Migration policy: patterns, perceptions and political-economy determinants

May 2018

Draft for review

Abstract

We review the patterns of migration policy around the world using systematic information collected by the United Nations between 1976 and 2013. We find evidence indicating that most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. We then propose a theoretical framework to understand the migration policy formation process, in which preferences of individual voters play a key role. This analysis leads us to empirically investigate the determinants of public opinion on migration. In addition, we examine the impact of migration attitudes on governments’ policy decisions. We find evidence broadly consistent with the median voter model, and propose a series of policy suggestions to increase the support for immigration among voters in destination countries.

JEL classification: F22, J61. Keywords : Immigration, Immigration Policy, Median Voter, Interest Groups, Political Economy

This paper was prepared for the CMI and World Bank under the overall supervision of Manjula Luthria (former program leader of the labor mobility program at CMI and now SPJ), by Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda Facchini of the University of Nottingham and Universita’ degli Studi di Milano and Georgetown University respectively.

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1 Introduction

As of 2017, only 3.3 percent of the world’s population lives in a country different

from the one they were born in. Every year, international migration flows involve on

average only one in 600 individuals (United Nations), and recent estimates suggest that

this figure will not change substantially over the next 30 years (Docquier and Machado

2015).

Which factors can explain the modest size of observed flows of people across

borders? The income gap between sending and receiving countries is still substantial,

whereas transportation and communication costs have declined rapidly in the past few

decades. Thus, supply side considerations would seem to imply – if anything – an

increase in the flow of migrants. It follows that the most likely driver of the limited flows

is to be found on the demand side and is represented by the migration policies

implemented by the receiving countries.

The first goal of this paper is to provide information on the restrictiveness of

policies towards migration as reported by government officials to the United Nations

Department of Economic and Social Affairs in a series of surveys that have been carried

out between 1976 and 2013. These data represent the most comprehensive information

available to date on the policy stance on the international movement of labor of

governments around the world. We find evidence that most governments have policies

aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. We also

document variation in migration policy over time and across countries of different regions

and income levels.

We turn next to develop a theoretical framework to understand the process

through which receiving countries’ migration policies come about, which is based on the

insights of the existing literature. In particular, we focus on the role played by voters’

attitudes towards migration as well as on political mechanisms – such as those in the

median voter and the interest groups models – through which voters’ attitudes translate

into migration policy decisions.

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To understand the formation of immigration policies in democratic societies, we

need to understand systematically the behavior of voters’ individual preferences. For this

reason we analyze recent trends in attitudes towards immigration in a group of advanced

destination countries, using data from five rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS)

carried out between 2002-2010. In particular, we investigate the role played by the

economic and non-economic determinants identified in the literature.

Our next goal is to determine whether actual migration policies are correlated with

changes in individual preferences. With this goal in mind, we merge the information

contained in the UN data with information on attitudes towards immigration from the

ESS. The merged datasets allow us to investigate whether – within a median voter

framework (Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005, Facchini and Testa 2009) – voters’ migration

attitudes are consistent with governments’ migration policy decisions. Our answer is

broadly yes. Given the very low fractions of voters in favor of increasing the number of

immigrants in the majority of destination countries, restrictive migration policies are

broadly consistent with a median voter framework. We also find that in countries where

the median voter and, in general, public opinion are more favorable to migration,

governments’ policies tend to be more open. In other words, there exists a positive

correlation between actual migration policy and public opinion across countries. This

evidence suggests that policy makers take public opinion into account as they formulate

policy decisions, a result which is in line with the predictions of the median voter model.

At the same time, we argue that voters appear to be basing their opinion on

systematically biased views of the importance of migration in their country, and on a

limited understanding of the estimated economic effects that immigration is likely to have

on the domestic economy. For this reason, we turn to discuss a series of policy

interventions that host country governments – interested in maximizing social welfare –

could put in place to increase support for immigration among their constituents.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a series of

stylized facts on immigration policy around the world, whereas section 3 sketches a

simple theoretical framework that can be used to understand the immigration policy

making process. Section 4 presents evidence on the patterns of opinion towards

immigration in European destination countries and assesses the role played by both

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economic and noneconomic determinants. Section 5 investigates the role of opinions in

shaping actual migration policies. Finally, section 6 develops a series of

recommendations for destination countries’ policy makers who aim at reaping the

benefits of the international mobility of people. Section 7 concludes.

2 Stylized facts on migration policies across countries

Measuring the stance of governments on immigration policy is a complex

undertaking, and to date researchers and policy makers do not have access to systematic,

cross-country comparable measures. There are two main reasons behind the lack of data.

On the one hand, conceptualizing migration policy is a challenging exercise (see Helbling

et al. 2013). On the other, the lack of a commonly accepted conceptual framework makes

it difficult, for individual countries, to systematically collect information on the policies

put in place

– which typically involve multiple dimensions of a foreign born individual’s ability to

access and re-settle in the destination country. In particular, researchers in the field do not

have access to anything comparable to the high quality data available to measure the

restrictions applied to the international flow of goods and services.

Several ongoing projects aim to fill – at least in part – this important gap in our

understanding. For instance, Michael Hiscox at Harvard and his international team (Gest

et al. 2014, Beine et al. 2015) have been working over the past several years to collect

systematic, objective measures of the de jure policies in place in a large group of

destination countries, over the period 1960-2010, within the framework of the IMPALA

project.1 The project is a very promising, massive effort to collect systematic information

on multiple facets of immigration policy but only some preliminary results – based on a

pilot study focusing on a subset of countries and a limited time period – are available. A

second promising effort is represented by the work of the team led by Marc Helbling at

the WZB in Berlin within the IMPIC project.2 Differently from the IMPALA project, this

1 For more information, see http://scholar.harvard.edu/hiscox/impala - database - 0 . 2 For more information, see http://www.marc-helbling.ch/?page_id=6.

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project is based on expert opinions rather than objective policy indicators. The scope is

also more limited, as it covers OECD countries over the period 1980-2010. Data for the

project have been collected but, as of today, they are being processed and are not yet

available to the broader scientific community. The latter is also true for the DEMIG

dataset on migration policies which is being developed at IMI, Oxford University. Other

efforts to construct cross-country policy indexes focus on specific aspects of migration

policy – like the index elaborated by Hatton (2004) to measure the stringency of policy

towards asylum seekers, and the ones constructed by Ruhs (2013, 2017) focusing on

immigrant rights in the destination country.

None of the policy indicators which are being developed offers a truly global

perspective though. For this reason, we have decided to take a different perspective,

taking advantage of a systematic data collection effort that has been carried out by the

United Nations over more than thirty five years, to implement a systematic monitoring of

population policies across member countries. Data have been collected since 1976 and

provide information on a broad range of issues.

Two sets of questions are particularly relevant for our purpose. The first is aimed

at eliciting governments’ views on the overall level of immigration. The second focuses

instead on countries’ policies towards immigration, as reported by their governments.

We start by considering governments’ views. View on immigration is the

government’s view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including

immigration for permanent settlement, temporary, high skilled work and family

reunification. Government views towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented

migrants are not reflected in this variable.3 The variable can take three possible values:

“too high”, “satisfactory” and “too low”. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1.

As we can see, on average for the period considered (1976-2011) about 77% of the

officials who have been interviewed have claimed to be satisfied with the current levels

of immigration. 18% deem the immigration level too high, while only 5% have the view

that immigration is too low (these percentages are broadly similar when we focus on

3 Notice that this question does not focus on the desired level of immigration in the country, but rather on the change compared to the existing status quo. While the phrasing of the question is not ideal for the purpose of eliciting governments’ preferences on the overall level of immigration, the wording chosen is very closed to the one used in the individual level surveys we will discuss in section 4.

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European countries, which represent the countries we analyze in the attitudes section –

see Table 3).

This aggregate data hides a substantial degree of heterogeneity both over time and

across country groups (see Tables 1 and 2). Over time, between 1976 and 2011, the

number of countries where immigration levels are perceived to be “too high” becomes

almost three times as large. This is true even though the pattern is nonlinear: between

1976 and 2001 we observe a monotonic increase in the share of governments opposed to

immigration while, between 2001 and 2011, a slight decline (from 22% to 17%).

Consistent with that, the share of governments which perceive immigration levels as too

low has declined from 7.3% to 6.2% between 1976 and 2011, but again the pattern is non-

linear. In general, governments’ views towards migration worsen between 1976 and 2001

and improve over the last decade.

It is also interesting to explore how views are affected by different levels of

development. Table 2 reports summary statistics according to income levels (we use the

UN classification of more developed, less developed and least developed countries, as

detailed in the footnote to the Table). Interestingly, the group of country governments that

are more likely to perceive migration levels as too high is represented the intermediate

income countries (“less developed countries”).

Considering different regions of the World (Table 3), it is interesting to notice that

among the most important destinations, officials in the Gulf countries 4 are the most

concerned with the current levels of immigration. On average, 61 percent of the

respondents in Gulf countries believe immigration levels to be too high. By comparison,

in Europe and North America, 19% and 6% of the officials respectively share the same

view. These views clearly reflect different objective situations. For instance, in 2005 the

share of foreign born in European and North American countries hovered on average in

the low double digit range, with the figure for most countries comprised between 5-15

percent. On the other hand, Gulf countries are characterized by a much larger immigrant

population. In particular in the case of Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates the

foreign born population represented well over 70% of the total residents, and in the case

4 Gulf countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

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of Qatar only one out of seven individuals currently living in the country was born there

(World Bank 2015).

2.1 Government policies towards immigration

Although a systematic, objective measurement of the restrictiveness of

immigration policies does not exist on a cross-country comparable scale, the United

Nations collect a wide range of information on government policies towards immigration

through a survey of each country’s government officials.5 The survey questions cover not

only the general policy, but also individual policy aspects.

Tables 4 through 6 reports summary statistics on policies regarding the “overall level of

immigration”.6 (see also Figures 1 and 2 at the end of the paper for, respectively, the

world and Europe). While 16% of the officials report that their country did not pursue an

active migration policy, the majority of government officials appears to exhibit a strong

status quo bias. On average, between 1976 and 2013, 54% of the government respondents

reports that their country has policies in place to keep immigration levels unchanged. On

the other hand, 24% reports that their countries have actively pursued a reduction in

immigration flows, while only 7% reports that their countries have tried to increase

immigration levels.

Once again, aggregate data hide substantial heterogeneity. Over time, the number

of countries which have implemented policies geared towards lowering immigration

flows has fluctuated widely (see Table 4). In 1976 less than 7% of the officials

interviewed report policies aimed at reducing inflows, while in 1996 this number grows

to over 40%. Over the last 15 years though the policy stance has become more open, and

by 2013 only 15 percent of the countries report to have implemented policies aimed at

reducing immigrant flows. Changes in the policy stance are likely due to a variety of

5 See UN “World Population Policies”, various issues. 6 Notice that the question on governments’ policy does not explicitly distinguish between stocks

and flows of immigrants. Also, the contents of the question on governments’ views and governments’ policy are slightly different. In the former, issues related to asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are specifically excluded, while in the latter no such distinction is explicitly made.

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factors, ranging from current economic conditions, to long term changes in the

demographic structure, to changes in general political conditions (see the discussion in

Section 5 for more on this point).

Across country groups, destinations characterized by intermediated GDP per

capita levels (“less developed countries”) are more likely to report restrictive immigration

policies in place (Table 5). This mirrors closely the findings on government views.

Looking at geographic aggregates (Table 6), the Gulf countries stand out as the group

most actively pursuing policies aimed at reducing immigrant flows, with 63% of the

officials interviewed characterizing policy in this way. On the other hand, 26% of

European officials report policies in place to reduce foreign workers arrivals, while the

same is true for only 5% of their North American counterparts.

Migration policy involves the use of a complex array of measures, and several

important dimensions are considered in the data published by the UN. The first important

distinction involves permanent vs. temporary migration, and starting from 1996, officials

have been asked to state whether policy on permanent settlement (temporary workers) has

been aimed at lowering, maintaining, increasing the current level or has involved no

intervention at all (Tables not shown – available upon request).

Overall, slightly over 21% of the governments report no specific intervention on

permanent settlement, whereas the corresponding figure is 17% on temporary workers. A

vast majority aim instead at maintaining the current levels of permanent and temporary

settlements, while 24-26% try to lower these levels. Only 6-7% of the governments report

that their policies had actually the objective of increasing the number of, respectively,

permanent and temporary migrants. Interestingly, comparing the first and last years for

which we have data, we can see that the fraction of officials reporting policies in place to

maintain the current levels of, respectively, permanent and temporary migrants has

substantially increased between 1996 and 2011, from 20-25% to 59%. This suggests once

again growing acceptance of the phenomenon.

Looking across income groups, we can notice how high GDP countries have a

more interventionist stance (only 6% of the governments report no intervention). In

addition, it is once again the countries in the intermediate income group (“less developed

countries”) that are on average more likely to have policies that are both aimed at

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reducing permanent settlements (27% vs. a sample average of 24%) and the number of

temporary workers (32% vs. a sample average of 26%). Among the immigrant

destinations, Gulf countries stand out once again as the most likely to have active policies

in place to limit both permanent and temporary settlement (54% and 87% respectively).

North America is instead the region in which officials are more likely to be trying to raise

the inflow of both temporary and permanent immigrants (29%).

The main channels of entry of immigrants into a destination country are family

reunification, work, and asylum seeker/political refugee. As selective policies have

become more widespread, it is interesting to investigate the role played by the channel of

entry – as it has been shown to have an important role in shaping the skill composition of

the foreign population arriving in the country. 7 Officials have been asked whether

governments have policies in place to raise/maintain/lower migration for family

reunification or if they do not actively intervene in this policy area (Tables not shown –

available upon request). Interestingly, summary statistics suggest that less than 6% of the

countries considered have policies in place to increase the number of immigrants arriving

for the purpose of family reunification, while 15% are actively trying to make it harder to

migrate taking advantage of this channel. It is important to notice that over time the

acceptance of family reunification as a channel of entry has vastly increased. As reported

by the OECD (2008), 44% of the new immigrants arrived in OECD countries in 2006

were admitted as family members, and in face of this development, government policies

are becoming more accommodating. In fact, in 1996 only 27% of the officials reported

efforts to maintain the current immigration levels of this type of immigrants, while 25%

indicated that policy was trying to limit their inflows. In 2011, these figures had changed

to 63% and 9% respectively.

As both theoretical models and the empirical evidence suggest, the skill

composition of migrants compared to the native population is likely to be a key factor to

understand the labor market impact of immigration. Starting from the 2005 survey, a

question has been introduced to assess the policies implemented towards highly skilled

workers (Tables not shown – available upon request). Officials in only a very small

number of countries (5-8 depending on the year considered) have reported that policies

7 See for instance Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002), Borjas (1999).

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are in place to reduce the arrival of this type of workers. Over 80% of the countries in the

sample have instead policies in place to maintain or increase the number of skilled

migrants arriving.

This finding is particularly interesting. In particular, the results from the UN

survey suggest that government policies are favourable to skilled migrants both in

countries where skilled labor is the scarce factor, but also in countries where skilled labor

is “abundant”.

Finally, as the number of individuals living in foreign countries has rapidly grown

in the past decades, it is important to assess whether destination countries are actively

promoting the integration of immigrants. A question on this issue has been asked starting

in 1996 (Tables not shown – available upon request). On average, 60% of the officials

interviewed report active integration policies to be in place, and this number has grown

over time (from 44% in 1996 to 63% in 2013). Furthermore, the overwhelming majority

of the more developed countries (87%) have policies in place for the integration of

foreigners, while poorer countries appear to be less active in this policy area.

3 Endogenizing immigration policy: Literature survey

How do migration policies come about? A useful conceptual scheme to analyze

the migration policy formation process – which is based on Facchini and Mayda (2010) –

is illustrated in Figure 1. The basic idea is that the immigration policy is the result of the

interaction between “policy demand” and “policy supply”. On the demand side of the

process, policy making necessarily needs to take into account voters’ individual

preferences, and how these preferences are shaped by the inflows of foreign workers.

Both economic and non-economic factors are likely to play a role in shaping public

opinion. These preferences are then aggregated into a policy demand, and various

mechanisms have been indentified in the literature, ranging from grass-roots movements,

to political parties, to pressure groups (Benhabib 1996, Facchini and Willmann 2005,

Ortega 2005, Llavador, H. and A. Solano Garcia 2011 etc.). On the supply side of

migration policies, we need to identify the policymakers’ preferences, and finally, we

need to understand the details of the institutional setting in which they are introduced. In

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the remainder of this section we will provide an overview of the existing literature, using

this conceptual framework to guide our analysis.

Figure 1: Determination of immigration policy

individual preferences on immigration policy(A)

policymaker preferences

(C)

pressure groups, political parties, grass-roots movements (B)

institutional structure of government(D)

“demand side” of immigration

policy

“supply side” of immigration policy

3.1 What drives individual attitudes towards immigration?

A substantial body of literature has studied the effect of both economic and

noneconomic factors on attitudes towards immigration. The overall message from these

studies is that, whereas non-economic drivers have an important and independent effect

on individual preferences, economic characteristics of the respondents do systematically

shape attitudes towards international labor mobility.

Several contributions – including the early studies in this tradition – have mainly

focused on individual countries like the United States (see for example Citrin et al. 1997;

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Immigration policy outcomes

Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Kessler 2001, Scheve and Slaughter 2001, Hainmueller

and Hopkins 2014, Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit 2015) and the United Kingdom

(Dustmann and Preston 2001, 2004, 2007). More recent contributions have instead taken

advantage of newly available cross-country surveys, which cover large samples of both

advanced and developing countries (Chiswick and Hatton 2003, Mayda 2006, O’Rourke

and Sinnott 2005, Facchini and Mayda 2008, 2009, Card, Dustmann and Preston 2012,

Hatton 2015).

The analysis of the economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration

focuses on the income distribution effects of the inflow of foreign workers. Most of the

literature considers a highly stylized economy that is usually described by either a simple

factor proportions analysis model, or a two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin trade model or a

multiple-sector specific factors model.8 In all these frameworks, ignoring cases in which

wages are not affected, the labor market impact of immigration depends on the skill

composition of the migrants relative to the natives in the destination country. If

immigrants are on average less skilled than the native population, their presence will hurt

unskilled natives and benefit skilled ones. On the other hand, if immigrants are on

average more skilled than natives, they will benefit the domestic unskilled while hurting

the skilled.

In an early influential study using the 1992, 1994 and 1996 rounds of the US

National Election Study, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) analyze the labor-market drivers of

attitudes towards immigration and find support for the theoretical predictions we have

just discussed. In particular, in the United States, where immigrants are on average less

skilled than natives, unskilled workers are more likely to oppose immigrants than skilled

ones. Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit (2015) carry out instead an original survey

experiment involving a sample of individuals employed in a group of sectors of the US

economy to assess whether the predictions of the multiple-sector specific factors model

are supported in the data. Their results suggest that while education is systematically

correlated with preferences towards immigration, there is no evidence that this effect

varies with the skill intensity of the sector in which the individual is employed. They

8 See for instance Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit (2015).

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interpret this results as suggesting that there is no evidence in favor of the role played by

labor market considerations.

The extent to which labor market competition plays a role in shaping individual

preferences towards immigration can be systematically investigated in a cross-country

setting by exploiting the variation in the relative skill composition of the immigrant

versus native populations across destination countries. This strategy is pursued by Mayda

(2006), using data from the 1995 round of the International Social Survey Programme

and the 1995-1997 round of the World Value Survey. She finds robust evidence

suggesting that individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes in

countries where immigrants are on average unskilled, while it is negatively correlated

with pro-immigration attitudes in countries where migrants are on average more skilled

than the native population. This evidence is consistent with the labor market competition

hypothesis as discussed by Scheve and Slaughter (2001).

The main OECD destination countries of immigrant flows are often characterized

by large welfare states (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick 2002), in which the public sector

redistributes a substantial fraction of national income across individuals. In such an

environment, immigration has a non-negligible impact on public finances, since foreign

workers both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state. The aggregate net effect of

immigration on the welfare state can be either positive or negative, depending on the

socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants relative to natives.

Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) focus their analysis of welfare-state

determinants of preferences on the United States, using data from the American National

Election Survey and exploiting variation in the generosity of the welfare system across

states. Their results indicate that welfare-state considerations do play an important role.

Facchini and Mayda (2009) look at the same question, developing a simple theoretical

framework and assessing its predictions on a panel covering a large sample of individuals

across countries. In their model, an inflow of unskilled migrants (relative to natives) will

make all natives worse off, by causing a given level of redistribution to become more

costly. More specifically, if the welfare state adjusts through a change in the taxation

level, in order to maintain the same level of per capita benefits (tax adjustment model),

higher income individuals will be more negatively affected, as they are on the

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“contributing” end of the system. On the other hand, if the adjustment takes place through

changes in the size of per capita benefits, in order to keep the same level of taxation

(benefit adjustment model), lower income individuals will be the ones more adversely

affected by immigration, as they are on the “receiving” end of the system. If, on the other

hand, an inflow of skilled migrants takes place, all the above effects are reversed. All

natives will gain with migration through the welfare-state channel. Under the tax

adjustment model, higher-income individuals will be more positively affected than poor

ones by the decrease in tax rates. Under the benefit adjustment model, lower-income

individuals will be more positively affected than rich ones, given that the increase in per

capita benefits is mostly relevant for this income category. See Figures 1 and 2 in

Facchini and Mayda (2010), which represent the correlations between individual income

and pro-migration attitudes implied by the tax adjustment model and the benefit

adjustment model, respectively, when migration is unskilled (right panel) and skilled (left

panel).

Using two surveys covering a large sample of advanced countries, and

information on both the characteristics of the immigrant population and of the destination

country’s welfare state, Facchini and Mayda (2009) also find evidence consistent with the

tax adjustment model. In countries where natives are on average more skilled than

immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences,

whereas individual skill is positively correlated with them. These relationships have the

opposite signs in economies characterized by skilled migration (relative to the native

population). Thus, their results suggest that the very same skilled and high income British

businessman may feel ambivalent regarding the arrival of unskilled immigrants since he

might benefit from hiring them (labor market complementarity) but be hurt by paying

their way through the welfare state. The authors confirm these results when they exploit

international differences in the characteristics of the destination countries' welfare state.

Our discussion so far has focused on the individual-level economic determinants

of attitudes towards immigrants. A large literature in sociology and political science has

emphasized instead the role of sociotropic factors, both economic and non-economic in

nature. For instance, an early study by Citrin et al. (1997) focusing on the United States,

emphasizes that views concerning the national economy and views towards Latinos and

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Asians do affect individual preferences towards immigration. Concerns about cultural

homogeneity have been shown to be an important driver of preferences also in Europe

(Sides and Citrin 2007). Similarly, perceptions on the size of the actual inflows of

immigrants have been found to matter as well, with opposition to immigration increasing

with the misperceptions on the number of immigrants present in the country (Sides and

Citrin 2007, Blinder 2013). The role played by sociotropic drivers has also been

confirmed in more recent, experimental and quasi-experimental based assessments (see

Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014 for a review of this literature). Several other papers like

Scheve and

Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2005) also consider

individual factors such as the perceived crime and cultural impact of immigration, racism,

sciovinism etc., and they find them to play a significant role in shaping preferences.

Recent work has also emphasized the role of group-specific stereotypes. For instance, a

recent study by Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) shows that Swiss citizens are much

more likely to reject immigrants from Turkey than immigrants from the former

Yugoslavia. Related to arguments about national identity are also arguments focusing on

the importance of social norms. In particular, in a recent book Schildkraut (2011)

investigates the role of the perceived willingness of immigrants to fit in the host country

society in shaping natives attitudes towards them, and emphasized how the perceived lack

of assimilation is an important driver of negative opinions.

One important issue when assessing the role of non-economic determinants is that

most of the literature analyzes them using answer to other survey questions, and

endogeneity concerns make it particularly difficult to quantify the effect of non-economic

drivers of preferences. Besides the studies focusing on experimental methods discussed

above, an interesting attempt at identifying the effect of the various factors shaping

preferences is represented by the recent paper by Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012),

who use the very rich set of questions on immigration asked in the 2002-2003 module of

the European Social Survey to tackle this question. Using a sophisticated structural

approach, the authors start by carefully spelling out the set of significant restrictions that

must to be satisfied to carry out this quantification. Interestingly, they find that

compositional amenities are more important than economic drivers in explaining overall

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attitudes towards immigration. At the same time, economic concerns are found to be more

important in determining whether immigrants are perceived to have a positive impact on

the host country’s economy.

3.2 From individual preferences to migration policy

Individual preferences are aggregated and become political demands thanks to the

working of grass-root movements, political parties and/or interest groups (box B in Figure

1). This process of aggregation is clearly affected by how severe the collective action

problem is for certain groups, which in turn is driven by several factors, for example the

geographic concentration of members of a group etc.

On the supply side of migration policy, the government’s preferences play an

important role (box C). Do officials care only about aggregate welfare, i.e. do they just

wish to maximize society’s well-being? Do they care only about being re-elected, i.e. do

they choose their policies by maximizing the electoral support they expect to receive? Are

their choices also driven by ideological considerations? Are they more receptive to the

demands of specific groups within society – in other words do they use migration policy

as a tool to transfer resources to a specific group?

Finally, the institutional structure of the government, i.e. whether for instance the

electoral system is majoritarian or proportional, or more specifically which body is in

charge of setting migration policy plays an important role (box D).

These three dimensions of the policy making process are typically modelled

together by the existing literature, and the detail to which they are analyzed, varies

substantially. Whereas quite a bit of attention has been devoted to the process through

which individual preferences are aggregated, the policy makers preferences are typically

modelled in a very reduced form fashion – with the exception of a recent contribution by

Llavador and Solano-Gracia (2011), who build an endogenous party formation model in

which immigration is the salient issue. Little attention is also paid to the details of the

institutional setting in which migration policy is set, and this appears to be an important

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shortcoming of the existing literature, as destination countries vary substantially in their

political institutions. In the remainder of this section, we will review the two main

preference aggregation mechanisms that have been proposed by the literature, the median

voter framework and the pressure group model, and assess their empirical performance.

3.2.1 The median voter model

What is the migration policy chosen by a stylized democracy? In one of the first

theoretical contributions to the migration policy literature, Benhabib (1996) considers the

human (physical) capital requirements that would be imposed on potential immigrants by

an income-maximizing society under majority voting. The production process is

described by a constant returns to scale production function combining labor with human

(or physical) capital. Both natives and immigrants are endowed with labor and capital,

and the distribution of the latter in both the native and (potential) immigrant populations

are known. Benhabib shows that, in this model, the Condorcet winner is a policy in which

the median voter chooses to admit individuals who supply a set of factors that are

complementary to her own endowment. As a result, if the median voter is unskilled, she

will choose the policy that guarantees the highest possible ex-post average level of human

capital. To achieve this objective, she will set a lower bound on the skill level of the

immigrants, and only foreigners with a level of human (or physical) capital above that

threshold will be admitted. On the other hand, if the median voter is highly educated, she

will choose the policy that minimizes the ex-post average human capital level in society,

by setting an upper bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and thus admitting only

individuals with low levels of education.

While this model importantly highlights the role of complementarities between

domestic and foreign production factors in shaping migration policy, and provides an

intuitive characterization of the policy choices, it presents two important shortcomings.

First of all, due to the constant returns to scale assumption, the optimal policy does not

identify the actual size of the optimal inflow. It only identifies the skill composition of the

flow of migrants. This is clearly at odds with the policies implemented by countries all

around the world. The second difficulty is that, if the median voter is skilled, it is going to

17

be very difficult to enforce a policy that sets an upper bound to the skill level of an

individual to be admitted by a country. In fact, potential immigrants with high level of

education could simply understate their academic achievements in order to enter the

destination country.

To deal with the first limitation of the model, one possibility is to consider a

production structure where returns to scale are decreasing in the mobile factors. An

alternative solution has been proposed by Ortega (2005). In a dynamic extension of

Benhabib’s model the author explores the trade off between the short run economic

impact of immigration and its medium to long run political effect. In particular, while

immigration affects only the labor market in the current period, in the future it also

influences the political balance of the destination country, as the descendants of migrants

gain the right to vote. As a result, on the one hand, skilled natives prefer an immigration

policy that admits unskilled foreign workers since, due to complementarities in

production, this policy will increase the skilled wage. On the other, the arrival of

unskilled immigrants and the persistence of skill levels across generations can give rise to

a situation in which unskilled workers gain the political majority and, therefore, vote for

policies that benefit them as a group. Thus, through the political channel, skilled natives

prefer an immigration policy that admits skilled foreign workers. The interplay between

these two forces allows Ortega to characterize under which conditions an equilibrium

migration quota might arise, i.e. to derive a prediction in terms of the size of the

migration inflows.

3.2.2 The pressure group model

The median voter model is a useful benchmark to understand the process of

aggregation of individual preferences into migration policy, but it is hardly able to

capture the complexity of the political process in modern democratic societies. In

particular, there is substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that interest groups

representing specific subsets of society have been very actively involved in shaping

policy towards immigration. For instance, labor unions have played an active role in

limiting the inflows of foreign workers (Briggs 2001, Watts 2002), and at the same time

18

pro-immigrant lobbies, representing the business sector, have been able to significantly

affect migration policy outcomes (Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2011).

To formally study the role played by pressure groups in shaping policy towards

international factor mobility, Facchini and Willmann (2005) develop a simple theoretical

model, in which policy is determined as the result of the interaction between organized

groups representing production factors, who maximize the net welfare of their members,

and an elected politician who trades off aggregate welfare vis a vis political contributions.

Using a one-good multiple factors framework, Facchini and Willmann (2005) find that

policies depend on both whether a production factor is represented or not by a lobby and

on the degree of substitutability/complementarity between domestic and imported factors.

In particular, they show first of all that a non-organized factor will not be able to

influence the policy determination process. Secondly, an organized factor will instead be

effective in reducing the inflow of a substitute, while it will increase the inflow of a

complement.

3.2.3 Empirical analysis

Our empirical understanding of the determinants of immigration policy outcomes

is still limited. Several studies present a series of very interesting historical accounts of

the political economy of immigration restrictions introduced between the end of the XIX

century and the beginning of the XX century (Goldin 1994, Timmer and Williamson

1996,

Biavaschi and Facchini 2017). Goldin’s (1994) classic work on the introduction of the

Literacy test provision has highlighted the role played by both the AFL and the Knight of

Labor in supporting this measure. Timmer and Williamson (1996) have instead taken a

cross-country perspective and documented both the pervasiveness of policy intervention

to shape migration flows towards both North and South American countries, and the

drivers of those policies. In particular, they have pointed out the role played by active

business lobby groups in subsidizing migration in labor scarce regions, like in the case of

the coffee grower lobby of Sao Paolo state in Brazil at the end of the XIX and beginning

of the XX century. Biavaschi and Facchini (2017) have instead highlighted the role

19

played by changes in the franchise granted to immigrants in shaping support for

immigration restrictions in the United States during the progressive era.

However, there are only few papers that have looked at what drives current

policies. Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) have focused on the role played by lobbying on

immigration policy enforcement. Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011) have instead taken

a more systematic perspective and studied the impact of targeted lobbying activity by

both pro and anti-immigration pressure groups on the allocation of work and related visas

in the United States in the period 2001-2005. Using data on lobbying expenditures on

immigration policy, they find not only that interest groups play a statistically significant

role in shaping policy, but more importantly that their activities have substantial

economic effects. They estimate that a 10 per cent increase in lobbying expenditures by

business groups in a given sector leads on average to a 2.3-7.4 per cent increase in the

number of work visas allocated to that sector. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in labor

union density translates into a 2.6-10.4 percent decrease in the number of visas issued to

that sector.

In a recent contribution, Casarico, Facchini and Frattini (2018) have studied

another important migration policy question, namely how to tackle the presence of

undocumented residents in the host country. To this end, they have developed a simple

random matching model, in which the decision to introduce an amnesty is the result of a

comparison between the benefits introduced by the legalization by promoting a better

labor market matching, and the costs represented by extending to newly legalized

migrants access to the host country welfare benefits. The authors assess then predictions

of the model by examining the determinants of the voting behavior of US congressmen

on the amnesty introduced by the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986, finding

strong support for the channels identified in the model.

4 Understanding individual attitudes towards immigrants

Are natives in favour of or against an increase in migration to their countries? Are

there differences in public opinion towards immigration across destination countries? We

20

tackle these questions by considering evidence from the European Social Survey, a large

study of individual level views covering 30 European countries, which provides

information on individual attitudes towards immigration. In particular we use five rounds

of data, spanning the 2002-2010 period. We focus on the role played by economic drivers

of opinion, focusing on both the labor market and welfare state drivers we have discussed

in section 3, but we consider also the impact of the non-economic determinants which

have been identified in the literature. Differently from previous studies, our analysis in

this paper exploits variation in the exposure of individuals to immigrants at the

subnational level, i.e. at the level of a region within a country, as this allows us to more

directly assess the effect of migration on possibly geographically segmented labor

markets. To this end, we exploit the information available in the European Social Survey

on the NUTS1 region of residence of the respondent, and construct measures of the

characteristics of the immigrant population taken from the European Labor Force Survey,

a large and cross-country comparable study of EU labor markets.

The European Social Survey elicits views on different facets of immigration. The

dependent variable of our empirical analysis, pro-immigration opinion, is constructed as

follows. It is the average for each individual of answers to the following two questions:

To what extent do you think [your country] should allow people of the same race or

ethnic group as most [of your country]’s people to come and live here? To what extent do

you think [your country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group as most

[of your country]’s people to come and live here? Possible answers for both questions

are: none=1, a few=2, some=3, many=4. In our investigation, we restrict the analysis to

only natives. Summary statistics of the dependent variable are reported in Table 7 (in the

column

“average pro-immigration opinion”).

Following the literature, our key explanatory variables are demographic

characteristics of the respondent (age and male) and the two measures that proxy for the

individual exposure to labor market competition (years of education) and for the effects

of the welfare state (household income quintile). Theory suggests that the impact of

immigration depends on the overall characteristics of the immigrant and native

21

populations and in particular on their relative skill composition. For this reason, using

information from the European Labor Force Survey, we have computed the following

indicator of the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants: 𝑟𝑁𝑟𝑐𝑅𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑐 = log (1 + ) 𝑟𝐹𝑟𝑐where 𝑟𝑁𝑟𝑐 is the natives’ skill ratio and 𝑟𝐹𝑟𝑐 is the immigrant skill ratio, in region

r in country c, which are defined as 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑗𝑟𝑗𝑟𝑐 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑗with j=N, F. Individuals are considered as skilled if they have at least one year of

tertiary education, based on the International Standard Classification of Education

(ISCED 5a, 5b or 6). RSC increases as the native population becomes relatively more

skilled than the immigrant one. Finally, we account for the role played by non-economic

determinants of preferences by using answers to two additional questions contained in the

ESS. The first elicits views on whether the respondent thinks that immigration enriches

the destination country cultural life; the second asks instead whether the respondent

thinks that immigration makes the country a better place to live.

To assess the role of economic and non-economic determinants of preferences, we

have estimated variations the following linear model:

𝑝𝑟𝑜 − 𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑟𝑐 = 𝛽1𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑆𝐶𝑟𝑐 + 𝑋𝑖

where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of additional individual-level controls. All specifications

include also a set of region-year fixed effects to account for region specific shocks, which

can vary over time. Standard errors are clustered at the region-year level. As discussed in

Section 3, based on the labor market competition hypothesis we expect 𝛽1 < 0 and 𝛽2 > 0. As for the welfare state channel, the theoretical models reviewed in Section 3 indicate

22

that if the adjustment to immigration occurs mainly through changes in the tax rate (tax

adjustment scenario), we expect 𝛽3 > 0 and 𝛽4 < 0 , whereas if the adjustment occurs

mainly through a change in the level of benefits provided (benefit adjustment scenario),

we

expect 𝛽3 < 0 and 𝛽4 > 0.

Table 8 reports our main results. In column (1) we start with a parsimonious

specification, in which we only control for the respondent’s age, gender, education and

income. Consistent with previous findings in the literature, our results indicate that older

individuals are less supportive of immigration, whereas male respondents tend to be more

open towards foreigners than females. As for the effect of education, we find that more

educated natives tend to be more in favor of immigration, and the same holds true for

richer natives. In column (2) we replicate the same specification reported in column (1),

but we allow the effect of education to vary depending on the relative skill composition of

the native and immigrant population. As suggested by the labor market competition

hypothesis, we find that as the immigrant population becomes less skilled compared to

the native one, more educated natives hold more favorable views towards foreigners. At

the same time, the positive and significant direct effect of education suggests that more

educated natives are more open towards foreigners, independently of their labor market

characteristics. This suggests that education is likely to be also capturing underlying

views of the world that go beyond the respondent’s position in the labor market

(Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

In column (3) we also allow the effect of individual income to vary depending on

the characteristics of the immigrant population. As we can see, we find that as immigrants

become less skilled than natives, richer respondents tend to oppose more open

immigration policies. This result is consistent with the idea that individual respondents

expect the welfare state to adjust to the presence of foreigners through changes in tax

levels (tax adjustment model) and confirms previous findings obtained in the literature

using different datasets (Facchini and Mayda 2010). Consistent with the theoretical model

under the tax adjustment mechanism, we also find that the direct effect of income is

positive and significant.

23

In the last column of Table 4, we also control for non-economic drivers of

opinion, which are proxied using answers to survey questions. For this reason, caution is

due in interpreting these results, as endogeneity is likely to be concern.

5. Mapping individual preferences into policy outcomes

As we discussed in Section 3, in a democratic society, voters’ attitudes should be

the basis of policy making. This idea is at the core of the median voter model according

to which migration policy should be correlated with the opinion of the median voter and,

more in general, with public opinion. We next evaluate whether these predictions are

consistent with the data.

Our first piece of evidence are the summary statistics in Table 7. As we have seen,

voters across countries are, on average, very much opposed to immigration. Given

restrictive migration policies observed across destination countries, this evidence is

broadly consistent with the median-voter framework.

Figure 3 provides additional evidence which is consistent with the median voter

framework. In particular Figure 3 combines data on attitudes – averaged over the five

rounds of the ESS – with data on governments’ migration policies presented in Section 2.

The broad pattern that emerges is that migration policy across countries is positively

correlated with the opinion of the median voter and, in general, public opinion across

countries.

In particular, we start by considering the impact on the migration policy of each

country of average attitudes in favor of immigrants (the average pro-immigration

opinion). Next, we look at the impact on migration policy of the fraction of voters, in

each country, in favor of allowing many or some immigrants to come and live to their

country. Finally, we relate the opinion on immigration of the median voter in each

country to the migration policy of that country. We identify the median voter using the

pro-immigration opinion variable: we rank individuals in each country according to their

pro-immigration opinion value and we next select the individual who corresponds to the

50th percentile (the opinion of this individual – median pro-immigration opinion –

24

appears in the fourth column of Table 7). We find that each of the three measures of

public opinion on migration is positively correlated with the country’s migration policy.

The higher significance of the correlation between policy and voters preferences obtained

using the opinion of the average rather than the median voter seems to suggest that the

views of “extreme” groups play an important role in shaping policy measures. This

suggests that the direct democracy model might be too simple to capture all the

complexities of the political process. In other words, interest groups are likely to be an

important additional determinant of migration policy outcomes, as we found in our earlier

work.

Finally, note also that Figure 3 treats the independent variable (attitudes) as given

and exogenous. This assumption might be problematic. In particular, our estimates might

be biased because of reverse causality: i.e., migration policy will impact migration

inflows, which in turn may themselves affect attitudes. As a matter of fact, Mayda (2006)

finds that, in countries with higher immigrant inflows, voters tend to be on average more

opposed to immigration. Notice, however, that this reverse causality biases the

coefficients in Figure 3 towards zero, thus it is not problematic for our results. Hence,

Figure 3 provide evidence which is broadly consistent with the median-voter framework.

While the empirical evidence in this section is consistent with the median-voter

model, it is clear that this framework is not sufficient to explain migration policy

decisions. In the summary statistics section, we have documented a systematic gap

between very restrictionist public opinion and more open government policies. What are

the other factors which are relevant in shaping governments’ migration policies and help

explain the public opinion gap?

Facchini and Mayda (2008) investigate the role played by interest groups,

focusing on the United States and using a panel dataset covering the period 1995-2005.

Differentiating labor according to both skill levels and occupation, we find systematic

evidence suggesting that the lobbying activities of organized labor lead to an increase

(decrease) in the inflow of foreign workers in different (same) occupation/education cells.

This effect is likely to be driven by complementarity (substitutability). In addition,

Facchini Mayda and Mishra (2011) find strong evidence that pro-migration interest

groups make policy more open to migration. The number of temporary work visas

25

attributed to a given sector in the United States in the period 2001-2005 is positively

affected by the lobbying expenditures for migration of firms in that sector. In particular, a

10 per cent increase in lobbying expenditures by business groups in a given sector leads

on average to a 2.3-7.4 per cent increase in the number of work visas allocated to that

sector. This is consistent with the interest groups model, given that capital and labor are

complements.

6 Policy implications

Our analysis of the determinants of migration policy so far has highlighted several

important issues. First of all, public opinion in the main advanced destination countries is

clearly against an increase in immigration flows. Second, individual opinions appear to be

shaped by a variety of factors. Among these, determinants that are consistent with simple

economic models of labor market and welfare state competition between natives and

foreigners appear to play an important role, together with non-economic drivers. Third,

most governments around the world do not appear to have policies in place aimed at

increasing overall migration flows, reflecting the underlying views of the domestic

population. Most advanced destination country officials appear to support a change in the

composition of foreign arrivals that would favor skilled immigration, but economic

theory suggests that welfare maximizing policies should emphasize the role of

complementarities between the domestic labor force and potential flows of foreign

workers. As a result, many advanced, human capital abundant destination countries

should pursue policies aiming instead at increasing the inflows of less skilled foreign

workers. What can destination country governments do to insure that the substantial

potential gains from immigration which have been identified in the literature can actually

be reaped?9 In this section we briefly discuss the existing evidence on the size and the

impact of immigration in destination countries, and suggest a series of possible policy

options.

9 See Hamilton and Whalley (1984) and for a recent contribution di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ortega (2015).

26

One interesting stylized fact that emerges from public opinion surveys carried out

around the world is the systematic upward bias in the voters’ assessment of the size of the

immigrant population resident in their countries. For instance, in a recent study, Sides and

Citrin (2008) point out that on average individuals surveyed in the 2006 US Cooperative

Congressional Election Study estimated the foreign born population to represent 28% of

the US population, whereas the true figure was only 12%. Similarly, using the 2002-2003

round of the ESS, they show that these patterns emerge in all the main European

destinations: in France the estimate is 28% and the actual figure 10%, in the United

Kingdom the estimate is 24% vs. an actual figure of 8% and in Italy the gap between

perceptions and reality is even larger at 17.5% vs. 4%.

Turning to the impact of immigrants on the destination country, much of the

recent literature has focused on labor market outcomes, using a variety of econometric

approaches to study the effect of immigration on native wages and employment

outcomes. While the discussion is still ongoing, and some differences exist in the results

obtained for different countries that depend on the characteristics of the local labor

markets, the overall picture that emerges is one in which immigration has comparatively

small effects on natives labor market outcomes,10 and these effects appear to be

concentrated on specific subgroups of the population. As for other economic channels,

some evidence exist on the impact of immigration on goods prices (Lach 2007, Cortes

2008), and in particular on its effects on the cost of non-tradable services. The evidence

on the effect of immigration on the destination country welfare state is instead mixed.

While some authors have emphasized the role played by the generous provisions of some

countries’ welfare systems as magnets that attract foreign migrants (Borjas 1999, Razin

and Wahba 2015) , more recent evidence has found very limited effects (Dustman and

Frattini 2014). In particular, recent work has emphasized that a proper assessment of the

impact of immigration on the destination country’s welfare state requires taking into

account a wealth of demographic characteristics of the immigrant population, and the

expected length of stay of immigrants in the destination countries.

10 See Borjas (2003), Card (2001), Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013), Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Manacorda, Manning and Wandsworth (2012).

27

This evidence suggests that, on the one hand, voters’ views on immigration are

consistent with the effects predicted by simple economic models; on the other there seems

to be a substantial gap between the perceived and the effective size of the foreign born

population and, most likely, a gap between the perceived and the effective size of the

impact of immigration on the destination country’s economy. Thus, the first type of

intervention a welfare-minded government should put in place is an effort to better

educate the public on both the size of the migratory phenomenon, and on the empirical

results of the economic analyses of migration. This will hopefully help the public better

grasp the positive effects of immigration.

Still, as we have argued, the evidence suggest that some groups within society

might end up actually being hurt by migration, both because of increased labor market

competition, and because of increased competition for welfare state services. The second

broad area of intervention for the government would then involve the introduction of

specific welfare schemes targeting subgroups of the native population that are likely to be

negatively affected by the foreign inflows. This type of programs have been introduced to

address similar concerns brought about by trade liberalization (see for instance the trade

adjustment assistance program in the United States), and could be extended to address

specific concerns related to large immigrant inflows.

Last but not least, as we have seen in our analysis of the determinants of

individual level opinions, and as it has been emphasized by a large body of literature,

non-economic factors are likely to play an important role, and unfortunately they

typically contribute to an overall negative perception of immigrants. Also in this case,

informational campaigns to demystify diversity and point out the advantages of a more

diverse society are likely to make immigration more welcome for the destination

country’s public.

7 Conclusions

28

In this paper we have used a large dataset on migration policy decisions reported

by governments, which has been constructed by the United Nations Department of

Economic and Social Affairs and covers the period 1976-2013, to systematically assess

the policy stance on migration around the globe. We have found evidence suggesting that

most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering

the level of migration.

We have then proposed a simple theoretical framework to explain the endogenous

formation of migration policies, and have argued that in democratic societies individual

attitudes are likely to play a key role in shaping government interventions. We have found

that individual opinion is overwhelmingly against immigration in most destination

countries, and have studied how individual opinion in a large sample of European

countries is systematically affected by economic and non-economic drivers.

Combining information from the UN dataset with data on individual opinion

obtained from five rounds of the European Social Survey, carried out between 2002 and

2010, we have found evidence suggesting that government policies are correlated with

individual opinions, as is consistent with a simple median voter model. We have also

argued that voters appear to be basing their opinion on systematically biased views of the

importance of migration in their country, and on a limited understanding of the estimated

economic effects that immigration is likely to have on the domestic economy. For this

reason, we have discussed a series of policy interventions that host country governments

interested in maximizing social welfare could put in place to increase support for

immigration among their constituents.

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34

Table 1. Governments' views on the level of immigration, by year (UN survey)

year

View on immigration

Too high Satisfactory Too low Total

1976 10 129 11 150

6.67 86 7.33 100

1986 33 125 6 164

20.12 76.22 3.66 100

1996 41 148 4 193

21.24 76.68 2.07 100

2001 43 145 5 193

22.28 75.13 2.59 100

2003 40 145 9 194

20.62 74.74 4.64 100

2005 33 151 10 194

17.01 77.84 5.15 100

2007 34 150 11 195

17.44 76.92 5.64 100

2009 34 152 9 195

17.44 77.95 4.62 100

2011 33 150 12 195

16.92 76.92 6.15 100

Total 301 1,295 77 1,673

17.99 77.41 4.6 100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year. View on immigration is the government's view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for permanent settlement, temporary and high skilled work and family reunification. Government views towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable. The possible values are: the government has indicated that immigration is too high, satisfactory, too low.

Table 2. Governments' views on the level of immigration, by development level (UN survey)

Development level View on immigration

Too high Satisfactory Too low Total

Least developed country 51 358 3 41212.38 86.89 0.73 100

Less developed country 180 629 45 85421.08 73.65 5.27 100

More developed country 70 308 29 40717.2 75.68 7.13 100

Total 301 1,295 77 1,67317.99 77.41 4.6 100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year. View on immigration is the government's view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for permanent settlement, temporary and high skilled work and family reunification. Government views towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable. The possible values are: the government has indicated that immigration is too high, satisfactory, too low. The current list of "least developed countries" includes 48 countries (34 in Africa, 9 in Asia, 4 in Oceania and 1 in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean), as defined by the United Nations General Assembly resolutions 59/209, 59/210, 60/33, 62/97, 64/295 and 67/136: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone,Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. The "more developed countries" comprise all regions of Europe plus Northern America,Australia, New Zealand and Japan. The "less developed countries" are the remaining countries.

Table 3. Governments' views on the level of immigration, by region (UN survey)

RegionView on immigration

Too high Satisfactory Too low Total

Africa

Asia (w/o Gulf Countries)

Europe

Gulf Countries

Latin America & Caribbeans

Northern America

Oceania

8518.09

6318.167

18.5133

61.1135

12.031

5.5617

13.08

37780.21265

76.15276

76.2420

37.04242

83.1613

72.22102

78.46

81.720

5.7519

5.251

1.8514

4.814

22.22 11

8.46

470100

348100

362100 54

100 291100 18

100 130100

Total 30117.99

1,295 77.41

774.6

1,673100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year. View on immigration is the government's view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for permanent settlement, temporary and high skilled work and family reunification. Government views towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable. The possible values are: the government has indicated that immigration is too high, satisfactory, too low.

Table 4. Governments' policy on the level of immigration, by year (UN survey)

year

Policy on immigration

Lower Maintain Raise No intervention Total

1976 10 129 11 0 1506.67 86 7.33 0 100

1986 33 125 6 0 16420.12 76.22 3.66 0 100

1996 78 58 8 49 19340.41 30.05 4.15 25.39 100

2001 75 62 8 48 19338.86 32.12 4.15 24.87 100

2003 65 75 10 44 19433.51 38.66 5.15 22.68 100

2005 43 104 11 36 19422.16 53.61 5.67 18.56 100

2007 38 114 11 32 19519.49 58.46 5.64 16.41 100

2009 36 108 16 35 19518.46 55.38 8.21 17.95 100

2011 32 117 21 25 19516.41 60 10.77 12.82 100

2013 30 120 22 24 19615.31 61.22 11.22 12.24 100

Total 440 1,012 124 293 1,86923.54 54.15 6.63 15.68 100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year. Policy on immigration is the government's policy regarding the overall level of immigration. The possible values of Policy on Immigration are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the overall level of immigration; the government does not intervene with regard to the overall level of immigration.

Table 5. Governments' policy on the level of immigration, by level of development (UN survey)

Development level Policy on immigration

Lower Maintain Raise No intervention Total

Least developed country

Less developed country

More developed country

7115.43260

27.2810923.9

21246.09518

54.35282

61.84

51.0972

7.5647

10.31

17237.39103

10.8118

3.95

460100

953100

456100

Total 44023.54

1,012 54.15

1246.63

29315.68

1,869100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by level of development. Policy on immigration is the government's policy regarding the overall level of immigration. The possible values of Policy on Immigration are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the overall level of immigration; the government does not intervene with regard to the overall level of immigration.The current list of "least developed countries" includes 48 countries (34 in Africa, 9 in Asia, 4 in Oceania and 1 in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean), as defined by the United Nations General Assembly resolutions 59/209, 59/210, 60/33, 62/97,64/295 and 67/136: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, SolomonIslands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia. The "more developed countries" comprise all regions of Europe plus Northern America, Australia, NewZealand and Japan. The "less developed countries" are the remaining countries.

Table 6. Governments' policy on the level of immigration, by region (UN survey)

Region

Policy on immigration

Lower Maintain Raise No interventio Total

Africa

Asia (w/o Gulf Countries)

Europe

Gulf Countries

Latin America & Caribbeans

Northern America

Oceania

11521.99109

27.95107

26.3538

63.3353

16.3615

1711.64

19336.9220

56.41245

60.341830

22268.52

1575 99

67.81

142.6840

10.2637

9.111

1.6716

4.944

20 12

8.22

20138.43

215.3817

4.1935

3310.19

00

1812.33

523100

390100

406100 60

100 324100 20

100 146100

Total 44023.54

1,012 54.15

1246.63

29315.68

1,869100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Policy on immigration is the government's policy regarding the overall level of immigration. The possible values of Policy on Immigration are: The government haspolicies in place to lower, maintain, raise the overall level of immigration; the government does not intervene with

Table 7: Policy on immigration and public opinion (2002-2011)

country policy on immigration

percentage in favor of allowing many or some immigrants to come and live here

percentage in favor of allowing many or some immigrants to come and live here,

SAME

percentage in favor of allowing many or some immigrants to come and live here,

DIFFERENTAustria 2.00 0.41 0.58 0.40Belgium 2.00 0.55 0.71 0.55Bulgaria 2.33 0.65 0.76 0.63Croatia 1.50 0.59 0.64 0.59Cyprus 1.00 0.26 0.57 0.12Czech Republic 2.50 0.37 0.50 0.39Denmark 1.00 0.57 0.81 0.53Estonia 1.50 0.42 0.62 0.38Finland 2.60 0.41 0.59 0.40France 1.20 0.51 0.64 0.52Germany 2.00 0.56 0.73 0.55Greece 1.75 0.20 0.36 0.14Hungary 1.80 0.28 0.55 0.18Ireland 2.00 0.60 0.70 0.61Israel 3.00 0.50 0.76 0.38Italy 1.00 0.60 0.69 0.60Luxembourg 2.00 0.45 0.60 0.43Netherlands 1.00 0.56 0.64 0.58Norway 2.00 0.61 0.77 0.60Poland 2.40 0.66 0.76 0.66Portugal 1.80 0.35 0.41 0.36Russia 2.33 0.50 0.69 0.40Slovakia 2.25 0.54 0.65 0.54Slovenia 2.00 0.56 0.68 0.58Spain 1.80 0.46 0.51 0.48Sweden 2.40 0.85 0.90 0.85Switzerland 2.00 0.63 0.82 0.62Turkey 1.50 0.27 0.42 0.28Ukraine 2.25 0.64 0.79 0.56United Kingdom 2.00 0.48 0.61 0.49"Policy on immigration" is the government's policy regarding the overall level of immigration. The possible values of "Policy on Immigration" are: The government has policies in place to lower=1, maintain or no intervention=2, raise the overall level of immigration=3. Policies are averaged over the years: 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011. The average of "proimmigration opinion" in column (2) is over individuals in each country and over the years 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010. The variable " pro-immigration opinion" is the average for each individual of answers to the following two questions: To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here? To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a different race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here? Possible answers are: none=1, a few=2, some=3, many=4. The median of proimmigration is the average for each country, over the years 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, of the median attitude of individuals in each country and year.

Table 8: The drivers of individual attitudes towards immigrants (ESS 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010)

(1) (2) (3) (4)

socio-economic

background

labor-market labor-market plus welfaredrivers state drivers

non-economic drivers

Dependent variable pro-immigration opinion

age male years of education

years of education*RSC

household income quintile

household income

quintile*RSC

Immigrants Enrich Cultural Life

Immigrants Make Country Better

Constant

-0.0024***[0.000]

0.0194*** [0.006]

0.0415*** [0.002]

0.0349*** [0.003]

1.8817***[0.024]

-0.0026***[0.000]

0.0403*** [0.008]

0.0282*** [0.005]

0.0222*** [0.008]

0.0352*** [0.003]

1.8915***[0.023]

-0.0026***[0.000]

0.0404*** [0.008]

0.0257*** [0.005]

0.0264*** [0.008]

0.0558***[0.012]

-0.0353*[0.020]

1.8900***[0.023]

-0.0015***[0.000]

0.0212*** [0.005]

0.0200*** [0.001]

0.0185*** [0.003]

0.0795*** [0.002]

0.1045*** [0.003]

1.1691***[0.019]

Observations R-squared

143,9060.136

106,4050.148

106,4050.148

137,1190.350

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include NUTS1*year fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets are

clustered at NUTS1*year level.The variable pro-immigration opinion is the average for each individual of answers to

the following two questions: To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic

group as most [country]’s people to come and live here? To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a

different race or ethnic group as most [country]’s people to come and live here? Possible answers are: none=1, a few=2,

some=3, many=4. The RSC is the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants.

Figure 1: Policy on immigration in the world in 2011 (UN survey)

Figure 2: Policy on immigration in Europe in 2011 (UN survey)

Figure 4: The impact of public opinion on

migration policy

3

UK

UA

TR

CH

SE

ES

SI

SKRU

PT

PL

NO

NL

LU

IT

IL

IE

HUGR

DE

FR

FI

EE

DK

CZ

CY

HR

BG

BEAT

3.532.52

fitted migration policy (mean) policyimmRECALLYRS

average pro-immigration opinion

2.5 2

1.5 1

3

FI

2.5 CZPL SE

2

1.5

FR

1

migration policy

migration policy

UK

UA

TR

CH

ES

SI

SKRU

PT

NO

NL

LU

IT

IL

IE

HUGR

DE

EE

DKCY

HR

BG

BEAT

1.8.6.4.2

fitted migration policy (mean) policyimmRECALLYRS

percentage in favor of allowing

3

2.5 2

1.5

1

migration policy

UK

UA

TR

CH

SE

ES

SI

SKRU

PT

PL

NO

NL

LU

IT

IL

IE

HUGR

DE

FR

FI

EE

DK

CZ

CY

HR

BG

BEAT

32.52

fitted migration policy (mean) policyimmRECALLYRS

median pro-immigration opinion