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DOI: 10.1177/030582980002900206012000 29: 307Millennium - Journal of International Studies

Marc LynchThe Dialogue of Civilisations and International Public Spheres

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Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2000. ISSN 0305-8298. Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 307-330

307

The Dialogue of Civilisations andInternational Public Spheres

Marc Lynch

Instead of speaking to each other with the language of force, we [should]speak with the language of reason, opening a dialogue between civilisations. 1

Mohammed Khatami

In December 1997, the recently elected President of Iran, Mohammed Khatami,directly challenged both the American policy of containment of Iran and SamuelHuntington s clash of civilisations thesis with a call for a dialogue of civilisations . Invoking discernibly Habermasian ideas, Khatami called for

American foreign policy [to] abandon its instrumental rationality and stopconsidering others as objects [and instead] respect the rights of others andadopt an approach based on communicative rationality. 2

The dialogue of civilisations would help to overcome cultural misconceptions anddeeply embedded hostility without sacrificing authenticity, equality, or legitimateinterests. This overture generated an unexpectedly positive response frominternational society, with the idea discussed within such diverse fora as the United

For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Jim Bohman, Jennifer Mitzen, AlexanderWendt, Chris Brown, M.J. Peterson, the anonymous referees for Millennium , and the participants in theWilliams College Political Science Department Faculty Colloquium. An earlier version of the articlewas presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, 3-6 September1998.

1. Mohammed Khatami, news conference, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, Tehran,in Persian, 14 December 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter SWB),Middle East/Iran/ME/D3103/MED .

2. Mohammed Khatami, interview by Christiane Amanpour, CNN, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, Tehran, in Persian, 8 January 1998, SWB Middle East/Iran/ME/D3120/MED . For asystematic presentation, see Mohammed Khatami, Hope and Challenge: The Iranian President Speaks (Binghamton, NY: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, 1997) and Islam,Liberty, and Development (Binghamton, NY: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, BinghamtonUniversity, 1998). For brief discussions of Khatami s political thought, see Shaul Bakhash, Iran sUnlikely President , New York Review of Books , 5 November 1998[http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/WWWarchdisplay.cgi?19981105047R#top] (5 July 2000) and FredHalliday, Mohammed and Mill: What Does Mohammed Khatami Think? , The New Republic , 5October 1998, 30-35.

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Nations General Assembly, UNESCO, the Organisation of Islamic Countries, theVatican, international scholarly conferences, global media, and the Internet, ineffect creating an international public sphere around the place of Islam in theinternational order. The communicative act of opening this dialogue created an

international public sphere which had not previously existed, opening the potentialfor an alternative to the spiral of conflict and mistrust between the West and Islam.

Interwoven with, and often conflated with, the call for dialogue of civilisationswas a more focused call for a dialogue between two states: Iran and the UnitedStates. Decades of hostility and strategic rivalry, with each state identifying theother as a primary enemy and rejecting all public relationships, had deeplyembedded enmity into their respective conceptions of national identity. The call fora political dialogue between these states generated very different political

dynamics than did the dialogue of civilisations, with intense controversy in bothstates and more limited results.Both dimensions of the dialogue of civilisations initiativethe dialogue over

global order and the dialogue between hostile statespose important questions forInternational Relations (IR) theory. Conventional approaches to internationalpolitics, whether realist or liberal, do not offer compelling theoretical foundationsfor such dialogues. Where does such a dialogue stand in relation to moreconventional IR concepts such as the diplomatic dialogue among states, or

transnational networks of citizens in global civil society? Without developing itstheoretical foundations, dialogue might easily become simply a rhetorical deviceshrouding the pursuit of power and state interests. Dialogue could be meaningless,a pro forma exercise designed to take the place of effective action, or an academicexchange program of international conferences preaching to the converted. At theother extreme, the dialogue of civilisations might aspire to be

a new paradigm for international relations...from the old mode of relationsbased on power politics and exclusion to one which will be based on inclusionand accommodation and dialogue and understanding. 3

This article elaborates international public spheres theory as a middle groundbetween transformative and instrumental conceptions of dialogue. Drawing onHabermas distinction between strategic and communicative action, this approachexplores the potential for actors to engage in rational-critical discourses which canrecast the context of strategic interaction. By appealing to reasoned dialogue beforean international audience, actors can, under certain conditions, jointly search for

new foundations for their relations. Global media and institutions provide thestructural potential for actors to create international public spheres around specificissues.

3. Javad Sarif, Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, remarks at the School of International and PublicAffairs, Columbia University, 6 May 1999. For an expansive conception of dialogue, see the TehranDeclaration on Dialogue Among Civilisations, adopted by the Islamic Symposium, 2-5 May 1999[http://www.un.int/iran/dialogue2.html] (2 June 2000).



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In this respect I will discuss Khatami s dialogue of civilisations initiative as anexample of the creation of such an international public sphere, as states, non-stateactors, and individuals began to engage in focused discussion before a globalaudience. At the level of global order, this international public sphere facilitated

substantial communicative action which began to articulate principles of co-existence and mutual respect despite substantive political and moral disagreement.This international public sphere did not as easily allow the United States and Iranto overcome their differences, but did allow them to reframe the interaction arounddifferences of interest rather than more intractable existential conflicts of identity.

The United States and Iran: Dialogue and Confrontation

Because the American-Iranian conflict underlies the international politics of theclash of civilisations , understanding the dynamics of the dialogue of civilisationsrequires a brief overview of the sources of American-Iranian hostility. Iran underthe Shah was one of the closest American allies in the Gulf region and a pillar of American Middle East strategy. 4 The Islamic Revolution of 1978-79, whichidentified the Shah with his American supporters, led to the taking of Americanhostages and fierce anti-American rhetoric, establishing a deep mutual hostilitybetween the Islamic Republic and The Great Satan . The Ayatollah Khomeini sconception of Islamic history identified the West as an existential threat based notonly on its material power and colonial history but also on the cultural threat posedby materialism and secularism. The conflict between Iran and the United Statesinvolved not only interest and power, but also a profound mutual demonisationwhich caused unusually deep estrangement. Iranian rhetorical support for Islamistrevolutions abroad, which served as a primary means for the Islamic Republic tomanifest its ideology in foreign policy, deepened this frame of hostility in theinternational arena. 5 American opposition to political Islam directly or indirectlytargeted the Islamic Republic as the source of this threat to American interests inthe Middle East and, as a result, drove mutually reinforcing rhetorics of enmity.Samuel Huntington s provocative assertion that a coming clash of civilisationsbetween the West and Islam posed the primary threat to international order built onthese rhetorical positions, and received extraordinary public attention in both theUnited States and the Islamic world. 6 While the Clinton Administration carefully

4. On US policy towards Iran, see Gawdat Bahgat, Beyond Containment , Security Dialogue 28, no. 4(1997): 453-64; Fawaz Gerges, Washington s Misguided Iran Policy , Survival 38, no. 4 (1996-97): 5-15; Gary Sick, The US and Iran: Truth and Consequences , Contention 5, no. 2 (1996): 59-78; RobinWright and Shaul Bakhash, The US and Iran: An Offer They Can t Refuse? , Foreign Policy , no. 108(1997): 124-37; and Shahram Rubin and Jerrold Green, Engaging Iran: A US Strategy , Survival 40,no. 3 (1998): 153-69.

5. For an overview of these developments, see John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). On Iran, see James A. Bill, The United States and Iran:Mutual Mythologies , Middle East Policy 2, no. 3 (1993): 98-106.

6. Samuel Huntington, A Clash of Civilisations? , Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49 and The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). For



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asserted that it did not oppose Islam, but rather radicalism, Muslims andWesterners alike increasingly perceived the potential for conflict, and Islamistsappropriated the clash of civilisations as a vindication of their analysis of international order. 7 European states, afraid of the implications of Muslim

immigration and political radicalism, portrayed Islamism as a new political andsecurity threat for the post-Cold War world, widening the spiralling conflict from apurely bilateral affair to an issue of global order.

Despite signs of Iranian foreign policy moderation in the 1990s, after the deathof Khomeini and the end of Iran s war with Iraq, the United States intensified itspolicy of confrontation and containment. Identifying Iran as a backlash statealmost unique in its malevolence, the Clinton Administration asserted that

as the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility todevelop a strategy to neutralise, contain, and through selective pressure,perhaps eventually transform these backlash states into constructive membersof the international community. 8

The designation of Iran as a rogue state and international outlaw was an act of communicative power on the part of the United States which largely failed tosecure any degree of international consensus. Recognising changes in Iranianpractices, as well as the potential of the Iranian market, the European Unioninstead officially pursued a policy of critical dialogue hoping to moderate Iranianforeign policy behaviour through trade and discussion. Frustrated with its inabilityto persuade even its close allies, in 1995 the US passed legislation imposing asecondary boycott on companies doing business with Iran. 9 In April 1997, the EUofficially suspended its critical dialogue after the findings of a German court aboutan Iranian assassination of a dissident on German soil. By spring 1997, then, mostavenues for inter-state, inter-societal, or inter-civilisational dialogue seemed to beclosed.

discussion, see Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, From The Clash of Civilisations to Civilizational Parallelism ,Telos , no. 115 (1999): 109-116; and Roman Herzog, et al., Preventing the Clash of Civilisations (NewYork: St. Martins Press, 2000).

7. See Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

8. Anthony Lake, Confronting Backlash States , Foreign Affairs 73, no. 2 (1994): 46. For an officialstatement, see Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Containing Iran , statementbefore the International Relations Committee of the United States House of Representatives,Washington, DC, 9 November 1995 [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/951109.html]

(6 July 2000).9. Charles Lane, Changing Iran: Germany s New Ostpolitik , Foreign Affairs 74, no. 6 (1995): 77-90;

Peter Rudolf, Critical Engagement: The EU and Iran , in Transatlantic Tensions: The United States,Europe, and Problem Countries , ed. Richard N. Haass (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press,1999); Simon Serfaty, Bridging the Gulf Across the Atlantic: Europe and the United States in thePersian Gulf , Middle East Journal 52, no. 3 (1998): 337-50. For documentation, see Kenneth Katzman,US-Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of US Policies, Laws, and Regulations (Washington,DC: The Atlantic Council of the United States, 1999).



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In May 1997, the unexpected election of the liberal, reformist presidentialcandidate Mohammed Khatami derailed these entrenched conceptions of conflict.In addition to advancing significant liberalising reforms at home, Khatamidramatically shifted Iran s foreign policy discourse; the consistency of discourse

abroad and at home, even in the face of strong domestic opposition, gavecredibility to the rather surprising new Iranian positions. 10 At a triumphant IslamicSummit in Teheran in December 1997 attended by over 50 Muslim heads of state,Khatami offered the dialogue of civilisations as a new conception of internationalpolitics. He followed this performance by directly addressing the American peoplethrough a lengthy, unprecedented interview with CNN. 11 He then took the dialogueinitiative to the United Nations General Assembly, UNESCO, a number of European and Islamic states, and several international conferences. Khatami

employed the possibilities inherent in a wide array of global institutionsthe UN,the global media, the Organisation of Islamic Countries, and the Internettobypass diplomatic channels and to directly thematise the issue for world publicopinion. In response, the United Nations General Assembly declared 2001 to beThe United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilisations , with the goals of

emphasizing the importance of tolerance in international relations and thesignificant role of dialogue as a means to reach understanding, remove threatsto peace and strengthen interaction and exchange among civilisations. 12

Huntington s clash of civilisations initially defined the terms of debate within arealist conceptual universe which simply replaced states with civilisations .Huntington assumed that inter-civilisational relations would follow the realist logicof anarchy, in which self-contained entities facing a security dilemma would beunable to credibly commit to peaceful relations and would inevitably spiral intoconflict. 13 The assumption of an inevitable clash created the foundations for a self-fulfilling prophecy. Huntington s formulation, I argue, rests on the realistassumption that no public sphere existed which would enable meaningfulcommunication between civilisations. The development of the dialogue of civilisations demonstrates at a minimum that there is nothing inevitable about suchconflict. The significance of this lies both in the structural foundations making aninternational dialogue possible and in the potential for agency demonstrated byKhatami s initiative. Khatami reframed the issue around dialogue rather thanclash by creating an international public sphere within which communicativeaction might take place. In an October 1999 address to UNESCO, Khatami noted

with evident surprise the intense and positive international reception of his ideas:

10. R.K. Ramazani, The Shifting Premise of Iran s Foreign Policy: Towards a Democratic Peace? ,Middle East Journal 52, no. 2 (1998): 177-87.

11. Khatami, interview by Amanpour, CNN.12 . United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/53/22 , 16 November 1998. 13. Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East

(New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996).



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being hailed by the intellectuals and the public alike is in itself of greatsignificance . 14 In other words, the deliberation itself created a public sphere withtangible political effects. By 1999, even Huntington accepted that dialoguesamong civilisations are absolutely essential . 15

The dialogue with the United States did not immediately generate suchmomentum towards communicative action. President Clinton initially respondedcautiously, asserting American interests and concerns while assuring Muslims thatthe United States did not pursue a clash of civilisations. An exchange of publicstatements explored the possibility of dialogue between the two adversaries. 16 InJune 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright proposed a series of reciprocalsteps towards a new relationship. 17 Khatami, under severe pressure fromconservative power centres in the Islamic Republic, found it necessary to step back

from formal discussions with the United States. While Iran made considerableprogress in advancing its relations with Europe, with official visits by Khatami toFrance, Italy, and Germany, prospects for an American-Iranian dialogue rekindledonly in February 2000, after the sweep of Parliamentary elections by reformists. Inresponse, the United States again reached out to Iran by lifting some sanctions andrenewing its call for dialogue. 18

Once again, Khatami faced a counterattack from conservatives, who attempted tooverturn election results and threatened decisive action to protect the Islamic

Republic against the reformists. Quite significantly, the conservative counterattack focused on the independent liberal press, whose construction of a contentiousdomestic public sphere most embodied the shift in Iranian politics. 19 While theoutcome of the Iranian domestic power struggle is still very much in doubt, areturn to the ideological politics of the 1980s seems unlikely. Though American-Iranian relations have yet to be normalised, the dialogue initiative has succeeded inchanging the official rhetoric on each side, focusing attention on interests andpossible areas of co-operation, and helping to legitimize discussion of US-Iranianrelations in both Iran and the US and to introduce a new vocabulary of respect andthoughtfulness into the dialogue by media . 20

14. Mohammed Khatami, Address to UNESCO , Paris, 29 October 1999, text as published in TehranTimes , 30 October 1999 [www.tehrantimes.com/today/int.htm#int001] (24 August 2000). For anexample of these global discourses, see Herzog, Preventing the Clash of Civilisations .

15. Samuel Huntington, When Cultures Collide , Civilization Magazine , June 1999 found in[http://www.civmag.com/articles/C9906E02.html] (27 July 2000).

16. Bruce Riedel, Assistant Secretary of State, speech to Washington Institute for Near East Policy,Washington, 6 May 1998.

17. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, address to the Asia Society, Waldorf-Astonia Hotel, NewYork, 17 June 1998.

18. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State, address to American-Iranian Council, Washington DC, 18March 2000.

19. On the press in the Iranian reform movement, see Zarir Merat, Pushing Back the Limits of thePossible: The Press in Iran , Middle East Report , no. 212 (1999): 32-35.

20. Gary Sick, Rethinking Dual Containment , Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): 22.



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Dialogue and the Public Sphere

An analytical and practical tension between different conceptions of dialogue lay atthe centre of the dialogue of civilisations. What Khatami called a dialogue of

civilisations referred simultaneously to a diplomatic dialogue between two states(Iran and the United States), to an international dialogue about principles of globalorder, and to a civilisational dialogue between two religions (Christianity andIslam). 21 As an active international deliberation developed over the meaning andpurpose of dialogue among civilisations , Khatami reformulated his conception of dialogue in increasingly specific and pragmatic detail. In the process, Khatamiexplicitly differentiated the dialogue of civilisations from interstate negotiation,urging a focus on cultural and philosophical discussions. But if this is the case,

then why has so much of the dialogue of civilisations initiative been directedtowards European and American opinion? Given its utility for Iranian foreignpolicy, is it credible that no instrumental goals lie behind Khatami s initiative?

IR theory offers limited guidance for thinking about the dialogue of civilisations.Rationalist theories of strategic interaction conceptualise dialogue as the exchangeof information, intended to help overcome co-ordination problems in situations of multiple equilibria or to signal intentions in strategic interaction. 22 Dialogue in thisconception serves the predefined goals of strategic actors, instrumental action withno higher end than state interests. Arguing might allow one state to persuadeanother to adopt a preferred policy without the need for threats or inducements, butthe actor does not herself expect to change her preferences. Conceived of in thisway, dialogue might allow for more rational conflict resolution and facilitate moreco-operative outcomes, but does not challenge basic conceptions of internationalpolitics. Khatami himself explicitly disavows this conception of dialogue: bydialogue we do not mean here the use of diplomatic language to promote one spolitical and economic interests and to bring about victory over the enemy . 23

Other theorists have placed dialogue within more radical or transformativeprojects. Post-structuralists have approached the dialogue among civilisationsfrom the perspective of radical incommensurability. 24 These critics not only

21. On Islamic conceptions of dialogue, see Michael Fischer and Mehdi Abedi, Debating Muslims:Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press,1990); Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Clash of Civilizations: The Relations of the Future? , in Islam,Modernism and the West , eds. Gema Martin Munoz (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999); and AtaullahSiddiqi, Christian-Muslim Dialogue in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin s Press, 1997).

22. James Morrow, The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signalling, Commitment, and Negotiation inInternational Politics , in Strategic Choice and International Relation, eds. David A. Lake and RobertPowell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

23. Khatami, Address to UNESCO .24. For a statement of this perspective, see Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, Reading

Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies ,International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990): 367-416. For discussion, see Jim George, Discoursesof Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,1994). The question of relativism in international order is taken up in Maria Lensu and Jan-Stefan Fritz,eds., Value Pluralism, Normative Theory and International Relations (New York: Macmillan, 1999).



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theorise but embrace the impossibility of communication, finding in this conditionthe room for difference and the potential to resist hegemonic power. Alternately,drawing on Tzvetan Todorov, David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah propose aconversation of cultures, found in the space bounded by an international society

of both common values and commitments and diversity , and based in respect forthe other as an equal . 25 This conversation requires reflexive and empatheticsubjects:

by discovering and engaging the other within us, we simultaneously draw theother into a dialoguea dialogue that changes both participants in a commonconfrontation with oppression and the search for the truth. 26

Richard Shapcott, drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer, has conceptualiseddialogue as an interpretative act of hermeneutic understanding in whichinternational society holds the prospects for a conversation which should aim notonly to listen to the concerns of the South, but also to understand them in thehermeneutic sense . 27 Finally, drawing on Jrgen Habermas, international publicsphere theory attempts to identify the modalities of communicative action withinthe structural development of the public sphere. 28 While not drawing sharp linesbetween these inter-related projects, I place my project within this communicativeaction approach, not least because Khatami s own conception of dialogue mostresembles that of Habermas.

International Public Sphere Theory

International public sphere theory has recently emerged as a distinct researchprogram, driven empirically by transformations in global civil society andtheoretically by the impact of publicity on state behaviour and the potential forcommunicative action in shaping international order. 29 Globalisation theorists have

demonstrated the increasing structural potential for global dialogues created by the

25. David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, Prelude to a Conversation of Cultures in InternationalSociety? Todorov and Nandy on the Possibility of Dialogue , Alternatives 19, no. 1 (1994): 24. Also seeChris Brown, Turtles All the Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory, and InternationalRelations , Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23, no. 2 (1994): 213-36.

26. Blaney and Inayatullah, Prelude to a Conversation , 26.27. Richard Shapcott, Conversation and Coexistence: Gadamer and the Interpretation of International

Society , Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23, no. 1 (1994): 57-83.28. Jrgen Haacke, Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, Self-Reflection, Rational

Argumentation , Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25, no. 2 (1996): 255-89 and AndrewLinklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Columbia, SC: University of South CarolinaPress, 1998).

29. International public sphere theory as developed here should be distinguished from other recentdiscussions of Critical Theory and Habermas, including most recently Beate Jahn, One Step Forward,Two Steps Back: Critical Theory as the Latest Version of Liberal Idealism , Millennium: Journal of International Studies 27, no. 3 (1998): 613-41; Charles Rustin, Habermas, Discourse Ethics, andInternational Justice , Alternatives 24, no. (1999): 167-92; and Nick Rengger, Going Critical? AResponse to Hoffman , Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17, no. 1 (1988): 81-89.



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revolution in global communications and travel. 30 While these studies generally donot consider specific discourses, they demonstrate a system-wide increase in levelsof interaction creating a shared space of common language, political argument, andexperience. International public spheres theory explores the potential for

communicative action within these structures. It draws on a vibrantinterdisciplinary deliberative democracy research program, which theorises thepotential for deliberation to provide normative foundations for democracy and apragmatic means for resolving contentious public problems. 31

While this literature has focused on deliberation within existing nation-states,there is no empirical or theoretical a priori reason to restrict the concept of thepublic sphere to the domestic context. Public sphere theory generically investigatesthe necessary conditions, the political implications, and empirical indicators

concerning the emergence of spaces for public deliberation. International publicspheres theory focuses specifically on public spheres which are not bounded by thenation-state. In some versions, this focuses upon deliberations among states; inothers, the actors are non-state actors or cosmopolitan citizens within publicspheres outside the bounds of sovereign states. 32 The conditions of globalisationand the declining ability of national states to act effectively on behalf of theircitizens reshape conceptualisations of international democratic participationwithout the necessity of the emergence of an international state. 33

As Habermas warns, the empirical existence of global communications does notguarantee an international political public sphere:

whereas the growth of systems and networks multiplies possible contacts andexchanges of information, it does not lead per se to the expansion of an

30. David Held, et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Culture (Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1999).

31. For an overview, see James Bohman, The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy , Journal of Political Philosophy 6, no. 1 (1998): 400-25, and Public Deliberation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1996); Jon Elster, ed., Deliberative Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); StephenMacedo, ed., Deliberative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Marc Lynch, StateInterests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordans Identity (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1999). For a related empirical application, see K.M. Fierke, Dialogues of Manoeuvreand Entanglement: NATO, Russia, and the CEECs , Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28,no. 1 (1999): 27-52.

32. James Bohman, The Globalization of the Public Sphere , Philosophy and Social Criticism 24, no.2/3 (1998): 199-216; International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political Equality andInfluence in Global Institutions , International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 499-513; and The PublicSpheres of the World Citizen , in Perpetual Peace , eds. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998). See also Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin Kohler, eds.,Re-Imagining Political Community (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Craig Calhoun,Nationalism and the Public Sphere , in Public and Private in Thought and Practice , eds. Jeff Weintraub and Krishan Kumar (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); and Jennifer Mitzen,Governing Anarchy: The Emergence of the International Public Sphere, 1815-1878 (Ph.D. diss.,University of Chicago, 2000). Habermas engages with the international dimension of public spheres inThe Inclusion of the Other: Essays in Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

33. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon, eds., Democracy s Edge (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999).



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intersubjectively shared world and to the discursive interweaving of conceptions of relevance, themes, and contributions from which politicalpublic spheres arise. 34

Indeed, James Bohman argues that the existing structures of global media offer arather dismal potential for the emergence of global public spheres, given theconcentration of ownership and profit-driven entertainment programming. 35 For theforeseeable future, international deliberation will involve temporary, issue-specific public attention...channelled through the established structures of nationalpublic spheres . 36 International public sphere theory does not rest upon an assertionof the empirical existence of a cosmopolitan, global public sphere, but rather uponthe existence of spaces for deliberation containing the potential for the exchange of

argumentation oriented towards rational consensus, problem solving, and thearticulation of common identities and interests. The growth of transnational civilsociety and decentralised global communication networks provides multiple anddiverse opportunities for actors to initiate international deliberations. From thisstandpoint, inter-civilisational dialogue might be understood as creat[ing]institutional frameworks which widen the boundaries of the dialogic community . 37

Public Dialogues and Public Spheres

The public sphere is a site of interaction in which actors reach understandingsabout contentious issues of shared concern through the public exchange of discourse. 38 In many cases, issues become shared concerns by being thematised ina public sphere; the issue-specific public dialogues and the public sphere aretherefore mutually constitutive. This functional definition of the public spheremakes no assumptions about either its location (with regard to the state) or itscontent (with regard to rational-critical discourse). Rather than assume a singlepublic sphere, or that public spheres are coterminous with state borders, this

definition posits multiple, overlapping public spheres of varying salience. What isnecessary is that political action be justified in public; this includes core notionssuch as the exchange of reasoned arguments oriented towards finding agreement,the existence of an imagined audience capable of judging the validity of profferedreasons, the inclusion of all affected actors in the process of deliberation, and theinadmissibility of direct appeals to power. Stripping the definition down to thisextent admittedly loses some of the historical specificity of Habermas analysis,but this loss is compensated by a wider applicability for comparative empirical

34. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other , 120-21.35. Bohman, The Globalization of the Public Sphere .36. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other , 176-77.37. Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community , 7.38. This definition follows the contributors to Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere

(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); for justification of this definition, see Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres , chap. 2.



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research and a greater respect for the divergent historical and institutionalexperience of non-Western cultures.

The rationalist conception of the international system assumes that states actalways and only in the strategic pursuit of predefined preferences. Such a

conception of political behaviour corresponds with Habermas concept of strategicaction: the instrumental pursuit of self-interest, cut off from public justification asstates pursue their survival and self-interest in a competitive system. Theseatomistic actors, isolated from communicative interaction, calculate purely in termsof interest and power and are unable to have access to the perceptions,interpretations, and fears of other actors. International public spheres theorycaptures this variation in international systems: with no international publicspheres, communicative action would be impossible and realism would be more

accurate. This is only one possible system structure however: internationalstructures vary based upon the presence or absence of a public sphere within whichactors can communicate and produce shared frames, norms, and identities. 39 Atleast since colonialism universalised the state system, few states are completelyautistic, existing completely outside all international public spheres. Revolutionarystates, such as Islamic Iran or Communist China or North Korea, come the closestto autism when they voluntarily shut themselves off from international society.The mere presence of the United Nations, with its universal membership, argues

against the idea that no sites whatsoever exist for the exchange of argument in theinternational arena, however. In other words, the continuum of existinginternational structures tilts towards the public sphere side rather than the systemic,anarchical side. 40

The presence of communicative action, argumentation before an audienceoriented towards achieving consensus, defines public sphere sites. These sites arenot necessarily identical with state boundaries or formal international institutions:the public sphere comes into existence whenever and wherever all affected bygeneral social and political norms of action engage in a practical discourse,evaluating their validity . 41 Public spheres exist when action is co-ordinatedthrough discourse oriented to the achievement of consensus. States today, nomatter how competitive, continuously exchange interpretations and arguments inpursuit of an international consensus. American strategic interaction with Iraq, forexample (surely one of the most conflictual of current inter-state relationships), isstructured powerfully by each side s efforts to secure international support. Theconstant give and take of arguments aimed at manipulating the formal consensus of the Security Council and international public opinion shaped the strategicinteraction over sanctions and weapons inspections. 42 In a more co-operative set of

39. Jrgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 359.40. This argument is consistent with the English School conception of international society; Hedley

Bull, The Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) remains the classic study of the international society of states.

41. Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space , in Habermas and the Public Sphere , 87.42. Marc Lynch, The Politics of Consensus Over Iraq , Middle East Report , no. 215 (2000): 20-23.



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relations, European politics are deeply constituted by a dense institutional structureand the expectation of ongoing political debate and interaction, even if Europecontinues to lack the necessary conditions for collective will formation in apolitical public sphere. 43 In each case, the demands and opportunities of

international public spheres powerfully shape the strategic actions of states.

The Impact of Public Dialogues

International public sphere theory focuses on the implications of discourse withinthese emergent public spheres. Taking seriously the warning that mediaproliferation alone does not make for a public sphere, public sphere theorists look for the potential within these structures for communicative action. At a normativelevel, analysts focus upon the rational-critical potential for public dialogue toovercome the dismal logic of anarchy and establish more communicative and lessstrategic foundations for world order.

Where communicative action does not take place, the existence of public spheresbefore which actors must justify their actions still affects the course of strategicinteraction. Thomas Risse, following Jon Elster s core distinction between themarket and the forum, builds on the observation that publicity shifts the strategiccontext of state action to examine the distinct logics of arguing and bargaining ininternational politics. 44 The need to construct persuasive arguments shapesstrategic choices when actors hope to persuade instead of coerce, and it acts as arestraint on behaviour which contradicts public positions. The presence of aninternational public sphere which structures state behaviour can be seen in the actof giving justifications. 45

This is not to say that public justifications necessarily represent the truemotivations behind actions. Justifications often involve strategic calculations andthe cynical manipulation of norms and ideals, a mix of communicative andstrategic action which has been termed rhetorical action . 46 It is commonplace thatactors struggling to manipulate public opinion will say anything to win. But thestrategic dimension of rhetorical action should not hide the fundamentallycommunicative nature of the act of offering justifications. Not just any excuse willdo: a justification must be persuasive, convincing within the context of the relevantpublic sphere. Where there is an expectation and demand that the legitimacy of an

43. Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other , 177. Erik Eriksen and John Fossum, eds., Democracy in theEuropean Union: Integration Through Deliberation? (New York: Routledge, 2000).

44. Thomas Risse, Let s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics , InternationalOrganization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1-40; Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum , in DeliberativeDemocracy , eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

45. Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and LegalReasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (New York: Cambridge University Press,1989).

46. See Risse, Let s Argue! ; and Frank Schimmelfenig, International Socialization in the NewEurope: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment , European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 1 (2000): 109-140.



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action should be secured discursively through the exchange of argument, there arevery different constraints on, and opportunities for, action than in a structure whereno justification is expected or needed. In a public sphere, not all interests can bepublicly advocated . 47 Returning to the Iraq example, the United States can not

simply say that it wants to overthrow Saddam Hussein to protect American oilinterests; it must make appeals to universal interests in security against non-conventional weapons, international law, and morality. Interests must begeneralisable to the community; selfish interests must be concealed or recast inmore general terms.

Are such public statements simply cheap talk ? Even cynical actors can becomebound by their public discourse, forced to live up to their public commitments.This is especially the case during periods of competitive framing, in which actors

strive to prove the sincerity of their discourse and the credibility of their claimsagainst the challenges of other actors. In order to demonstrate credibility, actionmust match discourse; the more costly and irreversible the action taken, the morecredible the argument. Furthermore, especially under conditions of relative globaltransparency, actors must keep their discourse and practice consistent acrossmultiple arenas, domestic and international; Iran s domestic liberalisation in asense proves its sincerity in appealing for international dialogue. Over time,particularly when engaged in ongoing rather than episodic deliberation, the defence

of positions, norms, and identities can change the actor s conception of herpositions, norms, and identities, in what Risse, Kathryn Sikkink, and Stephen Ropphave described as a spiral model of norm internalisation and what Elster calls thecivilizing force of hypocrisy . 48

International public sphere theory therefore reconceptualises both structure andaction: public spheres are sites which provide the possibility for communicativeinteraction. Actors initiate deliberation aimed at reaching a rational consensusthrough the exchange of reasoned argument. This potential for communicativeaction does not imply slighting power or strategic interaction. Strategic choicetheorists consider private information to be one of the most crucial dimensions of power in bargaining situations. Public spheres could be used to model the relativeability to convey or to conceal this information. 49 The convergence is not complete:signallingattempting to communicate private information through actionsis aform of strategic (instrumental) action, and is not the same as communicative

47. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms , 340.48. Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International

Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999); Elster, The Market andthe Forum .

49. For examples of strategic interaction arguments which have incorporated domestic public spheres,see Kenneth A. Schultz, Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting TwoInstitutional Perspectives on Democracy and War , International Organization 53, no. 2 (1999): 233-66and James D. Fearon, Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes ,American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (1994): 577-92.



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action, the exchange of reasoned argument oriented towards consensus. 50 International public sphere theory allows IR theory to capture the logic of both themarket and the forum, recognising the role of power and interest in strategic actionwithout ignoring the potential for reasoned dialogue in communicative action.

While this discussion of international public spheres has emphasised thepragmatic and empirical implications of deliberation, many deliberative democracytheorists articulate more ambitious goals: identifying shared interests, transformingpreferences through persuasion, establishing agreement on decision rules,legitimating institutions, transforming hostile social relationships, re-invigoratingdemocratic practice, building better citizens, providing a space for rational critique,and producing better outcomes. While these goals are not necessary for theconception of public spheres developed here, they certainly inform the underlying

agenda.For the dialogue of civilisations project several of these goals of deliberationdeserve particular notice. A dialogue between hostile states could conceivablyidentify common higher interests which transcend lower level conflicts and reducedoubts and suspicions about long-contested issues. Above all, it could shift theconflict from one based on identity the clash of civilisations, the Islamic menace,the imperialist Great Satanto one based on interests , e.g., power in the Gulf,economic rivalries, which can be negotiated. It could be taken as a sign of progress

when the United States listed specific issues of concern in Iranian behavior andidentified areas of possible shared interest, rather than issuing blanketcondemnations of Iranian evils. Existential conflicts based on incompatibleidentities are far less amenable to negotiated resolution than are distributionalconflicts; one of the major possibilities of dialogue is precisely to overcomeconflicts of identity and allow direct engagement with interests. While placingthese issues of identity into the public sphere threatens to harden lines of conflictand exacerbate differences, removing them from the public sphere virtuallyguarantees their perpetuation. In other words, only public dialogues can hope totransform these identity conflicts, but such change will not take place easily orsmoothly. 51

This does not mean, of course, that co-operation would inevitably follow fromsuccessful dialogue. Deliberation alone can not solve every international problemany more than it removes the need for domestic decision rules. As AndrewLinklater points out, international dialogues are unlikely to result in a global moralconsensus but may yield minimum agreement about the principles of international

50. See Risse, Let s Argue! ; James Johnson, Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting ConversationBetween Critical Theory and Rational Choice , American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (1993): 74-85 and Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action , Political Theory 19, no. 2 (1991): 181-201. Also see John Dryzek, How Far is it from Virginia and Rochester to Frankfurt? Public Choice asCritical Theory , British Journal of Political Science 22, no. 4 (1992): 397-417.

51. For a pragmatic discussion of the implications of conducting dialogues in public or in private, seeHarold Saunders, A Public Peace Process (New York: St. Martin s Press, 1999).



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coexistence . 52 Real conflicts of interest might be revealed, rather than transcended.Furthermore, it should never be assumed that actors want to overcome conflicts of identity; any move towards reconciliation with a bitter enemy threatens both theidentity and interests of many individuals within each society, invoking deep

historical memories and traumas which they may prefer to continue to embrace.Real differences exist between Western and Islamist notions of the good society,political order, and international order, differences which should not be glossedover, assumed away, or expected to dissolve through the mere act of dialogue. AsAmy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson suggest, deliberative democracy must beable to identify ground rules for dealing with deep conflicts of values; this need isarguably greater for international deliberation. 53 For Bohman as well as forHabermas, rational consensus on procedures can provide legitimacy for social and

political institutions even where the outcomes favour one actor over another.54

Public Spheres and International Relations

The absence of a state making binding decisions highlights the problems of adapting a concept developed to explain the processes by which individualsestablished democratic constraints on the state to the interaction of states. 55 Intraditional IR theory, the core distinction between international and domesticpolitics is based upon the lack of an international state able to make and enforcedecisions. International public sphere theory suggests that the existence of a publicsphere is not contingent upon a state taking authoritative decisions. Themanipulation and contestation of an international consensus takes the place of theeffort to influence state policy as the defining characteristic of public activity.

The advantage of public sphere theory over other forms of democratic theory forInternational Relations derives from this clear distinction between the publicsphere and the state. In his analysis of modern democratic institutions, Habermasdistinguishes the public sphere from the political system, defined as the official,institutionalised, decision-making system which makes and enforces bindingdecisions. 56 While the public sphere thematises issues, frames and interprets theirsignificance and identifies alternative solutions, the political system acts by takingauthoritative decisions. Deliberation does not itself produce decisions, even in theunlikely event of a perfect consensus. Some decision rule must, in the end,aggregate the preferences of actors at the end of the deliberative process. 57

52. Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community , 173, citing the views of Chris Brown.53. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, 1996); for discussion, see Macedo, Deliberative Politics .54. See Bohman, Public Deliberation and Habermas, Between Facts and Norms .55. For an extended discussion, see David Held, Democracy and International Order (Stanford, CA:

Stanford University Press, 1995).56. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms , 361-63.57. Jack Knight and James Johnson, Aggregation and Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic

Legitimacy , Political Theory 22, no. 2 (1994): 277-96.



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This division of responsibilities between a public sphere for deliberation and apolitical subsystem for decisions, which reflects the reality of modern democraticstates, takes on rather different connotations in the international arena.International public spheres serve as locations for norm formation and for

deliberation over the shared interests of particular or global internationalcommunities, but in the absence of an authoritative political subsystem. In such aninstitutional structure, public spheres potentially carry substantial weight. Withoutcentralised political institutions to act, the creation and manipulation of aconsensus takes on significance in its own right. The absence of a central decisionmaking body to influence might mean that public sphere deliberation is lessweighty, on the other hand, since in the end every state maintains its sovereigndecision making capacity and can reject an international decision, if it is willing to

pay the price of international isolation and sanctions.The centrality of power to international practice seems to challenge one of thecore components of deliberative democracy, that power will not intrude onoutcomes and only the force of the better argument will prevail. Habermas ideal of communicative action excludes power from the exercise of reason: a rationalconsensus is one to which all affected parties would agree in the absence of compulsion. This ideal presents a critical baseline for the evaluation of politicalbehaviour, but is not intended as an empirical description of political reality. While

power certainly structures international politics, it is hardly the case that power isabsent from the domestic deliberations upon which traditional public sphere theoryconcentrates. For IR, a better standard would be the goal of achieving agreementand the acceptance of the need to provide public justifications and engage inreasoned debate. In the words of Iranian Foreign Minister Said Kamal Kharrazi,who echoes Habermas:

Foreign policy should not be instrumental...instead it should reachunderstanding with others. How can understanding be reached? Only if bothsides are placed in an equal and similar situation, to talk on the basis of rationality and logic in order to reach an understanding. 58

In other words, even where power disparities exist, public deliberation shouldapproximate the ideal speech situation , in which power considerations are setaside and all actors sincerely pursue rational consensus through the exchange of argument. The outcome of this dialogue must be open-ended: If genuine dialogueis to exist, no particular outcome can be anticipated or presupposed...by entering

into dialogue, they accept that the logic of their beliefs may fail to persuade theirinterlocutors . 59 Power, of course, structures the dialogue of civilisations in moreways than just the direct imposition of pressure in bilateral relations stressed bymethodological individualists. From colonialism to the Western domination of

58. Kharrazi, interviewed on the Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2, Tehran, 17 January1998, SWB Middle East/Iran/ME/D3128/MED .

59. Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community , 86.



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international institutions, structural power shapes the very possibility of meaningful dialogue. 60 Khatami makes very clear the need for dialogue to avoideither the assumption of Western superiority or the instrumental use of dialogue asa means to force Islam to change: dialogue among civilisations requires admission

of equality of nations and peoples. When you engage in dialogue with a party, youmust have respect for it and accept it as an equal partner . 61

Does this expectation of power-free dialogue based on mutual respect relegateinternational deliberation to an unrealistic, utopian ideal type? The processesconsidered here suggest that the need to formulate, maintain, and manipulateinternational consensus around contentious issues requires universalisingarguments and appeals to shared interests. Where such conditions exist, publicsphere theory would expect considerable constraint on the exploitation of, but

certainly not the irrelevance of, power imbalances. The call to remove powerconsiderations from the interaction is, of course, a strategically rational position forthe weaker party; this should not be taken as prima facie evidence of insincerity,however. Entering into a dialogue poses very real threats for a weaker party, whichmight be asked to compromise on matters of great sensitivity.

We should not expect to see ongoing deliberations in either national orinternational politics: most of the time, normal politics requires an underlyingconsensus on procedures, norms, and expectations. Deliberation is episodic, taking

places during those periods where existing arrangements break down. Duringperiods of normal politics, rationalist models of strategic interaction as modified byrecognition of the public sphere structure should apply. During periods of crisis,and in the presence of a public sphere which offers the potential for communicativeaction, however, actors are more likely to initiate deliberations in order to discovernew, mutually acceptable rules governing interaction. The opening towards apotential American-Iranian dialogue, for instance, only took place after both sidesrecognised the bankruptcy of existing policy. Khatami s electoral victory anddomestic liberalisation signalled important change inside Iran, while importantsegments of the American foreign policy elite argued that containment had failedto influence Iranian behaviour and isolated the United States.

Because it looks for multiple sites of deliberation within and across state borders,international public sphere theory should make no a priori assumptions aboutlevels of analysis or legitimate actors. As Christopher Hill notes, internationalpublic opinion could refer either to the collective deliberations of states or to thecollective opinion of individuals, groups, and actors, whether domestic ortransnational. 62 In the exchanges between Iran and the United States, Khatamicalled for cultural exchanges and discussions between intellectuals and citizens,

60. Blaney and Inayatullah, Prelude to a Conversation of Cultures , 41-44.61. Mohammed Khatami, remarks at Dinner with Heads of Delegations to the Islamic Symposium on

Dialogue Among Civilisations, Teheran, 4 May 1999 [http://www.un.int/iran/dialog01.html] (10 July2000).

62. Christopher Hill, World Opinion and the Empire of Circumstance , International Affairs 72, no. 1(1996): 109-31.



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while the United States suggested a formal government to government dialogue,two very different conceptions of the form an international public sphere dialoguemight assume. 63 In any public sphere, the rules specifying the legitimateparticipants shape power dynamics, outcomes, and procedures. 64 In some public

spheres, gender, class, or race constitutively exclude certain individuals fromparticipation, thereby shaping the issues which are raised, the decisions made, andthe style of discourse. Similarly, some international public spheres sharply restrictparticipation to the official representatives of states, carefully excluding NGOs,private citizens, or national liberation movements. The introduction of effectivenew actors, such as NGOs in the campaign against land mines or the defence of human rights, can transform the process of deliberation in that issue area. No priortheoretical decisions should be made which arbitrarily close off participation in

international public spheres; what is necessary is to determine the politicalimplications of different participation/exclusion rules and practices.Public sphere participation carries a constitutive as well as a strategic dimension:

participation in the dialogue of civilisations empowers its interlocutors aslegitimate spokesmen of their civilisations . Not only does the dialogue in animportant sense create, rather than simply reflect, civilisations, but it specifies oneparticular version of that civilisation as authentic and real. As Michael Barnettpersuasively argues, struggles to claim a leadership position within a shared

collective identity have long characterised the Arab world, where states wereembedded within a rich and politically significant international public sphere. 65 Iran s bid to initiate a dialogue among civilisations might then be seen not only asa move to defuse an impending spiral of conflict with the West or to end itsestrangement with America, but also as a move in its ongoing efforts to assert itsleadership of the Islamic world. The coincidence of the dialogue of civilisationsinitiative and the extraordinarily successful Organisation of Islamic Countriesmeeting hosted by Iran in December 1997 supports this point. The attendance of many moderate Islamic heads of state, including some from Western allies such asSaudi Arabia and Jordan, validated Iran s claim to represent Islam. Westernrecognition of Iran as spokesman of Islam would further that intra-Islamic agenda.

The Dialogue of Civilisations as an International Public Sphere

Huntington s initial thematisation of civilisations stressed inevitable conflict,deeply rooted hostility, and the impossibility of peaceful coexistence. Indeed,given the absence of shared public spheres, a strategic conception of inter-

63. Khatami, interview with CNN, 8 January 1998. State Department spokesman Jamie Rubin

countered with a governmental level proposal the next day, in the US Department of State Daily PressBriefing (hereafter DPB), 10 January 1998.

64. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually ExistingDemocracy , in Habermas and the Public Sphere , 109-42.

65. Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York:Columbia University Press, 1998). See also the discussion of the Arab public sphere in Lynch, StateInterests and Public Spheres , chap. 2.



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civilisational relations carried at least plausibility. Globalisation, sharedinternational institutions, and world media provided the structural conditions whichmade possible (but not necessary) Khatami s overture towards an inter-civilisational dialogue. Above, I have argued that Khatami s ability to bring others

into a dialogue before an international audience created a public sphere around thenature of relations among civilisations. Without Khatamis initiation of thedialogue, no public sphere would have existed, despite the structural possibilities.Khatami s achievement was to exploit existing structural possibilities in order tobring a public sphere into being around the previously thematised issue of civilisational conflict. The UN General Assembly s positive reception of theIranian initiative, and Khatami s address to UNESCO, both reflect theopportunities offered by existing international organisations. CNN and the global

media offered a means by which Khatami could directly address American andinternational publics. Khatami s high profile visits abroad, including his trips toFrance and to Arab states, and particularly his meeting with the Pope in theVatican, directly engaged national public spheres and brought them into theinternational deliberation. For international deliberation to become more than anindirect negotiation, such exchanges must address an imagined critical audience of concerned citizens, and the dialogue of civilisations succeeded in engaging such anaudience.

How does this international public sphere relate to the strategic relationshipbetween the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran? Because of Americancontainment policies and Iranian suspicions, public spheres which might havebrought together the United States and Iran prior to the late 1990s were largelyclosed. The Iran-Contra scandals severed even private channels, and mutualdemonisation drove public perceptions on each side. As the global andcivilisational dialogue progressed, the Iranian Foreign Minister and StateDepartment spokesmen took turns indirectly addressing the other through publicspeeches, press briefings, and interviews. The differences which quicklyandpredictablyemerged over the form and content of the dialogue reflect the realtension between an abstract dialogue of civilisations and its translation intodiplomatic practice. While the US claimed to welcome a dialogue with the Iraniangovernment, such a dialogue would not end economic and political containmentpolicies, and would only concern those issues of concern to the United States. 66

First, the US and Iran disagreed over the actors which should participate in adialogue of civilisations. For Khatami, dialogue involved cultural exchanges and aphilosophical, high-level debate in which governments played a limited role, butprimary responsibility fell upon scholars, philosophers, intellectuals, artists andhistorians .67 The US, by contrast, favoured official, publicly acknowledged

66. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,Washington, DC, 25 May 1996.

67. Javad Sarif, Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, statement before the UN General Assembly underitem 168 (Dialogue Among Civilisations), 4 November 1998[http://www.un.int/iran/statements/ga/ga53008.html] (27 July 2000).



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representatives of states. While acknowledging the value of people-to-peopleexchanges for building trust and breaking entrenched hostility, official spokesmenrepeatedly emphasised that the best way to address our bilateral differences wouldbe to engage in a government to government dialogue . 68 The US emphasised that

the dialogue must involve authoritative representatives of governments, although itcould not specify who such representatives might be; when asked who might beauthoritative, Jamie Rubin responded we will know it when we see it , and eventhe democratically elected President Khatami did not receive an unconditionalacceptance as authoritative. 69 The practical restriction of the dialogue of civilisations to a diplomatic exchange between the American and Iraniangovernments radically reduces the extent of its challenge to existing modes of international order. In a true dialogue of civilisations, is Khatami s remarkable

meeting with the Pope less significant than the inability of the Iranian ForeignMinister to negotiate directly with the American Secretary of State?Second, the two sides differed over the kinds of issues which should be

discussed. Khatami called for an initial focus on cultural and civilisational issues,particularly the search for a common ground between two great civilisations basedon mutual toleration and respect. The US interpreted Khatami s call asendeavouring to emphasise the commonality of world civilisations and of worldvalues , Khatami stressed the distinction between cultural and political dialogue,

and Foreign Minister Kharrazi clarified that the aim of the cultural dialogue is nota political one...the aim is arriving at common understanding among peoples . 70 Clinton responded with a clearly defined set of American political interests: Iran spursuit of weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism, and opposition to theArab-Israeli peace process. Once again, a focus on specific political interestsrepresents a far narrower, diplomatic conception of dialogue as strategic actionthan it does Khatami s transformative vision.

Third, the parties differed over whether the dialogue should be public or private,and over the definition of publicity. Reflecting the Reagan Administration sexperience with the revelations of secret contacts in the Iran-Contra affair, theClinton Administration insisted that all talks be carried out by officiallyacknowledged representatives of governments. When pressed, however, StateDepartment officials backed away from suggestions that all discussions would bepublic . Instead, they suggested that the talks would be publicly acknowledged ,but would follow diplomatic practice during actual negotiations and discussions.The US retreated even further subsequently: publicly acknowledged means thatwe would not want to be in a position where we could not acknowledge, if asked,that there was such a discussion. I would not presume that we would necessarily

68. Rubin, DPB, 8 January 1998.69. Ibid.70. James Foley, DPB, 9 December 1997; Khatami on Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran,

22 September 1998, SWB Middle East/Iran/ME/D3340/MED ; Kharrazi, on al-Jazeera TV, Doha, 21March 1998, SWB Middle East/Iran/ME/D3183/MED .



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announce it . 71 Such a conception of public cuts against common-senseconceptions of a public dialogue, in which the widest possible audience of Americans, Europeans, Iranians, and Muslims would at a minimum have access,and ideally would participate. This tension reflected divergent understandings of

the meaning of public . Where public sphere theory defines public in terms of active engagement by all affected parties in rational deliberation before anaudience, the American position defined public in terms of transparency andpublic awareness of the essentially closed state-level deliberations.

Fourth, the two sides disagreed as to the ultimate point of the dialogue. TheUnited States focused on problem-solving: deliberating over matters of sharedconcern in order to find pragmatic, efficient solutions. Along these lines, the StateDepartment noted several areas, such as stability in the Persian Gulf and Central

Asia, in which the US and Iran shared interests and could usefully co-operate.Above all, however, the point of the dialogue was to change Iranian behaviour,supplementing containment strategies without affecting American priorities oreven policies. Iran, on the other hand, articulated a conception of dialogue in whichthe dialogue itself was a valuable end in itself. The act of dialogue would buildmutual understanding and establish relationships of trust, foreclosing a spiral into aself-fulfilling prophecy of a clash of civilisations . 72 Iranian officials articulated aHabermasian conception of communicative against strategic action: the

Americans [must be] really prepared to give up their positions and seek toapproach us from the point of view of mutual respect and the principle of beingequal .73 In other words, the point of the dialogue was not simply to moreefficiently change Iran, but rather to enter into a communicative process in whichboth sides would reconsider their positions from a position of equality and rationalargument. Such a conception more closely approximates Habermas conception of dialogue, in which all participants are prepared to question their own truth claims,respect the claims of others and anticipate that all points of departure will bemodified in the course of the dialogue . 74 The State Department s response to theIranian call for dialogue reflects the recognition that dialogue has no inevitableoutcome: remember, a dialogue is a discussion and it does not necessarily lead tochange .75

Fifth, neither side articulated clear indicators by which the success of thedialogue might be measured. The public sphere approach builds on a conception of action in which a public claim on identity or an argument made in the publicsphere is an action. For rationalism, talk is only talk, sharply distinguished fromaction, and talk is cheap. The American response to the Iranian overture is telling.While welcoming the change in the tone of Iranian discourse, American officials

71. Rubin, DPB, 18 June 1998.72. Mohammed Khatami, A Call for Dialogue , Civilization Magazine , June 1999 found in

[http://www.civmag.com/articles/C9906E03.html] (27 July 2000).73. Kharrazi, interviewed on the Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2.74. Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community , 92.75. Rubin, DPB, 8 January, 1998.



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emphasised that they would judge the Iranian initiative only in terms of anobservable change in Iranian behaviour ; in deeds, not words. 76 But they alsorecognised the ambiguous relationship between words and deeds: the basicpolicies of the United States [towards Iran] are determined based on actions.

But...words often precede actions .77

The Iranians adopted similar criteria: It canbe seen that their tone has changed in their statements. However, this is notenough. We must see from their actions . 78 Dialogue, then, represents real actionand is crucial for shaping shared understandings of the stakes and quality of strategic relations, but is not alone sufficient to transform those relations.

Placing the concept of dialogue within a bilateral strategic relationship thus helpsto reveal a wide range of pragmatic difficulties, from conception to practice to theultimate goals. Domestic political disagreements play a major role in shaping the

course of international dialogues. A dialogue which might bring together Iran andthe United States threatens on both sides the interests of hard-liners, who prefer tomaintain the conflict for reasons of identity or of interest. Proponents of dialogue,no matter how well-reasoned their arguments, risk being termed soft on Satan . 79 In the United States, pro-Israeli groups attempting to construct a common threatportfolio between Israel and the United States took a leading role in opposing theproposed reconciliation. 80 In Iran, Khatami s overtures to the West inspiredsignificant opposition from conservative power centres. Hard-line Islamist leaders,

led by the Ayatollah Khameini, bitterly attacked overtures to the United States asthreatening both Iran s security and the integrity of the Islamic Revolution, goingso far as accusing liberal reformers of treason to the Islamic revolution. 81 Thearrest of 13 Iranian Jews in early 1999 on charges of espionage, and their trial inspring 2000, probably represented an attempt by the hard-liner dominated securityforces to sabotage any reconciliation. The dialogue of civilisations initiative, thebilateral American-Iranian relationship, and the domestic struggle for reform thusinteracted in a tense and unpredictable struggle.

Conclusion

A common response to this discussion would focus on the realities of power andinterest: deliberation and public opinion may matter at the margins, but in the final

76. As Rubin maintained: what we are looking for...is a pattern of behaviour, we like to judge thingsby actions not words , see DPB, 11 March 1998.

77. Rubin, DPB, 8 January 1998.78. Kharrazi, interviewed on the Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2.79. Charles Kurzman, Soft on Satan: Challenges for Iranian-US Relations , Middle East Policy 6, no.

1 (1998): 63-72.80. For examples, see Patrick Clawson, The Continuing Logic of Dual Containment , Survival 40, no.

l (1998): 33-47; and Joshua Muravchik and Jeffrey Gedmin, Why Iran is (Still) a Menace ,Commentary 104, no. 1 (1997) [http://www.commentarymagazine.com/9707/muravchik.html] (27 July2000).

81. Ayatollah Ali Khameini, as quoted in Howard Schneider, Top Cleric Calls Pro-U.S. IraniansTraitors , The Washington Post , 4 November 1999, A25.



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analysis power determines outcomes. These criticisms should be taken seriously.Power inequalities threaten the theoretical core of public sphere deliberation. If thegoal of dialogue is the achievement of rational consensus, through the cleararticulation of interests and the production of higher order agreement on

procedures and of a minimal zone of agreement, then serious power inequalitiesare likely to stand in the way. Why would the United States put its identity andinterests at stake in dialogue with Iran, when it has the power to impose itspreferences? Why should Iran trust the intentions of the United States and openitself up to American influence? If American identity is secured through itsopposition to fundamentalism , or if Iranian identity is secured through itsopposition to the Great Satan , then what are the consequences of a dialoguewhich might open up profound questions about these oppositions and identities?

Indeed, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khameini, equated dialogue withsurrender to American power and with the abandoning of the principles of theIslamic revolution as articulated by Khomeini, which would only undermine Iran sdomestic cohesion and principled positions. 82

In other words, Khameini, the religious leader, articulated a realist response toKhatami s Habermasian call for dialogue, emphasising the continuity of Americanhostility and the reality of power imbalances. For Khameini, consensus and betterrelations with the West hold no intrinsic normative value; indeed, to the extent that

they are framed as the abandonment of the Islamic Revolution, they hold stronglynegative normative connotations. Khameini suggested that even well-intentionedreformers allowed the infiltration into the cultural centres of the society, into theintellect and religious beliefs and convictions of the people , a colonisation of theIslamic lifeworld which must be resisted. 83 Khameini s objections to domesticreform rest on a deep concern for the Islamic identity of Iran, threatened both bycultural processes and by hostile foreign enemies; dialogue, from this perspective,protects the Islamic Republic against neither threat. These fears, to the extent thatthey are widely held by one prospective partner to dialogue, must be takenseriously, since they work against any opening to communicative action. Fordialogue to succeed, it must over time produce tangible results and build mutualconfidence in the sincerity of the other.

A second line of criticism of this discussion of the dialogue of civilisations mightfocus on the internal limitations of Khatami s liberalism, pointing out thesupposedly inherent contradictions of liberal democracy and an Islamic state,particularly with regard to issues of the role of women and the toleration of religious minorities. One of the great virtues of the dialogue of civilisations is thatit encourages an open and constructive engagement over such contentious issues.Iran s attempt to reconcile democracy and Islam has not taken place in a vacuum.Throughout the Islamic world, Islamists have grappled with democracy and

82. Ayatollah Ali Khameini, sermon to Friday worshippers, Tehran, 16 January 1998, Voice of theIslamic Republic of Iran, SWB ME/D3128/MED .

83. Ali Khameini, speech to Friday worshippers, Tehran, 12 May 2000, as quoted in Two FactionsAre Two Wings of a Bird: Leader , Tehran Times , 13 May 2000, 1.



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liberalism, and these internal Islamist discourses provide a strong foundation for adialogue with the West. 84 These discourses in general hope not to imitate or toreject outright Western forms of democracy but, in true dialogic style, to find anaccommodation which incorporates the strengths of each.

The change in Iranian foreign policy discourse raises an ambiguous challenge toIR theory. Rationalists correctly observe that Iran s benign discourse can not betaken at face value, and that Iran has not abandoned the instrumental pursuit of national interests, security, or Islamic values. The ability of Iran s president toinitiate a dialogue of civilisations through an international public sphere should bedistinguished from the impact of that dialogue on the strategic relationship with theUnited States.

While dialogue has made only tentative and hotly contested inroads into the

American-Iranian relationship, it has significantly affected internationalconceptions of the role of Islam in international order. Where a decade ago thedominant expectation was of civilisational conflict, today international discussioncentres upon civilisational dialogue, the prospects for democratic Islamism, andprinciples of co-existence based on mutual respect. Iran has increasinglynormalised its relations with most European and Middle Eastern countries, even if the United States and Israel remain unconvinced. Taking dialogue seriously ininternational politics suggests alternatives to an inevitable clash of civilisations and

to the primacy of realist, strategic action. It provides intriguing evidence that in theemerging international order, the potential for communicative action can beexploited to create sites for deliberation, reducing the power of the logic of anarchyembodied in the system dimension of international structure and increasing thepotential for reaching more rational solutions to common problems.

Marc Lynch is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Williams College

84. For an overview of these debates, see Bruce Lawrence, Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

millennium - journal of international studies-2000-lynch-307-30

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