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Theory in Practice: Quentin Skinner's Hobbes, ReconsideredAuthor(s): Michael GoodhartSource: The Review of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer, 2000), pp. 531-561Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalfof Review of PoliticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408207

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Theory in Practice:QuentinSkinner's Hobbes, ReconsideredMichael Goodhart

Quentin Skinner'smethod for studying the history of political thought hasbeenwidely andheatedlydebated for decades.Thisarticle akesa new tack,offeringa critique of Skinner's approach on the grounds he has himself established:considerationof his historical work as exemplifying the theoryin practice.Threecentral assumptions of Skinner's method are briefly reviewed; each is thenevaluated in the context of his writings on Hobbes.Theanalysisreveals problemsand ambiguities in the specification and implementation of the method and in itsunderlying philosophy. The essay concludes by examining the broaderpracticaland philosophical implicationsof adopting this approachto the study of politicalideas: the method operationalizes a set of philosophical commitments thattransformsideological choices into questionsof propermethod.The issue of what practical differenceit makes whether or not one adoptsSkinner'smethodological uggestions is an underdiscussedquestion relativeto a rather high-flying debate which seeks to transform methodologicalpresuppositionsinto philosophicalconclusions.-Richard Ashcraft1We cannot safely judge of men's intentions.-Thomas Hobbes2Quentin Skinner's approachto the study of political ideas hasbeen controversialsince its firstarticulation; he recentappearanceof several majornew works by Skinner has initiated a reprise ofthe old debates.3I do not intend to join these debates directlybutratherto raisea somewhat differentquestion, one also occasionedby Skinner's new work on Hobbes: What is the practicalsignificance of employing Skinner's method in the study ofThe author thanks PerryAnderson, BlairCampbell,Susan Hoppe, AndrewLister,JohnMcCormick,Dan O'Neill, CarolePateman, and the staff, editor,andreferees at the Review or theirhelp and encouragment.1.Ashcraft,"TheRadicalDimensions of Locke'sPoliticalThought:ADialogicEssayon Some Problemsof Interpretation," istory fPoliticalThought 3(1992):707.2. Hobbes, Behemoth,TheEnglishWorksof ThomasHobbesof Malmesbury, 1vol., ed. SirWilliamMolesworth (London: 1839-1845)6:254.3.See,most recently,TedMillerandTracyB.Strong, "Meaningsand Contexts:Mr.Skinner'sHobbes and the EnglishMode of PoliticalTheory," nquiry 0 (1997).


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political ideas? Given the continued dominance of the"Cambridge"approach to studying the history of ideas-as inthe work of Skinner,Dunn, Pocock, Tully,and others-and thestalematedphilosophical debate over thatapproach,this questionseems particularly timely.Astrangeand, surprisingly,unremarkedfeatureof the disputeover Skinner's work is that even though his methodologicalwritings arehighly contentious, his historicaleffortshave gainedwidespread acclaim.4Thereis something odd in this disjunction;after all, in historical methodology, as in cookery, the proof-in-the-pudding rule self-evidently applies.5 Skinner himself hasalways seen the closest relation between his historical andmethodological writings, the histories having been intendedmainlyasexamples of his approachto thestudy of politicaltheory.6The oddity arises because commentators on Skinner's historicalwork usually bracket his method, while the debate over hismethod emphasizes philosophy ratherthan history.In this articleI attempt something different:a critique of the method based onan analysis of its implementation.I identify problems in Skinner'shistoricalwork on Hobbes and develop a critique of the methodbased on those problems.Ibegin with a short overview of Skinner'sapproach,stressingits three centralassumptions;each of the following three sectionsbrieflyelaborates one of these conceptualpoints and then surveysits deployment in Skinner'swork on Hobbes. The analysis revealsproblems and ambiguities in the method, its specification,and itsunderlyingphilosophy,as well asproblemswith Skinner'sreadings

4. "[Skinner'sFoundations]s primarilyof interest tophilosophers notfor itsexcellent accountof European houghtabout the state but for the self-consciousphilosophy that has gone into it" (Kenneth Minogue, "Method in IntellectualHistory: Quentin Skinner'sFoundations,"Meaningand Context:QuentinSkinnerandHisCritics, d.JamesTullyandQuentinSkinner Princeton: rincetonUniversityPress,1988],p. 176 [emphasis added]).5. Skinner,"SomeProblems in theAnalysis of PoliticalThoughtandAction";"Meaningand Understandingin the History of Ideas,"MeaningandContext,pp.97,64, respectively). Cf.Minogue, "Methodin IntellectualHistory,"p. 177.6. Skinner,"SomeProblems,"pp. 98-9. His recent work is no exception;seeReason nd Rhetoricn thePhilosophyfHobbes(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1996),pp. 7-8,15;Liberty efore iberalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),p. 10lff.Cf.JamesTully,"ThePenisaMightySword:QuentinSkinner'sAnalysis of Politics,"MeaningandContext,p. 16.

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QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBESof Hobbes.Ilook at Skinner'searlyand recentwritingstoemphasizethat these problems arerecurringand to highlight inconsistenciesin his applicationof the method. Much of the Cambridgeschool'sstaturecomes from itsperceivedhistoricalsuccesses;by identifyingproblems in the primaryhistoricalwork of the method's leadingpractitioner, his essay amounts to an indictment on the groundsSkinnerhimself hasestablished:considerationof his historicalworkas a test of his theory in practice.I consider two possible objectionsto my argument and conclude with some broader reflections onthe practicalrelation between Skinner's method and his politicaland philosophical commitments.

Theory in PracticeSimply put, Skinner holds that by studying the range ofconventional uses of words and concepts available to an authorwe can figure out what she meant to do in writing. The socialmeanings of texts or utterances are equivalent with the author'sintentions in writing ("illocutionary force") and can be fullyexplained by reconstructingthe conventions surrounding a text'soccurrence.7 Conventions, the "shared vocabulary, principles,assumptions, criteria for testing knowledge-claims, problems,conceptual distinctions and so on,"8delimit the range of thingsthat the author might have been doing in writing.Twogeneralrules about the recoveryof intentions follow: first,we should "focus not just on the text to be interpreted but on theprevailing conventions governing the treatment of the issues orthemes with which the text is concerned." Second, we should"focus on the writer's mental world, the world of his empirical

beliefs. This rule derives fromthe logical connection between ourcapacityto ascribeintentionsto agents and our knowledge of theirbeliefs."9 These general rules translate into more specificmethodological prescriptions:7. Cf.Skinner,"AReply to My Critics,"MeaningandContext,pp. 267, 278.8.Tully,"Pen is a Mighty Sword,"p. 9.Cf.Skinner,"'SocialMeaning' and theExplanationof SocialAction,"MeaningandContext,p. 94.9.Skinner,"Motives,Intentions,and theInterpretationof Texts,"MeaningandContext,pp. 77-8.

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THEREVIEWOFPOLITICSthe appropriatemethodologyfor the historyof ideas must...delineatethe whole range of communications which could have beenconventionallyperformedon thegiven occasionby the utteranceof thegiven utterance,andnext...trace relationsbetweenthe given utteranceand this wider linguistic context as a means of decoding the actualintention of the given writer.10

In effect, Skinner's method operationalizes the premise that "aknowledge of the author's intentions in writing...is not merelyrelevant to, but is actually equivalent to, a knowledge of the[meaning]of what he writes.""This faithin theexplanatorypowerof intentions led Skinner to assert famously that no thinker canbe said to have meant or done anything that she could never bebroughtto acceptas acorrectdescriptionofwhat she meantordid.12As this brief summary shows, Skinnerrelies heavily on threecentralassumptions adapted fromordinarylanguage philosophy:that texts of political theory can be treated as utterances or socialactions within identifiable contexts, that reconstructing theideological and linguistic conventions surrounding these actsallows the recovery of the author's intentions, and that theauthor's "mental world" of concepts, beliefs, and assumptionslimits the range of his possible intentions. On this basis, Skinnerconcludes that the historical identity of a text is identical to theauthor's intentions in writing it.

Identifying Utterances and ContextsSkinner conceptualizes texts as utterances or speech actsembodying two kinds of action. First, "the author is saying orwriting something-putting forward words, sentences,arguments, theories, and so on with a certain 'locutionary' or'propositional' meaning." Skinner finds this form of meaning

unproblematic;discussing a passage from Defoe, he quips, "Themeaning of what Defoe said is perfectly clear.What he said wasthat religious dissent should be ranked among capital offenses.10.Skinner,MeaningndUnderstanding,"p.63-64.11.Skinner,"Motives, ntentions, nd Interpretation,"p. 75-6.The termSkinneruses is meaning3,which he distinguishes from the plain meaning of thewordsand"meaningorme."12.Skinner,MeaningndUnderstanding,".48; f. "Some roblems,".102.

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QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBESWhat this means is thatreligious dissent should be rankedamongcapital offenses."'3Skinner's method and philosophy focus on asecond kind of action: authors"willbedoingsomethingn speakingor writing..."14 Thus, to understand Defoe, we need to recoverhis intentions, what he was doing in writing (questioning andridiculing religious intolerance).15 his "illocutionaryforce" mustbe established,accordingto Skinner,by situatingtexts within their"ideological" context. We initiate the interpretive process byascertaining the plain or "locutionary" meanings of utterances,and thus their subject matter,and next, "[turning] to the contextof theiroccurrence n order to determine how exactly they connectwith, or relateto, otherutterancesconcernedwith the same subjectmatter."'6n other words, defining the utterance and establishingits subjectmatter is the first step in applying the method.In Skinner's writings on Hobbes, we find three problemsrelated to the claim that texts can be treated as speech acts. Thefirst is evident in his earliest works, which link Hobbes to theEngagement controversy.17 ccording to Skinner,the debate overthe legitimacy of the Commonwealth government was mired inquestions of divine ordination and the origins of government;'8he argues that Hobbes's unique and brilliant innovation was tostrip his argument of religious foundations and create a defactotheory of government based on the political nature of man.19Hobbes's emphasis on the mutual relationbetween protectionandobedience is unique to Leviathan,Skinner claims; he altered hisviews to bring them into line with other defacto theories.20 n alater essay, Skinner revised his assessment of Hobbes's role,arguing that his "novel and dramatic intervention in the[Engagement] debate" was his deployment of a "distinctive

13.Skinner,"Reply,"pp. 284-85.14.Tully,"Penis a Mighty Sword,"pp. 8-9.15.Skinner,"AReply,"p. 271.16. Ibid.,p. 275.17. The Engagement controversy (1650-54)was a dispute over the oath ofloyalty or "Engagement"requiredby theCommonwealth government; it quicklyblossomed into a debateon the legitimacy of the government itself.18. Skinner,"Conquestand Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the EngagementControversy,"TheInterregnum: heQuestforSettlement 646-1660,ed. G.E.Aylmer(London:Macmillan,1974),pp. 79-93.19. Ibid.,p. 94.20. Ibid.,p. 97.

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analysis of liberty" in which conquest and consent arecompatible.21 "Hobbes's view of political obligation in Leviathanhas sometimes been assimilated to that of [the] defenders of defacto powers," he writes. "While there are important similarities,however, this interpretation overlooks the fact that, in the basicpremises of his political theory, Hobbes stands much closer" tothe enemies of the Rump.22"The best evidence [that Hobbesintended his theory of liberty as a contribution to debates aboutthe Commonwealth government] lies in the fact that hisconclusions are based not just on a clarification but a revision ofhis earlier arguments."23The problem is, how we define an utterance makes a crucialdifference in determining its subjectmatter and context, and thusthe author's intentions. In these essays, Skinner asserts thatHobbes revised key passages in Leviathan-the same passages-to bringthem into line with two markedly differentcontemporarytheories. A careful comparison of the footnotes shows that the"subject utterance" changes in the later essays, incorporatingadditional passages specifically addressing the relation betweenlibertyand consent. Skinner's methodological writings offer littleguidance on how to identify or limit an utterance;he writes as ifone begins with the utterance "in hand." A historian might wellchange his mind upon uncovering new evidence or simply uponfurther reflection; the point of this criticism is not that Skinnercontradicts himself but rather that he provides no rules or methodfor determining which of the utterances underlying these twointerpretationsis more accurate,representative, or authentic.A second problem, also clear in the early essays, is how weidentify asocial action orutteranceand its propercontext. Skinnerexplains thatat theheight of the Engagementcontroversy,Hobbespublished-for the first time in England and for the first time inEnglish-his majorworks on political obligation.As soon as theseworks appeared, Skinner writes, the "other lay defenders of de

21. Skinner, "Thomas Hobbes on the Proper Signification of Liberty,"Transactionsf theRoyalHistoricalSociety,5th eries,no. 40 [1990],p. 150.22. Ibid.,p. 145. Only in a footnote does Skinneracknowledge that he firstarticulatedthedefacto nterpretation,downplaying his role almost to the point ofdisingenuity (ibid.,n. 155).23. Ibid.,p. 149. Theclaimthat Hobbes's view of political obligation changessignificantlyinLeviathan ould be stronglydisputed.

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factopowers" recognized them "as giving the most authoritativepresentation" of their view of political obligation. Afterhighlighting several similarities between Leviathan and theEngager tracts, Skinner concludes that "there can be no doubt"that characterizingthese works as a "contribution" o the defenseof Engagement "gives anaccuratereflection of Hobbes's intentionsin writing these works."24Recent research shows, however, that Hobbes was notresponsible for the publication of The Elementsor De Civeduringthis period.25Skinner himself now finds it "impossible to believe"that the original 1651 edition of De Cive was "wholly or evenpartly"Hobbes's own work,26but he never expressly reconsiderswhether this evidence-not to mention that concerning TheElements-casts any shadows over his earlierconclusions (thoughhe has abandoned this interpretation).Skinnerconflated two socialactions, uttering (or writing) and publishing; his account makesit unclear in which action he is interested. TheElementsand DeCivewere written almost a decade before Engagement, so thatdebate can tell us nothing about Hobbes's intentions in writing(versus publishing) them. That Hobbes was not responsible forthe appearance of either work in 1651 makes the idea of hisintention in publishingthem nonsensical. In fact, Hobbes hadcompleted 37 chapters of Leviathanby May 1650, meaning thateven the passages on obligation in that work could not, strictlyspeaking,have been intended as a contribution to the Engagementdebate (save passages in the Review and Conclusion).27Skinnersuggests that we situate utterances in the "context of theiroccurrence";he does not differentiate between the context ofinceptionand the context of reception.He focuses on the context ofpublication in trying to understand Hobbes's works on political

24.Skinner,"Conquestand Consent,"pp. 94-96.25. M. M. Goldsmith, "Hobbes's Ambiguous Politics," History of PoliticalThought (1990):640-41;PhilipMilton,"DidHobbesTranslateDeCive?"HistoryofPoliticalThought9 (1990);RichardTuck,"Introduction,"Thomas Hobbes, On theCitizen,ed. Tuckand Michael Silverthore (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1998).26. Skinner,ReasonandRhetoric, . xvi.27. Glenn Burgess, "Contexts for the Writingand Publication of Hobbes'sLeviathan," istoryofPoliticalThought (1990),pp. 676-77;cf.RichardTuck,Hobbes(New York:OxfordUniversity Press,1989),p. 27,on the writing schedule.

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obligation, overlooking the importance of that issue in the 1630sand 1640s, even though that seems a much more likely contextfor the formationand development of Hobbes's ideas-especiallyin the cases of TheElementsand De Cive.28The third difficulty with utterances is clearest in Skinner'srecent work on Hobbes. In ReasonandRhetoric n thePhilosophy fHobbes,Skinner adopts something like a "collage" approach toutterances;sentences, even fragments of sentences, from many ofHobbes's works are patched together to establish his views oneloquence and civil science. Takethis example:

Hobbesproclaims n chapterV [of Leviathan]hat "theLightof humaneminds is PerspicuousWords,"adding that his own argumentis laidout"orderly ndperspicuously," iththe result hathis treatise s "clear"and "not obscure."He makes a similar boast at severalpoints in hiscontroversywithBramhall,nwhich he criticiseshisopponentforfailingto write "plainand perspicuous English,"and insistsby contrastthat"I have endeavored all I can to be perspicuous," and that "in theexaminationof truth,I search rather orperspicuitythanelegance."29Skinnercites fragments from An Answer to a BookPublishedbyDr.Bramhall[published posthumously, 1682]and from TheQuestionsConcerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance [1656 reprint, withadditions, of a 1645 exchange with Bramhall] as well as fromLeviathann makinghis point aboutHobbes's views on perspicuity.ThispatchworkapproachscommonthroughoutReason ndRhetoric.3This approach radically destabilizes the notion of utterancesand of intentions in uttering. I am not suggesting that Hobbeshad nothing to say about perspicuity or that Skinnergets Hobbeswrong on this or otherpoints. Theproblem is that the idea that anintention can reveal meaning depends on treating utterances associal actions. Statements dating from three decades, extractedfrom varied works, cannot in principlebe part of one utterance orsocial action.Skinner devotes large portions of ReasonandRhetoricto piecing together Hobbes's views on eloquence in this way, butit is hard to see how a study that lumps them together-whateverits other potential merits-can tell us much about intentions. It

28.JonathanM.Wiener,Quentinkinner'sHobbes," oliticalheory(1974):256;cf.Burgess, Contexts."29. Skinner,ReasonandRhetoric, . 361.30. Ibid.,pp. 291, 350, 354, and 362 for some other examples.

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might establishsomething about Hobbes'sbeliefs,but those beliefscannot, on Skinner's own view, represent a social act or embodyany single intention. (I defer until later the question of whatestablishing an author's beliefs can tell us about intentions.)Skinnercriticizes scholarswho paste togetheranauthor's scatteredremarksto determineher"doctrine"on some subject,yet he seemsdangerously close to such a "mythology of doctrines" himself.31Theseexamplesdemonstrateseveraldisanalogiesbetween textsand "speech acts."First,political texts arehighly complex; unlikethe simple examples favoredby philosophers (policemenwarningskaters about thin ice) it is not clear where theoretical utterancesbegin or end. Second, "utterances"of political philosophy do notsimply tripoff thetongue;theyareformed overyears,even decades,makingit tremendouslydifficultto isolate a "contextof occurrence."Third,a speech actis, as the name indicates,an act.Incases like theassembled fragments on perspicuity or the "series of works" onobligation it is hard to see that we are dealing with a text, anutterance,or anything Hobbes could recognize as "something hesaid or did" at all. It is equally hard to fathom what he could havepossibly intended in "uttering" t. This confusion aboututterancesis linked to several interpretive problems in Skinner's work onHobbes, which seems to obscure more than it clarifies about howthe concept of utterancesshould be deployed.

Context and IntentionsAssuming that authors intend to be understood, Skinnerconjecturesthat this intention entails working within preexistingconventions, even when authorshope to alter them. By comparingthe text in which we are interested with other texts addressingthe same subject, we can learn about the relevant conventionsand then, by studying how the author uses or manipulates them,we can determine her intentions.32 kinner s keen to rebuffchargesof an "insuperablecircularity" n his method, assertingthat "thereis surely no difficulty about seeing where to start." We first31.Skinner,"Meaningand Understanding," p. 34ff;cf.Minogue, "Method inIntellectualHistory,"pp. 179-80.32. Skinner,"SomeProblems,"pp. 103,107.

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THE REVIEWOF POLITICSelucidate the subject matter of utterances and then study thecontext of their occurrence to learn how they relate to otherutterances concerned with the same subject matter.33We havealready seen some difficulties involved with identifyingutterances,theirsubjectmatter,and context. InSkinner's writingson Hobbes, the question of the relation between a text and itscontext turns out to be quite problematic as well, complicatingour conclusions about intentions.The firstproblemis that contextsarequite numerous and quitecomplex, making it difficult to establish them reliably.ReasonandRhetoricpresents a masterly account of the teaching of Romanrhetoric in Tudor grammar schools-and thus of Hobbes's ownprobable studies. Skinner's scope is much broader than Englishschool-books, however; he delves into classical debates on finepoints of style and composition, the appropriateuses of rhetoric,and the political ideals those uses embody. For the student ofrhetoric,this history is probablymost welcome; for the student ofHobbes, it raises unwelcome interpretive difficulties. The firstresults directly from the breadth of scope. The thrust of Skinner'sargument is that Hobbes abandons the humanist position on therelationbetween reason and rhetoric for a faith in the persuasivesufficiency of science, only to change his mind again and acceptthat eloquence is indispensable in civil science. But becauseSkinner so exhaustively catalogues the greatdiversity of opinionamong thevarious authoritieswithin the tradition,he undermineshis own case for Hobbes's reversals.For instance, after explaining that Hobbes's "abandonment"of ornatus in his scientific works puts him in the company ofTacitus and Bacon, Skinner must assure us that Hobbes "carriesthe repudiation very much further" than they do-though thisposition too has precedents.34 The universe of humanism orclassical eloquence is so vast that one can find almost anyconstellationofviewpoints among its luminaries.This means thereis no clearstandardorreferentby which to assess Hobbes's allegedrejectionof and reconciliationwith "the tradition" (and maybethat there is effectively no "tradition"at all). Hobbes may havemeant any number of things by taking the positions he did. Given

33.Skinner,"AReply,"p. 275.34. Skinner,ReasonandRhetoric, p. 271, 274.

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the lack of consensus or orthodoxy on the use of ornatus, t is hardto tell if he meant to take any position at all with respect to it, atleast one that reflects anything about his wider views onhumanism and civil science. Wemight be able to see how Hobbesused various conventions, but the context is too diverse to supportany conclusions about what he might have intended in doing so.Thesecond interpretivedifficulty is closely related to the first.In Reasonand Rhetoric,Skinner overlooks or ignores dozens ofhistorically sensible contexts.35Even the context of Renaissancerhetoricis much more complex than Skinner's account indicates.As Miller and Strong observe, Skinner never explains his focuson the Roman rather than Greek style of rhetoric;both were invogue in Hobbes's day.36This is especially troubling givenHobbes's avowed appreciation of Aristotle's Rhetoricand itsspecial emphasis on persuasion through logical proof ordemonstration rather than eloquence. As Walkernotes, Skinnerjumps from a description of Tudor grammar school rhetoric toclaims about English Renaissance culture; but, beginning withthe curriculum of Elizabethanuniversities, one could just as easilyconclude that Renaissance culture was Aristotelian.37

Another, and arguably crucial, aspect of rhetoric Skinnerignores is the practiceof sacred rhetoric and preaching.38Thetwinaims of sacred rhetoric were to teach church dogma and to useeloquence to stir the passions of the congregation, therebytranscending or circumventing reason.39Hobbes consistently andcontinuously objected to such uses of eloquence, from his firstwritings on Aristotle and Thucydides right through to Behemoth.He always detested dogma and textual authority and alwaysworried about the nefariouspotential of eloquence detached fromreason and wisdom. PaceSkinner,Hobbes never viewed eloquence

35. Dan Herzog,"Reasonand Rhetoric n thePhilosophy of Hobbes,"PoliticalTheory25 (1997):895.36. Miller and Strong, "Meaningsand Contexts,"p. 343;cf. Leo Strauss,ThePoliticalPhilosophy fThomasHobbes: ts BasisandGenesis(Chicago:University ofChicago Press,1952).37. William Walker,"Reason and Rhetoricin the Philosophy of Hobbes,"Philosophy nd Literature1 (1997):206.38. Skinnerdevotes threeparagraphsanda few footnotesto thesubject ReasonandRhetoric, p. 66-67).39.DeborahShuger,"SacredRhetoric n theRenaissance,"Renaissance-Rhetorik,ed. Heinrich F Plett (Berlin:Walterde Bruyter,1993),pp. 123,152-53.

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THEREVIEWOF POLITICSas inherentlyeditious; t was the use of eloquenceby unwise or evilmenin dividing,deceiving,andconfusingcitizensthatdrewhis ire.40The most notable change in Hobbes's works on civil sciencefromTheElementso Leviathans the growing concernwith religionandreligious doctrine;his explicitworries about the use and abuseof sacred rhetoric certainly seem relevant to understanding thisdevelopment. Skinner acknowledges that Hobbes's change ofmind about eloquence stemmed from his analysis of the effectsof Presbyterian preaching before and during the Civil War,butthis context-like the scientific context to which Hobbes's firstvoltefaceis attributed-receives scant attention.We cannot of course fault Skinner for not studying what wemight have studied. Wecan, however, ask how the choices weremade, since the method purports to generate historically validinterpretations,to reveal the "historicalidentity"of texts. Skinnerargues that we recover intentions by studying conventions; welearnwhich conventions to study by placing the text in its propercontext. If we get the context wrong, we shall get the intentionswrong as well. Skinner cannot plead that only the historian'sinterests can determine what he studies. The claim to validitycreatesa need for a reliable determination about which context isthe correctone. Skinner offersprecious little advice on this crucialmatter,suggesting merely thatwe look forsimilarityin the subjectmatter of the texts themselves.

This hints at a moreprofound difficulty:How do we establisha connection between an author's work and a context? Hobbes'sstyle and use of rhetoricaldevices establishlittle about linguistic orideological conventions. This is especially true considering thatSkinnermustportrayTudorrhetorical rainingasextremelyeffectiveto establishhis claim thatHobbes "imbibed"humanist values as amatterof course-wouldn't one then expect stylish discourse fullof tropes and figures in all educated writing? Wouldn'teveryonebe a humanistby default?Likewise,theargumentsabout Hobbes'scareerchoice reflectvery littlewhen we consider the options opento educated commoners. Most importantly,subject matter is alsoambiguous;one subjectmay be relevant to many debates. The useand abuse of rhetoric s the subjectmatter of religiousdoctrine and

40.VictoriaSilver,"Hobbeson Rhetoric,"TheCambridge ompanionoHobbes,ed. TomSorel(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996),p. 338.

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political calculation as well as of humanist studies of eloquence.Besides, Skinner advances some questionable interpretations ofHobbes's statements on eloquence (more below).We see similar problems with context in Skinner's earlierworks on Hobbes. The claim that Leviathanhould be understoodin the context of Engagement rests mainly on its publicationhistory and on observations about the book's critical reception,Hobbes's alleged popularity, and similarities between Leviathanand some Engagement pamphlets.41While popularity and criticalreception certainlyrevealsomething about the broad social contextof a work, they bear only slightly on ideological and linguisticconventions. It turns out, anyway, that most of this information iscontradictory or anachronistic.42 his leaves the arguments basedon similarity.Here, Skinnerappears to have a much strongercase;not only does Hobbes share a defacto theory of obligation withmany Engagers, he is also sometimes cited by them.There are undeniable similarities between Hobbes and theEngagers and defacto theorists; what these say about Hobbes'sintentions is less obvious. Some Engagers do cite Hobbes, butcitation is consistent with a wide range of uses of a text. "Usageindicates a relationship between writers without carrying thepresuppositional infections of more portentous terms....[It] is anunspecific term,referringnot so much to a distinctive relationship(the purport of influence) but to virtually any evidentialrelationshipbetween writers."All that use indicates for certain isthat "one writer has found another germane to his ownenterprises."43Simply, citation suggests that Engagers foundsomething useful in Hobbes's theory, but does not necessarilyindicate anything about Hobbes's own intentions.

41. Skinner, "Ideological Context," pp. 293-94, 303-12; "Conquest andConsent,"pp. 81-93;"Context of Hobbes's Theory,"pp. 110-14.42.Parliamentconsidered Hobbes's work on blasphemy chargesin 1657 and1666. Skinner's claim that these charges hurt Hobbes's image and discouragedcitation of his work, thus concealing its true influence and relation to theEngagement debate, is anachronistic.Besides, it is difficult to square Skinner'sreportsof Hobbes's "notoriety"and "unspeakablydangerous"doctrines with hisclaimthatHobbes was popularandwell-respectedat home. Skinnercites Eachard,who wrote 28 years after the controversy,on Hobbes's popularity;all the authorscited there wrote after1665,making theirviews irrelevant to Hobbes's stature inthe early 1650s.43.ConalCondren,TheStatusandAppraisal fClassicTextsPrinceton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1986),pp. 138-39.

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THEREVIEWOF POLITICSI have already noted that Hobbes's political theory was

probablyworked out during the 1630sand 1640s,a contextSkinnerslights in focusing on Leviathan's"occurrence" n 1651. Burgessconcurs, noting that"Hobbes,after1649,was alarmed to discoverthat his political theory had changed sides on him"; he becamean Engager in spite of himself.44As Goldsmith suggests, Wardand others may have wanted to co-opt the argument of a"notorious royalist" in arguing for the Engagement. "InitiallyHobbes's ideas were used by defenders of Engagement," Burgessargues, "notbecause they readhim as a fellow-traveler of the newrepublic,but because they saw him as aRoyalistwhose ideas couldbe used for un-Royalist purposes."45Skinner misses this pointwhen he argues that "everyone of Hobbes's contemporary criticswould have had to be wrong, and in precisely the same way" ifHobbes did not intend Leviathan s a contribution to the debateover Engagement.46The Engagers might have been strategic andopportunistic in "misusing" Hobbes, perhaps knowing full wellthattheywerewrongabouthis intentionsall n the sameway);royalistswould have to attackheversionofHobbes heEngagerswerepromoting.Similarity of subject matter can be revealing and politicallyimportant, but it cannot establish intentions as Skinner hopes.Contexts are too numerous and too internally diverse to providethe kind of specificity required to "read off" intentions. Thedifficulties are multiplied because texts can be interpreted andused in ways their authors would eschew. That Hobbes wasuniversally understood as a theorist who located the origin ofobedience in protection and self-interestseems only to reveal thathis "locutionary" meaning was properly understood-byBramhall and other clerical critics as well as by Engagers.47t tells

44. Burgess,"Contexts,"pp. 679-95.Publicationof Leviathann 1651 causedconfusion and misunderstanding of Hobbes's intentions. Until then,Hobbes wasalways seen as a good (if clever)royalist."Leviathan as at best extremely tepid initsallegiance oEngagement heory, ndanylinksbetweenHobbesand theEngagerswere made contraryto his will, and to his embarrassment" ibid.).45. Goldsmith, "Hobbes'sPolitics,"pp. 640-41;Burgess, "Contexts,"p. 696.46. Skinner,"Contextof Hobbes'sTheory,"pp. 137-38.47.BramhallattacksHobbes's theoryas "dog'splay"-always takingthe sideof the stronger."Itseemeth T.H. did 'take' his soveraign 'for better' but not 'forworse'" (JohnBramhall,CastigationsfMr.HobbesNewYork:Garland,1977],pp.557-58).Bramhallblasts Hobbes'stheology,politics,andtimingbutneverchallengeshis royalistbonafides.

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us, on its own, nothing about Hobbes's intentions in puttingforward such claims.48 Machiavelli's Prince might serve tolegitimate a vicious ruler,but it does not follow that doing so wasMachiavelli'spolitical point in writing it.Tullyclaims that Skinnerhas always kept these questions separate,49ut this seems doubtfulin his work on Hobbes.Skinner's concern with intentions reflects the profoundinfluence of Collingwood, who was deeply concerned with thesubjectivity of actors in history-and thus with the mental worldof the historical actor.5 He takes his belief that conventions canreveal meaning from Austin and, less directly,Wittgenstein,whohold that all meaning is public and intersubjective.Skinner is wellaware that we cannot "get inside the heads" of past actors todiscover their mental states;he hopes thatby applying speech acttheory to historical texts, we will nonetheless be able to recovertheir author's intentions, which "can be inferred from anunderstanding of the significance of the act itself."51Skinner does not see the tension here:conventions can revealmeaning only in apublicsense;they areinadequateforuncoveringinterior or private meanings.52As we have seen, texts may have apublic significance that their authors never imagined, much lessintended. Unless we could find a way to show that a similaritywas itself intended, which would seem to require access to the

48. By focusing on how Leviathanwas received and used, rather than on theideologicalcontext which allegedly shapedit,Skinnermay overstate the theoreticalimportanceof Engagementaltogether(LotteMulligan,JudithRichards,and JohnGraham,"Intentionsand Conventions:A Critiqueof Quentin Skinner's Methodfor the Study of the History of Ideas,"PoliticalStudies27 [1979]:95).According toWallace, heEngagementwas not particularlyshocking,coming in the wake of theSolemn Leagueand Covenant (See MauriceAshley,TheEnglishCivilWar,rev.ed.[Gloucester,1990],p. 89);those who took the oath did so with the understandingthat the illegal governmentwas temporary.Mostpeople took thepledge and mostwould not have hesitated to break it if the opportunity arose (ohn M. Wallace,"TheEngagementControversy1649-53:AnAnnotated List of Pamphlets,"BulletinoftheNew York ublicLibrary8 [1964]:385-89).Even Bramhallrecognized that,asa practicalmatter, oyalists should submit (Bramhall,Castigations, p. 543-44).49. Tully,"Pen is a Mighty Sword,"p. 12.50. Skinner,"Meaningand Understanding,"p. 65;"SomeProblems,"p. 103;"AReply,"pp. 274-75.51. Skinner,"AReply,"pp. 274-75.52. Skinner's discussion of thepossibilityofwarningsomeone unintentionally(Skinner,"AReply,"pp. 264-65)makes this slippage clear.

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THEREVIEWOF POLITICSauthor's subjectivity,we cannotconclude much aboutintentions.53There is a missing link between similarity and use, which arepubliclyobservable factsavailable to thehistorian,and an author'sintentions, which are not available in the same way. This problemis mitigated somewhat in ordinary language philosophy becauseit is assumed thatthe context of occurrence is known or observed;knowing that the similarity is (presumptively) intended makes itplausible to infer intentions from conventions. It is preciselybecause the intended context of the historical speech act isunknown that we cannot reliably infer intentions from it. Thisambiguity points to another disanalogy between historical textsand speech acts: the historianalways encounters works "adrift."54

Beliefs, Motives, and IntentionsSkinnerencourages nterpretersofocuson theempiricalbeliefsof authors,their mentalworlds,because he sees a logicalconnectionbetween knowing that an author held certainbeliefs and ascribingintentions to her.55 vidence of corroboratingbeliefs ormotives canbolster our credencein an interpretation.56 xceptin limited cases,however, inquiries into the author's beliefs or motives will beancillaryto the process of determining intentions.57This must bethe case, because Skinner shows that intentions need not reflect

sincerelyheld beliefs orprinciples.58He maintainsthat even in caseswhere an agent never believes any of the principles he espouses,we can still identify intentions.59Motives stand "outside" anauthor's works and are rrelevant ounderstandingtheirmeaning.653. I takeup this problemof certaintybelow. Thanks to PerryAnderson andto refereesat the Review orhelp on these points.54. Conal Condren, TheLanguage f Politics in SeventeenthCenturyEngland

(London:St. Martin'sPress, 1994),pp. 10-11.55.Skinner,"Motives, Intentions,and Interpretation," . 78.56. Ibid.,pp. 77-78;cf. "AReply,"278.57.Skinner,"Motives, ntentions, ndInterpretation,"p.77-78.Theexceptionalcases are those involving ritualactions(Skinner,"'SocialMeaning,'"pp. 93-94).58. Skinner, "The Principles and Practice of Opposition; The Case ofBolingbrokeversus Walpole,"HistoricalPerspectives:tudies nEnglishThought ndSociety nHonourofJ.H.Plumb,ed. Neil McKendrick London:Europa,1974),pp.108-29,esp. 124ff.59. Skinner,"SomeProblems,"p. 108.60.Skinner,"Motives, Intentions,and Interpretation," . 73.

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QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBESWe have seen that Skinner initially interpreted Hobbes as a

lay defender of Engagement, basing this claim on the publicationrecord of Hobbes's texts, on Leviathan's riticalreception, and onthe similarities between Hobbes's arguments and those of theEngagers. Following Skinner's own critique of Macpherson, wecan posit that if Hobbes intended Leviathanas a lay defense ofEngagement, his mental world must have included at least thebeliefs that Engagement was in need of a defense, that his theoryof obligation could provide such a defense, and that it wasappropriatefor him to devote himself to accomplishing preciselythis task.61Hobbes might have held the firstbelief, in the sense offinding defenses of Engagement wanting, though he certainlydidnot feel Engagement merited defense-he considered itsimposition "a great crime."62As for the second belief, it is noteven clear that Hobbes realized his argument could be used asthe Engagers used it. With respect to the third, it hardly seemspossible that Hobbes could have felt it appropriate to devotehimself to defending Engagement.How do we know? Hobbes was a committed royalist and hadlife-long ties to the monarchy-ties that continued, it should bestressed,after the Restoration.63His clearpreferencefora monarchand his ringing criticism of rebellion are unequivocally hostiletoward the Rump. Hobbes did claim, in the Considerations,hatthe Review and Conclusion was a defense of the right of royaliststo protect their property by submitting, but he never mentionsthe usurpers. Besides, had Hobbes seen anything harmful to theking in his projectof "framing the minds" of royalist gentlemen,he would hardlyhave boasted about it in a defense againstchargesof disloyalty. Perhaps most telling is the matter of Hobbes's

61. Ibid.,p. 78.62. Hobbes, ConsiderationsUpontheReputation,Loyalty,Manners,andReligionofThomasHobbesn EnglishWorks, :418.63. Hobbes spent most of his life in the service of the staunchly royalistCavendish family.He helped collect the Forced Loan and stood for Parliament atNewcastle's behest in 1640. In1646,he became the mathematicstutor of thePrinceof Wales(laterCharlesII).After the Restoration n 1660,theking received Hobbeswarmly atcourt,even grantinghim for a time thesubstantialsalaryof ?100.Charlesalso helped Hobbesquashatheismchargesin Parliament n 1666(Tuck,Hobbes, .25; Arold Rogow, ThomasHobbes:Radical n the Serviceof Reaction New York:W.W.Norton,1986],p. 206ff.;Noel Malcolm,"ASummary Biographyof Hobbes,"TheCambridge ompanionoHobbes,p. 36).

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presentation of a manuscript copy of Leviathan o Charles II in1651. Could we square the portrait of Hobbes as Engager withany possible motive Hobbes could have had for making this gift?Skinner might have no trouble suggesting Hobbes's possibleintentions:to anger, to mock, to defy or persuade, even to winscorn at court. But knowing what we do about Hobbes's royalistbeliefs and his ties to the monarchy and to Charles IIpersonally,what could have motivated him to do any of these things? Hecould have intended the book simply as a gift, but what motivecould Hobbes have had for giving a gift sure to insult and offend?Why,without any evidence, should we assume that Hobbes wascontravening the norms of gift giving? To suggest that Hobbescould not know his gift would offend would mean he did notunderstand his own book or his own intentions in writing it.64The idea of the gift does accord with the view that Hobbessaw his book as a strongdefense of monarchy.Although Hobbes'spolitics were steadfastly royalist, his theory is stubbornly deaf toappeals to loyalty or traditionthat could have shown citizens why,after the execution of Charles I, they owed obedience to his sonand heir.Hobbes's cognitivisttheoryhasno room for such affectiveties. By publishing an overstated royalist account showing thatthose who abandoned Charles I before his execution did so toosoon, Hobbes inadvertently strengthened the case for obedienceto the Commonwealth65-explainingBramhall'sexasperationwiththe "blunderer."66n short, it is unlikely that Hobbes would haveever agreed, in principle,that he intended Leviathano be a defenseof Engagement, to lend support to the Commonwealthgovernment, or to justify its title to rule.One possibility is that Skinner simply fails to consider howhis interpretation its with Hobbes's beliefs;thatis, maybe Skinnerfails to follow his own method. Yet he is undoubtedly aware ofHobbes's beliefs, although he concentrates more on his viewsabout the relation between defense and obligation and betweenliberty and consent. Perhaps an author's "empirical beliefs" donot include personal views, allegiances, and emotional ties. This

64. Cf.Skinner,"Motives, Intentions,and Interpretation,"p. 77.65. I am grateful to a refereeat the Review orhelp on this point.66. "Blunderers,whilst they thinkto mend one imaginaryhole, make two orthreerealones" (Bramhall,Castigations, . 544).

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question points to a thornier problem: if the views or intentionsan author puts forward in some work need not reflect sincerelyheld principlesorbeliefs, and if we can determine intentions evenwhen all of the author's statements are insincere, what exactly isthe logical connection between beliefs and intentions to whichSkinner refers? Skinner offers no guidance on how we mightdetermine when intentions are "sincere,"except to imply, in anessay on Bolingbroke, that the author's biography can help. Eventhat is questionable, though, because thereseems to be no way todetermine which of an author's actions, statements, or writingsconstitute the baseline of sincere or actually held beliefs by whichthe others can be measured.These confusions arerelated to similardifficultiesin Skinner'smost recent interpretation of Hobbes. He argues in Reason andRhetoric that Hobbes's major political works-especiallyLeviathan-should be understood as contributions to a debate onthe place of classical eloquence in civil science. He presents anelaborate periodization scheme that establishes three distinctphases in Hobbes's beliefs on this subject:an early humanism, arejectionof eloquence and articulation of a science of politics, anda reconsideration of eloquence. Unlike his earlierinterpretations,thisone seems to relyon inferring ntentionsprimarilyfrom beliefsrather than from context.The argument for Hobbes's early humanism consists mainlyin the documentation of the Renaissance culture Hobbes musthave "imbibed" as a lad.67Other evidence includes Hobbes'sliterary style, his careeras an advisor and teacher of rhetoric,andhis purchase of books for his employers. Skinner argues thatHobbes's translations of Aristotle's Rhetoricand Thucydides'History demonstrate his devotion to the curricula of the studiahumanitatis and represent important contributions to thosestudies.68"Theearly part of Hobbes's career,"Skinner continues,"culminated in the production of two major treatises of civilphilosophy"-The Elementsand De Cive-which fulfilled the finalelement in the humanist curricula.69 Then, Hobbes becamefascinated with the methods of science. "Duringthe 1630s,Hobbes

67. Skinner,ReasonandRhetoric, . 11.68. Ibid.,pp. 217ff., 221ff., 226ff., 238-40,244ff.69. Ibid.,pp. 242-43.

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THEREVIEWOF POLITICSnot only turned away from the studiahumanitatis,he also turnedagainst the humanist disciplines and above all against the idea ofan art of eloquence." His first misgivings, Skinner argues, areevident in his translation of the Rhetoric,70ut Hobbes's most"sweeping attack" on humanist values is his argument about theintrinsic connection between eloquence and sedition.71 InSkinner's view, the use of tropes or ornatus n Leviathanprovesthat Hobbes again changed his mind and reconciled with hishumanist roots, marking another major development in hispolitical philosophy and his conception of civil science.Skinner argues that one of Hobbes's "principal aims in TheElementsand De Civeis to discredit and replace the Renaissanceideal of a union between reason and rhetoric,and hence betweenscience and eloquence";inLeviathan,Hobbes intends to show thatonly when science is allied with rhetoriccan it hope to persuade.72The hypothesized connection between Hobbes's changing beliefsand his purported intentions is straightforward: t is unlikely thatHobbes would have had these intentions if he had not changedhis mind in the ways that Skinner describes, and Skinneraccordingly devotes much of his argument to establishing thatHobbes did actually hold these beliefs.What can we infer about Hobbes's intentions in writing fromthis account? Again, the crucial question is the nature of the"logicalconnection" between beliefs and intentions.Showing thatan author held some belief is not equivalent with showing thatshe intended to do anything with regard to that belief in anyparticular text. It seems likely that an author will hold a greatnumber of beliefs incidental or irrelevant to her intentions inwriting any particularwork. But suppose Skinner is right aboutHobbes's beliefs on eloquence and civil science and that thosebeliefs did shape what Hobbes wrote in his major texts on thesubject (the best case for Skinner); it still does not follow thatHobbes's intention in writing these texts was to contribute to adebate on this subject,even if, as we have seen, they were relatedto or useful in that debate. Unless we know that some belief or setof beliefs motivated the author in writing a text, we are stuck in

70. Ibid.,p. 256.71. Ibid.,pp. 289-90.72. Ibid.,pp. 3-4.

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QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBESthe quandariesaboutsincerityand multiple, overlapping contextsand subject matter discussed above. And as Skinner admits,recovery of motives is perhaps impossible (it is certainly beyondthe scope of his method). Because intentions may be unrelated tobeliefs, it is impossible to make any connection between themwithout independent evidence for doing so-if such evidence iseven possible on Skinner's view. This makes Skinner's neglect ofHobbes's royalism and his ties to the monarchy in the early essaysparticularlydifficult to understand;they seem to be ourbest hopefor such confirmation.As a practical matter, these are moot points because theevidence does not support Skinner's account of Hobbes's beliefsabout reason and eloquence in the first place. To begin with,Skinner's neat periodization scheme is badly flawed. Though TheElements s Hobbes's first work on civil science, Skinner assertsthat it represents a radical break with his earlier views on thesubject. This in itself is odd; the only evidence we have aboutHobbes's earlier views is circumstantial, derived from theassumption that Hobbes must have "imbibed"a humanist politicsalong with his grammar lessons. It is also odd because Skinnerpresents Hobbes's writing of The Elementsand De Cive as the"culmination"of his early humanist career,but then goes on toclaim that in those very works he repudiates humanism.73Likewise,the translationofAristotle,one of the main achievementsof Hobbes's humanism, is said to be the earliest example ofHobbes's "misgivings" about eloquence, and the only citationgiven for Hobbes's "sweeping attack"on the intrinsiclinkbetweenrhetoric and sedition refers to Hobbes's "Life of Thucydides,"written in 1629, well before the supposed about-face, and alsodescribed as a defining achievement of Hobbes's humanist career.This rather tortured account gives little support to the thesis thatHobbes's thinking changed dramatically and suggests a bizarreinterpretationof his intentions: these works would appear to havebeen meant as contributions to the studia humanitatis andsimultaneously as rejectionsof humanist ideals.Moreover, once we look at the content of those works, theclaim that Hobbes twice reverses himself seems tenuous at best.Hobbes said that he translated Thucydides to show the English

73. Ibid.,pp. 250-326.

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THE REVIEWOF POLITICSthe dangers of flatterers and wicked, foolish men who usedeloquence to arouse the passions of assemblies and lead theminto folly.74 kinner neglects to mention, when documenting this"sweeping attack" on eloquence, Hobbes's emphasis on lack ofjudgment, stating merely that Hobbes equates eloquence withsedition. ButHobbes consistently held throughout his careerthatit was eloquence joined with lack of judgment or wisdom thatfomented sedition. He expresses this view in The Elements,warning, in a passage notable for its eloquence and classicalallusions,that "wheneloquenceand want ofjudgment go together,want of judgment, likethedaughtersof Pelias,consenteth, througheloquence, which is the witchcraft of Medea, to cut thecommonwealth in pieces."75Hobbes stresses in De Cive thateloquence devoted to truth is almost always linked to wisdom,while eloquence aiming atvictory rarelyis. Each form has its use;the formerin deliberation,the latterin exhortation;the danger isprecisely that foolish or wicked men will use exhortation, ratherthandeliberation,in counsel and in assemblies, a concern obviousthroughout Leviathan.76Most of the alleged shifts in Hobbes's views, along with his"attacks" and "rejections" of various parts of the rhetoricaltradition,areproducts of Skinneriangloss rather than Hobbesiandeclaration.77For instance, Skinner frequently invokes Hobbes'sstatement that the sciences are small power: "'The Sciences aresmall power,' [Hobbes] now concedes, 'but Eloquence is Power,'and is indeed to be numbered among the most eminent facultiesof the human mind."78These lines come from Hobbes's discussionof power, which he defines as the ability to acquireriches, friends,reputation, or good luck; persuasion is never mentioned.Eloquence numbers among the "eminent"powers, those whichare readily visible or apparent to others, along with physicalstrength, liberality, and good looks ("Forme is Power; because

74. Hobbes, "On the Life and History of Thucydides," Hobbes'sThucydides,ed. RichardSchlatter New Brunswick:Rutgers University Press,1975),pp. 12-13.75. Hobbes, TheElementsofLaw,NaturalandPolitic,ed. FerdinandTonnies,2ed.(London:FrankCass andCo.,Ltd.,1969),p. 178;cf.Skinner,Reason ndRhetoric,p. 300ff.76. Hobbes, On theCitizen,p. 139.77.Martinich,Reason ndRhetoric,".150documentshis"tendentious"prclivity78. Skinner,ReasonandRhetoric, . 351;cf. p. 4.

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being a promise of Good, it recommendeth men to the favor ofwomen and strangers"). "The Sciences," Hobbes writes furtherdown a longish list, "are small Power; becausenot eminent;andthereforenot acknowledged in any man."79notherwords, scienceis less useful than good looks or eloquence in acquiring friends,riches, and reputation because it is not an outwardly identifiabletrait. Skinner makes it seem as though Hobbes has declared thatscience is weak, compared with eloquence, in persuading peopleof the truth, a view Hobbes never even implies. Such "spin" onHobbes's statements is typical in Skinner's book.Skinneris wrong about Hobbes's beliefs on rhetoricand civilscience. Indeed, as Johnston shows quite persuasively, Hobbes'sviews on these matters remain consistent throughout all of hismajor works on civil science.80Whatever one's position on therelation between beliefs and intentions, this leaves Skinner'sargument about Hobbes's intentions in disarray.

Theory in Practice?Skinner has always held that good method will produce goodhistory.Judging from his historicalwritings on Hobbes, however,his application of the method is quite varied, sometimes

conflicting, frequently unpersuasive or problematic, and oftendifficultto reconcile with his theoreticalwritings.Thekey conceptsof utterances, conventions, and intentions are poorly specifiedand inconsistently applied.I have taken at face value Skinner's invitation to read hishistoricalworks as exemplary of his method-and thus assumedthat there is a method to be exemplified. Some critics deny thatSkinner actually sets out a method at all, arguing that he reallyadvances "a claim about what [he believes] takes place, or shouldtake place, in performing interpretations."81Even if this claim79. Hobbes, Leviathan, . 15180. David Johnston,TheRhetoric fLeviathan:ThomasHobbes nd thePoliticsofCulturalTransformationPrinceton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1986),p. 61.81.JohnG. Gunnell, PoliticalTheory:Tradition ndInterpretationCambridge,MA:WinthropPublishers,1979),p. 102;cf. CharlesD.Tarlton,"Historicity,Meaning,and Revisionism n theStudyof PoliticalThought,"History ndTheory2(1973):312.

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provides sound advice or accurately depicts what takes place ininterpretation, these critics allege, it is not a method but aprescription for successful understanding-a philosophicalreconstruction of the process of interpretation.82Based on ourreading of his works on Hobbes, a case study of the theory inpractice, the conclusion that Skinner does not really set out amethod atall seems plausible;it is certainlyclear that morespecificattentionto practicalproblemsof applicationis needed. Thismighttake the form of concrete guidelines for identifying utterances,selecting among contexts, and linking beliefs with intentions. Thedifficulties we have uncovered with the theory in practice,including the bad historythatsometimes results,give the soberingimpression that it may be impossible to do good history solely onthe basis of Skinner's extant methodological suggestionsIn concluding our discussion of the theory in practice, I wantto consider two possible objections to my argument. The first isthatIimpute a certaintyto Skinner's aims that he explicitly rejects.Inhis methodologicalwritings,Skinnercharacterizeshis approachas one providing a range of plausible intentions.83He recognizesthat any utterance may have almost infinite meanings, and thusthat the number of contexts within which the author might havebeen working is potentially vast. Suggesting that the method aimsat or is capable of determining an author's intentions thereforemischaracterizes Skinner's position, ignoring his own explicitrecognition that absolute certitude is impossible.84Skinnerdoes sometimes arguethat his method atbestprovidesa range of plausible intentions, though just as often he describeshis aim as determining what an author was doing in writing, andhe insists that certaintyis at least in principle possible.85Further,aclaim to historical validity seems to imply and depend upon atleasta strongmeasure of certainty. nthe works on Hobbes thatwehave surveyed, moreover, Skinner seems happy to advancedefinitiveclaims; nfact,he rarely ailstotell us exactlywhat Hobbeswas up to. Skinnerwrote that therecould "beno doubt"that Hobbesintended to contributeto the lay defense of Engagement and that

82. Gunnell, PoliticalTheory, p. 102, 122.83. Skinner,"Meaningand Understanding,"p. 64;cf. "Motives, Intentions,and Interpretation,"p. 77.84. Skinner,"AReply,"p. 280.85. Ibid.,p. 279.

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QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBESthis discovery provided "a new test of plausibility" forinterpretationsof Hobbes.86Some of his defenders dismiss suchbold statements as "youthful indiscretions," but in ReasonandRhetoric kinner is equally bold, stating that there is "noprospect funderstandingHobbes's]houghtunless we treat hiswider discourse[ofRenaissancehumanism]as theprimaryobjectof our research."87These examples might only indicate that Skinner's enthusiasmsometimes carrieshim away-though that indispensable contextscome and go with some frequencyis itself disturbing. Regardless,they raise serious doubts about whether the method is in factseenby its inventor as limited with respect to certainty.Second, it might be objected that I overemphasize the role ofconventionsinSkinner'swork. As my own argumentdemonstrates,rather than excluding other information,Skinner often dependsupon it. Theobjectorwould arguethat Skinner ntendshis approachto supplement, not to supplant,otherpractices.As one early criticof this articleargued,by using historical evidence to demonstrateerrors n Skinner's work on Hobbes, Iactuallyconfirmthe value ofcontextualistapproachesand therebyvindicateSkinner's theory, fnot his own applicationof it.No one can seriously claim as "his method" the use of anyand all historicalevidence-and Skinner of course has never doneso. Necessarily, even contextual methods establish evidentiarystandards and rules for using that evidence. The question is notone of morecontextual evidence, but of whatkind.On this pointSkinner s quiteclear: n "MeaningandUnderstanding,"he attackscontextualist approaches as eagerly and uncompromisingly as hedoes textualist ones. Broadercontextmight tell us something abouthow the relevant forms of words and arguments were used,88hesays, but the "fundamental assumption of the contextualmethodology, that the ideas of a given text should be understoodin terms of its social context, can be shown to be mistaken and toserve...as the source of further very prevalent confusions in thehistoryof ideas."89 he"appropriate ocus of the study is,"Skinnerwrites, "essentially linguistic" and this fact dictates that other

86.Skinner,"IdeologicalContext,"p. 313.87. Skinner,Reasonand Rhetoric,p. 8 (emphasis added). See also "'SocialMeaning,"' p. 95;"SomeProblems,"p. 104.88. Skinner,"Meaningand Understanding,"pp. 57-9.89. Ibid.

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aspects of social context must be located within the "linguisticenterprise"of interpretation.90 [Context]needs...to be treated asan ultimate framework forhelping to decide what conventionallyrecognizablemeanings,in a societyof thatkind,it mightin principlehavebeenpossibleforsomeoneto have intended tocommunicate."91Skinner's method hinges on the interpretive sufficiency ofconventions for recovering intentions; it purports to be a sciencefor the recovery of the actual historical meanings of texts.Conventions limit and define what an author might possiblymean; only by reconstructingthem can we determine an author'sintentions. Other evidence might be useful for other purposes,but it is logicallyunconnectedo theprocessof recoveringntentions:

It can hardly be a relevant criticism to observe that we may approach atext with many other questions in mind besides the one I have singledout. I do not arbitrarilyexclude these other questions: I exclude themon the grounds that they are unconnected with-and must not beconfused with-the hermeneuticenterpriseinwhich Iam alone interested.92

Skinner is not just an exponent of a contextualism with anidiosyncraticinterestin words; if he were, decades of impassioneddebate could be dismissed as a tempest in a teapot.

The Practice of TheorySkinner concluded his scathing 1964 review of Hood's bookon Leviathanby exclaiming: "If there is to be any prospect ofclearing up the confusions into which the study of Hobbes's workhas fallen, it is less philosophy, and more history, which isneeded."93Thereis something deeply ironic about this statement,given the immense philosophical machinery Skinner hasassembled in his pursuit of better historical understanding. So90. Ibid.,p. 63.91. Ibid.,p. 64.92. Skinner,"AReply,"p. 232.93.Skinner,"Hobbes'sLeviathan,"istorical ournal (1964):333. ForSkinner'scomplaints with the contemporary Hobbes scholarship see "The Context ofHobbes'sTheoryof PoliticalObligation,"Hobbes ndRousseau: CollectionofCriticalEssays,eds. MauriceCranston and Richard S. Peters (Garden City,NY: AnchorBooks,1972).

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farI have concentrated on this machinery and its operation; now,I want to consider briefly the connection between the machineryand the product it generates-between Skinner's methodologicalsuggestions, the philosophical commitments from which theyfollow, and the kind of history they turn out.Skinnerbegan his famous sweep through the Augean stablesof political theory because he felt that neither of the dominantapproaches, textualist or contextualist, was a "sufficient or evenappropriate means of achieving a proper understanding of anygiven literaryorphilosophicalwork. Bothmethodologies," he felt,"commit philosophical mistakes in the assumptions they makeabout the conditions necessary for the understanding ofutterances."94Skinner's method is designed to eliminate thesemistakes; his criticism of the leading approaches to politicalthought assumes from the outset the validity of his ownunderstanding of interpretation as requiring the recovery ofintentions throughthe use of a modified form of speech act theory.Gunnell is thus right that what is at stake in the debate overSkinner's method is what constitutes historical interpretation.95The "philosophical mistakes" Skinner attacks are really onlyphilosophical differences; textualists and contextualists are"mistaken"not because their methods prevent them fromreachingthe kind of conclusionin which they are interestedbut because theyare nterested nwhat Skinner hinks s thewrongkind of conclusion.

In other words, as Minogue charges (and Skinner accepts),Skinner s a "philosophicalimperialist."96hisimperialismderivesfrom his "fundamental assumption as an intellectual historian":that "the history of thought should be viewed not as a series ofattempts to answer a canonical set of questions, but as a sequenceof episodes in which the questions as well as the answers havefrequently changed."97Skinner's method must be understood inthese terms: to limit our study of historical meaning to what anauthormighthave intended is to put this assumption into practice,to make it impossible to find that old texts might be concernedwith the same questions thatconcernus. Skinner has recently tried94. Skinner,"Meaningand Understanding," p. 29.95. Gunnell, PoliticalTheory, . 103.96.Minogue,"Methodn IntellectualHistory," 78;cf.Skinner,"AReply," . 234.97. Skinner,"AReply,"p. 234.

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THE REVIEWOF POLITICSto conceal the iron fist of his imperialism in the velvet glove ofmethodological pluralism, acknowledging that there are manyreasons for doing history and many ways of doing it.98His stanceis further softened by his repeatedinsistence that there are severalkinds of meaning (plain or locutionary meaning and "meaningfor me" as well as illocutionary meaning) and that intentions arenot equivalent with the sum total of meaning a text might containor acquire.99Nonetheless, he never wavers in maintaining thatknowledge of intentions is equivalentwithillocutionary meaningand that this meaning alone defines the historical identity of atext.10?This largely uncontested claim to historical validity is apowerful weapon, and Skinner has never relaxed his grip on it.Skinner is often criticized on the grounds that his methodreduces the study of political theory to a dusty antiquarianism,stripping it of any modern relevance.'0 Too often this charge isleveled at Skinner as if it were an unforeseen or unintendedconsequence of his interestin intentions;on the contrary,his focuson intentions is meantto operationalizepreciselysuch aseparationbetween past and present. He frequently denounces as"depressingly philistine" the view that political thought isirrelevantto contemporaryreaderswhen restrictedto its historicalcontext. To him, the role of the intellectual historian is "toprovide...readers with information relevant to the making ofjudgments about their currentvalues and beliefs,"which are ofteninherited and frequently unexamined. The historian exposesreaders to neglected and forgotten ideas and then "[leaves] themto ruminate" on their judgments. His method, by showing howold texts relate to the context of theiroccurrence,provides the keyto "self-awareness,"helping us see what is necessary and what iscontingent in our world and giving us a broader,more objective,tolerant,and self-criticalperspective on our own political valuesand arrangements.02

98. Skinner,LibertyBeforeLiberalism,p. 108-9;"AReply,"p. 232.99. Skinner, "Some Problems," p. 102; "Motives, Intentions, andInterpretation,"p. 70;"Reply,"p. 272.Skinner ridicules the idea of "meaning forme" as a "consumer-orientedstudy of 'readerresponse"'(ibid).100.Skinner,"Motives, Intentions,and Interpretation," . 70.101.Skinner"AReply,"p. 286,summarizes these charges.102.Skinner,"MeaningandUnderstanding,"p.67;"AReply,"p. 287;cf.LibertyBeforeLiberalism, . 107;Reason ndRhetoric, . 15.

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QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBESThe charge that Skinner's method leads to antiquarianism

misses the mark, but it points to a more fundamental tension inhis philosophicalenterprise.He contends thatonly by establishingan author's intentions can we understand that he was concernedwith his own questions rather than with ours. But as we haveseen, the separation between past and present, which the focuson intentionsreflects,is Skinner's "fundamentalassumption,"thephilosophical starting point from which his method is derivedrather than a conclusion that it yields. The tension arises becauseif we accept this assumption, there is no need to do intellectualhistory to attain historicalself-awareness;we know as a matterofprinciple that our own ideas are contingent, that our questionsare our own, and that the past holds no solutions to them.Skinner "emphatically [reserves]" his admiration "for thosehistorians who consciously hold themselves aloof fromenthusiasm and indignation" when considering the past.103Theoverleaf of LibertyBeforeLiberalism,owever, describes Skinner'seffort "to excavate, and to vindicate, the neo-Roman theory offree citizens and free states." In his review, Crickdryly observesthat the book's cover is more forthcoming than its author aboutthe argument it contains.104Skinner is, to borrow a phrase,"maddeningly coy" about his political commitments.105 etfor allthis, he has throughout his long career been concerned withexcavating and vindicating a particularpoint of view: republicanhumanism or, now, "neo-Romanism."106We have seen that Skinner's projectof historicizing politicaltheory consciously follows from his convictions about theseparation between past and present-a typically republican orhumanist conception of historical consciousness. Skinner seesmodern political thought as comprising a dominant ideology(liberalism) and a subordinate counter-ideology (republicanhumanism).107When the intellectual historian contrasts our

103.Skinner,LibertyBeforeLiberalism, . 117-8.104.Berard Crick,"LibertyBeforeLiberalism," oliticalQuarterly9(1998): 26.105.Herzog, "Reasonand Rhetoric,"p. 895.106.Cf.Skinner,Reason ndRhetoric,. 16.Skinnerhopes toconvey "somethingof the attractionsof [humanism's] ... accountsof rationalityand moralargument"and to raise "anew the question of which [philosophical] style is more deservingof our intellectual allegiances."This is largely a rhetoricalquestion.107.Tully,"Penis a Mighty Sword,"p. 17.

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present beliefs with neglected or forgotten ones, he is essentiallyresurrecting this republican-humanist counter-ideology. This isclear when we consider that the views of this subordinateideologyare forgotten and neglected because they were at some pointrejected or abandoned in favor of other (mainly liberal) views.Thus, to reconsider our present beliefs in light of forgotten ones isto renew the ideological contest between the dominant and thesubordinate ideologies of liberalism and republicanism onhistorical rather than overtly ideological grounds. It is revealingin this respectthat all of the leading practitionersof the Cambridgeschool-despite their methodological differences-are advocatesof some brand of republican humanism and critics of liberalism.Itis difficult to understand how the historiancanengage in thisprocess of challenging contemporary values and judgments byreviving long-vanquished or abandoned ideological alternativeswithout taking at least a tacitposition on the relative merits of theideas themselves. The practicaleffect of resituating a figure likeHobbes in the context of humanist debates is to undermine theveryfoundations of much of contemporary liberal thought. RecallSkinner'svarious conclusions on Hobbes: he is identifiedwith thedefendersofEngagement Commonwealthmen),he reachesapartialreconciliation with the Renaissance humanist view of eloquence,he is implicitlybut clearlycriticized(in LibertyBeforeLiberalism)orfailingto see the attractionsof the neo-Romanview of liberty.Theseconclusionschallengethe acceptedviews of Hobbes as naturallawtheorist, as exponent of a rational or scientific or typicallyEnlightenmentview of political obligation,and as liberal theorist ofrightsand contract.108neffect,pastideological questionsare revivedand transformed nto problemsof method;sweeping challenges tothe foundations of modem thinking about rights, liberty,politicalobligation,and the very natureof civil science become questionsofhistoricalvalidity.10It is difficult not to conjecture that there is a connectionbetween Skinner's particularview of the relation between pastand present, the method he derives from that view, and the

108.Skinnerand otherCambridge chool theoristshavesimilarlyreinterpretedMachiavelli, Locke,Harrington,and others.109. This is not to take any position on whether these views do in factrequirereexamination.

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republicanhistorythat results.Paradoxically,uch a connectionwouldimplythatpastthinkers ndpast deasmighthold answersto ourpresentpoliticalproblemsandthattheseproblemsarenotafterall so distantand different romthose of thepast.WebeganwithAshcraft's ecommendationo consider hepractical ffectsof Skinner'smethod rather hanthe "high-flyingdebate whichseeks to transform methodological presuppositions intophilosophical conclusions."We considered a number of thepracticalissues that arise in Skinner'simplementationof hismethod in his work on Hobbes. Yet it might be that thephilosophicalcommitment o a humanistconceptionof historythat nforms hemethodand therepublicandeologyit resurrectsand promotesare the most importantpracticalconsiderationsraised n its use.I leave it for the reader o ruminate.

michael goodhart theory in practice quentin skinner s hobbes reconsidered

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