military review october 1966

7/27/2019 Military Review October 1966

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October 66


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UNI TEDSTATESARMYCOMMANDAND6ENERALSTAFFCOLLEGE,FORTLEAVENWORTH, ANSAS

COMMANDANT Major General Michael S. DavisonASSISTANT Ct)MMANDANT

Brigadier General Robert C. Taber

The Mili tary Review is publ ished by the United States Army Command and GeneralStaff College in close association with the United States Army War College. It provides aforum for the expression of military thought on national and military strategy, nationalsecurity affairs, and on doctrine with emphasis at the division and higher levels of command.

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Military ReviewProfessional Journal ofthe US Army

Mi l i t a ry Campaigns . . . . , . . . . . . . . Anthony Sas 3UN Peace Forces and Inter nat ional Law . . LTC Joseph k ! . Corvi no, USA 8Return of the North Sea Ghosts , . . . . . . . Lesl ie Anders 19Two Wiews on Wiot nam:

Let s lear n From t he French . . . . (JOL Charles P. Biggie, Jr. , USA 27

Mal hrovslrys Manc hurfan Campaign . . . . . Raymond L. Garthof f 5D

A Dragon Wit h Nucl ear Teeth . COL Chien Cheng, Republic of China Army 1$

Choose Your Weapon . . . . . . COL St anl ey W. Dziub an, USA, Ret 9D

M i l i t ary Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1D7

Spec t er of Dien Bien Phu . . . . . COL Wil l iam F. Long, Jr., USA 35leader ship . . . . . . . . GEN M att hew B. Ridgw ay, USA, Ret 411

Nucl ear Weapons Sharing . . . . . . . . . . W. B. Bader 62

Impli cat ions of t ho Developi ng f l reas . . . . LTC L. D. Overstr eet, USA 70

Soviet Defense Pof i cy . . . . Marshal R. Y. Ivlal inovsky, Soviet Army 85

M Ni t aryNot es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

The VIEWS expressed in this me azine ARE THE AUTHORS and not necessari ly those of{ theUS Army or the Command and Genera Staff College. ..


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Editor in ChiefCOL Oonald J. Oelaney

Associat a Edit orCOL John B. Mcl(inneyArmy War College

Assistant EditorLTC A. Leroy Covey

Faatures EditorMAJ Charles A. Gatzka

Spanish.AmerioanEditorLTC Ren6 Ramos

Braci l i an Edit orsLTC ParrloA. F. VianaLTC Walter J. Faustini

Product ion Off ic erMAJ Norman C. Murray

Staff Art istCharles k Moore

MILITARY ffEVl!l-Published monthly by the U. S. Army Command and General Staff Colleae, Fort Leavenworth, Kansaa, in En Iiah, Spaniah, and Portuguese. Uae of funds for printing of this publication haateen approved by Hea quarters, Department of the Army, 28 May 1965.Second.claas postage aid at Fort Le?yenworth, Kansse. Subscription rates $4.00 (US currency) ayear in the United Statea, Brlte~ Statqa mlhtary rmat oflicea, and thoee cormtriea which$re members ofthe Pan.American Postal Umon (mc!udwrgSpain); $5.00 a year in all other countriqs amgle copy price50 canta. Address subscription mad to the Book Department, U. S. ArmY Commend and General StaffCollege, Fort Leavenworth, Kansaa 66027.


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(Extractedrom a speech by President Lyndon B. lohn-PEACEI NASIA son, Washington, D. C., 12 July 1966)I f enduring peace can ever come to Asia, al l mankind wil l benefit .

But i f peace f ai ls there, nowhere else wil l our achievements real ly besecure.

By peace in Asia I do not mean simply the absence of armed hostil it ies, For wherever men hunger and hate, there can really be no peace.

I do not mean the peace of conquest. For humiliation can be theseedbed of war.

I do not mean simply the peace of the conference table. For peaceis not real ly writt en merely in the words of treati es, but peace is theday-byday work of buil ders.

The peace we seek i n Asia is a peace of concil iat ion between Cornmunist stat es and their noncommunist neighbors, between r ich nationsand poor, between small nations and large, between men whose skinsare brown and black and yellow and whiter between Hindus and Moslems,and Buddhists and Christians.

It is a peace that can only be sustained through the durable bondsof peace: through international trade, t hrough the free f low of peopleand ideas, through ful l part ic ipation by al l nations in an internationalcommunit y under law, and through. a common dedicat ion to the greattask of human progress and economic development.


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PO - --- MI LI TARYoCAMPAI GNS

WAS Na poleon B ona part e w hoITonce said that the secret of warlies in the secret of communications.This maxim has been valid wheneverand wherever armies faced one another, but i t hae frequently been ignored by military leaders. An outstanding example of the negative atti tude regarding this dictum is thatof the G erma n an d I ta l ian High C ommands with respect to the Mediterranean theater of operat ions duringt he S econd World Wa r. .When G erma n tr oops-w ith t okenhelp from the I tal ianshad victoriously concluded t he cam pa ign in Western E urope by th e end of J une 1940,the next logical step in trying to endthe war successfully would have beenthe defeat of Great Britain. Thismight have been accomplished by direct invasion ,acrose th e E nglish Ch a nnel, but with few exceptions al l thehigh er w a r lea ders of t he Third ReichOctober 1966

AnthonySas

Pw ere lukew a rm, i f not cold, regar dingsuch a n endea vor. Thie is w itn eseedby the uncoordinated planning andlack of cooperation among the threeservices. Aft er fut ile effort s ,of t heLuftwaffe to bomb England into submission, the invasion was postponed,a nd G erman mil ita ry pla nners on orders from Adolf H itler bega n to focustheir attention upon Eastern Europe,specifically the Soviet Union.After th e >direct a ssault upon th eB ri t ish Is les wa s a ban doned in thelat e summer of 1940, some high-ra nking Germans, including Grand Admira l E rich Ra eder, pointed out t ha tB rita in could eti l l be dealt a pow erful,if not mortal, blow. This could he accomplished by severing her vital east-west line of communications throughthe Mediterranean Sea by occupyingthe British-held bases of Gibraltarand Ma l t a .


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Such a ma neuver would interdicta significant part of Allied, especiallyB ritish, eea borne tra Sic to a nd fromthe Middle and Far Eaet, forcing itto take the long route via the Cape ofGood Hope. I t might, moreover, aiddeterm ined milita ry effort s on the par tof th e MIS from Libya int o E gypt

G ra nd Ada drsl E rich R eeder recognizedtie str a tegicva lueof 4Xbra ltersnd ?da ltaand the Nile Valley. This would deprive B rita in of t he use of t he SuezCanal, threaten her petroleum eourcesin the Middle Eaet, and pose a flanking threat to the Soviet Union.

Anthony SW ti Associate Professorof Geography at the Univeraitg ofSonth Caro13mzat Columbia. He holdsa Ph. D. in Geographg from Cfnrk?hiVeT8itU, WOYCe8tOT,Ma88fEChIWette;and ha been on the Geography 8taffat the Un$vemitg of Bfa@awd, andat Madimn CoUege, Harrieonburg,Virginia. Thie article, writtctt whilehe woe a member of Madison CoUege,was made poemble, in part, through areeearch grant from that college.

I t was suggeeted tha t an a t temptbe made to take Gibra l tar by paratroopers backed by forcee that hadcroesed Spain. However, after protra cted negotia t ion with Spa niehleadere, thie plan wae eventuaUydropped because the Spanish demandsfor euch collaboration proved to beexceesive and unrealistic.Strat egic Locat i onFrom a tactical standpoint, an occupation of the island of Malta wouldha ve been eimpler to car ry out th a na n a eea ult upon G ibra l tar . S t ra t egically, i t would certainly have beenmost beneficia l t o th e Axis ca use. Thisrocky ieland w ith a n ar ea of a bout100 equare milee hae little to offer aefar as raw materia ls are concerned.P ra ctica lly a ll food a nd fuel muet beimported. I te location made Maltastr a tegica lly import a nt eince it ie onlyabout 60 miles south of Sicily, about200 miles n orthea et of Tripoli inLibya , a nd a simila r dieta nce eaet ofTunieia. I t l ies about midway alongthe 2,200-mile-long sea route fromP ort Sa id and Alexandria to Gibraltar . During the war , i t formed a keylink in the Allied supply line, withdocking and repair facili t ies and arefueling baee.For tw o yea rsJ uly 1940 to m ideummer 1942-a n a tt empt on th e par tof the Axis to wreet thie etrategiccroeeroa ds from B ri t ish ha nda mighthave been crowned with eucceee. Theperiod between eummer 1940 andearly spring 1941 seemed especiallypropitious for such an end ea vor. TheG erma ns dur ing tha t t ime st i ll had a tt heir dieposa l a la rge force of high lytrained paratroopers that could havebeen employed in occupying the Britieh airbasee on the island.

E ven w hen th e great er par t of thiselite force wae ultimately deetroyedMiliity Review


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during th e stru ggle for G reece a ndCr ete in April a nd Ma y of 1941, aMalta inva sion m ight w ell ha ve succeeded. Axis a ifields a nd emba rka tion ports were only 60 to 70 milesa w a y in Sicily, a powerful Italian fleetwa s s ta t ioned on Ta ra nto, a nd theAxis enjoyed air superiority over themid-Mediterranean.I t is strange that so l i t t le attentionw a s paid to Malta -a part from bombing an d s t ra f ing ra ids+ ur ing thet ime tha t German and I ta l i an t roopsunder Field Ma rsha l E rw in Rommelfought their seesaw bat t les wi th theBritish in the Western Desert andCyrena ica . For , just as Malta w asvitally important to the Allied cause,a n Axis occupa t ion of t he islan d w ouldha ve sa fegua rded th e supply rout efrom Italy and Sicily to Libyan ports,thus assuring Field Ma rsha l RommelsAfvika Km-pa of much needed ma teriel and fuel.Invasion Pos@oned

It appears that a determined effortto invade the island was contemplatedonly once, and that was during theear ly summer of 1942 w hen F ield Ma rshal Rommel had enterad Egypt andwas poised for a thrust to Alexandriaa nd C a iro. B ut th e overconfident Axispar t ners decided to postpone t he Ma ltainvasion until the Nile Valley hadbeen captured with a f inal , l ightningthrusta thrust that never mater ia lized due to lack of fuel and armor,t he exha ust ed condit ion of Field Mar shal Rommels troops, and the determined stand by the Bri t ish a t ElAlamein.

A thorn in the side of the Axis,Malta held out, surviving air raids,severe privation, and near-starvation.That i t was never invaded is mainlydue to th e fa ct tha t H itler could notbe persua ded of t he stra tegic n eces

sity of a strong, continuous Mediterranean and North African war policy.His vacil lating and often negative atti tude for this theater of operationswas reflected in his considerations ofField Ma rsha l Romm els effort s a s buta sideshow, aimed at cont@ning tbeAllies with a minimum of men and

us .4TnwPhoto.Malta ceuld ha vea a fegusrdedth e supplyroute for Field Marsha lErw in RommelsAfrfka Korps

equipment. I t w a s not unt i l the Alliedla ndinga in M orocco a nd Algeria inlat e 1942 tha t he f ina lly aw a kened toth e import a nce of Nort h Africa , a ndtried to save Tunisia by pouringtroopa and armor into tbia battlefield.As for Allied strategy in the Med

iterranean theater after North Africahad been cleared of Axis troops int he spring of 1943, a noth er sta t ementcredit ed t o Na peleon comes to mind.U pon being a sked w hom he preferredto do bat t le against , the Emperor hadea id: Alliee, beea use t hey seldomagree.Oct obsr1966 !5


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Of course, this w a s not ent irely tru eduring World War II, for the Alliesa s far a s E urope wa s concerned w ereof one mind : t he uncondit iona l surrender of I ta ly a nd G erma ny. B ut itdid hold tr ue as to t he w a ys a nd meansof bringing this about.America n milita ry a nd politica lleadere were staunch advocates ofFranklin D. Roosevelt s strategy forE uropa -na mely, a knockout blow atG erma ny across the C ha nnel w hile a l loth er mili ta ry opera t ions in that thea ter w ere to be considered a s seconda ryin importance. Most of the British,and in particular Wineton Churchill ,favored the exploitation of any weakspot in the ar mor of th e enemy a ndso regarded Europes soft underbelly.The Soviet Union, clamoring for asecond front, obviously favored thecross-Channel invasion and, hence,played into the hands of the UnitedStates who by that t ime had becomethe senior partner of the Western alliance.Invasion of Sic i l yBecause a large-scale assault on thewest coast of France was not feasiblethen, a compromise was worked outto invade Sici ly a nd to a t t empt tocross over from thk isla nd to Ita ly.I t was hoped this move would knockthat country out of the war. Theinsane for these undertakings, however, were to remain limited becausethe buildup of the invasion forces inEngland had to continue, and considerable U S forces a nd equipment ba dto be cha nneled to t he P a cific thea ter.Sicily was, indeed, invaded successfully, and by the middle of August1943 the island was in Allied hands.Then followed the crossing to theI ta l ia n ma inla nd w here, faced w ithrelatively minor opposition, Alliedforces rapidly moved north. The

Americans, aided by an amphibiouslanding at Salerno, captured Napleson 1 October, a nd th e B ritish took theimporta nt Foggia a ir fields a t a boutthe same t ime.In the meantime, Benito Mussolinihad fa l len, the newly created I ta l ianGovernment under Marshal PietroB a doglio ha d ca pitula ted t o th e Allies,a nd G erma n troops ha d begun to pourinto central I ta ly .Ent husiasm WanesI t was then tha t a s i tua t ion developed in many respects reminiscent ofthat faced by Field Marshal Rommelin Libya. The fighting continueda ga inst st i ffening G erma n opposition,in extr emely d ifficult terra in, a nd under a ppa lling w eat her conditions-buti t a eon beca me a ppa rent tha t the All ies, and the United States in part icular , considered this I ta l ian theaterimportant only insofar as i t continuedto conta in fa ir ly numerous G erma nforces. The result was that Alliedga ins w ere usua lly mea sured in feetra ther tha n miles. An a t t empt to helpspeed up their advance by a landingat Anzio early in 1944 failed for avariety of reasons, not the least ofw hich w a s t he lack of eqth ueia sm forthis operation on the part of some ofthe higher US commanders.Again, i t is strange that no betteruse w a s ma de of th e opport unitiesw hich offered themeelvee a fter t heI ta l ian col lapse. Rather than persisting in the slugging match in therugged mountains of the peninsula, i tmight have been more expedient tohave employed such forces ae werea va ila ble for th e occupa tion of Sa rdinia and Corsica, especially eince theG erma ns ha d a l rea dy evacua ted themearly in October 1943.These two islands could then havebecome import a nt a ircra ft ca rriers

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MEDITERRANEANfrom w hich t o interdict movement oftroops and materiel in the valleys ofth e Rhone a nd t he P o a nd a cross t heAlpine pa sses. They a lso could h a vebecome sta ging a reas for a la nding onIt a ly s w est coa st , a ma neuver w hichw ould not only h a ve put t he G erma nforces in central I taly in jeopardy, ,but might w ell ha ve led to a n inva sionof the Po Valley and an advanceth rough th e Ljrrblja na G a p in the direction of Vienna .

Occupation of that city would havehad far-reaching political consequence regarding future developments in central Europe.Nothing is certain in war. Hence,it is ha rd to eay w hether such a s t ra t egy w Ouldha ve succeeded. B ut a mindreceptive and willing to exploit sudden opportun it ies ra ther tha n the single-mindedness of purpose exhibitedin this case certainly would have benefited t he ca use of t he Western Allies.

LESSONSEARNEDThe MILITARYR E VIE Wis pa rt icula rly int erested in receiv

ing ma nuscripts covering lessons lea rned by U S units inVietn a m. P roblems of orga niza t ion, comm a nd a nd cont rol,equipment, ta ctice, a nd fire support merit informed discussion. Aft er complyin g w ith a ppropria t e loca l regula t ions,a ut hors m a y submit ma nuscripts direct to th e MILITARYRE -VIE W. We w ill obta in t he necessar y security review on th oseaccepted.

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4

SNCE World War II , most of thesta tes of th e w orld h a ve heeomemembers of the United Nations tosa ve succeeding genera tion from th escourg e of w a r. To this end, t heyhave established as one of their purposes th e ma intena nce of interna tiona lpeace and eeeuri ty , and they haveagreed to unite their strength forsuppression of acts of aggressiona nd for th e sett lement of interna tiona l

of natione. The most basic legal issuethat ar ises ie the r ight of the UnitedNations to use armed forces otherth a n t hose cont empla ted in cha pterVII of t he cha rt er .Ma ny other probleme of a lega l na tu re a lso preeent t hemselves since t heU nited Nat ione is a n interna t iona l orga niza tion, w hile th e members of m ilitary forces in its service are citizensof com e na t ion-eta t e. This gives rise

+JUN PEACEFORCES

INTERNATIONAL LAWLieetemmt ColonelJ oseph M. C orvine, Um.ted States Arm#

disputes by peaceful means in conform ity w ith tbe principle of jueticeand internat iomd law.But the idea of using internat ionalforcee to maintain peace and eecurityie in direct conflict with the doetrineaof na tiona l sovereignty a nd th e rights

to many questions involving tbe auth ority to cont rol a nd employ th oseforces, t he problem of fina ncing suchopera t ion, t he legal etstus of individual members of th e forces, a nd therights a nd obliga tion of th e sta tesa nd th e orga niza tion involved.

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Ch a pter VII of th e cha rt er providesfor military forces under control ofth e S ecurit y Council to be employedin the maintenance of peace and security. These forces have not material ized, a nd the U nited Na t ions ha sbad to develop new forms of peacekeeping in a n a tt empt t o fulfill i tsoriginal purpose. The gradual changein thinking in the United Nat ions hasbeen due to th e la ck of nna nimitya mong th e grea t pow ers since 1946a nd to the ra dica l cha nge in t he nature of w a r w hich ha z been broughta bout thr ough th e development ofhighly sophistica ted a nd destru ctivew eapon systems.Realistic ApproachCollective security hae given wayto a more realistic approach to peacekeeping. The United Nations hasa ban donedthe idea t ha t i t can employw a r to count er aggression a nd to enforce peace. Forces from the lesspowerful nations have become an indispensable a ddition to th e a rt ofpea cekeeping t hr ough pers ua sion. Today, the United Nations rises a military force which strives not to fighta nd w hich is cont ributed by th eemaller powers.Since the peace-keeping forces nnder consideration are not those au-

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph M. Corvino in with the US Army CombatDevelopments Command Institute ofAdvanced Studiee at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He received hisB.S. degree in Military Studies fromthe University of Maryland, hia M.S.in Itttevnational Affai?e from GeorgeWashington University, and wae graduated from the Air War College in1965. He has eerved with both the45th Infantry Division in Korea andwith the .?d Armored Division in Germany , and was Signal Advisor withthe Tnrki8h Atvmy.

thorized by chapter VII of the charter , both internat ional law and thecharter itself prohibit the United Nations from placing such forces on theterritory of a na tion-sta te w ithoutthe consent of that government. Itis also necessary that the United Nations ha ve tbe consent of t he membersto employ their forces and materielin such opera tion. U N forces of onekind or another have been employeda t lea st a dozen t imes since th e organizat ion was founded.Maj er Operat ionsIn addition to a variety of observergroups and truce supervisory experiences, the United Nations has hadseveral major operations which usedmilitary units provided by memberna tions. The U nited Na tions. Command in Korea was established in1960 nn der cha pter VII a nd is t he ~only exa mple of t he use of w a r t orepel aggression.

The United Nations EmergencyForces in E gypt (U NE F) w ere created in October 1956 to deal with tbeS uez crisis. These forces w ere not de.signed to fight a ga ina t aggression, butra th er w ere intended to bring a boutth e pea ceful settlement of one of th emost da ngerous crises w hich th e w orldhad seen since the end of World WarI I .

The United Nations ObserverG ronp in Leban on w a s crea ted in 1958to deal with the tense situation whichha d developed in th a t count ry. P roba bly the grea test cha llenge to tbeUnited Nations arose in the Congoin tbe lat ter pa rt of 1960, w hen th eOp&atbn dee Natiorw Vnies au Congowas organized. Most recently, inMa rch 1964, th e Un ited Na tions F orcein Cyprus was established.The role of UN peace forces wassummed up nicely by Secreta ry G en

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INTERNATIONAL LAWeral U Thant in 1963 when, referringto the Suez, Lebanon, and Congo operations, he said:

AU three LueTe impvouiaed andcalled into the jield at very short notice: all three were severelfl limitedin their right to use fen%; all threewere demgned solely for the maintenance of peace and not for fighting

rectieu a nd control of the SecretaqGerte~al acting on behalf of the organe of the United Nationc.

Internat ional law and internat ionalorganization are historical developments that have come about largelybecause of a revulsion against war.For a t Iea et 300 years, t he na tions ofthe world have been aectdng ways of

USAri IwTurkey euppliedunite to the U ni ted Nat ions Comma ndir i Korea w here wa r wa e usedt o repel a cgreeeionin the militarp sense; aU three were a voiding w a r by more judicious uee ofrecruited from the smaller powers and politica l a ctione a nd I a ga l procedures.with special reference to thei~ accept- Old international law recognized tbeabilitg in the area in which thev were use of force a s an inst rum ent of into eerve; all thrse operated with the ternational relat ione. Internationallaw a tt empted to prescribe the ru lesexfmem coweotrt and cooperation of the for the conduct of wars that otberstates or teffitmes where theti wcTe wise could not be prevented.atationed, ae weU aa of arqt other parties directlv cowcerwed in the citua- The meet significant and revolution;nd all thrse wore under the ditiona ry development in interna tiona l

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law has been th e outla w ing of a ggressive force a e a m ean s of sett ling disputes.Cont empora ry law prohibits notonly t he use of force in a n a ggressivew a r, but a lso even th e threa t of force.The definit ion of a ggr essive force;how ever, is one still snbjeet to mu chdebate.Contractualand General lawsBasically, there are two kinds ofinterna t iona l law : contra ctua l la wbased on bilateral a nd mult i la teraltreat ies , and general law which consists of the customary rules normallyfollow ed hy eta tes in th eir rela tionswith other states. Thus, law can beta ken a e th e coordina ted w ill of va rious states.The UN Charter is a mult i lateraltreaty and const i tutes contractual interna t iona l law . Ae a n interna t iona lorganizat ion, the United Nations hasonly th e pow ers an d competence tha ta re conferred ,upon i t by th e cha rter .H ow ever , the Int ernat iona l C ourt ofJ ust ice (ICJ ) ha s rendered a n a dvisory opinion that the organizationmust also be deemed under law toha ve th ose pow ers necessary by implica t ion a s being eeeent ia l to t he performance of ite duties. The internalw6rkings of the United Nations anditz organs would, therefore, providerules in the general law category.

One of the most importa nt a ndmost controversial problems of international law ie the establishment ofthe legal I imite wi thin which s tatesa nd th e U nited Nat ions ma y use force .The ba sic rule-t ha t force ma y notbe used aggressively, but only in self-defens+ is subject to interpreta tionof th e terms a ggression a nd selfdefense. Also, this basic rule governsthe a ct ions of eta tee ra ther t ha n thoseof th e Unit ed Nat ions eince th e U nitedNations can hardly be pictured eitherOctobsr1S0S

INTERNATIONAL LAWas an unlawfnl aggressor or as a victim of a ggression. To determin e th elega l Iimita govern ing t he uee of forceby the United Natione, one must exa mine the cha r ter a nd the Unit ing forP eece Resolut ions of 1950.

Article 2 of the charter prohibitsmembers of the United Nations fromeither t he th rea t or th e use of force ininternat ional re lat ions or againet theterritorial integrity or political independen ce of a ny st a t e. Afilcle 51 gives

~ ,members the right of self-defenseuntil the Security Council has takenmeasures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VII ie the legal authori ty thatpermite the Seeurity Council to takeaction with respect to threats to thepeace, breaches of the peace, and actsof a ggression. These term s, how ever,a re not defined in the cha r ter , a nd theCouncil has considerable latitude intheir interpretation.Collective Securi tyThe collective security eystem contemplated in chapter VII pledges al lmembers to refrain from th e uee offorce and to participate collectivelythrough the organizat ion to acta gainst a ny threa t t o peace. P ea cekeeping, however, is seen as a continuous cha in run ning th rough all of th emethods of peaceful settlement. Milita ry force t o rest ore pea ce is providedas a last resort , and can be used onlyif a l l of th e f ive perma nent membersof th e Seeurity Council a re in a greement. Milita ry forces, however, ha venot been available to the Council beca use th e great pow ers could not a greeon collective decisions that wonld become th e la w under w hich thoseforcee could act.

The G enera l Assemblys role inpea cekeeping w a s origina lly intendedto be secondary to that of the Secur111


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INTERNATIONAL f.AWi ty Council , but in recent years theaction of the Assembly has becomeincreasingly important. The charterauthorizes the Aseembly to diecussa nd to ma ke reeommenda tions on a nymat ter tha t might a f fect the maintenance of peece and security or mightlea d to interna tiona l friction, but onlyw hen t he ma tt er is not being diecussedin the Security Council . I f the Council fails to take action, there ia nothing in the charter which specificallyprevents the Assembly from recommending appropriate actions.Unit ing for PeaceSince the charter was eigned, theCouncil has never been able to agreeon how to organize a UN police force,a nd, except for Korea, i t h a s been unable to agree on the use of force aea coercive measure, The ability of theCouncil to take action without a vetoon the Korean question was a freakcondit ion a rising out of t he a beenceof the Soviet representation. Laterdebate in the Assembly resulted inthe adoption of the Unit ing for PeaceResolut ions of Novemb er 1950 w hichca n be considered as a eeeonda ry pla nfor UN peacekeeping.The Assembly r esolved th a t if t heS ecurit y C ouncil ehould fa il t o exerciee its primary reeponeibility for themaintenance of international peaceand security, the General Assemblywould consider the matter immedba te ly wi th a v iew t o ma khg a ppropriat e recomm enda tion to membersfor collective rneaeuree, including useof armed force when necessary in thecase of a breach of the peace or actof aggreeeion. This resolution raisedcome legal problems.The broad recomm enda tion a ut hority of the Assembly is limited by thelast sentence of paragraph 2, Atilcle11, which requires that the Assembly

refer to the Council a ny ma tt er rela t ing to peace and securi ty that m.quires action. Strictly interpreted,this l imitat ion would appear to barany recommendation by tbe Aseemblyfor a ny ty pe of enforcement action.A elightly broader interpretation,however, would permit the Aseemblyto ma ke recommenda tions w hen thereis need for enforcement action otherth a n by th e Security Council und erchapter VII .Legal AspectsThe legal basis for tbe Uniting forPeace Resolutions becomes rather in.volved if considered from the standpoint of t he collective seeurity pow ersof the Council and the Assembly. Professor J ulius St one, a noted a ut horityin t he f ield, a rguee tha t the lega l a ndsociopolitica l na t ure of t he resolut ionsis keyed to the self-defense provisionsof Article 51. The members have tberight of s elf-defense, individua lly a ndcollectively. They remain free to actor not to act on the recommendationsof the Aseembly,It should be noted, however, thatAfilcle 51 sta tes th a t m embers ha vet he right of self-defense if a n a rm edattack occurs againet a Member ofthe United Nations. The Uniting forPeace Resolutions do not appear tobe so restrictive.

Customary in terna t iona l l aw hasrecognized for a long time thatfriendly a rm ed forces on the territoryof a noth er a ta te ha ve a cet i ln immunity from the jurisdiction of thehost etate. I t ie almoet always necessar y for th e tw o eta tee to enter intosome type of agreement to establisbmore specific rules for the clarification of many legal and proceduralquestione. History has recorded manyexzmplee of such agr eement s bet w eensta tes. The idea of interna tiona l

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INTERNATIONAL LAWforces, however, is a recent development, a nd t he cuetoma ry law a pplica ble to t w o eta tes, al t hough rela tedto th e problem, does n ot a pply directly.The agreement between the UnitedNa tions a nd t he best sta te is, th erefore, especially important.

The first real status of forces agree-ment conclnded by t he U nited Na tions

other count ry. The ma int ena nce ofthe international character of the operation was to be considered of primary importance.

When U NE F personnel w ere involved in a crimina l a ction, th ey w ouldcome und er t he jurisdict ion of t heirhome countries. The Secretary Genera l considered th k principle to ha ve,,. .,.- .,.

.-U.ited Nation.

Soldiers from India w ere Pa rt of th e U nited Na tions EmergencyF orcee in E gyptcrea ted to deel with t he S uez crisiswa s the a greement wi th Egypt in1957. The agreement provided thatmembers of the force would conductth emselves a s interna tiona l persona lities. The Secreta ry G enera l wa s of th eopinion tha t full loya lty t o the a imeof th e orga nizat ion ha d to he required,and that the individual could not bepermitted to divide his loyalty between the United Nations and anyOctober1966

set a most important precedent forfut ure a greements because it providedsome guarantee of legal statua forth ose personnel w ho might otherw isenot be covered by any provisions ofinternational law. Civil juriedlctionwas to be exercised hy the EgyptianG overnment in a ny ma tt er not re la tedto the official duties of a member oft he force. A C laims Commission would

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INTERNATIONAL LAWsettle civil claims arising out of official duty.

The U NE F a greement a lso includedprovision rega rdin g freedom ofmova ment of personn el a nd vehicles,use of communications and postalserviees, uee of reads a nd oth er tra nsport a tion facil it ies, a nd right s to public utilities such ae water and electrici ty . I t was agreed that the force , i ts

be settled by negotiation would be referred to a tr ibunal of three arbi trators.As of Octuber 1958 the SecretaryG enera l bel ieved tha t the s ta tus a gree .ment whkh a pplied to forces in E gyptha d met t he test of experience. H erecomm ended th a t ita ba sic principlesbe included in a ny simila r a greement sin the future. He also cautioned that ,

U . i l c d NatiowOne of tbe gre-eteetchallenges to t he U nit ed Netions a rose in t he C kmgoin 1960

comma nders, oth er oSt cials , a nd m embers would have privileges and immunities in accordance with the Convention on the P rivileges a nd Imm unities of the United Nations.Among other things, the agreementalso covered exemption from peespo~

and visa regulations, the powera ofa rrest a nd tra nsfers of custody involving both the military police of theforce a nd th e E gyptia n a uth orities,the r ight to beer a rms, a nd the ma nner in which disputes that could not

although UN peace forces are notf ighting forcee, they must have theright to self-defense, an d tha t th eremust be a clear -cut d efinit ion of self-defense in order to avoid conflict betw een pea ce forces a nd comba t opera t ions un der cha pter VII . In t he UNE Fopaa tion, th e rule w a s a pplied tha tmen engaged in the operation couldnever take the initiative in the useof armed force, but were enti t led torespond wi th force to an at tack wi tharms .

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INTERNATIONAL LAWThe forma l a greement w ith th e Republic of t he C ongo w a s not completeduntil 27 November 1961, sixteenmonths a fter th e initia l request for

UN intervention in the Congo. Comparison of this document w ith th eUNEF agreement reveale much similari ty . H ow ever, th e Congo agr eementseems to incorpora te ma ny of th ebasic rules which were developedth rough th e U N experience in E gypt.The Congo a greement included a par a gra ph w hich dif ferent iat ed the responsibilities of t he C ongolese G overn ment a nd the U nited Nat ions in theirmutua l endea vora t o ma inta in pea ceand security.LegalStipulationA statement wae also included toa t ipuia te tha t the U nited Nat ionew ouid ha ve recourse to force oniy a sa I a et resort , w hile the Congolese a uthorities had the right to resort toforce in conformity with iaw whenexecuting their legal dut ies. B oth par ties felt that the agreement would beconsidered a s ha ting been effectivefrom the date of arrival of the f irstelements of th e U N force. TKI S provision was undoubtedly included toprovide some legal basia for the settlement of juridica l dieputeea nd queetions which had ariaen in the preceding months of operation.

The sta tus of forces a greement betw een the U nited Nat ions a nd the government of Cyprus w ee effected by a nexchange of letters on 31 March 1964,iess th a n one month a fter th e SecurityCouncil had authorized the estabiiehment of th e force. E xam ina tion ofthie document reveals a close similarity to th e a greement w hich ha d beenma de in Egypt a nd the Congo.In examining the UN methods offinancing peace-keeping operationa,tw o pa rticular a epeete w hich becomeOctober19SS

obvioue a re tha t dependence w a spla ced on volunta ry cont ribution a ndthe solicitation of such contributionswa s ief t t o the S ecreta ry G enera l . Hehas pointed out on more than one occa sion tha t this m ethod ia most un sat isfactory , tha t there is a la rge degree of un certa ht y a bout how muchwil l actual ly be avai lable , and that

the p lanning and advance ar rangements essent ial to th e eff icient a ndeconomical operation are sorely hampered.Tbe U N Cha rter dea la w i th t hequest ion of fina ncing a ll opera tions ofthe organization in Article 17. Thiea rticle provides tha t t he G enera l Assembly shall coneider and approve thebudget, a nd tha t t he expenses of th e

organization shaii be borne by themembers as apportioned by the Assembly. In its brevity, the afilcieseems to lea ve no doubt a s to itsmea ning. H ow ever, some members a restill dieputing the legality of Peacekeeping aeaesamente.Afilcle 19 provides t ha t a m ember

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INTERNATIONAL LAWwhich becomes two yeere in arrearsin t he pay ment of its fina ncia l obliga tions shall lose ite vote in the Genera l Aesembly. B y D ecember 1961 t heAesembly w a s faced wit h th e fa ct tha tma ny members h a d ,not ma de theircontributions to the peace-keeping effort beca use t hey q uestioned th e legality of their obligation to pay onth e basic tha t the opera tion ha d notbeen properly authorized. Faced witha financial crisis, the Assembly aut horized a 200 milliondolla r issue of25-yezr bonds and decided to aek theIC J for a n advisory opinion. It tookth is a ction recognizing its need forauthoritat ive legal guidance regarding t he fina ncing of U N opera tiloneinthe W]ddle East and the Congo.Legal OpinionThe Court found that the responsibility of t he Security Council w a sprima ryfl not exclueive. The G enera lAesembly wae also considered to havecertain powers in connection withpeace and security. The Court votednine to five that the expenses wereproperly those of the organizationand should be paid by assessment onthe members. Although the Courtsopinion wae advieory and does nothave the binding force of a domesticlaw, the General Assembly would heinconsistent if it now took a viewcontrary to the legal opinion. The iesue of Ati]cle 19lees of v ote in th eG enera l Assembly for th ose memberstw o year s in a rrea rs-must st ill befaced.The Soviet Union has taken thestand that the Security Council is theonly organ of the UN that ie authorized to take action when militaryforces a re required. It eont ends tha tmilita ry forces should be ueed only a sa last resort , and that the costs ofth ose opera tion a uth orised by th e

Council should be eeseseed in accordance with the generally recognizedprinciple of international law that ag.greeeor states bear polit ical and material responsibility for the aggression they commit.The U SS R held tha t t he opera tionsin the Middle East and the Congow ere not conducted in a ccorda nce w iththe UN Charter and, therefore , didnot pla ce a ny fina ncial obligat ion onth e membere of th e U nited Na tions.She based her argument on the facttha t U NEF ha d not been a uthorizedby the S ecnrity Council, a nd tha t theG enera l Assembly, w hile it might rec.omm end w ith rega rd to q uestions ofpeace and security, must refer casesrequiring action to the Council.In the case of the Congo operation,the U SSR s ta ted that , a l though theoperation had been init ially authorized by the Council , the SecretaryG enera l ha d violat ed the provisions ofthe charter by deciding for himselfw hich na tione w ould be invited to t a kepart . L a ter, t he G enera l Assembly,w ithout competence under t he cha rt er,made a decieion to appropriate fundsfor th e opera tion a nd to a ppofilon th ecoet among the membere.Brit ish-Unit ad St ates ViawsThe Brit ieh and US Governmentha ve ta ken. the s ta nd that one perma nent member of th e Security Councilca nn ot be considered to h a ve t he rightto block completely the peace-keepingmachinery of the Unit6d Nations.Both governments point to the advieory opinion of t he IC J a nd to theopinions of the majority of the members as reflected in pertinent resolutions of th e G enera l Aa eembly.The US statement concluded thatthe financial and constitutional crisiemust be solved if t he orga nisa tion ieto cont inue a e an effective instrum ent .

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INTERNATIONAL tAWIt ca lled for th e coopera tion of a llmembers in a n effort to find a solutionw hich w ould a void t he requirementfor application of Article 19, andw hich w ould s trengthen t he organiza tion and enable it to continue its roleas Mans best hope for a peacefulworld.The 19th General Assembly carefully avoided any issue which mightha ve required a public vote, t husa voiding t he applica t ion of Art icle 19.Little meaningful business could beconducted under such circumstances.D uring th e 20th Assembly, t he U nitedStates agreed to abide by the majority will and not to press the Article19 issue. In the meantime, there hasbeen much backsta ge negotia t ion ina n a tt empt t o find a solution ba sed onsome U nit ed S ta tes-S oviet compr omise. A committee of 33 nations hasbeen direct ed t o exa mine tbe problem,but no solution has been suggested.Voluntary ContributionsIt was expected that voluntary con:tr ibutions w ould be ma de to cover outstanding peace-keeping costs. Onlya bout 20 million, dolla rs ha s been received to offset a deficit of over 100million dollare. Neither France north e U SS Rhea ding t he list of debt-ershas made any contribution ora definite commitment to do so. TheUnited Statea ie st il l willing to payher fair sha re , but insis ta t ha t othersbear their part of the burden. TheUnited Nations is approaching thepoint where i t may have to abandonthose peace-keeping operations inwhich it is now engaged. Severalcount ries ha ve informed th e Secreta ryG enera l tha t they ca nnot go on absorbing the costs, and will have tow ithdra w their t roope unless they a rereimbursed for their expenditures.A general conclusion can be drawn

that the idea of collective securitywas overly ambit ioua and has notw orked beca use th e world w a a not y etready for it. The great-power cooperation envisioned in the charter hasfailed to materialize, and the mem.hers of the United Nations havesought a nother method of a chievingand maintaining peace in the world.The new a rt -peacekeeping by pereuasionwhen permitted to functionhae proved successful as a method ofpeaceful settlement of dieputes. Thus,someth ing new , eomethh rg useful, butsometh hig cont roversia l h a s developedfrom the aspirations of 20 years ago.Legality OisputeAlthough tbe world is changingand the old internat ional law is notcompletely applicable, the nations ofth e world ha ve come t o a ccept th e ideaof conducting international relationea ccording to a genera lized body ofcontractual and customary internat ional law. Althongh this law is admittedly not enforceable in the usualsense, it ie binding in t he mora l sense.The present controversy over the fina ncing of peace-keeping opera tionsis a dispute over th e lega lity ofth ose opera tions. It is evident tha t t hemembers of the United Nations areseeking legal answers to politicalquestions.

The Uniting for Peace Resolutionsw ere developed a s a n expedient pla nfor peacekeeping in the absence ofgrea t-pow er a greement-e ma tt er ofnecessity a nd a n a tt empt to give somepractical meaning to tbe peace-keeping mission of the United Nations ascontemplated in the charter. Supporters of th e resolutions cont end tha t th elega l iss uee in pea ce-keeping fina ncesa re a ma t t er of law a nd have been upheld by the ICJ .

October966 , 17


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INTERNATIONAL LAWThe advisory opinion of the ICJsupported the majority opinion of theG enerel Assembly, upheld tbe lega lityof the Uniting for Peace Resolutions,

legalised the Egypt and Congo operations, andaf7irmed the legal reeponsibility of th e U N membere to sha rethe financial burden of those operations. Rut there were five dissentingvotes on tha t a dvisory opinion. J ustas there is lack of agreement amongth e great pow ere, th e lega l opinion w a slacking in unanimity. The Assemblyia fmP ing for a behind -th e-scenes SO-lution which will not be an utter disregard for the Court s advieory opinion--a n opinion for w hich t be Assembly asked.If the world community is to contin ue to d erive value from pea ce-keeping opera tions-in fa ct, if it is toforestall a serious blow to the futuredevelopment of interna tiona l orga ni

ca tion-it must find some solution toth e current impa sse in ths U nited Na.tions. This solution must, of course,be n~gotiated in the polit ical arena,but the outcome must be a legal solu.tion, legally accepted by and legallybinding on all of th e great pow ers an dall members of the United Nations.Possible solutions include amend.ment of the U N C ha rter and development of an international conventionon th e subject of peacekeeping . Nosolution seems possible, however, until those who now question the legality of past peace-keeping opera t ionsrecall again that the preservation ofpeace in the world is a question ofthe preservation of law and order.With th is obsta cle overcome, t he w orldcommunity can then move closer tow a rd the development of tha t w orldlaw w hich w ill cont ribute to w orldpeace.

Th er oa d t o w or ld or der , t her esd toa r ule of la w ir rt h e w or ld ie n ot a neasy one. It w ill eentinrr eto be a rduous,a nd beset by a gonizing hurd le%peinfa l decision%dillica lt eempromises,a nd , et t ime% dish ea rt eningset.bscks. Tra veling th e r ea d will demsn d th e most from ea ch of es. I prsytha t w e shall beeqa sl to th e ta sk.

Ambamador Arthur J. Goldberg

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RETURNOF THENORTH S E AGHOSTSLsslie Aa ders1N THE generation leeding up to World War I, theU nitsd Kingdom h eld th e w orld lea dership w hich ha ssince pa ssed to th e U nit ed St a tes. Like toda ys America nlea ders, th e B rit ieh chiefs th en gazed n ervously a crossfrssdoms ramparts in anticipation of a sscmingly inevita ble clima ctic struggle w ith a uthorita ria n milita rism.Soviet Ruseias reeket-rattling diplomacy is a fittingsuccessor to Kaiser Wilhelm IIs diplomacy by bluster,a nd t he commissa rs w orld revolut ion ha s succesdedthe Kaisers We2tpolit#c. Communisms new industrialism ha s rise+ nt o cha llenge th e older indust ria lism of th eU nitsd Sta tes just a s G a rma n induetry once thr ew dow n


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NORTH SEA GHOSTSsphere a nd outer spa ce, wherea s be- , , the Dutch, and the French had beenfore 1914 it was the salt water of theNorth Sea separa t ing the B ri t ish a ndGerman F1eeta. Unmanned missi leshave succeeded the manned warshipsof 1914.

After 1898 t he B ritish, a s did th eirAmerican cousins 40 yeara later, reluctant ly abandoned a t radit ionalsplendid isola tion in fa vor of substantial diplomatic commitments toforeign powers. The Kaisers unmannerly utterances and boundless ambitions for a place in the sun hadalready caet a pall on Anglo-Germanrelations when, in 1898, the Germaneannounced a sudden new naval program calling for a sustained effortto build 38 capital ships and 20 armored cruiaere.Fear of Invasion

Smoldering Brit ieh resentment ofGerman commercial succeseee nowripened into fears of a future Germaninvasion, a eent iment aggra va ted bya rising virulent anti-Germanism inEngland. Brit ish diplomacy sooncreated a Triple Entente with Franceand Russia to contain Germanys Triple Alliance with Italy and Austria-Hungary .Fa cing the Germa n threa t , the B ri t ish showed the courage, ingenuity,and perseverance of their ancestors.Dominat ing the seas around Europesince the late 16th century, they hadsurvived every peril crea t ed by scheming enemies or the implacable advances of technology. The Spaniarde,

This article was digested fromthe original, publiehed in theJ OU RNALOF TH OU G H T,J a m u w l t1966.Dr. Andere is Professor ofHL407y at Cera?rd Mi880rLriStateCOl&?Qeat wrTTT8?WbUTQ.

repulsed in their turns. The RoyalNavy had faced the challenge of converting to eteam, iron hulls, steelarmorplating, torpedoes, and ever-greater ordnance.Ea ch threat ha d ra ised th e fleet tonew heights of superiority over vanquished or potentia l riva ls . In a ll previous cent uries, the Br iton ba d sha kenoff every appearanceof decadence,andhe was to display the same qualit iesin the yeare leading to 1914.German ChallengeGrand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz,German Navy Minis ter , had hardlystarted his Imperial masters campa ign to seize th e t rident of Neptun ewhen a worthy opponent moved intothe Brit ish Admiralty to take command of the fight to keep Brit isheuprema cy on tbe North Sea . Admira lSir J ohn Arbuth not Fisher, relentless,remorseless, and ruthless, becameFirst S ea Lord in 1902, bringin g t oth e Admira lty a eense of urgency tha tit ba dly n eeded a nd w ould cont inueto have unt i l the outbreak of warjustified bis expectations.The officers of t he Roya l Na vy w ereput on notice that the enemies ofFishers drive for eecurity would ha vewidowed wives and fatherless children, tha t th e neutra l officers w ouldsee their careers blighted. If you didnot eupport Fisher totus percue, ashe loved to say, you might as welloppose him equa lly wh ole hog.For seven fra nt ic y ears, th e grimold sea dog ha mmered a wa y a t thetr emendous job of t urn ing ba ck th eGermans challenge. He establishednucleus crews for mothballed vessels,thereby gaining precious future mobilization time. The submarine cameinto the Brit ish naval establishment,although scoffers secretly laughed for

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a w hile a t F ishers toys. Sir J ohnruth lessly scra pped thousan da of tonsof obsolete shipping, ba tt led P a rlia ment year in and yea r out for biggerappropriations, and established theH ome Fleeta concentr a t ion of Br i t ish na val pow er in the North Sea,headqua rtered a t Scapa Flow , in theOrkneys.In MS ferocious effort to keep t heRoya l Na vy supreme, Fisher ca me UP

G ra nd Admira l Alfred von Tirpitz, G erman Navy Minister , thwarted Bri t isheffort s to curb the n a va l a rms ra cewith such a tremendous breakthroughin naval technology that even he wasterrified at his success. In 1905 theH MS D r-.sa rZrt ougMa s pla ced in commission, a splendid behemoth 490 feetlong, displacing 17,000 tons, andcarrying ten 12-inch guns in its fiveturrets .The Dreadnought had cost about4.5 million dolla rs (t he va lue of H o-ratio Nelsons entire fleet at CapeTra fa lga r) a nd could ma ke 21 knots.Octobsr1966

NORTH SEA GHOSTSIt was far superior to all those conventional pre-Dreads, with their fiveand eix-inch popguns. Some olderships, it is true, had a few 12-inchguns aboard, but their mixture oflarge and small ordnance had causedgrea t confusion in spott ing sa lvos a tgreat ranges .

The new bat t lewagon, having nosmaller artHlery, was the all-big-guntype and thus a far deadlier kind ofship than its predecessors. Britain,w ith her long hezdstzrt in pre-llrea ds,now a w a kened to f ind the va st bulkof t he Roya l N a vy obsolescent. S uppose Tirpitz now hurried up andlaunched a German Dreadrwught-ertw o, or t hree? Ta ehnology ha d ha ndeddown the grim verdict that a newna val ra ce must s tar t , a nd Sir J ohnbravely and unilateral ly decreed thatBritain would double Tirpitz Dreadnought launchings until charcoalsproute.Guns or Butter?The new batt leship was born undera n unlucky polit ica l sta rt . In t be veryyea r of ite comm issioning, th e Libera lP a rty swept into pow er on a pla t formpromising expensive socia l w elfar eprograms to an England beginningto suffer th e consequ ences of a fa dingindustria l predomina nce. G uns or butt er ? With Tirpitz on one side of t hemand economic insecurity on the other,the voters meant to have both gunsand butter. Let the polit icians handleth e detills ! G overn ment circles sh uddered, highly uncerta h tha t the ta xpayer conld or would foot both bills.Hoping against hope that somehowthe G erma n Government might letthem off this hook, the Liberals decided to extend an olive branch toBerlin by unilaterally reducing Britains naval program. Since the warlike Tories had started this Dr-ea&


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~ 9ht ra ce, a nd ha d laid dow n fourDreadnought keels in 1905, while theG erma ne laid only tw o, the Llheralea nnounced tha t they w ould la y onlythree keels in 1906. Tirpitz greetedthe L]beral gesture by raising bie1906 program to three. Thinking thatTirpitz had failed to get the meeeage,London reduced the 1907 estimatw tot w o-only t o find Tirpitz ra ising histo four.The Llheral Cabinet had no choicebut to go back to the naval race, andthe game wae played Fkher e wayagain, for a whi le .N a v a lSupremacy Ended?During these years, the Britishpublic and political leadership die-played a dietreeeing tendency to overdramatize the immediate signif icanceof tbe Dreadvmvtght. This had happened ma ny t imes before in oth ercseee. When Britabv floated her firetironclad in the middle of the 19thcentury, and i t wae leerned in J . .endon that France wae get t ing two, tbeha l le of P a r l ia ment ra ng w i th lament e over the end of B rit i lns na vslsupremacy. As if the great mass ofw ooden w a rships in H er Ma jeetysNa vy h a d euddenly va nished! As i fth eir shells ha d loet th e power to kill!The British public in the last century,as with the American public today,seemed prone to ha il ea ch mili ta ry innovation as rendering worthless al lexis t ing hardware .But thie is seldom the case in fact ,and i t waa not ao 50 years ago. Admiral Reinhard Scheer, who comnanded the Cerman High Sea Fleeta t J utla nd in 1916, lat er congra tulated himself on a last-minute deci~ ion to ta ke pre-Dr eada introbat tletf ter learning that the old outmoded,eeeele ha d sa ved hia ba tt le cruiser.qua dron from proba ble a nnihila tion.

Before he retired in 1909, Fisherdid i t again. In that year , the Iv errDuke was la un ched, a 25,000-t on veeeel ca rr yin g t en 131/2-inchgun a in fiv eturr ets. Ca pable of lan ding seven tonsof pa yloa d on terget a 35,000 ya rdsdietant , the Iron Duke bad a rmamenthal f again as potent ae anything Tirpitz ha d yet diepla yed. So fa r a sgunpower was concerned, Fisher waspulling aw a y fr om Tirpitz in 1909 a nd1910.

Fieher had aleo faced up to the iesue of armor versus speed. You needboth, he reasoned. But did every al l-big-gun chip ha ve t o he w eighted dow nw ith speed-ca pping a rmor ? In na va lwarfare , there was more to do thanjust slug it out capitzl shipto-capitalship. What about a ship capable ofoutshooting anything that could catchi t a nd outrunning a nyth ing tha t couldoutehoot it?Tbe answer was the battle cruiser,an all-big-gun veseel designed forpursuit a nd outfla nking w ork, wit hthe firepower of a Dreadnought, butwith only a fraction of the armor.Fiehere new creotion, of which theHome Fleet ha d nine when wa r ca me,could make 25 knote to the averagebattleships 21.Churcl r i l l a innovat ionTw o yea re a fter Fishers r etirementa e B rita ina e senior a dmira l , civil ia nlea dership of th e na vy pa seed to 37yea r-cdd Winst on S . Ch urchill. Thenew Libera l First Lord of t he Admira lty, destined for great ness ae awar leader, laid ample foundationsfor his reputation as a creative military thinker wi thin the three ehortyears of peace remaining after 1911.

Thr ee grea t deeisione w ere beforeChurchill , each of which conttinedthe possibility of decisive etrategica dvan ta ges-or devast a t ing da ma geMilitary Reviaw


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to the nations security. These werericks tha t deman ded a Churchil l, a ndthe ma n a nd the hour met wi thoutceremony a nd w ithout trembling.The 13?./z-inchgu n ha d a mply pr oveditself, hut Chur chil l wa s a nxious t ogo one size bett er: a n urg e not unknown in the a dministra tion of preeent -da y spa ce explora t ion project s.Why not a 15-inch gun for th e ca pita lships now being built ? Fisher, w hena sked for his opinion, decla red th a ta doption of th e new na va l r i f le wouldbe the equivalent of a grea t na valvictory a nd a greed with Chur chil l tha tfai lure to investigate i ts potential ities w ould consti tut e trea son to t heEmpire.Increased AppropriationsProblems arose, however. Biggerguns mea nt bigger ships, an d th is,in turn, mea nt hector ing a balky P a rlia ment for increased na va l a ppropriations. Moreover, the tense strategic si tua tion on th e Nort h Sea ma deit necessary to avoid constructiondelay s w hile redesigning vessels a lrea dy on h a nd . Worse y et, no 15-inchgun had ever existed. Was it evenfeaa ible? Would it a chieve t he grea t erra nge a nd a ccura cy a long wi th increased pay loa d t ha t th e 13-inch guniia d sh ow n in com pa r is on w it h t h e 12 ?Would it create unforeseeable stressesthat would fatal ly mar the f ive greatships then being built ?Weighing the hazards, Churchil lreal ized tha t it w ould ta ke a yea r toprove out the new gun to the engineers sa tisfa ction. This mea nt th a tf iveca pita l sh ips would ha ve to be commissioned w ith a n inferior w eaponto that which we had i t in our puwerto give th em; or else tha t t hey w ouldgo to sea with untried Ifi-inch riflestha t might ruin them. Ei ther w a y yousliced it, a year of precious head

Octohor 1903

NORTN 55A GHOSTSsta rt might be forfeited. B ut, ba ckedby the enthusiastic Fisher, Churchil lboldly took the plunge.All the guns were ordered after aha sty test firiiig of a model rifle bythe Ordnan ce B oa rd a nd a pr iva t esteel f irm. I t would be a year beforethe outcome of the gamble would befully known . And if it fa iled? Ch urch-ill n eeded litt le ima gina tion to pictu rean indignant House of Commonshounding him into political limbo asa brash and errat ic lad who had substi tuted hia immature judgment fortha t of older a nd w iser hea dsa ndenda ngered his count ry in th e bar gain !But i t al l came right in the end.The 15-inch rifle proved capable oflanding a ton of explosive on targets35,000 yards away, and with deadliera ccura cy th a n older models. I fel t a si f I ha d been delivered from a greatperil: C hur chill la t er conceded.Fast OivisionThis coup led t he First Lord directly to another. Eight of these newguns could th row a sa lvo greeter by at on t ha n 10 of t he 13%s-znd givea disproportionately higher explosiveeffect, too. The gleam returned toChurchill s eye. He pondered the outcome of putting just eight of thesemighty guns on a regular Dremfnought, keeping the 13-inch armor-plat ed sides, a nd devot ing t he old fifthtur rets spa ce t o increaa ed enginepower. He thought the result mightbe a bat tleship w ith th e apeed of abattle cruiser, but with superior armor and firepower. The Admiraltywent right to work to build i ts FastDivisionthe 31,000-ton Warepite,B arha m, Mafa~ a , Queen Elizabeth, a ndValiant, ships fas t enough and dangerous enough to fight two WorldWars.


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NORTH SEA MOSTSBut bril liant a dvances ha ve a w a y dependent on foreign oil sourcesof leeding into knotty problems. It would necessarily prees the govern-turned ont that the super-lheude of ment to take the lead in prospectingt he Fa st Division could ma ke 25 knote for oil and purchasing oil properties

only by using petroleum fuel. AddL in such places ae India, Pereia, andtiona lly, th e Admira lty lea rned tha t t he Ara b Middle E a et. This led t ooil would give the navy 40 percent enorm ous expenee a nd t remend ous opmore radius per ton of fuel coneumed position on the Naval Eetimatee;

J&

.....

The H MS Dreadnought, carrying t en 12-inchgun%w a s t he a ll-big-gunt yps ba tt leshipa nd thus far dea dlier t han the pre-Dreed8th a n it could get using coa l. Ta nkerscould refuel the battlewagons at see,whereas a fourth of a coal-burningfleet wa s a lwa ys ba ck in port ta kingon coal. Under wartime conditions,the coaling operation would rob theentire crew of i ta sh ore leave. I t w a salso found that Convefilng to oilwould cut maintenance and operat ingpersonnel in half. Weighty reasonsfor convert ing !But this had its repercussions.Fleets of tankers had to be built tobring in petroleum from a broa d sinceEngland had no oil resources of herow n. G reat s tora ge facil it ies ha d tobe built and protected. And a navy

Churchill admits, yet i t wa e a bsolutely impossible to turn back.The military l i terature of that ageof a nxiety on t he eve of 1914 dra matical ly captures for the reader theapprehensions daily haunting London.Would the Germans some day Pull acataclysmic surprise?Churchill had no fear of their gunnery. The worst nightmare novel hehad ever read had por trayed a German fleet unmaeking 15-inch artilleryto inflict a climactic defeat on theRoyal Navy. But Churchill could comfort himself tha t this boot w a e onthe other leg. But what about torpedoes, increasingly sophisticated and,

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now delivera ble w ith t enfold force bysubma rines? Might not fiendish newtypes of mines era se B rita ins ma rginof safety on the day of decision?To keep the navy alert, Churchillocca siona lly ordered surprise count downs, aeking the naval staff Whatha ppens i f wa r wi th G erma ny eta r t stoday? Always on their toes, the admirale tr iumphant ly demonstra ted toCh urchill how t hey could on ehort notice effect dispositions th a t w ould fa ceth e oncoming G erma ne w ith superiorseapower.The Home Fleet carefully chose thetime for ite cruises to Spa in a nd backwa it ing unt i l the German Navy wa eha ving its wint er refits . B rit ish Nort hSea maneuvers were conducted withcareful regard for coaling and chorelea ve a rra ngements w hich w ould notunduly emba rra ss th e H ome Fleetshould th e G erma ns ma ke th eir move.Seeking SolutionsAs in todays cold war, statesmenin pre-1914 B rita in w ere cont inua l ysearching for a r elease of the unbeara ble tensions creat ed by th e str a tegicsituation on the North Sea. After theLiberal regimes attempt to achievedisar ma ment by exa mple colla psed in1907, Fieher began campaigning fora P ea rl H a rbor a t ta ck on the G ermans a f ter the faehion of the J a pa nese thr ust a t P ort , Art hur in 1904or Britains own ravishment of Denmarks Fleet in 1801.Meet B rit ish sta tesmen riva led theirAmerican cousins in sentimentality,a nd they w ere also mora lly a boveFkhers doctrine of the pre-emptivestrike, as we would cell i t today.The Committee of Imperial Defensesecretly considered it very likely thatG erma ny w ould, if deeieive resultswere obtainable, try preemptionagainst the Home Fleet .

B ut th e B rit ish officia l poiicy, a eenunciat ed by ChurchIl l a t G lasgowin 1912, wee that We have noth oughts . . . of a ggression, a nd w eat t r ibute no euch thoughts to otherGreat Powers. The Foreign Officeehort ly a f terw a rd declar ed to the G ermans that England would make nounprovoked a tt a ck on G erma ny, pursue no a ggressive policy t ow a rds her.NavalIlolldajrSuch expressions awakened no corresponding sentiments in Berlin, butth e B rit ieh G overnment decided int he w int er of 1911-12 t o a pproa chG erma ny w ith proposals for a na valholiday. As is so often the caee inpolit ics, the Cabinet had twin motives. The more idea listic Minist ersprimar ily hoped for a rela xa tion ofteneions on the North Sea diplomaticfront. The more hard-boiled membersargued that the government s handw ould be etronger in th e an nua l bat t lefor milita ry a ppropria tion if th eH ouse of C ommone w ere convin cedthat an honest e ffort had been madeto mitigate the ruinously expensivenaval race .

The negot ia t ions w ith G erma ny CU Lminated in the visit of the Secretaryof St a te for Wa r, Richa rd B . Ha ldane,to Berlin in early 1912. But the highBritish hopes for a naval sett lementwent to pieces in a hurry. The IMserga ve H a ldan e a copy of proposed G erma n na val construct ion for the yea re1912-16. This revealed a naval program dest ined to give Germany a 29to 22 lead in capital ships unless ana val mora torium w ere a chieved righta w a y+ r a dras t ic increa se in B r i t ish construction undertaken.A naval holiday, the German Foreign Office insieted, wa s unt hinka bleunless coupled w ith a genera l politica lset t lement . G erma ny would be glad to

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nom SEA6HOSTSscrap her projected increase in capi tal ships, provid~ B ri tain gave acontractual guarantee of her futureneutrali ty in the event of a confl icta mong t he cont inent a l pow era . Thereforg if B rita in w ould junk t he TripleE nt ente, th e founda tion stonee of h%security, and return to eplendid isolationfl Germany would be pleased toscrap some of her unbuilt warakdps.Heads , G erma ny wina ; Me, B r ita in10SSS.B ri tains future securi ty ha d tobe left at the mercy of what P r inceBismarck had pradkted would besome fool thing in the Balkans.There exiets, then, a dkwerniblesimilari ty hetw ean the pre-1914 a ndthe post-1945 eras. Whether the present era wi l l end wi th a vast thermonuclear incineration of the humanspecies is not witMn the competenceof th e historia n to euggcet. But whilemaking al l due al lowances for largeand for small dltferencca between t hetwo eras compared above, i t is clearthat we can draw valuable lessonsfrom t he B ritish experience of th eearliei day.

E a ch cha llenge poeed by technica lprogrees must be faced reeliaticzlly,notw itheta nt i lng th e t endency of mili ta ry eeta blishment e to gr ow conservat ive toward famil iar herdware . Thevalue of vigorous and imaginative civil ian and mili tary leadership cannotbe overst resead . Vigila nce ia no infa llible gua ra nt ee of vietory, but th e lack

of i t wil l certainly bring swift andbitl ,cr retribution.

P urity of motive a nd sincerity ofintent a re by th emselves of l it t le va luewhen dealing with opportunistic anta gonists cynica lly determined to exploit every a how of generosity tow a rdth em. Pa nic is not very helpful in suchsitua tions eith er, for huma n opponent snever turn out to be supermen.

Fina lly, t here ha s never been a bet.tar t ime in the history of the worldthan now to promote the education ofthe sovereign citizenry in the historyand terminology of the profession ofa rms. I n recent dcsa dcs, i t ha s becomecrys ta l c lear that war fare can nolonger be the exclueive province of aclosed society of professionals.

Modern war has forced i tself uponthe people as a whole, obli teratingonce mea ningfu l db3tinctions betw eencivilia n a nd milita ry epheree. The voreeious requirement s of past w a rsa nd fears of future wa rs consum e toda y more tha n hal f of the U S Federa lbudget, a tenth of the grose nationalproduct.The American public owes ite military professionals the sympatheticunderstanding that comes only froma deepening acqua inta nce w i th tbepast and present of warfare . Suchundersta ndhg eecms th e best gua rantee that our eociety wi l l win theendurance conteet thrust upon i twi thin the pact generat ion.

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Two VIEW ON VIETNAM

=

zLErSLEARH THEROM 3C&rI el Cha rleoP. Bk@o, k Um%d Statee Arrw

BEC AU SE thef~ rench Ioet their w a r in Vietna m, ma ny America ns a reprone to ca et only a perfunctory glan ce a t Fr ench experiences in tha t w a r.America ns a re a la o quick t o point out th a t considera tion of th e Fr ench experience is not appropriat e toda y beca use th e U nited Sta tes is far w ealth ier andmore powerful than France wae in those days. Besides, the aeerreationie sometimes ma de tha t th e French G overnment a nd the French people w ere neverfully behind the war effort .Although t hese a rgument a ma y be val id, i t w ould be foolish, i f not da ngeroue, to ignore th e mista kes w hich th e Fr ench ma de in Ind ochina . There a rea surprisingly large number of aimilari t iee between the French war and theone now being fought in Vietna m:@ The terrain and climate are the came.

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i . ET~ f . EARN. The foa is virtually the came. The enemy is using the cameprinciples and tactics.. There isa cont iguous sa nctua ry,

and no feaeible means to eeal theborder.. The ba tt le environm ent fa cilitates guerri l la operations.Importance of ldeolo~Perhaps the most signif icant mistske that the French made in Indochina wae not mil i tary a t a l l . I t wasth e political da cieion t o reinstit ut ecolonia l rule a fter World Wa r II . J ueta ix w eeks a f ter V-J Da y, th e Fr encheoldiers who had been interned inSa igon by th e J a pan ese took over thecity in a coup detat, and French colonial administrat ion was seen reeeta hliehed on South Vietna m. B y April1946, North Vietnam had also beenbrought under French control.

These meaeur es w ere out of et a pwith the surge of nationalism whichswept the colonial areas af tar WorldWar II . Moraover, the new leader ofthe Weet, the Unitad Statee, soonmade clear her opposition to colonialism. In spite of these developments,however, France took positive meaeures to consolidate her poeition.Aimoet immediately, ehe wae challenged by H o C hi-minh, a Communist ,who capital ized on the nationalist icfervor of th e people by dem a ndin gColonel Charlee P. Btggio, Jr., iswith the Defense InteUigence Agsn@in Waahingtow, D. C. He served inEurope dzwing World War II; was

oseigned to Headqmzrteve, US ArtmISecurity Agencg in Wmhington; andeaw eeroice with the 8Zd ArtiUer?t, USArmy, Europe. He hokia an M.A. da-gree from the University of MaW-iand, and was graduated from the USArmy War College in June of thisWXZT.

independence for Vietn a m. B ut H oChi-minhe was not the only voiceclamoring for fraadom. There wereother nationalist leadere who alsow a nted independence a nd w ho w erenot Communists. As late ae mid-1949,France eti l l had an opportunity tocome to terme with these non-Communiet na tiona list a nd th ereby blockHo Chi-minh.At that t ime, however, France didnot see the problem in terme of independence or na tiona iiem. Sh e w a e notprepared to make conceseione. Shew a nt ed to retsin In dochha a e a colony. Thus, Ho Chi-minh emerged aethe strongest Vietnamese leader, andhe led the revolution againet Frenchcolonial reconquest.

Win MindsHo Chi-minh eaw the struggle aea n ida cdogica i w e in wh ich colonia lism was but one elementalbeit animportant one. Although recognizingthe importance of winning early batt les against the French, he fel t tkati t was an absolute neeeesity to wint he minds of t he paople by convincingthem tha t his ideoiogy w a e bet t er tha nthat of the French.This doee not mean that Ho Chiminh tr ied to da zzle the peopl+ ma nyof w hom were peaea nt sw ith complexMa rxiat philoeophia a . On the contrary, he reduced hie concepts to simple terme that al l could understand.It w a e not difficult for him to explainthat Vietnam should belong to theVletn a meee, tha t th e F renchmen w ereth ere to enrich th emselves a t th e expense of the Vietnamese, that Francea e a n a tion w a s keeping herself s t rongby stealing the resourcee of her colonies , and that i t wae t ime for thehated colonial rule to come to an end.He biamed aii the ioeai probiemspolitica l, socia l, a nd economic-on t he

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system w hich th e F rench h a d imposed on Vietna m. H e found fert i leground on ma ny issues w here reformewere, indeed, long overdue, euch asrea pport ionment of th e la nd.Id eology w a s given prima cy so a sto provide a noble csuee to both thepeople a nd th e a rmy. B y th oroughlyindoctr ina t ing hk tr oops, he w a s ablete instil l strong revolutionary 2ss1a nd a wil lingness to endure extremeprivat ions and r iske. Under the mantle of a common ideology, the peoplea nd the a rmy w ere to function a s asingle entity.Of f ensive Underesti mat edThe F rench underestima t ed th e potency of this ideological offensive.They saw the problem as one whichsimply required military suppressionin the conventional colonial manner.French ideology was based on a conviction that reeolonialization of Vietna m w a s a eort of val idat ion of t heirvict ory in World Wa r II , a nd th usneeeeea ry for t he ma intena nce ofFrench greatnees. They also rationalized tha t the Vietna mese would, t hereby, benefit from Fr ench cultur e a ndcivilization.

These views were convincing tomost Frenchmen, but they had l i t t leI appea l to t he Vietna mese. Ma ny t housands of Vietnamese, in both Northand South, made their choice againatcommunism. Many other Vietnamesemight ha ve preferr ed libera l democra cy to comm uniem if democra cy ha dprovided th em w ith politica l independence inet eed of colonia l sta tu s. Fr a nce,however, was unwil l ing to make thisconcession, nor w a s she rea dy t o ma kemeaningful land reforme and socialreforms.

w hen French officiala f inally rea lized their shortcomings in the ideological area, the corrective meesuresOctober19e6

I.STS LEARNthey took were too li tt le and too late.The bulk of the population had allieditself w ith t he aide w hoee ca useseemed t o be cloeeet to t heir own the Vietminh.Inta l l igencaSuccess in guerril la war dependson intelligence. Good intelligence depends on the support of the people.Once t he bulk of t he people w a s lost,therefore, the French found themselves at a terr i f ic dlaa dva nta ge. Virtual ly every t ime the French made amove, th e w ord w a e paa sed by loca lVietnamese civiliana to the nearestVietminh agent who, in turn, got theword to the army. The French foundthemselves trying to conduct militaryopera tions in a fiehbow l: th erebydenying to them the important element of tectical srrrpriee.The possible use of helicopters toobta in su rpriee w ith epeed w a s notfeasible since there were only a handful of helicopters in the theeter. TheCommunists a lwa ya had a good eet imate of French strength in a givensector, but th e French seldom ha d agood idea of what was fac ing them.when the French made a mobilethrust into enemy terri tory, th e Communists not only could tell the proba ble depth of th e penetr a t ion an d theprobable duration of the operation,but aleo the probable intentions oftbe commander.Recognizing th e import a nce th a t intelligence would play in the struggle,the Vietminh in about 1948 formeda n int elligence eervice th a t beca me a nelite corps w hose members w ere ha ndpicked. Its functione differed fromthose of Western intelligence unite.In addit ion to the tradi t ional intel l igence functions, V1et minh intelligencea lso reconnoitered retrea t a nd adva nceroutea, picked placee for ambushes,

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,.,,Ers WHpla nted a genta , ta ught a nd supervisedeemoufla ge, det ermin ed 10ssss of menand arms, and performed many otherduties.

From captured documents, theFrench found that Vietrnhh inteSigence pereonnel prepared extremelydeta i led a nd a ccura te surveys of a nticipa ted bat t le a rena to include tra ffica bility cha rt s for cooliea . E ven th e

G enerel J ean de La tt re de Ta eeignYattitudea of the local populace werea ssessed so th a t t he Vietm M commander could be advised of what toexmw t in th e w a y of loca l support .

The Vietminh intelligence pereonnel not only were adept a t in tUtra ting enemy a reas, but t heir ra cial cheracterietics also permitted them tomerge with tbe population. They oftenrema ined undetected r ight a mong th eFrench. The French by their racialdissimilarity, on tbe other hand, didnot enjoy the same advantage. Furt herm ore, photo reeonn a ieeenee, eo

import a nt to t he West, w a e reduced ineffeetiveneee by th e hea vy vegeta tion,mounta inous terra in, a nd the weether .The Fr a nch, of cours e, knew howimport a nt i t ie for guerrillas to getgood intelligence. They had learnedthe Ieeeon the ha rd w a y dur ing t he-@s opera t ions a ga inst t he G ermans in World War II. Nevertheless,they lost the intelligence aspect of t hewai in Vietnam, and were neverstrong enough in combat power tomake up for their intelligence deficit.Sba tegy and TacticcP rior t o 1949. t he Fren ch enjoyeda definite mili&y superiorit y -overthe V]etrahh, but they were not ableduring thie period decisively to beatdown the rebellion. When the ChineseCommu nist s closed on t he Nort h Vietnamese border in 1949, the war tankon an entirely new dimension; TheFrench were able temporarily tocount er this a dvan ta ge th rough thegenius of G enera l J ean de La tt re deTaeeigay. His strategy was to try tobring a bout a etpieee bett lee w hereth e Fr ench could get th e enemy outin the open a nd dea l him a fa t a l b low .In eerly 1951, General De Lattreenticed G enera l Vo Nguyen G iap toattack the French in force, and theresult w a s a num ber of bloody defea tsfor th e Vietm hh. These bat tles ta ughtGeneral Glap a leseon. Subsequently ,he refused to be drawn into the typeof meat grinder operation which theU nited St a tes bed u eed @ such ad vantage in Korea. From then on, hea ccepted bat tle only on h le ow n t erms.General Glap threatened the ThaiHighlands in late 1952, and the newFrench comm a nder, Genera l Reoul A.L. S a lan, deeided to count er t his m oveby Idt i lng tbe Vietminh at their baseof supply a t P hu-Dea n. General Sa landispa t ched four mobile regiment a l

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combat team~ver S0,000 menbutthese unite were frequently nmbushed,a nd never rea ched th e ma in Vletm inhdepot.

G enera l Henri Na va rre t ook comma nd in m id-1953, a nd t ried t o st emfurther Communist succeeseeby building a series of forte along the Lao-Vietn a meee bord er. The Fr ench, a tone point , ha d over 80,000 t roops in900 forte.The most important of the fortewa s Dien B ien P hu w here the Frenchult ima t ely lost a bout 12,000 men. TheVietminh losses were even higher byt he time t he fort f inally surr endered,but here aga in w ee demonstra ted theVietmhhs propensity for politicalconeidera tiona . At t he time of th esiege at Dien Bien Phu, the Genevanegotia t ion ha d begun, a nd the Vietminh decided that a vic tory over thega rrison th ere w ould force t he Frenchto end the war .Tact issl l essonsThe battle of Dien Bien Phu provides at least two important teeticallessons: f iret, the fort was located toofar from its source of rmpplieeand reinforcements, and eecond, the Frenchunderestima ted th e ca pabili ty of th eenemy to innova te and t o ta i lor histactics to fi t the situation.Approach trenches were dug inever-tightening circles, thus permitting t he infan t ry to close w ithin afew yards of the defenders beforelaunching their attacks. ArtWerypieces were disposed on the forwardslopes of the surrounding hills instead of on the reverse slope. Theartil lery pieces were dismantled andca rried into predug empla cements under the cover of night. Then shell-proof roofs were erected. The camoufla ge w a s so good t ha t even th e pat hsof the a mmunition ha ndlera w ere hidOcteber1SS3

LETSLEARNden. General Navarre considered theVietmin h a t illlery effeet ivenese t o bethe major surprise of the battle.

General Navarre a lso tr ied to exploit the mobile power of his mechanized and armored unite by creatingpowerful mobile groups to clear roadsa nd reinforce str ong point a . The lar gest euch group, GrorqrremerdMobile

-hare% RSOU1 A. L Selen100, wae an elite force of eeasonedveterans, many of whom had foughtin Korea . Within seven month e thisgroup was so badly beaten that i tno longer existed ae a unit . GM 100,despi te its s t rength , wa s a lwa ya a ta diea dva nta ge beca use i t w a s t iedto the roads by i ts heavy equipmenta nd w as vulnera b le to repeated a mbushes. The last euch ambush almostannihi la ted the unit .

The ambush was a primary tact icof the Vietminh. Ambushes were notspur-of-the-moment operations, butw ere ca reful ly pla nned a nd prepa red.; 31


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LETS LEARNThis Vietminh tactic recognised thatthe French enjoyed superiority innumbers and firepower, but were tiedto t he roa ds by their equipment a ndby the conventional tactics that theyemployed.The Vietminh a leo ha d ot her a dvantages. They possessed a superiorintelligence network, they could takeadvantage of heavi ly vegetated ter

the rear elemen t s of t he convoy. Afterma ny defea ts , t hey learned tha t mosta mbushes cont a hed enemy bloeklngforces a t both ends of th e a mbushedstretch of road, plue a m a in a mbushing element on bot h eides of t he roadthue pinning the column down andprevent ing it fr om ma neuvering . TheFrench found th a t i t h elped eomewba tto stretch th e column out to ma ke it

ra in for concea bnent, a nd their l ightlyequipped eoldiers could move quicklya crosa count ry to a mbueh much lar gerroadbound French units. Moreever,the Vletminh could stake out an areaand l ie in wai t for days without fearthat their position would be discloeedby the local populace.For a long time, the French forcesantiambush tact ics were based on anerroneous assumption that ambushes, were being eet up ae conventionalroad blocks th a t could be finked by

ha rder for t he Vietminh t o encirclethe whole unit . I t wae also of somehelp t o use helicopter for det ect ion,but the French had only four helicopters in t he entire thea ter in Ma rch1954.Early in the war , tbe French tr ieda program of pacification as a meansof ultimately winning over the country. The program was both militaryand political . I t aimed to crush theguerrilla , t o a eeiet t he loca l peepleto defend themselves, and to restore

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LETS LEARNkxal administration to normal. TheFr ench enjoyed some success in th isventur e, especially in t he milita ry a spect . The polit ica l side, h owev er, w a sdoomed to fa ilure by t he relucta nceof Fra nce to gra nt independence t ot he Vietn a mese, and by ite failure toinitiate neceesary reforms and improvement s once milita ry cont rol ha dbeen ga ined.Countergsrerri l laForcosAnother tactic that the Frenchtried was the use of counterguerril laforces patterned af ter the maquie opera t ions of World Wa r II da ys. Inth e opinion of G enera l P a ul H. E ly,counterguerrilla forces were the onlyones w hich could successfully copew ith guerril la s since th e sam e meth ods of t rickery, flexibility, a nd mobili ty had to be used to defeat them.He fel t that the French real ized thistoo late, and that counterguerrillasw ere used in insufficient numbers.Not too mu ch officia l informa t ion isa va ila ble on t hese French comm a ndo opera t ion, but appar ently th eFrench used several thousand mounta in tr ibesmen a s @guerrillas underFrench advisors.

Bernard B. Fal l does not ful lyshare General Elys enthusiasm forthe counterguerrillas. Mr. Fall pointsout that as long as the home area ishighly infil trated, i t is extremely difficult to keep theee unite from beingbetrayed. He also reports that manyof these tribesmen would not leavetheir famil iee af ter the armist ice waesigned. Many of these men, togetherwith French advisore who decided notto a t tempt to work their way throughenemy t erritory, fought to the veryend against the Vietminh mopup operation.From the purely military point ofview , there w ere a ppa rently th ree priOctober1900

mary and interrelated factore thatcontributed to the military success ofthe Vietminh:e The us e of five, simple t a ct ica lprin cipleespeed of movement , sur priee, undermining of enemy mora le,security, and collaboration with thepopulace.e Good, accurate, and up-to-dateintelligence.e Det a iled pla nning.

Tho SanctuaryThe sanctua ry wa s a nother vita laspect of the war. In retrospect, i t isnow evident t ha t t he beginning of th eend for the French came in late 1949when the Chineee Communists occupied a ll of t he Ch inese provinces bordering on Tonkin. A sanctuary wasth us provided th e Vietr ninh w heret roops could be t ra ined w ithout molesta t ion by t be F rench, a nd w here supplies could be etored and drawn asneeded. This wae prohahly tbe keydevelopment of t he conflict . B eca ueet he F rench did not ha ve th e resourcesto seal off the border, they tried toblock enemy movements by t he tr a ditiona l method of spott ing fort s a s keypoints along main roadi. Vietminh,however, did n ot rely on t he roa ds a ndeasily bypaseed the forts.

Within a few months the Vietminht ook th e offensive, a fter being a ugment ed by severa l ba tt a lions of tr oopstra ined in C hina, a nd a f ter being supplied w ith lar ge numbers of howitzerscaptured from the Chinese Nationalists. On e by one t he F rench fort s fell,and by October 1950 almost the entire northern half of North Vietnamhad come under Vietminh control.

The w a r wa s to Ia et a nother fouryears, but the sanctuary on the northprevent ed t he French from ga ining adecisive vict ory . It a leo ena bled t heu

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LETs LESRNVietmin h progressively t o bleed t heFrench Army until France wasobliged to aue for peace. Tbe Frenchknew how important the sanctuarywas to the Vietminh, but the FrenchArm y simply did not ha ve sufficientmilitary capabili ty to seal off theborder.When preesure w a s brought to bea rby the great powere to end the f ighting in Indochina, both the French andthe North Vietnamese tried to improve their military pozturee in thefield so that they could be in a betterbargaining poeition at the conferencetable. But here, again, the Frenchw ere out foxed by Ho Ch Lminh, Rea lizing that the political stakes dema nded a mili ta ry victory of largepropofilons, a nd th a t t he French didnot expect him to accept a setpiecebattle, Ho ChLminb decided to go allout to capture Dien Bien Phu. Whent he fort event ua lly fell, bis politica lobjective was within hk grasp.There are several important Iwsonatha t the Uni ted S ta tes should havelearned from the French experience,and that we should be applying inVietnam today.The Communists saw the situationin Vietnam as ripe for revolution, eothey fought a revolutionary war. Theyrecognized that in order to win a revolutionary war, they had to convincea sufficient number of people, P SS Santa and e l i tes , tha t their cause wasmore in the interest of the peopletha n w ee tha t of the government . Thepeople wanted independence.Thus, t he F rench experience t eachesth e U nited Sta tes tha t ideology should

be given primary attention if we bopcto win the war with the Viet Cong.From a mili ta ry sta ndpoint , w e a refighting a competent, dangerous foein terrain that worke to his advantage. He will try to avoid fighting abattle of our choosing and on ourterms. He ma y ma ke stra tegic a nd ta ctical mistakes, but he will correctthem promptly. He will capitalize onUS mistakes. He will move bin forcesfa ster th a n seems possible. H e willemploy ambushes of all types withtelling effect unless we employ effective countermeasures. He will try toredu ce o

military review october 1966

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