MERCANTILISM

Was British mercantile policy a causalfactor in the American Revolution?

Viewpoint: Yes. British mercantilism, as exemplified in the various Naviga-tion Acts, enriched the English merchant class while deliberately choking offcrucial areas of American economic growth.

Viewpoint: No. Far from causing economic harm, the Navigation Actsbrought enormous benefits to Americans, who did not object to mercantilistpolicies.

During the first decades of English settlement in America, the Crown andParliament did little to promote or regulate transatlantic enterprises. However,as the provinces grew in wealth and population, and as the Dutch increas-ingly monopolized the lucrative American trade, government officials soughtto administer the colonies more effectively to ensure that England, and not itsEuropean rivals, obtained the benefits from its own colonies. Beginning in1645 Parliament enacted a series of laws, commonly referred to as the Navi-gation Acts, regulating commerce between the British Isles and its overseasprovinces. Specifically, this commercial policy, often referred to as mercantil-ism, was intended to make the home country as self-sufficient as possible byobtaining those raw materials that it could not produce from its colonies ratherthan from foreign economic competitors; to increase the mother country'sstock of bullion (the measure of a country's power) by exporting more than itimported; and to strengthen the English merchant navy, while weakeningthose of its European rivals, by maintaining a trade and manufacturingmonopoly with its colonies. To that end, the trade laws forbade foreign shipsfrom trading in the English colonies, enumerated specific items (tobacco,sugar, rice, molasses, dyewoods, silk, hemp, naval stores, furs, and indigo)that the colonies could sell only to England, provided bounties to Americansproducing many of the aforementioned goods, prohibited Americans frommanufacturing certain products (clothing and iron) for overseas trade, andrequired that all goods imported by the colonies first pass through England (topay a duty). To enforce these acts, Parliament in 1696 established a systemof Admiralty Courts in America to try smugglers and created the Board ofTrade in London to monitor colonial governors and customs officials.

Historians have waged a protracted debate on the influence of Britain'smercantile policy in the coming of the American Revolution (1775-1783).Some scholars, particularly Marxist historians writing during the GreatDepression of the 1930s, saw the Revolution not as a struggle over complexconstitutional questions but as an economic clash between British and Amer-ican capitalists. To them, the Navigation Acts, by forcing the colonies intoeconomic subservience to England and by curbing American economicgrowth, were the crux of the Anglo-American dispute. The trade laws, forinstance, hurt Southern planters by preventing them from selling their enu-merated products (rice excepted) on the open market. Other provisionsretarded the development of American manufacturing and raised the price ofgoods Americans purchased from abroad. Northern merchants found thetrade restriction so harmful to their profits that it encouraged rampant smug-196

gling among them. The Navigation Acts also indirectly injured the lower classes, whose materialwell-being was tied to the successful enterprising of the upper classes. When Parliament tightenedthe economic screws on the Americans with stricter enforcement of the Navigation Acts in the1760s, this action led to a bitter clash of interests between American and British capitalists. Thus,the American Revolution can only be understood in terms of the necessity for American entrepre-neurs to escape from the "contracting prison walls" of the English mercantilist system.

Economic historians who have analyzed this issue from an accountant's perspective, however,assert that on balance the Navigation Acts did not hinder American economic growth; that overall,the colonists benefited from residing under British tutelage. Americans generally accepted the ideathat the mother country possessed the right to regulate imperial trade, and they made no efforts after1700 to repeal or relax the Navigation Acts. Why should they? The shipping clauses, after all, con-tributed to an enormous expansion in the American shipbuilding industry and other allied servicessuch as ropemaking and the manufacture of chains and bolts. Nor did Americans complain aboutthe lucrative bounties provided by England on indigo, lumber, cooperage materials, naval stores,and other products, all of which helped to diversify the colonial economy. Likewise, the enumerationof rice, tobacco, and indigo caused little grumbling among Southern planters, who made the largestfortunes in North America from the cultivation of these commodities. The prohibitions on colonialmanufacturing of textiles and iron, additionally, only applied to production for water export and didnot hamper household or neighborhood production. Often ignored in this American-British balancesheet are the indirect benefits the colonies enjoyed from English control of the seas, which servedAmerican commercial interests during war and peace, and the military defense provided by Britishredcoats, which saved the colonists enormous amounts of money. According to economic historians,the financial cost for Americans living under British tutelage rather than on their own amounted to260 per person per year from 1763 to 1772. Thus, arguing that Americans, who enjoyed high wages,extensive landownership, dramatic population expansion, and an increasing number of educationaland cultural institutions, were oppressed and exploited by imperial policies is difficult.

In the final analysis this issue goes to the heart of the question of whether the basis of theAnglo-American dispute was constitutional or economic in nature. Were American protests againstimperial measures in the 1760s a noble appeal for their rights as Englishmen or a self-serving issueof the pocketbook?

Viewpoint:Yes. British mercantilism, asexemplified in the variousNavigation Acts, enriched theEnglish merchant class whiledeliberately choking offcrucial areas of Americaneconomic growth.

One of the most famous events in Americanhistory is the Boston Tea Party (16 December1773), which many people believe was a patrioticresponse against high taxes set by Parliament oncolonial imports. Often this historically signifi-cant event is misunderstood. It supposedlyshows that the colonists would not pay hightaxes without any representation in the BritishParliament. This view, however, is incorrect; Bos-tonians, as well as other colonists, were notoffended by the price of tea but by the monop-oly given to the East India Company. The TeaAct (1773) lowered the tax so that British teaimported to North America became even lessexpensive than smuggled Dutch tea. This provi-sion of the act was designed to entice Americansback into the British system of economic imperi-

alism. Even more offensive to the colonists thanhaving their habits of consumption directed byBritain was Parliament's offering the financiallybankrupt East India Company a monopoly onthe distribution of tea that completely cut Amer-ican merchants out of the trade. While attempt-ing to save the British company throughdiscriminatory governmental action, Parliamentsacrificed the enterprise of Americans. Finally,since the East India Company also shipped manyother products from Asia to the transatlanticworld—such as silks, spices, and chinaware—thecolonists feared that the monopoly on tea wasonly the first of many incursions into theirdomain. Such had been the colonial experiencefor more than one hundred years under Britishmercantilism. The colonists' resistance to mer-cantilist proscriptions on their economic behav-ior precipitated the War for Independence(1775-1783) against Britain.

During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eigh-teenth centuries European states, such asEngland, devised and developed an imperial eco-nomic system called mercantilism. Under mer-cantilism the government closely directed theeconomy in order to promote the interests of thestate. Often individual interests were made sub-ordinate to state power. European governments

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 197

instituted mercantilist policies during an era ofoverseas expansion when states sought to buildoverseas empires. The age of European expan-sion to other continents coincided with the stageof capitalism dominated by merchants. Europeanstates sought to develop a carrying trade thatwould generate wealth in coin, not paper money,which would be acquired by the mother country.People believed that the accumulation of hardcash promoted the wealth and, hence, the powerof that country. In the case of England, mer-chant capitalists, often with landowning inter-ests, dominated the government through theirprominent presence in the lower house of Parlia-ment, the House of Commons. Beginning in themid seventeenth century, Parliament erected amercantilist structure for the economy ofEngland and its burgeoning empire, includingthe recently founded North American colonies.

Beginning in 1645 a series of Parliamentarylaws, called Navigation Acts, attempted to pro-mote English trade by eliminating competitionfrom European rivals and subordinating theNorth American colonies to England's eco-nomic interests. At the time when the Englishwere establishing a foothold in North America,the Dutch had wrested the Indian Ocean carry-ing trade from the Portuguese and had madeinroads into Spain's domains in the Caribbean.While the Dutch asserted their commercial dom-inance, the English attempted to develop a carry-ing trade that sailed on the Atlantic and IndiaOceans. To make inroads into the Dutch com-mercial empire, the English fought a series ofwars with Holland, and Parliament passed theNavigation Acts. A key part of the English mer-cantilist system, these acts required the shipmentof goods to and from the colonies to go throughEngland and to be shipped in English shipsmanned by English crews. These acts eliminatedthe Dutch, as well as other Europeans, as com-petitors within the English empire. AlthoughDutch shipping costs during the seventeenthcentury were lower than the English costs, thecolonies were compelled to transport withEnglish ships. This policy was only one way thatthe Navigation Acts served British interests atthe expense of the colonists.

The Navigation Acts, as well as other mer-cantilist legislation passed by Parliament, put thecolonies in a state of economic dependence uponBritain. Aside from assuring commerce for Brit-ish shippers, the Navigation Acts promoted Brit-ish industry at the expense of colonial economicdevelopment through the use of enumeratedlists, which designated items that were to beshipped only to Britain for use in that country orfor eventual transshipment. During the eigh-teenth century, as lower Scotland and the Mid-lands in England underwent industrialization,

the enumerated lists included such items as cot-ton, indigo, copper ore, iron, lumber, hides, andnaval stores. All of these items were vital for Brit-ain's industrial development. In regard to com-mercial exchange, the Thirteen Coloniesassumed the role of primary producer for Brit-ain's industrial revolution. While the enumer-ated lists compelled the production of certainraw materials, other Parliamentary legislationdiscouraged the development of manufactures inNorth America. For instance, the Board of Traderequired that all governors veto colonial legisla-tion that put import duties on British manufac-tures transported in British ships to the colonies.So, while British products were to enter the colo-nies under the basis of free trade, colonial manu-factures could not be sent to Britain. Forinstance, the Wool Act (1699) barred American-produced woolen manufactures from intercolo-nial and international commerce. Later the HatAct (1732) prohibited the shipment of hats outof any North American colony. During the late1760s Parliament completely forbade the foreignimportation of silk stockings, gloves, and mittensinto Britain. These years marked the industrialrise of Britain and economic depression inNorth America. Finally, the Board of Trade dis-couraged colonial industry. Consequently, a sail-cloth industry in New York was denied (1706),and a linen industry in Massachusetts was disal-lowed (1756). The Board of Trade explained thateconomic development in the colonies shouldnot compete with British industries but supportthem through the colonial export of raw materi-als such as hemp and cotton.

Being limited to serving as producers of rawmaterials for Britain's industrial developmentput the colonies in a financially disadvantageouscommercial relationship with the mother coun-try. Since manufactured products had a greatercommercial value than raw materials, the colo-nies always had to balance their trade with hardspecie, which exactly suited Britain's mercantilistagenda of enhancing state power through accru-ing gold and silver bullion. Trade laws ensuredthat manufactured exports to North Americawould have a greater value than colonial primaryproducts imported into Britain. Many productsshipped to Britain from the colonies were thenreexported to Europe. On such goods as tobaccothere was not only the added cost of importduties but also handling charges incurred duringtransshipment to one of the continental coun-tries. To keep the market price low in Europe,colonists had to lower their sale price to Britain,resulting in little or no profit margin for the pri-mary producers. Hence, many Southern plant-ers, such as George Washington in Virginia, werein debt to English merchants. Simply by the saleof their goods on the international market,which through the eighteenth century came

198 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

NAVIGATION ACT OF M60Catted th& Ultsmt Ca *Byftft <mi*^*^to&i®*nan John C. Miller, the Navigation Act o11660 revised andconsolidated two previous statutes. Its provisions on ship-ping and enumerated artides had a significant im^ct onth&MmriGan wtoafeg:

For the increase of shipping andeneouragemsnt of the naviflittow of tillnation, wliemin, under th& good pr ^W te^and protection of God, the wealth, safety,and strength of this kingdom it go muchconcerned; be it enacted by ttit; MAO'S'jtodttexcellent majesty, and by the lords andcommons in this present parliament assem-bled, and by the authority thereof, Tti t fromand after the first day of December 1660,and from thenceforward, no$t$0fw~modifies whatsoever shall be imported Moor exported out of any lands, islands, plan-tations or territories to his ItWtf*ing or in his possession ... in Asia, Africa,or America, in any other ship or:ynt*sel or vessels whatsoever, but in such shipsor vessels as do truly and without fraudbelong only to the people of England or Ire-land ... and whereof the master and threefourths of the mariners at Itast art fiftfif ft;under the penalty of the ferfiltttfe and Jossof all the goods and commodities whichshall be imported Into or exported out of anyof the aforesaid places In any other ship orvessel....

II. And be it f*1J»t% aftlii orperson not bom within the allegiance erf oursovereign lord the King, his heirs and succes-sors ... shall Mm and after the first day ofF0fe *3S 1681;**&& -

:

chant or f&etor hi* : "/upon the pain of forfeiture and loss ofgoodt and chirtieli. * * ;

JILAndftWt^or commodities whatsoever, of the growth, pro-duction andofA§It, |rArmrtet, or any pirtMmiu vrfeIrt^Wintffv , * ship ordo truli'peofW.tffeqiiM'JnM_.*:.

XIII. tod bt itTWtomand after*toto^#*W^*toi*!fcars, tobacco, cotton-wooljndigos, ginger,fustick, or other dyeing wood, of the growth,production or manufacture of anyplantations in America, Asia, or Africa, shabe shipped, carried, conveyed or transportedfrom any of tht f aidanylartd., > otter thiwitations as do belong to his Majesty....

Source; Dani?y P/c/cer/np, ed, The Statutes atLarge from foe Magna Carta, 46 volumes (Cam-bridge: Bertham, 1762-1807), VH:452.

increasingly under British control, the Southernplanter could not make enough money to pay hisbills and run his plantation.

Land speculation, then, became the way forSouthern planters to earn additional money thatto some extent compensated for losses underBritish mercantilism. By the middle of the eigh-teenth century, colonial expansion was surginginto the trans-Appalachian region; not onlythose without property, such as former inden-tured servants, were moving westward. Men ofproperty also moved into the territory west ofthe Appalachian Mountains as land speculators.While Southern planters needed additional landbecause the cultivation of tobacco quicklyexhausted the soil, they also sought more land asa means to pay the interest on their debts to Brit-ish lenders. The surge of Virginians, led by Wash-ington as a surveyor for Lieutenant GovernorRobert Dinwiddie, precipitated the French and

Indian War (1754-1763). Like Britain's waragainst the Dutch in the late seventeenth cen-tury, this conflict was another mercantilist war.In North America the French and the British,each supported by their colonial allies, foughtfor control of the trans-Appalachian region.

Less than twenty years later the Britishfought another mercantilist war, but this time itwas against their own colonists, who would by1778 have the French as allies. In part, the Warfor American Independence was triggered bycontroversies over control of the trans-Appalachianregion. Britain took control of the Western terri-tory (including all of Canada) and promptlyissued the Proclamation of 1763, which estab-lished a temporary line along the AlleghenyMountains, beyond which the colonists couldnot move. Land west of the mountains was keptas a preserve for the Native Americans. The Indi-ans were to act as partners of British merchants

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 199

in the fur trade. By 1774, as the crisis betweenthe colonists and Britain exploded, Parliamentpassed the Quebec Act, which extended the bor-ders of that Canadian province into the Alleghenyregion, thus blocking any possible expansionwestward from New York, Pennsylvania, and Vir-ginia. This act also made it possible for Montrealto become the fur center of all of North Amer-ica, thus favoring the British Hudson Bay Com-pany over companies that used the Americanports at Philadelphia and New York. From thecolonial perspective the Quebec Act was similarto the Tea Act that had favored the British EastIndia Company.

During the 1760s Parliamentary regulationsslighted colonial economic interests, particularlyin New England. For decades imperial legisla-tion successfully discouraged manufacturing inMassachusetts and other northern colonies, aswell as suppressed certain agricultural enter-prises. Landowners in Britain had a strong lobbyin Parliament, and they sought successfullythrough the eighteenth century to keep foreigngrain products out of the country through theCorn Laws. Hence, during the colonial periodthe export of American grain to Britain wasstrongly discouraged, and, in many instances,prohibited. New England merchants and busi-nessmen, like Southern planters, had an unfavor-able balance of trade with Britain, so they alsosought to find other sources of income by devel-oping an intercolonial trade, which included theslave trade with Africa and the molasses tradewith Britain's sugar colonies in the Caribbean.This traffic was New England's legal trade.Because of mercantilist restrictions that limitedthe commerce only to Britain's more expensiveWest Indies sugar, New England merchantsbegan to smuggle less-expensive sugar producedin the French West Indies. While West Indianplanters held seats in Parliament, the NewEnglanders did not have this political advantage.Without direct access to influence economic leg-islation, the New Englanders smuggled in orderto gain needed hard currency. Beginning in thelate 1760s, Britain sought to suppress colonialsmuggling by using a patrol fleet and increasingthe number of customs agents, Vice-AdmiraltyCourts, and informers in the colonies. Thesemeasures, coupled with the British intent to payfor an occupying army in North Americathrough various forms of taxation in the colo-nies, helped to spark the Anglo-American crisis.

By the mid 1770s British mercantilistpolices had fostered an independence movementin the Thirteen Colonies that quickly becamerevolutionary. The burdens of British economicpolicies for the Empire, including the effort totax colonists to finance imperialism, fell evenmore heavily upon the lower middle classes than

they did on New England merchants and South-ern planters. Britain was favored at the expenseof North America; within the colonies, mer-chants and planters were often favored at theexpense of the lower social classes, who wereoften disfranchised and therefore did not havetheir economic interests represented in the colo-nial legislatures. Not surprisingly, then, the Warof Independence from British imperialism alsobecame a revolution to overthrow government-backed privilege of one group over anotherwithin the colonies.

-GEORGE SOCHAN,BOWIE STATE UNIVERSITY

Viewpoint:No. Far from causing economicharm, the Navigation Acts broughtenormous benefits to Americans,who did not object tomercantilist policies.

The Acts of Trade and Navigation, more com-monly known as the Navigation Acts, were a seriesof regulatory initiatives enacted by the British Par-liament starting in 1645. One of the last of theseregulations, the Sugar Act (1764), is often associ-ated with the genesis of the American Revolution(1775-1783). The chronological link between thepassage of the Sugar Act and the beginning of theAmerican Revolution has encouraged some histori-ans to establish a direct causal connection betweenimperial commercial regulations and the War ofIndependence. Scholars writing during the Pro-gressive period argued that the Navigation Actswere "economically restrictive, oppressive, injuri-ous, and negative." Yet, much evidence exists toprove this argument false. British commercial regu-lations imposed a paltry economic burden onAmericans, who enjoyed rapid economic growthand a standard of living higher than their Europeancounterparts.

Historians who attempt to establish a causalconnection between the Navigation Acts and theAmerican Revolution ignore the fact that Parlia-ment passed these measures to prevent its Euro-pean rivals (particularly the Dutch) from tradingwith England's North American possessions, notto frustrate the economic development of its colo-nies. To that end, Parliament in 1651 passed an actthat stipulated that all goods from Asia, Africa, orAmerica be sent to England or any of its territo-ries in vessels owned and manned by Englishmenand that all goods from Europe destined for thecolonies had to be carried in English vessels orvessels belonging to their country of origin. The

200 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

only commodity of continental America affectedwas tobacco. Chesapeake tobacco plantersdenounced the measure as an infringement ontheir tradition of free trade. As a compromise, Par-liament agreed to ban the production of tobaccoin England that threatened to undercut the priceof tobacco grown in the Chesapeake Bay area.However, the 1651 act did not prevent Americansfrom shipping goods to Holland or other foreignports in foreign vessels. Parliament closed thisloophole with a second Navigation Act in 1660.This act also enumerated a list of colonial goodsthat had to be exported to England before being

shipped elsewhere: tobacco, sugar, cotton, ginger,indigo, and dyewoods. This enumerated list waslater extended to include molasses, rice, navalstores, copper, beaver skins, whale fins, raw silk,and potash. Between 1699 and 1764 Parliamentpassed additional statutes that prohibited the col-onies from exporting certain goods such as hats,wool, and iron.

Far from representing an onerous burdenon the colonists in America, the Navigation Actsfacilitated commercial consolidation thatenriched the colonists who engaged in the trans-atlantic commerce. Those individuals most

HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 201

directly affected by these regulations lived in theSouth. Tobacco, rice, and indigo planters con-ducted their business through extended kinshipnetworks. Members of the same family lived onboth sides of the Atlantic Ocean and frequentlyformed partnerships (often through marriage)with other prominent families with similar mer-cantile interests. On the English side of the equa-tion, these family enterprises would either buy orpay for the construction of vessels, which underthe Navigation Acts qualified them as "Englishships," and loaded them with a variety ofEnglish-made goods. Upon reaching port inAmerica, the cargo was unloaded and stored in awarehouse; the ships would then be reloadedwith tobacco before returning to England, all infull compliance with the Navigation Acts. Somescholars argue that such arrangements placed aburden on small planters who could not affordtheir own ships. In reality, larger planters encour-aged small planters to bring in their cash cropsand trade them for goods in the warehouse.Small planters would get products they needed(and avoid the hassle and cost of marketing theircrops), while larger planters acquired more pro-duce to fill their ships.

The Navigation Acts also helped to inte-grate trade within the Empire by enriching thecolonies and those individuals most activelyinvolved in the transatlantic commerce. Contraryto the conclusions of modern critics, the Naviga-tion Acts were not an onerous infringement onfree trade. Once American produce such astobacco or rice arrived at an English port, mer-chants could then sell it throughout Europe.Indeed, France was the single largest buyer ofChesapeake tobacco. The Crown actually encour-aged the formation of a limited number of car-tels that would control the bulk of tobaccobrought into English ports and sold to France.The Navigation Acts, consequently, fostered atrade arrangement that allowed English andAmerican merchants and producers to retain asignificant amount of control over the distribu-tion and price of their product.

One of the greatest complaints against theNavigation Acts was the alleged harmful restric-tions it placed on the American producers oftobacco, rice, indigo, and other enumeratedproducts by requiring them to ship their goodsto England first. However, Parliament did notrequire Americans to grow any of these products.Colonists did so because they could make largerprofits by growing these commodities than any-thing else. Indeed, Southern planters who culti-vated rice, tobacco, and indigo amassed some ofthe largest fortunes in North America. Produc-tion of these commodities increased dramaticallyin the decade preceding independence; if South-ern planters were truly oppressed by enumera-

tion, then they should have thrived afterAmerican independence. Yet, American tobaccoand rice exports declined precipitously in thedecades following the Revolution, while indigoproduction all but died.

Nor did the Acts of Trade retard the devel-opment of American manufacturing of wool,hats, and iron, as some economic historiansmaintain. These measures only prohibited thewater export of these items; they did not bantheir manufacture in America. Therefore, colo-nial production of these goods for domestic useand sale went unhampered. In any event, Ameri-cans did not try to compete with the mothercountry in the production of wool. After all,they could import English wool more cheaplythan they could make it themselves. The Hat Act(1732) did not injure the development andgrowth of the American hat industry. The samestatement is true for the Iron Act (1750).Indeed, by the Revolution, America had moreiron furnaces than England and Wales com-bined. Most of the pots, pans, and other hollow-ware used in the colonies were made at localiron-works, not in Britain. Finally, the prohibi-tive duties on foreign sugar, molasses, and rumimposed by the Molasses Act (1733) were usuallyevaded by American merchants through wide-spread smuggling, bribery, and fraud.

The Navigation Acts even encouraged thedevelopment of American manufacturing, partic-ularly shipbuilding and its ancillary services suchas making rope, anchor chains, bolts, lumber,staves, and other items. The commercial acts alsostimulated the American shipping industry byremoving the competition of foreign shipping.Additionally, the mighty Royal Navy protectedAmerican trading vessels, particularly in times ofwar. One must also not forget the bounties paidby the mother country upon certain colonialproducts—such as naval stores, indigo, lumber,silk, and hemp—which proved greatly beneficialto these industries. Their benefit is graphicallyrevealed in the fact that after the Revolution sev-eral of these industries all but disappearedbecause they could not survive without eco-nomic assistance. Thus, English mercantilismhad a greater tendency to promote than tohinder colonial industry.

In order to present a more balanced viewconcerning the economic relationship betweenBritain and America, one must examine the bene-fits and cost to the colonists of all British impe-rial policy, including those administrative andmilitary services provided by the mother coun-try. Economic historians, using counterfactualarguments, modern statistical methods, andcomputers allowing them to analyze mountainsof data, have calculated the burdens and benefitsof British imperial policy relative to how the col-

202 HISTORY IN DISPUTE, VOLUME 12: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

onies would have fared outside the Empire butstill within a mercantilist world. After analyzingthe effects the Navigation Acts had on the Amer-ican colonies from 1763 to 1772 (including themilitary and administrative services), economichistorian Robert P. Thomas estimated that itcost Americans about 0.5 percent of theirnational annual income (or 26$ per person) tolive within the British Empire. Given these fig-ures, one has difficulty making the case that Brit-ain's imperial policies exploited Americans andhindered their economic development.

Those scholars who argue that English mer-cantilism was a cause for the American Revolu-tion automatically equate trade regulation withexploitation, but Americans did not complainthat the mother country exploited them. Thecolonists recognized that the routing of a con-siderable part of their trade through Englandcarried a hidden tax, but they conceded that thisburden was their fair share of the costs of theimperial government. Indeed, Americans neverattacked the Navigation Acts, even during theimperial crisis of the 1760s and 1770s. Whyshould they rail against a system under whichthey thrived? After all, white Americans enjoyedthe highest standard of living and the greatestpopulation growth in the Western world. Theprosperity and propagation are reflected in theirmultiplying of schools, churches, civic clubs,theaters, philanthropic organizations, news-papers, and magazines. Americans also importedlarge amounts of British goods as well as manyexpensive African slaves. The thousands of Euro-peans who immigrated to America every yearreflected the prevailing view of America as aland of unprecedented wealth and opportunity.In the end, factors other than economic onesmust explain the American call for indepen-dence in 1776.

-J. KENT MCGAUGHY, HOUSTONCOMMUNITY COLLEGE (NORTHWEST)

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