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Military Review

VOLUME LXIV DECEMBER 1984 NO 12

CONTENTS

PAGE 2 THE FALAISE-ARGENTAN ENCIRCLEMENT:

OPERATIONALLY BRILLIANT, TACTICALLY FLAWED

by Major Cole C. Kingseed, US Army 12 THE EIGHT-DAY ARTEP FTX

by Lieutenant Colonel William R. Lynch III, US Army 23 GERMAN ARMY GENERAL STAFF OFFICER TRAINING

by Colonel Norbert Majewski, Federal Republic of Germany Army, and Lieutenant Colonel John H. Peyton, US Army

35 LIGHT INFANTRY IN EUROPE: STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

by Captain David H. Petraeus, US Army 56 40 YEARS AGO: THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

by Major John A. Reichley, US Army, Retired

58 SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE AIRLAND BATTLE

by Major Mark D. Beta, US Army 73 NEWS 80 LETTERS 82 BOOKS contemporary reading for the professional 90 INDEX-VOLUME LXIV, January-December 1984

MILITARY REVIEW is published monthly in English and Spanish and quarterly In Portuguese. Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the secretary of the Army. 1 December 1983. in accordance with the provIsions of Army Regulation 310-1. Secondclass postage paid at Leaven worth. KS 660489998 and additional entry offices Englishlanguage subscriptions: $14.00 per year US and APOfFPO; $16.00 foreign; and $9.00 for US Military Academy and Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadets and Officer Candidate School candidates. Single copies $1.75 US and APOfFPO; $2.00 foreign. Address all mail to Military Review. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth. KS 660276910. Telephone (913) 6845642 or AUTOVON 552-5642. Unless otherwise stated. the views herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. Basis of offiCial distribution Is one per general officer and one per five field grade officers of the Active Army. and one per headquarters (battalion and higher) of the Army National Guard and the US Army Reserve. Military ReView IS available on microfilm from UniverSity Microfilms. Ann Arbor. MI 48106. and is indexed by the PAIS (Public Affairs Information Service) Bullet'". Postmaster: Send change of address information to Military Review. USACGSC. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6910.

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Articles to Watch For: J' , t.l I

Air Assault in the Desert: How to Fight , . . Colonel W. Bruce Moore, US Army, and Major Glenn M. Harne'd,~,US ,4fmy, ~.}" \

. 1" 1 \ .. " ,." ~,'f"',' ..

"', v.,.t ~ .; \ A Perspective on low-Intensity Conflict ,j~/ .~ V .... iJColonel James B. Motley, US Army, Retired ,~\

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The Military Justice System and Command Accountability~'~" ;:,.., " Major Charles J, Dunlap, US Air Force . "" ......

FALAISE-ARGENTAN

Some two months after the Normandy invasion, Allied forces were on the verge of completely surrounding and trapping two German armies. Delays in completing the encirclement deprived the Allies of an opportunity to deliver an early decisive blow in the war in Europe.

F ORTY years after the Western Allies successfully invaded Normandy, the failure to properly close the Falaise Argentan pocket still generates contro versy. Why did General Bernard L. Mont gomery not reinforce the Canadians in their drive south from Caen? Why did Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley halt Lieutenant General George S. Patton's Third US Army when victory was ap parently in its grasp? And did the escape of an estimated 50,000 Germans prolong the war in the West? These and similar questions have plagued military histori ans for decades. To fully comprehend the intricacies in

volved in the command decisions relating to the final phase of the Normandy Cam paign, one must examine the operational and tactical situation confronting the Allied High Command in August 1944. On 1 August, Bradley relinquished com' mand of the First US Army to Lieutenant General Courtney H. Hodges and as sumed command of the Twelfth Army Group. At the same time, Patton's Third US

Army became operational. Montgomery retained operational control of the Allied ground forces in addition to his command of the TwentyFirst Army Group, consist ing of Lieutenant General Sir Miles C. Dempsey's British Second Army and Lieutenant General Henry D. G. Crerar's Canadian First Army. The operational situation at the end of July, however, had not met Allied expectations. Casualties had been far heavier than originally an ticipated, and stalemate gripped the front line.

There were several reasons for the slowed Allied advance from the beachheads. On the Allied left, Montgomery's failure to seize Caen on Dday, coupled with deter mined German resistance, precluded any rapid exploitation in that sector. The most serious attempt to break the deadlock was Operation Goodwood (18 through 21 July), but it was a tactical disaster of the first magnitude. Prepared German defenses and the skillful use of ar mored reserves limited the British ad vance and cost the attackers 4,011 casualties and 493 tanks-36 percent of the British armored force on the Conti nenl.' Goodwood did succeed, however, in drawing the bulk of the German panzer reserves to the British sector. Like Montgomery, Bradley had met lit

tie success in late June and early July. Prior to the commencement of Operation Overlord, no definitive analysis had been conducted to determine the effect of the bocage country of the Cotentin Peninsula. The bocage was ideal defensive terrain, and the Germans used it with devastating effect. To the difficulties of bocage and marshland was added the handicap of per sistently inclement weather which restricted air support.2 As a result, the First US Army had suffered 77,000 casualties since Dday. To break this stalemate, Bradley con

ceived Operation Cobra on 10 July. The essence of Cobra was a multidivisional attack on a narrow front, sp~arheaded by General J. Lawton "Lightning Joe" Col lins' aggressive VII Corps. The assault, preceded by a tremendous air bombard ment, succeeded in penetrating the Ger

3

MILITARY REVIEW

man 'defenses on 25 July. Throwing all ' available reserves into the fray, Bradley soon captured Avranches, an important crossroads town at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. Contrary to Montgomery's postwar

claim that the Normandy Campaign had conformed entirely to pre-D-day plans,' none of the Allied commanders envisioned that the battle for Normandy would be anything more than a deliberate, controlled advance of the sort encountered in late J llne. Patton was the first to realize that the destruction of the German left flank had created an opportunity for the very type of mobile warfare at which he excelled. Convincing Bradley that the seizure of the Brittany ports required minimal resources, Patton dispatched a single corps in that direction and the re-

Pallon, left, Bradley, center, Montgomery, right

mainder of the Third US Army eastward. Bradley and Montgomery quickly

agreed with tllis modification and, by 3 August, the Allied High Command had completely altered the preinvasion strategy to exploit Bradley's success at turning the German left flank. As Montgomery stated to Chief of the Imperial British Staff Alan F. Brooke, "The main business lies to the east.'" The new strategy revised by Bradley

and Montgomery was a double envelop ment of the German forces at the Seine. Montgomery directed the British and the Canadians to drive south via the CaenFalaise corridor. They would then pivot to their left while Bradley's Twelfth Army Group drove east through southern Normandy. The Allies could then be in position to encircle the majority of the Ger-

December 4

FAlAISE-ARGENTAN

Engltsh Channel

Figure 1

man forces short of Paris. Whether this strategy would have succeeded in its conceptual state remains a 'moot point, for Adolf Hitler seized this opportunity to make one of the greatest strategic blunders of the war.

MILITARY REVIEW

Convinced that Hodges' First US Army could hold the German attack at Mortain. Bradley conceived a brilliant operational plan that might annihilate the entire German force committed in the Mortain counterattack. If Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group could attack south and seize Falaise and subsequently Argentan. Patton would pivot on Le Mans and drive north to meet the Canadians at Argentan. If successful. the advancing Allied armies would completely surround the German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army in a pocket west of Argentan. As ground commander for General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Montgomery rapidly approved Bradley's shorter envelopment. Accordingly. the Canadian First Army

launched Operation Totalize on 7 August to seize Falaise. German resistance was exceptionally fierce. and the attack made little headway against prepared positions manned by the best German divisions in Normandy. As a result. the Canadian attack stalled far short of its objective. Meanwhile. Patton had dispatched Ma

jor General Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps eastward to Le Mans. On 8 August. XV Corps turned north and. by 13 August. it was on the outskirts of Argentan. Separating the US and Canadian forces north of Falaise was a 25-mile gap which constituted the only escape route from the noose slowly tightening around the German forces. Only when Patton turned north did the

Germans begin to realize the dire tactical straits in which they found themselves. Remarkably. neither Hitler nor von Kluge made timely strategic decisions to extricate their forces in Normandy. The war diary of the German Seventh Army indicates that von Kluge erroneously believed that Patton's eastward thrust was only a screen for the actual operations in Brittany.'

Only when he received reports of US reconnaissance units operating north of Le Mans did von Kluge attempt to remedy the situation. At that time. in violation of Hitler's orders to continue the attack toward Avranches. he created Armored Group Eberbach and directed it to protect the vulnerable left flank of the exposed German front. The move came too late to save the German Seventh Army and the Fifth Panzer Army. From 11 August to 13 August. the Ger

man situation continued to deteriorate as the battle for the Falaise pocket continued with undiminished ferocity. The Canadians were still holding north of Falaise. preparing for a renewal of their offensive. Unfortunately. the two divisions preparing for the assault - the Canadian 4th Armored Division and the Polish 1st Armored Division-were relatively inexperienced and had not worked together prior to this campaign. As a result. preparations were slow. and

Montgomery made a deliberate decision not to reinforce these formations with units from the veteran British Second Army. Montgomery's actions completely mystified his US counterparts who watched in bewilderment as the Canadians sat north of Falaise as Patton secured the high ground around Argentan. Why Montgomery did not press the at

tack on Falaise continues to haunt analysts of the Normandy Campaign. His defenders claim he was devoting himself to the campaign as a whole and was not as concerned with the shorter envelopment devised by Biradley. Montgomery claimed that "it was essential from my point of view to continue with the wide envelopment movement. concurrently with the Falaise-Argentan corridor. '" One recent historian states that Mont

gomery failed to comprehend how rapidly US armored forces could move to close

December 6

FAlAISE-ARGENTAN

Figure 2

1984 7

MILITARY REVIEW

their part of the gap. Montgomery felt that it would take the Canadians 48 hours to capture Falaise, but Patton's rapid movement surprised him as much as it did the Germans. In short, Montgomery felt the Canadians could take Falaise before Patton took Argentan.' Montgomery's faith in the Canadians

was misguided. Not only did Crerar, the commander of the Canadian First Army, not push his attack aggressively, but he did not receive any additional reinforcements from Montgomery. Montgomery's foremost biographer, Nigel Hamilton, argues that Montgomery's plan, as developed in a meeting with Bradley and Dempsey on 13 August, was for the Canadians to deliver a concentrated attack within 24 hours to seize Argentan. To assist the Canadians, Dempsey's British Second Army would seize Falaise itself so Crerar could proceed t.lirectly to Argen- . tan.' In any event, Montgomery left the Canadians to close the northern approaches to Argentan.

As rtbe Canadians prepared to renew their/offensive north of Falaise, Haislip's XV (::orps was approaching Argentan and the boundary between the two Allied army groups. On 12 August, Haislip informed Patton that he was on the outskirts of Argentan and requested additional instructions. Patton immediately informed him to push slowly in the direction of Falaise to contact the Allied forces advancing from the north.!O When Bradley received word of

Patton's directive, he made the most controversial decision of the campaign. In no uncertain terms, he ordered Patton to withdraw his advance patrols to Argentan. Patton pleaded that, given free rein, he would "go on to Falaise and ... drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk." "Nothing doing," replied Bradl~y.1I

Bradley's decision to halt Patton at Argentan ended any expectation of destroying the bulk of the German forces in the Falaise pocket. Bradley never sought to disavow the responsibility for countermanding Patton's orders. "The decision to stop Patton was mine alone; it never went beyond my CP [command post]."!' Why, then, did Bradley halt Patton's advance? Long after the event, Bradley offered

several explanations for his action. First, Haislip's XV Corps had been advancing along a wide front, and his left flank was exposed to increasing German pressure. When the Third US Army wheeled north at Le Mans, a gap of more than 30 kilometers separated Haislip's corps

FAlAISE-ARGENTAN

le Mans

juncture. This argument is also highly questionable since Allied strategy dic tated that US and Canadian units had to converge if the pocket were to be closed. Whether that point was at Argentan or elsewhere seems irrelevant. Finally. intelligence concerning the

number of Germans remaining within the pocket was often contradictory. Even with Ultra, the Allies were unable to determine the exact number of enemy in the pocket and how many had escaped.

Figure 3

The general impression was that the Ger mans had already begun their with drawal. Consequently, Bradley prefer;ed "a

solid shoulder at Argentan to the possi bility of a broken neck at Falaise." If 19 German divisions were stampeding to escape annihilation, he reasoned that XV Corps should brace for the assault and not risk being smashed by the retreating Ger . mans. Moreover, if the Canadians were planning a carefully prepared assault that

1984 9

MILITARY REVIEW

could commence within 24 hours. there was no need for the Third US Army to run the unnecessary risk in driving north into the face of increasing German resistance. Bradley's decision, therefore. was a purely tactical decision based on the available intelligence and military efficiency.

Unknown to Montgomery and Bradley, Hitler did not issue orders to von Kluge to initiate the withdrawal until 16 August. Thus. the entire German Seventh Army and the Fifth Panzer Army were still vulnerable to encirclement on 12 August when Haislip approached Argentan. Had intelligence been more accurate, Bradley would have certainly maintained his "shoulder" at Argentan and reinforced Haislip with additional divisions.

The remainder of the Argentan-Falaise Campaign is quickly told. The Canadians did not capture Falaise until 16 August, by which time the Germans were retreat ing through the 12-mile gap between Falaise and Argentan. Unable or reluctant to close the gap on his own, Bradley dispatched Patton eastward with the reo mainder of the Third US Army to complete the envelopment on the Seine. By the time he and Montgomery realized the true number of Germans still in the pocket, it was too late to recall Patton's advancing divisions.

It was not until 19 August that US and Canadian forces joined hands at Chambois, several miles northeast of Argentan. Resistance within the pocket continued until 22 August when the last defenders surrendered. By that time. an estimated 50,000 Germans had escaped.

On the positive side, the battlefield at Falaise was unquestionably one of the

. great killing grounds of the war.14 German

casualties totaled more than 10,000 dead

and 50,000 captured. In addition, they

lost 220 tanks, 160 self propelled guns,

some 700 artillery pieces and more than

5,000 vehicles in the US sector alone. Losses in the British zone were equally high."

In short, those German units that did manage to escape brought only fragments of their once splendid divisions from the pocket. Of a total of seven armored divisions in the Fifth Panzer Army, the Germans could muster only 24 tanks and 1.300 men by the time they crossed the Seine." These remnants could not halt the renewed Allied advance and, by 25 August, Paris fell to the victorious Allies.

In retrospect, the failure to deliver a decisive stroke against the Germans at Falaise on 13 August did not prolong the war in the West. By the time Paris fell. there was little the Germans could do to stem the Allied tide short of the borders of Germany itself. The Germans who escaped capture in the Falaise pocket found themselves confronted with another more serious envelopment by Patton at the Seine. Allied artillery and air power continued to take a horrendous toll on the retreating Germans. It was logistical shortfalls, not the number of escaped Germans, that finally halted the Allied advance. Author Cornelius Ryan correctly states that the Germans were losing faster than the Allies were winning."

In the final analysis, it is pointless to argue the question of responsibility for failing to close the Falaise gap in a more timely fashion. Operations in mid-August were extremely fluid. and 'commanders made decisions based on available intelligence. I n war, nothing is certain; N ormandy was no exception. Strategically, the Falaise. Campaign was a masterpiece of operational planning that was slightly flawed in its tactical execution. Yet, the campaign was successful enough that. two and one-half months after the Overlord landings, the Allies were irrevocably entrenched on the Continent of Europe.

December 10

FAlAISE-AR"GENTAN

NOTES

1 Omar N Bradley and Clay Blair A General'& LIfe, SImon & Schuster, NY, 1983, P 275, and see Russell F WelQ!ey E.lsenhower s Llfwlenants The CampaIgn of france and Germany, 19441945, IndIana Unwerslty Press, Bloomington, Ind 1981 P 146

2 See General Bernard L Montgomery S deserlpllon at the bocage country In hIS Normandy 10 the BaIIlC, Printing & Stationery Service, BrJtl'5h Army of the Rhine, Ger , 1946, P 87

3 Carlo D'Esle, DeCISIon N Y 1983 P 487

4 Martln BlurnenSOf1, Breakout and PurSuit OffIce 01 the ChIef 01 Mlillary HISlory, Washington 0 C, 1961,0432

5 Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command OfflC.e of the Crllel 01 Military Histor'l', WaShIngton DC, 1954.0207

6 German Seventh Army war DIary. 4 August 1944, 0 1 7 Montgomery op clf 0127, and see Nigel Hamilton. Master

of the Battlefield Montys War Years, 1942 1944, McGraw Hili Book Go NY, 1983, PO 71680

8 D Este, op, CIt, PO 426 28 9 Hamlllon, op clf, p 786 10 J:leport After Combat, 31 July 1944 fa 31 Augu&1 1944, XV

Corps, US Almy 11 Bradley,OP cit, p 298 12 Omar N Bradley, A Soldla's Story. Henry Holt & CO. NY

19':)1 P 377 13 Bradley A General's Life. op Cit 14 DWIght 0 EisenhOwer, Crusaae In E.urope, Doubleday & Co

!nc NY, 1948 P 279 15 D Esle, op cJt, P 432 16 MarlIn 81umenson, 'General Bradley'S Dec.IS10n at Argentan

(13 August 1944)." Command DeCISions 011 Ice of the Ch1ef of Military History, Washington, DC, 1959 P 417, and see FIfth Panzer Army Report 1650 28 August 1944

17 CornelIUS Ryan, A BfJdge Too Far, Simon & Schuster, NY 1974,059

Major Cole C. Kingseed lS currently serumg as executwe officer of the 1st Battahon. 27th Infantry, at Schofield Barracks. Hawali, He received an M A and a Ph.D [rom Ohio State UniverSIty and lS a graduate of the USACGSC. Previous asszgnments mclude serVlng with the Department ofHzstory. US Mziztary Academy, wah the 1st Infantry Dwz5zon and with the 25th Infantry Divlsion.

Generators to Suppress,Signatures. The Belvoir Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, has awarded two contracts for three each 15,30 and 60-kilowatt signature-sup'pressed, dieselenginedriven (SSDED) generator sets to the Kohler Corporation, Kohler, Wisconsin, and the Onan Corpora tion, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for competitive prototypes, SSDED generator sets will have suppressed acoustic and

thermal infrared signatures and will be nuclearhardened. Ex isting generator sets can be easiiy located by the enemy because of the uniqueness of their acoustic and thermal signatures. The functions of a combat system, its echelon of deployment and its level of importance on the battlefield may also be determined through the analysis of signature emis sions. The contracts call for the delivery of nine SSDED generator

sets from each company in 1986. In addition to contractor testing, these sets will be extensively tested by the Army to fully determine their suitability for military use. If proven suitable and cost effective, SSDED generator sets will be type classified and will replace current Department of Defense standard generator sets in the acquisition cycle.

1984 11

The Eight-Day

ARTEP FTX

Lieutenant Colonel

William R: Lynch III,

US Army

It is imperative that units derive maximum benefit from their training programs. The ARTEP FTX in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) is the basis for a program of continuous training. and evaluation aimed at development of combined arms capabilities in critical battle tasks at each echelon.

12 December

THE most important thing soldiers do in peacetime is train for war. They must train as they will fight-as a t:ombined arms team, under combat conditions and to the standards necessary to win on the AirLand Battlefield. The AirLand Battle will be deadly for

those' who are not well-prepared. The potential for destruction of entire units clearly exists. The commander can expect mass casualties. untrained rpplacements. equipment loss. adverse weather and loss of key leaders. Smoke. rubble. debris. fatigue and disorientation will create difficulty in command and control. To prepare for the conditions that can

be anticipated on the AirLand Battlefield. commanders must conduct well-planned training programs at every echelon. from the individual soldier to the division. The training should focus on the critical tasks that must be performed in battle. A commander should link everything that his unit does to the mission and the environment to be found on the AirLand Battlefield. While specific missions vary among

units, the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is a standard source for training objectives. The ARTEP is the Army's basic source document for collective and leadership training. Further, it provides a written link between individual and collective battle tasks. Based on its ARTEP manual, a unit develops a program to train its soldiers and evaluate those tasks which are considered critical battle tasks for that unit. Previously, the 1st Infantry Division

(Mechanized) followed a training strategy which included four-day field training exercises iFTXs) for evaluation of each task force. These exercises, called ARTEPs. were performed every 18 months. Most battalion training programs were aimed at peaking for these exercises.

ARTEPFTX

However, to be ready for the AirLand Battle. training programs must exceed the basic requirements in the training of units. leaders and soldiers and then must sustain a high level of combat proficiency. A four-dav ARTEP once every 18 months will not achieve sustainment and will not allow evaluation of all critical battle tasks. When a unit is evaluated in a simulated combat environment. adequate time and resources must be devoted to allow the full exercise of all operating svstems. In the 1st Infantry Division (Mecha

nized). the ARTEP is not viewed as a single event that occurs during a selected evaluation period. The ARTEP is a continuous program of training and evaluation that is designed to develop combined arms capabilities in the performance of critical battle tasks at each ecbelon. .. A RTE P FTX" describes a special field training period devoted to the training and evaluation of battalion task forces as well as all other associated units. The results of this kind of exercise form the basis for bat talion and task force training until the next ARTEP FTX. The design of ARTEP FTXs includes

many considerations. However. the two most important are: The frequency that will allow units

to sustain high levels of proficiency. Creation of a realistic environment

that will allow the unit to practice its wartime general defense plan mission.

Frequency

Task force ARTEP FTXs must occur more frequently than every 18 months. The ideal frequency would probably be every three months. This would permit the training program for the following

1984 13

MILITARY REVIEW

quarter to be based on an FTX evaluation. However. time and resource constraints usually prohibit quartefly ARTEP FTXs. Instead. a program of smallunit in dividual and collective training. platoon tests. companv and team ARTEP FTXs. task force command post exercises and tactical exercises without troops forms the basis for task force ARTEP FTXs. A task force in the 1st Infantry Divi

sion (Mechanized) participates in an ARTEP FTX as either the unit being evaluated or the opposing force unit ap proximately every six months. In the in tervals between these exercises. com manders focus their efforts on the im provement of unit. leader and soldier skills in complex areas and those areas where the unit is found to be deficient.

The Eight-Dav ARTEP FTX

Based on an analysis of the ARTEP tasks that must be evaluated. as well as the availability of training time. terrain. funds and other resonrces. the com manders at Fort Riley. Kansas. concluded that an eightday ARTEP FTX is the op' timum vehicle for the training and evalud' tion of units. Numerous battalion ARTEP FTXs have been conducted since that decision was reached. The eight-day ARTEP FTX trains all of

the task force' s operating systems. the brigade slice as well as separate battalions. The exercise is normally con ducted by a brigade that organizes and trains the entire brigade slice throughout the eight-day period. Combined arms operations are achieved through the integration of infantry and armor task forces. as well as the full participation of artillery. engineer. attack helicopter, taco tical air. air defense. forward area support

team, chemical, military police and combat electronic warfare intelligence assets. The task orgainzation is based on a unit's specific general defense plan mission. ARTEP FTXs are also conducted for separate battalions and artillery battalions by their parent headquarters as either separate exercises or while linked to task force exercises. A fourdav exercise tended to be too in

tense. and there was insufficient planning time. Furthermore, not enough critical events could take place in four days. Leaders did not rest; they "gutted it out." The longer exercise is intense. but it allows leaders time to rest-a critical necessity on today's battlefield. PI~nning time varies along with the difficulty of missions. If a unit does not successfully perform a particular mission. that mission may be assigned again. There is time fo~ daily after-action reviews (AARs) for every participating unit from platoon to task force. The eightday ARTEP FTX involves an

evaluated task force. an opposing force task force and each part of the brigade slice-engineer. artillery. air defense. aviation (attack. scout and lift). Air Force. combat electronic warfare intelligence. chemical and forward area support team. All units are players. An observer-con troller group controls and evaluates the task force and the brigade slice down to platoon level.

A Realistic Scenario

The scenario for a recent eightday task force ARTEP FTX is shown in Figure 1. The exercise began with an alert and an inspection of the unit. Every element was inspected in accordance with a standard precombat checklist. The inspected unit.

14 December

Scenario for Eight-Day ARTEP FTX

DAY 1 Conduct precombat inspection; Redeye moving target simulator evaluation

Conduct tactical road march and occupy assembly area

Receive operation order After-action review

DAY 2 Conduct passage of lines, movement to contact and hasty attack

After-action review Receive fragmentary order

DAY 3 Deliberate attack After-action review Receive fragmentary order

DAY 4 Night attack After-action review Operation order Displace to battle position

DAY 5 Defend to retain battle position

After-action review Fragmentary order

DAY 6 Defend in sector Rearward passage of lines

and withdraw to assembly area

After-action review DAY 7 Hasty river crossing and

counterattack Defend After-action review

DAY 8 Deliberate attack Air assault After-action review Redeployment and postcom

bat inspection

ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Pro gram

FTX - Field training exercise

Figure 1

ARTEPFTX

received immediate feedback from the inspection. Afterward. the task force was given a deployment order that was comparable to a wartime mission deployment. The next morning. the task force moved bv tactical road march to its assembly area. Once in the assembly area. the unit was ordered to conduct a passage of lines and a movement to contact. All ARTEP missions were based on missions that the task force would be required to perform in wartime. Over the next eight days. the task force

performed the various missions on widely varied kinds of terrain. Five missions called for the task force to make major moves. A rearward passage of lines and an additional deliberate attack against an opposing force strongpoint were included because the task force had earlier experienced difficulty with these missions. An opposing force task force had been

trained to use Warsaw Pact tactics. This ensured that the appropriate opposing force countertasks drove the mission execution as well as the evaluation of the task force. The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Simulation (MILES) was used to generate engagement realism. This combination created realistic battles and a high resolution of each mission. The forces were allowed to maneuver and assault objectives in daylight and at night. There were no "controller" phase lines to keep units separated. MILES engagement results were used

to drive every operating systel!l in the task force. I ncluded were such functions as evacuation of casualties. replacement of personnel. evacuation of damaged vehicles. replacement of weapons sytems and resupply of ammunition. Each function was allowed to run its full course. For example. soldiers "killed" or "wounded" in MILES engagements and vehicles "disabled" or "destroyed" were evacuated

1984 15

MILITARY REVIEW

to the field trains. The unit had to perform the evacuation properly and submit ap propriate reports that would generate replacements for the next mission. The eight-day period provided ample time for the full cycle of evacuation and replacement to be run several times. Improvement in these administrative and logistical tasks was dramatic as the awareness of their impact on mission accomplishment was heightened. The jamming and monitoring of radio

nets and imitative communication deception were commonplace. Simulated persistent and nonpersistent chemical attacks forced the task force to go to mission-oriented protection posture IV frequently and perform decontamination procedures which provided training for the chemical company. Pyrotechnics were used to represent all

weapons systems and most ordnance. including chemical munitions. Artillery fire marking teams were linked to the fire support officer to provide real-time showing of fires and an assessment of casualties. Two smoke generator platoons performed general defense plan-related missions. and they also simulated artillery and mortar smoke missions. A forward area support team was fielded

as a player unit so that all links to the task force were tactical. Making the combat service support units active "players" greatly increased the training value for all units. The working of all administrative and logistical functions created an excellent training vehicle for the newly formed forward area support team. the predecessor of a support battalion. Engineer obstacles were constructed or

dug. and minefields were laid. Engineer controllers killed the vehicles that hit simulated mines. In turn. exposed engineers were killed or wounded and evacuated.

The controllers assessed near-real-time kills by and against tactical air support and attack helicopters. based on standard probability tables and controller observation of air defense missions. Engagements such as these for which MILES was unavailable were done similar to REALTRAIN engagements. The brigade managed these events while

playing the roles of units adjacent to the task force and while training its staff in the command and control of combat operations. The effect was to portray the integrated battlefield to the task force. and each operating system of the task force was continuously pressed to function throughout the exercise. The primary objective of a realistic general defense plan-focused scenario was to train and evaluate the task force and all participating units on critical battle tasks.

Train-Evaluate-Train

Well before an ARTEP FTX begins. each headquarters in the division analyzes the systemic deficiencies that have been identified in past ARTEP FTXs and rotations to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin. California. The detailed evaluation received from the center is an excellent source for identifying systemic training deficiencies and objectives. For example. in one recent exercise. the analysis caused increased emphasis to be placed on the simplicity of plans and orders. offensive operations. night operations and the assault of fortified positions. The analysis leads to the identification of specific training objectives from ARTEP 71-2. Mechanized Infantry/Tank Task Force. which. despite changing doctrine. is still an excellent source document.

16

Troops of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in training

MILITARY REVIEW

Throughout the ARTEP FTX. the observer-controllers focus on critical battle tasks. known deficiencies and the deficiencies that are observed during each mission. In addition. critical individual soldier tasks are sampleddaily. The observer-controller group keeps a record of observations which becomes one hasis for a comprehensive after-action report on all individual and collective tasks that have been evaluated. Time. although limited. is provided to allow adjustments in task force' standing operating procedures or to correct weaknesses that are identified in daily AARs.

After-Action Review

The AAR is probably the most important link between training and evaluation. During ARTEP FTXs. multi tiered AARs take place after each mission. The first tier is at platoon and staff section level. The platoon AAR is held on the ground about 30 minutes after maneuver ceases and the unit consolidates its tactical position. Administrative halts are not allowed. The platoon AAR helps ensure that the

eight-day ARTEP FTX is a multiechelon training exercise. It links the evaluation with mission and task execution based on the observations of all participants. The training objectives-tasks. conditions and standards-are taken directly from the unit ARTEP. Shortly after the platoon AAR. leader

AA Rs are held for the company team. Separate AARs are also conducted for the support units of the brigade slice. This important step puts a "game jersey" on every participant in tbe exercise. About 3 hours later. there is a task force AAR for .commanders. separate platoon leaders. the staff and key brigade slice leaders. Every

other day. tbere is a logistical AAR which involves the commander and key logistical managers. Each AAR follows a strict format to ensure that it is focused on ARTEP standards. generates a professional discussion and analysis of the training exercise. includes all participants and identifies key lessons from the exercise. Together. the AARs form a multitiered approach which helps make the eight-day ARTEP FTX a truly multiechelon training exercise.

Task Force After-Action Review

The task force AAR is the capstone for each mission. The format is shown in Figure 2. It is important to take a close look at this critical training event. The key tp success in the task force

AAR is getting the task force and supporting unit leaders to participate in an open and objective analysis of the exercise. Each commander is given the chance to briefly explain his mission. concept and execution. The opposing force commander explains his plan. then comes back to add comments on what he thought or did in reaction to each company or team and the task force. The task force observer-controller leads the discussion and emphasizes key points when they are made. Teaching points are based on doctrine rather than opinion and must be well-researched. As doctrine changes. this step becomes increasingly critical. After several AARs. the analysis is done with very little assistance from the task force observer-controller. In many instances. participants will make a key teaching point more effectively than will the observer-controller. Once the plan and execution of the exer

cise have been discussed. the observer-

December 18

ARTEPFTX

Task Force After-Action Report Format

Task force observer-controller Describe format and limit time Brigade 83 Describe brigade concept Task force commander Describe task force concept and how it was

executed Task force engineer' Describe engineer operations Opposing force commander Describe opposing force concept and how

it was executed Opposing force engineer Describe opposing force engineer opera

tions Company team commanders Describe how mission was executed Opposing force commander Provide comments to company team com

manders' explanations Task force observer-controller Lead a discussion of operating systems Brigade commander- Provide a wrapup of significant lessons exercise director learned

Note: At various times, other members of the task force slice are called upon to present their concept and execution. Usually, this is done during the discussion of the operating systems.

Figure 2

controller leads an analysis of each operating system in the task force (Figure 3). An eighth system. survivability, is added to facilitate discussion of operations security. communications security, nuclear. biological and chemical operations. hot and cold weather operations and other aspects of survivability. To facilitate the discussion, an excellent approach used at the National Training Center is followed. A representative chart. which has been completed for one operating system. is shown at Figure 4. The observer-controller opens the dis

cussion by identifying a problem that has been observed within an operating system. In the case shown at Figure 4, the company teams were moving in a formation which invited and resulted in heavy

casualties. The task force observer-controller used a leading question to get the discussion going: "Team A Commander. why did you move in a traveling formation?" Often, a discussion will ensue. In this in

stance. it was discovered that the company team commander had selected the traveling formation partially" because the task force did not tell him that enemy contact was likely. This changed the analysis shown in the "Reason" block to include: "Dissemination of intelligence to company teams was not timely." At the end of the discussion, the task

force observer-controller links key teaching points to doctrine and moves to the next operating system. The task force AAR takes 1 to 2 hours. but it is time

1984 19

MILITARY REVIEW

Task Force Operating Systems

1. Command. control and communi cations

2. Intelligence 3. Maneuver 4. Fire support 5. Mobility-countermobility 6. Air defense 7. Combat service support 8. Survivability

Figure 3

wellspent. Furthermore. the eight-day ARTEP FTX allows enough time for the task force AAR to be done every day. There is often time available to correct deficiencies and repeat the missions or tasks that need work.

Roles 01 the Division and the Brigade

Effective management is crucial to the success of the eight-day ARTEP FTX. Roles have been clearly established for the division and the brigade. The division plans the exercise to ensure that resources are focused. the calendar is locked in. and all elements of the brigade slice are present. The assistant division commander for maneuver serves as the exercise director. In addition. the division staff participates by providing the task force observer-controller and experts in staff functional areas. Company and platoon observer-c.ontrollers are fielded by a designated battalion. This forges a close link between general staff planning and the execution of training for combat at

battalion level. I t also provides for continuity of evaluation and a clear understanding of the evaluation results at division level.

The brigade plans and executes the ARTEP FTX for the division because. in combat. the brigade commander controls and orchestrates most of the basic combat. combat support and combat service support systems in the division. Therefore. in a training environment. the brigade commander must also forge the combined arms team consisting of the eight operating systems which have been discussed. The brigade commander brings together th!! brigade slice in the detailed planning and execution of the ARTEP FTX. The task force observer-controller group and opposing forces also work directly for the brigade commander. This organization allows the brigade commander to train and evaluate the task force and the brigade slice.

Force Modernization

The eight-day ARTEP FTX provides an effective vehicle to assist in force modernization. The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) is changing rapidly as it converts from the H-series to the J-series table of organization and equipment and as it learns how to employ newly fielded systems. It is clear that leaders must be well-versed in emerging doctrine. that soldiers must train and be evaluated on new equipment and that new organizations must be trained and evaluated.

The eight-day ARTEP FTX enables the division to train and evaluate all of the critical battle tasks which are driven by force modernization. During AARs. issues concerning new doctrine. equipment and organization are identified and

December 20

-----

------- ------- ------------- ---- ------------

------ ---- ------

------ -------

ARTEPFTX

Chart for Conducting After-Action Review of Each Operating System

Operational system: Maneuver ------ ---- ------~----

Event:Jy1ove!!1ent to contact - t\1ove

Effect: Go~an~ams not providing overwatch between platoons when ~emy contact is likely. Task force not providing overwatch between com~ny teams when enemy contact is likely, _____. ________

Reason:.tJot following task force standing operating procedures. Nct using QoundiD9 overwatctJ. (Later:. Timely dissemination of intelligence.)

-_. --- -- --- ----- -------

Cost: Heavy losses on Lnitial contact. N.o overwatching uoit to suppress. Diffic.t!!!Lmoving "s.l!QPorLQyJire" unit into positio'-'-n"-.________

Doctrine: Army Training and Evaluation Program 71-2, Mechanized Infantry! Lank Task Force (3-VI-1, Mission-:-!!1oveL Unit-battalion taskJorce, Task Number 10:""move in traveling overwatch and Task Number 11-move in b9unding_ overwa1ch); Final Draft FLeid Manl,lal 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry _Battalion Task Force, Chapters 3 and 4; and Field Manual [1:1 The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, Chapter 4.

Figure 4

discussed. For example. on a recent ARTEP FTX. much time was spent rec onciling the doctrine stated in the Final Draft Field Manual 712. The Tank and Mechanized Infantrv Battalion Task Force. July 1983. for the battalion task

force. the task force stl).nding operating procedures and the task force ta~fics. Thus. an important side benefit of the ARTEP FTX is the identification of force modernization problems that need to be resolved quicklv by the division.

211984

MILITARY REVIEW

Conclusion

The eight-day ARTEP FTX is a multiechelon training exercise and an important training event for the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized). It is designed to train leaders and soldiers to fight and win the AirLand Battle and to provide a basis for sustainment training. Company team, platoon, section, crew

and individual training must be done between ARTEP FTXs based on weaknesses that have been identified. The eight-day ARTEP FTX is focused on the wartime mission. Time is provided for planning and AARs although planning time is sometimes restricted to vary the stress placed on leaders. Through the use of MILES and the

simulation of all operating systems, a realistic, integrated and "dirty" battlefield is portrayed to the task force. An aggressive, determined opposing force unit is fielded. On this battlefield. soldiers are killed or wounded when they make an error. Stress is placed on all operating systems in the task force, and they are made to perform. The weak areas are quickly identified. Important teaching points which lead to correction of problems are brought out in daily AARs, and a

detailed evaluation of all ARTEP tasks is provided at the end of the exercise. The proof of the success of recent

ARTEP FTXs has come in the form of comments from task force commanders and other leaders. They say this kind of exercise provides superb, realistic training. They uniformly appreciate the opportunity to be part of the analysis of training issues, and the clarity of the lessons learned enables them to improve in many areas while they train.

The Future

The success of the eight-day ARTEP FTX will be sustained and developed further in the future. The 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) is considering an expanded live-fire phase with an evaluation of platoons (platoon tests) in separate exercises. Consideration is also being given to exercising two task forces simultaneously, opposed by an opposing force task force. In addition, the eight-day ARTEP FTX will become a division vehicle to assure standardization. As these refinements are made, it is increasingly clear that the eight-day ARTEP FTX is the linchpin for training soldiers to fight and win the Air Land Battle. "'k

Lieutenant Colonel Wdlwm R. !..vnch I I I IS currfmtlv the commander. 5th BattalIOn. 16th Infantrv. ]

S A

car

Colonel Norbert Majewski, Federal Republic of Germany Army, and Lieutenant Colonel John H. Peyton, US Army

The training of a prospective German General Staff officer is dljmanding. Its objective is to produce a talented. highly ",otivated officer who is ready to assume key assignments within the German armed forces or NATO.

THE term "German army General Staff officer" evokes varied emo tions within n.llitruy circles. Students of military history tend to relate it to Ger man military tradition emanating from the days of Karl von Clausewitz or to the German army's performance during the world wars. Others may view it as a sym

bol of "elitism" within a military estab Iishment or as representative of a system designed to produce the leadership of to day's army of the Federal RepUblic of Germany. Whatever the feeling, refer ences to the German army General Staff appear often in military literature of both a historic and a contemporary nature.

1984 23

MILITARY REVIEW

Although there is no German army General Staff in existence today, the General Staff officer is alive and well. In viewing the contemporary German army General Staff officer, it should be realizE'd that he is the product of a deliberate selection and training process. It is a process designed to produce a talented, highly motivated officer who is capable of occupying key positions in the Federal Republic of Germany's armed forces (the BundesU'ehr) and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As is true with the US Army, this training process is dynamic and is continually being reviewed and revised to meet the requirements of a modern army.

BACKGROUND

Training and Experience

By the time a German army officer enters General Staff training, he has received extensive military and civilian education. He has passed successive hurdles in the career-progression process ranging from initial entry training as an enlisted man, to graduation from a German armed forces university, to the successful completion of the Field Grade Officer Qualification Course. In most cases, more than three years of his military career have been spent studying a civilian discipline leading to the award of a Diplom, the equivalent of a master's degree. More than two years have been spent in other forms of military or military-related training, of which about eight months have been devoted to tactics and branch training. Almost all of the officer's practical military experience has been with troop units, and he has spent from two to five years as a company commander.

As a result, he knows tactics and command and control from squad to battalion level. His experience varies, however, according to his branch of service. The typical student is between 30 and 35 years old and has about 12 years of service when he reports for General Staff officer training.

Selection

The selection of individuals for army General Staff officer training is based upon efficiency ratings as well as upon performance during attendance at the Field Grade Officer Qualification Course. This course is mandatory for all professional officers of the German armed forces and determines whether an officer is qualified for promotion to field grade rank. The overriding factor in selection, however, is the quality of the officer's efficiency ratings which are received once every two years. The "total man" approach is used to select an officer who is not only intelligent but who also has demonstrated the necessary leadership and persona) qualities. In additioh, the officer must be recom

mended for General Staff/Admiral Staff officer training by his division or equivalent commander. Branch selection boards convene at the Defense Ministry during the first quarter of each calendar year. Approximately 90 army, navy and air force officers are selected, of which about 45 are army officers. About 20 officers from other NATO countries also participate in the training, and three of them are from the United States. An army officer's basic branch is not considered in the selection process. Other criteria apply for the selection of navy and air force officers. From a given year group, about 10 percent are selected. Because of the rigorous selection criteria, almost all officers who

24

are selected eventually complete the General Staff!Admiral Staff Officer Course.

THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

GENERAL STAFF/ADMIRAL STAFF

OFFICER COURSE

The General StafflAdmiral StaffOfficer Course is taught at the German Armed Forces Staff College (Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr) in Hamburg and lasts for two years. It should be emphasized that German armed forces officers from all three branches of service are trained in a common course. Subjects of equal importance to all three services,' such as security policy, social sciences and management, are taught in joint seminars. The common instruction for officers of all branches promotes an understanding for

GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

the peculiarities and problems of the other branches and serves as a precondition for successful joint operations. A new General Staffl Admiral Staff Of

ficer Course begins every October. Thus, there is always a junior course and a senior course in progress. A class is subdivided into student sections consisting of about 14 officers, of which two are normally from other NATO countries. Each student section is supervised by a section leader in the grade of lieutenant colonel or commander who normally spends the entire two-year training period with his section. He observes the students continually and evaluates their progress throughout the period. Usually, the section leader has just completed a battalion or battalion-equivalent command tour. The section leader serves as an adviser, evaluator and faculty member who teaches command and control and tactics subjects to the members of his section.

German Armed Forces Slall College

MILITARY REVIEW

The course is designed to provide the students time to assimilate what they are learning. Normally. two afternoons each week are free. as are weekends. and the month of July is spent on leave. There is no assigned homework. Rather. students are expected to review that day's instruction. There are no written examinations. Each student prepares a thesis during

the first year that examines a specific topic relating to security policy. sociopolitical relationships or organization/ training/employment problems. Most thesis topics are recommended by various government agencies to allow for research in areas of current interest to the armed forces and government. The curriculum is dynamic in nature.

alternating between lectures. seminars. exercises and student trips. Joint service and service-specific subjects are interspersed. Joint service training relates pri-

October

marily to subjects which are normally taught at the senior service college level in the United States. The German armed forces have no equivalent to US senior service college courses. Therefore. these subjects receive appropriate emphasis during General Staff/Admiral Staff officer training and impart that knowledge required for service at high command and staff levels. Time is provided for activities such as sports. current events and administrative time. Figure 1 depicts the course.

TRAINING OF THE ARMY

GENERAL STAFF OFFICER

The broad objective of the course is: ... to enable officers to perform General

Staff duties in an independent and respon-

October October

'llt Branch of lerJeospeClfl trammg"" c~~ ~~~ :Of

~~ ~g g:i j ji E E ~I

0 ~ ~ '-' Common service tramlng

_------------ Two years -------------__ 'Army only

Figure I

December 26

GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

sible manner during peacetime, crises and war, within their own branch and with other branches of service, in national and integrated (NA TO) areas and at all command levels. Army-specific instruction is designed to

qualify officers to command, control and employ army formations from brigade to corps level; to refine the knowledge and understanding of the principal staff nmctional areas, particularly logistics; and to develop capabilities for executing command and staff actions, A particularly important goal is to teach the student to implement "mission-type orders (Fllhren mit Auftrag), .. This means that, whenever possible, broad, mission-type orders should be issued, The details concerning the execution of an ordpr are left to the appropriate commander with the confidence that, even when a mission cannot be executed exactly as had been planned, the results will still be commensurate with the original intent and objective of that mission. The student section leader is the key in

gredient of army-specific training. He is responsible for the tactic&! and the command and control training of his section. He accompanies his section on trips, participates in its social activities and, in the two-year period, gets to know each individual extremely well as their immediate superior. In this regard, he makes a valuable contribution to the student evaluation process by being able not only to evaluate a student's performance but also his character. Other members of the army faculty pro

vide instruction in specific areas such as intelligence, logistics. air defense. communications and the principles of all other branches of the army. These faculty members instruct. monitor and evaluate student officers within their specific functional areas.

PRECOURSE PHASE

Prior to reporting for the course, selectees study for three months at the Federal Language Institute near Cologne. The primary emphasis is on English to prepare officers for NATO assignments. Those officers already proficient in English study another language such as Russian. After the completion of the language training and prior to the start of the two-year course in Hamburg, the students visit the infantry. armor. artillery and engineer schools over a t woweek period. During these visit.s, the students participate in various map exercises that are designed to bring their competence to a common standard and provide a basis for participation in future training.

COURSE CONDUCT

Early in the course. ar~y-specific train~ ing begins with the introduction of the army's command and control system. The system is defined as "the systematic interrelationship of command and control organization. procedures. and means available for completing the military mission." Command and control procedures are applied in a special command and control organization exercise. An understanding of these procedures is a precondition for further training.

MAP AND COMMAND POST EXERCISES

The primary vehicles for the army-specific training are map exercises which. in

271984

MILITARY REVIEW

certain cases. are expanded into command post exercises (CPXs). These exercises take place over extended periods of timenormally several months-which are in terspersed with other instructional activi ties and treat a specific form of combat at a specific comri'rand level. Instruction tailored to the exercise situation is pro vided concurrently in areas such as in telligence and logistics. Abbreviated map exercises, which last for short periods and ar" conducted under time pressures, also take place during the overall exercise. The training is reinforced by carefully pre pared and executed terrain walks on the terrain actually depicted in the exercise. The area used in each exercise scenario

is in a different area of the Federal Republic of Germany between the Baltic Sea and the Donau River so that the various terrain forms and their impact on military operations can be conveyed. This terrain appreciation is strengthened through instruction and briefings by military geography officers. Little use is made of advance sheets, and there is no homework. Staff groupings are formed, officers receive specific command or staff assignments, and it is up to each student to become competent in his assigned area. Upon completion of a specific portion of

an exercise. the student is critiqued by a faculty member who is an expert on the subject. During CPXs. an evaluation group of student officers compiles notes about overall performance. The notes are used in an indepth critique that immediately follows the exercise. This training follows a normal progression from the reinforced battalion to corps level and treats various forms of combat as well as road movement and mobilization. Supplementary tasks. such as the crossing of water obstacles. the meeting engagement, relief and the passage of lines. are also included.

Tactical trammg ana exercises are designed to develop the ability of students not only to evaluate a given situation but also to visualize how a decision would be carried out under varied conditions or circumstances. Examples are radio silence, the effect of unit response times to orders, and the effects of the enemy and the terrain on a given task organization. By continually alternating between instruction, exercise and visits to tactical units, as well as participation in maneuvers and CPXs. a balance is maintained between theory and practice. Figure 2 lists the exercises conducted during the twoyear period which are: The Battalion and Brigade Offense Ex

ercise. The initial tactical exercise. which depicts reinforced battalion and brigade operations. serves as an introduction to tactics instruction. I t provides or reinforces knowledge at battalion and brigade levels as a basis for training at higher command levels. Its fundamental purpose is to convey knowledge in the command and control of a reinforced battalion in the offense and the planning of operations and the issuance of orders at brigade level. As is true for all follow-on exercises. such fundamentals as mission analysis. the issuance of warning orders. the organization of staff work. the estimate of the situation. the decision and the preparation of operations orders and graphic orders are stressed. The exercise is conducted over a two-month period. The Movement Exercise. This exercise

trains the student in movement organization and control using a Territorial Army lTerritorialheer) brigade as a model to familiarize the student with the Territorial Army organization. It should be noted that. in addition to those units which would be committed to NATO in time of war. the German army also contains Territorial Army units which would

December 28

GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

Type of Operation

Command level '

Map Exercise

CPX Terrain Walk

Computer Supported

Offense % X X Movement

X

D X Offensive

XX

D X X X Delay/ Defense % X X X X Alert. MobilIZation, Deployment

LJ X Defense LJ X X X

Symbol for a Territorial Army (TerntonalheerJ bngade CPX - Command post exerCise

remain under national control. The Territorial Army units have a different organization and would be employed primarily in the rear combat zone (communications zone), The crossing of water obstacles in rear

combat areas is included in the exercise as is interfacing with various national authorities that are responsible for traffic coordination and control. Careful planning that will enable several units to cross each other's march routes is stressed. The importance of this exercise is illustrated by the high density of people and vehicles

Figure 2

in the Federal Republic of Germany and the critical need for the close control of road movements during mobilization and war. This exercise lasts about one month. The Division Offense Exercise. As a

natural progression of the tactics instruction, a division offense exercise emphasizes water-crossing operations and brigade operational planning. It includes a terrain walk and concludes with a CPX. The exercise extends over a two-month period. The Division and Brigade Delay and

Defense Exercise. To illustrate how the

1984 29

MILITARY REVIEW

exercises are conducted, this particular exercise will be reviewed in more detail than the earlier ones. The aim of this exercise is to provide training and practical application in delay and defensive operations in accordance with German army doctrine. Specific objectives include a strengthened knowledge of the interaction of army service branches and com bined operations. as well as general combat missions and the peculiarities of delay and defensive operations. Interoperability with US Army units is

also emphasized. The exercise provides training in the functional areas of G 1, G2 and G4. as well as the branch of service (artillery. engineers, air defense artillery, signal, and so on) instruction. The planning of division-level defensive operations is emphasized as is the preparation of operations plans and orders for the delay and defense at brigade level. Command and control are exercised in real tactical time in two abbreviated map exercises, a spontaneous continuation of a previously presented tactical situation. and a CPX. The exercise is conducted in four phases as depicted in Figure 3. These are: Phase I-The initial phase lasts 15

days. After 6 hours of instruction on the delay and defense. students are introduced to the exercise through situation briefings by the faculty. These briefings present the situation of the German IV Corps and are followed by the issuance of a corps defense order. At this point. student participation in the exercise begins. Students in staff work groups of four of

ficers each serve as members of the German 16th Division. They complete an estimate of the situation and present a decision briefing. Concurrently. faculty members present exercise-specific instruction in artillery support, engineer support, communications, air defense, nuclear. biological and chemical support,

and so forth. This phase concludes with the preparation of an operations plan and its annexes by the student staff group. After presentation of the staff group solutions, a ..school solution" is presented as a common basis for the continuation of the exercise. After Phase I. students participate in the annual German army field training exercise (FTX) conducted in the REFORGER exercise time frame. Phase II-This phase lasts eight

days. Using the school solution from Phase I. the students are divided into brigade staff groups to prepare brigade operations plans. A three-day terrain walk enables the students to evaluate the actual terrain depicted in the exercise and to determine if the brigade operations plans that have already been developed could actually be executed at battalion level. Terrain orientation takes place, short exercises are conducted. and battalion-level planning requirements are considered. After returning to Hamburg. the students have 10 instructional hours to review and modify their plans based upon the terrain appreciation received on the ground. In each student section. orders for the division's three brigades are completed and briefed. The best student solutions are adopted for use during the CPX.

Phase III-This phase lasts eight days. Two abbreviated map exercises and a situation continuation train the students under tactical real time in delay and defense operations. In addition. a historical example is presented in examining Operation Goodwood which involved a British attack against a German defense in Normandy in 1944. The students compare and evaluate those doctrinal principles that have current application. Television tape interviews with participants in the operation are viewed and. where possible, actual participants review their experiences.

December 30

GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

August September December (Second year)October November

LJ I t------; X

IID Lt--I X

D IIIL LJ ~

~

L IV H D

Phase IV-The exercise concludes with a two-day. computer-supported CPX which is immediately followed by an exercise critique. Alert. Mobilization. Deployment and

Defense Corps Exercises. The high point and conclusion of army-specific training is the corps operations exercise. It is preceded by an alert. mobilization and deployment exercise. The first phase consists of preparatory instruction on the special aspects of command and control at the corps level. The students are also briefed by actual US. British and German army corps commanders concerning their concepts for corps operationR. The second phase involves the preparation of a corps general defense plan that incorporates necessary decisions and the preparation

Figure 3

of requisite plans and orders. This is accomplished by forming two corps staffs which work independently on common operational problems. The solutions are compared by section leaders and faculty members. and the students are critiqued. Selected subjects as well as problems

and solutions relating to corps operatiqns are presented in the form of "S~ff studies" prepared by the students w ch. in a special presentation. are briefed t the German army chief of staff and the tree German army corps commanders. He e. again. an attempt is made to establish a close relationship between theory and practice in military operations in the Federal Republic of Germany. The exercise concludes with a two-sided CPX which is computer-supported.

1984 31

MILITARY REVIEW

Computer Support 01 Exercises

Computer support in CPXs reduces the time needed for the prep.aration and conduct of exercises and reduces the number of control personnel required. It is also used to objectively determine data concerning personnel gains and losses. as well as losses of terrain in high-intensity combat. The simulation model used is called KORA/OA. which is an extract of the words Korpsrahmenubung-Offiziersausbi/dung (corps CPX-officer training}. and it consists of three interrelated parts: the scenario. the environment and the combat units. Its central structure is the Land Battle Presentatioll. The organization of the combat units involved in the exercise is provided for a given scenario. The availability of unit organic equipment and personnel begins at 100 percent. Additionally. the initial situation is pro

vided as are all unit positions. missions and task organizations. Theoeentral structure can determine. at any given time. the combat situation of the tmrticipating units. Specifically. it can provide unit engagement. combat activity. losses. movements and missions. This is done according to basic assumptions and rules. Calculation is done in increments of 15 minutes of exercise time. The control staff has access to the results after 30 minutes which allows for the portrayal of near-real-time conditions. The environmental conditions are of

special importance in the course of the battle. They are the additional factors which affect the combat value of the fighting elements. Terrain. as one of these factors. is automatically analyzed according to shape. vegetation. builtup areas. and so forth. I t is also related to the capability of units to move. find cover and camouflage. and use their weapons. For this purpose. two large areas in Germany-one in the

north and one in the south-have been evaluated to provide the system's data base. Obstacles and impediments. like barriers and rivers. represent separate inputs. Another factor which greatly influences

the operations is combat support. Artillery. engineers, antitank helicopters and close air support are assessed in additional models and considered in combat analysis. An additional reconnaissance model has been installed. This model gives the results of all reconnaissance missions ordered by the player staff. As has already been indicated. the system. directly supports the control staff. The player staff receives the results of its decisions and orders. The control staff can influence the exercise by adding new units or by increasing the combat readiness of given units. Other models for logistics and air defense are being developed.

Abbreviated Map Exercises

Abbreviated map exercises are conducted as part of the overall exercise. These exercises are developed by student sections and administered to other student sections. Their purpose is to place the student in a situation whereby he is required to develop a tactical decision under the pressure of time. The student is placed in a tactical setting at a particular com' mand level. He receives radio reports from higher and lower units which enable him to evaluate the situation. He is then forced under the pressure of time to make an appropriate decision in allocating available combat power to accomplish his mission in accordance with the higher commander's intent. The objective of this type of exercise is

for the student to arrive at the right decision at the right time without additional command guidance. If the student acts

December 32

too early. he dissipates his resources. I f he acts too late. he "loses" the battle. The exercise is carefully critiqued comparing the various decisions made by the respective student work groups at various times during the exercise.

Special Subjects Special subjects. such as military

history and military technology. serve to increase general knowledge as part of the army-specific training. In military history. the development of relationships among the armed forces. the state and society is examined. In addition. the development of military strategy. lessons of historical operations and the principles of war. with their changing effects on political and military leadership. are studied. The goal is to enable officers to understand their position in the state and society from a professional standpoint and in a hi storical context.

In military technology. students must acquire the capability to recognize general technical problems and supervise their correction. They must also be able to determine whether specialists have correctly evaluated technical considerations. Additionally. they learn about important military equipment systems. to include production and procurement procedures.

TRAINING IN THE PREPARATION ANO

CONOUCT OF EXERCISES

In another training phase. students prepare and conduct exercises under faculty supervision. Students are instructed on how to prepare and conduct CPXs and FTXs at brigade and division levels. The practical application of this tr'lining is for students to prepare a CPX

GERMAN GENERAL STAFF

or an FTX for an actual brigade or division and then to act as umpires or controllers during its conduct. Tl}is both enhances the training of the student officers and assists the units being exercised.

Whenever possible. joint service and army-specific instruction are integrated. For example. management instruction is conducted to complement instruction and training in command and control. English-language instruction by US and British liaison officers and the participation of US and British -army officers in exercises complement the regular Englishlanguage instruction.

Visits to national and integrated headquarters. as well as visits to German armed forces installations. round out the training. An exchange program with the French. British. Italian and Dutch military colleges during which map exercises are conducted also takes place. A highlight of the course is a lO-day visit to US military facilities and cities.

The final phase of the course lasts for two months and serves several purposes. Students participate in the annual Ger man army FTX. and selected officers serve with US Army brigade and division staffs during the REFORGER exercise. Information about current trends in military technology is also presented. Emphasis is placed upon training for war in peacetime. The main thrust is on the practical requirements of a General Staff officer at division level in peacetime such as preparation of training plans and conducting training at a major training area. Students become familiar with the German army HEROS computer information system as well as "nonmilitary" operations such as disaster relief. They also participate in seminars designed to prepare them for their first assignment as General Staff officers.

1984 33

MILITARY REVIEW

After graduation from the course and receipt of the General Staff officer designation-i.G. or im Generalstabdienstthe officer's career is carefully managed. With the exception of command positions, each General Staff position can only be occupied by a graduate of the General Staff Officer Course, with minor exceptions. Upon receiving his initial General Staffofficer assignment, the officer has at least an idea of what his follow-on assignment will be and what his chances are for foreign military schooling. A typical career pattern would include

assignment as G4 of a brigade, duty with the Defense Ministry, attendance at a foreign military college, battalion command, G 1 or G 3 of a division. NATO staff duty and brigade command. About 10 percent of the graduates of a given General Staff Officer Course will become generals, and most of the class will be promoted to colonel. The overriding consideration for a Ger

man army General Staff officer is that, through his education and training at the German Armed Forces Staff College, as well as his professional experience. he develops a true understanding of his

Colonel Norbert Federal Republic of Germany Army. is currently the director. Army Instruction Department. German Armed Forces Staff College. Hamburg, West Germany He lS a graduate of the German Armed Forces Staffeollege. His command and staff positions include serving as the G3 and the chief of staff of two mechanized infantry divisions and as an instructor at the German Armed Forces Staff Col/ege.

duties and responsibilities to the German state and to his subordinates. This is considered more important than the rank which he will attain during his career. In military leadership, the General Staff officer must possess the qualities of interpersonal sensitivity, personal integrity and self-confidence in addition to basic military competence. The nurturing of these qualities is a prime objective of the German army General Staff officer training. In conclusion, it should be emphasized

that the army-specific training outlined in this article encompasses about 50 percent of the total General Staff officer training. The other 50 percent concerns strategy, security politics, social sciences and command and leadership which are taught in service-common blocks of instruction and frequently in seminars containing officers of all three branches of service. The use of this system guarantees a uniform training for all General Staff officers of the German armed forces in areas having common application. This training is then complemented by the service-specific training which is the subject of this article. ~

Lieutenant CololUIlJohn H. Peyton is currently the chief, Army Section. Office of Defense Cooperation. Bonn, West Germany. He 1>eceived a B.A. from the University of Washington and is a graduate of the USACGSC. His command and staff assignments include serving as a liaison officer for the German II Corps and as an instruc-torlliaison officer at the German Armed Forces Staff College, Hamburg, West Germany.

34

Light Infantry

In Europe: Strategic

Flexibility and

Conventional Deterrence

Captain David H. Petraeus. US Army

35

MILITARY REVIEW

The light infantry has become a popular topic of discussion in military circles. This article addresses sel'eral important aspects ofthe light infantry such as the new units that are being formed and their possible roles in Europe. the renewed emphasis on NATO's cOIwenfiollal forces and fhe US Army's need for increased tactical and strategic flexibility.

T HE "most demanding challenge" for the US Army of the 1980s will be to: ... develop and demonstrate the capa

bility to succf'ss{ullv meet threats to vital interests outside oj" Europe. lcithout compromising the decis",e theater of Ct'ntral Europe.'

That was the judgment in 1980 of General E. C. Meyer. then the Army's chief of staff. The challenge he identified then appears every bit as formidable today.

FORWARO OEPLOYMENT

VERSUS STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY:

MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE?

The problem has been that the two parts of the Army's most demanding challenge have often seemed mutually exclusive. The first part is the maintenance of the conventional deterrent forces committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). and the second is the improvement of the Army's capability to meet threats to US interests outside of Europe-in other words. the development of unprecedented strategic flexibility. The maintenance of the conventional deterrent forces committed to NATO has resulted in the stationing in Europe of a large portion of the Active component of the Army-approximately 200.000 of a 780.000member force-predominantly in the Federal Republic of Germany.'

Traditionally. these forward deployed

forces have been "heavy." That is. they have been built around maneuver elements that are mechanized infantry or armor units. Of the four and two-thirds (plus) divisions in Europe, the only light US combat units are the brigade in Berlin and one airborne infantry battalion combat team stationed in Vicenza, Italy. (However, because of their missions. it cannot be anticipated that either of these units will be available to the US forces in NATO's Central Army Group.) Given the United States' limited air and sea lift assets, and the difficulty of deploying heavy units, the forces stationed in Germany cannot be considered reasonably available for emergencies outside of Central Europe, even were such a deployment deemed politically and strategically desirable.

There are, of course, excellent reasons for stationing so much of the Army in Europe and for having that contingent consist of heavy forces. NATO is the cornerstone of US foreign policy_ Furthermore. the huge Warsaw Pact conventional forces facing NATO are largely armored and mechanized. And, in most cases, aespite the advent of antitank guided missiles, the best all-around antitank weapon is still another tank.

The problem emerges when one looks at the second part of the challenge identified by Meyer. It is the challenge of developing the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe without compromising the Central European theater. Given the smallest

December 36

LIGHT INFANTRY

Army since June 1950,' sizable forward deployments in Europe, Korea and Panama, and the global nature of US commitments, there is concern that there may not be enough ground forces to go around. In August 1983, General John A. Wick

ham Jr.. Army chief of staff, told reporters: "Traditionally, we've had a range of contingency needs that probably exceed the force capabilities that we've been able to generate. That probably applies now."4 The retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, General David C. Jones, was less cautious in expressing his concern. In the summer of 1983, Jones said that the mismatch between US military forces and strategy "is !p'eater now than it was before because "{e are trying to do everything.'" , In fact, as William W. Kaufmann has

noted, of the 19 active duty divisions in the Army and Marine Corps, 11 1/3 already have quite specific responsibilities. Only seven and two-thirds divisions can, therefore, be considered seriously as making up an uncommitted reserve, and several of them must be rounded out by National Guard units to reach full strength.' And, in the case of the units in Europe, even if we wanted to move them from Europe to another region during a crisis, their "heaviness" would make the job extremely difficult considering the limited air and sea lift assets.' Given the emergence of regional threats

throughout the world, and the unlikely prospect of a substantial increase in the size of the Army, the conclusion is clear. We must do better with what we have. One central question quickly emerges: How can we maintain the conventional deterrent in Europe and still develop the level of strategic and tactical flexibility needed to narrow the gap between our capabilities and our commitments?

STRENGTHENING NATO'S

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT

Before tackling that question, howe