Harper’s FallCover Photo: Joshua Davis, Context TV

GLOBAL

CONVERSATIONSIssue 3 December 2015

WORLD AIDS DAY AND GETTING TO ZERO

December 1, 2015 marks the 27th annual World’s AIDS day, created to unite against the fight against HIV and AIDS, show support for those living with

the disease, and commemorate those who have passed away. In support of World AIDS day, the Red Ribbon Campaign has become the universal symbol of awareness and support for those living with HIV. The colour red was chosen for its boldness and visibility, symbolizing passion, heart, and above all else, love. On December 1, all are en-couraged to wear the red ribbon as a symbol of solidarity for the end of new infections, and the end of the discrimi-nation and stigma surrounding the disease.

The 2015 World AIDS theme, ‘Getting to Zero, Zero new HIV Infections. Zero Discrimination,’ provides a unique opportunity to reflect on the progress made in the fight against HIV. The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS) reports that currently 3.2 mil-lion out of the total 35 million people infected with HIV are children. Among those, 24.7 million people are located in Sub-Sahara Africa, and 19 million do not even know that they are HIV positive. This is because HIV is a viral infection that slowly depletes CD4 T-cells, a major type of immune system cell. What this means is that most individ-uals infected do not die from the HIV virus itself, but from other bacterial and viral infections that cannot be fought off due to their compromised immune system.

Although the death rate resulting from HIV infections has decreased yearly, the issue of accessing equitable healthcare and medicine to treat HIV infections remains prominent. This issue stems from two perspectives: the first advocates for the accessibility of HIV medication as a fundamental right to healthcare, while the second advocates for the prevailing economic and trade interests that view medi-cine as an investment and commodity to maximize profit. Before 1994, developing countries could create their own

generic medicines because they were not subject to intel-lectual property rights. However, with the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), if a country wanted to engage in global trade they must have had to agree to the privatization of intellectual patent rights, including those for essential medicines. These pat-ent laws have caused the price for HIV medicine to rise, particularly for novel second and third line HIV therapies — essentially making these drugs unaffordable, especially in middle income countries (MICs).

MICs such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Mongolia have government-funded public health sectors, but due to the absence of generic HIV medications and the high cost of original patented drugs, governments in these regions cannot afford HIV drug prices. This forces individuals to purchase HIV medicine in the private market and incur high out-of-pockets costs, which, for most, is unsustain-able in the long-term. With adequate HIV medication, the life-span of an infected individual can increase ten-fold, however, for HIV medication to be effective it must be tak-en consistently or resistance will occur and render a line of therapy useless.

Access to medicines is a prerequisite to achieving sever-al of the UN Sustainability Goals and the commitment of ‘Getting to Zero.’ However, these goals cannot be reached if barriers to access essential HIV medication continues, especially at the expense of the most vulnerable. Therefore, on December 1 2015, wear a red ribbon and stand in sol-idarity to support those with those living with HIV. Raise awareness and demand so that one day we may be ade-quately say that we have achieved ‘Zero.’

1

Written by Bojana RadanGlobal Health Correspondent

Bojana is a first year Master’s Student at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. She grad-uated in the spring of 2015 with a H. BSc. from the University of Toronto double majoring in Molecular Genetics and Microbiology. Her science background is the root from which her passion for equitable global healthcare stems form especially, in regards to infectious diseases and the current treatment options available for the Global South. She wishes to pursue a career in developing sustainable healthcare systems within developing countries and ad-vocating for the equitable distribution of resources for all, regardless of socioeconomic status. She is also a varsity volleyball player for the University of Toronto and her favourite pastimes include hiking, swimming, and playing beach volleyball.

THE PARIS ATTACKS AND ARTICLE 5Written by Ben AbonyiSecurity Correspondent

The dust had not yet settled in Paris following the horrific attacks of November 13. Already, the coun-try’s head of state had turned his attention – or at

least the corner of his eye – toward a response.

“We are going to lead a war which will be pitiless,” declared Prime Minister Francois Hollande from outside the Bata-clan theatre, mere hours after scores of civilians had been murdered there in an apparent attack by the Islamic State, or ISIS.

The scale of the attacks and the decisiveness of France’s immediate response – which included an aggressive cam-paign of airstrikes on the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa later that weekend – prompted some to wonder and others to opine about how France’s allies might, or should, respond.

On the tips of many tongues was Article 5, the collective defence guarantee in the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s founding document. “An armed attack against one or more of [the Parties] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” Article 5 declares. In the event of such an attack, each of NATO’s 28 member states “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Par-ties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”

The Article has only been invoked once in the Alliance’s history, and the circumstances in that case are strikingly familiar: A massive, coordinated attack on the home soil of a NATO member state was launched by an internation-al terrorist organization operating out of a failed state. In

2

canada2020.ca

https://www.flickr.com/photos/pixiduc/16252656315/

3

2001, Article 5 provided the impetus for NATO to attack Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks in the United States. If precedent is to be taken seriously, there is ample reason to believe that the North Atlantic Treaty’s definitive clause will be closely looked at in the days and weeks ahead.

France has quite clearly been attacked on its home soil; if Hollande wishes to invoke the Article and initiate NATO’s collective defence mechanism, there are few arguments – if any – that could dispute his right to do so. Any legal ambi-guity around this situation is all but eliminated by the en-actment of Article 5 after 9/11, a near-perfectly analogous situation.

The reaction of France’s NATO allies to such a suggestion, on the other hand, would be less clear-cut.

President Barack Obama has been consistent, above all else, in his insistence that no ground troops will be deployed in Syria, the heart of ISIS-controlled territory. And just hours before the Friday attacks, his talk of “containment” intro-duced a concept that had previously been absent from his anti-ISIS strategy. Though the Franco-American alliance dates back to the U.S.’ Revolutionary War, it is also worth questioning if there is any lingering resentment over Par-is’ decision not to join the U.S. in the 2003 Iraq War, and if this would cause any hesitation in joining an escalated military mission at France’s behest.

Canada, for its part, appears intent on drawing down its involvement in the Middle East. Though Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has stated that the country will continue to play a role in training local forces (specifically the Kurdish Peshmerga), he has re-iterated his government’s intent to withdraw Canada’s CF-18 jets from the region.

All that being said, there is no passage in Article 5 specify-ing that ground troops must be deployed in response to an attack, or that airstrikes or any other tactic is necessary. A meeting among NATO’s members, as outlined in Article 4, would provide a venue for these competing interests and

constraints to be ironed out. But it is entirely likely that, especially under American pressure to limit any sharp es-calation in approach, an Article 5 response could simply mean a broader and somewhat more aggressive version of the air campaign already underway.

In fact, despite American reluctance to dive headlong into a war against ISIS, invoking Article 5 may come with an unintended benefit. Activating the clause may actually le-galize the U.S.’ current air mission, which at the moment lacks an attendant Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) or declaration of war. An official retaliation in defence of an ally could grant the existing mission legal legitimacy.

There are countless other political hurdles to consider and clear if NATO’s collective defence apparatus is to be trig-gered. Will France’s European NATO allies be willing to commit to a military mission in the Middle East, especially as the Alliance’s easternmost members contend with Rus-sian intimidation? How would Russia react to a NATO mo-bilization in Syria, where Moscow is itself deploying planes in defence of Bashar al-Assad? Would NATO move to in-clude Moscow in any response, extending an olive branch in light of the horrific attack in Paris and earlier downing of a Russian plane? How might NATO try to involve allies from the Gulf Cooperation Council or elsewhere?

Ultimately, Hollande may choose not to invoke Article 5. France may unilaterally ramp up its efforts against ISIS, or pursue non-NATO avenues to form a coalition. But the words and actions coming out of Paris in the immediate aftermath indicate that this “war” will indeed be forceful and uncompromising. 14 years after NATO came to the defence of the United States in its most trying moment, perhaps leaders in Brussels will decide it is time to step up to the plate for France.

Ben Abonyi is the Security Correspondent for Global Conversations. He has worked in multiple roles at the Immi-gration and Refugee Board of Canada, and has interned in the Political Section at the Canadian Embassy (Wash-ington, DC) and at the Population and Community Development Association in Thailand. He has previously served as a Junior Research Fellow at the NATO Council of Canada and as Editor of the Oxfam U of T OUT Blog. Ben is currently completing his Master’s at the Munk School of Global Affairs.

lowed settlements to proliferate uninhibited and contin-ued to deliver millions daily in military aid while simulta-neously snubbing Netanyahu and his administration.

The Iran Question

T he question remains however, was this worth it? A cause of the isolation of Cairo and Jerusalem has been the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA). Has the U.S.

cost itself the unwavering trust of its allies to secure an overall safer Middle East, free from a nuclear Iran or the threat of a nuclear arms race in the region? The answer is at best that we don’t know, and at worst, a resounding no.

The JCPOA simply delays the threat of a nuclear Iran–it doesn’t eliminate it or change the regimes behavior. Iran has expressed no willingness to stop funding terrorist proxies, particularly Hamas. Nor has the regime made any attempt to normalize relations with the West following the signing of the deal.

In fact, Khameini’s rhetoric since the signing of the JCPOA has been increasingly anti-Western. While this might just be posturing by the Supreme Leader, it signifies, at the very least, the position it thinks it must embody to hold on to power. It hardly seems worth it to destroy relations with your allies for a promise of more of the same.

The Syrian Conflict and the Increasing Power of the Islamic State

On no issue area has the Obama administration been more irresolute than on the protracted Syri-an conflict. With “red-lines” crossed, 250,000 peo-

ple killed, over 12 million displaced, Obama’s response has been largely ad hoc. As Frederic Hof, former State Dept. Advisor on Syria noted, Obama’s policies, particularly the “train-and-equip” program are nothing more than box-checking exercises for an American administration eager to do something. This paved the way for Russia to take the lead in Syria, making U.S. involvement in a po-litical resolution seemingly unnecessary and potentially

4

THE STRATEGIC FAILURE OF OBAMA’S MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Written by Chelsea RubinGuest Correspondent

The Middle East is far less stable than it was when the Obama administration came to power: Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, and Israel are all worse off to-

day than they were in 2008; relations between the US and Egypt are at a low; and it is too early to tell whether Iran has been reformed in any meaningful way. US influence is waning. While it would be inaccurate to attribute all of the issues plaguing the historically unstable region to the action, or inaction, of the White House, unclear, inconsis-tent and shortsighted policy decisions have inflamed un-derlying tensions across the region. As Joseph Micallef of the Huffington Post notes, “The responsibility for a poorly defined, often contradictory foreign policy that has result-ed in a marked decline of American influence there, and a growing unease about the reliability of the US as a partner, must be squarely placed at the President’s door step”.

Obama’s Middle East policy falls into three areas: 1) Allies: the Cairo-Jerusalem-Amman Axis and the Gulf States, 2) The Iran question, and 3) The Syrian conflict.

Allies: The Cairo-Jerusalem-Amman Axis and the Gulf States

Historically, U.S. policy in the Middle East has been dependent on the de facto Cairo-Jerusalem-Am-man axis and the alliance with Saudi Arabia and

its Gulf Allies. While oil dependency has kept the relation-ship with the Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf at a sta-ble standstill, the Cairo and Jerusalem elements of the axis are fractured at best.

Cairo has essentially been isolated from the U.S., as Obama has suspended a large portion of its military aid to Egypt and eliminated most high-level contact with the el-Sisi government. In doing so, Obama has isolated the United States from what would likely have been a strategic ally – an ally that overthrew a regime unsupported by its people and that had been directly opposed to U.S. interests.

On Jerusalem, Obama has changed little in policy but has become increasingly aggressive in rhetoric. This rhetoric has seldom been backed with tangible action. He has al-

5

unwelcome.

What Should Have Been Done Differently?

Obama’s supporters consistently say that Obama’s policies are the best option, and that there are “no viable alternatives”. This simply cannot be true.

There are a number of steps that could have been taken and should be taken moving forward.

1) The U.S. must repair relationships with allies, par-ticularly given the current instability in the region and the perceived loss of American influence. Issues with the domestic policies of Israel, Egypt and the Saudis will per-sist – just as they always have. Allies they dislike serve the country better than new enemies.

2) They should adhere to the JCPOA. Disengage-ment at this point will only fuel the Iranian regime and delegitimize the U.S. Engagement gives Iran two options – adhere to the deal or violate it. Should they adhere, the U.S. accomplishes its goal of maintaining (in the interim) a nuclear free Iran. Should they violate it, the breakout time to a bomb is still delayed and Iran loses perceived legitima-cy, international trust and, likely, vital investment.

3) It is likely too late for a major shift in Syrian policy – there is no domestic appetite for another ground war in

the Middle East and little evidence that it would be effec-tive. The goal should be to reassert American importance in order to improve the perception of American involve-ment in a political solution, which Russia has largely boxed the U.S. out of. Air power should be used in a deliberate, less ad hoc way, focused on supporting effective ground forces – notably the Kurds and Sunni militias.

Let me be clear here: it is impossible to know whether different policies would have led to changes in the Mid-dle East, particularly in Syria. What’s important is to note that a country such as the U.S., with a deeply entrenched position in the Middle East, does not have the luxury of disengagement – every decision, including inaction, is just that, a decision.

Chelsea is a second year Master of Global Af-fairs (MGA) Candidate at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. She is primarily interested in Middle East geo-politics, Israeli domestic and foreign policy, American foreign policy, and the intersection

of international law and human rights. Originally from Toron-to, Ontario, she holds an honours BA in International Relations from the University of Western Ontario (2014).

http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/obama-middle-east-strategy-097268

6

EL NINO: THE HARBINGER OF AN AFRICAN DISASTER PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY?

Several African countries — from South Africa, which is experiencing its worst drought in 23 years, to So-malia, where 9,000 people have been displaced due

to immense flooding — have in recent times turned their focus to the climatic visitor known as El Nino.

El Nino is a periodic weather season that develops around the Pacific Ocean and increases sea surface temperatures. Nations north and south of the equator are likely to expe-rience some form of the El Nino effect. The World Mete-orological Organization estimates that this year’s El Nino might be the strongest due to a combination of climate change and other human induced activities harming the environment. Hence, we are likely to witness even more cases of flooding and droughts in different pockets of the world.

Some of the hardest hit regions of the world will be those in Africa that lack the infrastructure and disaster prepared-ness strategies for these types of climatic events. Neverthe-less, there is cause for optimism given that African gov-ernments are beginning to take interest in issues related to climate change, food security, and long-term sustainability. To put this into perspective, climatic disasters like droughts impact the revenue and food sources for several commu-nities. Weak institutions incapable of responding to the demands of the citizenry will invite anger and mistrust towards the government of the day. Untamed anger can result in a government being voted out or toppled. Hence, it is in the government’s interests to begin laying out a for-ward-looking strategy to cope with these increasing chal-lenges.

Where in the African continent are we seeing a trend in governments’ forward looking strategies? In Ghana, the Siemens Green City Index identified Accra, Ghana, as the city with the most progressive structures that allow for local assemblies to work alongside national governments

Written by Eddie KawooyaAfrica Correspondent

in implementing sustainable policies that benefit the or-dinary citizens. In South Africa, the Municipality of Jo-hannesburg set up a $100 million (R1.46 billion) Green Bond and, once matured in 2024, the bond is expected to finance initiatives aimed at reducing greenhouse gases. In partnership with the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other international partners, the Malawian govern-ment is on course to establish the Sustainable Rural Wa-ter and Sanitation Infrastructure for Improved Health and Livelihoods (SRWSIHL) program. While the primary goal is to help rural communities adapt to changes in climate, the program will also help develop better water catchment systems and provide climate awareness training.

In the recent 2015 Global Food Security Index, Botswa-na was noted as the only African nation to spend as much as the United States on agriculture research and develop-ment. The benefits of food research extend to understand-ing quality of food and availability options for both con-sumers and farmers. With endorsement from the AfDB’s Climate Investment Fund, Rwanda will be developing sustainable off-grid electricity to rural production centers, schools, and health centers. The target is to connect 48 per cent of households with 22 percent of power supplied through solar home systems. Electrification could provide much needed support to existing agrarian communities and alternative economic production opportunities for lo-cal entrepreneurs.

Governments all across Africa are faced with significant challenges from poverty, corruption, and violent conflicts. These challenges are magnified tenfold when you consider the dilemma of climate change. However, with enhanced focus on climate mitigation schemes, research into key areas, and engagement with both international and local stakeholders, a disaster preparedness strategy of the 21st century is within their grasps.

Understanding the importance and role of strengthening of African institutions, responsive to the challenges of Af-ricans, has been Eddie’s motivation to pursue a graduate degree in Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. As a young Ugandan, Eddie sought to play a meaningful role in the nation’s growth having witnessed first-hand the swift scale of development within the last twenty years. For the last two years, he served as an analyst at a leading govern-ment relations and public affairs firm in Ottawa, Canada.

12

WHY ARE WE STILL USING TRADITIONAL MILITARIZED TACTICS TO FIGHT A RADICAL IDEOLOGY?

Written by Elena Lifshits-CarreraPolitics Correspondent

In the wake of the recent tragic attacks in Paris, for which the Islamic State (IS) has since claimed re-sponsibility, world leaders are assembling to step

up their efforts, and join together in their fight against the caliphate. The U.S. and France have already joined Russian warplanes, which have been conducting air strikes in Syria against targets identified as IS strong-holds – over 400 hits in just a few days. But are the Western powers accurately analyzing and responding to an unconventional enemy? In other words, is using conventional physical military tactics an effective way to combat a pseudo-state, whose main weapon is the systematic spread of radical ideology?

So what, and how much, do we actually know about this organization?

Background Information:

• The roots of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sh am (ISIS or ISIL) can be traced back to October 15, 2006 when the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was established. • ISI took Baquba, Iraq as its capital and swore allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (a promoter of the Salafist ideology). Following Baghdadi’s death, the Council swore allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who has been named its current Ca liph Ibrahim. Caliphs are seen as successors to the Prophet Muhammad and govern in his name.• Islamic State (IS) was officially formed in April 2013 out of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).• Its assets today are estimated around two billion USD, mostly from wealthy donors in the Gulf Arab states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) and from the oil fields it controls in eastern Syria (selling a por tion of the supply back to the Syrian government) and northern Iraq. In addition, they impose taxes in areas over which they have sovereignty.• The area they currently rule is larger than the United Kingdom, although for the most part IS members are concentrated around cities and vill-

ages leaving much of their caliphate unoccupied.• The U.S. offensive in Iraq is believed to have per petuated the breeding of radical organizations on the ground, including ISIS. • Their total membership is estimated between 100,000 and 200,000; however, front line fighter totals are estimated at around 15,000 to 30,000. Concrete figures remain unknown. • As stated by the group itself on its official news letter Dabiq, ISIS’ goal is to “establish a new Is lamic caliphate across the Middle East”, and it has demanded that all Muslims worldwide swear al legiance to its leader. ISIS awaits the return of the Prophet and in the meanwhile instructs followers to engage in religious cleansing and stand against apostates. Members consider themselves to be a crucial agent in the coming apocalypse.

In the decade following the 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda on the World Trade Center in New York, the U.S. govern-ment and its national security agencies invested heavily into building elaborate structures of fighting al-Qaeda. They revised and adapted both military and intelligence frameworks for counterterrorism and counterinsurgen-cy. However, while the Islamic State does bear resem-blance to its predecessor, the two are fundamentally different. This is possibly rooted in the birth of the two organizations: al-Qaeda formed in the aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was shaped by the ten-year war against Soviet occupation. IS’ formation can be attributed to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Unlike al-Qaeda, IS holds vast amounts of territory, boasts sig-nificant infrastructure including schools, hospitals and research centres, has many thousands of members rather than few hundreds and retains military capabilities. Most notable, however, is its complex intelligence and commu-nications infrastructure. IS is not more technologically advanced than any other groups, but its advantage is in the unprecedented way it embraces media technology.

In part, IS’ success can be attributed to its intricate mul-tifaceted recruitment network, which uses both social

13

and conventional networks and media. Mostly targeting youth through a process of propaganda and radicaliza-tion via social media, they have been able to establish a wide geographic network, making it extremely difficult to track. In the words of Audrey Kurth Cronin of Foreign Policy, “ISIS offers its recruits a short-term, primitive gratification”.

Current U.S. offensive strategy has largely focused on bombing al-Qaeda targets and its partners in Syria and on strengthening Iraq’s Baghdad government so it can rebuild its forces to counter IS. Most recently, with the increase of IS terror attacks in France, the U.S. sharply increased its targeted air strikes, mostly in Syria. Foreign Policy’s Micah Zenko referred to this as the “tactical, whack-a-mole approach”, deeming it ineffective and re-

“In part, IS’ success can be attributed to its intricate multifaceted recruitment network, which uses both social and conventional net-

works and media.”ferring to the fact that in 2014, terrorist attacks increased by 39 per cent and fatalities by 89 per cent compared to 2013. These special operations and raids, when success-ful, only create a small dent in the larger diaspora of the IS operational field. Furthermore, analysts in the field have suggested that these attacks only further escalate tensions. What, then, could possibly deliver a meaning-ful blow to IS?

Ideology

The radical organization’s movement is deeply rooted in early seventh century Islamic theology. Its laws are a lit-eral translation of those listed in the Koran and rest upon a prophetic methodology that requires all followers to accurately duplicate every step of Prophet Muhammad’s ways. According to IS, it considers sinners to be modern day Muslims who deviated form the seventh century Is-lamic law. IS is based on an apocalyptic prophecy, which believes that the organization and its people will be main actors in the upcoming Armageddon. It is said that after a few great battles IS will be nearly wiped out, at which point it can be rebuilt and the return of the Prophet can take place. Thus every action that the state takes is mere-ly a tactical move to speed up the return of the Prophet, as Graeme Wood suggests in his detailed piece for The Atlantic ‘What ISIS Really Wants’. Invasion attempts by the U.S., Russia, and other powers are welcome, as they accelerate and encourage fighting.

It would then be reasonable to suggest that by increasing air strikes in IS areas, the U.S. and other counties achieve nothing more than aiding the IS in their goal of bringing on the apocalypse. Moreover, the resulting large numbers of casualties of civilians who had been trapped in IS-con-trolled areas provides the IS with additional grounds upon which to spread anti-Western propaganda, which in turn increases pledges to IS.

As such, it would be rational to combat IS by firstly edu-cating the general population and delegitimizing their ex-treme theological ideologies, and secondly, by better un-derstanding their apocalyptic goals. This is best achieved by a thorough understanding of early Koranic teachings. As well, in order to create the trust necessary to counter

IS propaganda, it is essential to engage the broader Mus-lim community, which might be best suited for such a task. This is not meant to imply that the responsibility falls on members of the Islamic faith, but rather suggests that change is most effectively carried out by members of the same religious community. While military cam-paigns should ultimately be abandoned, limiting rather than increasing them would minimize the de facto ac-knowledgement of IS, and would reduce its justifications for further actors of terror. Lastly, combining the above with a strategy involving social and traditional media to counter and educate the public on IS propaganda would aid in decreasing the radicalization and recruitment of new fighters.

We must understand the Islamic State first, in order to counter them later.

Elena Lifshits Carrera graduated Film and Television from Sheridan Institute followed by a BA Specialized Communi-cations: Marginalized Community Devel-opment from York University. She is cur-rently a Master of Global Affairs (MGA)

Candidate at Munk School of Global Affairs, University of To-ronto. Fervently passionate about everything revolving Human Rights, equality (or the lack of it) and the overlap of policy and communications in post conflict areas focusing on children rights, she is cautiously optimistic about the future.

With geo-p ol i t ica l t ens ions

escalating in the Mid-dle East, many experts have begun analyzing the relations between various actors in-volved in the region’s major conflicts, es-pecially in Syria and Iraq. One of the actors that have been men-tioned and analyzed extensively is a group commonly known in the west as the Gulf Cooperation Council

revolution era. The two countries have maintained these relations for decades despite complex circumstances in the Region. Oman is one of Iran’s closest friends in the region, and it has also shown itself as a trustworthy one. Oman was the country that hosted the secret negotiations between Iran and the U.S. These negotiations set the stage for a series of Iran-P5+1 negotiations that led to the historic Iran nuclear deal. In this case, by maintaining the secrecy of these deli-cate negotiations, Oman showed itself as a reliable partner for Iran. Oman’s Sultan Qaboos was also the first foreign leader that visited Iran after the victory of Hassan Rouhani in the Iranian presidential election. Unsurprisingly, Oman was the first Arab state that Rouhani visited as president.

The Neutrals

Many think that Qatar and the UAE have been consistent on publicly labeling Iran as a region-al threat. However, unlike the Saudis, these two

Arab countries have used rather soft and balanced tones for criticizing or confronting Iran. For instance, it is true that Qatar has supported the overthrow of Iranian-backed Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, the primary reason behind Sau-di-Iranian tensions, but it has also supported constructive

14

THE OVERLOOKED COMPLEXITY OF IRAN-GCC RELATIONS

Written by Kei ZamaninoorMiddle East Correspondent

(GCC). The GCC is comprised of six Arab countries: Bah-rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

This group has become important, given the escalation of the Syrian conflict and the worsening of already strained Iranian-Saudi relations. Some experts have gone as far as recommending policies for the Obama administration and have suggested ways to repair the U.S.’s damaged re-lations with the GCC. These recommendations revolve around two main policies: Increasing support for anti-As-sad forces and containing Iran’s growing influence in the region. What these experts have overlooked, however, are the major differences that GCC members have, especially in regards to Iran. While countries such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have been confrontational other GCC coun-tries have in recent years refrained from undertaking the same strategy.

The Friend

The most distinct example of a GCC country with friendly relations with Iran is Oman. Muscat’s close relations with Tehran go back to Iran’s pre-Islamic

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/20121225233041666942.html

14

dialogs with Tehran. Addressing the United Nations Gen-eral Assembly in September, 2015, Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani “offered to host a ‘meaningful dialogue’ in an attempt to calm Arab-Iranian differences […].” He also added that “[Qatar’s] relations with Iran were ‘growing and evolving steadily’.” Such positive re-marks are drastically different from the rhetoric coming out of Riyadh. Akin to Qatar, the UAE has also tried to maintain a bal-anced strategy while dealing with Iran. This balanced ap-proach has included full-scale military campaigns against parties backed by Iran. In Bahrain, where anti-government demonstrations were led by Iranian-supported Shiite cler-ics, the Emiratis sent 500 police forces to assist the Bahraini government with the crackdowns. They also sent troops to Yemen for the fight against the Houthis, a group that has been supported by Tehran. Nonetheless, the UAE has been cautious about dealing with Iran on other matters such as the Iran nuclear deal. A report in October, 2015 indicated that the UAE does not consider itself abound to the 123 Agreement. In the 123 Agreement signed in 2009 between the UAE and the U.S., the Arab country pledged not to pursue uranium enrich-ment capabilities. In response to this report, “the UAE em-bassy in Washington said ‘the government has not formal-ly changed its views or perspective on the 123 Agreement or commitments.” The UAE has also welcomed the nucle-ar deal reached between Iran and the world powers and has not been outspoken, unlike Saudi Arabia, in criticizing Iran. This is primarily due to its economic ties with Iran.

The UAE remains, by far, Iran’s biggest non-oil goods trad-ing partner within the GCC states. In 2013, about $100 bil-lion dirhams (US$27 billion) worth of non-oil goods was exported from the UAE to Iran. This makes Iran an im-portant trading partner for the UAE. Moreover, the IMF has forecasted that the end of Iran’s nuclear sanctions can result in a US$13 billion gain for the UAE economy. With such significant economic relations, the UAE is expected to continue with its balanced policy vis-à-vis Iran.

The Rivals

Two GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, stand out as rivals to Iran. The tensions between Bahrain and Iran are not new. Iran and Bahrain

have, at many times, used confrontational tones towards one another. This has been mainly due to Bahrain’s Shia Muslims who comprise 70% of the country’s population.

Since the beginning of the uprisings in 2011, the Sunni rulers of Bahrain have considered Iran as the main sup-porter of the Shia leaders of these protests, further souring relations between the two countries. Both, thus far, have shown no willingness to work towards reconciliation, and tensions are still escalating. On October 1st, 2015, Bahrain recalled its ambassador from Iran and expelled the Iranian envoy to Bahrain. About a month later, on November 5th, 2015, Bahrain detained 47 people, accusing them of be-ing part of an Iranian-backed terrorist plot. It also, on the same day, sentenced five individuals to life imprisonment for working with Iran to carry out attacks in Bahrain. As the Iranian-Bahraini relations deteriorate sharply, the Iranian-Saudi relations have also worsened — both of these Arab states appear to be following the same path for dealing with Iran. This is due to the disagreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia over the future of Bashar Al-Assad as part of Syria’s post-civil war government. Saudi Arabia remains inflexible over its policy of supporting a Syria without Assad — a policy in direct opposition to Iran’s in-terests.

Saudi Arabia continues to maintain its current level of oil production, putting downward pressure on oil prices. The falling oil prices are costly for Iran, as the sanctions-hit country will need its oil revenues after the nuclear deal is implemented. The Saudi government’s policy has also put significant pressure on the country’s own budget. In spite of this, there is no sign of a shift in the Saudi policy for the foreseeable future.

The GCC: A Complex Group

The GCC have members with varying interests, and this is especially true when these Arab states deal with Iran. Each GCC member country has economic and geo-political in-terests that greatly differ from the interests of other mem-bers. When analyzing Iran-GCC relations, experts need to recognize this fact and understand how internal dynamics of the GCC can affect their policies.

Kei Zamaninoor is currently a Master of Glob-al Affairs (MGA) Candidate at Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He previously studied Business Administration at

Schulich School of Business, York University. His research interests include international business, international economy, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and Iranian affairs.

CITIZENSHIP & HUMAN RIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE BASED ON ANCESTRY

Times haven’t changed much, one might conclude, having seen history repeat itself in matters pertain-ing to self-identity and discrimination. We saw the

injustice faced by Jews several decades ago, and are now witnessing Rohingyas of Myanmar being subject to similar acts of discrimination as a result of self-identity.

During the twelve years of Hitler’s Reich in Germany, the Jews of the country were imposed with over 400 separate discriminatory regulations prohibiting them from the most basic rights, such as performing in a symphony or-chestra or owning a pet cat. This September marked the 80th anniversary of the implementation of the Nuremberg laws, which surprisingly caused much confusion among the Nazi bureaucrats at the time. The widespread confusion among the Nazi bureaucrats was due to the restrictions on intermarriage that had been a norm prior to the birth of these laws. The following were the rules that caused much heated debate:

Marriages between Jews and citizens of German or kindred blood are forbidden. Marriages concluded in defiance of this law are void, even if, for the purpose of evading this law, they were concluded abroad. Proceedings for annulment maybe initiated only by the Public Prosecutor.

Laws that were drafted nonchalantly by scrawling on the back of hotel menu cards would decide the fate of an entire community. Hitler’s claim that the Nuremberg laws would actually “help the Jews by creating a ground on which the German people may find a tolerable relation with the Jew-ish people” was an apparent statement of deception aimed at justifying his action to the outside world in an effort to gain credibility in the world stage.

The fact that the laws prohibiting marriages between Jews and Germans did not specify who was considered a Jew raised many questions among even the Nazis. As a result, in November 1935, a supplemental Nazi decree was is-sued which defined a “full Jew” as an individual with at least three Jewish grandparents. Persons with two Jewish grandparents were designated as First Degree Mischlinge

and those with one Jewish grandparent were designated as Second Degree Mischlinge. Hitler did not apply the Nuremberg laws to the Mischlinges. The following were the laws pertaining to citizenship:

I. A subject of the State is a person who belongs to the protective union of the German Reich, and who therefore has particular obligations towards the Reich. 2. The status of subject is acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Reich and State Law of Citizenship.II. A citizen of the Reich is that subject only who is of German or kindred blood and who, through his conduct, shows that he is both desirous and fit to serve the German people and Reich faithfully.

Southeast Asia faces a similar citizenship and identity cri-sis today in Myanmar, where thousands of people known as the Rohingya are fleeing the country from persecu-tion. They live in situations very similar to that of the Jews during the Hitler Reich, lacking basic human rights such as access to healthcare, education and employment, the re-fusal of their acceptance as citizens of Myanmar, and are forbidden to marry without official permission.

The Rohingya are an ethnic Muslim minority in Myanmar, which is made up of a majority of Buddhists. Although the community strongly believes that they are pre-colonial residents of Myanmar’s Rakhine state, the earliest known usage of the term “Rohingya” was in 1799. Those against the community claim they are Bengalis who had illegally immigrated to Myanmar.

The controversial citizenship law passed in the state in 1982, which states that, “only ethnic groups which were al-ready in Burma in 1823 qualify as national races” is used as a framework in debating whether this humanitarianly deprived ethnicity is in fact a national race. The Rohing-ya have to prove that their ancestors settled in Myanmar before 1823, in order to obtain citizenship. Only a handful of these individuals have been successful in this task due to the burden of evidence required to support their cases.

15

Written by Dharini Vijendran,Culture Correspondent

16

This identity crisis faced by the Rohingyas is in several as-pects identical to that faced by the Jews as a result of the Nuremberg laws: they both require proof of heredity to prove their ethnicity in order to determine their citizen-ship status in their respective states.

Whether it is 80 years ago or the present day, this is not a justifiable process one should have to undergo in or-der to be accepted as a citizen of a country. Citizenship should be based on the individual’s ability to function as a “clear-thinking and enlightened citizen who is capable of participating in decisions concerning society, regardless of race. Society here refers to a special sense of a nation with a circumscribed territory which is recognized as a state”. Also, one should have the right to identify oneself as a member of a race he/she believes himself/herself to belong to without fearing persecution or discrimination. Simply stating, all human beings should be accepted as both in-dividuals and citizens of the society to which they belong, making human rights and citizen rights interdependent.

Dharini is a second year Master of Global Af-fairs candidate at the Munk School of Glob-al Affairs, University of Toronto. She has an undergraduate background in Mathematics and Economics from York University and is interested in applying her quantitative and

logical reasoning skills to current topics in global affairs. She also enjoys teaching and has taught in different capacities both in slum schools in India and in high schools in Toronto.

PEACE REMAINS ELUSIVEWritten by Colin BaulkeCo-Assistant Director of Written Content

In terms of positive and negative peace, Northern Ire-land can now be defined as being in a period of tenta-tive negative peace, although it is uncertain how long

this will last.

Transitional Justice scholar Johann Galtung posits that there are two definitions of peace: positive and negative peace. Galtung’s negative peace is the more concrete of the two, defined simply as the “termination of vio-lence…and [development of] initiatives towards collec-tive agreements.” Positive peace is the more intangible goal, and focuses on a “final result of cooperation and mutual reconciliation.” Since the Good Friday Agree-ment of 1998, Northern Ireland has been in a state of

negative peace. However, given the recent re-emer-gence of Catholic-Protestant tensions and resurgent violence in Belfast, even the negative peace in the re-gion is becoming more tenuous. The ongoing conflict within Northern Ireland is a unique case study in the study of transitional justice and colonial conflict. It is distinctive because it is one of very few conflicts to span both sides of the Cold War and, until recently, it was a region of open and brutal violence located in the West-ern hemisphere. Northern Ireland has been referred to as the “anomaly of the global north,” — despite the fact that the conflict is taking place within the United Kingdom and is highly publicized in both Europe and North America, little has been accomplished in the way of achieving a positive peace there. There have been at-tempts at various peace treaties and other initiatives, however, over the past century the province has been embroiled in cyclical levels of violence. From the initial War of Independence in 1921 and the cessation of the open urban warfare known as “The Troubles” in 1998, to sporadic and ongoing violence today, Northern Ire-land’s 20th century has been one of particularly great violence, considering its relatively small size and pop-ulation.

The relevant history of Ireland pertaining to the ongo-ing struggles with British rule begins in the early 17th century. Since King Henry VIII proclaimed Ireland to be under the English rule in 1603, there has been ongo-ing resistance between the Protestant English rule and the large Catholic population of the island. This con-flict was fueled by the material discrimination of this Catholic majority throughout English dominance, and reached a critical mass in the early 20th century, with the successful Irish War of Independence.

The subsequent partitioning of southern Ireland into a Free State, and Northern Ireland’s decision to remain a part of the United Kingdom, would be a continuing source of conflict in Northern Ireland. Within North-ern Ireland, two contradictory camps, the largely Prot-estant “unionists” and the largely Catholic, pro-separa-tion “nationalists” have dominated the conflict. These two groups represent the divergence in the region to-wards reunification with the Southern Ireland Free State with undertones regarding religious rights and discrimination. Their conflict has resulted in political and military stalemate, as the final goals of each party seem to be mutually exclusive. Since the end of the War of Independence in 1922, Northern Ireland has experi-

14

enced the Irish Civil War and civil unrest known collo-quially as “The Troubles,” which escalated into terrorist and riotous violence in the late sixties and seventies. The “Irish Question” has been a dominant issue with-in British politics, as it represents, to some, a failure to maintain order within the Crown’s jurisdiction, and to others, the systemic and longstanding repression of an entire population. Given the official cessation of open violence in 1998 and the dismantling of the Provisional Irish Republican Army in 2005, the region of Ireland meets Galtung’s requirements of “termination of vio-lence…and initiatives towards collective agreements.” But these collective agreements are coming under great-er scrutiny, and Protestant-Catholic relations are at an all-time low since the termination of violence.

The cause for downturn in Anglo-Irish and Protes-tant-Catholic relations began with the arrest, and sub-sequent release, of Sinn Fein party leader Gerry Adams for an IRA conducted murder in 1972. The line between the IRA and its political wing of the Sinn Fein has al-ways been blurry, but the potential culpability of one of Northern Ireland’s political leaders in a political murder has forced the nation to wrestle with a violent heritage that largely went unaddressed and unexplored during the peace process nearly two decades ago.

The state of affairs at the moment is dire. The progress on destroying “Peace Walls,” large concrete barri-ers between Protestant and Cath-olic neighborhoods has slowed to a near stop since 2011. The mur-der of several prominent figures within the Sinn Fein and Irish in-dependence movement led to the resignation of Irish First Minister Peter Robinson, as the Democratic Unionist Party refuses to partici-pate in the devolved power-shar-ing government with Sinn Fein if the IRA remains active. Sinn Fein denies the resurgence of IRA ac-tivities and any participation in the murders this past summer. There is little evidence to indicate that this is not the case, but regardless of Sinn Fein complicity in this spark of violence, the perceptions of the peace have shifted.

The situation can now be classified as a full-scale po-litical crisis in the region, as the devolved power-shar-ing government setup by the Belfast Agreement can no longer, and the British government is left with the two undesirable options of remaining distant and potential-ly allowing the situation to worsen, or intervening and triggering dormant anti-Crown sentiments that are still ever-present amongst many nationalists and Catholics. Prime Minister David Cameron has not yet made clear how the British Government will proceed with one of its oldest, and most tumultuous, constituents, but the com-ing months will represent the greatest test for a peace agreement that is regarded by many to be a historical achievement in diplomacy. The inadequacies of the positive peace-building initiatives that facilitate healing and cultural unity are now being exposed in Northern Ireland, and its citizens are being forced to reckon with the fact that the social and political fault lines that have been ever-present in their heritage have not been eradi-cated, but rather only temporarily submerged.

Colin Baulke is a co-assistant director of writ-ten content. He completed his B.A. in Interna-tional Relations at the University of Western Ontario and is currently working on his Mas-ter’s of Global Affairs at the Munk School of Global Affairs.

http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/eddie-izzard-unveils-new-flag-for-northern-ireland-as-he-completes-24-

FIRST STEPS ON THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY: THREE SNAPSHOTS OF POST-ELECTION MYANMAR

As the dust slowly settles over the landmark election in Myanmar, the nation’s various stakeholders look at their uncertain future, most with hope, but oth-

ers with distrust. For one, state institutions largely remain in the hands of the military. There’s also the newly-elected government, which still requires a President—to be elect-ed in March—and strong unified leadership in order to make effective reforms. Underlying both these forces are the people of Myanmar and their patient but persistent cries for meaningful change.

The military: still the big kid on the block

The balance of power will be determined by the de-gree to which the military cedes power over the next five months. A similar landslide victory of the

National League of Democracy (NLD) occurred in 1990, but rather than allow the transfer of power to democrat-ic officials, those same officials were largely harassed and jailed. That being said, few expect the military to put up that sort of obstruction again, since it has committed it-

self to promoting a more globalized position in the world economy. Whether the military decides to shed leader-ship in key state institutions to NLD-friendly candidates is largely uncertain at this point. The new constitution, writ-ten by the military, guarantees that 25 per cent of seats in each house of parliament be reserved for its candidates—hardly a democratic move.

The military’s role in the state remains paramount as it continues to be responsible for choosing the home secre-tary and defence secretary, while also maintaining control over the police, justice system, and intelligence. In addition to preserving nearly all roles related to security, the mili-tary also has the privilege of setting its own budget, which is substantially higher than both the education and health system budgets combined. With regards to business, the military controls many of Myanmar’s largest industries, including its largest brewery, and does not have to declare its profits to the government. Finally, if the military decides that the national unity or security is at substantial risk, it may constitutionally take control of either part or all of the country. As political reforms slowly unravel in the com-

15

Written by Darcy DruryAsia Correspondent

http://www.asianews.it/notizie-it/La-mano-lunga-del-governo-e-militari-sul-voto,-a-rischio-le-elezioni-in-Myanmar-35445.html

Darcy graduated with a double-major in eco-nomics and political science from McGill Uni-versity. He has spent the last three years trav-elling to over two dozen countries in Europe and Asia. His backgrounds in entrepreneur-ship, manufacturing, and teaching provide

ing months, it must be noted that the military’s hold over Myanmar remains significant.

The parliament and government: the new kids in school

The newly elected parliament enters this environment with the benefit of strong popular approval and the opportunity to make many key decisions in the coming months. Most significantly, they will be electing a president in March who will head the newly formed government. Nobel Lau-reate Aung San Suu Kyi founded the NLD in 1988, and has assumed unopposed leadership of the party for the past 27 years, including the 15 years she spent under house arrest. It is widely assumed to the untrained eye that she will be elected to the position of president in the new government, but due to her dual-citizenship (with Britain), she is consti-tutionally ineligible for the position.

What this means for the unformed Myanmar government is that Suu Kyi will be leading the government from the outside, as she has already pronounced, and will be putting forward a candidate on her behalf. Before any reforms are passed, this successful election must take place in parlia-ment and will be the first test proving the true unity of the NLD party. A further consideration is the strength of the NLD majority within parliament. While the unified par-ty would easily elect Suu Kyi as its head of government, electing her puppet will be less automatic. The next four months will be as critical for the success of the newly-elect-ed parliament as their election in November. There is much uncertainty of how this young democracy will make its first decisions.

The people: still waiting on change

Underlying the changes seen above are the 51 million citi-zens of Myanmar, who are the most in need of economic, legal, and societal reform. Success in Myanmar has his-torically come from working within the military or gov-ernment, which narrowed its participation to mostly Bud-dhists and Burmese nationals. Unlike most of Myanmar’s new parliament, its population is far from homogenous. Although 70 per cent of the population is ethnically Bamar and 80 per cent practice Buddhism, significant groups of Christians and Muslims exist throughout the country and often find themselves persecuted by the military. Ethnic and cultural relations will persist as a contentious issue in Myanmar as long as the institutions do not properly reflect

16

its heterogeneous population.

Besides a fairer representation in the budding democracy, the people of Myanmar want the change at the top of their political system to impact the economic circumstances they face in their daily lives. In a survey conducted on Oc-tober 31 by Mizzima, a Myanmar newspaper, 62 per cent of respondents believed that the country is going in the right direction. Among the various factors contributing to this positive outlook was the expectation of economic and infrastructure development (42 per cent). Translating this broad desire for better economic circumstances means hard policy being pushed through. The areas most in need of reform are the distribution of wealth, better roads, bridg-es, and pipelines, and more stable working conditions. As the United States continues to ease sanctions on foreign investment, the new government will also have to balance the increasing flow of outside money into these areas, and to maintain control over its own economy.

Where do we go from here?

In the past month there has been significant change within the Myanmar political system. The parliamentary majori-ties won by the NLD in both houses of government offer the country a real prospect of transitioning from a military regime to a democracy. History will constantly remind ob-servers of the struggles faced by young democracies and the difficulty of transferring power from old hands to new. The most eager spectators will certainly be the citizens of Myanmar as they hope to witness the effects of their casted votes. All this being said, the potential of reform in Myan-mar must be coupled with the sober reminder that the mil-itary has yet to secede most of its power in security and business. The citizens of Myanmar and the newly-elected NLD ought to enjoy the moment, for the battle is just be-

him a unique perspective on global affairs. Darcy lived in Seoul, South Korea for the past sixteen months.

American farmers have a history of resistance in the face of threats to their land rights and free-doms. This history can be traced back to their

resistance against colonial rule and, more recently, it can be seen in their resistance to 21st century agricul-tural practices, policies, and modes of production. Such is the reputation of South American farmers that they have become recognized globally as advocates of envi-ronmental justice and food sovereignty.

La Via Campesina, or “the way of the peasant,” is an example of how South American farmers, in solidari-ty with many farmers all over the world (representing approximately 200 million farmers), have chosen to side with nature and challenge transnational corpora-tions that take advantage of human health and nature for profit. Many of these corporations have had access to South American land, stripping it of its natural land-scapes and properties.

South American farmers have been quite successful in defending their natural and organic farming policies and land. Organizational movements such as La Via Campesina use the power of agro-ecology, a holistic ap-proach to sustainable farming using traditional ecologi-cal knowledge and local insight, as a tool for rural social movements to make an impact on their surroundings and react against exploitation of their land.

The struggle to keep crops organic, for instance, is an ongoing battle that South American farmers are facing. An example of this are transnational fertilizer compa-nies that are permeating the local, small to medium farming markets at low prices, presenting communities with the choice of choosing to convert their fertile, or-ganic lands into mono-cropping stages for higher, fast-er yields using modified seeds and fertilizers in order to become “more successful” on an international scale. As enticing as it may sound to many farmers, this is causing major push back, especially from indigenous communities, who have been immersed in the farming industry for traditions, using their own methodologies that are mindful of their communities and ecologies. Large fertilizer companies have proven to degrade the soil, ecosystems and environments surrounding their applications over time, which is against many South American farming values.

Ecocentric values are key in South America, especial-ly within the farming world. This virtue has kept soci-eties sovereign with their food and farming practices. Many agriculturalists would agree with the philosophy that nature is one with humanity and will fight for the right to protect it. This helps illustrate the important relationship that many farmers have with their crops and surrounding environments and why they contin-ue fighting for healthy, safe grounds. Visiting farms throughout South America, one will notice that beyond all of the different techniques, tools and farm config-urations, farmers come together in the defense of the greater good of the environment. The most recent con-tribution to the farmer fight is La Via Campesina’s lat-est publication addresses solutions to the COP21 titled “Peasant Agroecology For Food Sovereignty and Moth-er Earth: Experience of La Via Campesina,” a collection of global farming practices to help farmers maintain healthy crops and lifestyles via sovereignty of their land. Documents such as these are important tools produced and utilized to help society understand the importance of fighting for farmer rights and food sovereignty – making a huge impact throughout South America.

THE FARMER’S FIGHT FOR ORGANIC FOODWritten by Ella QuarreySouth America Correspondent

http://foodtank.com/news/2015/09/new-toolkit-works-to-improve-resilience-

Ella Quarrey is a second year Master of Global Affairs candidate at the Munk School with a BA in Spanish and Latin American Studies and a BES in International Development. She is passionate about languages, food, fash-ion, the environment and South America after living in Mexico and the Peruvian Amazon.

TORONTO’S BREAKTHROUGH: THE BLOOD-BRAIN BARRIER

Written by Kyle VanhoorenScience & Technology Correspondent

The blood-brain barrier (BBB) is a highly selec-tive barrier that separates the blood circulating in your brain from the extra cellular fluid of

your nervous system. It acts as a very effective natural protective agent against infections. It is also a natural barrier towards medicines and, up until November 8, it was one of the largest obstacles to treating brain con-ditions. Many diseases affecting the brain, like cancer tumours, Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s and depression, have had minimal treatment advances because of the blood-brain barrier.

On November 8, at Sunnybrook Health Sciences Cen-tre in Northern Toronto, the blood-brain barrier was broken by Doctor Todd Mainprize. Speaking with CTV, Dr. Mainprize said, “Between 1940 and 2005, there has been very little progress in improving the outcome of [cancerous tumour] patients.”The procedure is non-invasive, and involves adminis-tration of medication—in the instance from Dr. Main-prize’s original breakthrough—and a form of chemo-therapy. This is followed by an injection of microbubble gas into the blood stream, which resonates when tar-geted by a high-intensity ultrasound beam. The vibra-tions of the microbubbles break apart the proteins in the blood-brain barrier allowing the medication to pass through.

While the full ramifications of the breakthrough are un-known, it has been estimated that 98 per cent of poten-tial medications which could be used to treat brain con-ditions were, until now, unusable because they couldn’t penetrate the blood-brain barrier. With a method of allowing medication to pass through, the range of po-tential treatment methods expands exponentially. The innovation is a great step forward both for medicine, and for Toronto’s image. Toronto has had a long-stand-ing history of biomedical innovation, so much so that a substantial section of the downtown core is simply known as the “Discovery District.” By the strictest defi-nition, this includes the University of Toronto, Hospital

for Sick Children, Mount Sinai Hospital, the Toronto Rehabilitation Institute, the Princess Margaret Cancer Centre, and the MaRS Discovery District.

MaRS—or Medical and Related Sciences—is a non-for-profit entity founded in 2000 that has attempted to capitalize upon Toronto’s position as a world leader in biomedicine. One of their primary aims is to bridge the gap between medical innovation and patient treatment through the establishment of business partnerships. However, despite their 15-year history, MaRS’s ability to generate publicity has been modest, and Toronto’s Discovery District remains a relatively unknown as-pect of the city’s presence internationally. Hopefully, the fanfare from Dr. Mainprize’s achievement will be the breakthrough that brings some well-deserved recog-nition to a lesser-known aspect of Toronto’s innovative downtown core.

Kyle is a current Master of Global Affairs Candidate at the Munk School in Toronto. Prior to this he completed his masters in His-tory and Transitional Justice at the University of Western Ontario. His interests are diverse and varied, but pet projects include an inces-sant obsession with the intersection of securi-ty and commerce in the aerospace and energy industries.

marsdd.com

ALL DRESSED UP AND NOWHERE TO GOWritten by Maria FakhruddinBusiness Correspondent

Maria is an MGA/MBA student at the University of Toronto. She has a background in International Relations, Graphic Design and Philosophy. Apart from having an interest in business and global politics, she likes deconstructing public displays of human folly and unearthing obscure expressions of human magnificence.

In March of 2015, Better Shelter, a charitable arm of IKEA partnered with UNHCR to create makeshift shelters for refugees around the world. These tem-

porary shelters are equipped with UV protection and thermal insulation and are delivered in flat packs. They are sturdier than the usual tent-like structures, they last for about three years and can be assembled with-out any additional tools. This social innovation project has made good use of design thinking, and generated solutions through creating prototypes that were tested and approved by 40 Iraqi and Ethiopian families. Subtle details like providing dignity and privacy by designing doors that can be locked make it a sensible product.

Despite being such a timely product, the IKEA shelter has been a tough sell. The huge costs notwithstanding, ($7000 per piece, can be reduced to $1000 if ordered in bulk) the main concern seems to be that the three year life of the product does not make it temporary enough for refugees. It took intense lobbying by IKEA and UN-HCR to convince the Lebanese government to allow for a trial. Already burdened with over a million refugees from Syria, Lebanon’s concern was that the poor locals would be upset about refugees having bungalow-style houses while they live in much worse conditions. Fur-ther problematizing this initiative is the fear, according to David Sanderson, Professor of Urban Planning at Harvard, that upon seeing such state-of-the-art shelters that house smiling refugees, one gets the impression that all is well, and therefore nothing more needs to be

done. Pushback like that from Lebanon, and the hesitance of many European states to accept refugees has turned IKEA’s product into something that might have little social impact, despite its grandiose and undoubtedly sincere motives. Many initiatives for the settlement of refugees that employ the donor-state model are prob-lematic for the governments that house refugees because they do not see any advantages of accommodating so many people, who many believe could bring terrorism, amongst other problems to their lands. With the recent terrorist attacks in Paris in mind, this is now an even more compelling argument to many. A more sustain-able solution could be to harness the creativity, entre-preneurial skills and experience of incoming refugees to work towards reducing their dependency through a bottom-up approach to social innovation.Such plans have been thought of before but require con-sistent multi-sector engagement to reach fruition. IKEA took the first step of creating a makeshift shelter. Other sectors should now follow suit in to help refugees move beyond encampment towards self-sufficiency.

http://www.bettershelter.org/press/press-images/