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THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAUPONTYSSEMINATURALISTICCRITIQUEOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY

by

ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.

ADissertationsubmittedtotheFacultyoftheGraduate

School,MarquetteUniversity,inPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementsfortheDegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy

Milwaukee,Wisconsin

December2010


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ABSTRACT

THEPARADOXOFNATURE:MERLEAUPONTYSSEMINATURALISTICCRITIQUEOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY

ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A.

MarquetteUniversity,2010ThisdissertationdealswithMerleauPontyscriticaltransformationofHusserlsphenomenologythrougharethinkingoftheconceptofnature,whichHusserl,MerleauPontyargues,failstointegrateorexplainsuccessfullyinhisphilosophicalsystem.ThefirstchapterreconstructsHusserlstranscendentalphenomenologicalprojectinIdeasI,whilethesecondwidenstheinvestigationtocovertheontologicallycenteredIdeasIIandIII.Inmythirdchapter,IchartwhatIcallMerleauPontysorganicappropriationofHusserlandtheuniquehermeneuticalchallengesitposes.HeretheambiguityofIdeasII,whichbothgroundssubjectivity

inthelivedbodyandseparatesnaturefromspirit(Geist),playsacrucialrole.ThefourthchapterconcentratesontheMerleauPontyslatermeditationsontheontologyofnatureandsubjectivity,particularlyinhisrecentlytranslatedNaturelecturesof195961.Finally,thefifthchaptercomparesandcontrastsHusserlandMerleauPonty,intermsofbothsubstanceandmethod,throughadetailedexaminationoftheirdifferentnotionsof(andwaystoaddress)paradox.IshowhowMerleauPontysparadoxicalthinkingstemsnotfromchanceormeretemperamentbutafundamental,systematiccommitmenttotheselfcontradictory(ordialectical,butinamodifiedsense)natureofbeingandtruththemselves.


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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ShazadAkhtar,B.A.,M.A. Iowetheconceptionandfruitionofthisprojectabovealltomydirector,Pol

Vandevelde.ItisinhisclassesthatIfirstawakenedtotheimportanceof

phenomenologyandthepowerofitsmethod.Hehastaughtmethetextsandstyles

ofHusserl,Heidegger,MerleauPonty,andmanyotherfigureswhohaveinfluenced

myphilosophicalthinkingandresearchdecisively.Ihavelearnedtremendously

fromlengthydiscussionsoverbothhisownandotherauthorsoriginalworks.Ifthis

dissertationissuccessfulinanysmallmeasure,thisisowingsubstantiallytothe

guidanceandinfluenceofDr.Vandevelde.

Ihavealsomysecondreader,Dr.SebastianLuft,tothankprofuselyforhis

energeticandgenerousaidtomeovertheyearsandinthecompletionofthe

presentproject.IhavebenefittedgreatlyfrommyyearslongconversationswithDr.

LuftonmanytopicsrangingfromphenomenologytoHegelianidealismandmuch

more.Hisfriendship,availability,andcuttingedgescholarshiphavebeenvery

valuabletomeinmyacademicdevelopment.

Inaddition,IwouldalsoliketotaketheopportunitytosincerelythankDr.

AndyTallonandDr.StephenWatsonofNotreDamefortheirencouragementand

suggestionsduringmywritingprocess.


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ImustaddthatIwasgreatlyaidedincompletingthisdissertationinatimely

mannerbytheMarquetteGraduateSchoolanditsgenerousfinancialsupport,

throughtheRaynorFellowship,throughthe20092010academicyear.Iamalso

deeplygratefultotheMarquettePhilosophydepartmentforhavingnominatedme

fortheawardand,moregenerally,forhavinggivenmeafirstclassphilosophical

educationthatIwilltakewithmeandbuildupon,Iamsure,fortherestofmylife.


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TABLEOFCONTENTSACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................................................iINTRODUCTION..1I.PresentStatusoftheProblem

A.MerleauPontysInterpretationofHusserlandHusserlsConceptionofNature..4

B.MerleauPontysLaterOntologyandConceptofNature..6C.IdeasIandII7

II.SummaryoftheDissertation

A.ChaptersOneandTwo...8

B.ChaptersThreeandFour...11C.ChapterFive...15

III.Conclusion.17CHAPTERONE:HUSSERLSTRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGYINIDEASI:THEBASICPOSITION...19

I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology...19II.EpochandPhenomenologicalReduction

A.Introduction..24B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes26


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C.PhenomenologicalEpoch.32D.PhenomenologicalTranscendentalReduction(s)34

E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction.38III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction..40

A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence.43B.TheEideticDistinctionbetweenMentalandPhysical49C.TheChargeofDualism52D.AbsoluteandRelativeExistenceandtheWorldAnnihilation

Experiment..55E.HusserlsFinalPosition:TranscendentalIdealism60

IV.ConcludingReflections..65CHAPTERTWO:THECONSTITUTIONOFNATURE,BODY,ANDSPIRITINHUSSERLSIDEASII73

I.Introduction79II.TheOntologicalMatrixofIdeasII/III

A.Introduction..79B.TheConstitutionofWorldlyReality

1.MaterialNature822.AnimalNature,ortheBodyandSoul85

3.Ego...914.Spirit...93

III.Analysis:PhilosophicalDifficultiesofIdeasII/III

A.Introduction:PhenomenologicalMonism,OntologicalDualism..99


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B.HusserlsNaturalism.102C.ThePriorityThesis.108

D.SpiritandConsciousness110E.TheQuestionoftheBody114

IV.Conclusion..118CHAPTERTHREE:MERLEAUPONTYSORGANICAPPROPRIATIONOFHUSSERLIANPHENOMENOLOGY

I.Introduction.122II.MerleauPontysRelationshiptoHusserl:AnDoxographicalOverviewandCritique

A.Introduction127B.TheStrongView:Zahavi,Smith,andBarbaras.129C.WeakandMixedViews:Lefort,Richir,Madison,etal.130

D.FourWeakReadings:Embree,Behnke,Seebohm,Bergo...133E.ConcludingThoughts.140

III.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByText

A.Introduction141B.HusserlinPP..143C.HusserlinMerleauPontysLaterWork146

IV.MerleauPontysHusserlianPhenomenology:ByTheme

A.ThePhenomenologicalReduction152B.EssencesandtheEideticReduction.158

V.ConcludingReflections.161


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CHAPTERFOUR:MERLEAUPONTYSMATUREONTOLOGYOFNATUREI.Introduction.166

II.NatureandtheOntologyoftheNatureLecturesA.Introduction:TheNatureLectures,TheVisibleandtheInvisible,andtheProjectofOntology..168B.DefiningNature174C.NatureandtheSciencesofLife...181

III.TheNatureLecturesandTheVisibleandtheInvisible:TowardsaNewDialecticalOntoPhenomenology

A.Introduction190B.Reversibility191C.Flesh.196D.IdentityandDifference,theOneandtheMany:DimensionsofMerleauPontysDialectic.200

IV.Conclusion..205

CHAPTERFIVE:MERLEAUPONTYANDHUSSERLONTHEQUESTIONOFTHEPARADOXOFSUBJECTIVITYANDNATUREI.Introduction.....207II.MerleauPontysPhilosophyofParadox

A.OverviewofMereauPontysReferencestoParadox....211

B.ParadoxandthePerceptualFaith.217C.ParadoxandPhilosophy..220

III.HusserlandParadox221IV.TheParadoxofReflection


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A.TheReflectiveAttitude225B.HyperReflection.229

V.MerleauPontysParadoxicalThinkingInRelationtoOtherStylesofThinking:Dialectic,Skepticism/Quietism,andMysticismA.MerleauPontyandHegelianDialectic...234B.MerleauPontyandSkepticism/Quietism237C.MerleauPontyandMysticism.240

VI.Conclusion.244

CONCLUSION

I.MerleauPontyvisvisHusserl.....247

II.MerleauPontyandSomeOtherPhilosophers..251

III.ThePersonalisticAttitudeandtheLimitsofReflection253

IV.PhenomenologyasParadox254

V.Naturalism...255

BIBLIOGRAPHYI.PrimaryLiterature(HusserlandMerleauPonty)

A.Husserl...257

B.MerleauPonty...258II.SecondaryLiteratureandOtherWorks

A.BooksandMonographs...259

B.Articles,BookChapters,andVolumeIntroductions..262


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C.Miscellaneous.268


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Introduction

Thecentraldynamicofthisdissertationisthecreativeencounterbetween

MauriceMerleauPonty(19081961)andEdmundHusserl(18591938),twoofthe

mostimportantphilosophersofthetwentiethcentury.Iexplorethisencounteran

encounterbetweentwophilosophiesasopposedtotwophilosophers,asthetwo

thinkershadneverformallymetandareseparatedbymorethanageneration

withrespectprincipallytotheontologicalissuessurroundingtheclassicaldivision

ofnatureandspirit.Butinthecaseofphenomenology,ontologicaland

epistemologicalissuescannotbecleanlyseparated.Thusmajorquestionsof

epistemologicalsignificance,suchasthoseofidealismandthenatureofreflection,

arealsoaddressedandrelatedtothequestionofwhatitmeanstodo

phenomenologyandevenphilosophyitself.Phenomenology,ontology,

epistemologyallofthesetermsarenegotiatedandrenegotiatedinthecourseof

MerleauPontyssustainedhermeneuticsofHusserlswork,ahermeneuticsthat

opensupontoahiddenworldofpossibilitieslatentinthe(ostensibly)simple

phenomenaofsensing,seeing,speaking,andreflecting.

MerleauPontysinterpretationofHusserlhasbeencommentedonbefore.

However,oneoftheuniquecontributionsofthepresentresearch,Ibelieve,isitsuse

oftheconceptofnature,afundamentalconcernofboththinkersbutinvery

differentways,togototheheartofthequestionsofphenomenologicalmethodand

therelationshipofhumansubjectivitytotheworld.Thischoiceallowsusto

appreciatethemotivationsofMerleauPontysrethinkingofphenomenology,


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puttingasideitschallengetoclassicalmetaphysicalbinariessuchashuman

animalandnaturespirit,inthecontextofawiderphilosophicalontological

tradition(thoughstillverymuchamodernone,forthemostpart).Merleau

PontyscritiqueofsomeelementsofHusserlianphilosophyclearlybelongstohis

generalcritiqueofmodernismand,inturn,blendharmoniouslywithhispositive

appropriationofHusserlianphenomenologyasakindofunifiedfieldtheoryof

Being,oncecleansedofitsCartesianpresuppositions.1

InHusserl,natureappearsprimarilyinthreeguises:asthenatural

attitude;astheregionaldomainofthenaturalsciences;andastheonticnoematic

correlateofspiritintherealmofworldly(nontranscendental)reality.For

MerleauPonty,ontheotherhand,naturecomestoemergeasacomplexand

nuancedothernessattheheartofsubjectivity,manifestingitselfmostdirectlyin

therealmoflife,especiallyanimality,andyetalsohauntingconsciousness,or

spirit,withitspresencebyabsence,itsimpenetrableoriginality.Itis,as

Schellingsays,awildBeinguntamedbythought,yetalsountamable,forthere

couldbenothoughtwithoutahorizon,andthathorizonalityisthedepththat

cannotbeknownwithoutmyvanishingfromtheworldaltogetherandsomehow

seeingitfromaboveanimpossibilityevenforaGod,however,since,asboth

HusserlandMerleauPontyremindus,visionisacorporealact.

Inmyinterpretation,NatureandthenBeing,andstillagain,the

fleshcome,inMerleauPontystreatment,toquietlydisplacethetranscendental

egoofHusserl,itselfaholdoveroftheCartesianepistemologicalprioritizationof

1Itisinthislight,too,thatwecanappreciateMerleauPontysendorsementoftheworkofLeibniz,Hegel,andBergson,ontheonehand,andhisrejectionof(muchof)KantandSartreontheother.


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theinnerovertheouter.Natureisambiguouslybothinnerandouteran

interiorityquaexteriority,likethelivingorganism,whoseoutwardbehaviorcan

onlybeunderstoodaslivingoutwithintheinternalhorizonofanUmwelt.The

organism,mostevidentlyinthesimpler(butnottheverysimplest)forms,likecrabs

orworms,isradicallyselfcentered(initsownworld)atthesametimethatit

lacksacenter,anegothatcandifferentiateitselfabsolutelyfromaworldapart

fromitsinteriority.Theanimalisitsworld.Thelivingbeinginitsunitywithits

worldservesasareminderoftheprereflectivelifeofconsciousnessthat

underliesandchallengesfromwithinthedualismsofreflectivethought,

includingthatofthenaturalandspiritual,thecentraldivisionofHusserlsIdeas

II.2

Whileremainingaphenomenologisttotheend,MerleauPontyrejectedboth

Husserlstranscendentalidealism3aswellasthelattersimplicit(andironical)

collusionwithnaturalscienceoveritsdefinitionoftheessenceofnature.Itisnot

onlyinresponsetoHusserlorIdeasII,ofcourse,thatMerleauPontydevelopedhis

ideasofnature;afterall,hehadbeenatworkontheontologicalimplicationsof

animalityevenbeforehebecameacquaintedwithHusserlsworksinaseriousway,

startingwithhisfirstmajorworkTheStructureofBehavior(1942).4Nonetheless,in

IdeasIIheseesHusserlstrugglingwiththeconsequencesofdividingtheworldfrom

consciousnessandnatureandanimalityfromspirit,andhisarticulationofan2Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution .Trs.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,19893Itcanbedebatedtowhatdegree,ofcourse;seeToadvine,Ted.LeavingHusserlsCave?ThePhilosophersShadowRevisited.InMerleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.7194).4MerleauPonty,TheStructureofBehavior.Trans.A.L.Fisher.Boston:BeaconPress,1963.


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alternativecannotbefullyappreciatedwithoutthisworkasahermeneutical

backdrop.

Theremainderofthisintroductionoffersanoverviewofthepresentstatusin

therelevantsecondaryliteratureofthetheme(s)ofthiswork,aswellasapreview

ofthecontentsofthedissertationchapterbychapter,culminatinginasummaryof

theconclusionsIdrawfromalloftheforegoingstudies.

I.PresentStatusoftheProblem

A.Merleau-PontysInterpretationofHusserlandHusserlsConceptionofNature

WhilethereareanumberofgoodarticlesonMerleauPontysreadingof

Husserl,severalofwhicharecollectedinthe2002essaycollectionentitledMerleau-

PontysReadingofHusserl,5thereisverylittlematerialwrittenspecificallyon

MerleauPontyscritiqueofHusserlsconceptionofnature,6letaloneasustained

assessmentoftheirrespectivephilosophiesthroughthelensofthisidea.Thedearth

ofmaterialonthequestionofnatureisprobablyduetothefactthatMerleau5Merleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002.OthergoodarticlesincludethosebyTaylorCarmanandAnthony

Steinbockforinstance,whichbothcompareHusserlianandMerleauPontianphenomenologiesofthebody,amajorthemeofIdeasII;CarmanevenexplicitlydiscussesMerleauPontysreadingofIdeasII,thoughonlyinpassing.Thismaterialis,however,onlypartiallyrelevantforourpresentpurposes.See:Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999(pp.205225);Steinbock,Anthony.SaturatedIntentionality.In TheBody.Ed.DonnWelton,Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,1999(pp.178199).6AnexceptionisStephenCrowellsessayTheMythicalandtheMeaningless:HusserlandtheTwoFacesofNature.PrintedinIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.(pp.81106)Thisessayalsocontainsmuchextraneousmaterial,forourpurposes,onthephilosophyofmythology.


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Pontysmostpointedcriticismsonthisissuearedirectlytobefoundinhislecture

coursesonnature,whichwerehoweverpublishedonlyrelativelyrecently.7The

presentdissertationclosessomeofthisgapinthescholarship.

MuchofthediscussionofMerleauPontysreadingofandphilosophical

relationtoHusserlispolemicalandinsomewaysparalleltothemorestandard

HusserlversusHeideggerdebate.TaylorCarmanexpressesacharacteristicpro

MerleauPontianview:

UnlikeHusserl,butlikeHeidegger,MerleauPontylooksbeyondthesubjectobjectdividetotrytogaininsightintotheconcretestructuresofworldlyexperienceIndeed,takingtheproblemofembodimentseriously,asMerleauPontydoes,entailsaradicalreassessmentoftheveryconceptualdistinctionsonwhichHusserlsenterpriserests.8

CarmanfurtherclaimsthatgoingbeyondHusserlwouldmeanrelinquishingthe

conceptualdualismonwhich[his]projectrests.9ManyHusserlianswoulddispute

thischaracterizationofHusserl,thoughIpersonallybelieveitislargelyaccurate,10

thoughthereareactuallyseveralconceptualdualisms,notjustone,thatmustbe

contendedwithandsortedthroughontheirownterms,notallofwhichequatetoa

substancedualismofasortonefindsinDescartes(andisatleastoutwardly

refutedinHusserl).IaddressthisissueinChapter2.

7MerleauPonty,Maurice.Nature:CourseNotesfromtheCollgedeFrance .Compiledandwithnotes

fromDominiqueSglard.Trans.RobertVallier.NorthwesternUniversityPress:Evanston,Illinois,2003.8Carman,Taylor.TheBodyinHusserlandMerleauPonty.PhilosophicalTopics,Vol.27,No.2,Fall1999,p206.9Ibid.,p.208

10FranoiseDastur,acarefulandrelativelynonpolemicalreaderofbothHusserlandMerleauPonty,

agreeswiththelatterthatHusserlisbasicallydualistic.SeeDastur,Franoise.HusserlandtheProblemofDualism.SoulandBodyinHusserlianPhenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI),ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.6577).MerleauPontyisroutinelyreadasazealousantidualist,aclaimIwillpartiallychallengeinchapters4and5.


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Husserlhasplentyofdefenders,ofcourse,someofwhom,likePanos

Theodorou,takeissuewiththewidespreadreadingofIdeasIIthatunderstandsitas

validating,essentially,thenaturalscientificviewofnature.11J.ClaudeEvansagrees

thatthisreadingismisleading,andgoesevenfurther,arguingforthesuperiorityof

HusserlsaccountofnatureandscienceinIdeasIIoverhislaterreflectionsonthe

lifeworld,definitelyaminoritypositionforthoseconcernedwiththisproblem.12

WithinHusserlianscholarship,atleastasevidencedbyMerleau-Pontys

ReadingofHusserl,achiefquestionliesinjusthowfarMerleauPontydivergesfrom

Husserl.Fordiametricalpositionsonthisquestion,seeforexampleSeebohmsand

Zahavisarticlesinsaidvolume.13

B.Merleau-PontysLaterOntologyandConceptofNature

InrecentyearstherehasbeenaspateofliteratureonMerleauPontyslater

philosophyandhisgeneralontology.Theseincludeseveralbooklength

treatments,forexamplebyDillon(1998)andBarbaras(2004)14twoofthebest

availableaswellasmanyarticles,interestinglylargelyinEnglish.(MerleauPonty

hasproventobepopularinAmericaespecially,thoughoneshouldnotfailto

11Theodorou,Panos.PerceptualandScientificThing:OnHusserlsAnalysisofNatureThingin

IdeasII.InTheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophyVolume5,2005.Eds.BurtHopkinsandStevenCrowell,165187.Seattle:NoesisPress,2005.12

Evans,J.Claude.WhereistheLifeWorld?PrintedinIssuesinHusserlsIdeasII.Eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1996.13Seebohm,ThomasM.ThePhenomenologicalMovement:ATraditionwithoutMethod?Merleau

PontyandHusserl.InMerleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.5170);Zahavi,Dan.MerleauPontyonHusserl:AReappraisal.InMerleau-PontysReadingofHusserl.Eds.TedToadvineandLesterEmbree.Dodrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,2002(pp.329).14Barbaras,Renaud.TheBeingofthePhenomenon.Trans.TedToadvineandLeonardLawlor.

Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,2004;Dillon,M.C. Merleau-PontysOntology.Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988


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mentionthatthereisalsoaJapaneseMerleauPontyCircle).Oneofthesearticles,by

Geraets,dealswiththethemeofnatureexplicitly,15whileothersdealmorewiththe

fleshandotherrelatedtopicsfromthelaterphilosophy.16Acomprehensive

treatmentofMerleauPontysphilosophyofnature,onelongoverdue,hasbeen

recentlyauthoredbyTedToadvine.17

C.IdeasIandII

RegardingHusserl,thereareinnumerableworksdealingwiththecentral

conceptsoftranscendentalidealismandwithIdeasI18,asatext,inparticular

indeed,virtuallyeveryintroductorytextorstatementonHusserlhastotakethis

seminalworkintoaccount.Myrelianceonsecondaryliteratureforthesectionon

IdeasIisminimal,however,fortworeasons.First,Iexpoundonlytheworksmost

basicthemesepochandreduction,noesisandnoema,thetranscendentalego,etc.

Second,althoughthesenotionsthemselvesareallcontroversialandcontested

throughouttheHusserlliterature,myaimisnottogiveadefinitiveinterpretationof

them,onlytofacilitatethroughmytreatmentofthemacomprehensiblediscussion

ofMerleauPontysgeneralappropriationsandcriticismsofHusserlian

phenomenology.

15Geraets,ThodoreF.MerleauPontysConceptionofNature.InSoulandBodyinHusserlian

Phenomenology:ManandNature(AnalectaHusserliana,Vol.XVI) ,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.Dordrecht:Springer,1983(pp.301312).16SeeforexampleDastur,Franoise.World,Flesh,Vision.InChiasms:Merleau-PontysNotionof

Flesh.Eds.FredEvansandLeonardLawlor.StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Albany:2000(pp.2350).17Toadvine,Ted.Merleau-PontysPhilosophyofNature.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,

200918Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,

FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology. Trans.F.Kersten.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1983


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WorkonIdeasIIisfarlessextensivethanthatonIdeasI,buttherehasbeen

somenoteworthysecondaryscholarshipinthelastdecadeonIdeasII,someofit

includedinthevolumeIssuesinIdeasII19,whichdrawstogetheranumberofessays

onvariousaspectsofthework.Otherpenetratingreadingsincludethoseof

Rockstad20andthealreadymentionedEvansandTheodorou.IdeasIIhasofcourse

beenwrittenaboutbymajorphenomenologists,includingRicoeur21,Landgrebe22,

and(obviously)MerleauPontyhimself.Ihavefoundthatthese,alongobviously

withtheprimarytext,arestillthemostvaluableelementsinIdeasIIscholarshipat

thepresenttime.

II.SummaryoftheDissertation

A.ChaptersOneandTwo

InChaptersOneandTwo,IsketchapictureofHusserlofIdeasIandII,the

idealistHusserlwho,inthelatterofthesetwoworks,neverthelesslaysthe

foundationsofmostofwhatMerleauPontywillforgeintoanewvisionof19IssuesinHusserlsIdeasII,eds.ThomasNenonandLesterEmbree.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic

Publishers,1996.20

Rokstad,Konrad.TheHistoricityofBodyandSoul.InPhenomenologyofLife--FromtheAnimalSoultotheHumanMind:BookI:InSearchofExperience ,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.(pp.127159).Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2007;also,Rokstad,Konrad.Nature,SubjectivityandtheLifeWorld.InAnalectaHusserliana:TheYearbookofPhenomenologicalResearchVolLXXVII,ed.AnnaTeresaTymieniecka.(pp.4159).Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishing,2002.21Ricoeur,Paul.Husserl:AnAnalysisofHisPhenomenology.Trans.EdwardG.BallardandLester

Embree.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1967(Thirdchapter:HusserlsIdeasII:AnalysesandProblems,pp.3581).22Landgrebe,Ludwig.ThePhenomenologyofEdmundHusserl.Ed.DonnWelton.Ithaca,NewYork:

CornellUniversityPress,1981.


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phenomenologyandthenaturespiritrelation.Asjustalludedto,thefirstchapteris

adetailedoverviewofHusserlstranscendentalphenomenologytheeideticand

transcendentalphenomenologicalreductions,thenaturalandtranscendental

attitudes,noesisandnoema,intentionality,thetranscendentalego,constitution,and

thelike.23Thepurposeofthischapterismostlyexpository(someinterpretationis

involved,ofcourseasanygenuineexpositioninfactrequiresanyway);the

demandsofexplainingHusserlsphilosophicalsystem,however,alsohappento

makeitthelongestchapterinthiswork.

ThesecondchapterisadetailedexpositionandreadingofIdeasII24,witha

focusonitsontophenomenologicalmeditationsontherealmsofmaterialnature,

bodyandsoul,andspirit,alongwiththequestionoftheenigmaticrelationof

theseconstitutedrealitiesandthetranscendentalsubjectivity(orsimply

consciousness)ofthetranscendentalreductionformallyexpoundedinIdeasI.

23ANoteontheChoiceofText:Husserlwasconstantlyintheprocessofreinventinghimself; IdeasIis

onlyoneofmanypossibleintroductorytextstousetopresentHusserlstranscendentalversionofphenomenology(CartesianMeditationsandtheCrisisoftheEuropeanSciencescomemostquicklytomind,buttherehasevenbeenabooklengthintroductiontoHusserl,byKockelmanns,basedonhisEncyclopediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenologysee:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserlsPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994).WhychooseIdeasI?AsidefromthereasonthatIdeasIandIIbelongtogetherbytheirtitles( IdeasIIhadbeeninitiallyplannedasasequelandfurtherexplicationofthethesismaintainedinIdeasI),itisalsotruethat IdeasIissufficienttointroducemostofthefundamentalplanksofHusserlianphenomenology.WhetherornotHusserleventually,inthe1930s,shiftedhisbasicpositiontoamoreexistentialand

detranscendentalizedformofphenomenology,orwhetherthelatergeneticphenomenologyisnotmerelyanextensionofthephenomenologyoftheIdeasbutratherafarreachingradicalrethinkingofit,arequestionsIwillnotandneednotdealwithhere.ForitwouldsuitmypurposesiftheHusserl/sofIdeasIandIIareregardedasjustone(ortwo)ofmanyactualorpossibleHusserls,onlybecausethepointsIwillbetryingtomakearebasicallysystematicones,whichthetextsathandbringoutsufficientlyontheirown. 24Husserl,Edmund.IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy,

SecondBook:StudiesinthePhenomenologyofConstitution .Trans.R.RojcewiczandA.Schuwer.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1989.TheyearofpublicationoftheoriginalGermanlanguageeditionwas1952.


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InIdeasII,Husserlpresentsapictureofnatureasathelifeless,meaningless

(Sinnlos)substrateofreality,abarephysicalthinghoodthatdistinguishesitself

fromlife(soul,Seele),ontheonehand,andmind(spirit,Geist),ontheother.The

livedbody,aspresentedbyHusserl,istheunityofmindandmatter,but,

importantly,itisdistinguishablefromthepureformsofeither.Whatshields

HusserlfrombaldfacedCartesiandualismishisclaim,announcedalreadyinIdeas

I,thatpureortranscendentalsubjectivityandherehefollows(roughly)Kant,

whoseCopernicanturnhebroadlyendorsescannotbereducedtothinghood

orobjectivityofanykind.Puresubjectivityismorefundamentalthananyobject,

sinceitistheveryconditionforthepossibilityofobjectivityinthefirstplace.

Husserlsprioritizationoftranscendentalsubjectivityoverempiricalsubjectivity

radicalizesthisdifferencebyplacingempiricalsubjectivitysocompletelyinthegrip

oftheobjectiveandevenlifelessworldofphysicalnature,thatweareforcedto

seethatsubjectivitystrictly(orpurely)speakingcannotbeoftheworld,literally.

Thisisnottosaythatitcanexistwithoutit,butitcertainlycanbeconceivedtodo

soasdemonstratedinafamous,and,tosome,infamous,passageinIdeasIthatis

echoedinlaterwritingsaswell.ThatHusserlwasinterestedinmakingsuchan

underlyingpointisclearfromIdeasIIanditsother,complementaryarguments

againstmindbodyreductionisminthattext.25

25Foragoodtreatmentofthis,seeMarcelle,Daniel.TheOntologicalPriorityofSpiritOverNature:

HusserlsRefutationofPsychophysicalParallelisminIdeasII.InPhilosophyToday,vol.50(suppl.),2006(pp.7582).Whetherconsciouslyornot,Husserlpresentsakindofontologicalgambitdirectedagainstthenaturalisticorphysicalisticphilosopher.Inthislanguage,MerleauPontysconcernmightbethatHusserlsgambitfails,intheprocessconcedingfartoomuchtonaturalscience.Accordingtothisview,then,thetranscendentalego,thatis,istoothinareedtoputtheburdenon,sothatinthewakeofthefailureoftranscendentalphenomenology,therewouldbeonly


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IdeasIIwasunpublishedinHusserlslifetimebutreadandstudiedclosely

byMerleauPonty,whosepositiveappropriationofthatworkliesmostlyinthearea

ofthephenomenologyofthebody(thelivedbody,orLeib).26MerleauPontys

reservationsregardingtheworkasawhole,however,andinparticularonwhathe

regardedasitsunderlyingconceptualconfusions,wereconsiderable.Andthe

questionofnaturewhatitis,andhowhumanbeingsaretobeunderstoodin

relationtoitoccupied(aswehaveseen)greatdealofMerleauPontysmature

thought,whosegeneralthrustgoesagainstthegrainofHusserlsfindingsinIdeasII.

HusserldoesnotseemeithertorecognizethetensionsinIdeasIIasfundamental

onesorrealizethatnatureposesaradicalproblemforthetranscendental

phenomenologicalmethoditself.Wemightputitthisway:whereasforHusserl

naturehastobeexplainedintermsofitsconstitutionintranscendental

consciousness,forMerleauPonty,itisthisveryconsciousnesswhichwouldneed

explaining,inlightofitsobviousoriginationintheprimordialexperiencesofthe

livedbody,whichisitselfanemblemofnature.

B.ChaptersThreeandFour

ChapterThreeaddressesMerleauPontysspecificformofphenomenologyin

relationtoHusserlsown.Itessentiallyrepresentsmytakeonthedecadesold

questionofhowbesttounderstandMerleauPontysoftencontroversialreadingof

Husserl.Theissueiscomplex,butafterthoroughlydocumentingMerleauPontys

thenaturalisticphysicalisticoptionleft,adisastrousoption.Hencethereistheneedtorethinkphenomenologyinawhollynewlight(thoughstillrootedinperception,asHusserlhadit).26SeeforexampleMerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhilosopherandHisShadow.InSigns.Trans.

RichardM.McCleary.Evanston,Illinois:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964


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reenvisioningofclassicphenomenologicalmotifssuchasthephenomenological

andeideticreductionsfromthePhenomenologyofPerceptionthroughTheVisible

andtheInvisible,IarguefinallythattheFrenchphilosophersmannerof

appropriationofHusserlispersuasivebutalso,moreinterestingly,highlyorganic.

IusethistermnotonlyinthesensethatitdrawsonHusserlinanaturalmanner,so

tospeak,butmoreparticularlyinthesensethatitembodiesorinstantiates

MerleauPontysstyleofphilosophyandevenhisownontology.Forexample,

MerleauPontysownnotionsofambiguity,reflection,andparadox,amongothers,

actuallyprovetobethekeytounlockingthesecretofhisHusserlreading.Butthis

alsomeansthattheextenttowhichoneagreeswithMerleauPontysreading

correlatessomewhattothedegreetowhichoneacceptshisoverallphilosophical

vision,somethingthatmayaccountforatleastsomeofthedoggedoppositionto

himfromcertainmembersofthestrongHusserliancamp,atleast.(Merleau

PontysreadingofhisownreadingofHusserlhisviewofthedegreeofhisown

faithfulnessorunfaithfulnesstothesource,forexampleisalsoherelargely

confirmedthroughtheprismofhisowndialecticalviewsandhermeneutics.)

ThefourthchapterplumbsMerleauPontyswritings,mostparticularlythe

Naturelectures,toconnecthisreadingofHusserlandexistentializationof

phenomenologytohisnewlydevelopingconceptionsofnatureand,accordingly,the

natureofhumanityaswell.TheNaturelectureseriesisanexcitinglydetailedand

densetractoforiginalresearchandtextualandscientificinterpretationthat

MerleauPontygaveastheheadoftheCollgedeFranceoveraperiodofseveral

years,between1958and1961,shortlybeforehisuntimelydeath.Hedelivered


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thematthesametimehewascomposinghisunfinishedmasterpieceTheVisibleand

theInvisible,alsoatextIwillalsoheavilyrelyoninbothChapters4and5(itis

effectivelyMerleauPontysmostsignificantworksincethePhenomenologyof

Perception).

MerleauPontysexpressaiminthelecturesistoinitiateaprojectof

ontologystartingfromtheideaofnatureasitappearsinthehistoryofWestern

philosophyandscience,particularlyinthemodernperioddowntohisownpresent

day.Thisisasurprisingchoiceforaselfidentifiedphenomenologist,butitis

consistentwithMerleauPontysownfamousassertionthatthephenomenological

method,includingthephenomenologicalandeideticreductions,areradically

incompleteandthus,oneissafetoconclude,unabletosealconsciousnessofffrom

theempiricalrealminthewayHusserl,theprogenitorofthemethod,hadintended.

(Thisisnottosaythatnaturalmeansempirical,onlythatthereisafamily

resemblancebetweendoingexistentialphenomenologyandanarchaeologyof

nature,therootofourlivingexistence.)

WhereasinTheStructureofBehaviorandPhenomenologyofPerceptionthe

focushadbeenonanimalityandthelivedbodythesignificanceofwhichremains

inthelaterphilosophy(whichIdonot,asdosomeothers,readintermsofabreak

withtheold,ratheronlyadeepeningthatoccasionallypromptsacorrection),

MerleauPontynowbroadenshisinquirytoBeingasawhole,therebyfinding

himselfinquiringintonatureasafieldoflifepriortothedivisionofsubjectand

object.NatureturnsouttobenothinglikeeithertheobjectiveNatureof

scientistsorthenoematicpoleofHusserliantranscendentalconsciousness,since


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itis,inaprofoundsense,foreverbeyondanypowersofconstitution.Remarkably

andimportantly,MerleauPontydoesnotabandonthephenomenologicalattitudeor

standpointofreflectivethoughtinfavorofaholisticimmersioninprereflective

life.Hisvisionisoneofthehumanbeingsinevitablebelongingnessandalienation

fromnaturethatis,fromhimself/herself.Humanexistenceisthereforeself

interrupting,thoughnottothepointofrealizingaSartreandisconnectionfromthe

wholespectacleofBeing,inwhoseinternalfoldhumanconsciousnesstakesits

rightfulplace.Itis,however,aconditionedconsciousness,justasfreedomfor

MerleauPontyisaconditionedfreedom.Ineithercase,onecanputtheemphasison

eitherthefirstorthesecondtermandfind,ineachcase,animportantnuancethat

illuminesauniquesideofexistence.

MuchofthemostinterestingmaterialintheNaturelecturespresentsthese

ideasindirectlythroughMerleauPontysoriginalinterpretationsofsuch

philosophicalfiguresasDescartes,Spinoza,Kant,Schelling,andBergson,aswellthe

findingsofcontemporaneousscientists.MerleauPontyslaterconceptionofnature,

andanewontologicalvocabularytogowithit,hadbeengestatingforalongtime,

sincehisfirstworksinfact.Nature,aswehavealreadyseen,comestotakeonthe

meaningofwhatSchellingcalledthebarbarousprincipleofthereal,oragainwild

Being,whichcannotbebroughtinatransparentwaywithintheorbitofreflection.

MerleauPontyscritiqueoftranscendentalphenomenologyisapparenthere(much

asSchellingcriticizedthereflexivityofHegelandidealismgenerally).Itseemsas

thoughMerleauPontysnatureisonewhichsomehow,fromwithinitself,gives

risetosubjectivityandreflectionandtherebytranscendsitselfwhileremaining


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opaquetoitselfatthesametime.(Thisopacityisreflectedinthemottoweare

giventoourselves.)TheparalleltoSchellingsownNaturphilosophieis

unmistakable,asaretheromanticresonancesofhisunderstandingofnature

generally.27Butwhatisgoneisintellectualintuitionortheclaimtoaninsightinto

ahigherorderofbeing.

C.ChapterFive

Thefinalchapterisasystematicexplorationofonefundamentaldifference

betweenHusserl(andperhapsthevastmajorityoftraditionalphilosophy)and

MerleauPonty,anditpertainstotheirapproachtophilosophyandthought

itself.Isphilosophybestappreciatedasaproblemsolvingenterprise,asHusserl

believes,orratherasameditationonparadoxes,themselvesbeyondanysimple

solution?MerleauPontyfindstheultimatetruthofthehumanconditiontoconsist

inacertaindialecticalcontradictionwhich,however,unlikeHegelsversion,does

notfindaresolutioninsomethinghigher,suchasanabsolutestandpoint.

MerleauPontyisultimatelyaphilosopherofparadox,whichiswhatexplainsthe

titleofthepresentdissertation,TheParadoxofNature...Itisregardingthe

problemofnatureatoncethehomeofhumanspirit,aswellasitspermanent

otherthatMerleauPontyfindsoneofhismostfruitfulapplicationsofwhathe

callsinTheVisibleandtheInvisiblethemethodofinterrogation.

27WatsonmentionsNovalisinthisconnection.(Watson,StephenH.MerleauPontys

PhenomenologicalItineraryFromBodySchematoSituatedKnowledge:OnHowWeAreandHowWeAreNottoSingtheWorld.JanusHead,Winter/SpringIssue,9.2,2007.Amherst,NY:TriviumPublications,p.534549.)RobertVallierhaswrittenhisdissertation,notpublishedunfortunately,onthetopicofSchellingandMerleauPonty.(Institution:OfNature,Life,andMeaninginMerleauPontyandSchelling.DePaulUniversity,2001)


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Ofcourse,Husserlhimselfmakesparadoxacentralpartofthediscourseof

phenomenologyinthenarrowsensethatheneverceasesfirstofalltoemphasize

theuttercounterintuitivenessoftherevolutionaryperspectiveoftranscendental

phenomenology,oftheenormouseffortittakestooverturn(para)thecommon

view(doxa)thatplacessubjectivityatthemercyofthespatiotemporalcausal

world,ratherthanviceversa.YethealsospeakseloquentlyintheCrisisaboutwhat

hecallstheparadoxofsubjectivityparadoxheremoreinthemoreMerleau

Pontiansenseofantinomynamelytheparadoxthatsubjectivityisatonceapart

oftheworld(initsembodiedform,inindividualconsciousnesses),evenasitisthe

transcendentalconditionfortheverypossibilityoftheworld(whatHusserl

controversiallycallsabsoluteexistenceasopposedtotherelativeexistenceof

theworld).Inanimportantway,this,too,isaparadoxofnature:fortheworld

natureisboththeconditionofthepossibilityofconsciousness,evenas

consciousnessistheconditionforthepossibilityoftheworld.ButHusserloffersa

solutiontotheparadoxbymakingadistinctionbetweentwotypesofsubjectivity,

andofferingonepriorityovertheother.Aswehavealreadyseen,suchasolution

willnotdoforMerleauPonty.Andintheend,Husserlisnolesssympatheticto

antinomiesthanmostofthecanonicalthinkersoftheWesternphilosophical

tradition,fromAristotle(Metaphysics,BookIII)onward.


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III.Conclusion

InHusserl,thethematicofnatureinitiallyassertsitselfinthatphilosophers

famous(thoughclearlyambiguous)rejectionofthenaturalattitudeandhisstrong

distinctionbetweenworldandconsciousness,anditextendsinMerleauPontys

worktothelattersfinegrainedattempts,throughhislifelongstudiesofbiology

andpsychology,tonegotiatebetweenthissortofdualismandtheequaldanger,in

hiseyes,ofapurelyscientificnaturalism.MerleauPontyeventuallysettlesonan

interpretationofthephenomenologicalreductionasadeepeningofthenatural

attituderatherthanaflighttopureconsciousnessor,asMerleauPonty

paradoxicallystatesit(inHegelianterms),itisonlyadeparturebywayofreturning

toourselves.Inthisway,MerleauPontyslecturecourseonnatureafocaltextof

thisdissertation,alongwithIdeasIandIIandTheVisibleandtheInvisiblecanbe

seentobetheculminationofanongoingcritiqueofHusserliantranscendental

phenomenologyinfavorofamoreexistentialnaturalisticatonce

phenomenologicallythickandscientificallyinformedvariety,whichplaceshuman

subjectivityattheheartofnature,orBeing,ratherthanoutsideoraboveit.The

consequenceisthatforMerleauPonty,phenomenologyisnotanewscienceora

magickeytounlockphilosophicalpuzzlesonceandforall;rather,itisthe

witnessingofthemiraculouscoherenceofcontradictorytruthsinthespectacleof

existence.

Fromthebeginning,MerleauPontyrefusestoadoptamethodthatwould

allowfortheworldsthoroughgoingconstitutioninthemind.Atthesametime,he


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explicitlyprioritizedwhatwemightcallthefirstpersonalityofthe

phenomenologicalmethodoverthenaverealistmethodofmostsocalled

naturalists.ThenaturalisticmethodMerleauPontyandHusserl(nottomention

Heidegger)opposeisthatoftakingtheworldassomethingfirstselfconstituted,so

tospeak,andthenlaterexperiencedornotexperienced,dependingoncausal

conditionsthatobtainbetweensubjectsandtheworldasobject.InMerleau

Pontyswayofthinking,humansubjectivity,orspiritbroadlyspeaking,bearsan

intrinsicrelationwiththeworlditlivesthrough,perceives,andunderstands,butat

thesametime,itisalienatedfromthisworldatalevelwhichsuggestsatwistingor

breakingapart(dehiscence)attherootlevelofbeingitself.MerleauPontysanalysis

ofnatureandphenomenologymarksaturntowardswhatIcallMerleauPontys

seminaturalisticversionofthephenomenologicalproject;naturalisticbecause

itsituateshumansubjectivityorspiritintermsthatinscribeitinalargermatrixof

being,butonlyseminaturalisticbecauseitisnotthefullblownorreductive

naturalismofakindthat,onceagain,bothHusserlandMerleauPontyvigorously

opposed.


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ChapterOne:HusserlsTranscendentalPhenomenologyinIdeasI28:TheBasicPosition

I.Introduction:IdeasIandtheProjectofTranscendentalPhenomenology

IdeasIdemandsourattentionbothfortheboldnessandoriginalityofits

ideasandforbeinganundeniablemilestoneinHusserlscareeraswellasa

watershedmomentinthehistoryofthephenomenologicalmovement.Itisthefirst

textinwhichHusserl,theeffectivefounderofthemovementasweknowittoday,29

formallyintroducessomeofhismostfamousanddistinctivetheories,includingthe

phenomenologicaltranscendentalepochandthephenomenologicaltranscendental

reduction.30Italsocontainspreliminaryattemptsatarigorousdefinitionof

28Thefulltitleoftheworkis IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy(FirstBook).Iwillrefertoitthroughoutthistextas IdeasIforshort,asiscommonpractice.29Brentano,Husserlsteacher,revivedthemedievalnotionofintentionalityandpracticedarudimentary(andarguablypsychological)formofwhathetermedphenomenology,butHusserlsLogicalInvestigationsandIdeasIaregenerallycreditedforinitiatingtheschoolknowntodayasphenomenology,thoughHeideggers1927workBeingandTimealsocontributedstronglytothewaytheideaofphenomenologyeventuallycametobereceivedandinterpreted.30Husserlsometimesmakesastrongdistinctionbetweenthephenomenologicalandthetranscendentalreductions,whichissomethingIwillbringupagainbelow(IID)withrespectto

HusserlsfamousEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleonphenomenology.ButinIdeasI,hetreatsthemashavingthesameextension,onlyreferringtodifferentaspectsofasingleprocess.Thushedistinguishesthemasfollows:...weshall,onmostoccasions,speakofphenomenologicalreductions(butalso,withreferencetotheircollectiveunity,weshallspeakof thephenomenologicalreduction)and,accordingly,fromanepistemologicalpointofview[myitalicshere],weshallrefertotranscendentalreductions.(IdeasI,66)Inotherwords,thedistinctionasgivenhereismerelyoneofperspective,andaccordinglyIwilloftenusethetwotermsphenomenologicalreductionandtranscendentalreductioninterchangeably,exceptwhentheexpositiondemandsthattheytemporarilybeunderstoodasdistinct.(Whatgoesforthereductioninthiscasegoesfortheepochaswell,fortheyarecompanionconcepts.)


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phenomenologyasdistinctfromothersciences(naturalandhuman)andthe

introductionoftheterminology(noesisandnoema,naturalandtranscendental

attitudes,constitution)socharacteristicofHusserlssubsequenttechnical

phenomenologicaldiscussions.Itis,then,easilyonparinimportancewithHusserls

earlierandsimilarlypathbreakingLogicalInvestigations.31

YetevenincomparisontootherpublishedtextsbyHusserl,IdeasIisnota

particularlyeasytexttounderstandorunpack.Itishighlyabstractandrarely

pausestoexplainthesignificanceorphilosophicalcontextofitsanalyses,takingthis

backgroundmoreorlessforgranted.AsPaulRicoeurpointsout,themotivationsof

thework,rootedinaconfrontationwithskepticism,arebestdiscernedthrough

unpublishedtextsandlecturesfromtheperiodbetween1905and1913,aswellas

withthehelpofthewritingsofHusserlsremarkableassistantEugenFink.32Indeed,

theactualtextofIdeasIreadsattimeslikeastarterstrainingmanual,inthiscase

forthepracticeofanewphenomenologicalmethodofthinkingandanalysis.Yetthe

manualisalsoarecordofselfdiscoveryandhasthefeelofaworkinprogress,as

Husserlwashimselfworkingthroughmanyofitsideasandtheirimplications,not

allofwhich,asisclearfromhislaterintroductorytexts,arefullyworkedoutinits

pages.

31Husserl,Edmund.LogicalInvestigations.Trans.J.N.Findlay.London:Routledge,1900/01(2nd,revisededition1913)(HereafterLI)32InRicoeurswords:Finally,itmustbesaidthat IdeasIisabookwhosemeaningremainsconcealedandthatoneisinevitablyinclinedtolookforitsmeaningelsewhere.See:Ricoeur,Paul.AKeytoEdmundHusserlsIdeasI.Trans.BondHarrisandJacquelineBouchardSpurlock.(Trans.revisedbyPolVandevelde,ed.)Milwaukee:MarquetteUniversityPress,1996(pp.367)HereafterKey.RicoeurreliesheavilyontheHusserlapprovedessaybyFink,DiephnomenologischePhilosophieEdmundHusserlsindergegenwrtigenKritik(1933),tofillinsomeofthegapsleftbyHusserlhimself.MerleauPontywastodothesamelateron.


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ItwouldbeimpossibletocondenseallofIdeasIinthespaceofonechapter,

letalonetoshowhowitbuildsonHusserlsconsiderableoutputbeforeits

publication,orforthatmatterhowhisstilllaterthinkingrelatestoIdeasI.Indeed,

IdeasIiswrittenwithreadershipoftheLIlargelybeingpresumed.Certainofthe

lattersideasarerevisitedanewintentionality,forexamplewhileothersare

enfoldedimplicitlyintothesubstanceofnewerreflections.33Itisnecessaryforthe

purposesofthepresentworkforustosketchoutIdeasIsmainargument(ifthisis

therightword)anditsbasicorientationtowardssomeofthefundamentalquestions

itposestoitself,concerningespecially:thenatureofconsciousnessandthe

relationshipofconsciousnesstotheworld;thedefinitionofphenomenologyasa

transcendental(aswellaseidetic)sciencethateschewsthenaturalattitude

whileseekingtoexplainitscontents;theideasoftranscendenceand

immanence;andthequestionofthescopeandmeaningofthephenomenological

epochandreduction,thelatterquestionbearingofcourseonthecentralissueof

thephenomenologicalmethod.Theseareallinterrelatedquestions;indeed,one

mightevengosofarastosay(inHeideggerianstyleperhaps)thattheyarethe

samequestion.Forroughly,theyallconcerntheunderlyingrelationshipof

consciousnesstoworldor,putinanotherway,subjectivityandnature.Wecannot

33Forexample,inIdeasIHusserltakesforgrantedthenotionthatphenomenologydealswithactsofconsciousness,whosemeaningintentionsareeitheremptyorfulfilled.ThisprincipleisofcoursefoundationaltoHusserlsideasonperception.Forexample,whileIcanseeorintendonesideofadie,Igenerallyalsointenditshiddensidesaswell.Theformerintentionisfulfilledbyintuitiveevidencethegivennessofthedieinitscolor,shape,etc.,asitshowsitselftomevisually.Thelattersignitiveintentionsarenotfulfilledandarethusemptyunlessoruntilothersidesofthedieareseenbyme.ThedistinctionisimportantforitallowsHusserltoexplainhowitisthatweperceivethedieandnotmerelythissideofthedie.Weperceiveobjects,inotherwords,notmerelyprofiles.ThisisoneofHusserlsstrategies,sotosay,forovercomingtheappearancerealitydividethathashamperedprevioustheoriesofperception.


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hopetodofulljusticetothemanyanglesonemightusetoapproachandaddress

Husserlsmultifacetedanswertothesequestions.Totakeoneexample,wewillhave

toglossoverthesignificantcontroversiessurroundingHusserlsconceptofthe

noema34orofitsrelationtofulfilment.35Nonetheless,manyofthesortsof

fundamentalproblemsthatariseinsuchdebateswillbetouchedoninother

sectionsoftheoverviewprovidedbelow.Thisoverview,alongwithsome

independentcommentaryandbriefreferencestosomeofthesecondaryliterature

onIdeasI,willconstitutethebulkofthischapter.

YetgiventherelativelyintermediarystatusofIdeasIinthecourseof

Husserlsownlifelongtask(fromIdeasIonward)ofexplainingtranscendental

phenomenology,itmightstillbewonderedwhyweareconcentratinginthischapter

onthisparticulartext.MerleauPonty,forexample,regardedIdeasIasabelonging

toamiddleortransitionperiodbetweenHusserlslogicism,presumably

culminatingintheLogicalInvestigations,andthelatersupposedexistentialismof

34Thisquestionhasbeenwrittenaboutendlessly,especiallyincontextofthedebatebetweenthosewhointerpretthenoemaaspercept(Gurwitsch,Cairns,etal.)andthose,leadchieflybyFllesdal,whointerpretitasavariantofFregesSinn.Foranicerecapofthedebate,see:Solomon,RobertC.HusserlsConceptoftheNoema.InHusserl:ExpositionsandAppraisals,FrederickA.EllistonandPeterMcCormack,eds.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1977(pp.5469).Solomonbeginshisessaybynoting:Itisgenerallyagreedthattheconceptofthe noemaisoneofthethemes,ifnotthecentraltheme,ofHusserlsphenomenologicalphilosophy.J.N.Mohantyisseeminglyin

perfectagreementwhenhemakesapassingreferencetotheallimportantideaofnoemaandnoeticnoematicstructure,regardedbymanyasconstitutingthemostimportantandoriginalpartof[IdeasI].(Mohanty,J.N.ThePhilosophyofEdmundHusserl:AHistoricalDevelopment.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2008,p.372)Anothertopicwewillhavetoleaveout,thoughinthiscasebecauseitisalmostwhollyabsentfromtheIdeasitself,isthetopicoftimeconstitution,whichlaterfiguresdeeplyinallofHusserlsmostadvancedanalyses.35Foranexcellentsummaryofthedebate,seePolVandeveldesintroductiontoKey(pp.1620).AlsoofnoteisRicoeursremark,inspiredalsobythedifficultiessurroundingthenoema,andquotedbyVandeveldeintheintroduction,thatthus,realityalwaysseemstoescapetranscendentalconstitution.


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thelifeworldphilosophy,bestknownthroughtheCrisis.36Givensuchviews,why

notreviewHusserlslaterreformulationsofmuchofthismaterial?Moreover,as

mentionedabove,Husserlhimselflateradmitstothedisadvantagesthoughnot

necessarilyinadequaciesoftheCartesianwaytothereductionpresentedherein.

Healsodevelopedanewformofphenomenology,geneticordynamic

phenomenology,whichsupplements(andsomesaysupplants)thestatic

phenomenologyofIdeasI.

Thefactremains,however,thatHusserlhimselfnevertotallyabandoned

eitherthestaticortheCartesianphenomenologicalmethod.Regardingthelatter,

forexample,nolessthantheauthoroftheheterodoxtextTheOtherHusserl,Donn

Weltonnotesthat[t]heexistenceoftheCartesianMeditations,andthefactthat

[Husserl]recommendeditsFrenchtranslationtoreadersaslateas1933evenashe

begandevelopingthetextoftheCrisisconvincesusthat[theCartesianwaytothe

reduction]wasneveroverthrown.37Furthermore,Husserlneverabandonedthe

basicframeworkoftranscendentalsubjectivityanditswhollynonnaturalistic

essence.IdeasIpresentsabroadlyfaithfulpictureofthebasicthrustof

transcendentalphenomenology,andthisfact,combinedwithitshistorical

importanceandthefactthatitistheprequeltoIdeasII,atextequallyifnotmore

vitalforourtask,are,Ibelieve,enoughtorecommenditfordetailedinvestigationat

thepresenttime.

36SeeMerleauPonty,Maurice.ThePhenomenologyofPerception.Tr.ColinSmith.NewYork:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1962(p.320n).CrisisreferstoHusserlstextTheCrisisofEuropeanSciencesandTranscendentalPhenomenology:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenologicalPhilosophy.Trans.DavidCarr.Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,1970.37Welton,Donn.TheOtherHusserl:TheHorizonsofTranscendentalPhenomenology.Indianapolis:IndianaUniversityPress,2000(p.118).HereafterWelton.


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II.EpochandPhenomenologicalReduction

A.Introduction

TheheartofIdeasI,andprobablythesignatureofphenomenologyitselfasit

ispopularlyknown,isthephenomenologicalreduction.Itisallbutimpossibleto

giveabriefdefinitionofit,butanyaccountmustbeginwiththeconceptofepoch

orthesuspensionorbracketingofallonesbeliefsregardingexternalexistence

oftheobjectsofperception(andofcourseofanyothermentalact).Throughthisall

importantsuspension,oneeffectsaradicallynewattitude,thephenomenological

attitude,accordingtowhichtheworldisseentobeasitisfortheconsciousness,or

subjectivity,thatbeholdsit.Inthisway,allobjectiverealityisreducedtoits

significanceforconsciousnessor,alternately,toitsmeaningfulnessasa

noematiccorrelatetothenoeticactsofaconsciousnessinwhichtheworldis

constituted.38

Thejargonladendefinitiongivenabovemust,however,becarefully

explained.Furthermore,manypossiblemisinterpretationsmustbeobviatedat

leastregardingHusserlsownintentionssuchastheinterpretationofthe

reductionasbeingameanstoexposetheillusorinessoftheexternalreality.Thisis

notatallHusserlsintentionorreflectiveofhisactualview.Atthesametime,it

38Thislanguagewillbeexplainedbelow(IVA).NotethatthetermreductiondoesnothavethemodernmeaningofreductivenessforHusserl;thereisnoquestionhereofconvertingobjectiverealityintoasubjectivesubstratum.Reducemeans,etymologically,tobringorleadback,andthisisHusserlsintendedmeaning.Thereductionleadsbackaconsciousnessthatlosesitselfinitsworldbacktoitsownachievementsasasensebestowingandworldconstitutingbeing.


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cannotbedeniedthatHusserldidinsomesenseprioritizesubjectivityoverobjective

reality.Husserldidnotdenytheexistenceofsuchareality,butaswewillsee,

underthereductionitacquiresawhollynewsensenamely,thatofbeingthesense

mindindependentreality(alongwithinnumerableothersenseswhichgivethe

worlditsintelligibility).Toputitanother(unHusserlian)way,whilewecansay

thatthereisaworldthattranscendsthemind,itonlydoessoforthemind,39

acquiringitsmeaningfulnessassuchatranscendentbeinginthiswayalone.Thus,it

caninacertainwaybecalledindependent(initsexistence,orthatness)fromthe

mindinonewayandyetwhollydependentonit(foritsmeaning,orwhatness)in

another.Consciousnessitselfinitspurifiedandtranscendentalformis,by

contrast,dependentonnothing.Anditissolelybecauseofthisasymmetry,andnot

becauseofsomesupposednonexistenceofexternalreality,thatHusserlcalls

consciousness(asopposedtothetranscendentworldassuch)absolute.Allof

thesenotionswillbefurtherexploredindividually,however,inPartIVbelow.

Inthesectionsthatfollow,Iwillproceedtodescribethereductionasitis

outlinedinIdeasI.Alongtheway,Iwillbeflaggingsomeofthemostsignificantand

controversialissuesofinterpretation,aswellaspossibleinconsistencies,mysteries,

orambiguitiesinHusserlsaccount,whichcanbe(andusuallyalreadyhavebeen)

raised.Indoingso,itisinevitablethatsomecommentarybemixedwithpure

description(contrarytothespiritofHusserlsownmethodology!)evenbeforethe

39Iwillattimesusethewordmindforconsciousness,despitethepotentialhazardsthatcometherewith.Mindcaneasilybereified,whereasbyconsciousness(Bewusststein)HusserlmeansanythingbutanobjectorsubstanceintheclassicalCartesiansense.Nonetheless,itiscumbersometousethewordconsciousnesssolelytotranslateBewusststein,andhencesynonymswilloccasionally,thoughcautiouslybeused.


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finalsection,whichisprimarilycommentary.Butmyunderlyinggoalistopresent

HusserlsconceptionofthereductionasaccuratelyasIcan,andfurthermorewith

minimalrecoursetojargon(thoughHusserlis,afterall,coiningmanynewterms

here),andinawaythatisatleastplausibleasaninterpretationofjustwhatHusserl

wasafter.Nonetheless,extendedquotationsareoccasionallycalledfor,asmuchis

tobegained(andclarified)throughadirectexaminationofHusserlsprecise

phraseologyofhisownmainideas.

B.TheNaturalandtheTranscendentalAttitudes

Thestoryofthereduction,sotospeak,beginswithadescriptionofthe

naturalattitude.40Sowhat,then,isthenaturalattitude?Itwouldhelptobeginby

contrastingitwithwhatHusserlalternativelycallsthephilosophical,

phenomenological,andtranscendentalattitudes(allofthesebeingequivalentin

thecurrentcontext).41Thenaturalattitudeisthedefault,normalattitudeinwhich

wetacitlyornontacitlyframeour(mostlyperceptual)experiences;thealternative

attitudeisoneinwhichwehavedisengagedfromthepresuppositionsofthenatural

attitude,particularlyregardingobjectiveexistenceandnonexistence,andhave

takenupanewappreciationoftheoriginsofmeaningfulexperienceinthedepthsof

40Ofcourse,whatispossiblymostcontroversialaboutthereductionishowitcanbebegunatall,butwewillcometothatlater(PartV).41ThispictureofattitudeswillbecomeimportantlyexpandedandenrichedinIdeasII,inwhichthenaturalattitudeisdividedintopersonalisticandnaturalisticforms.Thesewillbediscussedcloselyinthenextchapter.


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subjectivityinourselves:Imustlosetheworldbyepoch,inordertoregainitby

auniversalselfexamination.42

ButwhatdoesHusserlmeanbyattitude(Einstellung)?Amazingly,Husserl

nowheredefineshistechnicalusageoftheterminthetextoftheIdeas(or

anywhere,asfarasIcantell),perhapsowingtoitsstatusasbasictounderstanding

thereductionitself.Fornow,wewillseehowHusserlusestheterm;wewillreturn

tothequestionofhowitmightbestbedefinedattheendofthissection.

Todescribethenaturalattitude,Husserlpresentsaseriesofobservationsof

whatexperienceinthisattitudeconsistsin:

Iamconsciousofaworldendlesslyspreadoutinspace,endlesslybecomingandhavingendlesslybecomeintime.Iamconsciousofit:thatsignifies,aboveall,thatintuitivelyIfinditimmediately,thatIexperienceit.Bymyseeing,touching,hearing,andsoforth,andinthedifferentmodesofsensuousperception,corporealphysicalthingsaresimplythereforme,onhandintheliteralandfigurativesense43

Inthenaturalattitude,hecontinues,we[are]humanbeingswhoareliving

naturally,objectivating,judging,feeling,willing.44Butanimatebeingsandpeople

arethereformealso:Ilookup;IseethemIgrasptheirhands45

Thenaturalattitudeisnaturalfirstofallinthesenseofitseveryday

pervasivenessaswellasitsdefaultcharacter.Itcomestousnaturally.Roughly,

then,wecancharacterizethisasaconditioninwhichweasnormal,adulthuman

beingsfindourselvesroutinelyandasitwereautomatically,justinsofarasweare

42Husserl,Edmund.CartesianMeditations:AnIntroductiontoPhenomenology.Trans.DorionCairns.Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999(p.157).HereafterCM.43IdeasI,p.5144Ibid.,p.5145Ibid.,p.51


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aliveandawake(andmaybeasleepanddreamingaswell),inwhichweperceive

theretobeobjects,aswellaspeopleandvaluecharacteristicsofthings,toexist

outsideusandonhand.Husserlstressesthattheworldasweknowitinthe

naturalattitudeisnotsimplytheworldofscienceoramaterialworld;thuswe

naturallyperceiveaworldofobjectswithvalues,aworldofgoods,apractical

world46Intermsofmaterialobjects,weperceivenotsimply(orvirtuallyever,

unlesswearescientistsinascientificattitude)matter,butthingsliketables

andpianosobjectswithculturalmeaningaccretions.Thenaturalattitudeisalso

oneinwhichwethinkandcogitate,atleastintheeveryday(non

phenomenological!)way.47Butmostpertinentlywithregardtothe

phenomenologicalepoch,inthenaturalattitudeweaccepttheworldasafactually

existentactualityandalsoacceptitasitpresentsitselfto[us]asfactuallyexisting.48

Empiricalscienceanditsmodeofcognitionpertaintothisworld,preciselytakenas

existentinthesenseoutlined.Hencescience(asanactivityandaformofthought)

itselfbelongstothenaturalattitude,afactHusserlnevertiresofexploitingtothe

advantageofphilosophyasheconceivesit.

Husserlregardshisdescriptionofthenaturalattitudeaspretheoretical;that

is,itisnotaconstruct,butsimplywhatisdirectlyintuitedtobethecaseabout

natural,nontranscendentalexperience:

46Ibid.,p.53(Husserlsitalics)47Ibid.,p.5348Ibid,p.57(Husserlsitalics)


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Whatwepresentedasacharacterizationofthegivennessbelongingtothenaturalattitude,andthereforeasacharacterizationoftheattitudeitself,wasapieceofpuredescriptionpriortoanytheory.49

Hethennotesthatbytheorieshemeanspreconceivedopinionsofeverysort.

Husserlclaimstokeeptheseatadistancestrictly,astancehemaintains

throughouthiscareer,inkeepingwithhiscommitmenttogotothethings

themselvesandbypassthecorruptinginfluenceofpresuppositionsofanykind.

(Hencehisfamousandfamouslyimperileddreamofdevelopinga

presuppositionlessscience.)ButwhileHusserlsdescriptionofthenaturalattitude

maybepretheoretical,itismorethanapparentfromitthatwe,insofaraswedwell

inthenaturalattitude,areallatypeofnaverealist,tousethemodernparlance.

Thus,Husserlsunderstandingofthenaturalattitudemaybestbeunderstood

throughasimpleconsiderationofwhatsomebodyunbiasedby,say,fancy

metaphysicaltheoriesunderstandshimselftobeexperiencingeveryday,inthemost

thoroughlyordinarysenseimaginable,asalivinghumanbeing.Itisthisthoroughgoingaverageness,thebasicmediocrityofexistence,thatHusserl

continuallycontrastswiththedisconcertingandvertiginousheightsofthe

transcendentalattitude.ItisnotasthoughHusserldismissesnaturalexperience;to

thecontrary,thewholepurposeofphenomenologyistounderstandit.Itisjustthis

embraceoftheordinarythatdistinguishesphenomenologyfrommorespeculative

sortsofphilosophicalendeavors.Andyetthereisatranscendental,noetic

noematicdimensionofmeaningconstitution,arealminwhichordinaryexperience

becomesclarifiedintermsofitssourceandtruemeaning.Itisthrough

49Ibid.,p.56


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transcendentalinvestigationthatnaturalconsciousnesscomestoknowthe

foundationsoftheexperientialityittakesnavelyforgranted.(Iwillexplorethe

transcendentallevelinsubsequentsections.)SebastianLufthelpfullyframesthe

natural/transcendentaldistinctionintermsoftheclassicaldivisionbetweendoxa

andepisteme:

WhenHusserlconceivesofthenaturalinoppositiontothephilosophicalattitude,thisechoesthedistinctionbetweenpretranscendentalandtranscendentalstandpointsasamodernversionofthedoxa/epistemedistinction.ThetranscendentalturnanticipatedbyDescartes,andtakenbyKant,appliestherealizationofthesubjectrelativityoftheworld.Theturntothesubject,thereductiontotheego(cogito),becomesthefoundationofscience.Theworldisnotanabsolutebeing,butis

relativetotheexperiencingsubject.(Luft2034)

Hefurtherexplains:

Thedistinctionofdoxaandepistemetranslatedintothisconceptionmeans:Philosophythatbelievesitcanoperateonarealisticlevelisboundtothenaturalattitudeanditcannotbecriticalinthetranscendentalsense.ThisisnotonlyHusserlscritiqueofpretranscendentalphilosophybutespeciallyofhispupilswhoneglectedtopursuethetranscendentalpaththathehadtakenupwithIdeasI(1913).50

Luftsexplanationisuseful,butitmustbekeptinmind,afactIwillcomebackto

lateron,thatinadditiontobeingdoxicasopposedtoepistemic,thenatural

attitudeforHusserlisafalsedoxa,awrongview.Thisisimportantbecausethe

naturalattitudesnaverealismisnotonlynavebut,preciselyinshowinga

blind[ness]tothecorrelativityofworldandexperience,(Luft,208)itwrongly

pronouncesagainstjustthiscorrelativity,falsely(thoughtacitly)affirming,asLuft

pointsout,theworldsabsoluteexistence.

50Luft,Sebastian.HusserlsTheoryofthePhenomenologicalReduction:BetweenLifeWorldandCartesianism.InResearchinPhenomenology34,2004(p.204)Hereafter,Luft.


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Letusfirstreturntotheinitialquestionofwhatanattitudeissupposedto

beinthefirstplace.IfwetakeHusserlforhisword,anattitudecannotbe

explainedmerelyasapsychologicalstate,astheword(inEnglish)isroutinelytaken

todenote.Afterall,onlythenaturalattitudeproperlydeservestobecalled

psychological,asHusserlhimselfonoccasiondoescallit.51Anattitude,then,I

propose,mightbestbedefinedastheorientationinwhichtheparametersof

experiencearedelimitedanddefined.Inthenaturalattitude,theseparametersare

defined,sotospeak,bytheinternalandexternalhorizonsoftranscendentthings

(andthehalosthatformthebackgroundinwhichweperceivethem),bypeople

andlivingbeings,byvariousactsoffantasyandmemory,andtoanextentbyour

selfperception(andhenceourownegos).Butinthetranscendentalattitude,these

parametersshifttosomethingnew,afieldofconstitution,aswellastothe

transcendentalegoorpureconsciousnessinwhichallworldlybeings,including

theempiricalego,arethemselvesconstituted(inwhichtheycometobeing).52A

shiftinattitudeisthusashiftoftheentirematrixofintelligibilityofthingsa

prefiguring,perhaps,ofHeideggerslaterconceptofworld.53

51Ibid.,p.126:Inourcasewehave,accordingly,ontheonehand,the psychologicalattitudeinwhichournaturallyfocusedregardisdirectedtomentalprocessese.g.toamentalprocessofrejoicingasasequenceofmentalstatesofhumanorbeast.Ontheotherhand,wehavethephenomenologicalattitude(Husserlsitalics)Seealsop.172forfurtherclarificationofwhatthepsychological

attitudeinvolves.52ItistruethatHusserldoesnotrestrictthetermattitudetothecontrastofnaturalandtranscendentalattitudes:healsospeaksoftheeideticattitude,thenaturalscientificattitude,etc..Onemaystillapplyourdefinition,however:forexample,intheeideticattitudetheparametersofexperienceareessences,ratherthanfacts.(Itneedstobeunderstood,ofcourseasIwilldiscussbelowthatthetranscendentalattitudepresupposestheeidetic,whilethenaturalmayormaynotoverlapwitheideticattitude.)53IamindebtedtoDr.PolVandeveldeforthislanguageofparametersandintelligibility,aswellastohisunderstandingofHeideggersconceptionofaworld,thoughIwouldnotpresumetosayhewouldendorsemyapplicationoftheseconceptsunderthesecircumstances.


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C.PhenomenologicalEpoch

Husserlbeginshisshiftintothenewattitudebynoticingthat,contrarytoits

spiritoftotalselfconfidence,thenaturalattitudehassomeansweringtodo.For

therearepresuppositionstoitspsychologicalexperience54thatremainsofar

unexploredandunknown(tonaturalconsciousnessitself).Husserlwantsto

investigatethese.Herenowaradicalalterationiscalledfor:anewstyleof

attitudeisneededwhichisentirelyalteredincontrasttothenaturalattitudein

experiencingandthenaturalattitudeinthinking.55Inordertodemonstratethis

transformation,HusserlcallsfatefullyupontheexampleofDescartesandthelatters

MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.Subsequently,thewaytothereductionoutlinedin

IdeasIistypicallycalledtheCartesianway.Husserlcertainlybelievedthat

Descarteshadopenedthewaytoawhollynewfieldofbeing,whichHusserlhimself

callstranscendentalsubjectivity,buthealsobelievedthatDescartesdidnot

properlyunderstandhisownachievementandhencefellawayfromthenewperch

almostassoonashereachedit,aswewillseebelow.

HusserlexploitstheCartesianmethodofdoubtinanewandoriginalway.

Throughhisownconfrontationwithskepticism,Descartesenactedthisfamous

methodinordertoreachthefoundationofknowledge,theselfcertainIthink,I

am(cogito).Husserlnowpracticesavariationofthismethodinordertoreacha

similarlyselfevidentsphere,somethingheisabouttocallasphereofpure

consciousnessorimmanence.ButHusserldoesnotwanttoactuallydoubtanything,

certainlynottheindubitableexistenceoftheworld(whichisalwayspresupposedin

54IdeasI,xix55Ibid.,xix


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consciousnessasitsultimatehorizon).Whatheisinterestedinistheattemptat

doubt.Forwhilewecannotdoubtcertainthings,wecanattempttodoubtanything

whatever,nomatterhowfirmlyconvincedofit,evenassuredofitinanadequate

evidence,wemaybe.56Thenatureofsuchanact,theattemptatdoubt,isto

hypotheticallyplacetheexistenceofthatwhichisdoubtedintometaphorical

bracketsorparentheses.Iteffectsacertainannulmentofpositingandprecisely

thisinterestsus.Thereisnoquestionofnegatingthatwhichexists,i.e.denyingits

existence.Butthereisasuddenneutralitywithregardtothisentirequestion

somethingwhollypeculiar.57Thequestionoftheexistenceofthingsissuddenly

putoutofaction,andinmywords,intoakindofpurgatorialmaybethat

neverthelessallowsonetofocusonsomethingelseinthiscase,onthemannersof

givennessofthings.Thisnewfocus58automaticallyimplicatesthemasexperienced

bysomeone,i.e.,showsthemintheirselfgivenness.

Aswehavesaid,theparenthesizingofpositingsofexistenceiswhatis

calledtheepoch.Morespecifically,thereareseveraltypesofepoch.Whatisat

issuenow,however,isnot,forexample,thekindofepochonespeaksofinregards

tothebracketingoffeaturesunrelatedtothestudyathand(forexample,a

scientistbracketsallvaluepredicatesofphysicalobjectsandfocusesontheir

spatiotemporaldeterminationssolely,aphenomenologicalpsychologistbracketsall

materialorbiochemicalaspectsofanlivingorganism,etc.),butratherthefulland

56Ibid.,p.5857Ibid.,p.5858ItmightbenotedthatthissortoflanguagechangingfocuswouldnotreallybesufficientforHusserltocapturetheradicalityofthenewattitude,sinceitisitselfborrowedfromexperiencewithinthenaturalattitude.


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totalbracketingofthequestionofexistence(ornonexistence)oftheentireworld

(includingevenoneselfinsofarasoneispartoftheworld,thoughthiscomes

later)thethesisoftheworld(Weltthesis).Butcanweeffectaglobalepochof

thissort?Canweputthewholeofrealityinbrackets?Thisisaquestionwewill

comebacktoattheendofthischapter.

D.Phenomenological-TranscendentalReduction(s)

ThebracketingoftranscendentthingsisnotforHusserlsufficient,however,

toreachthetranscendentalego.59Itonlygoesasfarassealingthepsycheofffrom

whatmightbecalled(fromanaturalattitudinalstandpoint,anyway)theexternal

world.ItisherethatHusserlmakesanotherinterestingdeparturefromDescartes.

Theego,too[is]arealObjectlikeothersinthenaturalworld.60Thisisnottrue

onlyinthesensethatIhaveaphysicalbody,butalsointhesensethatIeffect

cogitationes,actsofconsciousnessinboththebroaderandthenarrowersenseand

theseacts,asbelongingtothehumansubject,areoccurrenceswithinthesame

naturalactuality.61(Thisprincipleofthenaturalityofpsychicasopposedto

transcendentalconsciousnesswillonceagainbecomeacentralthemeinIdeasII.)

Inlaterwritings,Husserldistinguishesbetweenthephenomenologicalreduction

andthetranscendentalreduction,characterizingthelatterasafurtherstep

beyondtheformer,preciselyintermsofthefurtherbracketingoftheego.The

phenomenologicalreductiononthisunderstandingeffectsauniversalepochonthe

59Moreissaidaboutthisconceptinthissectionbelow.60IdeasI,p.6461Ibid.


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naturalworld,butnotupontheegoitself.Henceitisareductiontowhatmightbe

calledphenomenologicalpsychologyortheintentionallifeofconsciousness,but

withoutanexplicitrecognitiononlytobesuppliedthroughthefinal,

transcendentalreductionoftheultimatesourceofmeaning,thetranscendental

ego:

Ifthetranscendentalrelativityofeverypossibleworlddemandsanallembracingbracketing,italsopostulatesthebracketingofpurepsychesandthepurephenomenologicalpsychologyrelatedtothem.

Andso,

Accordingly,theconsistentreflectiononconsciousnessyieldshimtimeaftertimetranscendentallypuredata,andmoreparticularlyitisintuitiveinthemodeofnewkindofexperience,transcendentalinnerexperience.62

InIdeasI,Husserllatercomestounderstandthesetwodistinctstepstohavebeen

conflated.63Onceitiskeptinmind,however,itissufficientforourpurposestokeep

thembothascomprisingwhatHusserltreatsinIdeasIasasingle

phenomenologicalreductionareductiontophenomenologicalconsciousness

and,therewith,thetranscendentalego.

Husserlsbracketingofthe(empirical)egoisamajordevelopmentthat,in

Husserlsunderstanding,distinguisheshisownmethod,atthispoint,from

62ThesequotesarefromHusserlsEncyclopaediaBritannicaarticleof1928(trans.RichardE.Palmer),reproducedinfullin:Kockelmanns,JosephJ.EdmundHusserlsPhenomenology.Indianapolis:PurdueUniversityPress,1994(p.209)KockelmannssourceforthetranslationisHusserl:ShorterWorks.McCormackandElliston,eds.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1981(pp.2135).63Seefn.3,above.


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Descartes.64Forthereductiondoesnotretreatintoaprivatecogitooritstheater

ofconsciousness;neitherdoesitmerelyseizeontheessenceofconsciousness,when

takeninthemundanesense(thisisstillthetaskofpsychology).

Evenmoreinaccessibletohim[Descartes],andnaturallyso,wastheconsiderationthattheegoasitisdisclosedwithintheepoch,existingforitself,isasyetnotatallanegowhichcanhaveotherormanyfellowegosoutsideitself.ItremainedhiddenfromDescartesthatallsuchdistinctionsasIandyou,insideandoutside,firstconstitutethemselvesintheabsoluteego.65

HusserlunderstandsDescartestohavecorrectlydiscoveredtheabsolute

egoastheindubitableultimatumoftranscendentalinquiry,onlytohavethen

misinterpretedhisowndiscoveryinanimportantway.Inparticular,hefailedto

properlygraspthenatureoftheIoftheselfcertainIthink,Iam.66TheIin

questionisnotme,Descartesorevensomepossibleindividualempiricalego,atleast

notquapsychophysicalbeing,butrathertranscendentalsubjectivitynota

thinkingsubjectbutthethinkerassuch,transcendentallyconsidered,forwhomand

inwhomanentireworldisconstitutedand,hence,availableinfullselfevidence

formyknowingregard.Furthermore,whileHusserlendorsesDescartesthesisthat

theIisinsomewaymorecertainthantheveryquestionoftheexistenceofthe

world,helamentsthelattersfailuretoseethattheworldisstillpreservedasa

phenomenoninthereduction.WhatDescartesfundamentallymisunderstoodisthat

theindubitableselfisnotthemereegopoleofconsciousnessorevenpsychic

empiricalconsciousnessitself.Itistranscendentalsubjectivity.67

64IdeasI,p.6865Ibid.,p.8266MyitalicsontheCartesianquote67Crisis,p.81.OnecanalsoseeherethelanguageofDescartesselfmisinterpretation.


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Yetwhatremainsafterthereductionisnonethelessastreamofmentallife.

Isthisthenotorioustranscendentalego?JustwhatHusserlmeansbythe

transcendentalegoisoneoftheverydifficultproblemstosolveinHusserl

scholarship.AccordingtoDavidBell,thetranscendentalegoisnothingbutthe

ordinary,commonorgardenmind,albeitviewedfromwithinaphilosophicalor

transcendentalperspective.Insupportofthisthesishecitesthefollowingpassage

fromtheCrisis:Astranscendentalego,afterall,Iamthesameegothatinthe

worldlysphereisahumanego.WhatwasconcealedfrommeinthehumansphereI

revealthroughtranscendentalenquiry.68Inthisspirit,wewouldperhapsnotdo

badlytounderstandthetranscendentalegoofIdeasIastheselfquatranscendental

sphereofnoetic-noematicconsciousness,withallofitsactsandintentionalobjects

included,andunderstoodtoconstituteitselfthroughthelawsoftemporality

(thoughHusserlelaboratesonthislastpartlater).Ofcourse,thisdefinitionmight

seemtoconflictwithHusserlsenigmaticpostIdeasIclaimthatthemeaningof

transcendentalsubjectivityistranscendentalintersubjectivity.69Butwewillhaveto

presentlyleavethatcomplexissueaside.

68Bell,David.Husserl.NewYork:Routlege,1990(p.207),hereafterBell;theHusserlquotecanbefoundinCrisis,p.26469ThesubtitleoftheFifthMeditationofthe CM(p.89)statesthepointdirectly:Uncoveringofthe

SphereofTranscendentalBeingasMonadologicalIntersubjectivity.TherecanbenoquestionbutthatHusserlviewsintersubjectivityhere(andfortherestofhiscareer)astheauthenticmeaningoftranscendentalsubjectivity.Thetranscendentalegoisnotayouorme,butneitherisitanempiricalcommunity(asthiscouldleadtorelativism,oneofHusserlsavowedenemies),butsomehowanIthatisaweinatranscendentalregister.WecannothererehearsethestepsofHusserlselaboratedescriptionofthemannerinwhichthebeingofotheregosisevincedandverifiedintherealmofthetranscendentalego.(p.90)ForadetailedexpositionandinterpretationofHusserlsviewsee:Zahavi,Dan.HusserlandTranscendentalIntersubjectivity:AResponsetotheLinguistic-PragmaticCritique.TranslatedbyElizabethA.Behnke.Athens:OhioUniversityPress,2001.(Seeespeciallypp.15966).


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E.AnInterlude:OntheMotivationoftheReduction

Beforefurtherexploringthephilosophicalandontologicalimplicationsofthe

reduction(seePartIVbelow),wemightatthisstageaskwhatactuallymotivatesit

inthefirstplace.Sofar,wehavepresentedthereductionlargelyasHusserl(inIdeas

I)himselfdoes,namelyasaprocedureforgettingatthetruthofexperienceandthe

world.ButwhatmakesHusserlthinkthisparticularmethodisnecessary,asopposed

toothers?HereitisimportanttounderstandthatHusserlfitsintoaveryold

traditioninphilosophy,namelythequestforwhatmightbecalledrealandsecure

knowledge.Alongtheselines,thephilosopherspeaksoftheelementalquestfor

freedominthiscasetheepistemicfreedomthatcanalsobedescribedasthe

freedomfromerrorandbias,illusionandemptyabstraction.Foritisthepursuitof

certainty,clarity,andfreedomfromprejudicethatconspiretoproducetheprecisely

HusserlianversionofphenomenologythatburstsforthoutofIdeasI.See,for

example,Husserlsreferencetogenuinefreedomfromprejudice70inthefirstpart,

orHusserlsowndeclarationthatthegoalofthephenomenologicalreductionsisto

reachthefreevistaoftranscendentallypurifiedphenomenaand,therewith,the

fieldofphenomenologyinourpeculiarsense.71

Whatwecangather,then,isthat(transcendental)phenomenologyis

motivatedbyathirstforacertainfreedom,inparticularafreedomfrom

presuppositions.Butiffreedomfrompresuppositionsmotivatesthereduction,what

isthissupposedtobeafreedomto?Inshort,Husserlwasinsearchofthe

foundationofknowledge.Wemustbefreefrombiasinordertogainaccesstoa

70IdeasI,p.36(myitalics)71Ibid.,xix


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securezoneofknowing,adirectaccesstoreality.Logic,science,andmathematics

makethemostvigorousclaimstoknowledgeinourandHusserlsera,butHusserl

becameconvincedthateventheyneededsecuringonamorefundamentalbasis.But

Husserlwasnotsimplyametascientist.Insteadofbeingmerelyfixatedongiving

thesesciencesafoundation,hecamealsotobefascinatedforitsownsakewiththe

realmofmeaningsinwhichconsciousnessrevealedallthingsintheiressence.He

cametoregardphilosophyunderstoodinanewandnondogmaticwayasthe

indispensablescienceandthefoundationofallknowledge.Italonebearsthe

customaryroleandtheresponsibilityofansweringtheskepticwhodeniesthe

possibilityofknowledge,andhedoesthisbyshowingthewaytoanindubitable,

undeniablesourceofapodicticevidence.Husserlsstrivingforknowledgeissodeep

andthoroughthatheiswillingtorevisehimselfruthlessly.Husserldidnotthink

philosophywasascienceamongsciencesi.e.,asjustanotherformalor

materialontologythatmakesclaimsandargumentsaboutacertainregionof

reality.Sounlikepreviousphilosophers,HusserlinlargeagreementwithKant,his

transcendentalistancestorplacedallhistrustnotinsomerealmofmetaphysical

truths,intuitedorlearnedthroughrevelation(suchasPlatonicForms,God,

AbsoluteSpirit),fromwhichtoderiveandsecureothers,butsimplyinexperience.

Philosophysroleistodrawitsevidencefromthewellofexperienceactsof

consciousnessandthethingsofwhichitisconscious(egocogitocogitatum)

throughamethodinwhicheverythingbutthispurifiedexperientialityissuspended

indefinitely,andputoutofactionforthetranscendentalgaze.


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InthiswayHusserlsphilosophicalorientation,broadlyconstrued,is

radicallyepistemological.ButthisdoesnotmeanHusserlwasconcernedwith

epistemologyinthenarrowsenseinusetodayHusserlwasnotoverlyconcerned

withdefiningknowledgeasjustifiedtruebelieforsomethingelse,forexample.

Andheisnot,onceagain,obsessedwiththesubjectivesideofknowing(noetic

phenomenology)inthewaytraditionalepistemologyis(exceptingthecausaland

externalistmodels,ofcourse),ashegivesampleattentiontothevariousobjects

thatareknown(noematicphenomenology).Itdoesmean,however,thatfor

Husserl,todiscoverhowknowledgetakesplaceisbothanecessaryandasufficient

taskforphilosophyassuch,regardedinitspurestessence.

III.EssencesandtheEideticReduction

Besidesthephenomenologicalreduction,thereisanother,nolessimportant

typeofreductionwhoseperformanceisalsonecessaryforphenomenologyas

Husserlconceivesit:theeideticreduction.HusserlbeginstheversionofIdeasI

eventuallypublishedwithatackedonbut(tohismind)crucialdiscussionofthe

eideticnatureofphenomenology,tryingtoclassifyphenomenologyamongandas

againstothersciences.Thismaterialisveryinteresting,butwecanonlytouchon

itbrieflyhere,insofarasitisrelevanttoourtask.


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Thereis,forHusserl,afundamentaldividebetweenmattersoffact(in

muchtheHumeansense)ontheonehandandessences(oreid)ontheother.72

Overlappingwiththisdistinctionisthatbetweenreality(thereal,whichistosay

factical)ortheempiricalontheonehand,andessentiality,ontheother.What

exactlyisaHusserlianessence,oreidos?Isit,forexample,auniversal?Sucha

questionmaynotbeterriblyhelpful,giventhecontestednessofthequestionof

universalsitself,butHusserlianessencesareuniversallikeinthattheyare

multiplyinstantiableandnonparticular.Thatis,theyarenotsingularintheway

existentparticularsare.However,itisnottechnicallytruetosaythattheyare

outsideofspaceandtime;theydonotsubsistlikePlatonicFormsinasupra

spatiotemporalorder,asHusserlforcefullyunderscores.73Essencesarealso

ontologicalinastrongsensethatis,theyarenotpurelylinguisticor

conventional.Wedonotdecideasacommunitywhatisorisnotanessence,at

leastaspertainstothenaturalandspiritualfurnitureoftheworld;wediscoversuch

essences.

Thecleargraspofessencesisachievedthroughamethodknownas

imaginativevariation.Intheeideticreductionwhichistobeperformedbefore

thephenomenologicalreductiononeistobracketoutallparticular,factical,and

contingentfeaturesofthingsperceived(orremembered,imagined,etc.)andtoseize

onlythosefeaturesthatbelongtotheobjectnecessarilyi.e.,thatmaketheobject

whatitis.Inotherwords,theeideticreductiondistillsthosecategorialformsthat

weintuitinthings.Yethowdoesoneclearlydistinguishbetweentheessentialand

72Ibid.,pp.7873Ibid.,pp.4042


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inessentialaspectsofthings?Thisiswhereimaginativevariationasamultiply

repeatableexercisebecomescrucial:wearetoimaginethethingsinmanydifferent

circumstancesandundergoingmanychanges.Ineachchangeofcircumstance,some

featureorpropertyofthethingisaltered.Doestheobjectsurviveasjusttheobject

thatitisevenafterthisalteration?Thenthepropertyalteredmusthavebeen

inessential.Aftervaryingtheobjectenough,itistobecomeapparentwhatthe

essentialfeaturesoftheobjectare.

Hence,inkeepingwithatraditioninauguratedbytheGreeksandsustained

bythescholastics,essencesrevealthewhatofthings(andpeople),theessential

natureofthings,and,tothisextent,theirbeing.Allthesame,therearetwodistinct

sensesofthewordbeingessenceandexistence.74Itwouldseemthattheessence

ofathingcannotexistwithoutthereexistingthingsthatinstantiatethatessence.75

Thereare,then,atleastthesetwooptionsforthetheoreticalregardofan

objectorreal(athingorstateofaffairs,forexample):toviewitasfactualand

spatiotemporallylocated,ortoviewitinitsessentiality,i.e.intermsoftheessences

itinstantiates.Thedistinctiondoesnot,however,correspondtothatbetweenthe

naturalandtranscendentalattitudes;fortranscendentalreflectionisnottheonly

sciencedoneintheeideticattitude.Essencesarenottheprovinceonlyof

phenomenology.Phenomenologyisaneideticscience,butnotalleideticsciences

e.g.,logicandmathematicsarepersephenomenological.Phenomenology,in

Husserlsconception,isthereforeoneofmanyeideticsciences.(Tobemoreprecise

74Ibid.,p.1275Attimes,itdoesseemasthoughHusserlgoesevenfurther:Positingofessencesimpliesnottheslightestpositingofanyindividualfactualexistences;pureeidetictruthscontainnottheslightest

assertionaboutmattersoffact.(IdeasI,p.11;Husserlsitalics)


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still,onemightsaythatthereisnothingphenomenologicalintheeidosofthe

eidetic,butverymuchsomethingeideticintheeidosofthe

phenomenological.)

Husserlmakesmuchdependnotonlyontheeideticreduction,butalsoon

thestrictandabsolutedifferencebetweenfactsandessences,theempiricalandthe

eidetic.EssentialismalsobecomesextremelyimportantforHusserlspurposesin

termsofhisdistinguishingbetweentheessencesofmentalprocessesontheone

handandphysicalthingsontheother.76ThusitwillbecentraltoHusserls

delineationsoftheessencesofconsciousnessandreality,aswewillseebelow.

IV.ConsciousnessandWorld

A.Intentionality,NoesisandNoema,andTranscendence

ForHusserl,asforhisteacherBrentano,themostfundamentalfactabout

consciousnessisthatitisintentionalitisintrinsicallyaboutorofsomething.77

Fromtheperspectiveofthetraditionalissuesinmodernphilosophyofmindand

epistemology,thephenomenologicalnotionofintentionality,alreadyanticipatedby

Kant78,couldbyitselfbeseentosolve,asitwere,theoldquestionofhowsomething

likeconsciousness,whichisinner,cantranscenditselfandreachouttoaworld

76Ibid.,p.9877Ibid.,pp.73578See,forexample:Russell,Matheson.Husserl:AGuideforthePerplexed.ContinuumBooks.NewYork:2006(p.47).HereafterRussell.Theconceptisalsopresentinmedievalwriters.


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thatisoutsideofitouter.Forintentionalityrevealsanintimate,indeed

unbreakablebondbetweenanactofconsciousness(noesis)ontheonehand,and

anintentionalobject(noema,vaguelyakintoKantsphenomenological

objectGegenstand)ontheother.Onemightatfirstbetemptedtosaythatsucha

relationshiptakesplacewithinconsciousnessitself,butconsciousnessshouldnow

beseenasanequivocalterm.Consciousnessasintentionalityhousesbotha

subjectivepoleaswellasanobjectiveone;consciousnessinthissenseisnot

meresubjectivity.Whilethisisnotsomuchaproofthatthereexistsanoutside

world,sincethisisbuiltintotheverydefinitionofexperience(atleastforHusserl),

itisafundamentalproblematizationoftheveryinner/outerdistinction

philosophyhadbeentakingforgrantedprephenomenologically(orprecritically

intheKantiansense).Thereissimplynosenseintheideaofaconsciousness

essentiallyunrelatedtoanintendedworld,horizon,orobject.

Mostcommentatorshavegenerallyfoundthereferentofthetermnoesisto

beunproblematictograsp,butnotsonoema.Asmentioned,thetermnoesis

referstointentionalactsofconsciousnessandnoematotheobjectssointended

(andquaintended).InHusserlswords:

CorrespondingineverycasetothemultiplicityofDatapertainingtothereallyinherentnoeticcontent,thereisamultiplicityofData,demonstrableinactualpureintuition,inacorrelativenoematiccontentor,inshort,inthenoematermswhichweshallcontinuetousefromnowon.79

Husserlgivesanexample,pertainingtotheexperienceofseeingatree:

thetreesimpliciter,thephysicalthingbelongingtoNature,isnothinglessthanthis perceivedtreeasperceivedwhich,asperceptualsense,inseparablybelongstotheperception.Thetreecanburnup,be

79Ibid.,p.214


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resolvedintoitschemicalelements,etc.Butthesensethesenseofthisperception,somethingbelongingnecessarilytoitsessencecannotburnup;ithasnochemicalelements,noforces,norealproperties.80

However,thenoemaisnotforHusserlareallyinherentpartofconsciousness.The

noematree,saysHusserl,isnomorecontainedinherentlythanisthetreewhich

belongstoactuality.81

Hencethenoemaofaperceptionissimplytheperceivedasperceived.This

wouldapplyacrosstheboardtoallthevarioustypesofact:thenoemaofa

recollectionistherecollectedasrecollected,thenoemaofafantasyisthefantasied

thingasfantasied,etc.Husserlalsocallsthenoemaornoematiccorrelatethe

senseofanact.Howthisdefinitionofitmatchesupwiththefirstisadeepsource

ofdebate,butitcannotbefurtheredaddressedhere.82

Ashintedatalready,thenoeticnoematicbifurcationallowsHusserltoclaim

thatphenomenologyisnotmerelyaboutconsciousnessinthenarrowsenseof

subjectiveconsciousnesssincethisisonlythenoeticpoleofexperiencebut

alsoabouttheobjectsexperienced(asexperienced)thenoematicpole.Every

consciousexperience,withoutfail,hasbothanoeticandanoematicside.Itmakes

nosensetoisolatetheconsciousnessoffromthatofwhichthereis

consciousnessapointMohantymakeseloquentlyinspeakingoftheirreducibility

ofthephraseconsciousnessofsomething:

80Ibid.,p.21681Ibid.,p.23782Onceagain,Bellswayofcharacterizingtheissueishelpfulforourpresentnarrowpurposes:somethingisnoematicinsofarasitisanimmanent,butnonrealcontributoryfactorinthepossessionbyanactofsignif

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