Soldiers of Islam: Origins, Ideology and Strategy of theTaliban

Aabha Dixit, Research Associate, IDSA

Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis

New Delhi

http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug-2.html

Introduction

Labeled variously as soldiers of Islam, a militia in pursuit an obscurantist fundamentalist ideology,

the greatest destabilising threat to the Central Asian Republics, the Taliban's rise to pre-eminence in

Afghanistan necessitates an understanding of their origins, ideology and strategy in the quest for

unrivalled power in the country.

Creation of the Taliban

They emerged from anonymity in 1993 and in the span of four years have radically changed the

complexion of the Afghan civil war by becoming the notable political elite. Essentially, the Taliban

grew out of the turf battle between the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Interior Ministry in

Islamabad during Benazir Bhutto's second term. The Establishment had resisted their creation and

reportedly criticised Benazir Bhutto for the use of the Taliban for their November 1994 operation in

rescuing the trade caravan on its way to Central Asia that had been captured by the local warlord of

Kandahar. The ISI which had run the Afghan operations with complete autonomy since the late

1970s, was averse to the Taliban because they had continued to pin faith on the Hizb-i-Islami under

Hikmatyar to dislodge the Rabbani government. More importantly, the ISI viewed the Taliban as yet

another Benazir Bhutto ploy to reduce its role in Afghan affairs. But Maj. Gen.(Retd) Nasrullah

Babar who had assumed a mandate from the Bhutto government to attempt a parallel track, which

offered the possibility of opening new options in Afghanistan, relentlessly pursued the Talib option,

which initially led to the weakening of the hold of the ISI on the conduct of Islamabad's Afghan

policy. Eventually, the remarkable success of the Taliban forced the ISI to co-opt itself into training

and guiding the Taliban ranks. Despite persistent denials by the Benazir Bhutto government, there

is little doubt that the Taliban have been created, trained and equipped by the ISI and Interior

Ministry special forces. According to some estimates, the Taliban require $70 million on a monthly

basis to keep the militia in functional order and a 'major part of this money is provided from across

the Afghan-Pak border. Recent purchases by the Taliban of tanks, artillery pieces and armoured

personnel carriers ( APC ) have come from illegal tax checkpoints that have been raised along the

trade routes linking Pakistan to the Central Asian Republics. The Taliban have become a more

cohesive force, stocked with adequate weapons, including an Air Force, as a result of the ISI's

vigorous assistance. There have also been reports that Pakistani Army personnel are already

present in Taliban ranks, taking part in operational and tactical missions. Today the Taliban are over

50,000 strong, with 300 tanks, APCs and a squadron of MiG aircraft.1

While there has been no doubt that most of the funding for the Taliban has come from Saudi Arabia,

the Kandahar based organisation has not been able to resist using drug production to fund its

activities. Despite controlling a majority of poppy producing areas and publicly maintaining an anti-

drug profile, recent reports from the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) indicate poppy was

harvested from 55,000-58,000 hectares during 1996, which is slightly higher than 1995. Despite

political uncertainty, new routes from Afghanistan to Europe and beyond were used.2

The nucleus for the Taliban have been Afghan Talibs (students) who were studying in large numbers

in madrassas throughout Pakistan. Studying in madrassas offered a way out of the dreary living

conditions inside Afghanistan, as most madrassa chieftains supported the Talibs during their stay at

the madrassas in a bid to increase adherents to their particular sect. Between 1989 and 1991, a few

thousand Mujahideen, disillusioned with the post-Soviet withdrawal fighting amongst the various

Mujahideen' groups also joined these madrassas. In creating the Frankenstein monster, the

brilliance of General Babar's accurate analysis of understanding the prevailing sense of despondency

amongst ordinary Afghans will have to be acknowledged. Until the emergence of the phenomenon of

the Taliban, the Pakistani Establishment either overestimated the strength of the various

Mujahideen groups in different regions of Afghanistan or preferred to achieve their objectives by

placing implicit faith of resolving the Afghan conflict in their favour by pushing one group• the

Hizb-i-Islami under Culbuddin Hikmatyar. General Babar, therefore perceptively recognised the role

of the madrassas in being the fertile ground for indoctrinating the Afghan Talibs to find a new way

of establishing a new order. Closer interaction with numerous madrassas all over Pakistan and

specially those belonging to the Deobandi denomination, because these were funded by the Saudis,

saw the first beginnings of a new puritanical group that would seek to cleanse the country of its

corrupt Mujahideen leaders.

At the same time, there was realisation in Islamabad which questioned the ability of major

Mujahideen factions to retain fighters. Surplus weapons or religious ideology were no longer

inducing these fighters to remain loyal to faction leaders. Like all protracted civil war conditions,

once there is a dilution of revolutionary zeal among the foot soldiers, the only manner in which the

leaders could retain their loyalty is through money. This condition had become evident in

Afghanistan from 1993 when reports of the growing role of faction leaders in playing in the volatile

money markets of Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and Peshawar became well known. It was also during

Najibullah's post-Soviet rule that frequent desertions by local commanders became common

practice. Najib used it with great success to repulse the Pakistan aided attacks on Jalalabad and

Khost in 1992.

As a result, when the Taliban, supported by Islamabad entered the Afghan arena, there was a clear

strategy of targetting local commanders of regional warlords in a piecemeal fashion. This would

explain in large measure their blitz through southern and central Afghanistan, capturing 14

provinces without encountering resistance. Even in 1997, this policy has been pursued with even

greater success in sensuring that their non-Pashtun opponents like Ahmed Shah Masood, Abdul

Rashids Dostam, Karim Khalili and Syed Naderi have been' weakened not through battles but by

desertion of men, local commanders and equipment. The Taliban's recent entry into Salang was

facilitated after a local commander, Bashir Salangi, switched sides. Similarly, in Uzbek territory, the

Taliban took advantage of the brewing crisis. between General Dostam and Abdul Malik to "buy off"

the latter, along with a string ' of his local commanders. The fall of Mazar-is-Sharif and the fleeing

of a once very powerful Dostam took place only after his entire frontline commanders switched sides

for large sums of money.

Support Base of the Taliban in Pakistan

Initially, the Taliban's principal supporter was Fazlur Rahman, the Jamaat-i-Ulema-Islam (JUI)

leader from Baluchistan. The first batches of Talibs from seminaries run by Maulana Fazlur Rahman

were trained by the Frontier Constabulary Corps and the Sibi Scouts in training camps near the

Baluch border with Afghanistan. Subsequently, reinforcements for the Taliban militia came from

other seminaries located in other parts of Pakistan. The most important seminary is located in New

Town area of Karachi called Jamiat-ul-Uloom-il-Islamiyyah. Run by Maulana Mohammed Yusuf

Binnori, the seminary has 8,000 students from different nationalities. There have been unconfirmed

reports that the Taliban supremo, Mullah Omar, studied at this seminary. But the seminary has

assumed a prominent place within the Taliban hierarchy based in Kandahar, with three seminary

members within the ruling six-member council. Even during the recent call by the Taliban leadership

for sending more men into the frontlines following the reversal at Mazar-is-Sharif, it is believed that

the elusive Mullah Omar had spoken to the "Binnori" Madrassa in New Town.

Mullah Omar clearly acts as primus inter pares within the six-member council in Kandahar. Sketchy

details of Omar have become available. Apart from making his mark in fighting the Soviets, Omar is

reported to have lost one eye, but is well built (over 6 feet 6 inches tall) and is in his early forties.

Well versed in Farsi, Omar is not a cleric. He was associated with Nabi Mohammadi's Harkat group

which was close to the Saudis. He is reportedly influenced by the Deobandi school of thought.

The growth chart of the Taliban has run parallel to the mushrooming of sectarian madrassas in

Pakistan in recent years. The Punjab government had conducted a secret survey in 1997 which

revealed staggering figures. As revealed in a micro-study of one sectarian organisation, the Muridke

(Sheikhupura district) based madrassa belonging to the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) had spread

its tentacles with 28 centres in Punjab alone. This madrassa is of recent origin having begun its

functioning in 1987. Today, it has spread its tentacles into Baluchistan with 3 centres, 3 centres in

interior Sind, 43 centres in Karachi alone, besides having representative bodies in various

universities. At a macro-level, the mushrooming of sectarian bodies has been documented in

another survey conducted in 1996. There were 2,512 functioning deeni madrassas, representing all

schools of sectarian thought in Punjab. This figure sharply contrasts with the creation of 868

madrassas between 1947 and 1975. All these madrassas were reported to have a student

enrolment of over 2 lakh students. A nation-wide survey would reveal the overwhelming influence

that madrassas have come to assume in Pakistani politics as well as in the Taliban's growth chart.

Taliban's Route to Power in Afghanistan

The rise of the Talibs is thought to have begun with the capture of the small town of Doorahi on the

outskirts of Kandahar, although other reports have indicated that Talibs were initially used along

border areas to prevent cross border smuggling of goods. From there the Talibs moved to Spin

Boldak, a town controlled by Mullah Akhtar Jan who owed allegiance to Hikmatyar. After Spin

Boldak, it was a remorseless movement towards the periphery of Kabul, capturing 10 provinces in

the process. The unexpected success meant requiring more Talibs for operations. As a result, in less

than six months after Spin Boldak, their ranks swelled from 2,500 to over 30,000 by the time they

were perched at the gates of Kabul. But significantly, they had to fight no major battle, as bribery

accounted for most turnarounds. They fought two battles in 1995 to gain Farah and Nimroz

provinces.3 But without battle experience, Masood's forces were able to keep them at bay along the

perimeter of Kabul for over a year. Before the capture of Kabul, they suffered a few defeats when

the Rabbani forces pushed them out of Zabul and parts of Hilmand province.4

Their capture of Kabul in September 1996 was a combination of several factors, which significantly

did not include exhibiting their military prowess on the battlefield. Rapid desertions amongst the

Pashtun militia. then aligned with Masood for the defence of Kabul, the failure of Dostam to switch

sides from the Taliban into Masood's camp, thereby relieving pressure on the Afghan capital from

the north-west and the slow but steady progress made by the Taliban to cut Masood's links with

Jalalabad, forced the Tajik militia to make a strategic retreat from Kabul. In the post-Kabul capture

scenario, buoyed by their recent successes, they pushed ahead into Jabal-us-Siraj, Gubahar and

Bagram. But they suffered humiliating defeats near the Salang Tunnel. These reverses forced the

Taliban to undertake the now familiar strategy of encouraging defections amongst local

commanders before making their advances. In February 1997, their move into the Ghorband Valley,

which lies adjacent to the Panjshir Valley, came after local commanders switched sides, along with

their equipment. This weakened Masood and the Shia forces of the Hizb-i-Wahdat, located near the

Shiber Pass. In their push through the Chorband Valley, a month later, they were able to split the

Hizb-i-Wahdat by having two key commnanders desert Khalili, allowing the Taliban an open route

towards Mazar-is-Sharif. These two key commanders had belonged to a faction of the Hizb-i-Wahdat

led by Haji Diljo, with whom the Taliban had nearly clinched an accord in July 1997 in Maidan

Shahr.'5 Azizullah and Gafoor, two commanders from the Ghorband Valley who belonged to Masood

defected during the same period, weakening the Masood-Khalili alliance.

In simultaneous negotiations with Uzbek leaders belonging to the Rasul Pahalwan faction, the

Taliban had been successful in weaning away Abdul Malik Pahalwan and Gul Mohammad, the

younger brothers of Rasul. By exploiting natural differences between Dostam and the Pahalwan

faction for leadership of the Jumbush Milli as well as agreeing to pay Abdul Malik a staggering sum

of $200 million, the Taliban ensured that most of Dostam's field commanders on the frontline

deserted Dostam, forcing the Uzbek warlord to flee Mazar-is-Sharif. Failure to understand the

sensitivities of the Uzbeks and the Shia population, led to the Taliban being counter-attacked by

Abdul Malik and Karim Khalili's forces, exposing the Taliban's poor record in actual fighting.

Ideology of the Taliban

Initially metamorphosed into a militia by using disenchantment amongst the ranks with existing

Mujahideen leaders, the Taliban revealed their Islamic ideology only after the capture of Kandahar.

Between Doorahi and Kandahar, the ISI cultivated the Taliban amongst their principal backers viz"

Saudia Arabia and the US with a "catch all" philosophy. To the US and Pakistan, the Taliban's

attempts to curb poppy growing and heroin refinement was a welcome step as their own attempts

to break the nexus between the smuggler and drug producer were unsuccessful. If the anti-drug

programme undertaken by the Taliban provided tacit backing from Washington, pushing for a

pristine Islamic society found favour with the Saudis, who were not only bankrolling the madrassas

inside Pakistan, but were now reported to be funding the Taliban as well. The only discordant voice

came from the Iranians, who along with other ethnic minority groups like the Tajiks, Hazaras and

Uzbeks perceived the entry of the Taliban as an attempt to reintroduce Pashtun hegemony in

Afghanistan, undermining the plural character of Afghan society.

In areas controlled by the Taliban, efforts to impose a very narrow interpretation of the Shariah

were made. All Western technological advances including TVs, VCR, photography, films were

condemned and individual items destroyed and publicly displayed. Capital punishment was used

frequently and the position of women and children was reduced to pathetic proportions. All these

efforts, dubbed as "obscurantist", came in for strong criticism from the West, forcing countries like

the USA to refrain from recognising the Taliban regime in Kabul. But in the past year, the Taliban

leadership has shown some sensitivity to world opinion by seeking to re-define its interpretation of

women and children. Similarly, they have modified their strong objection to photography and

routinely allow the foreign Press to film Taliban fighters. The top leadership, however, remains

adamant about not being captured on film. Another indication of the Taliban bowing to international

pressure was the recent controversy over blowing up Buddha statutes in Bamiyan. A spate of

criticism finally forced the Taliban leadership to issue a denial. A third indication of the Taliban

leadership becoming less doctrinnaire in their approach is the recent 3-point offer by Mullah Omar

to the northern Opposition alliance which recognises the multi-ethnic character of Afghanistan and

seeks political accommodation. Such a change of tactics has taken place undoubtedly with prodding

from Pakistan, which now places a greater premium on getting a semblance of order and peace in

the country to facilitate closer links with Central Asia. The Taliban are not isolationist in approach,

and have offered closer contacts with the rest of the world. These have largely been conditioned by

the fact that there has been negative publicity about their implementation of Shariah laws.6

But there has been sharp reaction from human rights groups in Europe and the US. Ulrich Fischer of

the Greens Party accused the Taliban of creating a "religious police state' and that Western

countries should be very conservative in their official recognition of the Taliban." The presence of

the Saudi terrorist, Osama bin-Laden, in Afghanistan, proved embarrassing for the Taliban as well.

Initially, the Taliban confirmed that Laden was in Afghanistan, but when pressures for his

extradition increased, the Taliban leadership refused extradition, but announced that Laden would

not be allowed to use Afghan soil to target other countries.

Divisions within the Taliban

In these four years of existence, the Taliban have been successful in maintaining a monolithic

image, with Mullah Omar as the head of the movement. But a closer analysis of the Taliban

leadership structure would reveal that there are factions within the organisation. The first such

divide came to notice during the siege of Kabul in 1996. There were reports that some factions of

the Taliban were not averse to doing local deals with the Rabbani government, while the Kandahar

based leadership shunned all contacts with Kabul. In one such instance, the local commander of the

Taliban forces had agreed to an "unofficial" 10-day ceasefire, which pro-Rabbani leaders within the

Taliban were reported to have resorted to, so as to 'test the sincerity of the Rabbani government."

This ceasefire had been brokered by a Pakistan political leader, Mohammad Khan Sherani, and was

done to secure the release of 85 Talibs.7 Elsewhere, specially around their strongholds in Kandahar,

the Taliban had spurned all offers to cease fires with Rabbani. A Kandahar based Taliban leader,

Mullah Rabbani, had been quoted as saying that "we don't believe in talks with Rabbani as long as

he is in power."8 In another instance, fighting between Rabbani's forces and the Taliban broke out

in Dilaram area of western Afghanistan, when an unofficial ceasefire came into effect in other areas

where they faced each other.9

In another instance, there was an instant rejection of proposals made by the Kabul regime by the

Quetta based Taliban spokesman, which in turn had come within hours of Islamabad officially

rejecting them as 'backward". But the Kandahar based leadership council under Mullah Omar agreed

to meet the Kabul delegation in their first official contact in October 1995. The Kandahar group is

more purist in its approach demanding that Afghans keep beards among other edicts that they have

issued, 'while the other centres of the Taliban, mainly the Pakistan based ones, want a less

doctrinnaire imposition of Islamic values and life styles.

When UN Special Envoy Mehmoud Mestiri had resumed his peace parleys in Afghanistan in March

1996, he had been assured by the political leadership of the Taliban, represented by Maulvi

Mohammad Rabbani, who also commanded the forces encircling Kabul, that the Taliban were ready

for discussions with the Rabbani government. With this perceived shift in the Taliban's strategy,

Mestiri had moved to Kabul to tie up other details. This would explain in large measure the Taliban's

removal of heavy weaponry from areas surrounding Kabul very recently. But no sooner had Maulvi

Rabbani given this assurance to the visiting UN envoy, the religious leadership based in Kandahar

rejected talks with Kabul, scuttling Mestiri's efforts. In an bid to shore up their support bases, the

Taliban leadership called. an Ulema Shoora in Kandahar comprising 1,500 delegates, which in turn

declared Maulvi Omar, the 37-year-old founder of the movement, as the next Amirul Momineen.

During the recent forward move into Nangrahar in September 1996, hardliner elements in the

Taliban leadership like Mullah Mohammad Ghaus and Maulvi Wakeel Ahmed, who have been

favouring a tougher stance against the Kabul government, brushed aside the neutrality claims of

the Shoora-i-Mashreqi and virtually walked into the capital, Jalalabad.

With the passage of time and after the incorporation of local commanders who 'had defected from

other Mujahideen groups, the Taliban leadership has been exposed to more dissensions. Broadly,

two types of divisions exist in the organisation. The first division is between factions of the Taliban

itself, with some factions, notably those led to Mullah Ghous and Maulvi Ehsanuilah, plugging a

more moderate line. Another faction, led by Maulvi Khairullah and Maulvi Rabbani, are believed to

be more orthodox and are presently supported by Mullah Omar. The second split is between the

new entrants and the older leadership. Differences in the comings days would be magnified with

newer warlords being inducted into the Taliban organisational set-up.

Conclusion

Several conclusions can be drawn from this detailed study of the Taliban.

First, their embryonic connection with Pakistan is well known and widely acknowledged

within Pakistan. Further proof has been provided by Islamabad's recognition of the Taliban

government in Kabul.

Second, despite the desire of the Taliban to put into place a conservative and orthodox

regime, there have been numerous examples of the Taliban making concessions to improve

their international image.

Third, in the past four years, the Taliban have shown the capability to build a massive force

in comparison to their opponents, but their performance on the battlefield has been less

than satisfactory. The Taliban have not been able to coalesce into a fighting force capable

to crushing its opposition.

Fourth, despite their present dependence on Islamabad, the Taliban have given enough

indication that they would seek to operate independently once in control of the country.

Fifth, for Pakistan, the rise of the Taliban might have helped to break the logjam that had

been created because of the indecisive intra-Mujahideen fighting since the Soviet

withdrawal. But unleashing into the civil war an unknown element has radically altered the

character of the civil war. But this by itself does not guarantee Islamabad a feeling that it

would achieve its objectives in Afghanistan.

NOTES

1. Hindustan Times, September 26, 1995.

2. The News, March 18, 1997.

3. Frontier Post, May 14, 1995.

4. Muslim, May 14,1995.

5. "Taliban Confirm Accord with Hezb-i-Wahdat", The News, July 16.,1996.

6. The Frontier Post, February 22, 1997.

7. The News, June 21, 1995.

8. Muslim, June 1, 1995.

9. Frontier Post, June 14, 1995.