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Contention 1: Inherency

THA agreement stalled in the US and poses the biggest threat to US-Mexico

relations. Pemex drilling in the gulf key to Mexicos economy but they need

the USs expertise-US hasnt been able to pass THA-Best way to put energy into the agendacooperation-Oil is k2 Mexican Economy1/3 of the budget production-Tech and finance k2 revive PEMEX-Reverse causal: Failure to pass=Setback US: Mexico Relations

Rampton, 13(Roberta Rampton, Associated Press Staff Writer for Reuters. April 29, 2013.U.S.-Mexico deal on expanded Gulf oil drilling still in limbo,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUSL2N0DG0CV20130429)//SDL(Reuters) - More than a year after the United States and Mexico signed a much-lauded deal that

would remove obstacles to expanding deepwater drilling for oil in the Gulf of Mexico, the

agreement still has not been finalized by the United States.The delay, for which people close to the

administration blame Congress while Republicans in Congress blame the administration, is certain to be discussed when PresidentBarack Obama visits Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in Mexico City on Thursday.Mexico immediately ratified

the pactin April 2012, but the United States has so far been unable to pass a simply worded, one-

page law to put the agreement into force.The deal, formally known as the Transboundary

Hydrocarbons Agreement, provides legal guidelines for deepwater drilling in the1.5 million acres

(600,000 hectares) of the Gulf that straddle the U.S.-Mexico boundary.It is seen as the key to

opening a new era of cooperationon oil production between the two countries. Mexico's state-owned oil company

Pemex needs technology and investment to boost its stagnant production, and U.S.

companies are eager to help."The U.S. has a real opportunity now to put energy back on the

agenda with Mexicoin a way that it really hasn't been able to be on the agenda for the last several years," said Neil Brown,who worked on the issue during the last Congress as lead Republican international energy aide in the Senate.But the final step ofimplementing the deal has languished."I'm not aware of strong opposition to it. I think it's been a little more inertia," said JasonBordoff, a top energy official at the White House until January who now runs Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy.In the past several weeks, there have been some signs that the implementing legislation may move forward, but there also could

be new complications related to disclosure requirements.DEAL COULD OPEN THE DOOROil is critical for the

Mexican economy, paying for a third of the government's budget. But productionpeaked in 2004 at

3.4 million barrels per day and has slippedbelow 2.6 million bpd. PEMEX says it can revive production with

deepwater wells in the Gulf, but needs technical and financial help.The cross-border

agreement would be the first step toward joint projects for reservoirs that cross the

boundary, providing a way for PEMEX and other oil companies to share production and

creating a framework to solve disputes that could arise."Without the agreement, it creates

a barrier to investment," said Erik Melito, a director at the American Petroleum Institute, the oil industry's lobby group.

The agreement could help calm Mexico's fears about what is termed the "popote" or drinking-straw effect - fears

that U.S. oil companies are going to drain reservoirs that extend into Mexico's side of the

border, robbing Mexico of its share,said David Goldwyn, a former State Department official who helped launchnegotiations."This has been an urban myth in Mexico for decades," said Goldwyn, now president of Goldwyn Global Strategies, aconsulting firm.Pena Nieto is working toward reforms for PEMEX that would allow for more production and cooperation in

projects generally - a delicate issue in a country where PEMEX and oil are symbols of national pride."If they cansee some success here (with the transboundary deal), that's going to change the political conversation in Mexico," Goldwyn said.

Failing to implement the deal, though, would be a major setback for U.S.-Mexico energy

relations , former U.S. Senator Richard Lugar warned in December, in one of his final reports as the top Republican on the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee before he left Congress.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUSL2N0DG0CV20130429)/SDLhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUSL2N0DG0CV20130429)/SDLhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/29/usa-mexico-oil-idUSL2N0DG0CV20130429)/SDL


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Advantage 1: Mexico

Drilling in the Western Gap is inevitablecooperation is key to effectiveness-US out competes Mexico in resource development- Exploiting is happening now-Co-op=

Urdaneta 10associate at Grau Garcia Hernandez & Monaco (Law Firm) (Karla,TRANSBOUNDARY PETROLEUM RESERVOIRS: A RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR THE UNITEDSTATES AND MEXICO IN THE DEEPWATERS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO, Houston Journal of

International Law, Volume 32, Number 2, Spring 2010)

In view of this, Mexico is primarily concerned with reservoirs located outside the Western

Gap, and more specifically, those located in the Perdido fold belt. Nonetheless, it is only a

matter of time until the Western Gap is made available for exploitation andproduction by both countries, which will create the same issues for the Western Gap

faced by other areas of the GOM. The principal challenges that Pemex faces with regard to deep-water productioninclude: (i) human resources; (ii) exploration; (iii) exploitation; (iv) technology; and (v) financing. (85) These challenges will have to beassumed in the short term because Mexico's oil production is decreasing, and Pemex has estimated that fifty-five percent of the country's

54 billion barrels of equivalent oil from prospective resources (86) is located in deep-waters. (87) Currently, Mexico cannot

compete with the United States with regard to the development of the resources in

the GOM, for it has not yet progressed beyond the stage of exploration. In order to strengthenPemex's financial and technical capacities and provide it with more flexibility for the performance of its functions, Mexico began reformingits energy legislation. (88) This process ended in November 2008. However, the last legislative reform does not endow Pemex w ith the

capital and technology necessary to undertake the activities of exploration a nd production of deep-waters in the GOM. (89) The issue

of transboundary reservoirs has attracted the attention of Mexican lawmakers,

politicians, and economists, among others. (90) Most of them advise taking prompt

action to protect Mexico's rights to its resources.(91) Moreover, the exploitation of theresources located in the GOM will be a way for Mexico to increase its levels of

petroleum production.To summarize, in the GOM (i) there are formations, like the Perdido fold belt, that cross the maritime

boundary of Mexico and the United States, and that will enable production as early as 2010, (ii) substantial exploration

activity has already been conducted by the United States, (iii) large areas have been

leased by the United States for exploitation, while others are currently being

exploited, (iv) Mexico has not achieved the levels of resource development that the

United States has achieved, and (v) both countries need to take advantage of the production of their hydrocarbons in the

short term. (92) In light of these circumstances, with the aim of protecting the rights of both

countries and optimizing the use of resources, it would be appropriate for Mexico and

the United States to cooperate in the development of their transboundary reservoirs.

This cooperation will maximize economic benefits, avoid physical waste, increaseenergy security, and avoid international disputes likely to arise if the United States

initiates production of the transboundary reservoirs. Cooperation has led to beneficial

results among other countries that have faced similar dilemmas.

PEMEX is failing

Melgar 2k12[Senior reporter for Americas Daily-http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3781)]
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Exploration and Production: The Keys to Deeper ReformThe 2008 Energy Reform initiated the makeover of

the Mexican exploration and production (E&P) industry. Crucial institutional arrangements

were defined, such as the governance of PEMEX, the establishment of a regulator for E&P, the terms for

procurement, and the structure of contracts.Some of the innovations have since raised questions about

their usefulness. But they opened a path toward an institutional architecture that resembles

more closely the organization of the oil industry worldwide. Mexico continues to have one of the mostif

not the mostclosed arrangements in the petroleum industry. The lack of outside investment and input in

PEMEX Exploration and Production (PEP), the crown jewel subsidiary of PEMEX, has hindered

innovation and technological advancement. The limits of existing arrangements become

increasingly evident as traditional areas of production decline and new opportunities, such as in

the deep and ultra-deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, are pursued under tougher conditions.Preserving the status

quoand maintaining legal coherencehas been made more costly by the refusal to amend the

Constitution to allow some degree of private participation in the energy sectoras has been done inBrazil, Norway and even Cuba. Mexicos oil industry is accepting inefficiency while paying a high price to pretend that it can do it allon its own.In fact, world-class service companies such as Halliburton, Schlumberger, Noble, and Baker-Hughes work closely with

pemex engineers to keep the oil flowing. According to Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, PEMEX paid over $16 billion for

oil field services in 2007. PEP is repeatedly the number-one client of Schlumberger.A central element of the 2008 Energy

Reform was the definition of a new incentive-based contractual framework. The model was developed to attract

leading oil companies to the Mexican market while keeping the constitutional mandate intact.

It relies on a fee-per-barrel rate determined in a bidding process, where ownership of

hydrocarbons belongs to the Mexican state. Production, profits and risk are not shared, and

there is no reserve booking for the companies.Thus far, the new contract model has not attracted any major oil

companies. It has been applied to low-risk projects where a high recovery rate is ensured. Instead

of having a Petrobras or a Chevron working jointly with PEMEX in the deep waters of the Gulf

of Mexico, bidding has gone to mature fields, with services companies such as the United

Kingdoms Petrofac Facilities Management winning the auction.

Expanding drilling in the Western Gap is key to boost Pemex production

Iliff 12 (Laurence, Pemex Makes Its First Big Oil Find in Deep Gulf, The Wall Street Journal, 8-29-2012,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444914904577619712736497598.html)

Mexican state-owned oil firm Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, has made its first big

crude-oil discovery in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, near the Mexico-U.S.

maritime boundary, President Felipe Calderon said Wednesday. Mr. Calderon said the initial estimate of a deposit

in the Perdido area on Mexico's side of the Gulf was between 250 million and 400

million barrels of light crude, using the industry's broadest measurement of "proven,

probable and possible," or 3P, reserves. The exploratory well was drilled in 2,500 meters (8,250 feet) of water. "We estimate

that this deposit could belong to one of the most important regions of the deep-water

Gulf," he said. The larger "petroleum system" of additional fields, Mr. Calderon added, "could havefrom four billion to 10 billion barrels of crude, which bolsters our reserves and will

allow Mexico to maintain and increase petroleum production in the medium- and

long-term." The new well, dubbed "Trion I," was drilled 39 kilometers (24 miles) south of the U.S.-Mexico maritime border, and 180 kilometers east ofGulf state of Tamaulipas, which also borders the U.S. On the U.S. side of the Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell RDSB.LN -0.11% PLC operates its Perdido oil-and-gas platformin the region. The platform has a peak production capacity of 100,000 barrels per day, according to Shell's website. Prior to Pemex's discovery of crude oil at Trion,the oil monopoly had found only natural gas during the recent increase of its deep-water exploratory efforts. Carlos Morales, head of Pemex's exploration-and-production division, said in a radio i nterview that Trion I could be among the top 10 crude-oil discoveries on either side of the Gulf. He said typically a deposit ofits type would take seven years to get to the production phase, but that Pemex is going to try to do that in five years. Mr. Morales said Pemex began committingmore resources to Gulf oil exploration in 2007 with the construction of special drilling platforms and said he foresees a Tamaulipas oil port to service Pemex's

future operations in the Gulf. Mr. Morales said pushing aggressively into deep waters could raise Pemex's


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crude-oil production to four million barrels a day from the current 2.55 million barrels

a day. The deep waters of the Gulf are seen by analysts as one of Pemex's best bets to

have another surge of oil production after eight years of steady declines . Pemex has traditionallydrilled in the shallow waters of the southern Gulf, where the discovery of the supergiant Cantarell complex in the late 1970s launched Mexico as an oil power.Cantarell's output peaked at more than two million barrels of oil per day in 2004 and is now around 400,000 barrels a day. Mr. Calderon, who held up a sample ofcrude oil taken from the well, said half of Pemex's petroleum reserves could be in the deep waters of the Gulf. Pemex reported proven hydrocarbon reserves of

13.8 billion barrels of oil equivalent as of Jan. 1. Its 3P reserves were 43.8 billion barrels of

oil equivalent. Under current law, Mexico doesn't allow foreign companies to drill inits territory except under contract to Pemex, with strict rules that ban the sharing of risk or of oil. Oil majors have ex pressedinterest in drilling with Pemex on the Mexican side of the Gulf, but only under shared-risk contracts.

Melgar 12director of the Center for Sustainability and Business at EGADE Business Schoolof the Tecnolgico de Monterrey.(Lourdes, The Future of PEMEX, Americas Quarterly,2012,http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3781)The challenge for PEMEX is to increase reserves and oil and gas production in areas that are not part of its traditional zone of expertise.

PEMEX has been outstanding at E&P in shallow waters. But its experience is mostly

limited to 3,300 feet(1,000 meters) deepfar above the 8,200 to 11,500 feet (2,500 to 3,500 meters) needed in the

most interesting area of the Gulf of Mexico. Going to deep and ultra-deep waters or to complex, fractured

onshore fields such as Chicontepec requires new skills. Mexico is in the process of developing regulatoryand safety measures to do so. But it is not a matter of buying technology in the

market, as some politicians have asserted. Particularly in the case of deepwater

production, international best practices show that because of the associated

complexity and high risk, no company can operate alone.The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in April 2010,when a BP-operated drilling rig exploded on the U.S. side of the Gulf of Mex ico and caused a 4.9 million barrel leak, reinforces the concerns

over risks. Ideally, PEMEX would enter in a joint venture with companies at the cutting edge

of deepwater production, such as Chevron, Shell, Petrobras, or BP. Yet this is

prohibited by the Mexican Constitution, and the new contracts are unlikely to attract

those companies. In the past decade, over 4 billion barrels were extracted on the U.S. side of the deep waters of the Gulf of

Mexico. The area offers one of the richest potentials for oil and gas production. That is

why the U.S., Mexico and Cuba are eager to exploit those resources, most of which lie

in the deep and ultra-deep waters of the Gulf of Mexicowhere E&P presents great challenges and highrisks. But the sophisticated technical and managerial requirements of deepwater E&P are a great challenge for Mexico. Still, in acontroversial move, PEMEX has rented three rigs to initiate deepwater drilling in the Perdido Fold Belt area in the northwestern Gulf of

Mexico. The National Hydrocarbons Commission (CNH) recently approved regulations

that are consistent with those in the U.S., but the newly established agency does not

yet have the personnel required for the oversight; nor does it have the legal authority

to force PEMEX to wait.
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The plan solvesthe Transboundary Hydrocarbon Agreement would cause

PEMEX reforms by giving Mexico an overwhelming economic incentive

Melgar, 12(Lourdes Melgar, director of the Center for Sustainability and Business at EGADEBusiness School of the Tecnolgico de Monterrey. The Future of PEMEX, Americas Quarterly,

2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3781)//SDLDeepwater drilling is likely to take center stage with the signing of the U.S.MexicoTransboundary Hydrocarbon Agreementin February 2012. The agreement, ratified by the Mexican Senate but

still awaiting approval in the U.S., relieves concerns about the so-called straw effect, in which Mexican

oil is sipped away by the U.S. as its production advances closer to the international maritime

border in the Gulf of Mexico.The agreement provides a legal framework for development of

oil and gas reservoirs that cross the maritime border in the Gulf of Mexicothe first such pact for both countries.In fact, it is viewed as a dress rehearsal for negotiations the U.S. will have to undertake with Canada, Russia and even Cuba toaddress shared reservoir exploitation.Implementation will require legal and institutional adjustments in Mexico and in the United

States. Since it requires joint or coordinated production, the agreement possibly opens a new

era of cooperation between PEMEX and international oil companies. If a transboundary field

were identified, PEMEX would have to work with field operators on the U.S. side.This makes

technological aptitude particularly relevant, since shared reservoirs are more likely to exist in the deep and ultra-deep waters of theGulf of Mexico.For sovereignty, energy security and political reasons, Mexico will go the extra

mile to ensure that its hydrocarbon resources are not lost to its neighbor. This gives it a high

incentive to develop the institutional architectureincluding strengthening the CNHneeded

to implement the agreement. Identifying and developing a joint reservoir would allow PEMEX

to work in full partnership with companies at the cutting edge of ultra-deepwater production.The experience, benefits and know-how that would be gained may reduce the reluctance to undertake joint production and otherstrategic alliances that are banned by PEMEX bylaws. Implementation of the treaty could trigger an accelerated transformation of

the regime under which deepwater resources are exploited in Mexico.Exciting times are in sight. The incomingadministration will be compelled to conduct a debate on the future of PEMEX, and the issue of constitutional reform will have to be

a full part of it. The Mexican oil industry can no longer thrive on amendments to distorted

schemes.

PEMEX is critical to the Mexican economy ---- THA reforms key to solve

Samples and Vittor, 12(Tim R. Samples and Jose Luis Vittor, associate and partners atHogan Lovells US LLP. Energy Reform and the Future of Mexicos Oil Industry: The Pemex

Bidding Rounds and Integrated Service Contracts, Texas Journal of Oil, Gas, and Energy Law, 6-21-2012, http://tjogel.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Samples-Formatted_Final_June13.pdf)In recent years, Latin America has seen an uptick in interest as a destination for companies

seeking new opportunities in the exploration and production of oil and gas.1From the discovery ofmassive pre-salt oil fields off the coast of Brazil to unconventional plays in Argentina and Colombia, the region is generating

renewed interest for the international energy industry. Four countries in particularBrazil, Colombia, Mexico, and

Peruare moving forward with bidding rounds for significant exploration and production

contractswith hopes of attracting technology, expertise, and capital from the private sector. The case ofPetrleosMexicanos (Pemex) and Mexico is especially compelling. As a state-controlled monopoly, Pemex is the

sole producer of crude oil, natural gas, and refined products in Mexico.2Pemex, the most

important company in Mexico, is simultaneously referred to as the cash cow and a sacred

cow of Mexico.3As Mexicos cash cow, Pemex provides over a third of the federal

governments revenues.4As Mexicos sacred cow, Pemex has immense and symbolic national

importance, which is deeply rooted in Mexicos sense of sovereignty and independence.5

Increasingly, these two roles are in tension as Pemex struggles to remain a cash cow while


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subject to the legal and political constraints of a sacred national treasure.6For most of the 20thcentury, Mexico figured among the worlds largest oil producers and has been a major exporter for much of that time.7

Currently, however, Mexico is facing the prospect of becoming a net importer of petroleumwithin

a decade.8Pemex has recently undergone transformations in response to declining production,

but reversing the tide will require a dramatic departure from the norm.9Politically sensitive

reforms to the energy sector and a major shift in the traditional Pemex paradigm are needed.10 Together, Mexico and

Pemex are entering unfamiliar territory.11While a restrictive legal framework has barred competition within

Mexicos borders, Pemex is subject to rigid constraints under Mexican law with respect to finance

and budgeting, contracting, procurement, and corporate governance.12 The collective

weight of these restrictions has limited Pemexs ability to address lagging production.13 Inresponse, under the administration of President Felipe Caldern, legislation designed to modernize Pemex and allow greaterprivate participation in the Mexican oil industry was passed in November 2008 (the Energy Reforms).14

PEMEX decline will trigger instability throughout Mexicotimeframe is 10

yearsKohl, 12(Keith, 11-27-12. Crisis of Consumption,http://www.energyandcapital.com/articles/mexican-oil-crisis/2833)//SDLOf course, we all know the story behind the Cantarell field's downfall. Once production started to decline, Pemex

began injecting nitrogen to boost output. But this strategy was short-lived, and production at

the field has been dropping sharply sinceroughly 14% each yearfor the last six years.Cantarell's

decline marked the beginning of the end for Mexican oil production.The country's new finds have alsoproven underwhelming. The recent discovery by Pemex in Southern Mexico is a perfect example. According to Pemex, the new fieldholds up to 500 million barrels of crude oil, a trifle compared to the billions of barrels Cantarell once held.But these days,

Mexico will take whatever it can get... and pray it can hold off the decline .Crisis of Consumption

Mexico's declining oil production means there's less oil available for export.Those 2.5 million

barrels flowing from Pemex's wells daily are crucial to the country's stability.When almost

40% of your government budget is paid from oil revenue, exporting less oil is not an option

but that's exactly what's happening(click charts to enlarge):mexico exports to u.s.During the first eight months of2012, Mexican oil exports to the United States were slightly above one million barrels per day. Last May oil exports fell below one

million barrels per day for the first time in 27 years.Barring some miracle taking place in Mexico's oilindustry, I believe the country will be a net oil importer within ten years.

Mexican stability is critical to U.S. power

Kaplan, 12(Robert D. Kaplan, chief geopolitical analyst at Stratfor. With the Focus on Syria,Mexico Burns, Stratfor, 3-28-2012, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/focus-syria-mexico-burns)//SDLWhile the foreign policy elite in Washington focuses on the 8,000 deaths in a conflict in Syria -- half a world away from the UnitedStates -- more than 47,000 people have died in drug-related violence since 2006 in Mexico. A deeply troubled state as well as a

demographic and economic giant on the United States' southern border, Mexico will affect America's destiny in

coming decades more than any state or combination of states in the Middle East . Indeed, Mexico

may constitute the world's seventh-largest economy in the near future.Certainly, while the Mexicanviolence is largely criminal, Syria is a more clear-cut moral issue, enhanced by its own strategic consequences. A calcifiedauthoritarian regime in Damascus is stamping out dissent with guns and artillery barrages. Moreover, regime change in Syria, whichthe rebels demand, could deliver a pivotal blow to Iranian influence in the Middle East, an event that would be the best news to U.S.interests in the region in years or even decades.Nevertheless, the Syrian rebels are divided and hold no territory, and the topplingof pro-Iranian dictator Bashar al Assad might conceivably bring to power an austere Sunni regime equally averse to U.S. interests -- ifnot lead to sectarian chaos. In other words, all military intervention scenarios in Syria are fraught with extreme risk. Precisely for

that reason, that the U.S. foreign policy elite has continued for months to feverishly debate Syria,

and in many cases advocate armed intervention, while utterly ignoring the vaster panorama


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of violence next door in Mexico, speaks volumes about Washington's own obsessions and

interests, which are not always aligned with the country's geopolitical interests.Syria matters and

matters momentously to U.S. interests, but Mexico ultimately matters more , so one would think that there would beat least some degree of parity in the amount written on these subjects. I am not demanding a switch in news coverage from onecountry to the other, just a bit more balance. Of course, it is easy for pundits to have a fervently interventionist view on Syria

precisely because it is so far away, whereas miscalculation in Mexico on America's part would carry far

greater consequences. For example, what if the Mexican drug cartels took revenge on San Diego?Thus, one might even argue that the very noise in the media about Syria, coupled with the

relative silence about Mexico, is proof that it is the latter issue that actually is too sensitive for

loose talk.It may also be that cartel-wracked Mexico -- at some rude subconscious level -- connotes for East Coast elites a southof the border, 7-Eleven store culture, reminiscent of the crime movie "Traffic," that holds no allure to people focused on ancientcivilizations across the ocean. The concerns of Europe and the Middle East certainly seem closer to New York and Washington thandoes the southwestern United States. Indeed, Latin American bureaus and studies departments simply lack the cachet of Middle

East and Asian ones in government and universities. Yet, the fate of Mexico is the hinge on which the United

States' cultural and demographic future rests.U.S. foreign policy emanates from the

domestic condition of its society, and nothing will affect its society more than the dramatic

movement of Latin history northward. By 2050, as much as a third of the American population

could be Hispanic. Mexico and Central America constitute a growing demographic and

economic powerhouse with which the United States has an inextricable relationship. In recentyears Mexico's economic growth has outpaced that of its northern neighbor. Mexico's population of 111million plus Central America's of more than 40 million equates to half the population of the United States.Because of the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement, 85 percent of Mexico's exports go to the United States, even as half of Central America's trade iswith the United States. While the median age of Americans is nearly 37, demonstrating the aging tendency of the U.S. population,the median age in Mexico is 25, and in Central America it is much lower (20 in Guatemala and Honduras, for example). In partbecause of young workers moving northward, the destiny of the United States could be north-south, rather than the east-west, sea-to-shining-sea of continental and patriotic myth. (This will be amplified by the scheduled 2014 widening of the Panama Canal, whichwill open the Greater Caribbean Basin to megaships from East Asia, leading to the further development of Gulf of Mexico port citiesin the United States, from Texas to Florida.)Since 1940, Mexico's population has increased more than five-fold. Between 1970 and1995 it nearly doubled. Between 1985 and 2000 it rose by more than a third. Mexico's population is now more than a third that of

the United States and growing at a faster rate. And it is northern Mexicothat is crucial. That most of the drug-

related homicides in this current wave of violence that so much dwarfs Syria's have occurred

in only six of Mexico's 32 states, mostly in the north, is a key indicator of how northern Mexico is being distinguished

from the rest of the country (though the violence in the city of Veracruz and the regions of Michoacan and Guerrero is also notable).If the military-led offensive to crush the drug cartels launched by conservative President Felipe Calderon

falters, as it seems to be doing, and Mexico City goes back to cutting deals with the cartels, then the capital may in a

functional sense lose even further control of the north, with concrete implications for the

southwestern United States.One might argue that with massive border controls, a functional and vibrantly nationalistUnited States can coexist with a dysfunctional and somewhat chaotic northern Mexico. But that is mainly true in the short run.

Looking deeper into the 21st century, as Arnold Toynbee notes in A Study of History (1946), a border between a highly

developed society and a less highly developed one will not attain an equilibrium but will

advance in the more backward society's favor. Thus, helping to stabilize Mexico-- as limited as the

United States' options may be, given the complexity and sensitivity of the relationship -- is a more urgent national

interest than stabilizing societies in the Greater Middle East. If Mexico ever does reach coherent First Worldstatus, then it will become less of a threat, and the healthy melding of the two societies will quicken to the benefit of both.Today,

helping to thwart drug cartels in rugged and remote terrain in the vicinity of the Mexicanfrontierand reaching southward from Ciudad Juarez (across the border from El Paso, Texas) means a limited role for

the U.S. military and other agencies -- working, of course, in full cooperation with the Mexican

authorities. (Predator and Global Hawk drones fly deep over Mexico searching for drug production facilities.) But the legalframework for cooperation with Mexico remains problematic in some cases because of strict interpretation of 19th century possecomitatus laws on the U.S. side. While the United States has spent hundreds of billions of dollars to affect historical outcomes inEurasia, its leaders and foreign policy mandarins are somewhat passive about what is happening to a country with which the UnitedStates shares a long land border, that verges on partial chaos in some of its northern sections, and whose population is close to

double that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Mexico , in addition to the obvious challenge of China as a rising great power,


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will help write the American story in the 21st century. Mexico will partly determine what

kind of society America will become, and what exactly will be its demographic and

geographic character , especially in the Southwest.The U.S. relationship with China will matter more than anyother individual bilateral relationship in terms of determining the United States' place in the world, especially in the economically

crucial Pacific. If policymakers in Washington calculate U.S. interests properly regarding those two

critical countries, then the United States will have power to spare so that its elites can

continue to focus on serious moral questions in places that matter less.

Heg solves nuclear war

Brooks et al 13[Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College.G. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professorof Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Publicand International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University.William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel WebsterProfessor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment,

Winter 2013, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pages 7-51, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107]

A core premise of deep engagementis that it preventsthe emergence of afar more dangerous global security

environment . For one thing, as noted above, the United States overseas presence gives it the leverage to

restrain partners from taking provocative action . Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitmentsalso

deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansionand make its

partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threatenothers andthus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects ofanarchy is consistent withinfluential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone worldthat would emerge absent the American Pacifier is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecastsdangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation andassociated preventive wartemptations, regional rivalries, andeven runs at regional hegemony and full-scale greatpower war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capturemost of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is nota U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a c omplex future counterfactual

(what would happen to Eurasias security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, ea ch of theseresponses isnonetheless aweakerargument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories thatdiscount the conflict-generating potential of a narchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the highexpected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, andan array of policies and practices that canbeused credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasias major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the Americanpacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions wherethe kinds ofstabilizersthat nonrealist theories point tosuch as democratic governance or dense institutional linkagesare

either absent or weakly present . There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making

this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal .Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubtEuropean governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a

Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing withinthe region and beyond(e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might wantEuropean participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about theother parts of Eurasia where theUnited States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins

to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washingtonnotably Israel,

Egypt, and Saudi Arabiamighttake actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensifysecurity dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the regions prospects without the
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American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are

likely to obtain a nuclear capacity andincrease their military commitments, which couldstoke a destabilizing

reaction from China . It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwanmoved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity

and wereonly constrainedfrom doing so by astill-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the beton defensive realisms sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realisms optimism

about what would happen if the United States retrenched isvery much dependent onitsparticularand highlyrestrictiveassumptionabout state preferences; once we relax thisassumption, then much of its basisforoptimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquilitythroughout Eurasia rests on theassumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection fromviolent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is

extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoningresearch across the social and other sciences , however, undermines

thatcore assumption: states have preferencesnot only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims,

and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define securitynot just in terms of territorial

protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that arerelatively secure maynevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case.77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices.

To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significantdeterioration in the security environmen t inat least some of the worlds key regions. We have already mentioned the

third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either

a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis

instability, nuclear proliferation , and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of

local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional

great power war ). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars andsecurity dilemmas in the worlds core regions is not a U.S. na tional interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasianpowers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing

on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationallyreluctant to run theretrenchment experiment.First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous

place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition , one would see

overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client statesallof which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the

United States. Greater regional insecurity couldwell feed proliferationcascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South

Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation

decisionsby any of these actors would be the end of the game: they wouldlikely generate pressure locally for moreproliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates a re proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality andnarrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most willovercome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence insuch probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by

analystswho are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferationincluding the

risk of accidents andthe prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces

seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis

dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher asthe number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these

concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yetmore worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions,acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the differencebetween retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United


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States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and pass thebuck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The Uni ted States should commit toonshore balancing only when local balancing islikely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century.

The problem is thatChinas riseputs the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the

table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, The United States will have to play a key role in

countering China , because its Asian neighbors are not strong enoughto do it by themselves. 81 Therefore, unless Chinas rise

stalls, the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward theSoviet Unionduring the Cold War. 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing

in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as theformidably expensive

military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asiajustwhat the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the a rgument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highlyinfluential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security

consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover,switchingbetween offshore and onshore balancing couldwell be difficult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the argumentsdiscussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplyingreassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competitionin the worlds key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of ahothouse atmosphere for growingnew

military capabilities.

Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverageto prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United Statesformidable military

machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows,and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. I n addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting thefocused enmity of the United States. 84 All of the worlds most modern militaries are U.S. allies (Americas alliance sy stem of more than sixty countries now accounts for some

80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

Nations arent nice

Kagan, 12(Robert Kagan, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, Why theWorld Needs America, February 11th,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html)//SDL

With the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalismofEuropean civilization approaching its pinnaclecollapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism and

economic calamity.The once-promising spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a

handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The

collapse of the British and European orders in the 20th century did not produce a new dark

agethough if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might havebut the horrific conflict that it

produced was, in its own way,just as devastating.If the U.S. is unable to maintain its hegemony

on the high seas, would other nations fill in the gaps?. Would the end of the present American-dominatedorder have less dire consequences? A surprising number of American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospectwith equanimity. There is a general sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not meanthe end of the present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the currenteconomic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers.American power may diminish, the political scientist G. JohnIkenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator

Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live within theframework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrumRepublicans who call forretrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutionswho don't imagine that a "post-American world"

would look very different from the American world.If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order

was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the

balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit

their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-

American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the

capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of


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power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance

would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect

dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we

will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in anew, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democraciesBrazil, India, Turkey, South Africapicked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it.What about the economic

order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from thepresent system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.A Romney Adviser Readby DemocratsRobert Kagan's new book, "The World America Made," is finding an eager readership in the nation's capital, amongprominent members of both political parties.Around the time of President Barack Obama's Jan. 24 State of the Union Address,Washington was abuzz with reports that the president had discussed a portion of the book with a group of news anchors.Mr.Kagan serves on the Foreign Policy Advisory Board of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, but more notably, in this election season, heis a foreign policy adviser to the presidential campaign of Mitt Romney.The president's speech touched upon the debate overwhether America is in decline, a central theme of Mr. Kagan's book. "America is back," he declared, referring to a range of recent

U.S. actions on the world stage. "Anyone who tells you otherwise, anyone who tells you that America is in decline

or that our influence has waned, doesn't know what they're talking about," he continued. "America

remains the one indispensable nation in world affairsand as long as I'm president, I intend to keep it that

way."Says Mr. Kagan: "No president wants to preside over American decline, and it's good to see

him repudiate the idea that his policy is built on the idea that American influence must fade."

Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a

liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and

able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is

unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on

the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would

this produce an open global commonsor rising tension? China and India are building bigger

navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has

noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India

deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-

dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for

competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order.And do the Chinese really value an

open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will

be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, butin percapita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S.,Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over

$40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and

Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only

be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly whereSlovenia and Greece are today.[Multipolar

systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful.Nearly ahalfmillion combatants died in the Crimean War (depicted in "The Taking of Malakoff" by Horace Vernet, pictured here.)As Arvind

Subramanian and other economists have pointed out, this will make for a historically unique situation. In the

past, the largest and most dominant economies in the world have also been the richest.

Nations whose peoples are such obvious winners in a relatively unfettered economic system

have less temptation to pursue protectionist measures and have more of an incentive to keep

the system open.China's leaders, presiding over a poorer and still developing country, may

prove less willing to open their economy. They have already begun closing some sectors to

foreign competition and are likely to close others in the future.Even optimists like Mr. Subramanian

believe that the liberal economic order will require "some insurance" against a scenario in which

"China exercises its dominance by either reversing its previous policies or failing to open areas

of the economy that are now highly protected." American economic dominance has been welcomed by much ofthe world because, like the mobster Hyman Roth in "The Godfather," the U.S. has always made money for its partners. Chineseeconomic dominance may get a different reception.Another problem is that China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by thestate, with the ultimate goal of preserving the rule of the Communist Party. Unlike the eras of British and American pre-eminence,when the leading economic powers were dominated largely by private individuals or companies, China's system is more like the


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mercantilist arrangements of previous centuries. The government amasses wealth in order to secure its continued rule and to payfor armies and navies to compete with other great powers.Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open internationaleconomic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state'scontrol of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how

to keep both it and themselves alive.Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great

powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world?Mostcommentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar

harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularlypeaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to miscalculation. Conflicts erupt as

a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation.War among the great powers was a

common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarityfrom the 16th to the 18thcenturies, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and endedwith Napoleon's defeat in 1815.The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decadeseach, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian,French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants andmany more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, ofwhom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded.The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tensionand competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, themost destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker hasobserved, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the

essential means for maintaining the balance of power."There is little reason to believe that a return to

multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in thepast. The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-

power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand .President Bill Clinton left office believingthat the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower,"to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done?

For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order rarely survive the

decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They

don't hold the building up; the building holds them up.Many foreign-policy experts see the presentinternational order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasinglyglobal economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior and the gradual but inevitabletriumph of liberal democracy over other forms of governmentforces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations.

Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and

justnot only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the

triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system,

and that both are irreversible.That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the

end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable

evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen.But

international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision

over othersin America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles,

together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as

long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it.There

was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence orunfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will

outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been

and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell tomore powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s.

The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to

champion it.If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American

power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse

altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may

discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that


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the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe

which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

PEMEX solvency and reform are critical to battling drug cartels in MexicoOSullivan 12 professor of international affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government(Meghan, served on the National Security Council from 2004 to 2007, and was deputy nationalsecurity advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, Mexican Oil Reforms Are Vital on Both Sides of theBorder, reprinted from CFR at Bloomberg, 7-30-2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-30/mexican-oil-reforms-are-vital-on-both-sides-of-the-border.html)In recent days a coalition of Mexican advocacy groups has been protestingin front ofTelevisa, the

countrys largest TV network, to contest the legitimacy of President-elect Enrique Pena Nietos July 1 victory.These

protests are the second in a string of such demonstrationsscheduled before Pena Nieto takes office in

December. They bode ill for Mexicos near-term political future, pointing to a rocky transition at a

time when the challenges facing the country are anything but modest. Americans might

assume that tackling the drug tradethat has resulted in more than 47,000 deaths since 2006 would top the agenda.

But a strong case can be made that energy reforms are at least as urgent, for if Mexico cant

stem its sharply deteriorating energy situation, its ability to tackle other systemic problemswill be severely compromised.Despite some recent progress in diversifying its economy, Mexico still relies on

oil for 30 percent of its fiscal revenue. Yet oil production has plummetedfrom 3.4 million barrels a day

in 2004 to 2.5 million in 2011, with most experts predicting a continuing decline over the next decade.Absent changes, Mexico could be a net importer of oil by 2020, ceasing exports to the U.S. altogether.

Drug cartels instability will spill over throughout Latin AmericaBonner 10 senior principal of the Sentinel HS Group(Robert C., former administrator of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, The New

Cocaine Cowboys, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2010,

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66472/robert-c-bonner/the-new-cocaine-cowboys)The recent headlines from Mexico are disturbing: U.S. consular official gunned down in broad

daylight; Rancher murdered by Mexican drug smuggler; Bomb tossed at U.S. consulate in Nuevo

Laredo. This wave of violence is eerily reminiscent of the carnage that plagued Colombia 20

years ago, and it is getting Washington's attention.Mexico is in the throes of a battle against

powerful drug cartels, the outcome of which will determine who controls the country's law

enforcement, judicial, and political institutions. It will decide whether the state will destroy

the cartels and put an end to the culture of impunity they have created. Mexico could become

a first-world country one day, but it will never achieve that status until it breaks the grip these

criminal organizationshave over all levels of government and strengthens its law enforcement and judicial institutions. Itcannot do one without doing the other.Destroying the drug cartels is not an impossible task. Two decades ago, Colombia was facedwith a similar -- and in many ways more daunting -- struggle. In the early 1990s, many Colombians, including police officers, judges,presidential candidates, and journalists, were assassinated by the most powerful and fearsome drug-trafficking organizations theworld has ever seen: the Cali and Medelln cartels. Yet within a decade, the Colombian government defeated them, with

Washington's help. The United States played a vital role in supporting the Colombian government, and it should do the same forMexico.The stakes in Mexico are high. If the cartels win, these criminal enterprises will

continue to operate outside the state and the rule of law, undermining Mexico's democracy.

The outcome matters for the United States as well -- if the drug cartels succeed, the United

States will share a 2,000-mile border with a narcostate controlled by powerful transnational

drug cartels that threaten the stability of Central and South America.


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LATIN AMERICAN INSTABILITYFIND CARD

Independently, plan sets a precedent -- solves resilient US-Mexico energy

cooperation

Wood 12 senior associate in the Americas program at CSIS(Duncan, also director of the international relations program at Mexicos Autonomous Instituteof Technology, Global Insider: U.S.-Mexico Energy Deal Sets Important Precedent, WorldPolitics Review, 4-24-2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/11880/global-insider-u-s-mexico-energy-deal-sets-important-precedent)WPR: What is the history of energy cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico?Duncan Wood: Since

the nationalization of Mexican oilin 1938, the relationshipbetween the two countries in energy matters

has been sensitive, to put it mildly. Whereas Mexico has been one of the United States largest

crude oil suppliers, and the U.S. in turn is far and away Mexico's largest market for oil, open

collaborationbetween the NAFTA partners beyond exports has been restricted. This is largely due to

Mexican sensitivities over sovereignty, the contentious history of U.S. oil firms' involvement in Mexico prior tonationalization and the constitutionally mandated monopoly in oil production in Mexico granted to the state-owned energy

company Pemex. Any public statement by a United States government official or oil executive has traditionally been greeted withcharges of foreign interference by Mexican leftists and nationalists. There have, however, been a number of examples ofcooperation over the years. In the 1990s, Pemex and Shell went into business together in the United States, sharing the ownershipand operation of a refinery in Deer Park, Texas. This boosted Pemex's refining capacity and enabled it to collaborate with a largeinternational oil company (IOC) outside of Mexican territory. Within Mexico, Pemex has long used important contractors such asHalliburton and Schlumberger to help discover and extract oil without surrendering ownership. In gas, Mexico is an importantsupplier of natural gas to the United States through crossborder pipelines. In the 1990s and 2000s, close cooperation among theU.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. research labs and the Mexican government led to progress in renewable energydevelopment in Mexico, and there is currently a bilateral working group negotiating the question of crossborder electricitytransmission. During the existence of the Security and Prosperity Partnership, Mexico, the United States and Canada discussedenergy issues in the North American Energy Working Group, but this initiative fizzled out with the demise of the partnership.WPR:What brought about the recent agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to cooperate on energy exploration in the Gulf of Mexico?Wood: The history of this agreement goes back to the 1970s. After negotiations in the United Nations over the International Law ofthe Sea, the two countries came together to determine ownership of resources found in the border region of the Gulf of Mexico thatwere beyond their respective 200-mile exclusion zones but entirely surrounded by them (thereby not qualifying as internationalwaters). In the late-1990s the two countries agreed to a 10-year moratorium on exploration and drilling in order to allow the

negotiation of a settlement.Mexico's 2008 energy reform legislation called on the Calderon administration to seek a solution to the

issue, and when the 10-year deal expired in 2009 the two governments agreed to work toward a binding deal. In the first year

of the talks, the parties engaged in a process of information exchange, discussing standards,

emergency-management procedures and existing seismic data. This data exchange, it is vital

to recognize, was not aimed at establishing what resources might exist in the region, but

rather what geological structures might exist, thereby giving clues to potential oil fields. In

2010, Presidents Barack Obama and Felipe Calderon committed to a negotiated

transboundary agreement, and both sides agreed on an extension of the 1999 moratorium for four more years. Official

negotiations were concluded in December, and the treaty was signed on Feb. 20, 2012.WPR: What is the likely political

and economic impact of increased U.S.-Mexico energy cooperation?Wood: The transboundary

agreement is an exciting new departure for Pemex and for U.S.-Mexico cooperation. First, it

gives Pemex access to much-needed oil reserves in the border region that were previouslyrestricted. These reserves are estimated to be upward of 9 billion barrels. Second, it allows Pemex to work

directly in partnership with the private sector, foreign firms and particularly IOCs to extract

the oil -- arrangements prohibited to date. Third, the agreement sets a precedent for further transboundary talks with Cuba in the

eastern section of the gulf, where Mexico again shares potential reserves. For U.S.-Mexico cooperation, the deal

is highly significant, less for the oil involved than for the precedent it sets. Rather than rivals, in

this area the United States and Mexico are partners in oil exploration and production . The


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lack of political opposition to the deal within Mexico demonstrates that the traditionally

inflammatory nationalistic rhetoric of political forces on the Mexican left has diminished in

recent years, as a consensus emerges over the pressing need to reform the oil sector.

Thats key to move U.S. companies away from corn ethanol to Mexican biofuels

Wood 10 senior associate in the Americas program at CSIS(Duncan, also director of the international relations program at Mexicos Autonomous Instituteof Technology, Environment, Development and Growth: U.S.-Mexico Cooperation in RenewableEnergies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 2010,http://wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Renewable%20Energy%20report.pdf)To date, however, there has been only minor cooperation between the United States and

Mexico at the governmental level. The United States Department of Agriculture(USDA) has worked with

SAGARPA on a number of technical issues, and prepared a report on the Mexican biofuels sector in 2009

that pointed to the potential for growth in the market and to the changing regulatory

landscape for biofuels in Mexico. This report highlighted the prospect of higher levels of demand for biodiesel

thanks to the setting of a national goal to introduce at least 5 percent of biodiesel in the transportation sector by 2012.But the

main interest has come from the U.S.private sector, which is looking to invest in biofuels

production in Mexico with an eye to exporting the product either back to the United States

or to Europe. With small-scale projects popping up across the country, U.S. firms have begun to

evaluate the potential for large-scale production of biofuels. Global Clean Energy (GCE), a Los Angeles-based firm that specializes in feedstocks for the production of biofuels, has recently invested in two jatropha farms in Mexico andone in Belize. Jatropha, a hardy shrub that produces a nut with very high oil content that can be processed into biodiesel, is seen

by many as a perfect biofuel feedstock for Mexico. Native to the Mesoamerican region, the plant grows on marginal

land, is not edible either for humans or animals, and thus does not generate a foodvs.-fuel

controversy, and can be planted on land that is also used for grazing goats or sheep. In addition to being a feedstock forbiofuels, the harvest can be used as a source of biomass for producing energy and the nuts themselves can be detoxified andprocessed for animal feed after their oil has been expressed. GCE has 5,000 acres under cultivation in Yucatan, and has adopted

a sustainable business model that has resulted in jobs, fair wages and community development in the local area.52 This is

one of the dimensions of the biofuels industry that is only infrequently mentioned but that is

important to note. It is increasingly common for businesses focusing on biofuels production to develop a model that emphasizes both profitability and sustainable development. PioneerGlobal Renewables, a U.S. firm from San Francisco that has already invested in jatropha plantations in the Dominican Republic,is also looking to expand into Mexico and has a similar model to GCE, focusing on local community development, fair prices forharvests, and minimal negative impact on the environment.Jatropha, however, is only one of a multitude of biofuels that has

potential in Mexico. Sugar, a long depressed industry in the country, could receive a significant

boost if large scale ethanol production were contemplated. A161616 e number of sugar mills are currentlylying dormant, and could be retrofitted relatively cheaply to produce ethanol. For example:According to the Mexican

SugarcaneProducers Association, only two mills havethe capability of producing ethanol with the

technical requirements specified by PEMEX,equating to about 10 million liters per year.If these mills

upgraded their facilitiesandoperated at full capacity and efficiency, itis calculated that total productioncapacityfor ethanol could reach 170 million litersperyear.53The sugarcane-to-ethanol industry will also have to overcome labor and

taxation issues if it is to become commercially viable in Mexico.At present ethanol is subject to a luxury tax of

50 percent, which makes the production of ethanol for fuel uncompetitive at the moment.Another option exists in the incipientalgae to ethanol industry, which is receiving considerable attention because of the potential for using algae cultivations as a wayto capture carbon dioxide, and can be located in almost any climate. U.S. firms that possess the technology to increase efficiencyin this field, such as Phyco2, a California-based firm, are already looking into the possibility of bringing their product to market

in Mexico.54Biofuels innovations indigenous to Mexico will also be of interest to U.S. firms.

Recent research into the potential of succulents and, in particular, agave show enormous

promise. The agave plant has very high concentrations of sugar and produces more sugar per acre planted than sugarcane. Aresearch team working at the Universidad Autonoma de Chapingo has estimated that the variety Agavetequilanaweber can yieldup to 2,000 gallons of distilled ethanol per acre per year and from 12,000-18,000 gallons per acre per year if their cellulose is included, whereas:Corn ethanol, for example, has an energybalance ratio of 1.3 and produces approximately 300-400 gallons of


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ethanolper acre. Soybean biodiesel, with an energybalance of 2.5, typically can yield 60gallons of biodiesel per acre while anacreof sugarcane can produce 600-800 gallonsof ethanol with an energy balance of 8.0.An acre of poplar trees can yield morethan1,500 gallons of cellulosic ethanol withan energy balance of 12.0, according to aNational Geographic study published inOctober 2007.55In addition to the impressive potential for producing ethanol, agave is an attractive crop as it can grow in harshenvironments, requires relatively little water, can be used to produce a wide variety of products, such as paper, textiles, andrope, and is common across Mexico.

Biofuel production using corn is the largest cause of global food price increasesKlapper, 8(Bradley S. Klapper, Associated Press Staff Writer. September 10, 2008. UNexpert faults US, EU biofuel use in food crisis,

http://www.klamathbasincrisis.org/biofuel/UNfaultsUSbiofuel091008.htm)//SDLGENEVA (AP) - A United Nations expert said Wednesday that recent studies indicate that U.S.and European Union targets for

biofuel production by their grain farmers have been the biggest cause of the world food crisis.

Olivier de Schutter, a Belgian professor, also said an international monitor may be needed to supervise the

production of energy sources such as ethanol, which may end up being less beneficial to the environment than

expected, even as they cause global food prices to rise.Citing various reports, he said said biofuel

production targets outlined by the United States and European Union have led to increased

speculation on agricultural land and commodities, and diverted cropland and feed away from

food production.He said the International Monetary Fund estimated that 70 percent of the rise in corn prices

was due to biofuels, with 40 percent for soybeans.The World Bank, de Schutter added, concluded that biofuels from grainsand oilseed in the U.S. and EU were responsible for up to 75 percent of changes in commodity prices."There is a consensus that

these initiatives have had a significant impact ," said de Schutter, who reports to the 47-nation U.N. Human RightsCouncil. His message to Washington and Brussels: "They should without further delay revise their policies."

That causes extinctionTrudell 5 (Robert H., Fall, Trudell, J.D. Candidate 2006, Food Security Emergencies And The

Power Of Eminent Domain: A Domestic Legal Tool To Treat A Global Problem, 33 Syracuse J. Int'lL. and Com. 277, Lexis)2. But, Is It Really an Emergency?In his study on environmental change and security, J.R. McNeilldismisses the scenario whereenvironmental degradation destabilizes anarea so much that "security problems and .. . resource scarcity may leadto war.""^'McNeill finds such a proposition to be a weak one, largelybecause history has shown society is always able to stay ahead ofwidespread calamity due, in part, to the slow pace of any majorenvironmental change.'"^ This may be so. However, as the events

inRwanda illustrated, the environment can breakdown quite rapidlyalmost before one's eyes

when food insecurity drives people tooverextend their cropland and to use outmoded

agricultural practices.'"^Furthermore, as Andre and Platteau documented in their study ofRwandan society,

overpopulation and land scarcity can contribute to abreakdown of society itself.'""Mr. McNeill's

assertion closely resembles those of many critics ofMalthus."^^ The general argument is: whatever issue we face(e.g.,

environmental change or overpopulation), it will be infroduced at such apace that we can face the

problem long before any calamity sets in.'"^This wait-and-see view relies on many factors,

not least of whichare a frinctioning society and innovations in agricultural productivity.But,

today, with up to 300,000 child soldiers fighting in confiicts orwars, and perpetrating terrorist acts, the very fabric of

society is underincreasing world-wide pressure.'"^ Genocide, anarchy, dictatorships,and war are endemicthroughout Africa; it is a troubled continent whoseproblems threaten global security and challenge all of humanity.'"^ 106.

Compare McNeill, supra note 101, at 185 ("until recent centuries majorenvironmental changes happenedso infrequently and proceeded so slowly that theynormally gave societies ample time to

adapt,") with JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATERESOURCE (1981). "Nor does past experience give reason to expect natural

resources tobecome more scarce. Rather, if history is any guide, natural resources will progressivelybecome

less costly, hence less scarce, and will constitute a smaller proportion of ourexpenses in

ftiture years." Juan Somavia, secretary general of the World Social Summit, said:" We've replaced the threat of

the nuclear bomb with the threat of asocial bomb."'"^ Food insecurity is part of the fuse


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buming to set thatbomb off It is an emergency and we must put that fuse out before it is

too late.


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Gulf Advantage

Deepwater oil accident inevitable in the Gulf of Mexico

Shields, 12(David, independent energy consultant. QandA: Is Mexico Prepared forDeepwater Drilling in the Gulf?, Inter-American Dialogues Latin American Energy Advisor,2/20/2012,http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/20477/Is%20Mexico%20Prepared%20for%20Deepwater%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Gulf.pdf?sequence=1)//SDL"They say that if a country does not defend its borders, then others will not respect those borders.

That is probably how we should understand Pemex's decision to drill the Maximino-1 well in 3,000

meters of water in the Perdido Fold Belt, right next to the shared maritime boundary with the United

States. It is a decision thatdoes not make sense in terms of competitiveness or production goals. It is about

defending the final frontier of national sovereignty and sticking the Mexican flag on the floor

of the Gulf of Mexico to advise U.S. companies that they have no right to drill for oil in the

ultradeep waters on the Mexican side. The recently signed deepwater agreement obliges both countries to worktogether and share the spoils of the development of transboundary reservoirs, if they actually exist. For now, Pemex, in line withconstitutional restrictions, is going alone on the Mexican side. Safety is a major concern as Pemex and its contractors have no

experience in such harsh environments. In fact, Pemex has never produced oil commercially anywhere in

deep water. It does not have an insurance policy for worst-case scenarios nor does it have

emergency measures in place to deal with a major spill. It does not fully abide by existing

Mexican regulation of its deepwater activity, which cannot be enforced.On the U.S. side, prohibition

of ultradeepwater drilling, enacted after the Deepwater Horizon spill, has come and gone. The next disaster is just

waiting to happen."

Gulfs ecosystems on the brinkplan key to solve another accident

Craig, 11(Robert Kundis Craig, Attorneys Title Professor of Law and Associate Dean for

Environmental Programs at Florida State University. Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills

and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, Brigham Young University LawReview, 2011, http://lawreview.byu.edu/articles/1326405133_03craig.fin.pdf)//SDLThese results suggest that we should be very concerned for the Gulf ecosystems affected by the

Macondo well blowout. First, and as this Article has emphasized throughout, unlike the Exxon Valdezspill,

the Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred at great depth, and the oil behaved unusually

compared to oil released on the surface. Second, considerably more toxic dispersants were

used in connection with the Gulf oil spill than the Alaska oil spill.164 Third, humans could

intervene almost immediately to begin cleaning the rocky substrate in Prince William Sound,

but human intervention for many of the important affected Gulf ecosystems, especially the

deepwater ones(but even for shallower coral reefs), remains impossible.Finally, and perhaps most importantly,

the Prince William Sound was and remains a far less stressed ecosystem than the Gulf of Mexico.In 2008, for example, NOAA stated that *d]espite the remaining impacts of the [still then]

largest oil spill in U.S. history, Prince William Sound remains a relatively pristine, productive

and biologically rich ecosystem.165 To be sure, the Sound was not completely unstressed, and *w+hen the ExxonValdez spill occurred in March 1989, the Prince William Sound ecosystem was also responding to at least three notable events inits past: an unusually cold winter in 198889; growing populations of reintroduced sea otters; and a 1964 earthquake.166

Nevertheless,the Gulf of Mexico is besieged by environmental stressors at another order of

magnitude (or two), reducing its resilience to disasters like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.


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As the Deepwater Horizon Commission detailed at length, the Gulf faces an array of long-

term threats, from the loss of protective and productive wetlands along the coast to

hurricanes to a growing dead zone (hypoxic zone) to sediment starvation to sealevel rise to

damaging channeling to continual (if smaller) oil releases from the thousands of drilling

operations.167 In the face of this plethora of stressors, even the Commission championed a kind of

resilience thinking, recognizing thatresponding to the oil spill alone was not enough.It

equated restoration of the Gulf to restored resilience, arguing that it represents an effort

to sustain thesediverse, interdependent activities [fisheries, energy, and tourism] and the

environment on which they depend for future generations.168A number of commentators havecatalogued the failure of the legal and regulatory systems governing the Deepwater Horizonplatform and the Macondo welloperations.169 The Deepwater Horizon Commission similarly noted that the Deepwater Horizons demise signals theconflicted

evolutionand severe shortcomingsof federal regulation of offshore oil drilling in the United States.170In its opinion, *t]he

Deepwater Horizon blowout, explosion, and oil spill did not have to happen.171 The Commissions

overall conclusion was two-fold. First, *t+he record shows that without effective government oversight, the

offshore oil and gas industry will not adequately reduce the risk of accidents, nor prepare

effectively to respond in emergencies.172 Second, government oversigh

mexico tha affirmative - ddi 2013 ss

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