mesopotamia in british strategy, 1903-1914

Mesopotamia in British Strategy, 1903-1914Author(s): Stuart CohenSource: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1978), pp. 171-181Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162370 .

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 9 (1978), 17I-i8I Printed in Great Britain

Stuart Cohen

MESOPOTAMIA IN BRITISH STRATEGY, 1903-1914

Britain's strategic interest in Mesopotamia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a consequence of her control over India. The valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates constitute a natural highway from Syria to the Persian Gulf, and thence to the Indian Ocean. Not until a relatively late stage in Imperial history, however, did Britain extend her formal protection to this region. In the nineteenth century successive British governments had refused to finance the establishment of either a Mesopotamian steamer service or railway line.

Subsequently, they had first (I903) rejected participation in an international

Baghdad railway scheme, and then (1914) sanctioned complete German control over the project as far as Basra.1 A small Indian force was despatched to the head of the Persian Gulf in October I914, but the subsequent Mesopotamian cam-

paign was 'a haphazard affair from start to finish' lacking political or military direction.2 Thus, the De Bunsen committee, which reported on Britain's desider- ata in Asiatic Turkey in June 1915, had concluded that Ottoman "devolutionary control" over Mesopotamia was preferable to Indian annexation of any part of the region other than the Basra vilayet; that October, the War Cabinet experienced difficulty in deciding whether to sanction an advance on Baghdad. No

proclamation of political interest in Mesopotamia was in fact made by a British

government until the capture of the city in i917.3 The immediate and local

arguments impelling that operation have been fully investigated. By contrast, the strategic tradition that deprecated it has been relatively neglected. This

paper proposes to survey the latter and to indicate the degree to which the exten- sion of the Mesopotamian campaign contradicted previous British strategy toward the region.

This is not to deny the considerable military interest the British had evinced in Mesopotamia before World War I. Twice before in the twentieth century had the Government contemplated the unilateral use of force against the Otto- man Empire: in i906 over Aqaba, and in 1910-I9II in reply to a series of

1 The standard accounts are, on the nineteenth century, H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India (New York, I928; 2nd ed., London, 1966); and on the Baghdad Railway, M. K. Chapman, Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway 1888-I914 (Northampton, Mass., 1948).

2 B. C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs 1914-I92I (Berkeley, 1971), p. 53. On the campaign itself, F. J. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, I9I4-19r8 (4 vols; London, 1923-1927).

3 A. S. Klieman, 'Britain's War Aims in the Middle East in 1915', Journal of Contem- porary History, 3, 3 (Nov. 1968), 225-236; and V. H. Rothwell, 'Mesopotamia in British War Aims, I9I4-I918', Historical Journal, I3, 2 (June 1970), 273-294.

I71



172 Stuart Cohen

provocations in Asiatic Turkey and the Persian Gulf. On both occasions a

campaign in Mesopotamia had been mooted. In 1906, the Committee of

Imperial Defence reviewed the possibility of occupying Basra and seizing the Sultan's private trading vessels on the Tigris.4 In I9II it discussed various

proposals for more extended local operations.5 In each instance regional circumstances had appeared favorable. The Turkish garrisons in Mesopotamia were

notoriously inefficient and barely capable of controlling the factious tribes between Baghdad and Basra. They were also momentarily distracted: in 1906 by a frontier squabble with the Persians, and in 91 I by the diversion of some of their number to help suppress a revolt in the Yemen.6 Britain's forces, on the other hand, had a conveniently close base in India and possessed an apparently 'valuable asset' in the sympathies of the indigenous Arabs.7 For over one hundred

years, the local representatives of the British and Indian governments had nurtured Imperial prestige in the region,8 and by the early twentieth century their efforts were apparently being rewarded. In I906, the kadi of Baghdad vowed to welcome a British campaign 'with open arms',9 and in 19I1 the attitude of the town's naqib promised to warrant similar expectations.10

Moreover, various schemes for Imperial expansion in Mesopotamia had been advocated even during periods of comparative quiescence in Anglo- Turkish relations. For some, the motives were demographic. Mesopotamia would provide an outlet for the surplus population of India.1 For others, they were strategic. The Euphrates Valley, it was argued, was not only a passage to

India, it was also a route to Russia's soft underbelly in the Caucasus. Were Britain to construct a railway from the Gulf to Mosul, it would possess a means

4 9 May 1906 Foreign Office Paper 74b, Records of the Committee of Imperial Defence (Public Record Office, London), CAB 38/II/27; and minutes of 87th CID meeting, I May 1906, CAB 38/11/19.

5 Minutes of iioth CID meeting, 4 May i911, CAB 38/18/29; and minutes of II5th meeting, 14 Dec. 1911, CAB 38/I9/58.

6 June 1906 memorandum by Mark Sykes, Foreign Office Records (PRO, London), FO 371/152/22155/22155; 17 January I90o. J. Tyrrell (Military Attach6, Istanbul) to Sir G. Lowther (Ambassador at Istanbul I908-I913), no. 88; Istanbul Embassy Archives (PRO, London), FO 195/2346; 27 April 1906 General Staff Memorandum, War Office Records (PRO, London), WO 106/41, file C3/Io; and 24 May I9II Memorandum, WO Io6/43, file 03/2I.

7 28 May 1907 minute by Sir C. Hardinge (Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, I906-19IO, Viceroy of India, I9Io-I916), FO 371/350/16407/I6407.

8 On the Oudh Bequest, the Indian Sepoy Guard, and the imposing Residency, see J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman, and Central Arabia, vol. i, Historical (Calcutta, 1908).

9 2I Aug. 1906 Sir N. O'Conor (Ambassador at Istanbul, 1898-I908) to Sir E. Grey (Foreign Secretary, 1905-1916), FO 371/154/29027/29027.

10 22 Aug. I9IO J. Lorimer (Resident, Baghdad, 1910-1914) to Lowther, enclosed in FO 27/Io000/930/3478. On the naqib's local power see Lorimer, Gazetteer App. H., pp. 2368-2379.

1 Io March 1906 memorandum by A. Parker (FO clerk), FO 371/I48/1040I/IO680; Lovat Fraser, 'Some Peoples of the Persian Gulf,' The Times, 9 Jan. 1908; 30 March I908, evidence by Col. W. Yate before CID subcommittee, CAB i6/io paras. Io89 and Io99-1101.



Mesopotamia in British Strategy 173

of replying to a Russian thrust toward India.12 Economic factors were an addi- tional incentive. In Mesopotamia, British and Indian traders were already domin- ant and their merchandise supreme. As to the future, it was hoped that the

petroleum of the region, once extracted, would fire British ships; its fertile

plains, once irrigated, would feed the Indian people.13 Even before I914, therefore, Salisbury's embryonic conviction that 'the time has come for some terri- torial rearrangement' in Asiatic Turkey14 had been refined. In London, Crewe

regarded the partition of the Ottoman Empire as an inevitable historical process that need not be hurried.15 But in Istanbul, Adam Block advocated that it be initiated by 'smashing' Turkey;16 in Baghdad and Mosul the Consuls advised that it be preceded by the 'creation of facts' at a local level.17 Whichever the case, there was no question that Mesopotamia would be the portion of Asiatic Turkey which Britain would earmark. This, in Hardinge's words, 'has always been our

sphere, and we intend to keep it so'.18

The 'forward' policy implicit in such sentiments was to find forceful expression early in World War I. Indeed, in his March I915 memoranda, which demanded

extending the arc of India's administrative and military responsibility as far as

Mosul, Hirtzel was to quote some of them verbatim.19 Mark Sykes had expressed his views even sooner: in October I914 he advised Grey that 'the time has come when we must take action' in the region. He warned that 'we cannot confine ourselves to passive defence', suggested that 'those Indians who cannot serve in Europe for reasons of climate are specially fitted for action at Basra and

Koweyt', and advocated 'British help to an Arab rising in South Mesopotamia'.20 The Government's initial reluctance to heed this advice was not due solely to innumerable and usually more pressing contemporary distractions elsewhere. Its hesitant policy in I914 and 1915 was also a reflection of Britain's attitude toward earlier advocates of a similar operation. Various prewar studies had

already indicated that, whatever the immediate advantages of a military advance

12 20 Oct. 1906 F. Maunsell (Military Attache, Istanbul) Foreign Office, FO 37I/I55/ 36546/36546; 23 Feb. I9II Lorimer and P. Cox (Resident, Persian Gulf, to Lowther, tel. FO I95/2367(i). This was sent privately to Sir A. Nicolson (Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1910-1916), minute, idem.

13 G. Lloyd, Report on the Trading Possibilities of Mesopotamia (I908), enclosed in ii Jan. 1908 Board of Trade to India Office, India Office Records (Commonwealth Relations Office, London), L/P and S/3, vol. 259, no. 2832.

14 Lady G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, Vol. 2 (London, 1921), p. 130. 15 9 Sept. 1913 minute by Ist Marquess of Crewe (Secretary of State for India, 91o0-

1915), L/P and S/II, vol. 63, no. 3724/13. 16 28 May 1908 Block (British representative on the Council of the Ottoman Public

Debt) to Hardinge pte., FO 371/538. 17 I8 June 1913 Honey (Vice-Consul, Mosul) to C. Marling (Charge, Istanbul),

FO 371/I805/14470/3400I; and 23 June 1913 Lorimer-Lowther, FO 37I/i817/20107/ 29184.

18 24 Nov. 1919 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., Nicolson MSS (PRO, London), FO 800/342, p. 237.

19 I4 and 30 March 1915, memoranda by Sir A. Hirtzel (Secretary, Political Dept., India Office, 1909-1917), CAB 27/I, De Bunsen Committee papers, App. 6 and 7.

20 30 Oct. I914 Sykes-Grey pte., Grey MSS (PRO, London), FO 8o00o/i.



I74 Stuart Cohen

through Mesopotamia, the campaign would ultimately prove injudicious, unnecessary, and extremely difficult.

General factors of Imperial relevance had supplied the first objection. Before

1914 the Government considered that it had more to fear than to hope from a 'scramble' for Asiatic Turkey. Partition inevitably implied German predomin- ance in Cilicia and French supremacy in Syria: it would therefore exacerbate Britain's Mediterranean weakness.21 It might also endanger the peace of Europe by bringing the Powers into greater proximity in the area. Hence Mallet's famous warning that a division of the Ottoman provinces into spheres of influence would not benefit Great Britain and might involve the country in war.22 The

1912-I914 Anglo-German negotiations on the Baghdad railway and associated concessions in Asiatic Turkey were designed to heed that warning. Grey did insist on adequate British participation in Mesopotamian irrigation, petroleum, and navigation concessions. They were the necessary corollary to German control of the railways in the region.23 But the tone of the talks, no less than their substance, contradicts the claim that 'the ultimate possibility of

political annexation' lurked behind them.24 As late as March 1914, the British side believed that only a 'mingling' of European interests in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor would 'diminish the danger which is threatened by each country having a sphere of influence to itself'.25 Any suggestion to the contrary was

studiously avoided. Thus, the Admiralty was informed that grave objections of foreign policy precluded the participation of Government capital in the Mesopotamian petroleum concession;26 and the strong tendency on the

part of British officials in Mesopotamia even to talk of partition was strongly criticized.27

In any case, the Government of India had affirmed (before the De Bunsen Committee reached the same conclusion) that 'the existence in Asia of a strong Turkish power, friendly and reformed' was India's best safeguard against un- welcome interference from the west.28 British expansion was not a viable alterna- tive. The cost alone would be prohibitive since, as Grey once observed, even if

21 E.g., II April I912 F. Cartwright (Ambassador at Vienna)-Nicolson pte., Nicolson MSS, FO 800/356, p. 127.

22 I9 June I9I3 memorandum by Sir L. Mallet (Asst. Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1907-1913. Ambassador at Istanbul, I913-I914), in G. P. Gooch and H. Temp- erley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, i898-I914 (London, I928-1938), vol. io (i), Appendix, pp. 901-902.

23 28 May 19I3 Grey memorandum for the Cabinet, CAB 37/115/3I. 24 A. Cunningham, 'The Wrong Horse? A Study of Anglo-Turkish Relations before the

First World War', St. Antony's Papers (Oxford), 17 (I965), 73. 25 Io March 1914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, FO 800/80, and 25 March 1914

Mallet-Nicolson pte. 'The more we obtain concessions in each other's so-called spheres the easier it will be to arrest a division of Turkey' (Nicolson MSS, FO 800/373, p. 201).

26 13 May 1914 FO-Admiralty, FO 37I/2121/1067/20259, and 14 May 1914 Crewe minute, L/P and S/io, vol. 3Io (ii), no. 1914/177I.

27 Mallet minute on 23 June Lorimer-Lowther, above, n. 17. 28 13 Sept. 1913 Government of India Office to India Office, in FO 37I/2123/I940/

12320.



Mesopotamia in British Strategy I75

successful, an invasion of Mesopotamia would entail the 'expenditure of millions a year in keeping a new frontier in a state of defence'.29 The Indian domestic situation was an even more telling objection. Kitchener had long questioned the wisdom of employing Indian troops in any war against Turkey.30 More specifically, Hardinge warned that a British attack on the Caliphate (Ottoman State) in order to acquire Mesopotamia would most certainly arouse the antagonism of Britain's Muslim subjects. He could think of no other issue 'that would be so

likely to provoke a serious rising' in India.31 By I913, it had been agreed that, in deference to these considerations, 'every effort should be made to avoid action

likely to lead to partition of the Ottoman Empire either now or in the future'.32 The general requirement of secure Anglo-Indian communications did not

affect the detailed execution of this policy. Neither did it provoke demands for a

Mesopotamian expedition. Before the war, there was no apparent need for the immediate acquisition of an overland route under British control across Mesopo- tamia. Kitchener did not demand one until i9i5.33 It is true that various regional projects had been discussed earlier. One proposal had suggested a railway exten- sion from Basra to Karachi along the littoral of the Persian Gulf.34 More

publicity was given to another, which advocated a British line from Aqaba to Kuwait.35 In his rather eccentric manner, the British engineer Sir William Will- cocks had stressed the need for yet a third: a railway across the Syrian desert from the Mediterranean to Baghdad.36 Yet each suggestion had been dismissed. The first was considered impractical, since it would encounter too many engineering difficulties.37 The second was deemed undesirable: the longer railway communication with the Egyptian frontier could be postponed, the better.38 The third, the Willcocks scheme, was favorably considered in I909

and 910o, but it was then adjudged a threat to the Indian economy which

required that the Mesopotamian market be approached from the east, not the west.39 Moreover, throughout this period, British attention was restricted to the sea lanes to India. The naval authorities, for instance, maintained that if denied

29 25 June 1906 Grey memorandum, FO 371/152/22545/22545.

30 16 May 1906 Earl of Minto (Viceroy of India, 1905-1910), to J. Morley (Secretary of State for India, I905-19I0), pte., Morley MSS (CRO, London), vol. 8, p. 50.

31 24 Feb. 1913 Hardinge-Nicolson pte., Nicolson MSS, FO 800/364, p. 105. 32 13 Sept. 1913 IO-FO and minutes, FO 37I/I825/25533/42I05. 33 J. Nevakivi, 'Lord Kitchener and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire I915-I916',

Studies in International History: Essays Presented to Professor W. Norton Medlicott (London, 1967), pp. 316-329.

34 16 Sept. 1907 memorandum by A. Parker, FO 371/340/I2/3089I. 35 C. E. D. Black, 'A Railway to India', Nineteenth Century and After, 65 (1909),

163-I69; C. E. D. Black-Sir W. Tyrrell (Grey's private secretary), FO 37I/I246/9388/ 13011.

36 25 May 1909 Lowther-Grey 375 secret, FO, 371/340/12/30891. 37 17 Sept. 1907 minute by Grey, FO 37I/340/12/30891. 38 27 July 1914 Parker-Mallet (draft), FO 371/2125/2390/33655, p. 21; see also M.

Verete, 'The Balfour Declaration and Its Makers', Middle Eastern Studies, 6, I (Jan. 1970), 50.

39 24 July I909, Report of the Mesopotamian Railways Committee, FO 37I/764/2074/

29701.



176 Stuart Cohen

access to the Suez Canal, British reinforcements would travel by the long sea haul round the Cape.40

In this context, even the German Baghdad railway project, designed to link Istanbul (and eventually Berlin) with the Persian Gulf, proved something of a

strategic red herring. In 1904, the War Office predicted that control of this line 'would furnish Germany with more rapid means of communication with her colonies in the Pacific and East Africa and with Kiaochow, and would enable her to keep a fleet in eastern waters, independent of the Mediterranean route... It would also place her on the flank of our communications via Suez with India.'41 The Baghdad railway would not, however, provide hostile forces with a passage to the Indian frontier. This apprehension had been particularly current in Britain in I903, during the public outcry against participation in the project.42 It was also privately communicated to foreign governments thereafter.43 But the

danger was more apparent than real. Kaiser Willhelm II had made the point in a blunt lecture to Morley: 'Now think', he had instructed, 'of the journey these men would have to take before they got to the tapping point - through Austria, the Balkan Powers, Turkey, Persia. And they would only start if we were at war with England; and if we were at war with England we should most

assuredly want our armed men on a certain frontier a very long way from India.'44

This argument remained equally relevant after the agreement reached between Russia and Germany at Potsdam in i91 i. The fact that the latter thereby gained the removal of Russian objections to the conclusion of the Baghdad railway had a negligible effect on British strategic thinking. There is no cause to seek the reason in Britain's possible desire to take sides with Germany against Russia 'in the great question of Turkey-in-Asia'.45 Admittedly, in 1902 the Committee of

Imperial Defence had considered using the Baghdad railway as a means of

bringing Germany into collision with Russia and Turkey in the region of the Gulf.46 Immediately before 1914, however, the trend of British policy was toward the opposite extreme. The Foreign Office was specifically warned that 'we should go rather slow in this direction and not allow ourselves to be utilised

against Russia'.47 The real threat as Nicolson, certainly, saw it was of Russia's

40 See, e.g., 20 July 1907 Admiralty memorandum 99d, CAB 38/13/26; and March 1911 Churchill memorandum, CAB 37/105/27.

41 15 Nov. 1904 War Office memorandum, Effect of the Bagdad Railway on Our

Relations with Persia and the Defence of India, WO 106/52. 42 0. J. Hale, Publicity and Diplomacy, with Special Reference to Britain and Germany

(New York, 1940), p. 262. 43 E.g., 8 March 1907 Grey-F. Lascelles (Ambassador at Berlin), Gooch and Temper-

ley, British Documents, 6, (247), pp. 354-355. 44 3 Nov. 1907 Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, vol. 2, p. 299. 45 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, I848-I9r8 (Oxford, 1957),

P. 518. 46 Minutes of Nov. 1902 meeting, CAB 28/4/IO no. 5; and D. Dilks, Curzon in India,

vol. i (London, 1969), p. 148. 47 5 April 1914 Mallet-Nicolson pte., Nicolson MSS, FO 800/373, p. 210.




secession from the entente, not her incursions into the Middle East, where in any case Germany presented the greater threat to British interests.48

Meanwhile, and in immediate military terms, there appeared no need for alarm. The India Office continued to scorn the scare of a possible German- Turkish move across Central Asia with the help of the Baghdad railway; the Foreign Office even entered into negotiations with those two powers on the subject without admitting the need for prior consultation with the military authorities. The notion of a threat to India was regarded as 'fantastic in the extreme'.49 This thesis was indirectly supported by the difficulties that the Germans experienced in constructing their line.50 It was increasingly strength- ened by the growing British skepticism as to the railway's potential utility as a

through route between Europe and Asia. Chirol, in 1911, and his newspaper, The Times, in 19I2, both proclaimed that the concessionaires had abandoned all

pretensions on that point.51 Most parties accepted the view expressed by Lorimer, the British Resident in Baghdad. The German plan, he claimed, had been based on a misconception, since railways in Mesopotamia could only possess local value and would only serve local needs. They would provide neither a fast mail service, nor a secure highway, to India.52

Ultimately, therefore, the perimeter of Britain's interest in the Baghdad railway proved to be its terminus on the Gulf, not its alignment in Mesopotamia. The former was the point at which superior naval strength would be brought to bear. This belief had already occasioned Curzon's 'bond' with Shaikh Mubarak of Kuwait in 1899, Lansdowne's Persian Gulf declaration in 1903, and the Government's acquisition of a lease on the foreshore of Kuwait in 1907.53 Nicolson's view of the local situation was typical: 'Our position is thoroughly assured so long as we retain our sea supremacy, and if we lose our sea supremacy we lose our Empire.'54 During the later international discussions on the Baghdad railway, control of the Gulf terminus was an equally explicit British objective. By 1912, at the latest, it was clear that the question as to who should control the rest of the line (i.e., above Basra) 'was not of equal importance'.55 Moreover, the Foreign Office considered that its greatest gains from the final agreements

48 R. L. Greaves, 'Some Aspects of the Anglo-Russian Convention and Its Workings in Persia, 1907-1914', pt. 2, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 3I (1968), 308.

49 Parker minute on i8 June 1912 WO-FO, FO 371/1485/2064/26379; Hirtzel and Crewe minutes on 2 Feb. 1911 FO-IO, L/P and S/3, vol. 276, no. 1910/2961-2.

50 See U. Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire I914-19i8 (Princeton, I968), p. 7.

51 24 Feb. 1911 Sir V. Chirol-Hardinge pte., Hardinge MSS (Cambridge University Library), vol. 92(i), no. 38, p. 60; The Times, 24 May I912.

52 4 Aug. 1913 Lorimer-Marling, in FO 37I/1485/42138/42138. 53 B. C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf 1894-I9I4 (Berkeley, I967), pp. Io8-i Io,

255-257, 308-3Io, respectively. 54 19 June I907 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., Nicolson MSS, FO 800/338, p. I55. 55 I8 July I912 Nicolson-Hardinge pte., Nicolson MSS, FO 800/357, p. 311, also 27

March I9XI minute by Eyre Crowe, Gooch and Temperley, British Documents io (ii), (23), p. 36.



178 Stuart Cohen

were Germany's promise not to construct a naval base in Gulf waters, and Turk-

ey's readiness to regularize the situation there.56 As Hardinge noted, the mainten- ance of those agreements depended, in the last analysis, on the Royal Navy's ability to 'bottle up' the entrance to the Gulf at Khor Kawi and the Clarence Strait. They neither implied, nor required, a British commitment to penetrate the Mesopotamian interior.57

Even if a commitment of that nature had been entered into, it could hardly have been honored. A British campaign in Mesopotamia was not only rendered unwise by the requirements of Eurocentric diplomacy and unnecessary by the nature of Indian strategy, but it had also been precluded by military factors of immediate relevance to Mesopotamia itself. As early as 1874, these had indicated

that, whatever the changing motive of the global diplomatic situation, local circumstances might provide a constant brake on Indian expansion in this region. A War Office paper of that year had concluded that an expedition through Meso-

potamia would prove extremely difficult and that it could serve no useful purpose against Russia.58 Further study in 1906 confirmed that a projected advance to the Caucasus was 'chimerical'.59 At the same time, the region was disparaged as a possible theater of operations against Turkey.

In general terms, the Ottoman Empire was considered to be 'peculiarly invulnerable' to British attack. (So dishearteningly invulnerable, indeed, that the

papers indicating the difficulties of a Dardanelles operation were removed the files.60) It could 'shrug off' the loss of an island in the Aegean,61 and would be relatively unaffected by any blows delivered at its extremities.62 The occupation of Kuwait, for instance, would certainly 'uphold British interests and prestige in the Gulf', but would be largely ineffectual. 'It would not cause Turkey any material inconvenience or loss, and if she aquiesced in our remaining there, possibly under protest, it is not clear what permanent advantage we should have

gained.'63 Neither was the town of Basra a truly valuable objective. Indeed, it seemed rather a paltry prize when measured against the price that British interest would have to pay were Turkish reprisals to take the form of a boycott of British

goods or the capture of British ships in Turkish ports.64 Meanwhile, to have

56 28 August I913 Parker-Stanley, FO 371/I792/6463/39776; for the agreements see Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, 10 (ii), (124), pp. 183-198; (I33), pp. 203-206;

(188), pp. 283-298; (249), pp. 397-408. 57 8 Jan. I913, Hardinge-Crewe tel., Hardinge MSS, vol. 97(ii), no. 15, p.6. 58 1874, War Office memorandum, quoted in E. Elath, Britaniya u-Netiveha le-Hodiu

(Hebrew: 'Britain's Routes to India') (Jerusalem, 1971), pp. I78-I79. 59 Parker minute on Maunsell's memorandum, above, note 12. 60 Note dated 24 Feb. 1915 by Sir M. Hankey (Secretary to the CID), CAB

38/12/60. 61 16 July 1906, War Office memorandum 84b, CAB 38/12/42. 62 24 July 1906 memorandum by Esher, CAB 38/13/45. 63 I May 1911 War Office paper Io4d, CAB 38/17/25. 64 II July 1906 memorandum by Capt. Grant Duff, Military Policy in a War with

Turkey, WO 106/42, file C3/2Ia; and 13 March 1912 minute by Capt. A. G. Stuart, Local Action in the Persian Gulf, I9pi, WO 106/42, file C3/37.




locked up a division there 'might be a matter of serious inconvenience in connec- tion with military requirements elsewhere'.65

The solution was not to be sought in an advance of a more penetrative nature. That would make demands on the resources of the Empire which the Admiralty, in particular, could not promise to meet. As early as 1903, the Persian Gulf

squadron had been reduced to three ships,66 none of which carried sufficient numbers for landing operations;67 and by 191I only 'small sloops' could be

spared for operations any more extensive than control of the illicit arms traffic.68 These difficulties were compounded by those of the climate. A Mesopotamian campaign would subject even Indian troops to the strain of excessive summer heat and impassable winter mud.69

Even reliance on local discontent was a double-edged sword. If, in military terms, the Turks were feeble foes, the Arabs were hardly reliable allies. The former could always hope to call on the diplomatic support of Germany.70 But the Arab tribes of Mesopotamia, though numerous, lacked all cohesion and

leadership.71 Regarded as an utterly unscrupulous 'rabble of Bashi bazouks', their habit of executing lethal attacks on British steamers on the Tigris had occasioned far more anger than respect.72 To incite them to revolt would stir up a hornets' nest which it might later prove difficult to suppress. There was no

guarantee that individual shaikhs having been freed of the yoke of the Turks, would willingly submit to that of England. British policy had therefore con-

sistently stressed the 'importunity of mixing ourselves in entanglements... among Arab tribes in Mesopotamia'.73 The local consuls had themselves warned that 'by interference of the most limited character we start on the road of which we cannot see or imagine the end'.74 Even in I914, when the tribes of the region did appear to be initiating concerted action against Ottoman rule, and when there could be little doubt that the 'Arab movement' was 'the most serious

65 30 April 1912 IO-FO, FO 37I/I490/3369/I8365. 66 2I Dec. 1903 Drury (C-in-C East Indies) to Admiralty, Admiralty Records (PRO,

London), ADM 1/7964. 67 19 Nov. 1907 departmental minute, ADM I/7985. 68 Enclosure in 30 March 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1490/3369/18365. 69 13 March 912 Stuart minute, above n. 64; and 3 April 1904 Admiralty memorandum

39d, CAB 38/4/25, P. 2. 70 27 April 1906 General Staff memorandum, WO 106/41, file C3/I0; 29 June 1906

Morley-Minto pte., Morley MSS, vol. I, p. 140. 71 E.g., Maunsell's Military Report on Asiatic Turkey (1904), WO 33/325, p. 5; and

evaluations, dated 1913, by Honey in FO 371/1805/14478/3400I; and Lorimer in L/P and S/io, vol. 212, nos. 1913/2358 and 1913/3105.

72 The phrase in 27 June I914 R. Bullard (Acting Vice-Consul, Basra, 1914) to Mallet FO 371/2135/29919/42808. For descriptions of attacks see FO 371/541, file 11395 (1908); FO 195/2308 (1909); FO 37I/1785, file 45001 (1913); FO 371/2124, file 1990

(I914). 73 O'Conor minute on 17 April, 1907 F. Crow (Consul, Basra) to O'Conor, FO I95/

2242. 74 22 Feb. 1909 J. Ramsay (Resident, Baghdad), to W. Young (Vice-Consul, Mosul),

FO, 195/2308.



I80 Stuart Cohen

feature of the present situation in Mesopotamia', the standard advice was to do no more than 'wait and watch events'.75

By then, however, the military staffs had firmly ruled out a British Mesopo- tamian expedition. In I906, the project was described as 'futile',76 and in I9II, the Director of Military Operations ruled that 'If we wanted to fight Turkey we should not do so up the Valley of the Euphrates.'77 On the former occasion, a substitute was found in a plan to land British forces on the Mediterranean coast at Haifa.78 On the latter, the military option was altogether rejected and replaced by the search for a diplomatic solution.79 In I910 and I91, nothing would (or could) be done to satisfy either the desire of the Foreign Office for a local display of strength or the demands made by the Indian authorities for immediate military operations.80 The Admiralty even rejected Grey's suggestion to send but one

ship to Zakhnuniya, an island over Ioo miles from Basra.81 The War Office chose to emphasize the danger of possible Turkish reprisals on Egypt.82 In 1912, the Government of India did establish a committee under McMahon (Secretary of the Foreign Department) to consider military action in the Persian Gulf

region. But it refused to act on the suggestion there made, that Basra might be

temporarily occupied as a last resort.83 Instead, the Government of India warned that the plans for operations in the region could be regarded as no more than 'tentative'.84 In London, Nicolson and Crewe agreed that, with regard to Meso- potamian affairs, 'there is no possible chance of our coercing Turkey'.85

The Government's acquisition of a majority shareholding in the British Petroleum Company in June I914 did not affect this conviction. Indeed, it elicited an affirmation of military reticence. Even during the course of the war, oil was a 'late entry' into the front rank of British arguments for British control in Mesopotamia.86 Before the outbreak of hostilities, when immediate attention was in any case concentrated on the Persian fields, this factor had been deliber-

75 23 March I914 Mallet-Grey pte., Grey MSS, FO 800/80; and 27 March I914 Mallet-Grey tel. 194, FO 371/2123/1990/13605.

76 May 1906 minute by Capt. A. Grant Duff (DAQMG), WO 106/42, file C3/IO. 77 24 April I9II minute by H. Wilson, WO 106/43, file C3/2I. 78 I I March I909, Report of the CID Sub-committee on the Military Requirements of the

Empire as Affected by the Defence of Egypt and the Soudan, CAB I6/4. 79 Minutes of Iooth CID meeting, 4 May I911, CAB 38/10/29. 80 6 March I9II memorandum by the Foreign Office, FO 371/I245/8429/8429; 5

April I91 i Hirtzel-Sir R. T. Ritchie (Permanent Under-Secretary at the India Office, 19IO-I2), L/P and S/Io, vol. i62, no. 191I /3267a; and 8 June I911 Government of India- India Office tel., L/P and S/io, Vol. i88, no. I911/4523.

81 2I Dec. 1910 Adm-FO, FO 37I/O015/36702/462II. 82 i May I911 War Office paper Io4d, CAB 38/17/25. 83 Report of the McMahon Committee (I5 Jan. 1912) and covering letter from the

Government of India, in 30 April 1912 IO-FO, FO 371/1490/3369/18365. 84 27 June 1912 Government of India-War Office, WO 106/42, file C3/37. 85 I2 Dec. I9Io Nicolson-Marling pte., Nicolson MSS, FO 800/344, p. 325; and 21

Aug. I913 Crewe-Hardinge pte., Hardinge MSS, vol. 119 (i), no. 38, p. 65. 86 Rothwell, 'Mesopotamia in British War Aims', pp. 286-292; 'People forget how

lately this asset began to dominate the region's economy and disturb its politics' (E. Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, I9I4-I956 [London, I963], p. 95).



Mesopotamia in Britsh Strategy I 8

ately denied priority in Britain's local strategy. The Indian authorities refused to make any special provisions for the defense of the deposits. In London, General Barrow warned that the necessary force could not be spared to protect this area;87 in India Hardinge confirmed that he would 'strongly deprecate any attempt to vindicate our position in these territories vi et armis'.88

As is well known, Hardinge was himself one of the first to alter his opinion once the Indian Expeditionary Force had won its initial successes in Mesopota- mia. Ultimately, the idea of an advance on Baghdad exerted its fascinating, and fatal, spell on other sections of the British and Indian governments too.

Gradually, therefore, the traditional diplomatic, strategic, and military arguments against the advance were each abandoned. But they should not be ignored. Because they had engendered a climate of military reticence, these arguments were themselves to a degree responsible for the lack of planning characteristic of the campaign. As early as I9I0, the War Office had been advised to cease its

surveys of the region in view of the military impracticability and political inadvisedness of operations there.89 When Hubert Young asked in 1913 whether his proposed tour of the region might serve a military purpose, he was informed that the General Staff 'do not think there is anything you could do there which would be of any use'.90 If Mesopotamia was ultimately taken in a stumble rather than a canter, it was partly because British strategy toward the area before the war had disparaged the virtues of such a campaign.

Bar-Ilan University, Israel

87 io June 1915 minute by Gen. Barrow (Military Secretary at the India Office I914- 1917), L/P and S/io, vol. 410 (I), no. 1914/2248. Also 12 June 1914 minute by Holder-

ness, ibid.; and I July 1914 Crewe minute, L/P and S/Io, vol. 3oo(i), no. I914/235I. In an unanswered despatch of 17 July 1914 Crewe asked Hardinge to confirm that an Indian expedition to defend the oil would not be contemplated (ibid.).

88 17 June I914 Hardinge-Chirol pte., Hardinge MSS, vol. 93(ii), no. 173, p. 163. 89 29 April 9I0o FO-WO, FO 371/1009/I304/3041I. 90 21 May I913 unsigned letter to Young, Young MSS (St. Antony's College, Oxford),

file I.

