military power, impunity and state-society change in latin america

7/29/2019 Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin America

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Socit qubcoise de science politique

Military Power, Impunity and State-Society Change in Latin AmericaAuthor(s): J. Patrice McSherrySource: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 25,No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 463-488Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Socit qubcoise de science politiqueStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3229578 .

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MilitaryPower, Impunityand State-SocietyChangein Latin America*

J. PATRICE McSHERRY Ralph Bunche Instituteon the United Nations

The transition from military to civilian rule in Latin America has throwna searchlight upon two knotty and interrelated problems: the legacy ofmilitary repression from the era of the national security states, and theproblem of still-powerful and unrepentant armed forces coexisting withnew civilian governments. These intertwined problems have profoundimplications for the possibility of fundamental change in a region longcharacterized by extreme social inequality and political instability.After the Cuban revolution and its challenge to the hegemony ofcapitalism in the hemisphere, a series of coups brought militaryregimes-national security states-to power throughout Latin America.Their societies suffered, through the widespread use of state terror,gross human rights violations of unprecedented proportions from the1960s through the 1980s. Central America still suffers systematicabuses. How new civilian regimes should deal with the military perpe-trators of state terror, particularly when those forces still wielded pre-ponderant power, became a burning issue throughout the region.In country after country, a major obstacle to unfolding democrati-zation processes has been the military, or significant factions within themilitary institution. The military regimes often established laws givingthe armed forces extraordinary powers, and/or appointed civilian alliesto government positions, thus attempting to institutionalize perma-nently their power in anticipation of the eventual transition to civilianrule. At the moment of relinquishing government power, the major* The author is indebted to Kenneth P. Erickson, John Hammond, Irving L. Mar-kovitz, Ra6l Molina Mejia, Kenneth Sharpe and MartinWeinstein for their commentson versions of this article (although they may not recognize or agree with everything inthe final product), as well as to the anonymous reviewers of this JOURNAL.

J. Patrice McSherry, Research Associate, Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations,Box 530, Graduate Center of the City University of New York, 33 West 42 Street, NewYork, New York, USA 100368099Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, XXV: 3 (September/sep-tembre 1992). Printed in Canada / Imprime au Canada

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYdemandof the military n virtuallyall states was for guaranteesagainstaccountability-widely called impunity nthe region-for humanrightscrimes,ademand hat mplicitlyplacesthemilitaryabove thelaw. Thus,the new civilian regimes were faced with profoundchoices at themomentof transitionandbeyond,choices whichwouldshapethelimitsand possibilitiesof theirsocieties and polities in the future.Decisions to allow impunityhave far-reachingramificationsvis-a-vis the possibility of implantingdemocratic values such as justice,respectfor the rule of law and civiliansupremacy n new regimes,andthe constructingof institutionsto sustain them. Moreover, the pos-sibilitiesfor achieving socio-economic change in the interests of themajorities,orestablishingmechanisms o ensureparticipationor subor-dinate classes excludedby the militaryregimes, remainthreatenedaslong as politicized and undemocraticmilitary/security orces remainabove the law, protectedby impunityand able to define unilaterallywhat is a "nationalsecuritythreat." In short, impunity s an issue thatsymbolizesthe relationshipbetween differentsectors of the state-theelectedgovernmentandthe coerciveapparatus-as well as between thestate and society. This test of power is a dialecticalstrugglethat hasvaried n differentLatinAmericancountries,but it is noexaggerationosay that the issue of military mpunitystrikesat the very heartof thelimits and possibilities of transforming he former national securitystates.To paraphraseAlainRouquie,'civilianizationof the militarystatedoes not necessarily mean the democratizationor demilitarizationofpower.In countrieswith weakcivilianregimes,suchas GuatemalaandEl Salvador, he militaryhascontinued o dominate hepoliticalsystemthrough errorand an intactclandestinecounterinsurgencyapparatus.In Brazil, Argentinaand Chile, military power is embedded in thestructures of the state in various ways, despite the transition. InUruguay,the referendumprocess demonstratedthat fear of militarythreatsdampenedpopulardemands or militaryaccountabilityanddueprocess.In all these states,to agreaterorlesserextentdependingon thestrengthof theorganized orces in societyandthe civiliangovernments,powerfularmed forces are still a majorfactor definingthe limits ofcivilian power.This articleattemptsto show that impunitygrantedto the armedforces, and entrenched structuresof the national security apparatuswithinthe state, tend to perpetuatemilitarypowerto the detrimentofdemocratic orcesinthestate andsociety. (Anothercrucialdeterminantof the phenomenonof restricteddemocraciesin LatinAmerica in theearly 1990s s the highlyexclusionaryneo-liberaleconomicmodelbeing1 See Alain Rouqui6, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: Univer-

sity of California Press, 1987), 350.

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Abstract. The transition rom military o civilian rule in Latin Americahas thrown asearchlightupon the legacy of militaryrepression rom the era of the nationalsecuritystates,and heproblemof still-powerfulndunrepentantrmed orces.These intertwinedproblemshaveprofound mplicationsorthepossibilityof fundamentalhange n aregionlongcharacterized yextreme ocial nequality ndpolitical nstability.As Rouquienotes,civilianizationof the militarystate does not necessarilymean the democratization rdemilitarizationfpower.Howto dealwith heperpetratorsf state terrors aburning ndcontroversialssue throughout he region. Duringthe process of transition,the majordemandof the militarynvirtuallyall states was forguarantees gainstaccountabilityorhumanrights crimes-widely called impunity n the region-a demand that implicitlyplacesthemilitary bove thelaw. This ssuestrikesat theveryheartof the transformationof nationalsecuritystates and the democratization f power. Additionally,despitethetransition rom militaryrule, structuresof the nationalsecurity apparatusremainem-beddedwithin he civilianregimes.Anexamination f thequestionof impunityandthoseembedded tructures xposes the tensions between democratization ndpersistingmili-tary prerogatives ndpower.Resume. Le passagede l'autorit6militaire l'autorit6 ivileenAm6riqueLatinea mis enevidencel'heritagede la repressionmilitairedepuisl'6poquedes ltats de s6curit6natio-nale et le problemepose par des forces arm6es mp6nitentes t encore puissantes.Cesproblemes6troitementies pourraient eser profond6menturles possibilit6sd'un chan-gementfondamentaldans une region longtempscaract6riseepar une in6galit6socialeextremeet une instabilit6politique.Comme e remarqueRouqui6, a transformation el'ttat militaireen Etat civil n'entrainepas n6cessairement a d6mocratisationou lademilitarisationupouvoir.L'attitude adoptervis-a-visdesresponsablesdelaterreurdela part du gouvernementest une questionbrilante et tres controvers6e. Pendant eprocessusdetransition,danspratiquementous lespays,laprincipale emandede l'armeea ete d'obtenir des garantiescontre toute inculpationde crime contre les droits del'homme-ce quiest commun6ment ppeleimpunitedans la r6gion-demande quiplacetacitement 'arm6eau-dessusdes lois. Ceproblemeest aucentre memede la transforma-tion des Etatsde securit6nationale t de lad6mocratisationupouvoir.Deplus,malgr6atransitiondu pouvoirmilitaireau pouvoircivil, les structuresde l'appareilde s6curit6nationalerestent nbriqu6es ans es r6gimes ivils. Un examen de la questionde l'impu-nit6et de ces structures troitementiees revele estensionsentre a d6mocratisationt lesprivilegeset le pouvoir persistentsdes forces arm6es.

imposedby the civiliangovernments,with significantpressureby theInternationalMonetaryFundand nternational anks.Thisaspect,how-ever, is not the focus of this article.)Impunityperpetuates he politicalautonomyof the militaryand its abilityto act beyondthe reachesof theruleof law and civilianauthority.Unless the problem s confrontedandactiontaken to demilitarize tate andsociety, andto establisha systemofequaljustice,thelong-rangeprospects orconsolidatingdemocracy nthese countries seem dim. In other words, the way a new civiliangovernmentdealswith the questionof impunity n all its manifestationsencapsulatesthe struggle-or lack thereof-between democratizationand ruleby militarydictate.Thisarticleprovidesa sketch of the initialacts of impunityn severalcountriesat the momentof transition,as wellas some of the legal and constitutional mechanisms of impunityembedded n politiesthroughoutLatinAmerica.Through his exercise,the extentof militarypowerin each countrybecomes clearer, and thechangingnatureof the state as a site of struggleamongclass forces andcivilian-militaryectors begins to be revealed.



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J. PATRICE McSHERRYThe National Security StatesThe national security state is defined here as a type of authoritarianstate, associated with a dependent and internationalized capitalistmodel of development, which was governed directly by the military asan institution.2 In the national security states, the military undertook toreshape totally society in accordance with its messianic vision ofnational security. Clearly, there are majordifferences between the Cent-ral American countries and the larger South American states, in terms oflevels of economic development, types of participation in the globaleconomy, social structure and so on. However, these states can beusefully compared in key aspects such as direct governance by themilitary institution, the militarization of state structures, the nationalsecurity ideology held by these military institutions, and the mecha-nisms of impunity they imposed. Another common factor is the historicrole of the US government, as the hegemonic power in the hemisphere,in the training (tactical, strategic and ideological), financing and supportof these armies, particularly after the Second World War.The national security doctrine-still held by important sectors ofthe Latin American militaries-is an extremist ideology incorporatingLatin organic and corporatist theories of the state and US counterin-surgency and cold war ideology.3 The doctrine assumed an internal2 This is my definition, drawn from the literature, and elaborated in J. Patrice

McSherry, "The Evolution of the National Security State: The Case of Guatemala,"Socialism and Democracy 10(1990), 121-53. Other sources in English on this type ofstate include: Marian Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1988), 6-10; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C.Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 1986), especially the selections by Manuel Antonio Garret6n andLuciano Martins in Latin America (1989 edition); Guillermo O'Donnell, Moderniza-tion and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: University of California Press,1973), and "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," in David Collier, ed.,The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1979). This analysis highlights Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala andUruguay, although other states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras andPeru share some similar traits. Traditional one-man dictatorships such as Duvalier'sHaiti, Somoza's Nicaragua and Stroessner's Paraguay fall outside my definition ofnational security states.3 Important contributions to the literature on national security doctrine include JoseComblin, The Church and the National Security State (Maryknoll, N.Y.: OrbisBooks, 1979); Guatemalan Church in Exile (IGE), Guatemala: Security, Develop-ment, and Democracy (Mexico City, April 1989); Saul Landau, The DangerousDoctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988); Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (Gar-den City: Doubleday, 1980); David Pion-Berlin, "The National Security Doctrine,Military Threat Perception and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina," Comparative PoliticalStudies 21 (1988), 382-407; David Pion-Berlin and George A. Lopez, "Of Victims andExecutioners: Argentine State Terror, 1975-1979," International Studies Quarterly35 (1991), 35; George A. Lopez, "National Security Ideology as an Impetus to StateViolence and State Terror," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., Govern-

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americasituation of total war between the military guardians of the nation andexpansively defined "subversion." As General Videla of Argentinaonce said, "a terrorist is notjust someone with a gun or a bomb, but alsosomeone who spreads ideas that are contrary to Western and Christiancivilization."4 Democracy was regarded with suspicion at best, and asdetrimental to national security; working and peasant classes wereconsidered subversive and were primary targets for repression. As MariaHelena Moreira Alves has noted, the national security doctrine is inpractice an ideology of class domination.5 Struggles by subordinateclasses to better their lives and to demand socio-economic justice orpolitical participation have been regarded as communist-inspired threatsto "Western Christian civilization."

The national security state was characterized by fierce anti-communism and a commitment to pursue the twin objectives of "secu-rity and development." "Development" was envisioned as economicgrowth, linked to foreign investment and international capital, with theaim of eliminating the breeding grounds for communism. With its exten-sive repressive intelligence and counterinsurgency apparatus, thenational security state closed off democratic channels and seized controlof political, economic and social life. Torture, disappearance and assas-sination were among the means used to maintain "security" and ensure"favorable investment climates" for foreign capital. The working andpeasant classes were violently excluded from political life and economicinfluence; the left was hunted down and largely eliminated, with theexception of the guerrilla groups in El Salvador and Guatemala.In the 1960s and 1970s, the national security projects of the mili-taries coincided with the interests of key sectors of the agro-exportclasses in Central America, and the national bourgeoisies and eliteslinked to transnational capital in the Southern Cone, as well as USpolicymakers obsessed with the "communist threat." US military aidand trainingtended to encourage andjustify military role expansion, andcontributed to the all-encompassing character of the national securitydoctrine held by the Latin American armed forces.6 Alarmed by the

ment Violence and Repression (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 73-95; andMartin Weinstein, Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads (Boulder: WestviewPress, 1988).4 Quoted n Pion-BerlinandLopez, "Of Victims andExecutioners,"79.5 Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, 9.6 A numberof analysts have stressedthat militaryrole expansion(or what AlfredStepanhas called "new militaryprofessionalism")s a dangerousprelude o politici-zationandmay ead ocoups.See AlfredStepan,RethinkingMilitaryPolitics(Prince-ton: PrincetonUniversityPress,1988),13-15; ndClaudeWelch,CivilianControlofthe Military Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1976),30-34. US training,especiallyafter heCuban evolution,promoted oleexpansion ntheLatinAmericanarmiesby focussingon internal ubversionandcounterinsurgencyather hanexter-nal defence, and promotingcivic action programmes, military-in-development"

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYCuban revolution, and by the strengthened organizations of labour andnewly politicized peasant classes throughout the region, these elitesencouraged the Latin American militaries to crush the threat frombelow. Popular mobilization was seen as destructive, overwhelming andthreatening to the survival and development of the capitalist model. Themonetarist orthodoxy of the Chicago Boys, especially influential inChile and Argentina in the 1970s, stressed that inflation and economiccrisis were due to "excess demand" from subordinate classes. Thisimage coincided with the military perception that democracy hadbecome a dangerous threat to national security, opening the state tosubversion and disorder.

In the Southern Cone, export-oriented, debt-led growth strategiesaimed at rapid capital accumulation replaced import-substitutionpolicies and strengthened sectors of the upper classes linked to foreigncapital; in Central America, military rule reinforced the dominance ofthe agro-export oligarchic elites. The US government, which believedthe Latin American militaries to be the only forces capable of stabilizingthe region and eliminating the "communist threat," supported (overtlyor covertly) or condoned the wave of coups in these years. Thesemilitary coups, which violently imposed national security states, werethus the result of a confluence of specific domestic and internationalinterests.In Central America, the violence of recent decades is rooted inmilitary enforcement of a particularly inequitable form of capitalistdevelopment, which marginalizes large majorities in conditions ofextreme underdevelopment while allowing small minorities, mainlyagro-export and transnational sectors of the bourgeoisie (and their alliesin the military), to live in luxury. Military power, usually backed by theUnited States, supplied the coercion and control necessary to defeatperceived threats from social movements, including unions, peasantorganizations and intellectuals, to the hegemony of this class structure.In the Southern Cone, organized labour was perceived as the majorthreat to expanded capital accumulation as the import-substitutionmodel collapsed, and was particularly targeted for military repression.7

projects, and training in economics, fiscal planning, public administration and othercivilian functions. See ibid.; Lernoux, Cry of the People, especially part two on USintervention; and Miles Wolpin, Military Indoctrination and U.S. Imperialism, Occa-sional Paper #13, American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1973; Douglas Blaufarb,The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950-Present (NewYork: Free Press, 1977); Martin Edwin Andersen, "The Military Obstacle to LatinDemocracy," Foreign Policy 73 (Winter 1988-1989), 96-113; and McSherry, TheEvolution of the National Security State, for a sampling of literature on US influenceon Latin American militaries.

7 See O'Donnell's classic work, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism,and his "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question ofDemocracy," in David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America,

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin AmericaIn all these countries, "national security" meant the exclusion(political and economic) and repression of the popular sectors, whoseinterests were seen as threatening to the status quo. The national secu-

rity states utilized the dual mechanisms of economic restructuring andcoercion to terrorize and exclude the subordinate classes, demobilizeand destroy organized labour and preserve the system from challenges.8Today, as noted above, key structures of the national securityapparatus remain embedded within the new civilian regimes. In some,officers involved in the repression remain in high-ranking positions.9 Inmost, the military institutions remain largely intact and in many casesstrengthened. The significance of this situation is that restructuring ofthe militarized state and society continues to be hindered under civiliangovernment; the limits of social change and participation are alsodefined, to a significant degree, by the threat of military reaction.The Transition to Militarized Civilian GovernmentsIn previous work, I have characterized these new civilian regimes asmilitarized civilian governments in order to avoid the assumption thatthey are as yet full democracies. This new state type is an exclusionaryand constrained system, where structures of the military apparatus ofrepression remain intact, and significant regions of power and decision-making remain beyond the scope of civilians. Civilians hold office, butcivilian functions and prerogatives are still subject to military approvalor control. Again, each country examined here has a different balance offorces between its military and civilian sectors. Further, there are funda-mental differences between the Central American states and those of theSouthern Cone, where human rights violations and state terror havelargely ceased with the transition. However, in all these cases themilitaries have imposed "pacts of impunity" at the moment of transitionto protect themselves from accountability afterward.

285-318; David Pion-Berlin, "The Political Economy of State Repression in Argen-tina," in Michael Stohl and David Lopez, eds., The State as Terrorist (Westport:Greenwood Press, 1984), 99-122; and Pion-Berlin and Lopez, "Of Victims and Exe-cutioners," 63-86.8 See, for example, Juan Corradi, 'Military Government and State Terrorism in Argen-tina," in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., The Politics of AntiPoli-tics (2nd ed.; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 335-44.9 For examples of the persistence of these repressive structures after the transition tocivilian rule, see Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos, Proceso a la Impunidad deCrimenes de Lesa HumanidCad n Aeulnrica Latiloa (Bogota: Liga Internacional porlos Derechos y la Liberaci6n de los Pueblos, 1991);James Petras, "Global Transfor-mations and the Future of Socialism in Latin America," New Political Science 18/19(Fall/Winter 1990), 181-93; and Paulo S6rgio Pinheiro, "The Legacy of Author-itarianism: Violence and the Limits of Democratic Transitions," paper presented atthe Latin American Studies Association, 1991.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYIn these countries, formal democraticmechanismssuch as elec-tions andciviliangovernmenthave beenrestored,somegenuine,newly"civilianized"participatorytructureshave been created,and civil and

politicalrightsare legally recognized. However, the nationalsecuritydoctrine is still predominant n the militaryinstitution:the type ofinternationalizedcapitalistmodel, structuresof coercion and repres-sion,andthemilitary'sdea of its missionand role arestillinplace. Mostespecially,the militarydemands mpunity; t will not permitcivilianstohold it accountablefor its past repressiverule. The militaryremains astate withinthe state.In manyof these countries, such as Guatemala,Chile, Brazil andUruguay, the redemocratizationand/or liberalizationprocesses nowunderway were originallyformulatedby the military regimes, to bepermittedonly after the regimeshadinstitutionalizedpowerstructuresof militaryauthorityand reorganizedeconomic and social structures.Parallelmilitarycourts often serve to protect militaryoffendersfromcivilian ustice (adimensionof impunitywhich is not examinedhere).InChileandGuatemala, onstitutionsrewrittenundermilitary ulearestillthe legal basis for the civilian regimes. Fundamentalsocial changeremainsoff limits;civilianopposition,notablyof the left, mustoperatewithinstrictlydefined boundaries.Populardemands orjustice anddueprocessvis-a-vismilitaryabusesareusuallydeflectedordiscouragedbythe civilian governments.In sum, to a greateror lesser degree, themilitaryregimesmade concessions andwithdrewfromformalgovern-ance, but retained heirperceivedhistoricalprerogative o act as politi-cal arbiter.Impunity and Its MechanismsImpunitymeans,literally, reedom rompunishment.To actwith mpun-ity meansto act with the knowledgethatone is above the law. In LatinAmerica,impunityhas come to have a specific meaning npoliticalandhumanrightsterms: t means that acts of repressionandabuse of powerby the stateagainst ts citizens are shielded rom udgmentor accounta-bility before national law. This has taken place via military self-amnesties,variousamnesty aws, pardonsgrantedby new civiliangov-ernments,or othermechanisms.This has occurred,moreover,despiteoutragedpublicmobilization n favourof prosecutionand legal penal-ties. Theresultof impunity s invariablya renewedclimateof fearin thesociety, and a pervasivesense of injusticeandhelplessness.10Citizensbecomeresigned o the factthatjustice s beyondreachanddangerousodemand; impunity limits the horizons of what is possible. Simulta-10 See, for example, Jacobo Timerman's anguished account of President Menem's 1990

pardon of his torturers, "Fear Returns to Argentina," New YorkTimes, January 5,1991.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americaneously, impunity engenders a bolstered sense of power within the ranksof the military, and new rationalizations for terrorist methods.In Chile, Pinochet's national security state passed a self-amnestylaw in 1978 which "forgot" all crimes committed by the military afterSeptember 11, 1973-the day of the coup against Allende. Under thecurrent civilian government, the Supreme Court upheld this amnesty.Pinochet appointed members of Congress who are still able to blockexecutive efforts to democratize and demilitarize the Chilean state.In 1979, a "reciprocal amnesty" was passed in Brazil. This type ofamnesty has been criticized by international lawyers for its equation ofindividual crimes against the state (which the state can pardon) withstate crimes against its citizens (the state cannot pardon itself). Theresult of the Brazilian amnesty was to head off investigations of policeand military human rights violations, which included extensive tortureand disappearance."1In March 1991, for example, a clandestine ceme-tery was found beneath a new forest in Sio Paulo, with 1,500 gravesbelieved to contain the remains of disappeared political prisoners miss-ing since the early 1970s.12The Uruguayan case illustrates the alliance of certain military andcivilian elites at the moment of transition. In 1984, Uruguayan politicalleaders (excluding the Blanco Party) negotiated the transition frommilitary rule with the generals in the "Navy Club Pact." Part of thebargain was an agreement that the executive branch would not prose-cute military violators of human rights. The Sanguinetti governmentwon the first election in 1985, after leading competitors were excluded.Sanguinetti promised justice to Uruguayan society, but it soon becameclear he favoured amnesty for the military. In 1986, the Colorado Party ofPresident Sanguinetti introduced a proposal for a military amnesty. Thiswas voted down, but soon after General Medina, the minister ofdefence, ordered that no military man should appear before the courtsfor upcoming civil cases of military human rights abuses. Hours beforethese court cases were to begin, Sanguinetti managed to win Congre-ssional authorization for the so-called Ley de Caducidad, whichshielded military offenders from prosecution. Polls at that time showedthat 70 per cent of the public was opposed to this law.13 As outragedcitizens began organizing for a popular referendum on the amnesty, the11 See "Brasil:NuncaMais"-publishedinEnglishas "Torture n Brazil"-an accountsummarizingne millionpagesof military iles documentingorturecentres,mutila-tion andabuse of victimsand namesof prisonersand theirtorturers.Theserecords

weresecretlyphotocopiedbyhumanrights awyersover a periodof severalyearsinBrazil.See alsoA. J. Langguth,HiddenTerrorsNewYork:PantheonBooks, 1978).12 "Tumba landestinacon 1500cadaveres,"El DiariolLaPrensa, March27 1991.13 CynthiaBrown and Robert K. Goldman,"Torture,Memoryand Justice," TheNation,March27, 1989,408-10; ndInternational eague or HumanRights ILHR),"HumanRights nUruguay:WillHumanRightsViolatorsGo Free?" New YorkCity,April 1989,5.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRY

Uruguayan military issued dark threats about the consequences of over-turning the "Impunity Law." The government-appointed ElectoralCourt was openly obstructive towards the referendum, arbitrarily dis-qualifying thousands of signatures and enacting difficult new regulationsas the campaign appeared to be succeeding. The President condemnedthe referendum organizers for "seeking revenge" and General Medinacalled them "mentally ill." The referendum took place in April 1989; itwas defeated (57%to 43%), thus upholding the amnesty for the military.(Significantly, the referendum won 54 per cent to 42 per cent in Monte-video, where the country's most politicized half lives.)14A number of other legal-constitutional mechanisms of impunitywere put into place by civilian regimes in the region. In 1987, El Sal-vador, under President Duarte and in the context of tens of thousands ofcivilian murders, passed a reciprocal amnesty which was widely recog-nized as primarily benefitting the military. In Argentina, PresidentAlfonsin declared the Punto Final in 1986 to cut off hundreds of newcases of human rights violations, and then the Due Obedience law(which essentially exonerated all those military personnel who were"following orders") after mutinies by a faction of the military. The DueObedience law forgave hundreds of officers accused of human rightscrimes. President Menem pardoned over 200 military officers in 1989,and in December 1990 pardoned the notorious junta and military/security leaders who had been convicted for their atrocities in the "dirtywar." Among those pardoned was former General Carlos SuarezMason, who had been extradited from the US to face trial in Argentinaafter a landmark case in 1987-1988. Known as "the Lord of life anddeath" by his victims,15 he commanded concentration camps wherehorrendous torture was practised.16In Guatemala, in 1986, the military issued Decree 8-86 (a self-amnesty) four days before civilian president Cerezo took office, andafter more than 20 years of military rule. Cerezo basically accepted thisself-amnesty despite widespread outrage among Guatemalans. Today,the Guatemalan army continues to operate with total impunity, and withits counterinsurgency apparatus intact; disappearance, torture and mur-der directed against popular leaders continue to be tools of politicalcontrol. In Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, the civilian governments havefailed to take decisive action in cases of human rights violations andsystematic abuses, thus allowing de facto impunity for their powerfulmilitary forces.14 ILHR, "Human Rights in Uruguay," 6, and Shirley Christian, "In Uruguay, A Votefor Forgiveness," New YorkTimes, April 8, 1989.15 Katherine Bishop, "Foreign Abductors Held to be Liable in the U.S.," New York

Times, August 26, 1988.16 Aryeh Neier, "Menem's Pardons and Purges," New YorkTimes, October 2, 1989.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin AmericaEmbedded National Security ApparatusesMost, if not all, of the former national security states are characterizednot only by various "legal-institutional" acts of impunity but also byentrenched national security structures which persist in the newlycivilianized regimes. In Brazil, members of the Servigo Nacional deInformag6es (SNI), the military intelligence service, retain extensiveautonomy and power under the civilian government, although the SNIwas reduced in size and renamed by President Collor. The commandersof the three armed services are ministers in the cabinet, as are thesecretary general of the National Security Council, the former head ofthe SNI and the head of the Armed Forces General Staff. The militarycontrols the National Defence Council. Thus, the military is able to exerta rightist influence upon all national policy, above and beyondmonopolization of national security in the ideological sense describedabove, and including labour policy and agrarian reform.17Pinochet's national security laws were institutionalized in Chile's1980 Constitution and subsequent law. Congress and the courts are stillstacked with right-wing Pinochet allies; the Chilean Supreme Court,which, as noted, upheld the 1978 self-amnesty of the military, is totallycomposed of Pinochet appointees.18 Pinochet himself issued threatsregarding the 1990-1991 human rights investigation by the Truth andReconciliation Commission, appointed by President Aylwin, and allfour branches of the armed forces vehemently oppose criminal sanctionsfor officers guilty of human rights violations.19Pinochet and the national police have rejected any culpability forthe widespread human rights crimes of the dictatorship. The Truth andReconciliation Commission documented over 2,000 cases of dead anddisappeared victims of the military; cases of torture not ending in deathwere not included.20 The crimes of the military state, detailed by the17 See J. S. Fitch,"MilitaryProfessionalism,NationalSecurity,andDemocracy:Les-sonsfrom he LatinAmericanExperience,"paperpreparedor the annualmeetingofthe LatinAmericanStudiesAssociation,1989,15,and FrancesHagopianand ScottMainwaring, Democracyn Brazil:Problems ndProspects,"WorldPolicyJournal(Summer1987),492, 502-07.18 NathanielC. Nash,"Chile'sLeaderandArmySquareOff Over hePast," New YorkTimes,March26, 1991.Someencouraging teps to combatimpunitywere taken inSeptember1991 n Chile:a courtorder to exhume bodiesof the disappearedromclandestine emeterieswas obtained or the first time,and two high-rankingfficersaccused of overseeing heassassinations f OrlandoLetelier(Allende'sambassadorto the US, killed n Washington,D.C. in 1976)and RonniMoffittwere arrested.See

NathanielC. Nash, "GravesWithouta Name YieldingTheirSecrets," NewrYorkTimes,September19, 1991,and"ChileSeizes TwoPolicemenn LetelierCase," NewYorkTimes,September24, 1991.19 MargaretCrahan,presentation t ColumbiaUniversity,September1990.Hereaftercited as Columbiapresentation.20 Ibid.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYCommission's report, included systematic torture and murder;forexample, prisonerswere forced to watch as relatives were raped orbeaten;people were strapped o metalgrillsandelectrocuted;victimswere drugged,their stomachs cut open (so they would not float), anddropped nto the sea fromhelicopters.21InArgentina, ar-rightactions of the militaryhave carriedout fourmutiniessince 1987,threeagainstthe Alfonsinadministration ndone,inDecember1990,against he Menemadministration.The firstmutinieswere aimed at ending the trialsof militaryofficers for crimes in the"dirtywar." Argentina s the only countrywhereincoming governingelites rejectedthe military'sself-amnestyandinitiatedtrials for crimesagainsthumanity.Therevolts werequelledby loyal troopsandopposedby hundredsof thousandsof citizens who rallied n Buenos Aires. Yetafterthe dustcleared,Alfonsinsubmitted o anumberof demandsoftherebels.These mutinies aught hemilitary xtremists hatthe use offorcewould bringresults.The Punto Final and Due Obedience laws failed to appease keysectors of the Argentinemilitary.As GeneralJorge Videla, formerde factopresidentduring he Argentinedictatorship,putit afterhe waspardoned:"I havebeeninprison or more than sixyears,conscious thatcomplyingwithmy unjustsentenceconstitutedact of service ... In allmy publicdeclarationsI willonly seek the vindicationof the armyandtherestorationof militaryhonor."22 n short,unrepentant ectorsof themilitary,emboldenedby acts of impunity,were encouragedto seekcompletevindication orthe "dirtywar,"indefianceof the civilian egalprocess which convicted their leaders. In spite of Menem's 1989par-dons,the fourthmutinywascarriedoutby supportersofanultra-rightistleader of previous revolts, Col. MohamedAli Seineldin. Seineldin,reportedlylinked to the ArgentineAnticommunistAlliance (a deathsquadactive in the 1970s)once said in the ArgentineperiodicalPdgina12, "there is no such thingas a green horse or a decent Jew."23Recentdisturbingdevelopments nArgentinahint at the reconstitu-tion andincreasing nfluence of the militarynationalsecurity apparatusuponthe civiliangovernment.After a mysteriousandbloodyattackonthe La Tabladamilitarybarracks n 1989by armed,leftist militants,anattackwhich was savagelycrushedby the military,new measureswereadopted by the governmentwhich re-authorizedmilitaryand intelli-gence involvement n domestic affairs.Some accounts havepointedtothe possibilitythat militaryprovocateursor counterinsurgency gents21 Reuters, "Chile Details Over 2000 Slayings Under Pinochet," New YorkTimes,March 6, 1990, and Nash, "Graves Without a Name Yielding Their Secrets."22 "El ex dictador Videla comienza a plantear exig6ncias a Menem," El DiariolLaPrensa, January 1, 1991.23 International League for Human Rights, "Argentina: The Human Rights Record,"New York City, March 1990, 32.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americawere involved in provoking the La Tablada attack, because its conse-quences were to discredit human rights organizations and justify mili-tary warnings of impending national security crises.24

President Alfonsin, in January 1989, set up a National SecurityCouncil which was dominated by military officers, including the chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State for Intelligenceand the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force, to advise himon "subversive threats." This was a stunning setback for a major legalachievement of earlier years: Law 23.554, which challenged the nationalsecurity doctrine by redefining national defence in terms of externalaggression, not internal subversion.Approximately a year later, and after widespread food riots in 1989,President Menem dismantled Alfonsin's Council by Decree 392/90. Thenew government decree restructured the Council, renaming it theNational Defence Council, and excluded all civilians from it. The decreeexplicitly authorized military intervention in situations of "internalcommotion." The Assistant Secretary for Human Rights resigned inprotest.25Political violence also continues in Argentina. In May 1991, forexample, a well-known film maker, who publicly criticized the Menemgovernment for betraying its electoral promises, was the next day shoteight times in the legs by mysterious assailants. A leader of the Mothersof the Plaza de Mayo-the group that demonstrated to protest disap-pearances during the military dictatorship, and which now demandsinformation on missing children and an end to impunity for militarycrimes-received a wave of death threats in the spring of 1991.26In El Savador and Guatemala, terror against the population, carriedout by military and security forces both in uniform and in the guise of"death squads," continues on a daily basis despite the existence ofcivilian governments. In Guatemala, the military institution virtuallyoccupies the countryside, and controls the Indian peasant populationthrough counterinsurgency structures such as civil patrols, "modelvillages" and "poles of development." The G2, Guatemala's militaryintelligence agency, is the "brain" that orchestrates acts of state terrorand repression. The G2 has historically drawn up lists of "subversives"to assassinate. In the administration of President Serrano, as of fall 1991,two G2 officers hold key posts in the office of the Chief of Staff for theArmy and in the office of the President. Serrano's first minister ofinterior, who resigned in 1991, was also linked to G2; he was the same24 See Joe Schneider,"Argentina:TheEnigmaof LaTablada,"NACLAReporton theAmericas, Vol. 23, No. 3, September 1989, 9-13, and Ronaldo Munck, LatinAmerica: Transitions to Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1989), 103.25 ILHR, "Argentina,"12-14.26 "Solanasratificaque Menem 'traiciono'a sus electores," El DiariolLaPrensa,

May 23, 1991, and "Menem acusa a los nazis," El DiariolLa Prensa, May 24, 1991.

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armyofficer who held the post under the militaryregimeof fundamen-talist generalRios Montt, who directedgenocidalexterminationcam-paigns against the Indian peasants in the early 1980s.27The currentministerof defence also has long-standing ies to G2.Today, the World Council of Churches calls Guatemala-oftenreferredto as a "fragile democracy" in the United States-the mostdangerous country in the world for human rightsdefenders.2 Some200,000innocent civilians have been murdered n Guatemalaand ElSalvadorsince 1980;hundreds of grisly massacres of MayanIndianshave been carriedoutby the Guatemalan rmy, ncluding he massacreat SantiagoAtitlanin December 1990(one of dozens since the transi-tion). Yet in only one recent case have officers in Guatemala ver beenconvicted for humanrightscrimes.In El Salvador,an armycolonel andlieutenantwere convictedinOctober 1991-a precedent n thatcountry-for the 1989murderof sixJesuits and two women. However, thejudgmenthas been criticizedbythe Jesuits and others for failing to look higherin the military highcommand orthosewhoordered hemassacre,as well as forexoneratingthe seven paratrooperswho confessed to actuallymurdering he vic-tims.29 n short, impunityfor those who "followed orders" was per-petuated,andimpunityseeminglyremained ntactforthose at theapexof the militaryapparatus.The Lawyers Committee or HumanRightsarguedthat the Salvadoranmilitarycovered up the involvement ofhigh-ranking fficers, and only tolerated the trial because of pressurefrom the US Congressand threats of an aid cut-off.30The obstacles to democratizationn El Salvadorcould be vividlyseen in January1991during he first electoralcampaignafter the elec-tion of theright-wingARENAgovernment he yearbefore.For the firsttime, oppositioncandidates rom the DemocraticConvergence, nclud-ing former membersof the Frente Democratico Revolucionario(pro-gressive civilians who had alignedthemselves with the revolutionaryFMLN), were running.Negotiationsbetweenthe governmentand theFrenteFarabundoMartiparala LiberacionNacional(FMLN)were inprogress.In the midstof thisactivity,San Salvadorradiostationsbeganbroadcastinga written threatfrom two of El Salvador'sdeathsquads,threatening o kill oppositionleaders, intellectuals,priests and labourleaders. Excerptsof the messageare worthquotingat some length,as27 Noticias de Guatemala, February 1991.28 Enfoprensa, Year 9, No. 4123, February 19-25, 1991.29 "Jesuitas buscan a los autores intelectuales," El Diario/La Prensa, October I, 1991;

Cynthia J. Arson, "Bizarre Justice in El Salvador," New YorkTimes, October 3,1991; and "El Salvador at the Crossroads," editorial in El DiariolLa Prensa, Octo-ber 4, 1991.30 Shirley Christian, "Colonel in Jesuit Deaths in El Salvador," New YorkTimes,September 30, 1991.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americathey demonstrate the ideology of El Salvador's far-right sectors andreveal the threats to the democratization process:This country's society is divided into three classes: a superiorcreative classcomposedessentiallyof specialistsandlargelandowners;a smallerclass thattries to imitate this superiorclass; and an inferiorrusticclass that is madeupessentiallyof workers,poor peasants,studentsandsmallbusinessmen.Anothergroupexists thatwe holdinlow regardand considervery small-the dangerousintellectualclass that tries to contaminate he above-mentioned lasses... thedestinyof the superiorclass is to governandregulate he inferiorclasses. Andwhat s more,it has a dutytoexploit,disposeof, conquer,andeven exterminateelements of these inferior classes when the benefits of capitalism requiresuch.... Wewill shortlyresumeourconquestthat will lead to absolutepower.Whatever ourse of action is justified,whateveraction,justice is a luxurythatwe cannot allow.31The impunity which remained entrenched in El Salvador embold-ened the armed forces and their affiliated death squads, limited politicalparticipation and perpetuated a climate of terror. As documented byhuman rights organizations such as Amnesty International, deathsquads are usually composed of military and security forces, and in ElSalvador were linked to Roberto D'Aubuisson, the lifetime president ofARENA, who died in 1992.32Significantly, impunity and the role of themilitary have been key issues to be resolved in the peace negotiationsbetween the Guatemalan and Salvadoran governments and their respec-tive insurgencies. Mechanisms for overcoming impunity and democ-ratizing the state, established in the 1992 Salvadoran peace accords overthe strong opposition of sectors of the military, remain to beimplemented. In the Guatemalan negotiations, impunity has been amajor obstacle to reaching an agreement on human rights.In sum, the militarized structures described above, and the mecha-nisms of impunity built into the state, impede attempts to control themilitary, as well as to democratize and demilitarize the state. In society,the ability of popular classes to struggle for better conditions and anexpansion of their political and socio-economic rights is limited by fearof military retaliation, or in extreme cases by continued threats to life.Impunity protects the prerogatives of the military institution and itspolitical autonomy; its self-defined mission is to act against perceivedthreats to the political and economic order. The military, shielded byimpunity, continues to make the rules and define the terms for its ownintervention. In all these states impunity was effected through unilateralamnesties passed by the military to forgive itself, amnesty laws passedby civilian governments, de facto situations of impunity, pardons orinstitutionalized "national security" constitutions and laws. There was31 Jean Kavanagh, "Salvador Death Squads Threaten Leftist Leaders." TlheGlobe and

Mail, January 14, 1991.32 Ibid.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYlittle or no accountabilityo the popularmajoritiesnor democratic nputfrom society. As Alberto Zumaran,a Uruguayansenator, once ob-served, impunityinsures a kind of permanentcoup by a defiant mili-tary.33Often, this situationhas been facilitatedby incomingcivilianelites.SocialOpposition o ImpunityHumanrightsorganizations nd nternationalawyers,as well as victimsof the militaryregimesand their families, have been amongthe mostvocal in their condemnationof impunity.The anguishand horror ofmany after Menem's pardons were well expressed by Nazi-hunterSimonWiesenthal:"TheArgentinegeneralscommitted hesame crimesagainsthumanityhatthe Nazis did. GiventhisIcannotunderstandheirliberty."34n responseto governmentclaimsthatamnestyandforgive-nessarenecessaryfor nationalreconciliationandprogress,or to preventnew militarycoups, these groups arguethat only the victims have theright to forgive. Victims cannot be forcibly "reconciled" with theirtorturersand deprivedof any means of justice in a democraticpolity.Further,the state should not have the prerogativeto forgive its owncrimesagainst ts own citizens, whetheror not therehas been a changeof government.Thesecritics also chargethatdespiteits professed ntent,impunityundermines ather hanstrengthensdemocratization ndtheruleof law.Concessions grantedto militarydemandssparknew revolts and newdemands.The criticsfurtherargue hatattempts o appeaseunrepentantsectors of the militaryproducethe opposite of the claimedeffect; byrewardinghe forces most dangerous o democracy,furtherabusesareencouraged.TheUN WorkingGrouponEnforcedorInvoluntaryDisap-pearancesconcurs.Inboth its 1990and 1991reports,theWorkingGroupnoted: "Perhapsthe single most important actor contributing o thephenomenonof disappearancesmaybe that of impunity.The WorkingGroup's experienceover the past ten years has confirmedthe age-oldadagethat impunitybreeds contemptfor the law."35The victimsand their familiespointto the ironyof Nazi war crimi-nals stillbeing soughtafter45 years, while they are accused of vindic-tivenessandurgedtoforgivemilitaryofficerswhosecrimeswerejust asabhorrent.36nternationalawyers arguethat crimesagainsthumanity33 Editorial in The Nation, "Closing the Books," February 28, 1987.34 "Firmenich inicia los tramites para salir del pais," El Diario/La Prensa, January 3,1991.35 "Report of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disap-

pearances, Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form ofDetention or Imprisonment/Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,"E/CN.4/1990/13, January 24, 1990.36 Note the worldwide outrage generated by Lithuania's decision to pardon its fascist

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin America(extrajudicial execution, extermination, disappearance, torture) andwar crimes (massacres, murdering captured prisoners) are exempt fromamnesties under international law. Further, international agreementsand treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, the Convention against Genocide and the Convention againstTorture are violated by acts of impunity,37meaning that states party tothese agreements are reneging upon their international obligations.Large sectors of these societies have opposed impunity for militaryviolators of human rights. A poll in fall 1990in Chile showed that 67 percent of the population wanted investigations and punishment (asopposed to forgiving or forgetting) for human rights crimes.38 Publicoutrage was heightened as, almost weekly, mass graves of torturedcadavers, victims of Pinochet's national security state, were discoveredin Chile.39A poll taken by a Buenos Aires paper in September 1989, atthe time of Menem's first pardons, showed that 62 per cent condemnedamnesty for military criminals, with only 28 per cent in favour; anothersource cites the figure of 95 per cent opposed to the pardons.40 WithMenem's December 1990 pardons the number of citizens opposed was70 per cent; radio stations were flooded with calls protesting the meas-ure, and all political parties except Menem's Peronist movement and itsconservative allies urged citizens to join marches against the pardons.41

war criminals in September 1991. See David Binder, "U.S. Expects Lithuania Not toErase War Crimes," New YorkTimes, September 6, 1991, and Jonathan Alter andMichael Meyer, "An Unpardonable Amnesty," Newsweek, September 16, 1991.37 See, for example, Robert Goldman, "Amnesty Laws, International Law, and theAmerican Convention on Human Rights," The Law Group Docket (Summer 1989);Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute GrossHuman Rights Violations in International Law," California Law Review 78 (1990),449-512; George C. Rogers, "Argentina's Obligation to Prosecute Military Officialsfor Torture," Columbia Human Rights Law Review 20 (1989), 259-308; and LouisJoinet, "Study on Amnesty Laws and Their Role in the Safeguard and Promotion ofHuman Rights," special report to the UN Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/16, June 21, 1985.38 Arturo Valenzuela, address at Columbia University, September 28, 1990. Hereaftercited as Columbia address.

39 In September 1991, as bodies packed two per coffin were exhumed from clandestinecemeteries, Pinochet outraged Chileans by commenting "How economical!" andcongratulating "the seekers of cadavers." He also demanded general pardons forviolators of human rights, arguingit was "time to stop the party" and "not reopen thewound" ("Gobierno califica de 'crueles' comentarios de Pinochet sobre ejecutdaospoliticos," El DiariolLa Prensa [September 4, 1991; "Pinochet pide indultar vio-ladores de DH," Ed DiariolLa Prensa, September 16, 1991]).

40 Chris Kline, "Menem Defends Amnesty," The Times of the Americas, October 4,1989;Paul W. Zagorski gives the 95 per cent figure in the manuscript for his Democ-racy vs. National Security: Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1992).41 Reuters, "Argentine Defends Release of 'Dirty War' Leaders," New YorkTimes,December 31, 1990.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYAs noted, 70 per cent of Uruguayans opposed amnesty for militaryoffendersin 1986.In Brazil,the leftist WorkersParty PT) s the strongestparty nthecountry; duringthe last presidentialelection, the PT's Lula (Luis daSilva)cameveryclose to winning,with47percent of thevote (31millionvotes).42The PT's programmencludedplansto dissolve theSNI andtosubordinatehe military o civilianrule,as well as to challengesome ofthe military'sprojectsandprivilegesaccumulatedsince the 1964coup.The high-rankingmilitaryechelons lobbied hardagainstthe PT beforethe election.43In April 1991, the outgoing Salvadoran egislature unanimouslyapproved constitutionalreforms hammered out in the negotiationsbetween the FMLN andthe ARENA government.These includedsig-nificant imitson militarypowersandautonomy,new civiliancontrols,exclusionof the military rompublicsecurityfunctions,andthe institu-tion of a commissionto investigatehumanrightscrimes.44n September1991,President Cristianiand the FMLN negotiatorsreacheda broadagreementon the future of the countrywhich included"purification"and reduction of the armedforces.45As noted, both the FMLN in El Salvador and the UnidadRevolucionariaNacional Guatemalteca(URNG) in Guatemalahaveengaged in UN-monitorednegotiationswith their respective govern-ments. Both have demanded hatthe militariesbe heldaccountable orcrimes against humanityand war crimes. During the summer 1991Guatemalan negotiations, popular organizations including CON-AVIGUA,the organizationof widows, andCERJ,anorganizationhatadvocatesrespectforthe constitutionalrightsof the campesinos,heldamass demonstrationof 15,000 n GuatemalaCity,demandingan endtoimpunityanddisappearances.Representatives f popularorganizationsalso presented the URNG negotiatorsin Mexico with a petition onbehalf of thousandsof Guatemalansdemandingan end to impunity.4642 MariaHelena Moreira Alves, presentation at the Graduate School, City University ofNew York, February 20, 1990. Hereafter cited as CUNY presentation. She called thePT the strongest party because of its millions of members and disciplined grassroots

organization. Collor's victory was at least in part the result not of superior organiza-tion, but superior access to resources, particularly O Globo television, in a nationwhere millions of people cannot read. Election percentages from James Brooke, "BadTimes, Bold Plans for Brazil," New YorkTimes, January 7, 1990.43 Moreira Alves, CUNY presentation, and James Brooke, "Brazil Will Vote with Eyeon Army," New YorkTimes, December 15, 1991.

44 Mark A. Uhlig, "Salvadorans in Accord on Army Curbs," New YorkTimes, April29,1991, and AP, "Salvadoran Legislature Passes Reforms in Time," New YorkTimes,April 30, 1991.45 Shirley Christian, "Salvadoran Chief and Rebels Reach Broad Agreement," NewYorkTimes, September 26, 1991.46 NGO Coalition Against Impunity Newsletter #3, July 1991.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin AmericaAmong the demands of the Guatemalan insurgents in the negotiationsare elimination of all the legal and structural mechanisms of impunityand dismantling of the repressive apparatus.

In sum, the demand for military accountability by important sectorsof Latin American civil society reflects a profound rejection of thenational security state, and the recognition that impunity perpetuatesfundamental violations of justice and social inequities. In such condi-tions of impunity, the potential for democratization is seriously cur-tailed. In effect, impunity structurally impedes the struggle to change thesocial balance of power between the politicized coercive apparatus ofthe state and the majority populations.In some cases, notably in El Salvador and Guatemala, substantialsectors of society have seen civilian governments as complicit in theperpetuation of terror by the military and the exoneration of militarycrimes, cynically attempting to use the legitimizing function of civiliangovernment to re-establish public confidence and provide the percep-tion of fairness in the absence of substantive justice. In Chile, while theAylwin government did establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-sion, the clear policy of the government was that legal penalties wouldnot be part of the process.47 The Commission was prohibited from evenpublishing names of accused military criminals.48 Menem's pardonsrepresented the apex of impunity, and provoked anguished mass demon-strations in Argentina as well as international condemnation.

Conjectures on the Current Historical MomentHistory has demonstrated time and again in Latin America that politicaland economic elites invariably knock at the barracks door when theyperceive their interests threatened by subordinate classes. There is hopetoday that the years of military terror have eliminated this tendency,even among right-wing sectors. However, the Latin American eliteshave had a shallow commitment to democracy when democracy beginsto give voice to demands from the working and peasant classes forstructural change.49 They may still turn to the military-usually thebest-organized, right-wing, quasi-party, with a ready-made machineryof repression-to enforce the status quo. Or, military factions may maketheir own decisions to intervene-at times using the language of nation-alism to justify military rule. In Venezuela in early 1992, a rebel factionof the military opposed to the neo-liberal economic programme of Presi-47 Valenzuela,Columbiaaddress.48 Crahan,Columbiapresentation.49 A recentexample s the case of Haiti,wherePresidentJean-BertrandAristidewaselectedby 65percent in early 1991,only to be overthrownby the military,with thesupport f theelites,,nSeptember1991.See alsoEvelyneHuberStephens,"Democ-racy in Latin America," Latin American Research Review 25 (1990), 157-76.

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dent Carlos Andres Perez (as well as corruption)stageda significantcoupattempt.Also, recently nPeru,PresidentFujimori ndthemilitaryimposed an auto-golpe (a self-coup), abolishing the democratic politicalsystem, to establish "order" in the face of growinginsurgencyandsocio-economic desperation. The historic propensity of the UnitedStates to intervenewhenit perceivesits hegemonythreatenedhasoftenreinforcedthis tendencyto look for military"solutions." The UnitedStates continuesto supplymilitaryaidthatis far moregenerousthanaidto strengthenweak civilianinstitutions n the regionin manycases.Today,however,new social coalitionsandforms of the statehaveemerged nLatinAmerica.The national ecuritystatesweakeneddue toa numberof complexfactorson severallevels, internal,domesticandinternational.One importantelement was that the interests of statistmilitariesbeganto conflict with the interestsof international lites andnational sectors linked to foreign capital, which demandedprivatiza-tion, more direct political control and free markets. The perceptiondeveloped amongdomestic elites that militaryrule, having performedthe function of eliminatingthe threat from below (except in CentralAmerica)and restructuringhe state, was now an obstacle to furthercapitalistdevelopment.Military nstitutions endedto demandnationaldevelopment (in the context of security) and control of strategicresourcesand industries,while free markets and privatizationsbettersuitedthe interests of international apitalandnationalelites linked toexportmarketsandtransnationalorporations.Further,manymembersof dominantclasses had come to believe that the terrorand arbitrarygovernmentof the militarywere threatening heirinterests.They pre-ferredmore direct influence and representationn government.Moreover, in many cases the militarieswere deeply involved inrunningstate enterprises;key sectors often tended to oppose drasticneo-liberal market "solutions" (with the exception of the Pinochetregime nChile).Inshort, tappears hatthemilitarynterests n nationalsecurityanddevelopment,and nationalpower, beganto divergefromthe requirementsof the globalizationof productionin internationalcapitalism,and the interests of key elite sectors. The collapse of thecommunistbloc removeda major ustificationforlargemilitaryappar-atuses. In sum, the nationalsecurityprojectsof the militariesno longercoincided with the interestsof foreignand internationalized lites.The current form of the state in these countries seems for thesereasonsto reflect better the currentstage of worldcapitalistdevelop-ment, markedby the globalizationof markets,productionandfinanceand the increasingmobilityof international apital.Inthe rapidlydevel-oping globalpoliticaleconomy,economicandtechnological actorsarenow more often drivingpolitics, reversing previoustendencieswherenationalsecuritydrovepolitics; massive military-industrialomplexes

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americaare becoming an economic and political burden.50 On the other hand,market forces impose their own demands. The "neo-liberal" paradigmwhich is predominant today depends upon low wages, minimal or non-existent benefits and weak labour organizations; restructuring andprivatizations throw thousands more out of work. All this suggests thepossibility of new social conflicts, a dangerous situation when militaryforces, protected by impunity, may still decide (or be asked) to interveneto "maintain social peace."In sum, under the new civilian governments the same capitalisteconomic model and harsh neo-liberal measures, the same class structureand the same control mechanisms for "challenges from below" aremaintained, but with greater legitimacy. In contrast to direct coerciverule, the invisible hand of the market and the structural power of capitalcamouflage naked exploitation and obscure the beneficiaries of thesystem.51 The hegemony of capitalism (and the US sphere of influence)are still in place without the stigma of military rule.The new civilian governments converge quite well with the US-preferred liberal model of democracy. A liberalized system allows somedissent and social unrest to be ventilated, yet, as John Peeler has noted,"Liberal democracy as a structure, in short, tends to lock the choices ofpolicy and leadership into a relatively narrow range around what comesto be called the center of the political spectrum... liberal democracy'simmobilism must be seen as defending social injustice by making itvirtually impossible to bring about fundamental change."52 Yet liberalsystems are clearly farpreferable to dictatorships; at least for a time theyhave great legitimacy.Thus, the establishment of these new governments, widely wel-comed after the national security states, has tended to diffuse criticismof the extreme socio-economic inequalities that still exist. The pressurefrom abroad to ameliorate these conditions, which appeared starklyillegitimate under military rule, has lessened with the advent of thecivilian governments. As Peter Winn has noted, the greatest failure ofthe transition in Chile has been the reinforcement of negative socialfeatures: the maldistribution of income, wealth and power. UnderPinochet, this was perceived as illegitimate, but the democratic govern-ment has now endowed legitimacy upon ill-gotten gains and severesocial inequality.53Further, civilian rightists and internationalized elites50 This nsightwasexpressedbyYoshihiroTsurumi,Professorof International usinessat City Universityof New York, in a presentationentitled "New Political and

EconomicOrders ntheWorld,"partof the RalphBuncheInstituteSeminarSeries,on October16, 1991.51 See RobertHeilbroner oracogentanalysisofcapitalistdemocracy TheNatureandLogic of Capitalism New York:W. W. Norton, 1985]).52 JohnPeeler,LatinAmericanDemocracies ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress, 1985),153.53 ParaphrasedromPeterWinn'spresentation t the LatinAmericanStudiesAssocia-

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYcan press their agendasmore easily, knowingthat the latent threatofmilitaryreaction inhibitspotentialopposition.Prospects for Consolidation of Constitutional Rule and DemocratizationIn summary, militarized civilian governments are embedded withauthoritarian tructurespersistingfrom the national security states,includingmechanisms of impunity.These structuresand mechanismsreflectboth the institutionalized owerandprivilegeheldbythemilitaryvis-a-viscivil society,and tspoliticallyautonomous tatus. Themilitaryinstitution s able to continue to act outsidethe scope of the rule of lawand civilian control. This situationhas disturbing mplicationsfor thefuture of democratizationprocesses and the consolidation of civilianrulein thesecountries,particularlyn timesof economiccrisis orpoliti-cal challenge. The prospectsfor consolidatingconstitutionalrule andadvancingdemocratization n these societies seem to involve severaldimensions:(1) demilitarization;2) establishing he rule of law and animpartialsystem of justice; (3) fostering respect for human rights;(4) increasingpoliticalparticipation; nd(5) increasingsocio-economicequity.Demilitarization.Unless armies are defeatedin war (as was theGermanarmy n 1945,or the Nicaraguanarmyof Somozain 1979), t isextremely problematic o dislodgethemfrompower.Yet democratiza-tion in any meaningful ense cannot be achievedwithoutrequiring hearmedforces to take theirproperplaceundercivilianrule, removedasan institutionrompositionsofpublicauthoritysimilaro what occurredwith the Church n a previoushistoricalperiod).A military nstitutionaccountable to civilian authorities is a fundamental element ofdemocracy,as is a police force that is trustworthyand protectiveofcitizens' rights.A new militarymission, focussed on nationaldefencerather than internal security, national development or politicaldecision-making,is part of the process of democratization.Such achangedrole for Latin American militariesrequiresa rejectionof thenationalsecuritydoctrineand a reformulation f the militarymission.Obviously,reducing he role of the armiesin publicpolicy making s achallenge or all these countries,but one required ordemocratization.Pactsand mechanismsof impunityundermine he demilitarizationprocess by institutionalizinghepowerof the militaryover society.Thedamagedone to new governments' credibilityand legitimacy by elitepactsandimpunitymeasuresmaybe deep. As O'Donnelland Schmitter

tion conference, Washington, D.C., April 1991. Special thanks to Diane Hawney forher notes on the panel, "Chile's Return to Democracy: The First Year," organized byIvan Jaksic.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americahave noted, impunity"risks provoking ustifiably indignantreactionswhich may prove more difficult to cope with than the specter of apossible coup... some horrorsare too unspeakableand too fresh."54Unless guiltyindividualsareremovedfrompositionsof authority,andrepressivestructuresaredismantled, t is difficultto be optimisticaboutthe prospectsfor consolidatingconstitutionalrule in Latin America.Establishing the rule of law and an impartial system of jus-tice. Sinceimpunity mplicitlyplacescertainpowerfulgroups nsocietyabovethe law, attempts o establishdueprocessandequalityunderthelawareseriouslyundermined. fthe foundationof democracy sjustice,impartiallyand equally applied, impunity corrupts that foundation.First, members of society suffer extreme insecurity when identifiedmilitary riminalsare atlarge, especially nthe context of persistingactsof terror forexample,in CentralAmerica).Second, if victims of abusehave no recourse ojustice, a stratumof second-classcitizensdevelops.Officialdisregard or the fundamentalrightsof the victims and theirrelatives continues as painfullyunder civilian governmentas undermilitaryrule. This process intensifies the social divisions in society,where the torturersare "moreequal"than theirvictims. Some humanrightsactivistsarguethat,even if majoritieswere to supportamnesties,these would still violatedemocraticprinciplesregarding he protectionof the rightsof minorities.A doublestandardofjustice emerges,whichmilitatesagainst hefosteringof a sense of citizenshipandequalityunderthe law.

Additionally,heextentoforganized errorunder he nationalsecu-rity states meantthat society sufferedas a whole. Failure to sanctionthoseresponsibleperpetuatesa climateof fear andmayset into motion achain reactionof processes whichundermine he rule of law. Victimsand relatives are afraidto come forward;dissent and opposition arestifled; udgesareafraid o act andimplement he law for fearof retalia-tion;the state avoidsresponsibility or the past and loses legitimacyinthe present.The effect upon society is corrosive, promotingcynicismanddisrespectfor civiliangovernmentand law.While the processof establishing he rule of law andaccountabilityis obviouslysensitiveanddifficult,it is a necessaryelementfor demo-craticconsolidation.Truthandjustice are recognizedby most humanrightsgroupsas inseparable omponentsofthisprocess.This is not to saythe leniencyor even eventualpardonscannotbe options.However, theprocess of civilianjustice should be allowed to complete its course,unimpededby the nationalsecurity apparatus;amnestiesand pardonsused to avoidthejudicialprocessbecomeinstruments f impunity orthepowerful.54 O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 30.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRY

Impunity endsthemessage o extremistsnthemilitaries hatactsofstate terrorwillbe eventually orgiven,even rewarded;t communicatestacitacceptanceof militarymethods.Simultaneously,heciviliangovern-ment risks its chances to democratizepower and begin to bringthemilitaryunder civilian control.Finally, by failing o alignitself withtheaspirationsof a mobilizedcitizenry,a civiliangovernmentalienatesacrucialsocialbase, andstrikesanunholybargainwith the mostundemo-cratic sectors.

Fostering respect for human rights. A daunting task for new civil-iangovernments trugglingo democratize s to establisha politicalcul-ture of respectfor humanrightsand humandignity,especiallyamongthose responsible o enforce the law. Democratization equires he mili-taryin particularo discard ts notion that massiveviolationsof humanrightsarejustifiable n the nameof nationalsecurity.Struggles gainst mpunity resignificantbecausethey helptocreatea highsocial consciousnessabouthumanrightsand ustice;they provideanimportant oliticalconstituency or effortsto builda systembased ondueprocessandtheruleof law.Achievingciviliancontrolof themilitary,respectfor humanrightsand the renunciationof the nationalsecuritydoctrineare transformations hichwillonly occurthroughsocialstrug-gle. Historicallyin Latin America, movementsof politicized sectorsdemandingheirrightshave beennecessaryto openthepoliticalsystemsandkeepthemopen.55The referendum ffort n Uruguayand the partialprocessof truthandjustice exemplifiedby the trialsin Argentina,bothaccomplisheddue to the mobilization f civil society,aregoodexamplesof such consciousness-raisingnd democratizingmovements.AugustoVarasargues hatthehumanrightsquestion s central o theprocessof bringing he militaryunder civiliancontrolin newly democ-ratizingsocieties.56Sanctionsby civiliansto hold militaryviolatorstoaccountstrikeat theheartof themilitary'spoliticizedrole morethananyothereffort, such as reductionof troops. Civilianrejectionof militarystate terror s a crucialsignalof transformedivil-militaryelationsand aclearrejectionof themilitarynational ecuritydoctrine,whichasserts heprimacyof the stateaboveanyindividual ight.As Varasnotes,sanctionsalso weakenthe military'scapacityto establishpoliticalcoalitionswithciviliansectors,or to overthrowciviliangovernmentswhenthe militarydeems it necessary.Greater political participation. Democratization also implies theexpansionof citizens' politicalparticipation nd influencein decisionsthat affecttheirlives. However,impunitymayweakensuchattempts obroadenparticipationn new civilianregimes.As KatherineHite noted n1991,politicalparticipationn Chile has declined markedlysince the55 Stephens, "Democracy in Latin America," 169.56 Augusto Varas, "Democratization and Military Reform in Argentina," in AugustoVaras, ed., Democracy Under Siege (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 47-64.

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Military Power and Impunity in Latin Americatransition to civilian rule. She quoted Chilean social psychologistElizabeth Lira, who argues that there is a great fear of participationbecause Chileans still associate politics with death, torture and disappear-ance, loss ofjobs andexploitation.57Impunity is animportantfactor in thisclimate of fear, for the same militarythat commanded massive repressionstill holds substantial power today.Greater socio-economic equity. The question of impunity is also acentral element in the struggle for social justice. Clearly, the struggle fordemocratization includes a socio-economic dimension which threatensentrenched class interests (and often, the dictates of the IMF). The 1991Haitian coup graphically demonstrated that even elected governmentswhich attempt to voice the interests of the majorities are violentlyopposed by elite classes and the military institution. Yet the mar-ginalization and human misery of large proportions of the populations inthese countries warn of new social conflicts.The current socio-economic order in Latin America, according toone source, has resulted in the deaths of 700,000 persons annually fromhunger and malnutrition.58 n Guatemala, nine out of ten families live insqualid conditions, with no money for housing or medicine; in Brazil andGuatemala, military police and death squads routinely murder impov-erished street children; in Argentina, one third of the population is belowthe poverty line; in El Salvador, half the children under five are mal-nourished; in Peru and elsewhere, cholera is sweeping the population forthe first time in a century; in Chile, wages remain below the 1970 level.The "lost decade" of the 1980s threw hundreds of thousands into deep-ening poverty. Such a situation does not bode well for democratization.The rights of those who struggled against the dictatorships-forjustice and for protection from the ravages of neo-liberal capitalism-arestillbeing denied. If social conflicts cannot be peacefully resolved throughthe political system another cycle of repression may be triggered, espe-cially if powerful military institutions continue to act autonomously,beyond the reach of civilian control. In short, the possibilities for socialmobilization and structural socio-economic change in favour of themajorities are confined by still-powerful militaries (together with otherfactors such as macro-economic conditions in today's global economyand the strictures of the IMF).None of these dimensions of democratization will likely beachieved without substantive international support. The US govern-ment has a particular responsibility, after its history of intervention andsupport for repressive armies and "dirty wars" in the hemisphere. While57 KatherineRobertsHite, presentationnpanelentitled"Chile: AftertheTransition,"organizedby KennethP. Erickson for the annualmeetingof the New EnglandCouncil on LatinAmericanStudies,October 1991.58 "En AmericaLatinamuerende hambre700,000personaspor aio," El DiariolLaPrensa, October7, 1990.

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J. PATRICE McSHERRYthe US government has supported elections, it remains to be seenwhether the deeper development of democratization, in those dimen-sions outlined above, will enjoy the blessings of the United States.

Concluding RemarksThe argument for absolving or forgetting military crimes in the interestsof reconciliation is based upon an assumption of ends and means: theend of stable democracy and social peace is said to depend on the meansof impunity. Yet the end of any process is born within and shaped by themeans employed. Mechanisms of impunity foster attitudes and struc-tures antithetical to democracy and, as this article has tried to show,fortify those forces least committed to democratization. The unsatisfiedpublic demand for justice thus has moral, legal, socio-economic andpolitical reverberations in all the former national security states. Thephenomenon of impunity tends to institutionalize the power and politi-cal autonomy of the military institutions and perpetuate the skewedbalance of power between the military apparatus and civil society.Embedded authoritarian structures of the national security state restrictthe possibilities for substantive change in these societies. In short, theeffort to eliminate impunity and these embedded structures is an impor-tant element of the struggle for state-society transformation on a numberof levels in these countries, with profound implications for democratiza-tion.

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military power, impunity and state-society change in latin america

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