military review june 1970

8/14/2019 Military Review June 1970

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NITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERALSTAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KANSASCOMM ND NT

Major eneral John H. Hay Jr.DEPUTY COMM ND NT

Brigadier eneral Frank B. Clay

The Military Review is published by the United States Army ommand and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. t provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy nationalsecurity affairs and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.


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Military Review~ o f e s s i o n a l Journal of the US Army

The Threat of Communist ChinaBritish Withdrawal From the Persian GulfWhy the Ussuri?Politics and Culture in Southeast AsiaEurope, the United States, and NATOThe Military Advisor and the CommanderFrunze Military AcademyThe Soviet Threat Since CzechoslovakiaMilitary Aid to Turkey: 194750The International SoldierBeyond SALTMilitary NotesMilitary BooksReader Forum

Roger Hitsman 3Alvin 1. Cottrell 14

Peter Mayer 22MAJ Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA 33

Stanley L Harriso'n 43LTC Raymond J. McClean, USA 55and MAJ Melvin P. Williams, USALTG P. Bashurin, Soviet Army 60I

Eugene Hinterhoff 68Rocco M. Paone 74

Ahmed Sheikh 80Dennis MenDs 91

98106110

Library of Congress Catalog Card No 34 33760 RevThe VIEWS expressed in t is magazine ARE THE AUTHORS' and not necessarily those of theUS Army or the Command and General Staff College.


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!lilitnry ieultw-Awnrb Article

The Military Review announces the selection of the following articlefrom the April issue as a MILITARY REVIEW AWARD ARTICLE:Soviet European Policy in the 1970's

Walter C. Clemlm8 JrDr. Clemens discusses four main options which will be open to the Sovietsin the future: preserving the 8tatus quo; a strategy of interdependence;a forward strategy; and isolationism. He concludes that Soviet Europeanpolicy is an important factor shaping the outcome of the Uriited States-Soviet arms control talks, as well as the prospects of arms control measures in Europe. He suggests that there can be agreement of benefit toboth- sides even though an adversary relationship remains.

"* "* "*COMINGolonel William E. LeGro, United States Army, in The Why and How ofLimited War, describes two concepts of limited war. One is that rigid rulesmust be imposed to govern the means utilized in order to prevent escalationinto a general holocaust. The other concept, which has less support, is thatlimited war is limited because of limited objectives. He discusses how theUnited States can best employ its military capabilities successfully in limitedwar and suggests that we remain ftexible in order to take advantage of changing situations and new opportunities.

Will F. Thompson, in Airmobile Warfare in Mountains, suggests that military planners should become much more concerned with potential operationsin the high mountains of Eurasia. Rugged mountain zones long have served asbarriers to the spread of wars, but advances in vertical takeoff and landing(VTOL) and short takeoff and landing (STOL) technology are threateningthese barriers. He feels special training should be provided to certain troopsin a wide variety of mountain environments and that we rapidly should increaseour understanding of the mountains in the Eurasian area.


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he Threat 1 ommunist ChinaBQger Hilsman

C OMMUNIST China easta a longand ominous shadow over all ofAsia. It is a nation of at least 750miDion people. One out of every fourhuman beings is Chinese. By the Yolar2000 every third human being willbe Chinese. They are able hard-working self-disciplined nd ambitious.They occupy territory o continentalsize within whose borders are contained n the natural resources if_ 978

and when they are developed neces-sary to m ke China the rival of anypower in the world.China occupies a strategic positionof interior lines. From ita central position in Asia can thresten Japan andKorea in the east the peninsula ofSoutheast Asia the subcontiuent ofIndia and Pakistan over ita Himalayanborders in the south and Soviet Asiain the north. And ita history is peeu

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liar. Never has China had the historical experience of an international political system of equals. Relations withits neighbors have been either thoseof master to vassals, or those of thesick man of Asia over whose prostratebody the Western Nations, and evenJapan, have trampled almost at will.China s PowerThere is no question that China'sneighbors inl Asia are impressed bythe facts of its power-even that theyare fearful of its power. Neither isthere any question that this fear canbe manipulated by China into tangibleand significant political leverage.There also is no question that thesuperpowers-the Soviet Union andthe United States-are respectful ofChina's power. t may be, in fact, thatboth are overly impressed with at leastthe potential threat that China poses.F 11Der Secretary of State Dean Rusk,in an address that seemed so alarming

Roger Hilsmo,n is Professor of Government, Institute of War and PeaceStudies, Columbia University. A 1943grailuate of the US MiliM'I'Y Academyhe holds M.A. and Ph. D. degrees inInternational Relations from Yale Un{,.versity. During World War II heserved with Merrill's Marauders inBurma, with the Ofjice of StrategicServices, and at the. time of the Korean War, served in North AtlanticTreaty Organization planning in London and Germany. His career includesteaching and research at Princeton'sCenter of International Studies and atthe School of Adw1lCed InternationalSttiilies of Johns Hopkins -University.A former Assistant Secreta'I'Y of Statefor Far Eastern Affairs, Dr. Hilsmanhas written numerQUB articles on foreign affairs and national defense andis the author of The Problem of Ok{nawa. which appeared in the luly 1969issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.

to the press that they labeled it theYellow Peril speech, warned that, ina few decades, there would be a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. The Soviets, for their part, haveissued a steady stream of propagandathat, if anything, is even more alarmist about China's intentions.

In both the Soviet Union and theUnited States, a cool and realistic assessment of the nature of the Chinesethreat needs to be made.Major DeterminantsBeyond the bare facts of size, resources, and population, there are twoseries of events that are of overwhelming influence in their impact onChina's position. One is the SinoSoviet dispute, and the other is theso-called Great Proletarian CulturalRevolution. '

The S i n o s ~ et dispute is fundamental in all the rich connotationsof the word. F st, it ~ concerned withideology, with e true meaning ofthe sacred texts of the Communistworld, and with the Communist visionof the future. t also is concerned withpower, with who should have powerwithin the Communist world, and withwho should lead and who should follow.In a real sense, communism is a doc-trine for gaining and holding power,and, in their bid for leadership in theCommunist world, the Chinese werereally just behaving like Communists.The dispute also has been concernedwith the organization of decisionmaking within the Communist worldand the nature of the relationshipamong the different parties. The keywords in this aspect of the debate werecentrism and polycentrism -thetags for whether Soviet national interests should be synonymous with theinterests of the entire Communistworld or whether the national inter-

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By the start of the 21st century, every thhd eing will e Cbmeseests of the other members should alsobe considered in determining policyfor the Communist world.The differences were also concernedwith policy toward the in-betweenworld, whether the friendship of theCommunist world should be extendedto national-bourgeois regimes inplaces like India, for example, or onlyto the radical nationalists and nationalliberation movements. The So:-viets chose friendship with such statesas India and eneouraged them in apolicy of neutralism while China advocated a policy of support only for themilitant. Indeed, in 1962, China wentso far as to respond to India's somewhat bellicose rhetoric and ratherprovocative action on the ground witha military attack which, undoubtedly,was designed, in part, as a deliberateaffront to the Soviet Union.JU e 1970

The dispute also has been eoncernedwith grand strategy, with the questionof how aggressive the Communistworld should e in its dealings withthe West, and how much risk couldbe run of nuclear war. This differencewas symbolized by the exchange between Mao Tse-tung and Nikita S.Khrushchev at the time of the Cubanmissile crisis-with Mao saying thatthe West was only a paper tiger andKhrushchev replying that this particular paper tiger had nuclear teeth.All these different aspects andthemes appeared and reappeared as thedispute unfolded. t apparently hadbegun in 1956 with Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization, with which theChinese disagreed. t was exacerbatedby the Polish and Hungarian crises,and by almost every major policyproblem from agriculture to relations

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COMMUNIST CHIN1With Albania. But the issue that seemsto have caused the most difficulty concerned the new technology for nationaldefense-nuclear weapons. It is nowknown that some time in 1957, theSoviets signed an agreement to assistthe Chinese in the nuclear weaponsfield in exchange for. which the Chinese msde a number of concessions,including a public ac\mowledgmentthat the socialist camp must have ahead; and this head is the U.S.S.R.Unreasonable DemudsBut i the next two years, disagreement and misunderstanding reportedlydeveloped over just how much th..Soviets had promised to do in helpingChina develop nuclear weapons. Intheir later statements, the Chinesesuggest that it was no misunderstanding, but a Soviet decision to renege onwhat had been a commitment to helpthem build a nuclear capability. Butwhat really may have happened wasthat the Chinese asked for the weaponsthemselves, or samples of them, andKhrushchev countered with conditionsthat the Chinese found unacceptable.They alleged that the Soviets put foro.ward unreasonable demands designedto bring China under Soviet militarycontrol. In any event, it was immediately after this episode that the Chinese publicly reasserted that the nuclear bomb was a paper tiger.In June 1959, according to theChinese, the Soviet Union finally rejected Peking's request for a samplenuclear bomb. Moscow furthermore,apparently dabbled in subversion byencouraging Marshal Penll' Teh-huai,the Chinese Defense Minister,.in opposing the rest of the Chinese Partybu t unsuccessfully, for he waspromptly purged.The Khrushchev visit to the UnitedStates in September 1959 and the

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Camp David spirit that came outof it seemingly brought all these developmenta into crisis, for Khrushchevfound it necessary to make a suddentrip to Peking immediately followinghis visit to the United States. I t seemsonly to have made matters worse. Notonly did the ebullient Khrushchev usethe occasion to warn the Chinese in apublic speech against testing by forcethe stability of the capitalist system,but he used the oceasion to push atwo-Chinas' policy about Taiwanwhich is an anathema to the Chinese.Propaguda IncreasesThroughout 1960, the propagandafrom both Moscow and Peking becameeven more virulent. The symbolic issue was Albania, and, in 1961, Khrushchev forced it to a crisis, breakingdiplomatic relations between the So-viet Union and Albania, and -endingSoviet aid. The Chinese stepped inand replaced it.Then, there began a fierce competition for the allegiance of the Commu-nist Parties of every country in theworld. The debate grew hotter still,and each side published more and moreof the formerly secret correspondence in an effort to bolster its owncase. By early 1963, Peking was de-nouncing the Soviet Communist Partyleaders as betrayers of the revolution,arguing that the underdeveloped areasof the world were the real focus of thestruggle against imperialisin and thatthe real leader of the struggle was theChinese Party.Moscow in tum attempted to showthat the Chinese were indifferent tothe risks of nuclear war and bent ondividing the Communist world alongracist lines. In the summer of 1963,the Chinese distributed, first in Mos-cow and then throughout the world, aletter dated 14 June 1963, declaring

M l t y I I ln
http:///reader/full/Minister,.inhttp:///reader/full/Minister,.in


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that they intended to split every Communist Party whose leaders sided withthe Soviet Union.The next stage brought armedclashes between Soviet and Chinesetroops along the border at the UssuriRiver and talk in Moscow of extending the doctrine of Leonid I. Brezhnevto China. f the Soviets were justifiedin invading Czechoslovakia to removean anti-Soviet Politburo, why notChina?Tension essens

Perhaps because both sides realizedthat the paths they were followingcarried a high risk of full-scale war,talks on the border troubles were begun recently, and there are some signsof at least a slight lessening of tension. But even though these talks mayavert actual warfare, it is now clearthat the Sino-Soviet dispute itself isone of the most portentous international political facts of our time.It will not be easily healed, even following the death of Mao or even ifthe entire Maoist faction is overthrown. In the meantime, it will be thesingle most dominant infiuence onevery act of foreign policy taken byPeking. The Chinese response to anyinitiative taken by the United States,for example, will be based on whatthey believe are the necessities of theSino-Soviet dispute above all else.'The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the other major determinantof the future course of CommunistChina is equally portentous. Unlikemost revolutions, the sources of thecultural revolution were not from below, but from the top. It had its origins in Mao Tse-tung's deep and psssionate commitment to the concept ofpermanent revolution. Mao correctly

~ I D o S o v i e t Border DlBpule:' MlljlGrI/Review Janual 1970 1 1-88.JI 1870

saw that the great enemy of revolutions, in historical terms, was routinization and bureaucratization. It isessentially this settling down into thecomfortable stett 8 quo to which herefers in his charge that the SovietUnion Is revisionist.But Mao's idea of p e J m l L I l i l l ~ t

Mao Tae-tuai is and nathless, but bis doetriue of permaneut revolution is not likely to 8lIrVive himrooted in his personal psyche. Perhapsthe greatest revolutionary of his time,Mao is puritanical, determined, and.ruthlsss, yet sensitive and Idealistic-a poet without pity. To find a historical parallel, it is necessary to o hackto Martin Luther who was also a greatrevolutionary. There are, in fact, several instructive similarities. Like Luther, Mao was an avid reader whenyoung. Mao has said of himself that

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he read "greedily, like an ox that hasrushed into a vegetable garden . "Also, like Luther, Mao's writing hasan earthiness that appeals to simplemen.Luther hated his father, and so didMao. Luther's father-hate took theform of doubting divi,ne righteousnessto question the goodness of theHeavenly Father, as he did the earthlyone. The thought was unbearable. SoLuther turned against the earthly andhuman institution, and he was led touse his gifts of language and leadership to bring about a massive revolution against the oldest human institution of the West, the Church of Rome.Mao's father-hate was no less farreaching. It seems to have armed himin an even more monumental taskagainst an even older human institution, for he set out to destroy the Chinese family system whose central ethicis the Confucian ideal of filial loyalty.Struggle mong FactionsIt requires some such analysis ofMao, the man, to understand the origins of the cultural revolution. Eventhough the concept of permanent revolution is historically based in that itseea the enemy of revolutions as routinization and bureaucratization, it isalso a personal, visionary dream of entirely remaking human nature by repeatedly destroying human institutions until mankind achieves a finalre-creation.Thus, the cultural revolution is inno sense an uprising of the mass of ,Chinese, nor does it have.any connection with Mao's old rival, Chiang Kaishek, or any implications for Chiang'spossible return to the mainland. TheGreat Proletarian Cultural Revolutionis neither a revolt from below nor-as yet. at least--a civil war.

What the Great Proletarian Cultural

Revolution has been' so far is a struggle among dUferent factions of theCommunist Party. At least three ofthese can be distinguished-Mao, LinPiao, and the other true Maoists inthe center; the Communist militaryleaders on the right; and, on the left,Liu Shao-ch'i, Peng Chen, the exmayor of Peking, and, in general. theparty hierarchs. what the Sovietswould call the apparotckikil.Polley and PowerThe struggle is over policy as wellas power. Each of these principal factions is identified with a particularpolicy line.2 The Maoist faction isfirst and foremost committed to permanent revolution. Beyond that.' it isanti-Soviet. viewing Soviet revisionism as more dangerous than US imperialism, at least in. some respects.The Maoist faction has opposed intervening in Vietnam. unless the UnitedStates first attacks China.It follows the line laid down by LinPiao in his September 1965 statement,emphasizing that wars of "nationalliberation" are do-it-yourself wars, inwhich the native Communists must notcount on substantial help from outsidesources: At the same time, the Maoistlilie opposes the Paris negotiations. trejects any compromise in Vietnamand urges Hanoi to gird itself for aprotracted struggle ending in totalvictory.The military faction has, naturally,little interest in permanent revolution.As to relations with the Soviet Union,it is doubtful that the military factionis any less hostile in a fundamentalsense. But tactically, the militaryleaders clearly favor closer relations,principally in order to obtain aid in

Donald s. ZaaorIa The S Debate InPeJdu: n CAifta n CriN olieiu inoIG ...... AtII6ri Cbleeao P. . . . .ChI....... m. 1968.MIlIWy Review


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COMMUNIST CHINmodem arms. These leaders also favora harder line on Vietnam in terms ofChinese participation, even thoughthis action increases the risk of warwith the United States.The a /YlKtratchiks also favor closerrelations with the Soviet Union, butfor different reasons. Basically, thisfaction wants to tum inward, to concentrate on modernizing and industrializing China first, and let the task ofspreading the revolution wait. Theynot only agree with the Maoist factionthat China should refrain from directinvolvement in Vietnam, but alsowould favor a negotiated settlement.Cultural Revolution WaningWe are now seeing at least the beginning of the end of the culturalrevolution. Although it is too earlyfor a definitive assessment, certainpoints seem clear.

The first is that Mao seems to havecome out ahead-not in the sense ofhaving achieved a victory, but in thesense of emerging stronger than anyrival even though weaker in absoluteterms. The map of China today lookslike a case of measles. Some areas arecontrolled by the Maoists, others bylocal military commanders, and someby a coalition of the military and theparty hierarchs.The second implication is paradoxical-that although Mao seems to havecome out ahead, Maoism, the doctrineof permanent revolution, is not likelyto survive. The idea of permanentrevolution failed at the time of theGreat Leap Forward and the CommuneProgram, and now it has failed againin the cultural revolution. t seemsunlikely that the concept could longsurvive Mao.Mao's aJlies in the cultural revolution suggest the weakness. The centralcore of the army was not interested in

permanent revolution. Stability, hierarchy, and preparedness were moreto their taste than perpetual chaos.Similarly, this was true with the partya /YlKtratchiks. The entire idea of Mao'sassault on revisionism, in fact, wasthat institutions must be repeatedlytom down and r e u i l ~ n d the institution in Communist China is theparty itself. The peasants could not bearoused to such a slogan. Their interest, to use Mao's own expression ofcontempt, is economism, a higherstandard of living and a better life.Red uardsSo, Mao turned to the one segmentof society which had not acquiredeither a career or families, and henceno interest as yet in stability, the oneelement of society most easily IIPpealedto by the idealism of an attempt to ra :make mankind entirely-the teenagerswho became the Red Guards. Theweakness, of course, is that this is itself an unstable segment of society touse as a power base. Even in a RedGuard parade, boy meets girl withcertain inevitable personal, social, andpolitical consequences.

t seems unlikely that events inmainland China will change so radically as to bring about either a revolution from below, or a civil war inwhich anti-Communist or non-Communist elements become serious rivals.Maoism, too, seems to be nearing theend of its course. What seems mostprobable is that, sooner or later, powerin China will return to the hands of a.reunited Communist Party of themore traditional type.By this stage in the history of communism, to say that it seems mostlikely that power will return to a reunited Communist Party of the moretraditionsl type s not to say much.The Sino-Soviet dispute is one exam

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pIe of the end to the monolithicity ofthe Communist world. Others abound.Will a reunited Communist Party inChina be like the party of Josip Tito?Or Joseph Stalin? Or Nikita S.Khrushchev? Or Nicolae Ceausescu?Or Wladyslaw Gomulka? Or AntoninNovotny? Or Alexander Dubcek?The dominant faction of a reunitedparty in China could range from thedoctrinal rigidity of a Stalin to thepragmatism of a Tito, and most likelywiIl at times adopt the policies of theone and iLt other times the policies ofthe other, whichever seems expedient.Obviously, it is important to the restof the world whether the dominantfaction is doctrinaire or pragmatic-the point is only that, with the evidence at hand, it is impossible to predict.

What does seem to be within therealm of the predictable is that, whichever faction or coalition of factionscome to dominate the party, it islikely to be both ambitious, in termsof the achievement of national goals,and hostile to the outside world, interms not of tactics, but of funda-.mental attitude toward both the SovietUnion and the West.Direct and Indirect ActionBut the question is precisely whatkind of threat this combination of ambition and hostility is likely to pose.For convenience, the analysis of thisthreat can be divided into two parts-first, China's capability for direct military action, and second, its capacityto instigate indirect action throughsubversion and internal guerriIla warfare in the classic pattern of so-calledwars of national liberation.There can be no doubt that Communist China, with its vast population,can mount formidable power in defense. In spite of the turmoil of the

cultural revolution, there is no evidence to suggest that the Chinese people would fail to unite in the face ofan outside threat The Vietnam strug-gle has shown what determined mencan do Oll their own home grounds,using guerrilla tactics and essentiallyindividual weapons, even against themost sophistic;ated of nonnuclear modern weapons. Only madmen wouldseriously contemplate attempting toinvade and occupy China today.China can project this type of powerinto the local arenas immediately adjacent to its borders, as it demonstrated quite amply in its interventionin the Korean War and in the SinoIndian war of 1962.Local PowerBeyond this, however, China's military capability is small. t does nothave the naval and air forces, or thesea and airlift to project its powerbeyond the contiguous arena. Its nuclear capability, although impressivein local terms, is neither large enoughnor sophisticated enough, especially interms of delivery systems, to giveChina any more than local power.

t will be many years before Chinacan seriously threaten the sources ofeither United States or Soviet powerwhile the sources of Chinese powerwiIl remain highly vulnerable to thepower of both the Soviet Union andthe United States. Even when Chinadoes develop power of intercontinentalreach in sufficient numbers and sophistication, both Soviet and United Statespower will remain vastly superior foras far ahead as it is useful for themind to reach.

In the realm of intentions, as opposed to capability, even though theChinese leadership is, undoubtedly,both ambitious and hostile to theoutside world, the evidence is over- ilitaryReview


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O ~ M U N I S T CHINoped it into essentially sound programs and proceeded to spread thedoctrine by every available means.

In addition China has estsblishedtraining bases for the nationals ofcertain countries and has successfullyplaced agents with many of the minority mountsin peoples in most ofthe Southeast Asian countries. Asthe Soviets recently admitted Chinahas succeeded in a i n i n g ~ m i n a n t influence in the Communis Parties ofAlbania New Zealand urma Maliand Thailand and in one faction ofthe underground Communist Partyof Indonesia.ew NationalismBut seems doubtful if these ef

forts will enjoy any significant success. In Communist terms there islittle revolutionary potential to workon and the reason is the rise of thenew nationalisms. For the first timein two or three millennia the teeming millions of Asia and Africa areawakening breaking out of the essentially village culture which turnedthem inward on themselves isolatingthem economically politically andpsychologically.

The millions of Asia are seeking abroader identity than the village andthat identity is nationalism. The motive forces and aspirations are deepand powerful-a search for identitya deep demand for national independence and expression a yearning formodernization and a determinationnot only to control their own destiniesbut to have a voice in the affairs ofthe world. Anything foreign is theenemy of this nationalism whetherit is a foreign invader or local ideologues who seem to be dominated byforeigners.The implications of the rise of thenew nationalism are portentous. t

seems clear that once this nationalismis thoroughly aroused no power how-ever mighty can hope to subjugateanother people with few exceptions.The new nationalism is indigestible.One concrete implication is the factthat there are today few if any dominoes in Asia. Vietnam in fact seemsto be turning out to be unique-uniquein the sense that it probably will bethe last Asian nation in which com-munism captures the leadership ofnationalism.Future Prospects imIn Japan the Communist Party isweak and divided. In Korea repeatedinfiltrators from the North have beenquickly rolled up with the help of thepeasants. In the Philippines the Com-munist Hukbalahaps I .ave been reduced to the ststus of local bandits.In Cambodia the Communist Partyis virtually nonexistent. In Laos thePatket Lao has made little headwaysince 1962 although Laos does remainvulnerable to direct attsck from NorthVietnam. Even the recent Communistsuccesses in the Plain of Jars, inwhich the Communists retook territory they held at the time of the 1962agreements but lost in 1964 and 1965was done not by the Patket Lao butby the-North Vietnamese.

In Indonesia following the abortedcoup of 1965; over 300 000 Communists were slaughtered by local peasants and although the CommunistParty has apparently been able tomaintsin an underground organization its prospects for the immediatefuture are dim. In India the ColP-munists have been able to estsblishthemselves in some local governmentsbut the influence of the Chinese faction has lessened. In Pakistsn thereis no Communist Party of any consequence.

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In Burma, 'with all of its troubles,the traditional fear of China and thefact that the local party is underChinese influence have reduced theprospects for the Communists immeasurably. t is only in Thailand thatthere is any immediate danger, andthis is, in fact, instructive. The dangerin Thailand is principally in the northeast, and what is instructive is thatthe people of northeast Thailand aremore Lao than Thai and, consequently,do not identify with Thai nationalism.

China is thus a formidable militarypower in defense, but its capacity to

project that power beyond its bordersis limited, both in material terms. andin terms of its realistic caution anddesire to avoid provoking a greatpower intervention. Its doctrine ofwars of national liberation is aweapon of great potential, but due tothe rising nationalisms, the opportunities for its use are limited. YetChina remains ambitious, and, inconsequence, is likely to continue topursue those ambitions with the instruments at hand that avoid creatinghigh risk which means not militarymeasure, but political.

To have better relations with the Soviet Union and with CommunistChina. we believe. would be in our national interest, and our poliey is to seeksensible ways to accomplish this. The fact that a Sino-Soviet conDict existsis strictly their affair. but it should not be a restraint on our efforts to improverelations with both.

Secretary of tate William P. ogers

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ritishWithdrawalFrom th Persian Gulf

Alvin J. Cottrell

T HE British decision to withdraw its military forces east of Suez particu-larly from the Persian Gulf by 97 is a significant turning point in that~ of the world. The implications of this have not been fully appreciated in theWest and especially in the United States. Indeed it could be argued that relatively

few people in the United States with the exception of a handful of diplomatsmilitary officers and oil men know much about the Persian Gulf area.For approximately 150 years British forces have made an important con-tribution to the stability of tbe Indian Ocean area. Prime Minister Harold Wilsonreportedly suggested in 1964 that one British soldier east of Suez was morevaluable than 1 000 British soldiers on the Rhine. He may well have been correct.

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However, in, 1968, Wilson apparentlychanged his earlier judgment for he. reversed himself and announced thatBritain would withdraw all forces eastof Suez by 1971.WItMrawal ScheduleIn reversing British policy, Wilsonalso reversed the previous Labor Government's flexible withdrawal sched-ule-namely, 1973-77-a date whichat least had the advantage of maintain-ing enough ambiguity to provide thetime necessary to see more clearly theevolution of political developments inthe gulf before setting a firm date.Even highly eminent scholars who be-lieve it is impossible and inadvisablefor the British to reverse or to modifytheir policy now agree that the de-cision was hasty and unfortunate.What prompted such an abrupt re-versal of policy by the British LaborGovernment, and what are its implica-tions?The Labor Government decided todevalue the pound in November 1967

Alvin J. CottreU is Director of Research at the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, GeorgetownUniversity, Washington, D. C AWorld War 11 rmy veteran, he received a B.S. from Temple University,Philadelphia, an M.A. and Ph. D fromthe University of Pennsylvania, and isa graduate of the National War Col-lege. He h s served as an instructorand Research Associate at the University of Pennsylvania; with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense; with the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford ResearchInstitute; and as Professor of ForeignAffair8 at the National War CoUegeHe is the author of numerous booksand magazine articles, including Soviet-Egyptian Relations which appeared in th December 1969 issue ofthe MILITARY REVIEW.URe 1970

TilE PERSI N GULF

so there can be little doubt that a keyconsideration in Wilson's decision waseconomic. cost Britain about 85 mil-lion dollars to maintain a combinedforce of approximately 8,400 men inthe

Saudi Arabia, led by King Falsal ibnAbdul-Aziz plays a principal role inPeraian Gulf polities225 million dollars to maintain forcesof 48,000 in the area east of the gulf.The rundown of forces is proceed-ing, and the number of forces in theFar East already has been reduced tobelow 30,000 and in the Persian Gulfto about 7,500. A British defensestatement, published in early 1969, hasindicated that the return of forcesfrom the gulf may e slowed awaitinga clearer picture of the political situa-tion. There can be little doubt thatBritain was unable to afford the cost

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of maintaining its current level ofmilitary commitment east of the Persian Gulf in Singapore, but it isequally clear that Britain could affordthe cost of maintaining its presencein the Persian Gulf.Many believe that the British presence in the Persian Gulf could havebeen reduced substantially and stillhave been adequate to provide continued stability. The British Conservative Party pamphlet, East of Suez,states that less than 25 million dollarsmight have been sufficient. Britain'soil investment alone in the gulf netsover 450 million dollars per year infavorable exchange balances. Thus,Britain has been paying a low cost forthe return it receives from its investments in the area.

t is not at all clear what savings,if any, are likely to result from thecomplete withdrawal of British military forces in the gulf because Britainprobably will continue military training and other assistance after pullingout.Strong OppositionSome Labor Party members have'favored a continued British militarypresence in the gulf, but the LaborLeft was' strongly opposed to. a continued presence in the area on thegrounds that it was merely a policy ofpropping up feudal sheikhdoms. However, the Labor Left is opposed to aBritish military presence anywhere.Even some Laborites, who' contendedthat Britain could afford the initiatoutlay of 35 million dollars, arguedthat Britain could not afford theopen-ended economic commitmentinvolved.In effect, it was argued that thecommitment in the gulf, while small,could escalate in a crisis as did theUnited Kingdom commitment in Cy-

prus. It also was argued that, if theBritish stayed any longer, they wouldnever leave.Furthermore, with the projectedBritish cutback and eventual elimination of aircraft carriers, it was assumed that any British commitmentin the gulf could not be supported.Also, it appeared that the UnitedStates was too involved to undertakea greater presence in the Indian Ocean,in general, even if small British forcesremained in the gulf. Then, too, therewas a general psychological mood inEngland born of a desire to liquidateall of its foreign military commitments.Changed SituationThe decision, although it is not tobe implemented until 1971 hasbrought about a changed situation inthe Persian Gulf. Many of the statesand territories in the area alreadyhave begun to behave as though theBritish have withdraWn. The Britishpresence in the gulf has, for manyyears, constituted a successful, majorpeace-keeping operation.The British forces in the PersianGulf have insulated the area from internal conflict for over a century anda half. Their presence has providedthe states of the area with an excusefor not asserting historic and conflicting claims in. the region while, at thesame time, not forfeiting them andthus making themselves winerable tointernal domestic pressures to assertsuch claims.In this sense, the small British military presence in the Persian Gulf hasbeen more political than military. Thesituation which the British presencehas held in check for so long is described by a group of British andUnited States specialists in a report ofthe Georgetown University Center for


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THE PERSI N GULF

t

Strategic and International Studies: 1Some of the states of the Gulf region have experienced a dmmatic increMe in the literate and semi-litemte,professional and artisan elements Mthe re81dt of both an increa se in ed1h-cational opportunities for citizens ofthe Gulf, and the injluz of educa tedmen from other area s of the mbworld. This growth in the size of apolitically conscious group that couldhelp to extend unrest in the regionthreatens the continued existence ofsome of the states in their present territorial and political forms.Conjlicting territorial claims andother traditional rivalries inhibit thecurrent attempt to set up a federationof Gulf sheikhdoms. The political OT

1TM Gulf: l pli of Bnew WitlldmlDa ,Specfal .Report Series Number 8. eorgetown Uni-verstb Center for StrateBle and InternationalStudies WashingtoD D. Co 16.URe 197

As part of their withdrawal from the Middle EBlIt these British troops msreh past Arabsoldiers waiting to take over their post' in Adender in the Gulf during the lMt centuryhM been maintained by British interest and control. In the very delicateba la nce of Gulf politics there are manyclaims that have been in abeyance fora long time without actually being resolved. . . The principal territorialclaims in the Persian Gulf are thoseof Iran to Bahrain and certain otherislands, Iraq to Kuwait and SaudiArabia to the Bumimi OMis which isportly in Abu Dhabi and partly inMuscat and Oman. Disputes have notbeen pursued because the porties con-cerned recognize that, while the British were present, tempomry silenceover a claim did not imply its forfeiture. British withdrawal could lead toa renewal of old interstate conjlictsand the development of new disputesarising from changed economic circumstances.

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THf PERSI N GULFTo emphasize the dangers inherentin the unresolved claims, it might bewell to bear in mind that the Iraqiclaim to Kuwait was asserted in 1961

and was only forestalled by the landingof a British brigade group.To this list of potential conflictsand disputes might alSb be added thesharp clash. of interests between Iranand Iraq over the Shatt-al-Arab-abody of water at the confluence of theTigris and Euphrates Rivers at thehead of the gulf. Iraq was given sovereigntyover the waterway by a treatypromulgated in 1937. Under the termsof the treaty, all ships entering theShatt-al-Arab were to fly the Iraqiflag.Treaty DenouncedIran has denounced the treaty andhas been sending vessels up the Shattai-Arab flying the Iranilln flag andsometimes escorted by naval vesselsand military aircraft. The dispute,which h s already created serious tensions between Iraq and Iran, couldevolve into serious conflict if Iranseeks-as it apparently intends to -to fill the vacuum left by the British.withdrawal from the gulf.

t has been the consistently ststedposition of the Conservative. Partyleadership, as it envisages a return topower no later than 1971, that it willdiscuss with the governments of thePersian Gulf the possibility of maintaining a British military presence inthe area. Since it is unlikely that allBritish forces will have been withdrawn from the area by 1971, the option, at least theoretically, should stillremain open to them.The Conservative Party leader, Ed- ward Heath, repeatedly has statedthat, when returned to power, the Tories will maintain a military presenceeast of Suez. Referring specifically to

the Persian Gulf, he has said thatBritain will, under a Conservative government, maintain a presence in thePersian Gulf if our friends in thearea want us to stay.Still, any change in policy wouldhave to be brought about quickly because of the changes in the gulf already brought about by Labor's announced intention to withdraw. Forexample, the Shah of Iran now arguesthat he will replace the British in thegulf even though, when the decisionwas first announced, he appeared to bequite concerned over the prospect ofBritain's withdrawal. He has nowsaid that the British troops are notwanted in the gulf by any of the gulfstates.ederation ProposedSteps have been taken to form aFederation of Gulf Emirates seekingto establish responsibility for its owndefense. The rulers of the nine statesmet in Abu Dhabi in March 1968, butfailed to agree on such questions as location of a capital or a constitution.Thus, the prospects for success do notlook favorable. Should they fail, thearea would be a perfect target forrevolutionary forces which have already been established for the statedpurpose of overthrowing the traditional rulers and bringing Socialistrevolutionary. governments to powerin the area. One such organizationwhich opened an office in Aden in December 1968 is known as the NationalLiberation Front for the Liberation ofthe Arabian (Persian) Gulf.Still, the Federation does represent another change in the situationwhich would require the renegotiation of new defense arrangements inthe area if the British were to stay.The Conservative Part)', if it returnsto power by 1971, will, at best, be

MilltaJy Revie8


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THE PERSI N GULF

able to modify, but not completelyreverse, the Labor Government's decision. The Labor Government couldkeep the option of maintaining aBritish presence in the gulf open if itwere to go slow on the rundown ofthe present level of military commitments in the area. There are hints

Nation politically acceptable in thearea.The United States presently has nointention of replacing the British. Asone high-ranking State Departmentofficial put it:Local leadership must and will-carry on after the end of Britain's

BU1Dkef Bnia10Commando carriers such as the 8MB BulUlark shown in Aden Harbor are importantelements in British presencethat some thinking is in this direction.The British have been in the Persian Gulf for sO long that they aretruly part of the landscape-notreally foreign to the area at all. fthe Labor Government's precipitatedecision to withdraw has, indeed,made it impossible, as some contend,for the British to modify their position in the gulf and still maintainsome kind of military presence there,one element is certain-no otherWestern Nation could possibly replace them-certainly not the UnitedStates. Britain is the only WesternJUDe 197

historic role. The United States wicontinue to do what it c n to help,but there c n be no question of anyspecial role in Gulf affairs.Great hope is being placed on thesuccess of regional elements to bringstability to the gulf following theBritish withdrawal. Much of the hopefor the future cooperation of the gulf'stwo principal states, Saudi Arabia andIran, relates to the cordial meetingbetween the Shah and King Faisal ibnAbdul-Aziz in November 1968 and the

19


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THE PERSI N GULF

agreement reached on a median linein the gulf and a plan for sharing ofoil in the disputed area. While this isa hopeful sign, it is a long way fromassuming that the two gulf rulers willbe able to maintain stability in the region. Certainly, an understanding between the two nations is a fundamentalelement looking toward peace and stability in the gulf.U Naval ForceThe present US naval presence inthe Persian Gulf, under the Com-mander, Eastern Mediterranean Area,is small. t consists of a seaplane tender based at Bahrein and two destroyers which make visits into the gulf.This is not an impressive force. Thisfact has been remarked on by some ofthe local rulers. It is even less impressive than the Soviet vessels whichshowed their flag in the gulf in 1968.

Some have suggested strengtheningthe US force, but this might not be themost prudent policy course as it couldconceivably make the United States thetarget for revolutionary elements already active. It might appear that theUnited States were attempting to re- .place the British, and this would beunacceptable to some gulf states.Still, this does not mean, as nowappears, that the United States shouldhave no military policy for the area.One of the most dangerous steps theUnited States could take is to indicatea disinterest in the area by not doinganything. The United States did this

in Korea when former Secretary ofState Dean Acheson made his muchquoted statement which suggested thatKorea was not within the defense perimeter of the United States in thePacific. Some believe that the statement was an open invitation to theSoviets and their North Korean alliesto attack South Korea in June 1950.

The policy answer in the PersianGulf would appear not to be one ofmaintaining a permanent large navalpresence in the area, but, rather, astrategy of making frequent visits intothe gulf with modern US naval vesselsoperating from a task force in theIndian Ocean.There can be no doubt that many inthe area-particularly the Shah-areconcerned with the possibility that theUnited States will do nothing to counter the Soviets in this region. TheShah, with the largest navy in thearea, while stating his belief that therewill be no vacuum following the British withdrawal because. he has thepower to fin it, cannot help but be concerned lest the Suez Canal be reopenedand Soviet naval forces now deployedin the eastern Mediterranean flowthrough the canal into the gulf andIndian Ocean.Shah s PolicyThe Shah s more neutral policy visa-vis the United States, while motivated, to a large extent, by his objection to US policy toward Pakistanover Kashmir, is also, in some measure, caused by his concern over thegrowing Soviet presence in the MiddleEast. In this respect, his policy is similar to that of the Turks who haveadopted a more conciliatory policytoward the St;lviets because of irritation over US policy toward Cyprus andthe growing evidence of Soviet navalpower in the eastern Mediterranean.The Soviets, in the likely event theSuez Canal is eventually reopened,would then be in a position to blockIran s sea route from its great oil refineries and shipping ports at the headof the gulf. t is one of the Shah sprincipal concerns to keep this routeopen. The Shah now has doubts thatthe United States has the will to con-

Military eview0


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ceive and carry out any policy to counter the Soviets or their potential Araballies in the area. From the point ofview of Iran-and, indeed, the othertraditional gulf states-it must look asthough the only policy of the UnitedStates is to hope for the best.Many in the area believe that theSoviet interest in the gulf is greaterthan that of the United States. and,symbolized by their growing navalpresence, the oviets will eventuallybecome the dominant power in thearea. In view of public opposition tomilitary commitments by the UnitedStates as a result of the war in Vietnam, few military poliCies are likelyto find any public or congressional acceptability, but it is clear that a minimum naval policy probably would bethe most acceptable politically. Eventhis type of policy would not be feasible until the war in Vietnam is endedor drastically phased down.

There can be little doubt that theprospect of Britain s withdrawal hasstimUlated Soviet interest in the Mediterranean. For example, in 1968, a Soviet naval force consisting of a cruiser,a missile-carrying frigate, and an antisubmarine vessel of the Pacific Fleetcruised for about four months in theIndian Ocean. The ships made calls at

TH P RSUlN GULF.

Madras, Bombay, Karachi, Colombo,Basra, and Umm Qasr in Iraq, theIranian port of Bandar Abbas, Aden,and Mogadishu in Somalia. The sO :viets have suggested that they intendto make frequent visits into the Persian Gulf.

The creation of a Soviet IndianOcean Fleet is a possibility that shouldbe taken into account. This would increase the threat of direct USSR political and military action within thegulf itself, and pose the danger of interference with the seaborne transportof oil through the Indian Ocean, thuspresenting further reason for continuing a matching Western capability inthis area. .

The Arab-Israeli dispute, as potentially explosive and important as it is,has served to obscure an area of theMiddle East which, because of itsgreat wealth and unresolved localclaims, could become a serious sourceof local conflict which might eventuallydrag in the great powers. The Westshould not wait until conflict ensuesbefore endeavoring to show its interestin stability in the region by meansother than mere pronouncements tothe states in the area that we wishthem all well.

June 197 21


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~ . ~ I r ' ~rom Westinghouse Advam ed Studies Group MonographSeries

WHY TH U S S U R ~A RE Moscow and Peking, whoserelations have deteriorated instages since 1958, now stopping atthe brink? While there have beenpauses and even reverses in deteriorating relations between the two sides,the long-term trend has been togreater and deeper antagonism.

What distinguished the recent phasefrom those that preceded it was thatboth protagonists were willing to engage in actions designed to embarrassthe other, make him appear weak andirresolute, and thus lessen his credibility and standing in the international Communist movement, as wellas in the field of foreign relations.Strong terms of opprobrium havebeen flung back and forth betweenPeking and Moscow The Soviets

Peter Mayer

were deemed to have become fascistrenegades and revisionist fascistbandits. . Their armed forces weretermed Soviet hoodlum troops, andthe regime was dubbed a revisionistrenegade clique. The Soviets reciprocated in somewhat milder language;they merely


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the least inhibition to their quarrel.The depth and intensity which thatquarrel reached might best be gleanedin an examination of the various actions each side engaged in vis-a-visthe other, and a discussion of possiblemotives for such actions.

Since the border clashes constitutedthe most important single series ofevents within Sino-Soviet relationsin recent years, these can be taken asa point of departure. From a carefulreading of all the evidence that hasbeen assembled so far it appears virtually indisputable that the ChinesePeople's Republic troops attacked theUSSR's territory on Damansky Islandon 2 March and subsequently, as wellas other Soviet frontiers at subsequenttimes. However, it is the Chinese whocharged the Soviets with aggression,and did so in a manner hardly calculated to soothe the strong feelings en-

This article was condll1l8edfrom the original, published inthe WESTINGHOUSE ADVANCEDSTUDIES GROUP MONOGRAPH SE-RIES Waltham, MassaehJusetts,Dec;mber 1969 under the title,Why the Ussuri?: Reflectionson the Latest Sino-Soviet Fracas 'Dr. Mayer, formerly withWe8tinghouse Electric Corporation, Advanced Studie8 Group,received his Ph. D from the Univer8ity of California Berkeley,where he specialized in Communist affairs. From 1961. to 1968.he was an Assistant Professor ofPolitical Science at Wichita StateUniversity. He s the author ofSino-Soviet Relations Since theDeath of Stalin and Cohesion andConflict in International Communism, A Study of MarxistLeninist Concepts and TheirApplication.

une 1970

WHY THE USSURI

gendered on both sides of the dispute.China claimed that:The fact that the Soviet revisionistrenegade clique h s repeatedly carried out armed intrusions into China'sterritory to create border incidentsh s once again enabled the peoplethroughout the world to see clearlythat this handful of renegades areout-aruJ,.out social imperialists andnew tsars pure and simple ,

zech InvasionThe Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was cited to prove the aggressive nature of the Soviet state. Instead of an unbiased analysis of Moscow's intentions, the Chinese mediaresorted to vituperation:Fascist white terror reigns in Soviet 80ciety today. t the end of itsrope, the Soviet revisionist renegadeclique is feverishly '/Wacticing socialfascism at home and crueUy BUPfWessing the broad masses of the Sovietworking people in order to maintainits tottering reactionary rule and'/Wess ahead Vigorously with socia/'imperialism abroad. These counterrevolutionary tyrannical acts arearousing the stiff resistance of theSoviet people.'The Soviets, on the other hand, wereblunt and most specific. Among all theverbiage about the original activitiesof Mao Tse-tung's gangsters, twolines stand out in sharp relief. Firstthe Soviets contended that Pekinginitiated the action on the Ussuriagainst Damsnsky Island in order todeftect attention from internal difficulties that continually plagued themainland. They further claimed itwas done to divert the Chinese people'sattention from the illegal maneuvers, employed before and during

&wletD, 7 March 1969, p 6.S Peking llfn:MtD April 1969.

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WHY THE USSURI

the convocation of the Ninth ChineseCommunist Party Congress, to breakwith established ''legality'' and to se-cure Mao's personal rule. The follow-ing official statement sets both toneand content of the Soviet charge:These criminal actions by Mao

anti-Soviet hysteria, it will be easierto impose on the Congress a platformhostile to the Soviet Union and theCPSU and to legitimize anti-Sovietism as a state policy.The second Soviet contention wasthat the actions against Damansky

Boldal l id r.chThe Soviets used heW:opters aud armored reeounaissanee vehie\es to patrol the U ssuriRiver 1969Tse-tung s group have far-reachingobiectiv68. The il n , . are trying tocreate an atmosphere in their coun-try that would enable tT m to distractthe Chin68e peOPle s atterttion fromthe huge economic and political fa11-ures inside the country and to consolidate Mao Tse-tung s great-yower ad-venturiat course aimed at furtherworsening relations with the socialistand other peace-loving countries.And it is not mere chance, ofcourse, that the provocation on theSoviet-Chinese border was staged during the period of preparations for the

Ninth CCP Congress. It is 61Iidentlyezpected that in an atmosphere of

Island were instituted specifically toemIiarrass the Soviet Union abroad:The new dangerous provocations bythe Maoists are also indicative oftheir striving to step up their unprincipled politicai flirting with the imperialist states, in particular with theUnited States and the FRG. t is noteworthy that the villainous armed raidon the Soviet-Chinese border wastimed by the Maoists to coincide withBonn s provocative presidential elec-tions in West Berlin

n oft.stressed theme: see espeefaIbr Leonid MZamntin, chief of the press section of the USSRForelp Ministry, as reported In Prut'do, 8 Mareb1969, from which the excerpted section s quoted.Prtlvoo. 8 Mareh 1969. Editorial, ProvocativeSaIb of Peking Authoritl

MilItary RevIew4


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The barely veiled charge containedin the last statement bears closeranalysis. The evidence, obviously, iscircumstantial. However, since 1962,the two major Communist powers badbeen engaged in a deadly seriousstruggle aimed at undermining theopponent's credibility within theinternational Communist movementand thus at a diminution of its power.Propaganda PurposesA recent (1968) manifestation ofthis policy was the Peking claim thatanti-Soviet (Marxist-Leninist) Com-munist Parties based in several of theEast European party-states and inthe USSR itself had been founded. Theprime purpose of these parties wasfor propaganda purposes, and thepropaganda was geared against theindigenous regime, with the claimedsupport of the people of the nation.

These parties published, throughthe Chinese press, manifestos andnews, botho of which echoed Peking'sline, and both of which stressed extreme hostility to the USSR. TheCommunist movement bad become abattleground for influence betweenMoscow and Peking, in which noteven the territorial integrity of theparty-states was respected.The Ussuri incident of 2 March1969 represented a new stage in thatstruggle, not because of what happened-border clashes were endemicbut, rather, because of the timing andexecution of the action itself.

The long Sino-Soviet border wasdisputed practieally in its entirety.Among the claims and counterclaims,even the rivers, usually obvious demarcation lines, had come under challenge. Peking claimed the frontier tolie in midatream; the Soviets declaredthe unequal treaties to have grantedune 197

WHY THE USSURI

them the entire stream, leaving onlythe left bank to the Chinese.There ean be no question that . asfar as suzerainty was concerned, disputed, uninhabited Damansky Islandhad been under Soviet jurisdictionsince 1917, and Russian since theunequal treaties. The Chinese People's Republic informed the USSR asearly as 1968 that the territories -quired by the czars under the unequaltreaties had not been forgotten bythe irredentist indigenous regime.This should have served as a clearwarning that the Sino-Soviet frontiers of czarist days were unacceptableto the Peking regime, and that revision thereof would gain priority asstrained mutual relations turned evermore hostile.ction SurmisedNor was Chinese action againstDamansky Island entirely unexpected.Frontier guards had, for the pastseveral months, pushed onto Sovietterritory, only to be expelled by bor

der guards. But on 2 March, Pekingaltered the script. The Soviet chargethat their opponents opened fire seemscredible; most accounts agree that theSoviets lost some 80 men killed inthat first engagement. t seems reasonable to suppose that, were thislimited action to have been instigatedby the USSR, casualty figures wouldhave been much lower.The next question is, What possiblebenefit might the Chinese have derived from the attack? The answerseems to be twofold. The first was attaining maximum internal cohesionat the Ninth Congress, and even sothere developed concerted opposition,judging from the unprecedented number of ballots required to elect theCentral Committee. This is usually afunction that takes place under a

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WHY TH _RI

show frontier guards in tile DamausIIy Islandarea maintaining while studying the words of Mao Tse-tungfacade of ''monolithic unity" amongthe "fraternal" delegates. The secondbenefit was derived from specifically,embarrassing the Soviets in the international arena.

The year 1968 had seen a furtherdeterioration in Sino-Soviet relations.Evidence for that statement can befound on both the verbal and practical levels. On the first, the presses ofboth Communist states disparagedthe integrity and intentions of therival in increasingly harsh terms; few,if any, subjects remained-taboo; andthe number and frequency Of v t u ~ -ative articles increased markedly,especially in the Soviet press (theChinese barrage h d begun earlier,and was continued).The Chinese were intent to opposeSoviet hegemony wherever possible

in the international Communist move-ment, among the party-states, and inthe world at large. Examples rangefrom support of the Czech "people"against the Soviet aggressors, tobottlenecks in Soviet supplies forVietnam and renunciation of most, ifnot all, direct and indirect participation in that war.During an earlier phase of the dispute, before the open polemics cameto be initiated and just after the 1962Cuban missile crisis, Peking remainedcontent to direct its criticisma againstbona tide Kremlin policy errors. Subsequently, however, the Chinese were. not that tolerant. In the Ussuri crisis,they demonstrated that they werequite prepared to intervene in Sovietaffairs when the opportunity presenteditself, provided that the risks involved

MIlItIIy -.evll.8


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remained at a rather low and manageable order of magnitude.One question which needed to beasked about that specific crisis is.Why did it occur at that particulartime and place? After all. no majorterritory or principles were involved.Yet. on the face of the evidence. asmall. insignificant event carried connotations and resulted in repercussions which far transcended its original importance. The attacks wererepeated later that m()nth; borderfighting broke out elsewhere; andSoviet citizens demonstrated outsidethe Chinese Embassy in Moscow without. for once, drawing a counterresponse in Peking.West German lectionIn this instance, whether intentionally or unintentionally. the Chinesehad scored a major triumph in theirquarrel with the Soviets. But the realbattlefield was not the SinO-Sovietfrontier, but faraway Berlin. wherethe West Germans had announcedthey would hold the election on 5March for the Presidency of theFederal Republic of Germany (FRG).Both the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) haddenounced that intention as utterlyillegal. The Soviet position was explicitly stated in a text handed bySemyon K Tsarapkin. USSR Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, to Chancellor Kurt G Kiesingeron 15 February.The text termed the procedure agross violation of the four-poweragreement" and predicted the mostundesirable consequences" unless theelection was relocated.No state in this world elects itspresidents on someone ekle s territory The whole lIenture was nee-eSS4f 11 only to re4fjilrm 4btmrd 4ndJUl 1870

WHY TH USSURI

bankropt cmi1ll8 to the city, which h snot belonged, doB8 not belcmg, 4ntJ,-for obvious rea8onB-Catmot belongto the FRG

The illegal intriguB8 o the FRGin West Berlin halle been and w ll beresolutely rebuffed by the S01lietUnion Opposition MountsBoth Communist powers. the USSRand the GDR, announced that theelection would be opposed by all conceivable means. Shortly after the notewas delivered, both Soviets and EastGermans declined to accept any re-sponsibility whatsoever for the safetyof the presidential electors on theirflight into West Berlin. The Sovietpress was replete with veiled threatsof dire. but unspecified, consequence.To that end, the East Germans,quite obviously backed by the USSR,began to interfere seriously withtraffic in and out of West Berlin inlate Februari. causing delays of several hours. At the same time, i t wasannounced that illegal war materieland related items were manufacturedin West Berlin. East German authorities pledged themselves to end thetraffic, thus providing a ''legal'' excusefor traffic delays caused by searchesfor "illegal" merchandise.At the same time, the Soviets announced that joint Soviet-East German "maneuvers" would take placewithin the confines of the GDR. morespecifically within the vicinity of Berlin. Statements expressing these various policies were often explicitlylinked to the "nefarious" activitiesof the Bonn "warmongers" and "revanchists' "illegal attempts" to holdtheir presidential elections within theconfines of West Berlin.

,..,, ' 18 Feb.....,. 1989. See aIoo ,..,,""'" 88Feb.....,. 1969.7


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. THE USSURI

The crescendo of such articles andstatements, both in the East Germanand Soviet news media, and their implacably hostile tone, left no doubtthat both Communist Parties haddeeply committed their prestige andresources to m x i m ~ l pressures onboth West Berlin and the FRG inorder to force the German authorities

of threatened intervention in theWest German election was fortuitous.Only the specter of a serious threatcould possibly have induced the Com-munist High Command to cancel itscarefully prepared plans.t may thus be safely postulated

that the Soviets perceived the Chineseaction on the Ussuri, which coincided

East German guards block an autobahn route to Berliu protesting the West GermanU e of Berlin as the site of their presidential elections in Mareh 1969

to convene their election in another with the West Berlin election, as alocation. The two Germanies even prime challenge. The major thrust ofentered into semiofficial negotiations, Soviet policy-military, economic, butan unheard of procedure, on this especially propagandistic-wheeledissue. and faced its adv!i'rsary in the East.Yet, on 2 March. the threats. 'the And the Soviet military buildup ontanks, and the frenzied preparations the Chinese frontier, already impresto prevent the "illegal" election sive, was rapidly expanded.6abruptly ceased. The news media, The reason for such a completewhile still covering the news, no longer about-face is readily apparent. Thepersisted in a threatening attitude. t entire Soviet strategic position isis surely too much of a coincidence to

G The N :ron. Ti ay 1969: Pekl o Bsuppose that such a complete reversal 11ie1D 8 J ay 1969, IMilitary eview8


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built on 1;he teachings of Karl vonClausewitz; the Kremlin has an absolute horror of multifrontal engagements. The question then turns onwhether or not Peking's action wasintentionally designed to foil MosI I}W'\\ Eutl}\\eIl.u \\latw..Such a concept is by no means inCl Ildibl ll. Th'll Chines'll wet'e certainlyaware that intervention on the Ussuriwould spell finish to whatever ambitions the Soviets might entertain overBerlin. Those ambitions had beenwidely and loudly proclaimed throughout the Soviet media.

New DimensionThe end of the maneuvers, and thebitter, utter silence which befell theentire operation, must have broughtboth satisfaction and acclaim to theChinese People's Republic. The satisfaction would come from havingmanaged once again to bring an enterprise-to which the Kremlin had publicly committed its prestige-to anignominious and precipitate halt. Theacclaim would lie in the fact that themeaning of their action was not loston the parties of the Communist movement. Such fulminations against Peking's "adventurism" served only tounderscore Soviet impotence to dealsuccessfully against Chinese acts designed to limit the USSR's influencewith friend and foe alike.Viewed in this perspective, Peking'saction on the Ussuri assumes a newdimension. Both sides put out feelersaimed toward negotiations.7 The Soviets had no concrete advantages tobe gained on the barren wastes ofthe Ussuri; the objective of the Chinese was strictly delimited. Onceunderway, negotiations, even if fruitless, would provide a face-saving device to end a confrontation which, if

7 P l4 80 :March 1969.une 1970

WHY TIlE USSURI?carried beyond its original intention,might provoke the USSR to overreactstrongly. The Soviets proposed threeagendas for negotiation: .

To convene the already established and previously functioning-civet ( .1}mm.i\\siI}U to adjudiell.te uavigational disputes. 'l'n lmld a bt'OOIiet' based, higMt'level commission to adjudicate theborder disputes. To call a conference between theChinese and Soviet Parties in orderto discuss the entire spectrum of SinoSoviet differences.As a result of these Soviet initiatives, a meeting on riparian rightswas held in June 1969, and an agreement was reached on navigation ofthe Amur and Ussuri Rivers alongthe Soviet-Chinese borders.Soviet BetrayalThe actions of the CommunistParty of China are readily comprehensible when their single most crucial charge, often repeated againstMoscow, is remembered: the Sovietshad betrayed the revolution, had restored capitalism, and thus had lostthe right to speak for internationalcommunism. But that is confined tothe ideological realm as it waspreached from Peking. In practice,the Soviets, not the Chinese, held'first priority on the allegiance of international o m m u n i s m ~ t h e statesas well as the parties.Such a situation was intolerable tothe fervently proselytizing Chinese towhom theory and practice formed anintrinsic whole in the dialectical spectrum. Yet, Soviet, not Chinese, powerheld down the party-states in EastEurope, and the Kremlin's moneyfilled the coffers of the internationalCommunist movement. Thus, Communists the world over, from individ

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uals to groups, from parties to partystates, were forced to accede, to agreater or lesser extent, to the bidding of the Soviet "revisionists" and"renegades."

That Peking was willing to redressthat balance in any manner whichcame to hand was proved by Chinesesupport of the Czech "people" in theirstruggle against the Soviet invadersand occupiers8.-.even though it musthave been obvious to the CommunistChinese leaders that the people ofCzechoslovakia were farther advancedon the scale of revisionism than their"revisionist" suppressors, and thuseven more hostile to the Chinese thanto the Soviet brand of communism.Circumstantial vldencoThe evidence which can be adducedfor the thesis that the Chinese at-tacked on the Ussuri in order to forcea Soviet retreat in Europe must remain circumstantial. It does, however,point in the direction of an attemptto undermine the Soviet leadershipof the Communist bloc. Certainly, theattack was well planned, and Chineseruling circles were absolutely prepared to take full and immediate advantage of all favorable opportunitieswhich the new situation, created bythe attsck, offered.

Nor has anyone claimed that Peking was seriously concerned to recapture territory which the regimeconsidered legitimately its own Hadthat been the case, the att8cks shouldhave been mounted along more disparate, wider sections of the SinoSoviet border. The rather narrowlimits of the Chinese action indicatedthat as far as foreign policy was coneerned, their aims were met in theaction of 2 March. The later fighting

Psf ing _ and 18 April 1969. 5 ay1969.

was Soviet instigated and designedto impress upon Peking that Sovietborders could not be violated with impunity. Yet, from its own vantagepoint, Peking's original premise thatsuch an attack promised great gain,at little risk, proved correct; theKremlin would on no account risk thepossibility, however remote, of simultaneous confrontation on two widelyseparated fronts.

What of the future? Both sidesbacked off from the brink of possiblewar when they agreed, in the wake ofAleksei N. Kosygin's visit to Peking,

Soviet miBSile .:rew at training exercise.Similar Soviet units were rushed to theChinese border region after the Ussunelashes.to initiate general negotiations ontheir boundary disputes. There appears to be concern by both Sovietand Chinese leaders to reach an agreement on border questions. For China,this is seen as a major conciliatorystep.

Before the feelers for a mP oche- ootwere put out, both the Sovietsand the Communist Chinese were


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showing concern about the implications of other tendencies withinthe Communist movement for theirrespective interests. The general picture was not reassuring. The organizational structure of the Communist. movement lacked the bureaucraticframework that could enable thewhole to subsist in adversity, even inconditions of disintegration of itsparts.9imited SuccessThe Council for Economic Mutual

Assistance and the Warsaw TreatyOrganization were limited and parochial in that they encompassed onlythe European party-states, the USSR,and Mongolia. Yet, within these limits,the two organizations had been successful in enforcing minimal unityamong the diverse factions of themembership. Even Romania had beenforced to acknowledge the principleof solidarity among the Communiststates while, at the same time, put'ting every conceivable obstacle in thepath of the Kremlin's proposed socialist commonwealth -the latestversion of which is expressed in theBrezhnev doctrine.

Even though the Chinese had nothad a direct role in this struggle forsome time, -it concerned them intimately. Again, a great deal can belearned from past institutional behavior.The meeting of the ruling Communist Parties in 1957, and the generalconference of the Communist movement in 1960, produced two documents (Declaratilm, 1957;10 State 1la7er. CoAuiott. 4ftd ConJliet in ItlCet'........... C ,,, ..;.,,,, A SWdw 1 MGr.riof-Lonln1otCOfICfJPt. and TMlir ApplkGtion. The Bane .Netherlands. JrlartfnU Nfjho1r* 1968. I t 228.

10 Declaratlon o f Communist and Workers'Parties of SociaUst Countries,f New CenturyPublish.... N. Y.. 1957: _r ln ted from PoI'I 'AIltJirll. December 1957.Junl 1870

mtIfIt 196011) which set forth theterms of Sino-Soviet cooperation inthe realms of ideology, strategy andtactics, and interparty organization.ess than three years later. in June

1968, delegates from the CommunistParties of the Soviet Union and Chinamet in Moscow in an unsuccessfulattempt to resolve the widening rift.llISince that time, both parties haverepeatedly called for consultations.Yet neither side saw fit to accommodate itself to the other: each opposedany meeting proposed by the other.Soviet PlotThus, the Chinese viewed Sovietproposals for a meeting of the o m ~munist movement, or a conference ofselected Communist Parties, sa hatching a big plot for openly splitting thesocialist camp, as part of a Sovietplot to accelerate an open split, andas a first step to the ''final open splitthat will destroy themovement.18Thevery innocuous consultative meetingamong a limited number of the Communist Parties, which finally convened in March 1965, was denouncedin the strongest terms as though itthreatened to reimpose the Kremlin'shegemony over a monolithic partystate communism which would, ofcourse, include China.Similarly, Peking had refused tocooperate in the preparations for theinternational meeting of the parties,continually postponed, which finallymet in June 1969.The Soviets promptly broke theirpromise, made to the Albanians, to

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criticize neither Tirana nor Pekingat the conference. Thus, the congress,supposedly called to discuss Communist unity, became another steppingstone in the direction of polycentrism.Tbe Kremlin seemed intent to carryits version of Communist orthodoxywithin the Communist movement tothe point of disaffection of one or moreof the independent Communist Parties, and where even the organizationadherence of the Romanian Communist Party became a matter of conjecture.Nevertheless, Moscow was stillready to pursue a course of minimalhostility toward its major ideologicalprotagonist. The June negotiations onSoviet-Chinese riparian rights areproof of t h t ~ the Soviets faced moreimmediate problems, and threats,than those presented by. the borderissue. Nor was the move toward negotiation a meaningful step leading toward an understanding with the Chinese; rather, it fell into the categoryof nuisance abatement -that is, ofan attempt to settle differences at the

marginal, thus less sensitive, level.All that the June meeting achieved,as already noted, was a minimal riparian agreement.

The fact remains that the SinoSoviet dispute is not just a strugglebetween two nation-states. It is noteven an ideological struggle. Rather,its primary. importance, at least tothe protagonists, lies in the competition for the minds and allegiance ofthe components that comprise the international Communist movement.In that struggle, ideological andpower motives merge. The merger iseffected, in part, because of the beliefsystem which postulates communismas the wave of the future, eventually and inevitably to swallow upall of mankind. And from that belief,it is but a small, logical extension toinsist that one's own s1de controls theforces in command of the ''historicprocess. Tbus, power and ideologycombine to form the ultimate commandto the struggling Communist elites:He who controls the movement controls history.

SUBSCRIBERSAvoid the inconvenience of renewing your subscription each year. Write toThe Book Department, U. S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeFort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 requesting conversion to the AutomaticRenewal Plan.

Military eview2


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POLITICS ND CULTUREIN SOUTHE ST SIMajor Harry G. Summers Jr., n ed States rmy

T THE root of many of our difficulties in making an ac-curate assessment of political realities in mainland South-east Asia Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Thai-land, and Vietnam) is our difficulty in understanding the peculiarpolitical culture or the distinctive national style of these coun-tries. Lacking this knowledge, we confuse form for substance,and accept meanings for labels that have no basis in reality.Eighteen years ago, Professor Filme1: S. C. Northrop, ofYale University, wrote that the success of the Communists inAsia was due, in large part, to their great initial effort at under-standing any culture they hoped to take over, including innerbeliefs, basic tenets, and mentality, as well as outer forma and

Cop _ t @ 1970 by 1IIajor liarlY G. Summ J r United States Army AURishts Reserved.une 1970 33


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The war haa weakened the authority of the father and threatens traditional familyloyaltiesposing poles of human behavior. Fromthis concept, we tend to see the worldin terms of absolutes.We believe that we prove our worthin the world through practical achievements through work. As the German sociologist Max Weber pointedout, a man's existence is justified bythe work he accomplishes in life.* Webelieve in men of action, and in theefficacy of work as a cure for socialills. We distrust the purely intellectual scholar and take little stock inhis interference with the business oflife. We esteem the individual andprize individualism as a virtue. Weconsider following the herd themark of an inferior man.

~ e b e r T P n _ n t E ~ and thel / s O ~ a p i U J - . Allen Unwin. London.

We see ourselves as open, practicalpeople who look forward to changeas an important and necessary partof modern life. We esteem deeds overwords. We value materialism, and theaverage American is so rich in material wealth that is life is unbelievable to the majority of the world.Immensely more irritating tI theworld is the fact that we are largelyunaware of our good fortune and tendto accept it as a ~ r of course and.a natural right.

The US historical experience hashad a profound effect on our nationalattitudes. Our original Anglo-Saxonorigins. our revolutionary heritage,our belief in the primacy of the com-mon man and our pioneer spirit dis-played in the conquest of the West

Junl 187 35


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POLITICS ND CULTUREhave reinforced our picture of the superior man as a man of action. Thishistorical experience also has providedthe foundation of our political beliefs.

From the beginning of the American Nation, the military services werethe tool the action arm of the civilian Government. Even in the face ofIndian threats, the Military Establishment was subordinate to the civilian Government. The concept of civilian supremacy over the militaryforces is so deeply ingrained in ournational character that it is acceptedas a basic truth.Military ProtectorThis is not so in many countries ofthe world where the country beganits existence under military tutelage,and civilian government was the creation of the military overseer. In thesecountries, the military eIement looksupon itself as the protector and guardian of the nation, and deems it its dutyto step in when, in its opinion, thecivilian government is no longer capable of ruling. This phenomenon hasoccurred in recent years in Korea,Indonesia, Greece, several of thllLatin-American countries, and theRepublic of Vietnam. Military coupsare not, necessarily viewed in thesame light in these countries as theyare in the United States.Another aspect of our Anglo-Saxon'heritage is that of the ''loyal opposition. t is possible, although not always popular, to be o ~ p l e t e l y inopposition to every facet of Americanpolitical life and still be consideredloyal to the country. While we takethis as a matter of course, such opposition is equated with treason in themajority of the world. The ferment,the dynamic change created in our

p o l i ~ i c l life by opposition, has keptour political process alive and vibrant.

StiJI another concept is that ofno lesse oblige the obligation ofthose in authority to behave honorably and generously toward theirsubordinates. This concept, reinforcedby our Judeo-Christian ethic, andstrengthened by our Anglo-Saxonheritage, has broadened into the ideathat government exists for the benefitof the governed. Neither governmentnor politicians are sacred in Americanlife.The net effect of these various, andby no means all-inclusive, facets ofour political culture is to produce adynamic, modern society oriented toward the future. Science and technology are valued, and innovation islooked upon as a natural and almostessential part of our national life.Utopia, if it exists at all in our national conscience, exists in the future,

This is the bare framework of ourpolitical culture. t is through the lensformed by this culture that we viewSoutheast Asia. This lens tends togive a distorted picture of reality.Common DenominatorsThe most striking common denominator of mainland Southeast Asia ispovertY. Although one-third the geographical size of the United States,and over one-half as large as theUnibid States in population, mainlandSoutheast Asia is only one-fiftieth aswealthy as the United States in grossnational product the total goods andservices produced. On an individualbasis, the average American is 8times as rich as the average Southeast Asian. The average per capitagross national product of the UnitedStates in 1968 was $4,240 while theaverage per capita gross national product in mainland Southeast Asia was$149.The presence in some countries of

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PO mcs ND CULTUREb values with the majority group.Large ethnic Chinese minorities existin all Southeast Asian countries.Large tribal minorities exist in most

of the countries. Not so apparent isthe effect these groups have on the ma-jority. When a person can acbieve status solely on the basis of race or tribeor by being bom into a majoritygroup, then the strength of the majority group is weakened.n the United States, a man can nolonger achieve status solely by being

bom white, and no longer can a manbe denied status solely by being bomblack. In general, status must beearned through work. A Vietnamesecan achieve status by_deprecating thehill tribes or looking down on theCambodians. A Burman builds his egoby vilifying a Karen or Shan tribesman. The Chinese minorities lookdown upon all Southeast Asians assemicivilized barbarians. The crosscurrents arising from the existence ofminority groups wesken the culturalfabric of the various nations. How didthese minority groups come about?rossroads of ivilizationt the beginning of recorded his-tory, Southeast Asia was populatedby tribes of Khmer, Indonesian, andAustraloid stock. The first known civilization on the mainland was theKingdom of Funan, located in what isnow southeastem Cambodia and theMekong Delta region of Vietnam. Invaders from Java conquered the areafor a time until the Khmers, in 802,

threw out their Javanese overlordsand began their climb to empire. l, hevast temples at Aug-kor Wat werebuilt, and the Khmer Empire controlled most of mainland SoutheastAsia.Under pressure from the expandingChinese Empire to the north, tribes

of Mongoloid stock -began migrationssouth into the peninsula. The firstgroup to move south were the NamViets from South China, beginningin the third century B.C. Movingfrom river delta to river delta, theypushed the native tribea before them.By the beginning of the 19th century,the Viet people had reached their present borders in the Mekong Delta.Thai MigrationThe next major invasion was theThai peoples. Under pressure fromthe Mongol conquerors of China, theThai migration reached its height inthe 13th century. Thai peoples, especially Shan tribesmen, moved intoBurma and ruled that country forseveral hundred years. The Thai alsomoved south, pushing the Khmer inhabitants before them, and established the Kingdoms of Lanna (Laos)and Siam (Thailand). In the 15thcentury, Angkor Wat was sacked byThai armies, and the priests were carried away into captivity. By the 19thcentury, the Khmer people had beenforced back into wbat is today Cambodia.In the meantime, the Burmans descended-from the heights of Tibet into present-day Burma. By the 18thcentury, they had subdued the Thaiinvaders and had set up their ruleover the original Mon inhabitants.Wars followed upon wars as theinvaders battled for the spoils. TheThai capital was destroyed by the Burmans in 1767, and the Burman invaders were not expelled from Thailand until 1780. The Cambodians weredominated by a Thai-Vietnamese coalition, and only the intervention ofthe French in the 19th century prevented the complete dissolution of theCambodian nation. Nationalism, mutual distrust, and ancient feuds are

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part of the historical heritage of mainland Southeast Asia.Cultural invasions also have sweptacross mainland Southeast Asia. Thefirst was Hinduism. Indian princeswere instrumental in setting up the

POLmCS ND CULTURE

Mahayana (the Greater Vehicle)Buddhism swept China. In1Iuenced byChinese Taoist teachings, MahayanaBuddhism is more Byzantine n its -liefs, with much pomp pageantry,and ceremony. This form of Bud-

Kingdom of Funan in about the firstcentury in the Mekong Delta area.The Khmer people were converted toHinduism, and the religion spread.By the sixth century, however, Hinduism was replaced by Buddhism.After Buddha s death, two principal schools of Buddhism arose. Hinayana (the Lesser Vehicle) was closerto the original Hindu roots and tothe original teachings of Buddha.This form of Buddhism is the religionof all mainland Southeast Asia ex-cept Malaysia and Vietnam.

Jan 187

dhism is practiced In China, Korea,Japan, and Vietnam.From the eighth century onward,the Islamic Moguls raided and conquered India and parts of SoutheastAsia. Malaya, Indonesia, and the

southern Philippines were broughtunder the Islamic faith.The diverse cultural forces twork In this area are shown in thecultural Invasions diagrsm. Religionwas not the only legacy of these invasions. Hinayana Buddhist textswritten in Pali, a form of Sanskrit,

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formed the basis of the written languages of Burma, Laos, Thailand, andCambodia. Malaysia and Indonesia,on the other hand, use a form of Jawi,the Arabic script of the Koran. InVietnam, the ancient Chinese Mahayana texts introduced Chinese writing into the country. Jfhe Vietnameselanguage was written in Chinesecharacters until Romanization was introduced in the 17th century. Literature and art forms were other heritages of these cultural invasions.Imperial ConfucianismIn addition to the religious heritagereceived from China, the Confucianphilosophical heritage also was passedto Vietnam. Confucius built his philosophy around the family which wasthe basic economic unit of society. Heformulated the Golden Rule, andpreached the Golden Mean theavoidance of extremes in all matters.Individualism was a sin; the familywas all important. His teachings thatthe ruler governed through the powerof his moral authority made theAnglo-Saxon concept of loyal oppositiolJ impossible

military review june 1970

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