miner_descartes causa sui & ontological proof

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R.P.F.

58-2002

The

Dependence f

Descartes9

ntological

roof

Upon

he

Doctrine

f

Causa

Sui

Robert

C.

Miner*

Abstract: CanGodbe the fficientauseofhimselfcausa ui/?t s wellknownhat es-

cartes nswers

his

uestion

n the

ffirmative,

ut t s

considerably

ess clear

why.

he

main

ontention

f

he

ssay

s that escartes dvances he ausa sui

doctrineecause e

came o

think

hat

he

ntologicalroof f

Meditation

required

t.We

rgue

hese on-

tentions

hrough

close

nalysis

f

Descartes

initial

rticulation

f

ausa

sui n

response

to

Caterus,

ollowed y

ttentiono the

eformulation

f

the

doctrinen

response

o the

logical bjections

osed by

Arnauld.

ur

understandingf

causa sui as a

movemade

withinhe orizon

f

he

ntologicalroof

ot

nly

lluminates

hy

escarteswould ave

defended

doctrine

s

conceptuallyroblematic

s

causa

ui,

but lso

provides

n

alter-

native o

Jean-Luc arion

s view hat

ausa

sui constitutes

third,

istinct

roof

or

he

existence

f

God.

Key words: Arnauld, ntoine1612-1694);Caterus;Causa sui; Causality; escartes,

Rene

1596-1650);

xistence

f

God;

God;

Marion, ean-Luc;

ntologicalroof.

RESUMO:

ode

Deus ser causa

eficiente

e si

mesmo

causa

ui,)?

bem

abido

ue

Des-

cartes

esponde

firmativamente

esta

questuo,

mas é

consideravelmenteenos laro

porqué.

O

principal

onteúdo

o ensaio

que

Descartes

presenta

doutrina

a

causa ui

porque

ensou

ue

a

provaontològica

a

Meditagào

V

precisava

éla. Demonstramos

estas

firmacoes

través e

urna

nálise

igorosa

a

articulacàonicial

e

Descartes a

causa ui

em

resposta

Caterus,

eguida

e urna

tengào

reformulacào

a doutrinam

resposta

s

objeccdes

ógicas

presentadasor

Arnauld. nossa

ompreensào

a causa

sui

corno

roposta

eita

no

horizonte

a

provaontològica

ào ilumina

penasporque

que

Descartes

eña

defendido

rna

outrina

onceptualmente

ao

problemática

omo

causa ui,mas ambémrovidenciarna lternativaoponto e vista e Jean-Luc arion

de

que

a

causa ui

onstituí

terceira,

rova

istinta

ara

a existencia

e Deus.

Palavras-CHAVE:

Argumentontologico;

rnauld,

ntoine

1612-1694);

aterus;

ausa

sui;

Causalidade;

Descartes,

ene

(1596-1650);

eus;

Existencia

e

Deus; Marion,

Jean-Luc

has

been

writtenbout

Descartes'

ersion f what

hilosophy

fter

Kant

alls he

ontological

rgument

or he xistence

f

God.

Somewhat

less

has

been

writtenbout

Descartes'

escription

f God

as cause of

himself

causa

sui\

first

entured

nhis

Responsiones

o the rimae

Objectiones,

andreaffirmedithome ualificationsnhisResponsionesotheQuartaeObjec-

*

Department

f

hilosophy,

oston

ollege

Chestnut

ill,

Mass.,

SA).

©

Revista ortuguesa

e

Filosofia,

8

2002),

873-886



874

Robert C. Miner

Hones.Among ontemporaryommentators,ean-Luc arion asemphasizedhe

radical haracter

fthe ausa sui doctrines it

passes

from escartesnto

pinoza

and he

history

f

ubsequent etaphysics.1

This

ssay

will

not

ttemptgeneral nalysis

í causa sui. ts

objective,

ather,

is

to

probe

he

particular

onnectionsetweenhe

ntologicalroof

ndthe ausa

sui. Most

of thosewho

have

analyzed

he

ontologicalrgument,

hethero en-

dorse

t

orto

refute

t,

have

done

o in

solation rom

he ausa sui

doctrine.

his s

understandableor t

leasttwo reasons.

irst,

he

ontological roof ppears

n

Meditano

,

whereas he

ausa

sui

doesnot

ppear

ntil he rimae

Respons

ones.

Second,

when

escartes

nitially

tates he

octrine

n

the rimae

Responsiones,

e

isrespondingo anobjectionccasionedy he econd art fMeditadoII,rather

than

nything

irectly

romMeditano .

Yet

n

replying

o bothCaterus nd

Ar-

nauld,

escartes

rgues

n

such

way

s

to

suggest

hat he

ntologicalroof

ctu-

ally

depends

pon

he

notion f

God as

causa

sui,

nd

s

scarcelyntelligible

ith-

out t.

Why

oes

Descartesmake his

uggestion?

hy

oeshe thinkhat is

proof

requires

he

doctrine,

specially

n

viewof

Arnauld's

riendly

uggestion

hat he

argument

f

Meditano

works

erfectly

ell

withouthe

aggage

f

teaching

o

controversialhat itwill

carcely

e

possible

o find

single

heologian

ho

will

not

object

o

the

proposition

hatGod derives is

existence rom imself

n

the

positive

ense,

nd

s

it

were

ausally ?2

Themain laim f his ssay sthat,t east s Descartes nderstoodt, he n-

tologicalrgument

or

he xistence

f

God

requires

he ausa sui.Thefirstection

will

howhow he

ssue rises n Caterus'

bjections

o the

rgument

f

Meditano

III.

Descartes'

esponse

o

Caterus

s the

irstccasion or he

xplicit

ecision hat

God is

causa sui. In the

econd

ection,

e

will

rehearse he

objections

gainst

causa sui

by

Arnauld,

hofinds

he

rimae

Responsiones

o Caterus

eeply

nsat-

isfactory,

nd

probe

Descartes'

esponse

o

Arnauld's

riticisms.

ttentiono the

characterfthe

Quartae

Responsiones

ill

raise he

uestion:Why

oesDescartes

reaffirm

he ausa

sui,

f

henotion

s

as

fraught

ith

ogical

roblems

s

Arnauld

thinks?

hethirdection ill

lluminatehe

motivationehind

ausa

sui

by

how-

ing hat escartes egardst not s an additionalroof orGod's existencepace

Marion),

ut

rathers an

indispensable

remise

f

the

ontological

rgument,

s

more

ully

laboratedn

the rimae

Responsiones.

ur

findings

ill

be confirmed

1

See

Jean-Luc

arion,

n Descartes

Metaphysical

rism

Chicago:University

f

Chi-

cago

Press,

999),

03-118.

Arnauld,

bjectiones

uartae

hereafter

edii,

Objs.

4ae,

cited

n

noteswith

olume

and

page

from

euvres

e

Descartes),

euvres e

Descartes

hereafter,

AT ),

d. Charles

Adam nd

Paul

Tannery,

2

vols.

Paris:

J.

Vrin/CNRS,

964-76),

:214;

The

Philosophical

WritingsfDescarteshereafterCSM\citednnoteswith olume ndpagenumber),ol.2,

ed. John

ottingham,

obert

toothofTand

ugald

Murdoch

Cambridge:ambridge

niver-

sity

ress,

85),

1

0.

n

quoting

romhe

Cartesian

exts,

haveused he

enderings

n

CSM

unless

therwise

ndicated.

Revista

Portuguesa de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



Descartes

'

Ontological

Proof

875

inthe oncludingection, hich rieflyotes vidence rawn romontempora-

neous

orrespondence

nd

ater ormulations

f he

roof.

1. Caterus'

Objections

nd

thePrimae

Responsiones

Caterus

ummarizes

is

primary

bjection

o the

rgument

í Meditano

II in

a

rhetorical

uestion.

What

ort fcausedoes

an

idea need?

he

asks.3

His

general

contention

s that

deas s

such,

which ontain

nly

bjective

eality,

o not

equire

a

cause.

Althoughhey

may

e

conceived,

ndhence

re not

nothing'

ut ome-

thing

eal, 4

deas

renot

aused.Thisholds

or

oth ternal

ruths

e.g.

Davus s

Davus andnotOedipus 5) nd the deaof God. Caterus rgues hatDescartes'

attempt

o

use

the dea Dei

as the

tartingoint

or n

argument

hat

oncludes

n

the xistence

f God

fails,

ince he

mere

dea

does

notdemand causal

explana-

tion.

A more uitable

trategy,

aterus

oncludes,

ould

be to follow he

Second

Way

of

Thomas

Aquinas

n the umma

heologiae,

hich easons

rom he

auses

of

hings

ather

han

deas

neither

e nor

Aristotle

as bothered

bout

he auses

of

deas ).6

To

support

is

objection,

aterus

bserves

hat,

ven

fGod s

truly

aid

to de-

rivehis

existence

rom

imself

a

se),

this

oes not

prove

is existence.

he rea-

son,

Caterus

ays,

s

that

n

common

sage

from

tself

simply

means

not

from

another. 7aterushinkshat escartess reproducingnargumentromuarez,

whom

e

remembers

inaccurately)

o contend

hat f

being

erivests

xistence

from

tself,

ather

han rom

ome

ause,

tmust e

unlimited

nd

nfinite.8

gainst

this,

e

objects

hat

ven

finite

hings

may

derive

heir

xistence

rom

hemselves,

while

emaining

inite.

or

example,

hot

hing ua

hot

hing

ill

be

hot from

itself,

n

the ense

hat

ts

heat

does

not

ome

from nother.

t

will

be

hot

op-

posed

to

cold

n

virtue f

ts

nternal

onstitutive

rinciples,

nd this

will

be true

even

f

you

magine

hat

ts

being

what

t s does

not

depend

n

anything

lse. 9

Hence

he

mere

act f

self-derivation

illnot

prove

hat

his

eing

mbraces

ll

things

nd

s nfinite. 10

3

Caterus,

bjectiones

rimae

hereafter

edii,

Objs.

ae)

(AT

:92;

CSM

2:66).

4

Medii.,

bjs.

ae(ATl:94y

CSM2:67-8).

D

Medii.,

bjs.

ae(ATl:93J

CSM2:61).

6

Medii,

Objs.

ae

(AT

:94,

CSM

:68).

1

Medii,

Objs.

ae(ATl:95y

CSM2:6S).

8

Jean-Robert

rmogathe

rgues,

onvicingly,

hat

aterus

onfuses

uarez's

ctual

osition

with he

tance

e

s

opposing;

ee

Armogathe,

Caterus'

bjections

o

God,

nDescartes

nd

His

Contemporaries,

d.

Roger

Ariew

nd

Marjorie

rene

Chicago:

University

f

Chicago

Press,

995),

9.

The

ostensibly

ore

historical

ssay

f

Theo

Verbeek

n the ame

volume

simplyakes aterusthisword,ssuminghathepositioneis contetstings authentically

Suarezian

see

Verbeek,

The

First

bjections,

nDescartes

nd

His

Contemporaries,

9).

9

Medii,

Objs.

ae(ATl:95i

CSM2:69).

10

Medii,

Objs.

ae

(AT7:95,

CW2:68).

Revista

Portuguesa

de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



876 Robert C.

Miner

Theonly ossiblewayoutofthis bjection,aterusuggests, ould e to vio-

latethe

universallyccepted

enseof fromtself as

notfrom nother

nd to

replace

twith

positive

ense

n

which fromtselfwouldmean

fromtself

s

from

cause. 11 ut

Caterus

resumes

hat escartes

will

not

want

o

take

his

option.

He

wouldhave

every

eason o think hat

escartes,

ven

f

not

overly

attached

o traditional

heology,

ould t

east

gree

hatfonetakesGod to

derive

his xistence

rom cause

any

ause t all

-

then ne

necessarily

emotes

im o

the

tatus f an

effect.

ny

uchdemotionmountso a denial f thedivine

er-

fection. here

s no

mystery

s

to

why

Caterus

xpects

escartes o

go

along

with

the

negative

ense f se.

As we knowfrom hePrimaeResponsiones,heexpectations spectacularly

violated. fter

ountering

he

rgument

hat deas

neither ave norneed causes

with he laim

hat hemind's

onception

f

an idea

n

any

particular

ase

does

n

fact

equire

n

explanation

if

someone

ossesses

n

his

intellecthe dea of

a

machine

f a

highly

ntricate

esign,

t s

perfectly

air o

ask what s the ause of

this

dea 12),

escartes

cknowledges

he

mbiguity

f he

hrase

fromtself. e

does

not,

owever,

ppear

hreatened

y

Caterus'

trategy.iewing

is

objections

as instances

f

carefullyisguised

ssistance 13

ather

han

angerous

ebuttals,

Descartes urnshe

mbiguity

nto n

opportunity

o

clarify

isowndoctrinef he

divine ssence.A

being

hat oes not

require

he

help

of

anything

lse

n

order o

exist nthefirstlace,orto continuexisting,s in a sense, tsowncause. 14

Descartes

ays

hat e

understandsod

to

be such

being.

As self-caused

nd elf-

-preserved,

od

s

causa

sui.

Only

hose

who attendo the iteralnd trict ean-

ing

f he

hrase

efficientause'

think

t

mpossible

or

nything

o be causa sui.

They

o not ee that heres

anyplace

for nother

ind f

cause

analogous

o an

efficient

ause,

ndhencewhen

hey ay

hat

omething

erivests xistencefrom

itself

hey

ormally

ean

imply

hat

t

has

no

cause. 15 erbal iteralismhould

not e allowed o obscure

he

natural

ight.

hosewho look t

the

acts

atherhan

thewords will see

that he

negative

ense

of fromtself s a

product

f

gno-

rance,

aving

no basis n

reality,

nd hat

contrary

othe

ssumption

fCaterus

- there

s

a

positive

ense

of

the

phrase

which s derived rom he rue ature

f

things,

nd t sthis ense lonewhich s

employed

n

my rgument. 16

Against

hose

who

equate

God's

existing

rom imself

ith

henotion hat

e

has no

cause,

Descartes

laims,

he

nquirer

ho

attends

o

the

immensend

n-

comprehensibleower

hat

s contained

ithin

he dea of God

will

be forced o

11

Medii,

Obis.

ae(AT7:95< CW2:68).

Descartes,

esponsio

uthor

s

ad Primas

Objectioneshereafter

edii,

Resp.

ae)

(¿77:103; CSM2-.15).

Descartes'

ubsequent

nclusion f the

xample

n the

ynopsis

,477:14,

CSM 2:10-1

1) suggests

hat

e

regarded

t s an

exceptionallyowerful

llustrationfhis

point.

13

Medii,Resp lae (¿77:101,CSM2:14).14

Medii,

Resp

lae

(¿77:109, CSM2:1S).

15

Medii,

Resp

lae

(¿77:109-10, CSM2:19).

16

Medii,

Resp

lae

(¿77:1

10,

CSM2:19).

Revista

Portuguesa

de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



Descartes'

Ontological Proof Sil

see that his owers so exceedinglyreathatt splainlyhe ause of hiscon-

tinuing

xistence,

nd

nothing

ut his an be

the ause.And f

we

say

as a result

that

God derives

is existence

rom

imself,

e

will

not

be

using

he

phrase

n

a

negative

ense,

ut n an

absolutely

ositive

ense. 17 his

s

not

uite

o

say

that

God s the

fficientause

ofhimselfn the

narrow

ense fthe

erm,

ince

God s

not

prior

o or

distinctrom

imself. ut t

s to

endorse

strong

nalogy

o effi-

cient

ausality.

We are

quite

ntitled

o thinkhat n

a sensehe

stands

n

the

ame

relation

o

himselfs an efficient

ausedoes

o

his

ffect. 18

2.

Arnauld's

Objections

o

Causa Sui

Is

Descartes

rying

ohave t

both

ways?

Can he

apply

ausa to

God,

while

e-

nying

he

conditionshat

overn

he

term's sual

application?

learly

Arnauld,

despite

is

considerable

ympathies

ith

escartes,

hought

hat

e was

engaging

in verbal

leight-of-hand.

rnauld

haracterizeshe

bove

Cartesian

eclaration

s

a

hard

aying

which

ndeed s

false,

ince it s

a

manifest

ontradictionhat

anything

houldderive

ts

existence

ositively

nd

as

it

were

causally

rom

t-

self. 19

very

ffect,

s an

effect,

epends

pon

cause

that s not

tself. he

no-

tion f cause andeffect

ust nvolve

wo

erms,

ince t

s a

relation.

o

speak

f

efficientause

mplies

n

existence-giving

ntity

nd n

existence-receivingntity.

In a case where iver ndreceiverre the ame-assuminghat necanimagine

such

thing

hen

tcomes o

bestowing

xistences-the

otion

f

efficient

ausal-

ity

acks

pplication.

To these

eneral

laims,

rnaulddds hatwith

espect

othe

articular

ase

of

God,

t

s evenclearer

hatGod

cannot erive is

existence rom

imself

n

the

positive

ense,

ut ando

so

only

nthe

negative

ense

fnot

deriving

tfrom

ny-

thing

lse. 20 rnauld

ives

hree

easons o

upport

his laim.

First,

he

very

xample

hat

escartes sed

n

replying

o

Caterus urns ut

o

work

gainst

him. The

presence

nd

independence

f

separate

ime-divisions,

Arnauld

ays

n

accordwith

escartes,

equires

ome

power

o create

odies on-

tinuously.enceArnauldgrees hatwhenwerejecthenotion hat body sthe

cause of

its

own

existence,

e

are

positivelyffirming

hat

body

s an

effect

caused

by something

lse

or,

quivalently,

enying

hat

body

xists

romtself

as

from

cause).

But thedivine

ase,

as

Arnauld

roceeds

o

claim,

s

different.

Since

he dea of an infinite

eing

ontainshe dea

of

nfinite

uration,

emporal

concepts

annot

e

applied

o it. f we

say

thatGod

derives is

existence rom

himself,

e

cannot

mean

his

positively

nd s

it

were

ausally. 21

he

statement

can

only

e taken

n

the

negative

ense,

s

meaning

not rom

nother.

17

Medii,

Resp.

ae

(ATTA

0,

CSM2:79-80).

18Medii,Resp. ae (AT7:U\,CW2:80).19

Medii,

Obis.

ae AT

7:20%, SM2:146).

20

Medii,

Obis.

ae(AT7:2\0,CW2:148).

21

Medii.

Objs.

4ae

{AT

:208-09,

CSM2:

146-7).

Revista Portuguesa

de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



878

Robert C. Miner

Secondly,he pplicationfthepositiveense f from imself n thedivine

case

entails hat

God

preserves

imself. ut

God

cannot e his own

preserver,

since

reservation

s

ust

ontinuous

reation,

nd t annot e said hat od creates

himself.

oreover,

rnauld

dds,

the

very

ermscontinuation'nd

preserva-

tion'

mply

ome

potentiality,

hereas n infinite

eing

s

pure ctuality,

ithout

any

otentiality. 22

s Caterus

uspected,

o

regard

od as causa sui

compromises

his

perfection.

Thirdly,

rnauld

oncludes hatwe

apply

henotion

f efficientause

only

o

existences,

ever o

essences.

Why

n

essence s

the

way

t is can

only

be

ex-

plained

hrough

ormal

ausality

that

s,

by

referenceo the

nature f the

hing.

Hence he orrectnswero the uestion Why oesGod exist?willnot nvoke

an

efficientr

quasi-efficient

ause.

nstead,

twillrefer

o his

essence,

xplaining

simply

that e

exists

ecausehe is

God,

or an

infinite

eing. 23

ne

maypersist

asking

or he

fficient

ause of

God,

but uch

person

eveals

nly

hat e does

not

understand

hat s

containedn the

dea of

God. God needsno

efficientause

precisely

ecause he

s an

infinite

eing,

whose xistence

s his

essence. or

the

only

hings

hat

equire

n

efficient

ause arethose n

which ctual

xistence

may

be

distinguished

rom

xistence. 24n

naming

God as causa

sui,

Descartes as

misunderstoodhe

ogic

of

his own

argument

n

Meditano

. Far from

equiring

causa

sui,

he

ntological

roof ctually

recludes

t.

Arnauld inds he dea oí causa sui to be simplyncoherent.escartes' ttempt

to

argue

hat

ejections

f

causa sui

depend

pon narrowly

iteral

onstrualf

efficient

ausality

s

beside he

oint,

ince ven he

nalogous

r

extended otion

of

efficient

ausality

hat

escartes as

in

mind

s

fatally

muddled. It is com-

pletely

vident

o

me,

Arnauld

oncludes,

that

othing

an

possibly

tand n

the

same elation

o tself

s thatn

which n efficient

ause

tands o ts ffect. 25

Descartes new

hat e had

found

worthy

riticn

Arnauld. e

prefaces

he

Quartae

Responsiones

y aying

hat e will

follow he

xample

f

hosewho re

matched ith

pponents

ho

re

uperior

n

strength:

nstead f

meeting

im

head

on,

will

dodge

his

blows. 26

escartes

egins

y distancing

ausa sui from

literaldentificationfGod with he fficientause of himself. lthoughor he

purposes

f

nquiry,

e

may

sk about

heefficient

ause

of

anything,

e

may

well ncounter

case where

he

uestion

ecomes if t

doesnothave

one,

we

may

demand

hy

t doesnot

needone. 27

escartes

laims hat ll

along,

e has main-

tained elief n

something

hat oesnot

equire

n

efficient

ause.Causa sui s not

an

assertionhat

od s the

fficientause

of

himself,

ut

way

of

aying

hat the

22

Medii,

Objs.

ae

AT

7:212,

GW2:149).

23

Medii,

Objs.

ae

AT7:213,

CSM2A50).

24

Medii,

Objs.

ae

AT7\2\3,

5Af

:150).

25

Medii,Objs. ae AT7:2H,CW2:150).

Descartes,

esponsio

d

Quartas

bjectiones

hereafter,

edii,

Resp.

4ae) (AT

7:231;

CSM2-A62).

ee alsothe

etter

o

Mersenne,

March

641

.473:331,

CSMK3:\75).

21

Medit,

esp.

ae

(^T7:108;

CW2:78);

Medii,

Resp.

ae

AT7:236,

SM2:165).

Revista

Portuguesa de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



Descartes'

Ontological

Proof

879

reason r causewhyGod needsno cause s a positiveeason r cause. 28t s an

affirmation

f the

immensity

f his

power

r essence. 29

ut

f

this

s all

Des-

cartes

meant,

hen

why

id

he

bring

he

notion f ausa

nto

lay?

Descartes

nswers

his

uestion

y

proclaiming

hat

this

way

of

talking

s ex-

tremely

seful

nd

ven

necessary

hen

ealing

with

he

opic

nder

iscussion. 30

Butuseful

orwhat?

Arnauld

as

forcefully

rgued

or ts

nutility

ith

espect

o

proving

he xistence

f

God.

At

best,

he

pplication

f

causa

to the

divine xis-

tence

s a

distraction;

t

worst,

t

ignifies

onceptual

onfusion.

onetheless,

es-

cartes

vers

hat

if he erm

cause'

assists

n

demonstrating

he

xistencef

God,

itcan

hardly

e more

seful;

nd

f

t

s

impossible

o

achieve

larity

n the

proof

withoutt, he ermanhardlyemore ecessary. 31

The

immediate

eference

s

to the

rgument

f

Meditano

II,

not o

theonto-

logical

proof.

ut,

s

we

will

show

n the

next

ection,

escartes

lso

takes

he

ontological roof

o

require

he ausa

sui.

Against

rnauld,

escartes

maintains

that

in

between

efficient

ause'

n the trict

ense

nd

no cause

t

all,'

theres a

third

ossibility,

amely

the

positive

ssence

f

thing,

o

which

he

oncept

f n

efficient

ause

can

be extended.' 32

n

speaking

f

quasi-efficient

auses,

Ar-

nauld

has

already

oticed

nd

rejected

his

ossibility.33

escartes

roceeds

one-

theless

o

articulate

is

notion f

what

mounts

o

quasi-efficient

ausality.

uasi-

-efficient

auses

re

ike

uthentic

fficient

auses,

xcept

1)

there

s

no

temporal

priorityfcausetoeffect:the estrictionpriorn time' an be deleted romhe

concept

while

eaving

he

notion

f

an efficient

ause

intact 34;

2)

there

s

no

distinction

etween

ause

and

effect.

escartes

hinks

e can

remove

hese

wo

notions

rom

fficient

ausality,

hile

reserving

ts

ore

that

s,

the

bestowal

f

existence.

With

Arnauld,

e

agrees

hat

here

s no

question

fthe

divine

ature's

being

fficiently

aused

by

something

utside

f

itself.

et

we

can,

and

n fact

must,

ay

hat

od

s causa

sui,

ince

he

mmense

ower

fhis

ssence

uarantees

his

capacity

o

bestowing

xistence

n

himself.

escartes

oncedes

o

Arnauld

hat

God

s

not

his own

efficient

ause

tricto

ensu,

ut

maintains

he

ight

o

say

that

he s

his

own

uasi-efficient

ause.

Butwhy oweevenhave his ight?f thedivine ssence ontainshe dea of

infinite

uration

ithin

t,

why

notfollow

Arnauld's

ead

and

account

or ivine

existence

urely

n

terms

f

formal

ausality?

Why

s

the

mputation

f

quasi-

-efficient

ausality

equired?

ere

Descartes

onfronts

rnauld's

rgument

irect-

ly.

Arnauld

olds

hat ince

ssence

ontains

xistence

n the ase

of

God,

ny p-

plication

f

efficient

ausality

ails,

ince

we ask

for

fficient

ausality nly

with

28

Medii,

Resp.

ae

AT

7:236,CSM2:\65).

29

Medii.,

esp.

ae

AT

:236, CSM2:165).

30

Medii,Resp.

ae

ATI

231,CSM2Ú66).

31Medii,Resp. ae AT1238,CSM2:\66). havemodifiedottingham'sranslation.

32

Medii,

Resp.

ae

ATT239,

CSM2Ú61).

See

Medii,

Objs.

ae

AT

1:213,

GSM

:

149).

^

Medii,

Resp.

ae

¿7*7:240,

SM

2:

167).

Revista

Portuguesa

de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



880

Robert

C.

Miner

respecto existences.escartesrgues,ngeniously,hat he dentityf existence

and

ssence

n

the

divine ase

mplies

he

pposite.

ince

God

may

be

regarded

s

pure

xistence,

nd

inceArnauld

oncedes hat

henotion f

efficient

ausality

s

relevant

henever e

are

considering

he xistence

f

something,

e

may

egiti-

mately

sk about

he fficientause of

God,

regarded

s

pure

xistence.

In the

case

of

God,

essence s not

distinctrom

xistence;

encewe can ask for he

ffi-

cient ause n

the ase ofGod. 35

We

may

bserve hat

escartes

s

appealing

o a

premise

hared

y

himselfnd

Arnauld n

order o

draw

n

opposed

onclusion.

rmogathe

ttributes

o Des-

cartes

he

rgument

hat from od's

being

he

fficient

ause of

Himself,

t fol-

lowsthatHis essence nd His existencemust e one and the amething. 36er-

haps

Descartes

rgues

n

such manner

lsewhere.

n

this

assage,

however,

he

directionf

the

rgument

s

precisely

he

opposite.

What

egitimates

nquiry

nto

efficient

ausality

ith

espect

o

the

divine ase

is

the

hared

ssumption

f den-

tity

etweenssence nd

xistence.

To allow

hatwe can

ask for he fficientause

n

the

ase ofGod doesnot

m-

ply

o

ipso

hat

God

willhave

n efficientause.And n the trict

ense,

God does

not

haveone.The

ability

o

raise he

uestion,

owever,

ives

Descartes he

pen-

ing

he

requires

o

say

thatGod

will

have a

quasi-efficient

ause. n cases where

essence nd

existencean be

separated,

ormal

ausality

s

entirelyndependent

f

efficientausality. ut n thedivine ase,where ssence nd existenceannot e

distinguished,

heformalause

of

God willbe

stronglynalogous

o an efficient

cause,

ndhence

an

be called

omething

loseto an efficientause

quasi

causa

efficiens)}1

he

causa

in

causa sui remains

recisely

hat f efficient

ausality,

o

long

s

the

notion as been

purged

f

temporal

riority

nd distinctionetween

cause nd ffect. od

s,

after

ll,

he

uasi-efficient

auseofhimself.

3. Causa Sui

and

the

Ontological

roof

But

why

was

Descartes o interestedn

maintaining

is

own

position,

n

the

faceofobjectionsromn opponent hose uperiortrengthe acknowledges?

Whatwork s

actually

one

by

the ausa sui? n the

bsence f a

compelling

n-

swer othis

uestion,

tremains

bscure s

to

why

escartes ouldhave hosen o

35

MediL,

esp.

ae

ATT243,CSM2:169).

Jean-Robert

rmogathe,

Proofs

f he

xistencef

God,

n The

Cambridge

istoryf

Seventeenth-Centuryhilosophy,

ol.

1,

312.

Medii.,

esp.

4ae

{AT

7:243,

CSM

2:170).

While his

assage

onfirmshat escartes

does not

mean

o attributehe

iteral

otion fefficient

ausality

o

the

ivine

ssence,

t lso

strongly

uggests

hat

ny

etractionsf hewider ense f

fficient

ausality

re

merelyppar-

ent.We concurwithMarion hat escartesactuallyid,from ime otime,hink od as

efficientause f

himself

and

hat

the orrective easureshatntroduce

he

ausa

sui when

it

s

thought

n

terms

f

efficiency

ount ess as

retractions

han

s confirmations

xercising

prudence ;

arion,

nDescartes

Metaphysical

rism,

7-8n5

Revista Portuguesa de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



Descartes'

Ontological

Proof 881

defendhenotion,ivents ogical roblems hichArnauld o acutelyoints ut.

One

might

hinkhat escartes as

simply

motivated

y

the

pride

fa

polemicist.

The

supposition,

owever,

s not

plausible, iven

Descartes'

eneral espect

or

Arnauld nd his

willingness

o

adopt

his

suggestions

n several

articularoints.

In

criticizing

he

ausa

sui,

ArnauldeavesDescartes

lenty

f

room o maintain

and

perhaps

ven

trengthen

he ssential

octrines

ut

forward

n

theMeditatio-

nes.

The

question

emains:

Why

oes

Descartes

ling

o

a

doctrine hich

ot

nly

fails

o surface

n the

ody

fthe

Meditationes,

ut lso

seems

urdened

ith on-

ceptual

ifficulties

nddeficientn

argumentativetility?

To answer his

uestion,

e must

eturno the rimae

Responsiones,

he

rigi-

nal siteof Descartes' ecision onameGod causa sui.A remarkableeature f

these

esponsiones

s that

lthough

aterus'

uery

bout he

roper

ense

f se is

keyed

o the

rgument

í

Meditano

II,

Descartes ollows

is

proclamation

hat e

intends

he

xpression

n a

positive

ense

with ts

deployment

n

a

renewed

ormu-

lation

f

the

ntological

rgument,

iven

n

response

o Caterus'

bjection

gainst

Meditano

.

The core

fthe

roof

n

Meditano

is

straightforward.

It

s

quite

vident

hat

existence

an

no

more

e

separated

rom he

ssence

f

God

than

hefact hat ts

three

ngles

qual

two

ight

ngles

anbe

separated

rom he ssence

fa

triangle,

or

than he

dea

of a mountain

an be

separated

rom he

dea of

a

valley.

Hence t

is ust smuch f a contradictionothink fGod thats,a supremelyerfecte-

ing)

acking

xistence

that

s,

acking perfection),

s

it s to think

f a

mountain

without

valley. 38

aterus

bjects

hat even

f t is

granted

hat

supremely

perfect

eing

arries

he

mplication

f existence

n

virtue f ts

very

itle,

t still

does

not

follow

hat

he

xistence

n

question

s

anything

ctual

n

the eal

world;

all

that

ollows

s

that he

oncept

fexistence

s

inseparably

inked o

the

oncept

of

a

supreme

eing. 39

o

infer

hat heexistence

f

God is

anything

ctual,

Caterus

ontinues,

equires

escartes

o assume

what

e s

trying

o

prove.

He has

to

suppose

hat

he

upreme

eing

ctually

xists;

or

hen t

will

actually

ontain

all

perfections,

ncluding

he

perfection

f

real

xistence. 40

editatio

does not

justify,ithoutegginghe uestion,he assage romonceptoactuality.

Descartes

iews Caterus'

bjections

s an

opportunity

or

him o state

more

clearly

hat

s

implicitly

ontained

n

the

Meditationes.

lthough

escartes

s far

from

hinking

hat is

proof

s

in itself

eficient,

e does

take

Caterus'

bjection

seriously

nough

n the

rimae

Responsiones

o

give

more laborate

ormulation

of

his

argument.

e

acknowledges

type

f

case

in

which n dea

ofa

being

may

contain

he

oncept

f

existence,

ithout

he

mplication

hat

ny

uch

being

ctu-

ally

xists.

If

were o

think

hat

he

dea of a

supremely

erfect

ody

ontained

existence,

n

the

rounds

hat

t s

a

greater

erfection

o exist

oth

n

reality

nd

n

38

Descartes,

editations

e

Prima

hilosophiae

,477:66;

CSM2A6).

39

Caterus,

edii,

Objs.

ae

(AT

7:99,

CSM2:12).

w

Medii,

Objs.

ew

AT

7:99,

CSM2:72).

Revista

Portuguesa

de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886

10



882

Robert

C.

Miner

the ntellecthan t s to existnthe ntellectlone, couldnot nfer rom his hat

the

upremelyerfectody

xists. 41ll thatwould

ollow s

that he

ody

s

ca-

pable

of

existing. 42

ny

dea of a

maximallyerfect

ody

willcontain

xistence,

but heformation

f

the dea can be traced o

the

ctivity

f human

ntellect.e-

cause

we

perceive

hat

he dea s

constructed

y

the

ntellect,

e have

ground

o

reject

he laim hat heres a

necessary

onnectionetween

xistence

nd he dea

of

body.

Indeed,

hen examine he

dea

ofa

body,

perceive

hat

body

has no

power

o

create

tself

r maintaintself n

existence;

nd

rightly

onclude

hat

necessary

xistence and t s

onlynecessary

xistence

hat s at issue

here no

more

elongs

o

thenature f

body,

owever

erfect,

han

t

belongs

o

the

nature

of a mountaino be withoutvalley, r to thenature f a triangleo haveangles

whose

um

s

greater

han wo

right

ngles. 43

ossible xistence

elongs

o the

ideaof

body,

ut

necessary

xistence oesnot.

Why

hould he

dea

of

God be

any

differenthan he dea of

body

n

this e-

spect?

What

makesus so sure hat t contains he dea

of

existentia ecessaria?

This s the

hinge

pon

which he

ontological roof

urns.

f

the dea of God can

merely

e

exhibiteds

capable

f

existing,

henwe

haveno

ground

or

ffirming

the

rgument

í

Meditano .

Although

hose

e.g.

Hobbes

n the

Objectiones

er-

tiae)

who

deny

hatwe

possess non-contradictory

dea

of God

would

ontest

he

point,

escartes

akes

t as

relatively

ncontroversialhat

possible

xistence,

t

theveryeast, elongso such being,ustas itbelongso all the therhingsf

whichwe have

distinct

dea,

ven

o those

which

re

put

ogether

hrough

fic-

tion fthe

ntellect. 44utwhat

wouldwarranthe

onclusion

hat ot

nly ossi-

ble

existence,

ut lso

necessary

xistence

ould

belong

o such

being?

et us

allowDescartes

o answer

n

hisown

words:

When

we attend o

the mmense

ower

f this

being,

we shallbe

unable

o

think f

tsexistences

possible

withoutlso

recognizing

hat t can exist

y

ts

own

power;

nd we shall nfer rom

his hat his

eing

does

really

xist nd has

existed rom

ternity,

ince

t

s

quite

vident

y

the

natural

ight

hat

what an

exist

y

ts wn

power

lways

xists.45

WhenDescartespeaks fa being hatexists y tsownpower, edoes not

mean his

n

the

negative

enseof

not

xisting

rom

nother. s we have

een,

Descartes

xplicitly okes

he

divine

mmensitas

o

causa sui. Arnauld

orrectly

sees the

mplication

f Descartes'

iew: God derives is existence rom

imself

positively

nd

s itwere

ausally.

Properly

nderstood,

he dea

Dei contains

ecessary

xistence. ut

he

ustifi-

cation or

ttributingecessary

xistence o

God,

according

o

Descartes,

s the

41

Medii.,

esp.

ae

(ATTA

8,

CW2:84).

42

Medii,Resp. ae (ATTA 8,CSM2-M).43

Medii., esp.

ae

(ATI

A

18,CSM2:M).

44

Medii.,

esp.

ae

(A

TI

A

19,

CSM

:85).

45

Ma/fc,

tes/?.

ae

¿77:1

19,

CW2:85).

Revista

Portuguesa de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



Descartes' Ontological

Proof

883

naming fGod as causa sui. This s innovative: on-Cartesianersions fthe

argument

ontend

hat

he

eason orGod'sexistences

contained owhere ut

n

God

himself,

ut

hey

o

not

ground

hat

ontention

n a

positive

ausa sui. Ar-

nauld

rgues

n

this

manner,

incehe

finds ausa sui ncoherento the

degree

hat

it s

distinguished

rom atio ui.

Descartes, owever,

oes notresolve ausa

sui

into atio ui. God does

not

merely

ontain hereason

orhis

own

existence;

e

constitutests

quasi-efficient

ause.Hencewe

may

onclude hat he

ogic

of

the

ontological

rgument,ccording

o the

more

xplicit

enditionfthePrimaeRes-

ponsiones, pecificallyequires

hedoctrinef causa sui. Withoutausa

sui,

ac-

cording

o

Descartes,

e

would ack

the

bility

o

say

thatGod

exists

y

his

own

power. his nturnwould icense hepossibilityhat eexists hroughhepower

of

another,

.g.

the

go,

ndhence

has

only

ossible

eing.

f

this s

granted,

hen

Caterus'

bjection

ould ucceed

nd he

ntologicalroof

ail.

Attending

o the rimae

Responsiones,

hen,

nables

o understand ore lear-

ly ust

why

escartes ould

o

to such

engths

o defend

henotion fcausa sui

n

the

QuartaeResponsiones.

e wouldnot

only

ose

face

against

Arnauld.More

importantly,

e

would

be forced o

retract doctrine

hat

urns ut o

perform

n

important

uty

n

serving

s

the ltimate

upport

f he

ntologicalrgument.

4. The

Evidence

fthe

Correspondence

nd the

Principia

In March

641,

Descartes sks

Mersenneo

alter he

riginal

ords fhis

reply

to

the

penultimate

bjection

f Caterus.

he altered ormulation

s the

first alf

of he

assage

uoted

bove.

Originally,

he

assage

ead:

We are

unable o

thinkf

ts

xistence

s

possible

ithout

hinking

hereanbe

some

ower

y

means

fwhich

t

xists,

nd hat

ower

annote understood

s resid-

ing

n

nything

therhan

hatame

upremely

owerfuleing;

ence econclude

hat

it an xist

y

ts

wn

ower.46

Why

id Descartes

make he

hange?

is own

nswers that

he

riginal

er-

sion

was too

crude.

ut s

theremore

o the

matter? escartes

imself

uggests

theremay e,speculatinghathe rased ext ttractedrnauld's ttentionn a way

that ed

him o

suppose

hat e

had detected

particularly

eak

spot

n

the

rgu-

ment.

f there

adbeen

no

palimpsest,

e

conjectures,

rnauld

might

ave found

nothing

t all to

say. 47

uch

n account f

Arnauld's

motivation

s

highlymplau-

sible.

There

s

no

reason o

suppose

hat

n the bsence

f access to

the

original

wording,

rnauld

ould

have verlooked

he

ogical

roblems

n

causa sui.

The

lettero

Mersenne

s

valuable

notbecause

t

contains

nythingnsightful

about

Arnauld's

motivation

it does

not but

because

t tells s

aboutDescartes

himself.

t

suggests

hat escartes

ecided,

fterome

onsideration,

o

emphasize

the

mmensitas

f

the

divine

ower.

n

the

riginal

assage,

xistence

by

tsown

46

Letter

o

Mersenne,

March

641

,473:329,

SMK3:\74).

4/

Letter

o

Mersenne,

March

641

,473:330,

SMK3:\14).

Revista

Portuguesa

de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



884

Robert C.

Miner

power esults rommere eflectionponGod's possible xistence.n thefinal

version,

xistence

er

se is

made o followmore

learly

rom

mmensity.

he

re-

sult

s to

emphasize

he

rounding

f

necessary

xistence

n

positiveelf-causality.

Is

Descartes

utting

orwardnew

proof

f

the xistencefGod n the rimae

Responsionesl

ean-LucMarion

holds hat e

is,

finding

n

theCartesian

orpus

three

ways

for

demonstrating

heexistence

f God. 48 he firsts the

proof

f

Meditano

II

(which

he

reads s a

single rgument

ith wo

formulations),

he

second s the

ntological

rgument

f

Meditatio

,

andthe hirds the

rgument

from

he

principle

f

sufficient)

eason,

which

finds he cause of God

in

God

Himself,

enceforthamed

ausa sui

(cause

of

tself)

Resp.

,

IV). 49

Descartes

himself,owever,ivesnosign hat eunderstandsimselfs furnishingn addi-

tional

roof.

he

ettero

Mersenne f 18 March

1641 makes t clear

hat

e

ad-

vances ausa

sui as a

response

o

what e

referso as

Caterus'

penultimatebjec-

tion the

bjection

o the

ntologicalroofs

passage

rom

oncept

o

actuality.50

Causa sui

does

not erve

s

a

newdoor o

God's

existence,

ut s a new

or

newly

illumined)

inge

n a door

hat as

already

een

fashioned.51

arion's

mputation

of a

third

istinct

roof

o

Descartes

ppears

o

be motivatedess

by

the extual

evidence han

y

desire o find

artesian

orrespondences

othevia

negativa,

he

via

affirmativa,

nd he

way

ofeminence.52

48Jean-Luc arion,The deaofGod, nThe

Cambridgeistoryf eventeenth-Century

Philosophy,

ol.

1,

ed. Daniel

GarberndMichael

Ayers

Cambridge:ambridge niversity

Press,

998),

75.

Jean-Luc

arion,

The dea

of

God,

75. See

also

Marion,

n Descartes'

Metaphysi-

cal

Prism,

45.

One

may,

f

course,

uestion

arion's

udgment

hat

Meditatio

II contains

two

formulations

f a

single rgument.

any

thers

avefound t east

wo

ndependent

r-

guments

n

that

ext.

evertheless,

arion's erdictoes

find

upport

n

the

Correspondence.

See the

ettero

Mesland,

May

1644,

where escartes

tates hat

lthough

itdoesnotmake

much

ifference

hether

y

econd

roof,

he

nebased

n our wn

xistence,

s

regarded

s

different

rom

he irst

roof,

r

merely

s an

explanation

f

t,

t

eems

o him

that ll these

proofs

ased n

his

ffectsrereducibleo

single

ne

C4T4:1 2,

CSMK3:23

-2).

50LetteroMersenne,March 641 ,473:329, SMK3Ú1A).

Hence

ur

modificationf

Cottingham's

ranslation

f he

assage

ited bove.

ottingham

translatessi Dei

existentiaeemonstrandaenserviats

if he erm

cause' serves o demons-

trate he

xistencef

God

AT

7:238,

GSM

2:166)

-

a

rendering

hat

may

eem o confirm

Marion's

iew

hat

ausa ui sthe asis

f

separateroof

hat

ppears

n

he

Responsiones.

he

literalense f

nservio

uggests

atherhat ausa serves

s a

vassal

r

ssistant

n

a

job

that

s

already

eing

ndertaken,

ndnot s the

oundation

f

new,

utonomous

roof.

See

Marion,

The dea of

God,

276-8.

n

questioning

arion's

iew

hat ausa sui

constitutesn

existence-proof

n ts wn

right,

e do not

necessarilyepart

rom is

udgment

that ausa sui

constitutes

distinctdentificationr

determinationf the divine ssence.

Marion

would

rgue

hat new

determinationf he ivine

ssence o

ipso mplies

newde-

terminationfhisexistenceseeMarion, n DescartesMetaphysicalrism, 57).Without

commenting

n the

ossibility

hatMarion

nderstandsescartes

etter

han

escartes nder-

stood

imself,

he vidence emainscant

or

upposing

hat

escartes

ook

imselfo dvance

a

separate,ndependent

roof.


Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



Descartes

'

Ontological

Proof

885

A furtherointnsupportfour nterpretationftherelationetweenausa

sui and he

ntological

rgument

s that

he

rincipia

onspicuously

mits o

men-

tion ausa

sui in

its

catalogue

f

ways

to

demonstratehe

existence f

God.

If

Descartes ad

really

nderstoodausa

sui

as

a

third,

elf-contained

roof,

e

surely

would

have

mentionedt n

the

Principia.

n

fact,

he

Principia

owhere

ffirms

causa sui

by

name.This s

not o

say

that he

doctrine

as failed

o eave

tsmark

upon

he1644 ext.

rguing

ith

aterus nd

Arnauld

n

1641

pparently

onvin-

ced

Descartes o

include he

notion f

necessary

xistence n

the

Principiaos

formulationf

the

rgument.

One

looks n vain

for n

occurrencef

the

phrase

existentia

ecessaria n

the

formulations

f the

argument

rior

o the

Respon-

siones.)Hencewe find he itle fArticle 4of PartOne assertinghat he xis-

tence

f God can be

inferredrom

hefact

hat

necessary

xistence

s

included

n

our

concept

f

God. 53Article

5

proceeds

o

emphasize

hat

our

concepts

f

other

hings

o not

imilarly

ontain

ecessary

xistence,

ut

merely

ontingent

existence. 54ut

n

virtue f what

oes the dea

Dei contain

ecessary

xistence?

His

essence,

obe

sure,

uthis ssence

etermineds causa

sui.

Part

1

of the

Principia

oes not

ay

this

xplicitly.

ut

Article 1

hints t the

idea;

mmediately

fter

mentioning

od's

ability

o

keep

himselfn

existence,

t

adds that

rather,

e

requires

o

being

o

keep

him

n

existence. 55he

intent

f

the

orrective

elpotius

s almost

ertainly

o

discourage

he

ntended

udience f

the rincipia, hose heologicalrainingsnot o differentrom hat fCaterus r

Arnauld,

rom

ingering

pon

he

mplicit

ssertion

fa

positive

ausa

sui.

t

must

be

observed, owever,

hat

escartes

hoosesnot o

simply

mit he

doctrine.

n

the

ontrary,

e

consciously

uilds nto

he

ext n

audible cho

of

causa

sui,

per-

haps

becausehe

expects

he ext's

est eaders

o see the

ink

etween

he

doctrine

and

he

ogic

f he

ntologicalrgument.

It

seems,however,

hat he

criticismsf Arnauld

ad their

mpact.

ot

only

doesthe

rincipia

ack clear

tatement

f he

octrine,

ut

ubsequent

extsmake

itclear hat escartes idnotwant

isname ssociated ith

heviewthat

God is

the

fficient,

r even

uasi-efficient,

ause of

himself.

n

the

Notae

n

Programma

quoddam, escartes enies hat ehas everwrittenhatGod should ecalled the

efficientause of

himself ot

ust

n

a

negative

ense

but lso

in

a

positive

ense

and declares hathe

is

totally

pposed

o such

extravagant

iews. 56 e chal-

lenges

he eader

o find

ny

place

n

which e ever

tated

he

iew.

n

the

bsence

of

other

vidence,

here s no reason

o

accept

Marion's dea that

escartes

ut

causa sui

forwards thebasis

of

a

third,

elf-sufficient

roof

f

God's

existence.

But

t

s

difficulto credit escartes' ssertionhat e never eld heview

or

any-

53

Descartes,

rincipia

hilosophiae

1

(A

T

8-

1

,

CSM

1 1

7).

54

Descartes,

rincipia hilosophiae

1

(A

T

8-

1

,

CSM

1:198).

55Descartes,rincipia hilosophiae .21 ^r 8-1:13,GW 1:200).Principia .24may

also

contain

he iew: God

alone s the rue auseof

everything

hich s or can be

AT

8-

1:14,

SM

1:201).

56

Descartes,

otae

n

Programma

uoddam

AT

8-2:368-9,

SM

1 3

10).


Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886



886

Robert C. Miner

thingike t andhereMarion ssurelyorrect).57n the ontrary,edidhold he

view n

response

o

the

cute

objections

f

Caterus,

nd defendedt

against

he

even

more

cute

bjections

f

Arnauld.

e

hope

o

have

gone

ome

way

n

explain-

ing

why.

57

See

the

discussionnd

referencesn

Marion,

n

Descartes

Metaphysical

rism,

7-08

n5

1

Revista

Portuguesa de

Filosofia,

58

(2002),

873-886

miner_descartes causa sui & ontological proof

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