Metternich and the Papal Condemnation of the "Carbonari", 1821Author(s): Alan ReinermanReviewed work(s):Source: The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Apr., 1968), pp. 55-69Published by: Catholic University of America PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25018108 .Accessed: 16/01/2012 12:05

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METTERNICH AND THE PAPAL CONDEMNATION OF THE CARBONARI, 1821

BY Alan Reinerman*

On September 13, 1821, Pope Pius VII promulgated the brief

Ecclesiam a Jesu Christo, which launched the Papal excommunica?

tion against "a multitude of wicked men . . . united against God and

Christ, with the principal aim of attacking and destroying the

Church . . ., deceiving the faithful, and leading them astray from the

doctrine of the Church by means of a vain and wicked philosophy."1 The group thus anathemized was not, as the language of the brief

might have led one to expect, some new religious heresy, but the

Italian "sect" or secret society of the Carbonari, the best known of the

numerous revolutionary organizations plotting to free Italy from

foreign (i.e., Austrian) rule and establish a unified, liberal Italian

state.2 Widespread throughout the peninsula, their greatest strength

lay in the south, particularly in Naples, where they had played a

leading role in instigating the revolution of 1820.3 The suppression of

that revolution by an Austrian army in March, 1821, had weakened

the Carbonari, but they were far from extinct and continued to

alarm the rulers of Italy with their plots.

* Mr. Reinerman is an associate professor of history in Sacred Heart Uni?

versity, Bridgeport, Connecticut. He would like to express his gratitude to

the Prefect of the Secret Vatican Archives and the Director of the Haus-, Hof

und Staatsarchiv in Vienna and their staffs, without whose aid the material

used in this article could not have been gathered, and to Dr. Raymond Schmandt for his kindness in reading and criticizing a draft at an earlier stage

of composition. i Bullarii Romani Continuatio (Rome, 1835-1855), XV, 446-448. 2 Much has been written on the Carbonari; for the most recent conclusions

on their origin and nature, see R. John Rath, "The Carbonari: Their Origins, Initiation Rites, and Aims," American Historical Review, LXIX (January,

1964), 353-370. See also Angelo Ottolini, La Carboner?a dalle origini at primi moti insurrezionali (Modena, 1936) ; Oreste Dito, Massoneria, Carboner?a ed

altre societ? segrete del Risorgimento italiano (Torino, 1905) ; G. Leti, Carboner?a e Massoneria nel Risorgimento italiano (Genova, 1925).

3 George T. Romani, The Neapolitan Revolution of 1820-1821 (Evanston,

Illinois, 1950), is the best account in English of this revolution.

55

56 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

The Carbonari, then, were a political organization. Why were the

ecclesiastical penalties of the Catholic Church, usually reserved for

heretics and blasphemers, directed against them? According to the

brief, the reason was that :

The books . . ., statutes, and other authentic documents of the Carbonari

... as well as the testimony of those who after belonging to the Society have left it, demonstrate clearly that the Carbonari aim at giving every? one the licence to create at will his own religion according to his own

convictions, thereby introducing religious indifference, than which

nothing more pernicious can be imagined; that they parody sacred rituals by their sacrilegious ceremonies . . ., and that they plot to ruin

the Apostolic See against which . . . they have a special hatred.4

Explicit enough, one might think, and this explanation has been

accepted by some recent historians.5 Yet hardly had the condemna?

tion taken place than another explanation began to be heard : that the

Papacy had been inspired to issue the brief, not by religious motives, but by pressure from Austria, which hoped to use the moral force of

religion to complete the destruction of the Carbonari6

In 1821 such an interpretation was only a conjecture, but it has

proven since to be an inspired one. Archival research leaves no doubt that the political interpretation of the condemnation is essentially correct, and has made it possible to trace the way in which the process of condemnation was from start to finish inspired and encouraged

by the Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich.

Since the return of peace in 1815, Metternich had been convinced

that co-operation between Austria and the Papacy, between Throne

and Altar, was desirable, and indeed essential, for the defense of the

restored order of society against the forces of revolution. Revolution

posed a threat to Church as well as to the State ; therefore, reasoned

Metternich, the two should work together against the common foe, the one using its spiritual force, the other its material power.7 The

4 Bullarii Romani Continuatio, XV, 446-448. 5

E.g., Massimo Petrocchi, La restaurazione romana (1815-1823) (Firenze,

1943), pp. 56-57; E. Vercesi, Pio VII (Torino, 1933), p. 315. 6

E.g., Abb? de Pradt, Europe and America in 1821, trans. J. D. Williams

(2 vols.; London, 1822), II, 207-208. 7 This conviction was frequently expressed by Metternich in his correspond?

ence of 1815-1820; see, for example, his Instructions for Prince Kaunitz,

May 31, 1817, in Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (hereafter cited HHSA),

BY ALAN REINERMAN 57

Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, shared this con?

viction, and therefore the 1815-1820 period saw Austria and the

Papacy working together for their mutual benefit, especially against the "sects."8

Papal co-operation seemed even more valuable to Metternich after

the outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution in July, 1820. The ludicrous ease with which the Carbonari overthrew the Neapolitan regime in?

dicated that they were even more dangerous than he had thought; it also indicated that the ability of the Italian governments to repress them was not to be relied upon. Metternich therefore decided that

only if all the Italian states could be brought to work together under

the direction of Austria could the forces of revolution be kept in

check. The attempt to implement this decision was the basis of his

Italian policy in 1820-1822.9 In such a policy the role of the Papacy would be of special importance since it was not only the ruler of one

of the largest Italian states, but the spiritual leader of the Catholic world as well; the aid which it could give to the anti-revolutionary cause was thus far greater than that at the command of any other

Italian ruler. The chancellor, therefore, devoted great care in 1820

1822 to attempting to secure the whole-hearted co-operation of the

Papacy in his plans.10

Staatskanzlei: Ausw?rtiges Amt (unless otherwise mentioned, all documents

hereafter cited from HHSA are from this section), Rom: Weisungen 1817. 8 This period of Austro-Papal co-operation and Consalvi's role in it form

the subject of the author's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: "The Austrian

Policy of Cardinal Consalvi, 1815-1823: an Experiment in Austro-Papal Co?

operation" (Loyola University, Chicago, 1964). 9 On Metternich's aim for hegemony in Italy and the various means used

to secure it, see Paul Schroeder, Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith, 1820

1823 (Austin, 1962), especially Chapters IV and V; Annibale Alberti, Atti del Parlamento delle Due Sicilie 1820-1821 (Bologna, 1935), IV, vii-cdx; Karl Grossmann, "Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes," Historische

Bl?tter, No. 4 (1931), 37-76. 10 On the Papal reaction to Metternich's plans, which was largely unfavorable

because the latter seemed to threaten the temporal independence of the Papacy and thereby to endanger its spiritual freedom, see Reinerman, Chapters IV

and V; Joseph Brady, Rome and the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820-1821 (New York, 1937) ; Silvio Furlani, "La Santa Sede e il Congresso di Verona," Nuova Rivista Storica, XXXIX (1955), 465-491, XL (1956), 14-47; Angelo Tamborra, "I Congressi della Santa Alleanza di Lubiana e di Verona, e la

pol?tica della Santa Sede (1821-1822)," Archivio Storico Italiano, CXVIII (1960), 190-211.

58 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

With this background, it was natural that Metternich should seek

the moral support of the Papacy once Austria had decided in the

autumn of 1820 to crush the Carbowan-inspired revolution in Naples.11 Such moral support, by justifying the Austrian intervention in the

eyes of Catholics and turning them against the "impious" Carbonari, would be "of an immense value," Metternich felt, in strengthening the "material and moral force" of Austria.12 Papal condemnation of

the Carbonari seemed to the prince a logical complement to the

Austrian military intervention; it was one more weapon in the

arsenal of legitimacy, to be used whenever expedient, and in this

great crisis "the Carbonari must be attacked by all weapons at once,"

spiritual as well as temporal.13 The Austrian army soon to march

against Naples, representing the secular arm of society, would supply the material force necessary to crush the armed resistance of the

Carbonari. But military defeat alone was not sufficient: the Pope, wielder of the spiritual power of society, must also unleash his

weapons to destroy the moral position of the sect so that it could

never revive.14

Metternich's first approaches to Consalvi on this subject, in No?

vember, 1820, were framed with caution, asking only in general terms

for moral support and not yet mentioning a formal condemnation.15

No doubt he foresaw that his request, involving as it did the intent

to use spiritual powers for an essentially political end, would encounter

some difficulty at Rome. Such proved to be the case. Needless to say, neither Consalvi nor Pius VII had the slightest sympathy with the

Carbonari. The difficulty was that the sect could not be condemned

simply because it was politically obnoxious. As Consalvi explained to the Austrian ambassador, "as a spiritual ruler, the Holy Father

11 It should be pointed out that Metternich also expected, and to a great extent received, the material support of the Papal government in allowing and

assisting the passages of the Austrian army through the Papal States to

Naples : see Brady, especially Chapters II and III. 12

HHSA, Rom : Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, First Confidential

Annex to Dispatch #1 of November 22, 1820. 13 Charles van Duerm (ed.), Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi

avec le Prince Cl?ment de Metternich 1815-1823 (Louvain, 1899), p. 311,

Metternich to Consalvi, November 22, 1822.

14Ibid., 326, Metternich to Consalvi, December 13, 1820. Also, HHSA, Rom:

Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, April 19, 1821.

15 Van Duerm, op. cit., pp. 311, 326.

BY ALAN REINERMAN 59

can pronounce ecclesiastical penalties only against those societies

whose institution is evidently contrary to the Catholic religion and

which openly attack its principles."16 There was as yet no evidence

that the Carbonari could be considered such a society?indeed, their

constitution prescribed Catholicism as their official religion.17

To this moral obstacle was added a question of expediency.

Throughout the Neapolitan crisis, one of Consalvi's foremost con?

cerns was to avoid any action which might serve as a pretext for a

Neapolitan invasion of the Papal State. A Papal condemnation of

the Carbonari would certainly displease the Neapolitan regime, and

the cardinal was therefore determined to avoid it as long as the

threat of invasion existed.18

For these reasons, a formal Papal condemnation was then impos? sible. Consalvi, therefore, replied to Metternich's appeals only by

declaring in general terms that the Pope would of course "try to

concur, for his part, in everything that his character and his relations

permit, with the views" manifested by Austria.19

This reply by no means satisfied the prince, who continued to

press Consalvi to bring the spiritual weapons of the Papacy to the

aid of Austria.20 In Rome the Austrian ambassador, Count Anton

Apponyi, under instructions from his chief, took up the same question with the Secretary of State, but with an equal lack of success. After

two months of fruitless argument, he reported to Metternich that it

was futile to hope for any change in Consalvi's attitude as long as

the danger of Neapolitan retaliation existed:

This consideration has made him cling to a strict neutrality in which he sees the sole means of avoiding disaster. . . . This is the reason

for his obstinate refusal to reinforce the secular arm with the spiritual

weapons at the disposal of the Head of Christianity. . . . But I am

convinced that this objection will . . . disappear as soon as our first

victories have restored the Court of Rome to a position of security. . . .

Thereafter we will find in it a faithful ally which will follow our line

i? HHSA, Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, April 14, 1821, #61-A. " Ibid. 18

Ibid., Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, January 9, 1821, #34-D. 19Archivio Vaticano (hereafter cited A.V.), Segretariato di Stato (all A.V.

documents cited are from this collection unless otherwise mentioned), Rubrica

242 (hereafter cited R242), Consalvi to Metternich, December 5, 1820. 20

Ibid., Metternich to Consalvi, January 18, 1821.

60 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

of conduct. . . . Until that time, we must renounce all hope of active

co-operation . . . and be satisfied with a passive attitude.21

Apponyi's sound advice did not dissuade Metternich from again

raising the subject at the Congress of Laybach in January, 1821.

Consalvi had expected this and had instructed his representative at the

Congress, Cardinal Spina, to reaffirm the Papal opposition to a con?

demnation at that time.22 Therefore, when Metternich approached

Spina at the Congress to argue vehemently that a condemnation was

vital for the defense of Church and State alike, the Papal delegate

merely repeated Consalvi's view that such an action would at that time

be both morally impossible and politically inexpedient. Prolonged

argument failed to weaken either the prince's insistence on the neces?

sity of a condemnation or Spina's refusal to consider it possible, and

the conference ended on a note of mutual dissatisfaction.23

However, this discussion appears to have convinced Metternich

that he would have to accept Apponyi's advice and defer further action

until the Austrian forces had subdued Naples. For two months he

allowed the subject to remain dormant until the suppression of the

Neapolitan Revolution in March, 1821.

The way was now clear for Metternich to renew his request for a

bull of condemnation, which seemed to him more desirable than ever.

The revolution at Naples had been crushed, but its instigator, the

Society of the Carbonari

still encourages the people to revolt from one end of Italy to another; it still maintains conspiratorial relations with all the revolutionaries of

Europe; it counts among its initiates prelates, priests, citizens of dis?

tinguished rank; its existence is utterly incompatible with that of any

legitimate government. Repressed today by force, its activity is only suspended; it has not renounced its aims, and will never renounce them

until it is destroyed. It is, of all the sects, . . . the one whose principles menace most directly the existence of sovereigns and their governments,

and of religious institutions. . . . All the governments of Italy must

21 HHSA, Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, January 9, 1821, #34-D.

Apponyi was Austrian ambassador in Rome, 1816-1817 and 1820-1826.

22A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, January 10, 1821. Cardinal Giuseppe

Spina (1756-1828) is best known for his role in negotiating the Corcordat

with Napoleon; he represented the Papacy at the Congress of Laybach and

Verona. 23

A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, January 26, 1821.

BY ALAN REINERMAN 61

join forces to destroy this impious sect, but this great aim can be

completely! attained only with the co-operation of the spiritual power. . . . Rome must strike them with the anathema. ... It must launch a

bull of excommunication against all their adherents_24

Unless the Papacy used its moral force to destroy the moral posi? tion of the Carbonari while they were still weak from their military defeat, they would recover in time and would once again raise the

standard of revolt in Italy. It was therefore essential that the Papacy act, and act quickly.25 So Metternich argued in his renewed appeal to

Consalvi of April 12, 1821,26 and to lend greater weight to his argu? ments, the Emperor Francis I on the same day addressed a personal

appeal to Pius VII for the condemnation "which concerns equally the welfare of religion and of society."27 Apponyi on Metternich's

orders now resumed his discussions with Consalvi and pressed for

the condemnation with renewed vigor.28

While thus exerting all of Austria's influence upon the Papacy, Metternich at the same time turned to her allies, the other con?

servative powers, to secure their diplomatic support. Tsar Alex?

ander I had for some time favored using the moral authority of the

Papacy against the forces of revolution, and he now readily agreed to instruct his ambassador in Rome, Count Italinsky, to support

Apponyi's attempt to obtain the condemnation. Similar instructions were sent by the Prussian government to its Roman representative, while the French ambassador, Count Blacas, a staunch conservative,

willingly used his influence with the Holy See to the same end.29

This multi-pronged diplomatic offensive put Consalvi in a difficult

position. Austria, backed by the other conservative powers, obviously attached the greatest importance to the condemnation, and would be

seriously offended should the Papacy persist in its refusal?might even abandon the policy of Austro-Papal co-operation to which

Consalvi attached such importance. Yet, no evidence had so far been

24HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, April 19, 1821. 25 Ibid., April 12, 19,29. 26

Ibid., Varia, Metternich to Consalvi, April 12, 1821. 27 Ibid., Francis I to Pius VII, April 12, 1821. 28

Ibid., Rom : Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, April 12,19, 1821.

29Ibid., Kongressakten, Laybach: Metternich's report, "Resultats de ma

conf?rence avec S. M. Alexandre . . .," January 13, 1821; Kongressakten,

Florenz, Rom, Neapel: Proc?s-verbal of the ministerial conferences, April 27,

1821; Rom; Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, May 4, 1821.

62 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

found of the religious errors which alone could justify the Papacy in acting against the Carbonari. In the hope of placating Austria

without violating the laws of the Church, the Secretary of State on

April 10 issued an edict against the sects in the Papal States. But as

this was only a measure of the civil government of the Papal State

and imposed only civil penalties, it failed completely to satisfy Metternich.30

Throughout April and May of 1821 Metternich thus kept up a

steady diplomatic pressure on the Papacy. Reluctant though he was

to antagonize Austria and her allies, Consalvi nonetheless refused

to abandon the position which the principles of his Church required of him. As he told Apponyi :

Without a justifiable accusation of irreligion or impiety the spiritual authority finds itself involuntarily paralyzed. . . . Furnish us with

irrefutable proof of some outrage offered by the Sect of the Carbonari to the Catholic Religion, based upon the laws of their Society, and we

will eagerly use this plausible pretext to second the temporal authority's

coercive measures with all the influence of the spiritual authority.31

Spurred on by his assurance, Apponyi "constantly directed all my efforts to the search for some official document to serve as the basis

for an accusation against the Carbonari from the purely religious

point of view." His long search was eventually rewarded with the

discovery of

a book containing the ceremonies of admission for initiates of the second grade of the Carbonari, ceremonies which enact the mysteries

of the passion of Our Lord in the most impious way: the initiate plays the role of Our Lord, the members of the Carbonari those of Pilate,

Caiphas, and Herod, the crown of thorns is put upon him, he is

scourged, he is made to carry the cross to Calvary, the sacred words

of the gospels are put in his mouth and those of his assisting brothers ; in sum, the whole ceremony is no more than a tissue of blasphemies

and insults against all that is most sacred in our religion.32

30 Ibid., Rom : Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, April 19, 29, 1821. Copy

of the edict in A.V., R165, 1821. 31

HHSA, Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, May 4, 1821. 32 Ibid. This ritual closely resembles those described in Rath, op. cit., pp.

359-365, as typical of the Carbonari, who used them to give an air of Chris?

tianity to the Society and thereby impress the devoutly Catholic peasantry.

BY ALAN REINERMAN 63

Apponyi at once brought his discovery to Consalvi's attention, and

"had the satisfaction of seeing it produce in him the desired effect of

the most profound indignation, and a marked willingness to agree that

the spiritual authority would be able to co-operate towards this im?

portant goal."33

Consalvi and Apponyi now set to work to uncover further evi?

dence. Aided by the police of Rome, Naples, and Milan, they suc?

ceeded within a few weeks in accumulating much information about

the ways in which the Carbonari had adapted the ritual and beliefs

of Catholicism to their own purposes.34 The aim of such adaptation was, of course, to win for the sect the support of the devout; as

Rath has observed, if the Carbonari used the language of Christianity, "the aim was not to make good Christians, but to turn good Chris?

tians into Carbonari/'35 To Consalvi, however, and no doubt to most

of the Roman Curia as well, such practices represented "the most

detestable blasphemy" which rendered the condemnation of the

Carbonari, so desirable politically, morally desirable as well.36

With such zeal did the cardinal and his collaborators work that

by the end of May the collection of evidence was virtually completed, and he was able to begin the drafting of the brief of condemnation.37

Though the brief was virtually certain of approval by the Pope and

his advisory Congregation of Cardinals, it was absolutely essential, Consalvi warned Apponyi, that "all the formalities required and

prescribed by canon law must be scrupulously observed" before the

condemnation could take place. Otherwise, "by neglecting them the

moral effect of the measure would be destroyed . . . and the spiritual

authority exposed to ridicule and distrust."38

Metternich approved : "the Cardinal is quite right in wishing this ; we wish it just as sincerely as he, and share his fear that by neglect?

ing these formalities ... we would destroy the effect of the measure."

The prince also agreed with a suggestion by Consalvi that since "the

33 HHSA, Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, May 4, 1821.

**Ibid., May 9, #66-B, May 15, #67-A, May 21, #69-C, June 7, #70-K, June 23, #73-A, 1821.

35 Rath, op. cit., p. 362.

36 HHSA, Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, May 9, #66-B, May 15, 1821.

37 Ibid., June 7, #70-K, 1821. A.V., R247, Papal Nuncio in Vienna to Consalvi, May 31, 1821.

38 HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, May 9, 1821, #66-B.

64 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

thunders of the Church alone may be insufficient to destroy this evil," Austria and the Italian states should enact new and stringent laws

against the Carbonari to coincide with the condemnation. In order

that these supplementary measures should harmonize with the brief, he asked Consalvi for a confidential description of its contents before

its publication.39 The cardinal agreed, on condition that "the most

inviolable secrecy must be preserved on this point" to avoid arousing

suspicions of the role which Austria had played in the condemna?

tion.40 Thereafter, although until the actual promulgation of the

brief the Papal government took pains to preserve the strictest

secrecy for fear that premature disclosures would not only weaken the

effect on public opinion but might also lead to reprisals by the sect

against the Pope or his ministers, Consalvi was careful to keep Austria fully informed, in strict confidence, of all that concerned the

process of condemnation.41

In fact, the formalities of which Consalvi had warned did not long

delay the brief, which, by the standards of the Curia, made surprising?

ly rapid progress. Metternich had originally feared that Papal co?

operation with Austria against the sects might be hindered by the

opposition of the Zelanti, the powerful ultra-conservative faction in

the Curia. Bitter enemies of Consalvi and distrustful of Austrian

religious policy, the Zelanti tended to oppose any policy which the

Secretary of State advocated, especially his attempts to co-operate with Austria. However, the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820 and the

subsequent growth of revolutionary activity in the Papal States had

terrified the Zelanti, who were now calling for the strongest measures

to repress this peril. They therefore willingly supported the con?

demnation, even though it meant for once co-operating with their

b?te-noir, Consalvi, and with Austria.42 The rapid approval of the

brief was thus ensured. The Secretary of State completed his draft

of the brief early in July ; an extraordinary Congregation then took

39 Ibid., Rom : Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, May 20, 1821, #2.

40 Ibid., Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, July 9, 1821, #75-A. *ilbid., Apponyi to Metternich, July 9, #75-A, July 22, #76-B, September

1, #82-A; Rom: Varia, Consalvi to Metternich, July 2$, 1821; Apponyi to Metternich, July 27, 28, 1821.

42Ibid., Rom: Varia, Metternich to Consalvi, August 2, 1820; Apponyi to

Metternich, July 27, 1821. Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, September 20, 1820, #2-A.

BY ALAN REINERMAN 65

it under consideration and gave its approval on July 22 ; a few days later Pius VII also approved it.43

All was now in readiness ; however, Consalvi, wishing to be certain

of the complete satisfaction of Austria with the brief, delayed its

promulgation while he dispatched a copy to Metternich for his ap?

proval.44 Metternich reacted to the brief with enthusiasm :

I considered it perfectly suited to the purpose for which it is intended. ... It is written in the best spirit, the wording is clear, precise, and

eloquent; I have no doubt that it will make a profound impression everywhere, but above all in Italy, where this is most desirable. Far from criticizing the contents of the document, as Cardinal Consalvi has authorized, I can only pay a just tribute of admiration to so excel?

lent a work . . . which the most precious interests of the Church im?

periously demanded. It will not, I hope, be less useful to the Temporal Power, which can henceforth act with still greater severity against a class of criminals so dangerous that the Church itself has expelled them_45

Having secured Metternich's approval, Consalvi now proceeded with the promulgation of the brief, which took place on September 13, 1821. The brief declared to be anathema "that society, of recent origin

but widely spread in Italy and elsewhere, which, although divided into many sects and hence called by many names, is nonetheless sub?

stantially one by virtue of a common doctrine and common crimes, and is commonly called the Carbonari." The brief went on to describe the reasons for the condemnation, notably the blasphemous misuse of

Catholic rituals and ceremonies by the Carbonari and their "special hatred" for the Papacy which they wished to overthrow, and con?

cluded by decreeing the excommunication of all present members of

the Society who failed to quit it immediately, and of all who should

hereafter join it ; those excommunicated could only be absolved upon

application to the Pope himself.46

Reaction to the brief was mixed, varying in general with the

political views of those who read it. Official circles in Austria, Italy, and other conservative states naturally greeted its appearance with

43Ibid., Rom: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, July 9, #75-A, July 22, #76-B, September 1, #82-A, 1821.

44 Ibid., Rom : Varia, Apponyi to Metternich, July 271 1821.

45 Ibid., Rom : Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, August 21, 1821, #1.

46 Bullarii Romani Continuatio, XV, 446-448.

66 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

enthusiasm, while supporters of the conservative cause among the

general public likewise tended to praise the wisdom of the Pope in

striking at the revolutionary movement, and to rejoice at the de?

moralizing effect which the condemnation was expected to have upon it.47 The satisfaction of the conservatives was matched by the in?

dignation of the liberals ; in countries where the latter could express their opinions on the subject the condemnation was denounced as a

"triumph of tyranny and hypocrisy,"48 but its possible harmful effects

upon the revolutionary movement were usually minimized or denied.49

Metternich, as we have seen, was highly pleased with the brief.

Convinced of the great moral effect which the brief would have, he

spared no effort to publicize it and to secure the adoption of com?

plementary measures by the civil governments of Italy. The Austrian

government gave wide publicity to the condemnation, in the press and elsewhere, in its Italian territories, and in November issued a

decree in support of it.50 Consalvi on his own initiative had previously

arranged for the distribution of the brief immediately upon its ap?

pearance to every community in the Papal States.51 As for the other

Italian states, Metternich had originally planned that each Aus?

trian envoy would inform the court to which he was accredited of

the condemnation and urge the adoption of supporting legislation.

Consalvi, however, had feared that such a procedure would reveal

Austria's too-close involvement in the condemnation, and persuaded Metternich to change his plan. It was now agreed that on September

13 the Papal representative at each Italian court should inform the

local ruler of the condemnation ; the Austrian diplomats would then

second the efforts of their Papal colleagues to persuade the Italian

princes to adopt the desired measures. This joint pressure was

sufficient to induce most of the Italian states to take advantage of

the condemnation to pass new laws against the Carbonari.52

47 See, e.g., A.V. R247, Vienna Nuncio to Consalvi, September 27, Novem?

ber 26, 1821; R248, Paris Nuncio to Consalvi, October 15, 1821; R252, Naples Nuncio to Consalvi, September 28, 1821.

48 Anonymous, Portrait politique d'Italie en 1822 (Madrid, 1822).

**Ibid. Also, A.V., R248, Paris Nuncio to Consalvi, October 15, 1821. 50

A.V., R247, Vienna Nuncio to Consalvi, September 27, November 26, 1821. 51

HHSA, Rom : Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, September 14, #84-A,

September 17, #87-C, 1821. 52

Ibid., September 1, #82-A, September 14, #84-A, 1821; Weisungen,

Metternich to Apponyi, July 21, #1, August 21, #1, 1821. A.V., R247, Vienna Nuncio to Consalvi, November 26, 1821.

BY ALAN REINERMAN 67

In September, 1821, then, Metternich at last secured the "object to

which I attach the greatest importance," for which he had worked

so long and so zealously?the condemnation that would "serve as the

most potent weapon for the destruction of this pernicious sect."53 He

was well aware that the responsibility for the condemnation was

essentially his, since without his initiative and determination the

Papacy would hardly have acted; and he was well pleased that it

should be so, for thus the glory of destroying the Carbonari would

be his : the condemnation, coming on top of the Austrian suppression of the Neapolitan Revolution, would, he felt, give the coup de gr?ce to the society.54

In contrast, Consalvi had never been entirely convinced of the

efficacy of the condemnation,55 and the historian too must wonder

whether Metternich's expectations were justified. Did the condemna?

tion prove in the event to be so "potent a weapon for the destruction

of this pernicious sect" as he had hoped ?

Given the meager evidence available, no definite answer can be

given to this question. Certainly, both contemporaries of Metternich

and modern historians have doubted that the condemnation produced

any significant effect.56 It can be argued that those with revolutionary

inclinations, being anticlerical in most cases, were unlikely to have

paid much heed to Papal anathemas,57 while those sufficiently devout

to be impressed thereby were not likely to become Carbonari in any case. The Carbonari did in fact decline after 1821 and eventually

disappeared, but this may more plausibly be attributed to the

crushing defeat of the 1820-1821 revolutions and the appearance of

new and more effective revolutionary organizations than to the Papal condemnation.

However, one significant exception must be made to the above line

of reasoning. The Carbonari made a point of giving their society a

53 HHSA, Rom : Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, April 19, 1821.

54 76?., August 21, 1821, #1. 55

A.V., R165, Consalvi to Spina, May 5, 1821. 56

E.g., De Pradt, op. cit., II, 207-209 ; Alberto Aquarone, "La restaurazione

nello Stato Pontificio ed i suoi indirizzi legislativi," Archivio della Societ? romana di Storia Patria, 1955, 119-188.

57 As Consalvi observed to Spina (A.V., R165, May 5, 1821) : "Indeed, we

can strike them with the anathema, but . . . since they already hate our holy

religion, what effect can this produce upon them except to arouse their derision ?"

68 METTERNICH AND THE CARBONARI

Catholic appearance in order to attract the devout. In the words of

the brief :

They affect extraordinary zeal and special respect for the Catholic

religion and the person of Jesus Christ, whom . . . they sometimes

dare to call . . . the Grand Master of their Society. But these claims

. . . are but weapons with which to assail more effectively the unwary ;

they are wiles adopted by these wretches who though dressed as sheep are in truth rapacious wolves.58

The condemnation and the wide publicity given to it made this pose difficult if not impossible to maintain. Henceforth, anyone joining the

society must know that by so doing he came under the ban of the

Church. Though this would not deter the dedicated revolutionary, it

probably cost the Carbonari adherents among the hesitant and the

more devout; to this extent, the condemnation may have contributed

to the society's decline.

If such an outcome was gratifying to Metternich and Consalvi, the

latter at least should have found another effect of the condemnation

less pleasing: the clear identification of the Papacy with the forces

of reaction. Despite the careful precautions taken to avoid giving any hint of the role which Austria had played in the condemnation, the

circumstances were such as inevitably to arouse suspicion. As a

contemporary observer reasoned :

Rome is much indebted to Austria, who has restored the three Legations to it [at the Congress of Vienna], and disencumbered it of the Neapol? itan Revolution. . . . The sect of the Carbonari is the scarecrow of

Austria; when therefore the Pope was seen to excommunicate it, it

may be supposed that he was instigated to do so by Austria in order to complete the work of the Baron de Frimont [commander of the

Austrian expedition to Naples], who is the real excommunicator of the Carbonari... ,59

This contemporary judgment was, as this paper has demonstrated,

essentially correct. Though an adequate basis for the condemnation

on religious grounds could be found in the ceremonies and aims of

the Carbonari, there can be no doubt that the real motivation was the

Papal desire to please Austria, without whose constant pressure the

condemnation would never have been carried out.

58 Bullarii Romani Continuatio, XV, 446. s? De Pradt, op. cit., II, 207-208.

BY ALAN REINERMAN 69

Such apparent support for the cause of reaction naturally embittered

liberals and Italian nationalists against the Papacy, while it grieved and alarmed the more far-sighted among its friends. As one of the

latter warned, apropos of the condemnation :

Policy is seated by the side of religion in her temples, and the priests have become the ministers of the one by means of the other. . . . Suc?

cessor of St. Peter ! . . . make your erring family return to the paths

it has forsaken; it goes astray, it is subservient to a world that makes a tool of it and trifles with it. . .; make it re-enter its legitimate dwelling, the temple, separate its ministry from all connection with

worldly interests, and its mind from co-operation from any faction;

restore to heaven that which it spreads in vain upon the earth. ... A

period replete with great trials for Rome approaches: three hundred

years back, Rome lost a part of Europe; let her take a lesson from

what she did, to guide her in what she will soon be called upon to do.60

But the warning went unheeded, and the lesson was not to be

learned for many decades. Instead, the Papacy was to remain the

ally and instrument of reaction for the better part of a century, and

the resulting rift between the Catholic Church and the progressive forces of the age left a legacy of mutual bitterness and suspicion that

has not yet wholly been effaced.

60 Ibid., II, 210-213.