the mort common type of mental state tilkwbn childm were two
yean old. We preâided that feeling talk would increase over time, but remsin Iess
common than talk about cognitions or desires.
Changes in parental cognitive, desire and feeling talk are also examined in this
study. Ptevious research has examined only matemal mental state talk, and found
that cognitive talk increased as children's age increased, while talk about desires
decreased ffom the time children were two years old. Wo predicted a similar trend for
cognitive and desire talk Studies of feeling talk have been less conclusive and so we
made no particular prediction. Furthemore, previous studies have not involved
fathers. However, we predided that fathers would demonstrate changes in mental
state talk similar to that of mothers.
Our second goal was to examine gender differences in talk about others' mental
states. Given the differenœs in how males and fernales define thernselves and others,
we predicted that girls would talk more about the mental States of other people than
would boys. We also predided that mothen, more so than fathen, when talking to a
child, would talk mon about the mental states of wmeone othw than the diild.
Furthemore, given the Wnd for talk about desires to begin earlier than that of
cognitions, we pfedicted that talk about the desims of others would k greater thon talk
about aie cognitions of dhers, et Imst when childm wbn îwo yeam of age.
The third goal war to examine the dF8d of having an older sibling on meMd state
talk. At the 2. the mean age of the ywnger childm who had an older sibling was 4.4
years. At time 1, the man age of the 01- siblings, who thmseIve8, did not have an
older sibling, was 4.4 years. This similarity in age a l l d us to examine aie
relationship between the presence of an older sibling and mental state talk. Given the
trend for children with an older sibling to be advantaged in fatse bdief understanding
(Lewis et al., 1996; Rdman et al., 1998), we predicted that those with an older sibling
would produce more cognitive terms than those without. We predided a specific
advantage for cognitive state talk over other types of mental state talk based on the
proposal that cognitive talk requires more advanced representational skills than talk
about desires (Barlsch & Wellman, 1995).
Pu(lcipwit8
Forty Caucasian families, eech consisting of two p a r 0 and hwo children living
together, participatecl in air study. F amilies were rmi ted based on birth
announments in the local newspaper. me data were originally collecteci to examine
the concept of moral orientation (Lollis, Ross 8 Lefou, 1996). ln the initial intenriew,
parents wem told thet investigatws wsn, interested in the rdationship between their Iwo
children, as well as in how children leam funily rules and expectations for interpersonal
behavior. The childm wen told that the obsewews were coming into their homes and
would watch how they played together. They were asked not to interact with the
observer.
At time 1, the older children were ôebmen 3.8 and 4.9 years of age (M = 4.4 years)
and the younger childrm were betwwn 1.9 and 2.6 w= 2.4 y-). At time 2, the
older children were between 5.4 and 7.0 yem (Y = 6.3 y@-) and the younger children
were between 3.8 and 4.8 yean = 4.4 yeam). The gender of older and younger
chilben was balanced for an eqwl numbr of riIl possible brother/sistm combinations.
Families lived in a medium-sizd industrial city in SOUfhWBstern Ontario. Caneda. All
fathen ware mployed Usîâe the home on a full-tirne basb, and 29 mothem were
employed outside the homa on a hl1 or pmt-tirne baais. Fathers or other family
membem genwally cand for the childm, in üie mothors' absence. Parents' educational
backgrounds varid wiâely in the mple: 29% hrd completed a univemity degm, 15%
haâ completed r collage progmm, 41% had completed high s c h d and
15% had not gmduated from high schod. At time 1, parents' ages rangd between 23
and 48 yeam of age (M = 30.8 for mothers; M = 32.6 for fathers). At time 2, thrw
families wem unavailable to participate, as one family had moved away and Iwo others
were in the process of divorce or sepration. Therefom, al1 analyses wen, conducteci
with the remaining 37 families.
Procedure
The data used in this study was ofiginally collecteâ for an investigation of moral
orientation carried out by Susan Lollis and Hildy Ross. The majority of the procedure
that follows is taken directly (with permission) frorn a publication pertaining to the
originel data collection (Lollis, Ross & Leroux, 1 996). Tho section titled coding mental
$ta& talk marks aie beginning of the procedurer carriecl out for the present study.
Behavioral observations.
Data were collected during six Qûmin observational ses8ions in the homes of the
participants, at each of the hno tirne pieds. Duing haif the sessions both parents
were present (mother-father sessions) and during the remaining sessions the mother
and children were obsewed without the father (moaHKonly sessions). These two
situations wwe used as they wrwe thought to mpresmt the most common
con8tellations in the famil y.
During the sessionr, an observer follannd the childm nd dictated ont0 one tradc
of a stem audiotape a descriptive rccount d all interactions botwem the childm and
36
of al1 parental behaviots that related to the childrm's interaction. On the second track
of the tape, a recording was made of the s m that occurred in the home. Obrervers
did not participate in family interaction and nsponded as little as possible to camments
of family mernbers. For obsmations to proceeâ the children had to k in the same
room and parents had to be either in the rame or an adjacent room, although in both
cases allowances were made for brief absences of up to 2 min. Televisions, video
games, or other major distractions wn not allowed. Whenever these requirements
were not met, observeni stopped recording and either waited until the participants
cornplied with these provisions or arranged to obsenie again et a tirne that was more
wnvenient for the families. To maintain stability and rapport. two obsewers were
assigned to each family. To limit the intrusiveness of the observations, only one
observer was present during each observation session. These procedures were
repeated two yeats later. The content of the speech that family membws directed to
one another and a descn*ption of each person's adions were accounted for in coding
the transcripts.
There is some research suggesting that girls use mon, feeling words than boys
(Kuebli et al., 1995) and thrt mothm use mon, fmling wordr than fathers (ffiebli &
Fivush, 1992). In addition, Condry and Condry (1976) demonstmted that when
observen know a child's geridet, they diffmntly Mbute emotions. To prevent biased
coding of tranraipts, codefs wcne blind to th8 g d e r of parents and the gender of
childm. For example, if r child indiCBfd gmdw whm refwing to thair siMing (e.g.,
het she), the mtarence was rspl8cad by a code for ribling, with no indication d gendw.
Coding Mental State talk
Mental state talk was divideâ into three categories; cognitive, desire and fwling
talk M a t follows is a description of tems included in each category.
Cognitive talk includeâ tems wed to denote the thougMs, mernories or knowledge
of the speaker, listener or a third person. nie tems included in this category were the
tems think, know, believe, wonder, remember, bfget, guess, pretend, understand and
expect, and aall variations. Shatz et al. (1983) found these to be the most cornmon
cognitive state tems uttered by young children, and these ternis have been included as
examples of cognitive talk by leter researchen, (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Hughes 8
Dmn, 199û; Moore et al., 1994).
There is rom8 variation in the coding schernes of past research, with respect to
whidr ternis to include and which to exdude. Battsch and Wellman (1995) were
concerned with the onset of references to genuine mental states, and so used a
conservative toding scheme that included only mentalistic uses of ternis and excluded
convenational uses (ag., 'Do you know ...'). Conversely, other researchem have
included convemational uses (Brown, Donelan-McCall8 Dunn, 1996; Fuww et al.,
1 992; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Pemer, 1 991 ). Much of the support for the inclusion of
conversational uses atise8 fmm work by Moore and hir wlleagues (Moore, Bryant &
Fumm, 1989), who establishd that childm as young as four wem able to distinguish
betwcnm varying Ievels of œrteinty in cognitive terms, and used this kndedge to
modulate asseftio~. Fu-, a8 B m et al. pointed out, it would be enoi#ous
to assume that statmmnts rudr as '1 dont k n W am nothing m m than idiomatic
axprsuionr, whm umd by adub or childnn. We induded conv«rrtional usas of
cognitive tennr basa on these arguments and the recent finding of Hughes and Dunn
that both 'genuine' and 'conversational' uses of cognitive terms were associated with
performance on theory of mind tasks (Hughes & Dunn, ? 998).
Consistent with Shatz et al. (1983)' we included "know Mat" if it was used to direct
an interaction by introducing information (ag., "know what, 1 have a... ') and references
to '1 know" and "1 dont knoW if a descriptive statement is made irnplicitly, not only
explicitly, such as 'the big snake is dangerous," " I know." Consistent with Bartsch and
Wellman (1995), "1 knog and "1 don't know' were included if they were linked with a
description of ignorance. Consistent with Pemer (1991), we included know as it r e f h
to an ability (e.g., '1 know how to tie my show'), or to facts (0.0.' '1 know rny socks are
in the drawef) or to access information.
Instances of cognitive state tems which were excluded were undeai meanings of a
tenn or sentence fragment, repetitions of own or others' utterance and ternis useâ in
direct response to a question (e.g., 'Where do you think the sock is?" "1 think the sock
is in the drawef) and '1 knaw Boô" if it c m be paraphrased to mean '1 met Bob"
(Bartsch EL Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al., 1 983).
Oesire t m s induâed went, hop?, wish and c8m, and al1 variations of these termr
used to capture diildmn's desires or goab (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Shatz et al.,
1983). Specifically, wanf was induded as a refmnce to a goal directed behwior (e.g.,
'I wsnt to rit down'), h o p r it refend to a wish or wint (ag., '1 h o p Santa canes
mona), and a m as it referred to a prof- or Iack of pmbmme (e.g., 'I dont cus
which crayon I usen) (Bartsch 8 Wellman, 1995). As in Bartsch and Wellrnan and
Shatz et al., unclear rneanings of a term or sentence fragment and repetitions of own or
othen' utterances were excluded, as were idiomatic phrases such as "taking caren or
"wish upon a star."
Feeling tems included those that referred to an emotional state. Consistent with
previous coding criteria, we included al1 variations of sad, hurt, angry, happy, excited,
love, dislike, afraid, enjoy, fun, glad, mad, scared, upset, suprise and fear (Dunn et al.,
1987). In addition, disgust was included, consistent with Dunn. Brown and Beardsall
(1 991). The terrn like was included when it referred to a state of enjoyrnent or dislike,
and good was included only if it denoted a feeling state (Dunn et al., 1987). Phrases
that connote a feeling state were also included, such as "make a fuss" (Dunn et al.,
1987). Excluded feeling tems consisted of non-verbal expressions (e.g., crying or
laughing), specific and non-specific expletives (e.g., ÿuck"), like when it indicated
volition and good if used in a moral sense (Dunn et al., 1991). As in Bartsch and
Wellman (1 995), unclear rneanings of a tenn or sentence fragment and repetitions of
own or others' utterances were excluded.
Coding Referent
The category of referent of the mental state talk described whose mental state the
speaker was refemng to. Speech was divided into three categories, consistent with
Kuebli and Fivush (1 992); (1) other (other than the chiid), when the parent speaking
referred to him I her self; or to a third person; (2) child, when the child who was the
conversation partner was being referred to; (3) group, indicating that the mental state of
the speaker and anothw wwe k ing refeweâ to. The catqory of 'groupr wat also used
W n the mental state of the Iistener and the speaker wen, cornbined in an embedded
construction. For example, '1 know that you want to go " is a linguistic structure known
as an embedded sentence. Such uttefances w l d k coded as a cognitive terni (with
an embedded desin, proposition) ref-ng to a group (deVilliers, 1995).
As we were interested only in references to people other than the target child,
references to 'child' and 'group' were not included in analyses. To examine parental
references to 'other' (other than the child) for cognitive talk, we divided r8fwenc8s to
'othet by the total number of references to cognitive states to create a proportional
score. The same produre war cameâ out for desire and feeling talk and for fathers.
All variables wbre transformeci using a square root transformation to account for
positive skem.
Based on gender differencm in the vmy that males and fernales define themselves,
we predicted that mothen, more than fathen, would mode1 for childm how to talk
about the mental states of amthar person. AS such, we are interest8d in wmparing
mothem and fbthws in mir piodudion of mental state temr aâdresaed to 'other,'
meaning 0 t h ~ th8n the Child. It may bu that by talking to childm about the mental
states of m e o m 0 t h ~ than the child, parents will promot8 mir child's interest in the
mental states of 0 t h ~ people.
Consistent with the coding $chme af W b l i and Fivu* (1992), thme categories of
refetent w m usud for childmfs speech: (1) wlf, W m the child mhmd to Mm or her
self (2) other, when the child referteâ to their conversation parfner (2d person), or
made a 3d peson reference (e.g., other parent, sib) (3) gmup, when child refened to
self and another.
To examine diffemnœs btween boys and girls in their references to somebody
other than themselves, cognitive talk direcîed at 'osier' (second I third person) was
divided by the total amount of cognitive talk to mate a proportional score. This
procedure was repated for desire and feeling speech and was performd seperately
for younger and older siblings. All variables were positively skwed and so a square
root transformation was perfomeû.
Based on the literature, we predided that girls would talk more than boys would
about the mental states of peopk other than themselves. Therefore, we are interested
in comparing gender dWemnces in the frequency of mental state talk for the category of
'other.
Inter-rater reliability was calculateâ for the t y p of mental state talk and the refefent,
using 1 S pet cent of the families, each a time 1 and time 2. For time 1, the per cent
agreement for cognitive state talk was 97%, for desin alk, 98% and for feeling talk
88%. For time 2, the par cent agreement was 98% for cognitive talk and desim talk,
and 97% for fmling state talk. Kappa values for the -nt at tirne 1 and time 2 w m
0.91 and 0.93, respedively.
Conversat ional Tums
The original tmnscripts w m divided into convenationrl tums, which wem defined
as al1 of one speakedr uttefance8 bounded by the utterances of another speaker
(Shatz 8 Gelman, 1973). Sentence fragments and mpetitions were not included. A
conversetion tum may have contained mors than 1 utterance.
Utterances
As in Shah and Gelman (1973) an utterance was defined as a complete clause.
For the purposes of mis study, an utterance was oonridered to be a group of words
bounded by a period or question mark on the trenscriptr, end includeâ both forneci
sentenas and conversationil phrases. Utterances mat wfe sentence fragments or
exact repetitions of pmviour utterances were not included. tf non-worddbehaviour was
al1 that occurreâ, it war not counted as an utturanco or as a conversation tum. Singing
was not counted a i an uttefance, a convemtion tum, or a word.
Mean Lemgth of Utteranœ (MLU)
The numW of words in the 100 utterances follming the fint ten conversation tums
was avefageâ and constituted the MLU (Shatz & Gelmen, 1973). This was calculateâ
for each child at time 1 and time 2.
When counting the n u m k of wofd8 in an uttemnœ, the aiteria set by Shatz and
Gelman (1973) wem fdluwed: (1) cmtmüons (O& an't, wanna) and pioprr name8
(e.g., Julia Webtw) nnn courited as hno wwds; (2) hyplmated wwdr (ebg., beep-
bop) wwe counted r me w#d. ExpIatives and rwndr PiggW, 'Ah hrh' wem mt
counted as words. The interiater nliability for MLU calculetions was .97 at time 1 and
.74 at tirne 2, for the younger sibling. For the older sibling, the mliability was .97 et
time 1 and .85 at time 2.
As al1 of ouf main questions involved diifences between mothers' and fathen'
mental state talk. oniy date h m rnother-faaier sessions wen used in analyses. In
order to account for the significant diflerences in conversation tums between family
mernbers, proportional scores were used for al1 variables. In accordance with Brown et
al. (1 996), we created proportional scores by dividing the number of cognitive state
ternis by the number of conversation tums. This process was repeated for desire and
feeling ternis and for each family member. As al1 variables mre positively skewed,
they were transformed using a square mot transformation.
In order to examine differences betWBBn mothers and fathers in the mental state talk
that they direded to their younger and older children, summed scores of mothers'
cognitive, desire anû féeling talk to either the younger or older diild was created and
divided by her total number of conversation tums. The same procedure war carrieû out
for fathen' speech. As al1 variables wre positively skwad, they wre transfomied
using a square mot transftmnation. In one family, the fathgr, at time 2, used mom
cognitive and fWing tems thon he had speaker tums (multiple uses per tum).
Although scores for al1 pamnts w e le81 than 1 (ranged fiom O airough .82), scores for
this fatherwere ovw 1. In oder to reduce the dthis outlier, it was riscoded to '1'.
P amts alm directed r#nirkri to both of their childm sirnuttane~usIy. At üme 1. the
proportion of directed to both childm w# -4% d th. mental $tate Uk. At time
2, it had flsen to 16.5%. Because the proportion of talk was so lw et time 1, it was not
possible to maintain thb as a separate category of talk in subrequent analyses.
Cons8quently, wo droppd speech dir-eû 1 both childrsn from the analyses that am
reported below. In ofder to ensun that mis did not Iead to erroneous conclusions, we
always fan subsequent analyses for time 2 wparately, in which speech directed to both
children was included as a third Ievel of ouf age of child variable.
Convmaüon Tumr
Over time, the number of mothw conversation tums inueased significantly,
1 (36) = 4.24, p < ,001, as did fathers, (36) = -3.99, Q c -001. The means and standard
deviations far the- variables can k found in Table 1. Mothm engaged in mon,
conversation tums than fathers st time 1, f (36) = -2.76, g c -01. There was a trend for
fathen to engage in mon conversation tums than rnothen at time 2, f (36) = 2.01, p <
.M. It is important to note that on, father at time 2 was an outlier in the very large
number of conversation tums that he pmduced. Rether than changing the value of this
outlier, t h t-test was conducted bo(h with and without this f a W . As the results of the
t-test did not change substantively, he mmains in the analyses. Moreover, dl
subsequent analyses wbm conduded both with and without this father. As none of the
results reporteci below change substantively, ho ma ins in al1 analyses.
Over timo youngor and older childm increased the number of c o n v ~ t i o n tums in
which they engageô, f (36) = -7.56, p < .W1 and f (38) = -7.48, p .ml, respecüvely.
The means and standard daviationr for these variables cari al- be fowid in Table 1.
Fu--, olâer childm producd m conversation hrms thn younger childm et
time 1, t (36) = 4.25, Q .001, and time 2, f (58) = -3.07, Q < -005.
Younger Child 7.56"
Mother &! 40.46
sp 28.83
Mean Length of Uttomce (MLU)
The MW foi youngw diildm was significwrtly greatw at üme 2 than a time 1, f
(36) = 6.31, < .ml. For oldw childm, MLU did not change significantly over time.
The rneans and standard deviationr for these variables can be found in Table 2. Older
children had a higher MLU than their ywnger ribling at time 1, (36) = -7.55, p c .al,
and again at time 2, t (36) = -2.3, p c .03. When ma MLU of younger siblingt at time 2
(men they wen 4 y w r old) and 01- siblings at tim 1 (when they wwe 4 ymn old)
wem compudd, üwe was no rignificant d i i n œ .
Younger !Y! 2.72
sQ 0.85
The Relrtion8hip k(nmn MLU and Montal State Talk
ln order to examine the reletimship behmen children's use of cognitive, desire and
feeling tems and their mon, general use of Ianguage, we conduded bivariate
correlations between MLU and each type of speech, for younger and older children
separately. The only significant C O K ~ ~ ~ O ~ S were between the younger chilci's desire
state talk and MLU a time 1, and cognitive stata talk and MLU at time 2, as cen be
seen in Tables 3 and 4. So, as the younger children are b m i n g mon, verbally
fluent, the strength of the mlationship betwaen MLU and cognitive state talk increaser,
while the relritionrhip btween MLU and desires and feelings decreases. For the older
children, as they becom more verbally fiucmt, the stmngth of the mlationrhip betwvm
MCU and cognitive $tate talk dmeam~, whib the nlationthip between MLU and
desire and fwling state trlk imams.
Conalrtionr behum MLU and toeoch of vounau riblipoIiPOI
Time 1
Cognitive
Desin
Feef in9
Time 2
Cognitive 0.35.
Derin 4.23
Feeling -0.13
*Q < .O5
TaMa 4. Conelrtions between MCU and sgoach of oldu Jblinaa.
Time 1
Cognitive
Desire
Fding
Time 2
Cognitivs
DmCn
F d i n g
According to Cozby (1 997), the strength of a correlation will increase if a broad
range of scores is involved. So, to better understand the conelations between mental
state talk and MLU, the range of the different types of mental state talk was examined.
Upon closer inspection, the conelations that decreased in strength do in fact have a
reduction in the range of mental state talk at time 2. For example, the range of desire
and feeling talk for younger siblings nartowed ove? time, as a result of individual
differences in development. For those correlations that are stronger at time 2, such as
the younger siblings' cognitive talk, there was an increese in the range of cognitive state
talk.
Question #1: How does the balance between different types of mental state talk in
children and in parent's change with children's age? Outcome variables were the
proportion of conversation tums that involved cognitive, desire and feeling state tens.
Younaer Children
A 2(time) x 3(type of speech) x 2(gender) repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) for the younger children revealed a significant main effect of time, (1,35) =
52.96, p < .001, with children using more mental state talk at t h e 2 than at time 1.
Type of speech was also significant as a main effect, E (2,34) = 52.81, p < .001, with
children talking most about desires at both time periods. Gender was significant as a
main effect, (1,35) = 6.54, p < .02. There were no significant interactions between
gender and time or type of speech. so girls spoke more than boys dld about cognitions,
desires and feelings at time 1 and time 2.
There was a significant interaction between time and type of speech, E (2,34) =
27.50, p c .W1. A doubly muhivariate N O V A was used as a posthoc test, to
detemine which type(s) of speech changed over time. The doubly muMivariate ANOVA
revealed that the proportion of cognitive speech (as a proportion of the nurnber of
conversation tums) increased significantly, E (1 , 35) = 141.51 , Q c .O01 , as did feeling
speech, E (1, 35) = 8.94, Q c .0W. The proportion of speech about desires did not
change significantly over time, E (1,35) = 0.73, n.s. By time 2, cognitive talk is
ocairring almost as frequently as desire talk. The data are presented graphically in
Figure 1 to enable the patterns to be seen more clearly. See Table 5 for means and
standard errors.
To further explore gender differences in mental state talk, the MLU of boys and girls b
was compared et time 1 and time 2. Results of t-tests indicated that at time 1, the
verbal fluency of girls was significantly greater than that of boys, 1 (35) = 2.55, e < .02.
At tirne 2, although girls spoke more than boys did, the difference was no longer
significant. Overall, the magnitude of the gender differenœs was greater at time 1.
when children were 2 yeers of age, than et time 2, when they were 4 yean of age.
These results suggest that the gender dMlerence in mental state talk may be best
explained by girls' genenl cornpetence in language when compared to boys rathef than
a cornpetence that is specific to mental state talk
Older Children
A 2(time) x 3(type of speech) x 2(gmder) repeated meesures N O V A for older
childmn revealed a signifiant main effect of type d speech, E (2,34) = 87.79, Q c 001,
with children speaking most about desires, followed by cognitions and then feelings.
Time was not significant, E (1, 35) = 1.63, ns., nor was gender, E (1, 35) = .6, n.s.
The interaction between time and type of speech was signifiant, E (2, 34) = 28.37,
e e .W1 (Mer to Table 4 for means and standard deviations). The post-hoc doubly
muitivariate ANOVA revealed a signifiant increase in talk abwt cognitions, 5 (1, 35) =
15.69, g c ,001, and a significant decrease in talk about desires, E (1, 35) = 20.54, Q <
.O01 and feelings, E (1, 35) = 6.26, < -02 (as a proportion of the total number of
conversation tums). As cen be seen in Figure 2, older children spoke proportionately
more about cognitions over time, whereas they spoke proportionately less about
feelings and desires. At time 2, although older children spoke marginally more about
desires than cognitions, the difrence belween the Iwo was slight. The means and
standard mors for these variables can be found in Table 5.
Although there are no gender differences in mental state talk, a t-test was
conducteci to compare the MLU of older boys and girls at each time period. There was
no signifiant difference in MLU between boys and girls at either time. So, the older
girls did not demonstrate greater ampetence in verbal fluency or frequency of mental
state talk than the older boys.
Table S.
Mean IM) and Standard Error (SEI for chanaes in children'~
mental state talk at time 1 and time 2,
Younaer
cognitive M - SE
feeling !Y!
SE
cognitive hd s€
feeling M s€
Figura 1.
Mean ~ro~ortion of vounaer children's coaruve. desire and feeling s~eech at tirne 1 and time 2,
t i m e 2
O
CO g n itive desire feeling
Type of Spcrch
Figure 2.
M e a n p r a D a r t i o n o f oldetctiildren'seech at time 1 and tirne 2.
O .1 t i m e 2
O
CO g n itive desire fe e lin g
Type of Speech
Parents
A 2(time) x 3(type of speech) x 2(age of child) x 2(parent) repeated measures
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of type, (2,35) = 19.43, g c .001, with
parents speaking most about cognitions and desires, and least about feelings. Parent
was significant as a main effect, with mothers speaking more about mental States than
fathers, E (1, 36) = 7.1 3, c .02. There were no significant interactions between parent
and time, type or age of child, so mothers spoke more than fathers did about
cognitions, desires and feelings under al1 conditions. lime was not signifiant as a
main Med, E (1 , 36) = .26, n.s., nor was age of child, E (1, 36) = .92, n. S.
The type by time interaction revealed a trend for talk about cognitions, desires and
feelings to change from time 1 to tirne 2, E (2, 35) = 2.87, g < .08. The doubly
mulüvariate ANOVA revealed that the proportion af cognitive state telk imeased
significantly over time, E (1, 33) = 5.6, g < .03, while speech about desires, E (1, 33) =
.37, n.s. and feelings, (1, 33) = .53, n.s. did not change significantly. At time 1,
parents spoke proportionately more about desires, followed by cognitions and feelings.
At time 2, parents spoke proportionately more of cognitions, followed by desires and
feelings. Refer to Table 6 for means and standard enw and ta Figure 3 for a graphical
representat ion.
Table 6.
Mean LM) and Standard Emr ISE) of ~arents' mental state talk to children at tirne 1 and 2.
State Talk Ttme 1 Time 2 F (1,331
Cognitive M E
Feeling M -LI
SE
Mean ~rogortion of parents' coanitive. desire and feeling s~eech at time 1 and time 2.
cognitive desire feeling
Type of Speech
Cognitive, desire and feeling tilk as a percantage of mental state talk
The frequency of cognitive, desire and feeling talk was also calculated as a
percentage of the frequency of mental state talk, separately for each family member at
each time.
For younger children, cognitive talk represented cl % of al1 mental state talk, desires
81 % and feelings 18% at time 1. At tirne 2, cognitive talk represented 39%, desires
48% and feelings 13%.
These results indicate that desire and feeling talk, as a proportion of mental state
talk decreased over time, as cognitive talk increased with age.
For older children, the pattern was similar to that seen for younger children. The
percentage of cognitive, desire and feeling talk at time 1 was 18%, 66% and 16Oh.
respectively. At time 2, the percentages were 40%,49% and 11 %, respectively.
As children get older their mental state talk is increasingly about cognitions. These
patterns are consistent with those produced when mental state ternis were expressed
as a proportion of the total number of conversation tums.
The cognitive, desire and feeling state talk of mothen and fathers was summed
together and then calculated as a percentage of mental state terms. At time 1, the
percentage of mental state talk that was cognitive talk was 38%, desire talk was 42%
and feeling talk was 20%. At time 2, the percentage of cognitive talk increased to 49%.
with a decrease in desire talk to 33Oh and feeling talk to 18%.
57
Question 2: We are interested in answering two questions. First, do mothers and
fathen differently socialize their children to speak of the mental states of people other
than the child? Second, are thwe differences in how boys and girls refer to the mental
states of people other than themselves?
Parents
A repeated measures P(time) x 3(type of speech) x 2(parent) x 2(age of child)
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of age, E (1, 36) = 7.16, < .02, with parents
talking more to older children about the mental states of someone other than the child.
Type of speech was also significant, (2, 35) = 7.88, e < .002, with parents talking
most about othen' cognitions, fo l lmd by desires and feelings. Parent was significant,
F (1, 36) = 13.16, p e .002. As can be seen in Figure 4, mothers talked more about the 9
others' mental state than fathers did. T i m was not significant, E (1, 36) = -15, n.s., and
there were no significant interactions, so rnothers spoke more about the mental states
of people other than the target child, at both time 1 and time 2, irrespective of the type
of mental state that was k i n g referred to or age of child. The means and standard
error c m be found in Table 7.
Children
Younger Children
A 2(time) x 3(îype of speech) x 2(gender) repeeted rneasures ANOVA on younger
children's talk about the other revealed a significant main M d of time, E (1 , 35) =
7.36, p < -02, with children showing highet levels of talk about sorneone other than
themselves at time 2 than at time 1. Type of speech was not significant, E (2'34) = .6Q,
58
n.s., nor was gender, E (1, 35) = -41, nos. Them was a significant interaction between
type of speech and gender, E (1, 35) = 4.18, < .03, with younger girls speaking more
about others' cognitions and desires. Means and standard enar can be found in Table
Older Children
A 2(time) x 3(type of speech) x P(gender) repeated rneasures ANOVA on older
children's talk about the mental states of someone other Vian themselves revealed no
effect of type of speech, (2, 34) = .47, n.s. Gender was significant as a main effect,
(1, 35) = 4.03, p = .05, with girls speaking more about the mental states of others' than
boys (se8 Figure 5). There was no signifiant main effect of time, (1,35) = 1.75, n.s.
There were no significant interactions, so girls spoke more of others' mental states
regardless of time and type of speech. Means and standard erroi can be found in
Table 7.
Mean lM1 and Standard Err~r (SB of talk about the 'othet fother than 1118 child) for ~arents and children at tirne 1
and time 2. as a function of aender,
Time 1 Time 2 F
Parents
Mother M -
SE
Father M -
SE - Older Children
Boys
Girls M -
s!E Younaer Children
Girls M s€
Mean differences in the morti ion of ~arents' talk about 'other' (other than tamet chil&
mother father Gendrr of Parent
Figure 5.
Mean differences in the ~ro~or t ion of older siblinas' talk about 'other' (other than themselves).
girls b o p
Gendrr o f ChilJ
Question 3: Are 4-year old children with an older sibling advantaged in their cognitive
state talk, relative to other types of mental state talk?
Children's talk when they were 4 years old was examined. At time 2, the mean age
of the younger children who had an older sibling was 4.4 years. At time 1, the mean
age of the older siblings, who themselves did not have an older sibling, was 4.4 years.
This meant that talk at time 1 for childten without an older sibling and talk et time 2 for
61
children with an older sibling war the dependent vaieble. A mked within and belween
3 (type of speech) x 2(psition) ANOVA revealed a signifiant main eflect of type of
speech, (2.71) = 73.62, p < ,001, with children talking most about desires, then
cognitions and then feelings. Position was not significant as a main effect, 5 (1,72) =
1.77, n.s.
There was a significant interaction b e W n type of speech and position, E (2, 71) =
12.52, e < .MM. As a n be seen in Figure 6, children with an older sibling spoke more
about cognitions and less about desires and feelings. Means and standard error can
be found in Table 8.
In order to ensure that the results of position were not explained by differenoes
between groups in MLU or age, a 3(type of speech) x P(position) x 3(MLU) x3(age)
ANOVA was conduded, with MLU and a g each recoded to trichotomized variables.
The position by type of speech interaction temained signifiant, E (2, 55) = 9.32, p c
.ml, demonstrating that the position effect wae not explained by differences between
group on MLU or on age.
Table 8.
Mean IM) and Standard Error (SB of M 8 m State Talk. With and Without an Older Sibling.
With an Older Sibling Without Older Sibling
State Talk - M SE - n - M SE -. n
cognitive
desire
feeling
Figure 6.
Mean ~roportion of coanitive. desire and feetina talk in children with and without an older sibltna.
cognitiw desire feel hg Type of Speech
CHAPTER 4: Di8curdon
Many important developrnental changes in children and mothers' talk about mental
states have been identified in the literature. The present study sought to elucidate
previous findings and provide new information about mental state talk by addressing
several significant gaps in Our understanding. First, little is known about changes in
children's or parents' talk about mental states after children reach four years of age, and
so we included children until age six. Second, we examined concomitant changes in
belief, desire and feeling talk to augment what is known about the balance between
different types of talk as children get older. Throughout this discussion, when changes
in children's talk is discussed, we refer to the type of mental state talk as a proportion of
total conversation tums. Third, many studies have addressed mental state talk in
contrived, time limited contexts. By studying families naturalistically and over an
extended period, we hoped to uncover patterns of mental state talk as it occurs in
everyday conversations. Finally, fathers have been largely ignored in studies of mental
state talk. For this study, we have included only dual-parent families so that we may
begin to identify changes in fathen' mental state talk as a function of children's
developmental stage.
The Relationship Between MLU and Mental State Talk
There are two factors to consider when interpreting the correlations between MLU
and mental state talk. Fint, the relationship between MLU and mental state talk is
affected by the range, which decreases in cases where conelation strength decreases
('e.g., desire talk for younger siblings) and increases in cases where conelation strength
increases (e.g., cognitive talk for younger siblings).
Second, as children are growing older, the proportion of the different types of mental
state talk is changing. In some cases, individual children use proportionately less
desire talk while using propoitionately more cognitive talk.
The Development of Children's Mental State Talk
The first aim of this study was to examine, sirnultaneously, the developrnental
changes in children's cognitive, desire and feeling state talk. The present results
indicate that cognitive talk, expressed as a proportion of conversation tums, burgeons
at age four and continues to increase until age six. These resuks provide converging
evidence with previous studies, with cognitive talk presented either as a proportion of al1
utterances (Bartsch 8 Wellman, 1995; Moore et al., 1994) or as the number of terrns
per hour (Hughes & Dunn, 1998).
Despite the methodological diffennces, the results of the present study do agree
with the pattern reported by Bartsch and Wellman, that talk about desires is the most
frequent type of mental state talk between ages 2 and 6. With few exceptions, the
majority of past research has studied children only until the age of four. This study not
only supports previously established trends, but also off ers new information about
changes in cognitive talk beyond four years of age.
These latest results also indicate that feeling talk, as a proportion of conversation
tums, increases until the age of four, and then begins to decline. Our results are
consistent with those of Dunn et al. (1987), who found that children's production of
feeling temis increased between 18 and 32 months of age, when represented as the
number of conversation tums containing a reference to feelings. That we found
references to feeling talk decreasing after the age of four suggests that feeling state talk
reaches a peak by 4 years of age, and decreases as cognitive state talk increases.
By the age of four, the children in our sample were able to discuss the events of the
mind in terrns of beliefs, desires and feelings. It is important to map the developmental
changes in a normative sample of children so that in the future, developmental
deviations might be identified and remediated.
The Development of Parents' Mental State Talk
The mental state talk of parents was examined for changes over time. The resuîts
of the current study find that parents increase their use of cognitive state talk over time.
as a proportion of conversation tums. This finding is consistent with those of other
researchen who expressed cognitive ternis differently, as a percentage of utterances
(Furrow et al., 1992). While the current study does not address the issue of
directionality between children and parents' speech, it is worthwhile noting that such
changes are synchronous and may be indicative of modeling.
The present resuk indicate that mothers and fathers do not change their frequency
of talk about desires over time, as a propoition of their convenation tums. Earlier
studies have reported that mothers decrease their proportion of desire talk, albeit with
younger children (Brown & Dunn, 1991 ; Moore et al., 1994), and with speech presented
in nurnber of terms pet 100 conversation tums (Brown & Dunn, 1991) or as a proportion
of total utterances (Moore et al., 1994).
Our data indicate that parents do not change the frequency with which they engage
in feeling talk as a proportion of their conversation tums. Feeling talk is the hast
frequent type of talk produced by parents at each time period. A previous longitudinal
study of feeling state talk indicated that the number of conversation tums in which
mothers referred to feeling States increased between the time children were 18 and 32
months of age (Dunn et al., 1987). The present results, with older participants than
Dunn et al. extend what is known about developmental changes in feeling talk up to the
time when children are six yean of age.
The present study not only supports past results, but also provides distinct
information about the changes in fathers' mental state talk over time. Fathers'
developmental changes in cognitive, desire or feeling state talk were not significantly
different from mothers'. For the cuvent study, al1 analyses were based on observation
sessions during which both parents were present. A natural extension would be to
obseive and compare the mental state talk of parents separately, with their children, to
examine their patterns of change.
Gender Oifferences in Mental State Taik
Although it was not a specifc aim of this study, we did examine the data for gender
differences between boys and girls and mothers and fathers, in their production of
mental state talk. The present resuîts provide converging evidence that gender
differences are apparent in the speech of young childm and are consistent with
previously reported findings (Cervantes & Callanan, 1998; Dunn. Bretherton & Munn,
1987; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Keubli, Butter 8 Fivush, 1995). These previous studies
have reported that girls spoke more than boys did about feelings and cognitions. For
the present study, gender differences were found only for the younger sibling and may
represent gender differences in verbal fluency, suggesting that girls and boys may have
different baselines for mental state talk. Interestingly, at time 2, there was no significant
diffeience in the verbal fluency of boys and girls (MLU), arguing against this being the
only explmation of what was found.
That gender differences are not found in the older siblings suggests that there may
be an interaction between birth order and parental socialkation of mental state talk. It
would be important to replicate the present findings with a larger sample of children and
using a more varied measure of verbal ability.
It appears that mothers and fathers differ in their production of mental state ternis in
everyday conversations with their children. The present results are in keeping with the
suggestion that mothers use more motion labels than fathers during interactions with
children (Parke, 1994). In addition, mothers also use more cognitive and desire labels
than fathers in this study. Why this is the case needs to be explored further. All of the
fathers in this study were employed full time, hi le 29 of the mothers were involved in
full or part-time work. Perhaps by virtue of being home more often, mothen take on a
different role than fathers, resulting in more frequent conversations between mothers
and children about mental states. Fathers, on the other hand, may develop
relationships with childien that do not involve the labeling mental states. Our
knowledge of gender differences in mental state talk would benefit from a more detailed
investigation of the contexts and styles that parents use to talk about mental states.
The present study examined only feeling words or labels, and it may be that fathers
express feelings and other mental states in ways other than labeling. In addition, the
present findings should be replicated with a larger sample sire.
The Referent of Mental State Talk
A second airn of this study was to investigate possible gender differences in parents
and children's talk about 'others' (other than the child). In the present study, mothers
speak more about the mental states of people other than the target child, than do
fathen. These results are consistent with Gilligan's (1 982) views, and inconsistent with
those of other researchers who found no differences (Kuebli & Fivush, 1992).
However, several methodological differences rnay account for Our findings. First, this
study examined references to 'other' in a naturalistic context, during everyday
conversations, as opposed to Kuebli and Fivush's (1 992) more structured context.
Second, we observed the production of cognitive, desire and feeling ternis about 'other'
among families with two children and two parents simultaneously. Kuebli and Fivush
conducted their obsewations of feeling ternis with each parent separately.
The current study highlights new information about differences between mothers
and fathers talking about a variety of mental states. Female children may selectively
attend to and model the speech of their mothers, while boys may attend to their fathen.
Given differences in parental modeling of talk about people other than the child to
whom they are speaking, girls would then be more likely than boys to attend to the
mental states of people other than themselves and this is supported by gender
differences in the older siblings' talk about people other than themselves.
Our analyses did not reveal an overall gender difference in the younger siblings' talk
about 'othen', at either time point, however, younger girls did speak more than younger
boys about the cognitions and desires of othen. Results also indicate that older girls
speak more about othen' mental states than older boys. at both time points. That
gender differences are not apparent for al1 types of speech in the younger children
suggests that talk about others' mental states may develop along a different time line
for each type of talk. One must interpret these results with caution, however, as the
distribution for younger children's talk about 'othet remained positively skewed. Most
children spoke very little of others' mental states and a few spoke much more. Gender
differences may in fact be a function of the higher scores. A larger sample sire might
help to clarify this issue. The gender differences in older siblings support our prediction
and are consistent with Gilligan's (1982) perspective that girls and women show more
of a focus on the intemal states of other people. Given that talk about others shows a
clear developmental pattern, as does talk about cognitions, it is likely to be how girls are
more advanced in language than boys. This advantage is picked up in subtle ways,
such as talking about cognitions, talking about others, and the combination.
While other researchers have not reported gender differences in talk about 'other',
(Hughes & Dunn, 1998), methodological differences make a direct cornparison difficult.
Specifically, the definition of 'other' is inconsistent in the literature. Hughes and Ounn
for example, collapsed refennces to 'other' (other than child) and to 'child plus friend'
when they examined references to 'ottiei': whereas for the cunent study, 'other' did not
include shared refennces between the speaker and another person. Fuither, the
context of talk about the other in previous studies diffen from the present study.
Whereas Hughes and Dunn obsewed children with a friend. the present study involved
siblings, mothers and fathers.
The results of the this study illuminate gender differences in talk about the mental
states of others, as occun naturally in the home, an environment which has the
potential to influence perspective taking and social develo pment. It would be
worthwhile to examine the developmental trajectories of children, as they refer to the
mental states of 'others', over a longer period of time, in order to detemine the
existence of gender differences in adolescence.
The Effect of Siblings on Mental State Talk
The final aim of this study was to examine the effects of the presence of an older
sibling on mental state talk. Children with an okler sibling were found to be advantaged
in cognitive talk, but not desire or feeling talk, Previous studies (Ruffman et al., 1998)
have found an increase in false belief understanding amongst children with an older
sibling in the home. It may be that cognitive talk with an older sibling is the mechanism
involved in the association between the presence of an older sibling and false belief
understanding. When older children talk to younger children about cognitions they may
foster an understanding of the nature of cognitions and more specifically the nature of
belief,
While the present study contributes new and important information about
developmental changes in mental state talk, aiem is much to be leamed about mental
state talk beyond age six. Furthemore, we have no measures, at any time point, of
false belief understanding, perspective taking or other measures of social skills to
correlate with the frequency of mental state talk. Because our design was correlational,
we cannot make causal statements about the rote of gender or parents in talk about
mental states. Additional longitudinal studies are necessary to more fully understand
developmental changes in the mental state talk of family members.
This is the first study that we are aware of that examines, longitudinally, the naturally
occumng speech of children and both parents when children are between two and six
years old. These results add important information to what is known about changes in
mental state talk, as a function of age, gender and birth order. The present study also
represents an important first step in identifying the developmental changes in fathen'
mental state talk.
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