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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THE EASTER OFFENSIVE

Thomas H. Lee United States Army Center of Military History 06 September 1990

The offensive that Hanoi launched on 30 March 1972, was

characterized by unprecedented coordinated attacks using massed

formations of i.nfantry, armor, and artillery against fortified

positions. The assault began at noon on the 30th, when the 304th

and the 308th North Vietnamese Divisions and three independent

infantry regiments spearheaded by two armored regiments, crossed

the Demilitarized Zone and attacked elements of the 3rd Infantry

Division of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN]. The

thrust was supported by a sustained artillery barrage delivered by

five artillery regiments that the North had prepositioned along the

Demilitarized Zone, at least two of which contained batteries that

were equipped wi.th 130-mm. howitzers.

On 4 April, two days after Easter Sunday, Hanoi launched a

second thrust in Military Region 3 toward the provincial capital of

Loc Ninh. Subsequently, the North committed the 5th and the 9th

Viet Cong Divisions which were in reality composed of North

Vietnamese main force units, along with the 7th North Vietnamese

Division and a separate infantry regiment, once again buttressed by

heavy artilery and armor, in an attempt to capture the city of An

Loc.

In Military Region 2, the first two weeks of April saw attacks

by the 2nd and the 320th North Vietnamese Divisions with three

additional infantry regiments, an independent artillery regiment,

and a brigade of armor. They overran South Vietnamese firebases in

the Dak To II Camp - Tan Canh area and approached the city of

Kontum. Military Region 4 also witnessed enemy activity, albeit

._------------_.-.

not to as extensive a degree as in the other three regions, when

five local main force regiments initated a series of attacks in the

Mekong Delta on 7 April 1972. Approximately 15 kilometers north

across the border in Cambodia, the 1st North Vietnamese Division

attacked and captured the South Vietnamese base at Kompong Trach. 1

In all four regions, South Vietnamese forces were initially

thrown back by the assaults. However, aided by American military

advisers and considerable American air support, they eventually

managed to parry and even to roll back the North Vietnamese

offensive. By September of 1972, most of the serious fighting had

subsided, and the North had to settle for meager tactical gains in

all four regions. Once again as with the Tet Offensive of 1968,

the North was left with a "military defeat" and a "psychological

victory."

The "Easter Offensive" of 1972 was the largest conventional

attack that the North had launched during the war. In the

aggregate, Hanoi committed the equivalent of fourteen of its

divisions and at least three hundred tanks in a four-headed

a. This account is composed of details from: 1) Ngo Quang Truong. The Easter Offensive of 1972. Washington DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 1980. 2) Turley, G. H. The Easter Offensive. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985. 3) United States Military Assistance Command - Vietnam. "Command History, 1972-73, " Volume 2, Annexes J, K and I. Historical Reference Branch, United States Army Center of Military History.

b. Additional order of battle information provided by: Defense Intelligence Agency. Army Activities Report: Southeast Asia, 26 April 1972: p. 47. Historical Reference Branch, United States Army Center of Military History .

. _---------_.----_._-

invasion of the South. Though the South Vietnamese ultimately

succeeded in countering the move, this was due more to poor follow­

up planning on the part of the North and overwhelming air

superiority than to prowess on the battlefield. Both the Americans

and the South Vietnamese seem to have been taken off guard by an

offensi ve of such scale, as one can see by the considerable

advances that the North made in the early days of the Offensive.

Hindsight has often condemned the inabil i ty of military

intelligence to predict accurately the intentions of the North for

this unpreparedness. It has been argued that American and South

Vietnamese combat intelligence forces had become deficient since

the LAM SON 719 incursion into Laos which was initiated in February

of 1971 and concluded in late March of the same year.

It is the intent of this author to examine the course of

American and to a lesser degree, South Vietnamese, intelligence­

gathering efforts during the one-year interim between Lam Son 719

and the Easter Offensive, in order to assess the validity of this

statement. Hano i did indeed succeed in masking a cons iderable

mil i tary invasion from American and South Vietnamese detection.

However, this was not achieved solely at the expense of poor

intelligence on the part of the Americans and the South Vietnamese.

To ask whether or not intelligence had "failed" to predict the

Easter Offensive is a misleading and unnecssarily obtuse question

because such a simplistic mode of inquiry belittles the scope of

change that combat intelligence, and for that matter military

operations in general, had endured from 1971 to 1972.

The logical question to begin with is to ask "what did

military intelligence predict?" The answer varies substanitally

depending on the source one chooses to consider; perhaps, this lack

of agreement is in itself endemic to the problem at hand. American

and Vietnamese officers in the field have argued that the invasion

came as a surprise, especially in Military Region 1. There had

been signs of increased enemy activity, most notably in more

frequent detections by unattended ground sensors, but no one

suspected an attack of the intensity of the Easter Offensive. John

M. Oseth, who was then serving as the G-2 adviser to the 3rd ARVN

Division, acknowledged that although there might have been isolated

agent reports of an impending invasion, the general consensus, at

least at the division level, was that the threat of enemy attack

though present, was not great. 2 Subsequent to the initial attack,

Col. Chester B. McCoid, who replaced Col. Donald J. Metcal f as

Senior Adviser to the 3rd Division.on 3 June 1972, repeatedly asked

junior officers why the North Vietnamese had chosen to attack when

they did. No one had a convincing answer available, and it seemed

clear at least in Military Region 1, that the Americans had had

very little insight into the enemy's intentions.

Capt. Thomas O'Toole, USMC, who served as the G-2 adviser to

the South Vietnamese Marine Corps, likewise claimed that

intelligence authorities were not aware of the invasion before it

2 Oseth, John M., Lt. Col. USA (ret). author. Washington D.C., August 1990.

Interview with the

Advisory Team 155, G-2 Adviser After Action Report, Annex E, May 1972. Box 113, Accession Number 74-034, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland MD .

. --------

occurred. 3 Military Region 2 was somewhat more prepared for the

attack; in part because intelligence had been predicting increased

hostile activity along the B-3 Front in the region since late

J a n u a r y

The soldiers in Military Region 3 had also heard about the

possibility of enemy activity during the early months of 1972,

especially in the northwestern portion of the region. Increased

incidence of sapper attacks on outposts in the two regions during

late February and March also led intelligence officers to suspect

some siginificant enemy activity in the near future. However,

even in these areas, no estimates predicted the scale of the

enemy action that was to occur.

It is interesting to note the lack of discrepancy which

becomes apparent when comparing the opinions of field-grade

officers with the assessments of regional commanders. Though the

commanders in most cases did not eschew the possibility of higher

levels of enemy action, it is quite evident from their

O'Toole as the senior Marine intelligence officer in Vietnam, had access to upper level intelligence briefs. Nevertheless, he related to Oseth upon his arrival in Quang Tri on 31 March 1972, that nowhere along the line had he heard any word of an impending enemy drive in Mil i tary Region 1. By contrast, Turley, who was also in Quang Tri at the time, implies in his book (pp. 67-69), and in a screenplay he authored for a movie to be entitled "The Easter Offensive,· that O'Toole was not surprised by the type of assault that Hanoi launched in Military Region 1. The pertinent documents corroborate Oseth's version.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence [J-2), United States Military Assistance Command - Vietnam. Periodical Intelligence Reports [PERINTREPS), January, February, March, 1972. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.

All three PERINTREPS mention the possibility of multi -batttalion attacks on the B-3 front.

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correspondences of the period that they too, did not forsee the

scale of the offensive that was to occur. The regional commanders

who in most cases had access to intelligence material which was

never disseminated to subordinate units, were nevertheless, as

clueless as their charges. The most prevalent problem in this

regard was an unwillingness on the part of commanders to heed

warnings of massed armor and heavy artillery. This is a tendency

that is crucial in understanding the combat intelligence picture

prior to the offensive, and it will be the focus of greater

attention later in this study.

The ranking military intelligence officer in Vietnam,

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence [J-2], U. s. Military

Assistance Command - Vietnam, Maj. Gen. William E. Potts, argues

that military intelligence was highly effective in predicting

enemy actions immediately prior to the Easter Offensive. He

claims that the combat intelligence operations surrounding Easter

Offensive constituted "the highpoint of American military

intelligence" during his tenure as chief. 5 According to Potts,

the only weakness in intelligence estimates was the selection of

the tri-border region in the west and not the Demilitarized Zone

as the initial point of enemy attack.

One of the top Vietnamese generals, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang

Truong, ARVN, Commanding General, IV Corps, also holds that

combat intelligence had predicted much of what the enemy did in

Potts, William E. author, Washington D. C.,

Lt Gen., USA (ret.). August 1990 .

. -------

Interview with the

April of 1972. 6 His assertions cannot be dismissed simply as

the product of distortive hindsight because the positioning of

ARVN units, most notably in Military Regions 2 and 3, suggests

that the South Vietnamese generals knew exactly where the main

foci of the offensive would be. Military Region 1, where the

untested and newly - formed 3rd Division was stationed along the

Demilitarized Zone, appears to be the isolate exception. This

seemingly oracular feat becomes somewhat demystified when one

realizes the consistency between the attacks of April 1972 and

Hanoi's past offensive actions. The Easter Offensive was a

replay of stratagems that Vietnamese troops had employed since

encounters with Chinese armies of the Tang Dynasty during the

10th century A.D. Though they might have been thoroughly

communist in ideology, historical memory was a very important

component in the thinking of Hanoi's military leaders; it was not

for naught that the campaign was code named "Nguyen Hue."? The

Truong, The Easter Offensive, pp. 9 - 12.

Nguyen Hue was the familiar name of Emperor Quang Trung who achieved a decisive victory in 1789 over Chinese troops of the Qing Dynasty intervening on behalf of his rival. The name seems to be especially appropriate since this battle marked the last time that the Vietnamese had managed to successfully expel a foreign army en masse. (The American intervention was in a very real sense, a neocolonial continuation of the French effort after World War II.)

Though it is only speculation, the selection of this particular code name implies that the North launched its attack to throw out the Americans and to win the war, not to gain a better hand at the bargaining table, as Henry Kissinger suggests when he likens the offensive to the Viet Minh's victory at Dien Bien Phu. (Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston, Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1979: p. 1102. Kissinger gives a verbatim citation of remarks he made in a White House press conference on 26 Jan 72.) In 1954, the Viet Minh fully intended to use the successful siege as a propaganda tool at the Geneva Conference. In 1972, it is doubtful

7

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forces in the west were cutting across the highlands to split the

I Corps and northern II Corps from the rest of the south, while

concurrent thrusts were made from the north to take the imperial

capital of Hue, and from the west in Military Region 3 to seize

the provincial capital of An Loc which guarded the main highway

to Saigon. The local attacks in Military Region 4 were primarily

a diversionary feint to prevent the use of the region's South

Vietnamese troops elsewhere. The question of where the enemy was

to attack, was, as Truong noted, "not very difficult to

answer. ,,8 There was definitely a discrepancy between those who

thought had combat intelligence had performed adequately in the

period preceding the Easter Offensive and those who thought

otherwise.

The most prominent American officials, Army Chief of Staff,

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, and Secretary of Defense Melvin

Laird, were the individuals most responsible for the public's

perception that combat intelligence in Vietnam had failed to

perform to standard in the period before the Easter Offensive.

In late 1971 and January of 1972, they were vociferously

if Hanoi would have even continued peace talks in Paris had the invasion been successful.

8. Ibid, p. 11. The question emerges, then, of why the Americans and the South

Vietnamese were so caught off guard in Military Region 1, where both historical experience and logisitical convenience foreshadowed a strong enemy assault. The answer seems to lie in part on a belief held by many senior Americans and South Vietnamese that the North would not risk international condemnation by attacking in force across the Demil i tarized Zone. This condemnation never materialized.

8

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proclaiming that the enemy would be launching a large offensive

during the Tet holidays in mid-February of 1972. During a press

conference in Saigon on 31 January 1972, Westmoreland stated that

communist forces were mounting a multi-phase offensive timed to

coincide with the Tet holidays and with President Nixon's trip to

the People's Republic of China in mid-February.9 As the

Washington Post notes, Westmoreland cited evidence gathered by

the military intelligence agencies in Vietnam as the foundation

for his predictions. "A record supply buildup in those regions

has been reported and several North Vietnamese divisions have

been shifted to improve their tactical positions. Elsewhere in

the country~ terrorism and minor contacts are up sharply over

what they were in the latter part of 1971 .• 10 The Washington

Post states that the ·the general was echoing virtually every

other top-ranking American and leading South Vietnamese officials

who have been saying for more than a month that an important

enemy buildup was underway.·11 Westmoreland in turn, informed

Laird of the findings of his six day visit to Southeast Asia.

When the highly-touted main force attack failed to

materialize, the press and public opinion lambasted the military

intelligence forces who were a convenient scapegoat for the

9 Westmoreland, cited in the Washington Post, 01 Feb 72, and the New York Times, 01 Feb 72.

10 The Washington Post, 01 Feb 72.

II

9

miscalculation of enemy motives. l ! However, careful examination

of the documents suggests that combat intelligence sources were

not to blame for the apparent mistake. Although military

intelligence initially did assume that the major attack was to

occur during Tet; by early February of 1972, in time to make

tactical adjustments in response to a changing enemy picture,

intelligence was correctly predicting that the big offensive

would not occur during Tet. On 7 February 1972, Lt. Gen. Welborn

G. Dolvin, Commanding General [CG] of XXIV Corps in Military

Region 1, wrote that all the intelligence agencies in the region

believed that there was to be an increase in enemy activity prior

to Tet and during Tet, but that this activity would be limited to

guerrilla and local forces. He continues by stating that no

major offensive was to be expected until after Tet. 13 As if to

punctuate his faith in the prospective lack of siginificant enemy

activity during Tet, Dolvin allowed plans for a USO show in Da

Nang featuring Sammy Davis Jr. to proceed as scheduled on 24

12 See Zorza, Victor. "Experts Overlook Pol i tics in Hanoi," in the Washington Post, 01 Mar 72. Zorza argues that political in­fighting among doves and hawks in the North was the ultimate reason for the abortion of the planned offensive. In his argument, the offensive was called off because the doves in Hanoi who advocated more careful consideration of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's latest peace offer, managed to win the day. Zorza implies that Kissinger himself was of this opinion. Kissinger later claimed that the North was duplicitously setting up peace talks to coincide with a spring offensive. Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.

13 Message, Commanding General, XXIV Corps to COMUSMACV, 07 Feb 72, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, Dolvin to Abrams. Box 1, Accession Number 77-0064, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD.

10

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February 1972. 14

Maj. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, Commanding General, Third

Regional Assistance Command, had caught on by late January that

there would be no large scale attacks greater than battalion -

strength in Military Region 3 in the near future. By this time,

the director of the Second Regional Assistance Group, John P.

Vann, who had formerly been the most vocal of the American

commanders in predicting an offensive, also doubted the ability

of the enemy to launch an attack comparable to the Tet Offensive

of 1968. By early February of 1972, only Maj. Gen. Thomas M.

Tarpley, Commanding General, Delta Regional Assistance Command in

Military Region 4 appears to have forseen a second offensive

timed to coincide with Tet. He increased security measures and

advised his ARVN counterpart to maintain South Vietnamese units

full alert status until 26 February.15 on

The Vietnamese generals were even more confident that the

enemy would not attack during Tet. Vann writes that the II Corps

commander, Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu quoted indigenous intelligence

sources in claiming that the enemy's major offensive was to occur

H Message, Commanding General, XXIV Corps to COMUSMACV, 24 Feb 72, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, Dolvin to Abrams. Box 1, Accession Number 77-0064, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD.

15 Message, Commanding General, Del ta Reg ional Assistance Command to COMUS MAC V , 09 Feb 1972, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, Tarpley to Abrams. Box I, Accession Number 77-0064, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland MD.

11

after the Tet ceasefire. 16 Oseth recalls that neither Brig.

Gen. Giai nor his G-2 Maj. Quy demonstrated any extraordinary

concern about the possibility of an enemy offensive during Tet in

1972, even though western Quang Tri Province which was reported

to be one of the major objectives of the coming offensive was in

his area of operation. 17 In his monograph, Truong mentions that

even in Military Region 4, South Vietnamese soldiers were allowed

the traditional three day leave for the Tet holidays at the last

minute, contrary to Tarpley's original directive. 18

The reasons given by intelligence sources for this apparent

postponement in enemy main force action are quite plausible.

Extensive bombing of trails and depots acted to delay North

Vietnamese logisitcal support for such a move. Increased alert

staus and aggressive ARVN operations in some of the military

regions might have further inconvenienced the enemy. In any

event, there is no reason to believe that military intelligence

was wrong in its initial estimate of Hanoi's intentions to launch

a major offensive during Tet. The North Vietnamese High Command

has not been known for its originality in planning, and it is

highly possible that it did plan to launch the attack in

February. If this were indeed the case, then it is a credit to

16 Message, Director, Second Regional Assistance Group to COMUSMACV, 10 Feb 72, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, Vann to Abrams. Box 1, Accession Number 77-0064, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland MD.

17. Oseth. Interview with the author. Washington D.C., August 1990.

18 Truong, "The Easter Offensive," p. 10.

12

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intelligence efforts that the Americans were able to predict in

three of the four regions the inability of the enemy to launch a

major offensive during Tet.

Yet, despite the corrected forecasts, the general perception

that intelligence had erred monumentally in its assessment

persisted. What had already been reported, perhaps too

emphatically, in the press had heightened expectations, and

truthful attempts at explanation were more likely to be

interpreted as ex post facto inventions. [Cite the TIME

article 1. For this reason, combat intelligence agencies seem to

have been rather reluctant to predict impending enemy offensives

in the near future. This predisposition might have prejudiced

some intelligence people to belittle indications of heightened

enemy activity that continued to appear in gathered intelligence

data. There is a noticeable drop~off in the boldness of

intelligence predictions of enemy intentions after mid-Fuebruary.

Whereas in January, signs of logistical buildup and troop

infiltration were seen as indicative of the pending offensive,

the identical trends were interpreted as preliminary to a series

of "moderate" attacks in late February and March. 19

19 Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Military Assistance Command - Vietnam. Periodical Intelligence Report , November 1971 March 1972. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D. C. The November, December and January issues were confidently predicting multi - battalion attacks in Military Regions 1, 2, and 3 for the future. The February and March PERINTREPS have more guarded predictions. For example the March PERINTREP concludes that in Military Region 1, "During the following month, the level of enemy activity is expected to remain at the same general low level, as the enemy continues to prepare for possible operations

13

To the press the issue was easily decided: intelligence had

stridently predicted an enemy offensive in mid- February and it

did not happen; therefore, the intelligence agencies had failed.

However, as we have shown above, combat intelligence had

correctly adjusted their predictions by the first week of

February. It would seem, then, that the condemnation of the

press was undeserved. Nevertheless, the subsequent events

suggest that military intelligence did misinterpret two key

aspects of the enemy's intentions. Having picked up enough

signals that the enemy had postponed its spring offensive,

intelligence agencies were unable to pinpoint even an approximate

date for the rescheduled push, nor did they forsee the magnitude

of the invasion to come.

Some officials thought that Hanoi had abandoned its plans

for a major offensive altogether. Even during the last days of

March when gradually increasing levels of enemy artillery

barrages were noted in addition to continued infiltration and

supply movement, and in spite of at least four separate human

resources who claimed that there would be a "great offensive" in

the near future, American military personnel for the most part

were dubious about any impending large-scale attack. Information

from these human sources proved to be both detailed and factually

accurate as the Offensive took its course. In Military Region 2,

one rallier, Nguyen Trong Huy, gave precise information regarding

North Vietnamese deployment of tanks for the upcoming offensive.

after the conclusion of the NE monsoon season."

14

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"Source stated that he had heard the next campaign would be

'violent and great.' In it the 320th Division would conduct

activity in Kontum Province with the 2nd NVA Division supported

by tanks. The 64th Regiment and the D-19th Sapper Battalion,

320th Division are to attack Kontum City. Source was not

knowledgeable of dates for these attacks. He reported that tanks

will deploy from Base Area 609 southeast to Ngok To Ba (YB 819

105), then south to Point 1030 (YB 817 077). East across the

Hodrai River (YB 856 064), east to Dak Red (YB 939 072), and then

across Rocket Ridge to Point 1049. This Route is eventually to

be connected to Highway QL-14. The information provided by this

source is in substantial agreement with that provided by PW Pham

Hung, concerning the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment. ,,20

Such testimony as well as captured order of battle

documents, North Vietnamese directives, sensor detections,

intercepted radio broadcasts, and occasional visual

reconnaissance, all hinted at the strong possibility of an enemy

offensive in late March or early April. One document issued by

the Communist Central Office for South Vietnam [COSVN) gave a

detailed plan for an invasion of the South during the dry season

of 1972. "The outline of the plan was to tie down South

Vietnamese regulars with major conventional attacks and discredit

20 Intel igence and Securi ty Division, Off ice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, "Daily Intelligence Review," 17 Mar 72. Southeast Asia Branch, United States Army Center of Military History, Washington D.C.

15

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Vietnamization by defeating the Saigon troops. ,,21 Unfortunately,

the missive gave no precise dates for the invasion.

The intelligence agencies were not blind to the eventuality

implied by this data; reports did forecast a rise in enemy

activity. The Daily Intelligence Review for 26 March 1972

observed that "Next week, overall enemy activity will probably

increase to a moderate level. The enemy will probably continue

to use small scale ground attacks and attacks by fire against

selected targets."22 The bulletin acknowledges that "the

possibility of heavy fighting in the B-5 and B-3 Fronts continues

to increase as the enemy forces remain active in these areas.

According to three prisoners and a rallier from separate units,

the offensive in the B-3 Front is scheduled to start early next

month. "23

The J-2 of the U. S. Military Assistance Command - Vietnam

concurred with the assessment afforded by the Headquarters

Section of the U. S. Army - Vietnam. The PERINTREP covering the

month of March, 1972 claims that there is a possibility of multi-

battalion attacks in the B-3 Front, northern Military Region 1,

and to a lesser degree in northwest Military Region 3 and in

21 This citation is a synopsis of the contents of the actual document, in Osnos, Peter. "Predicted by Intelligence, But ... Size of Offensive was a Surprise," in the Washington Post, 13 Apr 1972.

22 Intelligence and Security Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, United States Army -Vietnam, Daily Intelligence Review, 26 March 1972. Southeast Asia Branch, United States Army Center of Military History.

23 Ibid.

16

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western Thua Thien Province of Military Region 1. However, it

concludes that these will not constitute a major offensive, and

that enemy activity will probably remain at the current low level

elsewhere in South Vietnam. 21 So, it becomes evident at this

point that the main problem with combat intelligence operations

preceding the Easter Offensive involved predicting the scale of

the invasion. Even in the initial predictions of a second "Tet"

offensive the most liberal estimate of enemy main force strength

to be committed to the invasion was put at seven divisions. In

addition, no mention was made about possible enemy use of heavy

artillery and armor. The public was left with the impression

that the enemy's spring offensive of 1972 was to be primarily a

guerrilla and small arms affair, not the massive conventional

assault that the Easter Offensive proved to be. This misleading

impression was disseminated by senior military and government

officials in good faith, because they apparently shared the same

conviction.

Once again, contrary to popular opinion, the documents

suggest that combat intelligence officers had compiled data that

hinted at the size and the magnitude of the enemy's planned

offensive. The sensor system in Military Region 1 provided the

strongest signs that the enemy was preparing for a truly

monumental attack. As American forces had pulled out in 1971,

21. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Military Assistance Command-Vietnam. Peridical Intelligence Report, March 1972. Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington D. C.

17

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the sensor system had by contrast, been upgraded. Contrary to

rumors that moving elephants and animal refuse would set them

off, the electronic sensors were very useful and usually highly

accurate in detecting logistical buildup and vehicular

traffic. 25 The intelligence summaries of XXIV Corps detail

significantly high levels of sensor activations in territory near

the Demilitarized Zone and western Quang Tri Province. On 1

March 1972 there were 70 moving activations, 42 of which were

along Route 9 and 22 activations along Route 548. 26 On the same

day, there was heavy movement along the Demilitarized Zone and

Thua Thien Province as well. On 19 March, infrared emission

detectors also detected considerable activity in the Zone

area. 21 These frequent activations suggested that troop

infiltration was continuing, roads were being bulldozed and

improved for use, and supplies were being moved to forward

positions.

As mentioned above, captured documents and interrogations of

prisoners-of-war and ralliers also forecasted major assaults that

would involve tanks and heavy guns. CIA translations of Quan Doi

25 For an excellent discussion of the value of electronic sensors in intelligence gathering and target acquisition, see: Memorandum, Oseth for Deputy Commander, Support, Det N, 06 Dec 73, Subject: USAICS Study Areas. Southeast Asia Branch, United States Center of Military History, Washington, D. C.

26 XXIV Corps, Intell igence Summary, Accession Number 730051, Record Group 319, Records Center, Suitland, MD.

01 Mar 72. Washington

27 XXIV Corps, Intelligence Summary, 19 Mar 72. Accession Number 730051, Record Group 319, Washington Records Center, Suitland, MD.

18

Box 15, National

Box 15, National

Nhan Dan, a North Vietnamese daily newspaper included seven very

interesting articles by someone writing under the pseudonym of

Chien Thang, "The Victor." These articles which appeared in mid-

December of 1971 repeatedly stressed the key role of main force

and armored attacks in the war with the United States and the

South. 28 Visual reconnaissance by both American and South

Vietnamese pilots frequently reported enemy tank sightings, enemy

field guns of large caliber, or signs of past vehicular movement.

Nevertheless, no published assessment of intelligence predicted

large-scale conventional attacks. This begs a puzzling question:

if the signs were there, why were the senior officers who set the

tone for intelligence estimates so unwilling to believe the enemy

could launch a World War II style attack, replete with tanks and

heavy guns?

The regional MACV commanders with the possible exception of

Dolvin of XXIV Corps, were among those who most strongly doubted

the enemy's ability to launch a large-scale conventional attack

during the latter part of the dry season. Vann, who had been one

of the first to guess that the enemy had been forced to postpone

its offensive; nevertheless, refused to believe numerous reports

of enemy tanks in his region which could be used to lead an

offensive. ARVN officers and his own subordinates expressed

frustration at Vann's refusal to heed warnings of tanks in MR2.

28 Central Intelligence Agency, "North Vietnamese Army Newspaper Reports," 22 Feb 72. Historical Reference Branch, United States Army Center of Military History. Many analysts believe that Vo Nguyen Giap is the author of the articles.

19

One American wrote that "During the last week of January the

first sightings were made of enemy armor activity east of Base

Area 609. On 25 January two Cobra gunship pilots from the 391st

Aerial Weapons Company reported engaging two tanks in the Plei

Trap Valley just west of Rocket Ridge. The pilots also saw four

other tanks under trees in the area. In this same area another

Cobra team reported sighting six sets of tracks made by armored

vehicles. Subsequent visual reconnaissance did not locate the

tanks, but the tracks indicated that the enemy had at least one

armor company in the area. Further tank sightings by US gunships

occurred on 30 January and sporadically thereafter. Because

these reports could not be substantiated by ground

reconnaissance, little credence was given them by the SRAG

advisory staff."!! Vann was ferociously skeptical of any

sightings of enemy armor, claiming obsessively that he would have

to see one with his own eyes before he believed the reports. On

6 March 1972, he wrote "A light armored vehicle was reportedly

sighted by a U. S. FAC (Forward Air Controller] and destroyed by

VNAF AI's in Phu Yen Province. This report is highly suspect and

will be checked by ROK ground action this morning. 30

Hollingsworth, too, was very reluctant to believe that the

29 United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam. "Command History, 1972-73," Volume 2, Annex K- "Kontum- The NVA Buildup," Page K-l. Historical Reference Branch, United States Army Center of Military History.

30. Message, Director, Second Regional Assistance Command to COMUSMACV, 06 Mar 72, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, Vann to Abrams. Box 1, Accession Number 77-0064, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD.

20

.----_ .. _-

enemy was capable of launching an attack on the scale of the

Easter Offensive. Both men, especially Vann, thought that

extensive bombing had caused serious damage to the enemy's

offensive capability. Hollingsworth's daily reports to Abrams

for late February and March are colored by a dangerous level of

complacency about the status quo. 31

Dolvin, in Military Region 1, was the regional commander who

listened the most to his intelligence assets. He continuously

referred to enemy artillery sightings, increased supply and

personnel movement and hostile armor sightings. On 27 February

1972, he writes: "Visual reconnaissance, infrared, and sensors

reveal that the enemy is still expending considerable effort in

the upgrading of the Western routhe structure throughout MR 1.

Signs of truck and bulldozer activity are increasing and

personnel sightings are an almost daily occurrence. These

operations are undoubtedly being directed at the continuing

preparation of staging areas for a major offensive scheduled for

later this spring. To insure the uninterrupted progression of

this preparation, AAA Defenses are being significantly upgraded

and represent an increasing threat to air interdiction efforts in

the A Shau Vailley and Western Quang Tri.,,31 Dolvin, however

was replaced as the senior man in Military Region 1 by Maj. Gen.

31 It must be admitted, however, that Hollingsworth waS not a great fan of the "Daily Commander's Evaluations," as is evidenced by his request to Abrams to discontinue them. His complacent tone therein might have been due to his lack of confidence in the worth of the document he was writing.

31. Dolvin, DeE, 27 February 1972.

21

.------_._-------

Frederick J. Kroesen, Jr. on 20 March 1972. Kroesen, in turn,

was much less certain about the likelihood of a major North

Vietnamese invasion in the near future.

The regional commanders in Military Regions 1, 2, and 3 which

bore the brunt of the Easter Offensive all suspected possible

increases in enemy activity but no large-scale attacks in the

near future. This opinion was firmly held in spite of

intelligence reports and warnings from ARVN counterparts to the

contrary. Such a reluctance can be attributed in part to certain

political considerations that were undoubtedly prominent in the

minds of these men. Military and political superiors as well as

public opinion at home would not look favorably on reports of an

impending invasion of the South, especially after the lack of

actvity during Tet. The Nixon Administration with its policy of

Vietnamization and wariness of public discontent with its Vietnam

policy, could not have appreciated reports from commanders in the

field of an enemy offensive in the near future involving tanks

and heavy artillery. The general mood was that a second Tet

Offensive had been averted, and no one it seemed, was willing to

be the Cassandra who predicted a resurrection of large-scale

hostile action.

Good and verifiable intelligence that would have in years

past found willing audiences among the American commanders was

for the most part disregarded. Intelligence reports like the

Daily Intelligence Rev1ew and the PERINTREP which were themselves

assessments of raw data also tended to gloss over the true

22

._------

situation. This tendency serves to occlude accurate analysis of

whether or not the actual process of intelligence-gathering

experienced any change in the year after LAM SON 719. In other

words, how entrenched were the deficiencies evident in combat

intelligence immediately prior to the Easter Offensive? Were the

mistakes that intelligence authorities and regional commanders

made mistakes that could have been just as easily made in 1968 or

1969? In order to perform such an evaluation, we need to look

first, at the physical intelligence reports themselves,

especially statistics regarding the quantity and the quality

thereof.

During the latter part of the Vietnam War, a number of

American organizations endeavored to gather combat intelligence

in-country. The U.S. Army's 525th Intelligence Group functioned

as an independent unit under the operational control of USMACV J-

2. 33 In addition to the group, there were military intelligence

units organic to different American divisions, as well as CIA and

NSA operations to gather intelligence on the American side. In

late 1971, the last organic intelligence unit conducting air

reconnaissance missions, an unit of the lOlst Airborne Division,

was shipped back to the United states. The CIA had also moved

out a lot of its people during the last months of 1971, although

33 Former J-2, Maj. Gen. Joseph A. McChristian, provides a comprehensive if somewhat confusing explanation of the formal relationships among the various Army military intelligence units in Vietnam as they were in 1967. McChristian, Joseph A. The Role of Military Intelligence: 1965 -1967, Vietnam Studies series. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1974: Appendixes C and D.

23

it continued to operate its network of agents. The NSA which had

always been concerned with information gathered by high-tech

sources did not have personnel stationed in Vietnam.

The 525th Military Intelligence Group was still operating in

Vietnam in the weeks before the Easter Offensive; however, its

component units were preparing to stand down in April of 1972. 34

Statistics on the 525th are available in the Operational Reports

- Lessons Learned [affectionately refered to as ORLL's in Army

parlance] of the group. The ORLL's reflect a definite decrease

in the sheer quantity of intelligence gathered by the 525th. For

the 181-day period ending 31 October 1971, the 525th produced

10,715 Intelligence Information Reports, the Combined Document

Exploitation Center which the 525th staffed came up with 72,476

items, and the Combined Material Exploitation Center analyzed 550

tons of captured enemy merchandise. 35 For the 181-day period

ending 30 April 1971, the 525th Military Intelligence Group

produced 11,630 Intelligence Information Reports, evaluated

124,000 captured documents and 1,250 tons of enemy material. 36

There was a 7.9% decrease in Intelligence Information Reports, a

34 Defense Intelligence Agency. Army Activites Report: Southeat Asia, 12 April 1972: p. 5. Historical Reference Branch, United States Army Center of Military History.

35 Operational Reports Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, 31 Oct 71. Box 38, Accession Number 73-051, Record Group 319, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD.

36 Operational Reports Lessons Learned, 525th Military Intelligence Group, 30 Apr 71. Box 38, Accession Number 73-051, Record Group 319, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD.

24

41.6% drop in exploited captured documents, and a 56% fall in the

exploitation of captured enemy equipment. 37 Although decreases

in the latter two categories are significant, the drop in

Intelligence Information Reports which constitute the

condensation of raw intelligence data that American and South

Vietnamese commanders received is minimal. Moreover, among the

reduced number of enemy documents that were exploited were

detailed orders of battle and COSVN plans for the spring

offensive. In addition, the ORLL's do not show a corresponding

decrease in lack of satisfaction among field commanders as to the

quality of the intelligence provided by the 525th Military

Intelligence Group. All this suggests that American military

intelligence were working extremely hard, even as American troops

were being withdrawn.

Armed with a better understanding of the facts and the

statements that were made, let us now attempt to interpret them

in a coherent and insightful fashion, with especial care to avoid

prejudicing the audience with unsupported assertions of whether

or not intelligence had "failed." Keeping this in mind, we can

argue cautiously, but without qualification that certain trends

did occur in military intelligence operations between LAM SON 719

and the Easter Offensive. First there was a definite standdown

in American military intelligence operations and assets that

37 Unfortunately, the ORLL for the subsequent period from 1 November 1971 to 30 April 1972 was nowhere to be found, probably because the 525th was winding down operations in preparation for standdown.

25

complemented the considerable standdown of American combat forces

which Nixon initiated in 1969. This fact is well-documented both

objectively by the marked decline in the numbers of American

personnel and intelligence reports that were generated, and

subjectively in terms of the opinions of both US advisers in the

field and their Vietnamese couterparts. Lt. Col. Oseth recalls

that his South Vietnamese counterpart's most frequent complaint

about military intelligence operations in 1972 was the absence of

American air units to provide aerial reconnaissance. 38 Aerial

reconnaissance, one of the most valuable and accurate venues of

military intelligence was thus relegated to the Vietnamese Air

Force. Vann for one, had no faith whatsoever in South Vietnamese

visual reconnaissance, claiming that VNAF pilots purposely

avoided areas of enemy activity for fear of being shot down and

would then volunteer invented sightings and information.

Second, there is evident in practically every assessment of

intelligence data during this period a tragic propensity among

South Vietnamese and US intelligence officers alike to analyze

hostile behaviour in the matrix of seasonal patterns. Such an

attitude toward intelligence assessment had been characteristic

of South Vietnamese operations since France had relinquished its

claims in Indochina. The innate comfort and deceptive

credibility of the South Vietnamese approach to combat

intelligence appealed to young American intelligence advisers who

38 Oseth. Interview with the author. Washington, D.C., August 1990.

26

.-----------------~

were unfamiliar with almost every aspect of Vietnam and the war

in which they found themselves. This infectious and crippling

habit had apparently traveled up the chain of command:

Westmoreland himself was guilty of succombing to an overemphasis

on pattern analysis. As the Washington Post observed,

·Westmoreland said he based his view that the offensive would

come in several stages on past actions of the Communists. 'The

historic pattern of enemy action is normally in phases,' he said.

'There would be a campaign involving multiple offensives

appropriately spaced in accordance with political activity. ,.39

Evaluation of what might have proven to be very revealing data

was often hampered by over-reliance on the excuse that this or

that type of activity was what the enemy had been doing since

time immemorial and would continue to do in the forseeable

future. Pattern analysis can be a powerful tool in combat

intelligence if applied effectively in conjunction with other

input, but when used so frequently and indiscriminately, it can

lead to misinterpretations of the enemy's intentions.

Third, in close conjunction to the point made above, there

was an overwhelming reluctance especially on the part of American

civilian and military leaders to heed warnings of strengthened

enemy capabilities. There were numerous reports, some

indubitably of questionable origin but many from reliable

sources, of forward-deployed tanks and 130mm guns which suggested

the

39 ·Westmoreland Says Enemy Washington Post, 01 Feb 72.

27

to Start 'Major' Attack Soon"

---------_._------_.

in

an offensive of enormous scale. However, most American regional

commanders tended to downplay such warnings. On the surface,

they cited lack of firm evidence as the basis for disbelief, but

one detects in their attitudes and actions a strong undercurrent

of obstinacy bred of deeply-held hope for the success of their

undertaking. Furthermore, the enemy had never mounted a

conventional invasion before and though the absence of a

precedent is certainly no grounds for dismissing a possibility,

especially in the intelligence profession, many commanders were

lulled into a false sense of the repetitive predictability of

enemy actions. For the politicians of the administration who

espoused Vietnamization, ackowledgement of the possibility of

enemy offensive was permissible, but to imply that the enemy had

the vastly augmented capability to launch a conventional invasion

would lead to accusations from liberals of the futility of what

was left of the US military intervention in Vietnam and calls for

greater involvement from hawkish critics.

Fourth, there was a noticeable lack of integration among

different intelligence organizations, and this failing increased

as American intelligence people left the scene. There was an

obvious lack of coordination in the US intelligence effort, as is

evidenced by the sometimes divergent intelligence re~orts that

were circulated at the time. The monthly Periodical Intelligence

Reports issued by the U.S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence [J-21, often

disregarded information put out by the Headquarters of the U.S.

28

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Army in Vietnam. Dissemination of information was also

haphazard. Within the indivudual regions, intelligence officers

division-level and below were limited only to information

concerning their own region, even when potentially useful data

had been made available elsewhere.

Fifth, one must keep in mind that from 1971 to 1972, the war

in Vietnam was primarily a Vietnamese affair. ARVN fought its

own battles, albeit with American air and naval gunfire support.

In the context of the units that fought during the Easter

Offensive, the Americans present were primarily advisers. The G-

2 of an ARVN Division was a South Vietnamese officer with an

American adviser. Consequently, it was South Vietnamese

personnel who dealt with most of the intelligence-gathering in

the field as well as early assessments. Unfortunately, it was

common practice for ARVN commanders to assign their less talented

officers to G-2 and S-2 duties. The few effective field grade

and junior officers who were available were deperately needed in

the field.

Finally, and most importantly, one must take into account

the psychological effect of Vietnamization on military

intelligence to comprehend fully the nature of the change which

intelligence efforts had undergone from March of 1971 to March of

the following year. Even thou'gh the Laot ian incurs ion was

undertaken by South Vietnamese troops, the intelligence work had

been performed primarily by Americans. By contrast, at the time

of the Easter Offensive, although American assets provided most

29

I

-----------'- ",'

of the technological resources such as Unattended Ground Sensors

Remotely Operated Battlefield Sensors, and MAGIC intercepts, ARVN

units were no longer receiving the wealth of information on call

that they had been accustomed to during the height of US

involvement. The American withdrawl had removed a crutch upon

which the South Vietnamese had been completely dependent on the

past.

Psychologically, the heavy reliance of senior South

Vietnamese officers upon American-supplied intelligence in the

past served to discredit indigenous efforts, even when it was

simply a case of South Vietnamese officers regurgitating American

data. Brig. Gen. Giai went so far as to demand that his G-2

supply him with only American weather information. 40 There was

a prevalent sense among many of Saigon's generals that as far as

intelligence was concerned, there was no substitute to the

technology - rich American brand. To believe ARVN intelligence

estimates, if it required a leap of faith for South Vietnamese

generals, constituted an affinity for Aztec sun worship as far as

most senior American military officers in Vietnam were concerned.

As a result, the commanders found themselves relying more and

more on electronic and other American-gathered intelligence data,

which though professionally obtained, was not as insightful as

visual reconnaissance or interrogations might have been.

ever the doubting Thomas, stated on 7 February 1972 that

Vann,

40

1990. Oseth. Interview with the author, Washington D.C., August

30

"Intelligence gathering is the chief problem." and that "Nearly

all reliable intelligence is limited to US S.I. Channels.,,41

In conclusion, it appears that military intelligence in the

period between LAM SON 719 and the Eater Offensive had not

deteriorated as much as the press or field commanders would have

us believe. In spite of the standdown of American forces,

intelligence agencies were still generating comparable numbers of

data, and South Vietnamese personnel had assumed the roles of the

departing Americans. In fact the system of electronic sensors

that provided hints as to the size and the rough timing of the

Morth Vietnamese offensive had been augmented during late 1971.

The Intelligence Summaries and the Periodical Intelligence

Reports for periods before 1971 offered practically the same type

of information, predictions in the same style, and comparable

asssessments of intelligence. The J-2, Maj. Gen. Potts did an

excellent job in preserving the combat intelligence apparatus

during the American standdown. The grave errors in judgement

which resulted in the tactical surprise which Hanoi achieved with

the Easter Offensive were committed for the most part in the

assessment stage by higher-level intelligence officers and

regional commanders. They tended to disparage South Vietnamese

intelligence efforts and to over-emphasize pattern analysis in

41 Message, Director, Second Reg ional Ass i stance Group to COMUSMACV, 07 Feb 72, Subject: Daily Commander's Evaluation, Vann to Abrams. Box 1, Accession Number 7'7-0064, Record Group 334, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD. "S.I. Channels" refers to special intelligence of the type collected by electronic means. [The emphasis in the citation is mine.l

31

" 1 1_"

predicting the intentions of the enemy. One example of the

close-mindedness of some senior military commanders was the total

disregard Kroesen and Westmoreland among others showed toward

intelligence predictions of an enemy frontal assault along the

Demilitarized Zone. The enemy had never done it in the past, and

so they were never going to do it in the future. This opinion

persisted even when reports came in almost daily of sightings of

tank tracks or 130-mm. field guns positioned along the

Demilitarized Zone. 42 Hollingsworth likewise continued to

believe that the main enemy offensive in his region was to occur

in Tay Ninh province even though intelligence sources were

constantly suggesting otherwise. However ineffectual the South

Vietnamese replacements might have been, the data that they did

gather provided more than enough insight into the size and the

approximate timing of the offensive which Hanoi had in mind. In

this case, military intelligence was not as inept or clueless as

it has been reputed to be in other instances.

Dolvin was somewhat more open to the intelligence estimates.

32