mfr nara- t7- tsa- arroyo marcus- 10-24-03- 00035

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@Event: Marcus Arroyo, Federal Security Director for TSA at Newark LibertyInternational Airport

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Type: Interview

Date: October 24, 2003

Special Access Information: None

Team: 7

Prepared By: Lisa Sullivan

Participants (non-Commission): Marcus Arroyo and John Danner, Counsel for TSA

Participants (Commission): Sam Brinkley, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan

Location: TSA facilities at Newark Airport, Newark, New Jersey

Background

[U] On 9-11, Arroyo was the Security Division Manager for FAA's Eastern Region. Hetook this position in 1989. In this position he oversaw 7 states and 64 airports. Thisincluded 8 field offices and all (CASFO and CASFU) units. Newark was a CASFU thatreported to the New York CASFO at JFK Airport. During one period between 1989 and

1995, he went to Brussels and assumed an international role for the FAA (Title?).However, he returned in 1995 and resumed his position as Division Manager for EasternRegion. Arroyo is currently the Federal Security Director for Newark, appointed in Julyof 2002. The civil aviation security incidents he has responded to included TWA 800,Swiss Air, and Egypt Air.

The Security Vectors:

[U] Significant elevations of security measures were driven by Security Directives andintelligence. As Arroyo received them, airports responded accordingly. It was theresponsibility of Washington to determine potential vulnerabilities. SEAs (specialemphasis assessments) focus deliberately on one target area. Throughout the periodleading up to 9-11, the annual work plan had a comprehensive (for CAT X airports)inspection plan.

[U] SEAs were done at Newark prior to 9-11, particularly testing the checkpoints.Clutter bags were sent through in the morning and the evening, peak and off-peak. Theairport has terminals A-C. Each has three "fingers" for a total of 9 checkpoints. The


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smallest checkpoint has two lanes. Checkpoint 1 in terminal A has three lanes. Theterrorists went through this checkpoint.

[U] The Newark CAT X inspection occurred in January of 200 1 . Any deficiencies thatarose from it were met and dealt with continuously. He doesn't have the 'records ofNewark's test results.

SEA (Security Emphasis Assessments) Testing

~ SEA testing including the following areas: 1) Screenin~ ~ 2)CAPPSI: The

program of testing consisted of presenting themselves with baggage and a ticket, and"deliberately pressing buttons" to trigger the selection process. 3) Positive Passenger.BagMatch: I '4) Access and PerimeterControl: They did SEAs on access, the airport perimeter, "107/14" doors, and AOAchallenges. 5) Small packages and cargo: They would see if the shipper called forpickupand see if all the proper documentation to make pick up for cargo was provided.' Arroyosaid that Unabomber-type tactics were perceived as a threat. / Ramsi Yousef and the BlindSheik operatives were known to be working in the vicinity 1'f the airport. ...:,::'

~ Generally, the SEAs were systemwide. The focus w~s wherever the,:PAA had apresence, such as at Newark. Ultimately, the FAA would make a trip to Atlantic City andTrenton Mercer to test those airports but Arroyo felt as though the lack ,c'f resources,budgeting and personnel inhibited their testing abilities. / .... ...

~ SEAs were derived from Washington threat information derived from intelligence(that was not necessarily tailored to the individual airp1rt vulnera~,i1ities).

~ There was not much flexibility in the manner in/~hich th~,y:'tested the system. Thenumber of tests conducted at a checkpoint was rigid. Because of this rigidity, agentswould be recognized, and testing effectiveness decreased. InArroyo's view, it was afutile effort to continue to do it in that method with ,$ 0few resources, The response topoor screening performance was remedial training ../The FAA incorporated moreprocedures and returned to the checkpoint to help rhe screeners do their job better and getthem to search more thoroughly (which he referred to a~,:'t'onthe spot reinforcement

training"). I : :'/,/~ As a consequence of the deficiencies founJ Cl:l,:~~iladelphiaAirport and withArgenbright (the screening security company), Arfoyo's security managers focused onbackground investigations and the required fivp-,year criminal history check. He felt thatthe system was made more vulnerable by issu~~g:identification badges and giving accessto people that have not been fully vetted. ! :':'

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~AITOYO was asked about the effectiveness ofcheckpoi~t::~cr~ening. Arroyo citedthe civil aviation incident on December 21, 1988 over Lockerbie.Scctland. Since thenmuch progress has been made. In 1999, checkpoint performance w~s,~'tCleffectiveness. He attributes the poor results to an increasingly sophisticated testingregime. The industry's response was that the FAA was not playing fair. Arroyosupported the testin conducted b FAA securit because "no terrorist would 'ever be fairabout it."

j S 8 11Threat Image Projection (TlP) ready x-ray scanners were being deployed as aresponse to the more sophisticated tests of the screening measures. He doesn't rememberif this system was deployed in Newark. on 9-11. After PAN AM 103, the use 0 f ThermoNeutron Analysis equipment was broached. FAA had $144 mi1lion to deploy as muchequipment as they could. Venders competed for the contract. He didn't know which thebest vendor to contract was. Their proposals varied in price.

~ TIP ready x-rays came later in the deployment scheme. In 1996 they began workon deploying CTX machines. In January of 1997, they got one in the United Terminal.Linda Daschle (short term FAA Administrator) left the FAA right after that. Some timeafter that, TIP-ready x-ray machines were being deployed. Arroyo felt that the machinesweren't ready for "prime time yet." The deployment diminished checkpoint effectivenessand took time to resolve, assuming that they were, in fact, installed and turned on. Therewere bugs in the system .

Newark

[U] In the context of the airports Arroyo was overseeing, it was JFK that seemed the mostvulnerable to a terrorist attack. Newark wasn't neglected. There was a supervisor;asecretary, and nine agents dedicated to testing Newark. Arroyo commented that it isnever enough. You can always do more with more resources. Newark received its fairshare. In genera], he characterized security for his airports as under-resourced. The FSMat Newark on 9/11 was Russell White.

The Threat

~ The primary threat to civil aviation airports was thought to be car bombs. Hijackswere always a possibility and a threat. There was a shortage of Federal Air Marshals.Screening checkpoints always got attention for their poor performance rates. The need toprevent potential hijackings was never compromised because of the need to addressanother threat vector, according to Arroyo. Arroyo stated that the required testing wasalways completed. Screener training was reviewed when there was a failure. He, attimes, would sit in on GSC training and some PSI (Principle Security Inspector)personnel would come and monitor as well.

[U] Arroyo was asked if the fines imposed for security failures were effective. Arroyosaid a n um ber of fin es w ereissued, an d the"industry balked." FAA felt th atit was th eir

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responsibility to monitor their screening contracts. "It was a struggle" to get the 'airlinesto monitor the performance of their own contracted security companies. StationManagers were responsible for this at the airport.

CAPPS I

[U] Arroyo was referred to the initial intent of CAPPS I, which, in 1997, required thatCAPPS selectees were to be escorted to the checkpoint and their carry-on subject toadditional screening. As far as Commission staff can discern, the procedure wasterminated with the expiration of the SD dictating it. Arroyo was asked ifhe rememberedwhen they were no longer required to follow this procedure and he said he would lookinto it, and get back to the Commission.

[U] Arroyo added that the procedure of escorting selectees and "dumping their carry-onsat the gate" generated a lot of pushback from the ACLU (American Civil Liberties

Union) and the Justice Department. There was a greater emphasis on 100 percentchecked bag screening. The TWA 800 incident gave them the impetus to deploy the EDSmachines.

[U] Arroyo thought the rationale for the decision on CAPPS consequences was theFAA's focus on combating the threat ofa bomb in a checked bag. "No one was preparedfor the suicide hijacker." Hijacking was always thought to involve negotiation, and wasdealt with in conflict resolution exercises. Guns were the weapon in the example he cited:a hijacking of a Lufthansa flight out of Frankfurt by Ethiopians in 1992 brought toKenned y airport in which a gun was used.

Intelligence

[U] When asked, Arroyo responded that he remembered Pat McDonnell's CD- ROMpresentation on intelligence. He was flattered he was asked to review it. He thought thepresentation was to produce something to share with the industry at a high level. It was agood start as a way to drive the message home and certainly with the airport managers(Susan Baer did not receive the briefing). He made it a point to share the information hegot from the presentation with people under him, because, as he said, "It sensitized myworkforce to the seriousness of the threat, to compliment whatever security efforts werealready in existence."

. n intelligence dissemination in general, Arroyo said "We wanted more but theanalysts had to protect sources," implying that he understood why the information hereceived was not specific. Arroyo had former NYPD members on his staff, and he wasalso working with a terrorist task force. He thought the Port Authority police had a goodintelligence system. He had a "comfort level" with law enforcement in his area. Theseother sources led him to conclude that he was never at a "deficit" in terms of intelligence.He agreed with the statement: "If it was to be had, he felt he was getting it."

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[U] There was talk, but no real specific information on Islamic fundamentalists. He wentto the trial of the Blind Sheik on the attempted Landmark bombings. After his conviction,the Sheik said something about airports: "People would be coming," or something asobscure. The statement was made in Arabic and translated. Arroyo passed the info on toFAA Headquarters. The transcript of the statement was received through contacts.Normally, he would not have gotten such a transcript. Because the statement was soobscure and indirect, nothing came of it in terms of security precautions.

[U] Arroyo never took the posture that Newark was a "stop over" for terrorists. He"hardened Kennedy," as well as all of his other airports, because he thought there wasnothing to prevent a terrorist from going through another airport. He wanted to maintainuniformity of airport security. Other airports under his jurisdiction included JPK; Phil.;Dulles; BWI; Pittsburgh; and National.

Other Suspicious Activities

[U] There was one event that really perplexed him. Down on Broadway Avenue, near theTrade Center, there was a discovery of an obscure briefcase with test objects that theindustry used to conduct tests of screening checkpoints. Anyone could buy them fromthe company the FAA used to produce the items. This discovery occurred in the May -July time frame (what year?). Arroyo said it was never determined who the bag belongedto; it might have been an attempt to see what the reaction of the LEO would be to findingthe briefcase. Upon hearing about the discovery, Arroyo sent an agent down therewanting to know what it was all about. He's pretty sure he obtained digital pictures.Arroyo realized that the manufacturer that made the test pieces did not put serial numberson the items.

[U] In another instance, two federal protective uniformed officers were eating lunch pre9-11, when they observed two Middle Easterners taking pictures of the doors and thegarage doors of a federal building in lower Manhattan (2600 Federal Plaza). Uponquestioning the individuals, they said they wanted to send pictures of skyscrapers to theirfriends and family in the Midwest. The officers confiscated the camera and let theindividuals go. Sometime later the film was developed and it was of the doors andgarages; the address the individuals had planned to send the pictures to was for an Arabwho worked at a chemical plant, Arroyo said.

[U] Arroyo recounted that the airports get their share of "number spotters" (people thatscout out the tail numbers of planes at airports as a hobby.) Some airports try to set areasaside for these people.

[U] Arroyo was asked if there was a way to report suspicious activity at airports and onaircraft. Arroyo mentioned Tony Affonte, a former airport official who was killed at theWTC and had b~en involved in the Airport Law Enforcement Association. Arroyo saidAffonte as particularly vigilant and always shared word of suspicious activity and or"anomalies" with him. He also added that he thought the Port Authority police werepretty good. They took some shots after TWA 800; but they were vigilant. Reports were


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sent up the chain of command. He thinks the report of suspicious activities wasappropriately disseminated.L S B ' ! 1Fort Hamilton shared their intelligence with Arroyo's office. An example ofintelligence the Fort would share with the FAA was the method by which weapons wereartfully concealed in a book.

[U] When asked how much latitude he felt he had to work outside of FAA standardsArroyo said it was not permissible for him to create his own test for checkpoints.

Personnel- Credentialing

[U] Arroyo stated that he received reports when people were denied airport SIDAcredentials and would work with the FBI on this issue .

. L S 8 1 JHe recalled an instance in which a Flight Standards person knew someone had

suspicious Middle Eastern affiliations. "He was suspicious of him so he reportedit,"

Arroyo said. He remembers the reports were passed on to the FBI. In that case, theevidence wasn't sufficient to fire him. FAA had a limited workforce in the geographicarea. It was built up at one point, and then pared down with budget cuts. Because he wasunderstaffed he would ask others to be the "ears and eyes" to assist the FAA securityinspectors.

Hi Tech checkpoints

~] Commission staff asked why Newark had no high tech checkpoints whereas Dulleshad them on 9-11. Arroyo stated that ITS (International Total Security, Incorporated) wasthe driver of the high tech checkpoint. It consisted of factors such as putting the cameras

in the right position, light illumination, best metal detectors, etc. ITS sold it as a securityproduct for the industry. Funding for Dulles came from MWAA. The Port Authority forNYINJ was the lease holder. It was the decision of the individualleasee whether to putthe money up for ITS equipment.

[U] In fairness to FAA, whenever rules went to OMB, the discussion of how additionalrulemaking would affect ticket prices always took priority. Tom Kelly, the SecurityDirector of ATA prior to Susan Rork, once said (according to Arroyo), that OMB would"Fight you like a junk yard dog," if you do anything to raise the ticket prices. Insummation, "if the government wants additional security measures, they should pay forit" was the reigning attitude of the day. High tech checkpoints were a pilot program; ithad some grant money.

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[U] Arroyo was asked ifhe recalled the increased chatter about security threats leadingup to 9-11; the presentation made by FAA's office of Civil Aviation Security aboutincreased threat to civil aviation (McDonnell road show); the issuance of IC'shighlighting the increased threat; and the NIE stating that the threat to civil aviation

security had increased. Arroyo said he remembered the chatter, but that there wasnothing on hijacking with box cutters or knives, nothing to heighten the a1ert or to set themagnetometers at a more sensitive level.


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~ Arroyo said that a 1992 memo went to the 700's indicating that knives were theprimary weapon of choice for hijackers.

FAA fines to air carriers - enforcement

[U] Arroyo said ATA would fight all settlements and negotiate them out. AdministrativeLaw judges had to settle the cases. Some judges weren't sophisticated enough tounderstand what the FAA was trying to do. "A one hundred thousand dollar case mightsettle for 10 thousand," Arroyo commented.

[U] If screeners failed a test, the screener was fired. "That wasn't the solution," Arroyothought, "the answer should have been to train you better." At times, the whole securitycompany was fired. Security contracts went to the lowest bidder.

Safety, Security, and Efficiency

[U] Flight standards had 350 employees for the eastern region, whereas there were only72 employees for security. Security made up less than a quarter or the entire workforce.There was no parity between safety and security. Arroyo stated that it was in theindustry's self interest to make sure the safety part was adhered to.

[U] Arroyo was asked how many air carriers "red teamed" their own checkpoints toimprove the effectiveness, and make sure they were getting their money's worth. Arroyosaid the carriers left that up to the FAA. Arroyo didn't remember any station managerscoming to him about doing their own testing. He said some Station Managers took suchinitiative, as in Richmond, VA.

Summer of '01

[U] He recalled that the aviation security level that summer was at "3 plus". The Port Authority had its own rating levels, which would explain why Baer had a differen t

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w ere qu ote u pset an d presen ted a seriou s th reat to th e FAA . Th e reg ion al. office's secu rityw as im prov ed b ecau se of th is th reat. (F ew lob bies of fed eral b uild in gs h ad m etalde te cto rs be fo re9-11, n ow they all d o).

~ CHIA manufactu red state of thear t metal d etectors. H e d id n ot w an t to createapan ic at the airport, so he con ducted h is ow n test of the m etal detector capab ilities in h isow n lob by. Person ally, h e w en t th roug h the m etal detector. M an y of the box cu tters h etested "lo oked like m ag ic m arkers," h e said .l

[U] Staff h as asked TSA for copies of th e C omman d C en ter at th e Eastern Region 's em ailmessages and dig ital pictu res about A rroyo 's box cu tter test. :'

Operations Center

[U] A rroyo th ou gh t on 9-11 th at the n ew s reports w ere th e b est sou rce ofinformation,He had each CASFO m anager up on the n et. The prim ary net con sisted of thenationallead ersh ip in clu din g M on te B elg er an d Jan e G arv ey, etc. Th e Secon daryandTertiaryn ets w ere up, an d he also h ad a private n et talkin g d irectly to th e C ASF Os. /,:/

[UJ A rroyo w orked closely w ith M ark Ran dol, th e CA SF O M an ag er for Du lle,s{~ nd NoraZola h is New Y ork CASFO manager at th at time. "",/..'....i .'

The National Net, ,

[U] Arroyo th in ks th at the FAA had a good system to con nect everyon e, F or in stan ce, th en et w orks in a w ay that it d ials all of your num bers on record un til you finally pick up(cell ph on e, h om e ph on e, office d esk ph on e). R eports are m ad e in sh ort b ursts. E veryon eh as to id en tify th em se lv es.It is orderly . No on edropped.off, bu t you w en ton muteu n less you h ad someth in g impo rtan t to sa y. E ve ryo ne .kn eww ho to listen to; w ho w ou ldh av e importan t in formation to report. H e remef !tb ,~ rs"g iv in g a lot of in formation ov er th e

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[U] To support the cases of flight crews and the pilots in such instances, the FAA metwith U.S. Attorneys who agreed they would prosecute the cases and support the flightcrews.

Recommendations

[U] Arroyo would like to level out the passenger flows. The industry would fight that.Arroyo went on to say that there are times during the day that the airport IS virtuallyempty of travelers. Other times, you can't get in the door. He would like to spread outthe flow, thereby wait times would be shortened and security scrutiny per passengerincreased. "Someone needs to recognize at a high level that this airport is complex. Thereis a lot of energy wasted on reconfiguring smaller airports," Arroyo said. ContinentalAirlines just spent millions remodeling and expanding its terminal at Newark, and hasreported increased efficiency of 25 percent (the TSA model at Newark).

Profiling

[U] Newark does not train screeners to profile passengers because, "of the level ofintrusion," it requires. Arroyo said, "Unless you walk .around with two inch platformshoes, you won't get that level of discrimination. The El Al (Tel Aviv Airport) operationknows its passengers, so it can get away with it." With respect to the trusted travelerfeature, there is always a risk no matter what, but not everyone needs the same scrutiny.

[U] Arroyo cited a case at JFK in which an emotionally disturbed person went to theticket counter and showed his or her gun. Somehow, the person managed to board theairplane and held a gun to the copilot's head. The pilots escaped out the window. Aftersix hours of negotiation, the situation was resolved. He's not sure if a more restrictive

checkpoint could have prevented that from happening.

[U] He wants the visible presence of a LEO at every checkpoint, but the budget can'tafford it. The notion of TSA as a law enforcement agency got push back because ofovertime costs. Without the presence of LEO's, Arroyo feels the checkpoint lacks thevisible deterrent.

[U] Arroyo agreed that security procedures need to vary in pattern so an individual can'ttell which lane you are going to go to, be it a high scrutiny lane or not.

[U] Arroyo thinks that Immigration and Customs should be tied into the IT systems of

aviation security.

Security as disruption

[U] Arroyo said that the air carriers know that a 747 with 350 passengers requires acertain number of security agents at the checkpoint and they know what time the averagepassenger will arrive at the airport for the scheduled flight. The carriers have thisinformation in hand, yet they criticize the amount of time it takes passengers to get


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through security. It is simple math that if you have three 737s boarding and thecheckpoint has two lanes, there will be a bottleneck and a delay. The airport cannotphysically put in more lanes.

[U] Passengers need to be smarter with what they pack. Some carriers will tum it aroundand say "you can bring whatever you want to bring on the flight," as a customer serviceboost to their sales. If passengers use more discretion, then the process will go faster.

[U] Arroyo recommends that the Commission look into the five pilot checkpoint. screening pro grams in effect now at chosen airports around the country.

What is the real metric of success for Newark at the screener checkpoint?

[U] Arroyo says 100 percent is the proper goal. We have to work toward 100 percentresolution. Screeners have to say, I don't know what this is and open up the bag."Recognize and resolve" needs to be the mantra of screeners.

mfr nara- t7- tsa- arroyo marcus- 10-24-03- 00035

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