mirsky on an lu-shan 1969 598280

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Structure of Rebellion: A Successful Insurrection during the T'ang Author(s): Jonathan Mirsky Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1969), pp. 67-87Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/598280Accessed: 30-09-2015 06:45 UTC

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STIMSON: The Sound of a Tarng Poem: "Grieving About Greenslope" 67

not', here somewhat softened to "that they may not"; the line ends with another descriptive word, tsaongtsueot 'rush'.

This line phonologically resembles Line 5, the first line of this quatrain. Both lines are over- loaded with syllables beginning with the same kind of initial. Here, the initials of the first five syllables are all voiced, and four of them are re- sonants. Also, both lines end in two alliterative syllables beginning with aspirates; in both lines these two syllables constitute descriptive words

with similar meanings: "whoosh" and "rush." All these similarities suggest that we should look for semantic connections between the two lines. The desolate scene depicted in Line 5, made more poignant by the tragedy of the battle fought there, is recalled, phonologically and in the choice of descriptives, in Line 8, where the poet regrets that the government troops did not wait until they were better prepared to cope with the rebels. Had they waited, the desolation described in Line 5 would not have seemed so severe.

STRUCTURE OF REBELLION: A SUCCESSFUL INSURRECTION DURING THE T'ANG*

JONATHAN MIRSKY DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

In 782 four provincial governors of the T'ang Dynasty (618-906) swore an oath of mutual allegiance, and instituted a revolt resulting in the establishment of semi-autonomous areas in north China for one hundred and fifty years. The rebellion was a success but, contrary to the usual pattern of such revolts, instead of overthrowing the existing Dynasty, it helped to guarantee the survival of the T'ang for almost a century and a half.

This sheds new light on the nature of rebellion in China and affords a new approach. It is often asserted that rebellions in Chinese history resulted either in total victory for the rebels and consequently a change in dynasty, or in total defeat and historical ignominy for the insurgents.

But in 784 neither extreme took place. Owing to a compromise the T'ang was able to continue for almost one hundred and fifty years, although considerably changed in form.

MANY ORGANIZED SOCIETIES have been faced with the challenge of decay and decline. One symp- tom, independent local control- "warlordism" in

the modern period-formed a persistent problem for Chinese rulers from the middle of the Chou Dy- nasty on. In 782 four provincial governors of the T'ang Dynasty (618-906) swore an oath of mutual allegiance, claiming as their precedent the * Dating. In dating, I follow Pulleyblank's system of

using the Chinese lunar calendar and numbered months. If western years are given, they correspond to the greater part of the Chinese. Determinations are based on the Basic Annals of the Old T'ang History and on the Tzu- chih t'ung-chien.

Thus, for instance, 5/1 Yung-t'ai (765) means the fifth month of the first year of the Yung-t'ai era, for which the western equivalent is given in parentheses. For reference in the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, the month and year will be preceded by chapter number, and succeeded by the page in the edition used, viz.: 223:5/1 Yung-t'ai (765), p. 7165.

In citing the T'ang dynastic Histories, the procedure is as follows: CTS 12:4b, means the twelfth chapter,

fourth page, verso, of the Old T'ang History (CTS; for this, and other abbreviations, see list).

Abbreviations BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiq-

uities CTS Chiu T'ang shu HJAS Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies HTS Hsin T'ang shu JAS Journal of Asian Studies JOAS Journal of the American Oriental Society TCTC Tzu-chih t'ung-chien TCTCKI Tzu-chih t'ung-chien k'ao-i THY T'ang hui-yao


68 STRUCTURE OF REBELLION: A Successful Insurrection During the T'ang

feudal lords of the Spring and Autumn Period (722-481 B.C.) and the early Han (206-ca. 154 B.C.), and instituted a revolt resulting in the establishment of semi-autonomous areas in north China for one hundred and fifty years. The rebellion was a success but, contrary to the usual pattern of such revolts, instead of overthrowing the existing Dynasty, it helped to guarantee the survival of the T'ang for almost a century and a half.

Although this revolt and its implications have not been carefully studied in the West, Chinese historians, referring to it as the Revolt of the Four Princes, have treated it at length in the dynastic histories, the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, other pre-modern surveys, as well as in more recent works. Tu Yu and Liu Tsung-yuian, who lived during the late T'ang, considered this revolt an example of the calamity that could befall a dynasty when its power began to decline. The Ming- Ch'ing philosopher-historian Wang Fu-chih (1619-1692), on the other hand, felt that its success actually saved the T'ang from early barbarian conquest. Other political philosophers from the T'ang through the Ming, when discussing the merits and potential for disaster of provincial militarism, frequently cited this period and the Spring and Autumn of the Chou as the basis for their arguments.

The primary purpose of this study is to describe the background and to assess the forces which made it possible for this rebellion to succeed without a change in dynasty.' Much of north China bad been ravaged following the An Lu-shan up- rising in 755, and after the Emperor Te-tsung's concessions to the rebels (in 784) an area rich in gram and silk and vital to the imperial economy was to be removed for more than a century from central authority. It was during these years that the principle of regional independence was firmly established in parts of north China, especially in a considerable part of the area covered by the modern province of Ho-pei.

The episode of the T'ang provincial governors also presents us with still another opportunity for speculation on revolts in China. "Government oppression" and "general decay of political institutions" are the two elements in the traditional list of explanations which we may retain, but such terminology is so vague as to verge on the useless. More specifically, the Emperor Te-tsung vigorously but unwisely attempted to impose a traditional form of central control on a powerful provincial military alliance upon which the Dy- nasty depended for vital frontier defense. Heredi- tary provincial rule was the price for military support demanded by the local magnates.

Why did the governors not overthrow the T'ang? Probably they commanded insufficient military power to topple the Emperor. Nor was literati discontent sufficiently bitter that the scholar officials abandoned their duty in Ch'ang- an to join the rebels. Indeed, Lu Chih, one of the most gifted men of his time, risked his life to stay with the Emperor, as did most of the important functionaries who fled with Te-tsung when the capital fell in 783. Quarrels among the officials there were-the antagonism of Lu Chih, a famous scholar-official, and Lu Ch'i, the Chief Minister, is well-known-but they were resolved before rivalry turned into permanent factions. Even Lu Ch'i, the Chief Minister who cautioned the Em- peror that the rebels were insignificant, is not described in any historical record as actually dis- loyal. Nor is there any indication that some clique in the court secretly involved itself with the governors. We can only speculate on local "gen- try" support in Ho-pei; certain sources in the Tzu-chih t'ung-chien k'ao-i indicate literary ac- tivity at the rebel "courts" but its extent or significance is unknown. Finally peasant insurrection on a mass scale, as demonstrated near the end of the dynasty, was absent. Even Marxist historians do not refer to it. (See, for instance, my later comments on Ts'en Chung-mien.)

Thus, although these governors did not establish a new dynasty, neither did they fail. Their limited demands were, in fact, granted completely. If is often asserted that rebellions in Chinese history resulted either in total victory

I The actual events of the great rebellion may be found described in my "Rebellion in Ho-pei: The Successful Rising of the T'ang Provincial Governors," Dissertation Abstracts, XXVIII, No. 4, 1967.


STRUCTURE OF REBELLION: A Successful Insurrection During the T'ang 69

for the rebels and consequently a change in dynasty, or in total defeat and historical ignominy for the insurgents. But in 784 neither extreme took place.

This sheds new light on the nature of rebellion in China and affords a new approach. Owing to a compromise the T'ang was able to continue for almost one hundred and fifty years, although considerably changed in form. Compromise as a method of statecraft enabled successive T'ang Emperors to maintain limited authority.

If for no other reason, this significant rebellion is worth attention for its deviation from the "fixed" course of the dynastic cycle. In this study we shall examine its background.

Ho-pei: A Troubled Area In order to proceed with the problem of central

vs. local control in the middle T'ang we must attempt to identify the more general factors- ethnic, political, and geographical-which allowed the Ho-pei area to become the breeding ground for sworn rebels against imperial authority. What will be offered here are some possibilities, not final solutions. But the vital economic importance of Ho-pei must be a focal point.

The problem of Ho-pei was not short lived. An historical center of dissatisfaction, it constituted a permanent sore-point for the T'ang, and it remained so until the end of the Five Dynasties period in the tenth century.2

Fortunately, the character of Ho-pei itself has been well explored by Professors Pulleyblank, Twitchett, Ch'en Yin-k'o, and Mr. Ku Chi- kuang.3 Although Ch'ien Mu described Ho-pei as

historically benighted,4 this was not always the case, for just before the T'ang Ho-pei was ". . . a prosperous and populous agricultural region, and the center of Chinese culture in the north."5 During the Sui almost one quarter of the regional households in China lived in Ho-pei.f

At the end of Sui and the beginning of T'ang, parts of Ho-pei underwent considerable suffering, first during the unsuccessful Korean expeditions of Sui Yang-ti and later from the violence which accompanied the establishment of the new dynasty.7 The population registration for 641-643 was only 17 % of the Sui total.8 Only by 799 did the official figures begin to indicate a recovery.9

Before An Lu-shan, during the Khitan invasions of 696, the court began to realize the stra- tegic importance of Ho-pei and significantly to strengthen its defenses and increase its supplies.'0 But by 755 the power structure altered sufficiently so that now the troops gave personal allegiance to generals who could reward them with the fruits of battle. This had come about with the end of the great northern campaigns to Korea and against the Khitan, together with considerable internal security, so that the militia lost its im-

2 For a full-scale and important study of this area at the end of T'ang and during the Five Dynasties period, see Wang Gung-wu's The Structure of Power in North China During the Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur: Univ. of Malaya Press, 1962).

3E. G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan, (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1955), chap. 6, passim; in it can also be found summaries of Chinese investigations in this subject; D. Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy and Central Finance in Late T'ang," Asia Major, n.s., XI, pt. 2, pp. 211 ff.; Ku Chi- kuang, "An-Shih luan ch'ien chih Ho-pei tao," Yenching Hsaeh-pao, XIX (1936), pp. 179-209; Ch'en Yin-k'o,

T'ang-tai cheng-chih-shih shu-lun kao, (Shanghai: Shang- wu yin-shu-kuan, 1947), passim.

4Ch'ien Mu, Kuo-shih ta-kang (Taipei: Kuo li pien- i-kuan, 1960), I, 331. See below, in my discussion of the "barbarian" problem.

6 Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, p. 77. 6 H. Bielenstein, "The Census of China During the

Period A.D. 2-742," BMFEA, XIX (1947), 125-163; E. G. Pulleyblank, "Registration of Population in China in the Sui and T'ang Periods," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, IV (1962), 290 ff.; Twit- chett, "Provincial Autonomy," p. 213.

7 W. Bingham, The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty: The Fall of Sui and the Rise of T'ang, a Preliminary Survey (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1941); Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, chap. 6.

8 Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," p. 213. 9 Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, p. 261. 10 For the State Colonies in Ho-pei and elsewhere see

D. Twitchett, "Lands Under State Cultivation under the T'ang Dynasty," Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, II (1959), 162-203; R. Des Rotours, Traite des Fonctionnaires et Trait4 de l'Armee Traduits de la Nouvelle Histoire des T'ang (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1947-48), I, Introduction and pp. 55 ff.



portance, and long-serving frontier armies manned the borders. In An Lu-shan's day, ". . . the immediate dispenser of the new wealth was not the Emperor in Ch'ang-an, but the provincial governor at Yu-chou."'1 Within fifteen years of the great rising the same conditions existed not only at Yu-chou, under Chu Tz'u and Chu T'ao, but at Wei-po, Ch'eng-te and other commanderies where local control satisfied ancient separatist leanings and immediate needs. Until the end of the T'ang and into the next period, these particular areas maintained their identity and power, when all the rest of China seemed permanently in flux.

Despite military and ethnic problems, in the face of a good deal of political dislocation, Ho-pei remained an area of critical economic importance. This is partially true for northeast Ho-pei and those parts of Ho-nan which harbored separatist leanings. Until recently economic factors during the decades after the great rebellion of An Lu-shan have been ignored or misrepresented. The neglect by the court before the seventh century, and the poems of Tu Fu which describe great desolation after 755, can easily create an impression of an area of no particular productive consequence. But if this were so why should the Emperor and the governors struggle so long and so hard-from 755 through the ninth century-over the hegem- ony of Ho-pei and Ho-nan? The answer lies in the wealth of the battleground.

By 742 Ho-pei and the northern part of Ho-nan once again contained approximately two million registered households.'2 Because the households of Ho-pei were larger than the national average, and contained therefore more males, the capital drew on a larger tax-paying population in the northeast than elsewhere, males being the taxable persons.l3 For purposes of revenue, then, before

An Lu-shan's rebellion, Ho-pei was essential to the T'ang government.

Grain constituted one of the chief items in this revenue. Ho-pei and Ho-nan between them pos- sessed more than half of the total grain reserves of the Empire. More important is that these reserves exceeded the requirements of the local population. The biggest single granary in all China was at Pei-chou in Ho-pei.'14

Following the An Lu-shan rebellion the central government was at once deprived of this important source of revenue. Since the area of southern and central Ho-nan had indeed suffered in the fighting,'5 the government found itself increasingly dependent on the Grand Canal for access to the regions south of the Yangtze. Already important before the rebellion, this southern region now assumed an unexpected role as the sole reli- able supplier of grain to Ch'ang-an, for the taxes of the northeast were essentially lost.'6

The loss of silk revenue from the northeast was another blow to the T'ang economic structure. During the reign of Hstian-tsung, before the great rebellion, a large part of the government's silk revenue came from Ho-pei and Ho-nan.'7 As with grain, far more silk was produced in the two provinces in proportion to population than elsewhere in China. Silk was by far the most important medium of exchange in large transactions before 755.18 After the civil war the silk revenues were sharply reduced.'9 Stores of silk were de-

11 Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, p. 80. For the militia system see also Pulleyblank, ibid., pp. 62 ff. and 140, note 1; and Ts'en Chung-mien, Fu-ping chih-tu yen- chiu (Peking: Kao-teng chiao-yi! ch'u-pan she, 1957), passim, esp. chap. 1.

12 Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, pp. 172 ff. 13 Ibid., p. 172.

14 Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," p. 216; D. Twitchett, Financial Administration Under the T'ang Dynasty (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962), p. 193.

11 Chiu T'ang shu (Po-na edition), 120:6a-6b; CTS, 123: lb-2b.

16 Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," p. 218. For crop failures in the Ch'ang-an region see TCTC 223:3/2 Kuang-te (764), p. 7164; CTS 11:8b and 37:5a; Hsin T'ang shu (Po-na edition), 35:3b. For the decline in what reached the capital along the canal, see CTS 49:4a and THY 87:1590.

17 See maps in Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," pp. 226-227.

18 See Ch'tan Han-sheng, "Chung-kuo tzu-jan ching- chi," Academia Sinica, Institute of History and Phil- ology, Bulletin, X (1948).

19 See Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," p. 228.



stroyed; prices could no longer be manipulated by the government; silver from the south assumed a more important function as a medium of exchange, in part because it could be procured from safe areas under government control. The indirect effects of the changeover from silk to a money economy were considerable, and cannot be discussed here.20

But the political effects of the loss of Ho-pei and Ho-nan to the independent governors were considerable. Twitchett's summation is a good one:

It would appear then that the virtual independence of Ho-pei and Shantung had a very serious effect upon T'ang central finances. By drastically reducing the central government's available revenues in grain and in silk cloth it made it extremely difficult for the government to reassert its effective authority over these provinces.... The possession of these same industries -salt production, silk textiles, and iron and bronze metallurgy-provided the governors of the north- eastern provinces with a stable economic foundation to maintain their own administrative machinery and their large standing armies without imposing an intolerable burden of direct taxation upon the population of their provinces.21

Early T'ang Emperors for reasons which are still indistinct had allowed Ho-pei to lapse into chronic autonomy. After the governorship of An Lu-shan, when a decision was made to secure closer ties with the frontier, the idea of local rule had already been established and the government could do little. Northeast China was lost economically to the central authority, foreign armies menaced its borders, and Ch'ang-an required all the help it could get. In a real sense the great up- rising of 755 did not die away with the death of An Lu-shan's successor, Shih Ch'ao-i, in 762, but settled into glowing embers. These burned fitfully until they exploded again in 780 in an area which the histories call a "boiling cauldron."

But the frontier armies also offered something positive in this unstable atmosphere: to the local population, safety from foreign raiders and some

chance of economic survival; to the central government, defense against invasion and a possible check to large-scale invasion. It became necessary to prepare for either ceaseless war against the provincial governors, singly or in their changing combinations, or to grant them certain fundamental concessions. By 820 the T'ang had re- stored a measure of control over the north, but never in the commanderies principally involved in the rebellion. While Ho-pei could indeed pro- duce armies capable of defending the Emperor, these same forces were ever poised in a position from which they could swoop down like falcons and sever the lifeline from the south. The independent governors, once in control of a rich area and convinced of their rights under the "old custom of Ho-pei," were not prepared to give way.

Central vs. Local Control Wang Gung-wu, in his description of north

China at the end of the T'ang and beginning of the Five Dynasties Period in the tenth century, describes a disordered state of affairs springing from the concessions made to the provincial governors in 784. "The struggle which lasted over a century was unresolved .... The (T'ang) court never succeeded in regaining control over the greater part of the Ho-pei region."22 This struggle was symptomatic of the ancient Chinese problem of central vs. local control.

The best general treatise on the subject, written during the T'ang as a direct response to the question of the governors, is the "Essay on Feudal- ism," by Liu Tsung-yiian (773-819).23 Liu felt a

20 See, for example, Ch'tian Han-sheng, "Chung-kuo tzu-jan ching-chi," for discussion.

21 Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," pp. 231-232.

22 Wang Gung-wu, The Structure of Power, pp. 11 (note 7) and 209. Wang is not especially concerned with the origins of the provincial governors, but on several occasions he mentions their special nature in Ho-pei. I am grateful to Professor Wang for allowing me to read his book in manuscript.

23 Liu Ho-tung chi (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chii, 1961), pp. 31 ff. For a discussion of the importance of this essay Feng-chien lun and of an earlier one by Tu Yu, in early neo-Confucian thought, see E. G. Pulleyblank, "Neo- Confucianism and Neo-Legalism in T'ang Intellectual Life," in A. Wright (ed.), The Confucian Persuasion, (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 78 and 102- 104.



deep concern, as one of his editors said, about feng-chien, or feudal control:

The provincial governors of the T'ang, at the very beginning, were not based on the feng-chien system . . . but when An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming were put down, the Emperor and all his ministers wanted to live in peace, and they therefore divided Ho-pei like a melon and gave it to former rebel generals. Thus, the Emperor and his ministers were cultivating the shoots of rebellion.... The rebellious ones took advantage of this, appointed officials without imperial permission, used taxes for selfish purposes, and never contributed anything to the court. This great evil is the same as that of the strong feudal lords, and the weak royal family in the Spring and Autumn Period.24

Liu's solution for the problem of feudal control was the chiin-hsien system of administrative units adopted by the state of Ch'in.25 In this system the capital occupied the dominant position and held the whole country "in the palm of its hand."28

Later thinkers, like Chang Tsai (1020-77) in the Sung, however, saw certain advantages in a somewhat decentralized feudal society whose unity was bolstered by the virtue and morality of the ruler. Chang insisted on the reestablish- ment of feudalism as an ideal, because ". . . if the administration is not simplified (through decentralization) then it will be impossible to govern well. Therefore, the sages insisted on

sharing the affairs of the Empire with other men. 27

Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-95) in the Ming desired not an actual return to a feudal order but a centralized state, dependent on the balance of power; for this reason he advocated a system of provincial governors.28

Near the end of the Ming and the beginning of Ch'ing, Wang Fu-chih (1619-92) saw definite advantages in this notion of Huang's. (His ideas are discussed more fully below.)

It may be seen, then, that the existence of the governors gave rise to different reactions. Scholars like Liu Tsung-ytan regarded them as a cause per se of dynastic misfortune, while others, like Huang Tsung-hsi, saw them as an element in a vital balance of power. Some intermediate view should emerge from further investigation; although not in themselves a primary cause of disintegration, the provincial governors were surely a sign that the central pivot no longer held firm. In such a situation it became the Emperor's responsibility to retain them at least partially in his service through intrigue and-if necessary- concession.

Several questions deserve answers: (1) How important is it that numbers of the rebel leaders were of non-Chinese background? Did they play a significant role because they were "barbarians"? Or is it more noteworthy that they were sinified border figures and, like their "Chinese" comrades, neither wholly Chinese nor steppe? (2) Was the larger situation in which the rebellion occurred purely one of dynastic deterioration, without qualification, or was it partly a genuine clash between the center and local-perhaps "feudal"- power?

Chinese scholars from the T'ang to the present have discussed the provincial governors, trying to

24 Liu, ibid., Introduction. As we shall see, the governors themselves preferred to refer to their situation as akin to that of Han, when, in 154 B. C., the Emperor decided to abolish the princedoms he had established in his marches. It was precisely that move, discussed below by Liu Tsung-ytian, which, Liu said, displayed the glory of Han.

25 For a detailed description of the origins of this system, which in fact extend back to the middle Chou, see Derk Bodde, China's First Unifier (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1938), chap. 7, esp. pp. 135 ff. It is interesting to see there the theory advanced that the chun were originally military zones along the frontiers, designed to keep the barbarians at bay (p. 140). It was only later that they became administrative areas.

H. G. Creel has given an even earlier date for the chiin-hsien system, in "The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in China," JAS, XXIII (1964), 155-184.

28 Liu Ho-tung chi, p. 33.

27 Quoted in W. T. deBary, "A Reappraisal of Neo- Confucianism," A. Wright (ed.), Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 99.

28 W. T. deBary, "Chinese Despotism and the Con- fucian Ideal: A Seventeenth-Century View," in J. K. Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chi- cago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 174 and 193.



answer these very questions. They dwelt on the stability of the State and how it might be pre- served. As we have seen, it was admitted, by some, that in certain periods of dynastic weakness it was not only customary but necessary for the Em- peror to make weighty-and even risky-concessions. It was his only recourse for ultimate security; but once concessions were granted, those who assumed new roles in the structure of political and military power could themselves present a possibly lethal threat to the already enfeebled dynasty.

The Establishment of the Provincial Governors The provincial governors after An Lu-shan were

presented with areas in Ho-pei and Ho-nan which, in essential ways, were thereafter lost to the Em- peror. As Ch'en Yin-k'o has written:

After An Lu-shan the T'ang, while in name still unified, was in fact two completely different areas, that of the central government, and that of the governors. Not only were they not united politically and militarily, neither were they unified socially, economically, or in racial background. Though the attempt of An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming failed, their generals and other inferiors kept their power.... Though T'ang was called one dynasty, in fact there were two separate states.29

This is no vague conjecture. The changes in local administration, especially in the north, were striking. Whereas in the south administration remained for the most part as it had been at the beginning of the eighth century, after An Lu-shan the provincial administrations in the north developed as intermediaries between the capital and the counties.30 The semi-autonomous provincial commanders arrogated to themselves a considerable number of local appointments, causing the minor officials to become personally responsible to the provincial centers and not to the capital. An example of this was the part played by the gov-

ernors in affixing local taxes. It is unfortunate that details of the beginning of the provincial take-over are not known, but the chief rebels, "The Four Princes," of this period exercised their power in just such a way.31

The rise of the semi-independent governors, or chieh-tu-shih,32 after 755 is treated as an historical period in Chinese histories, both early and modern. The armies themselves, far from the capital, and often living under the most unstable conditions, played an important part in the installing and deposing of their commanders.

The problem as such first arose in 757, in the twelfth month of the first year of the Emperor Su-tsung, while the great rebellion was still in progress. At this time, Wang Hsian-chih, provincial governor of P'ing-lu province (see Chart; comprises most of Ho-nan) died, and the Em- peror, eager to maintain the loyalty of that area, sent an envoy to discover whom the army desired as its new commander. Meanwhile a Korean general, Li Cheng-i (who originally had been named Li Huai-yfi), killed Wang HsUan-chih's son, nominating as Acting Governor Hou Hsi-i, whose mother was Li Cheng-i's aunt.33

Hou Hsi-i later tried to rid himself of Li Cheng-i, but was soon driven out himself by his own troops. Li Cheng-i therefore gained the governorship of a considerable area in Ho-nan, and after a time featured amongst the most dangerous opponents

29 Ch'en Yin-k'o, T'ang-tai cheng-chih, p. 19. 30 See, for instance, Twitchett's comments on their

new role as tax collectors, Financial Administration, p. 114, and "The Salt Commissioners after An Lu-shan's Rebellion," Asia Major n.s. IV (1954), 62 ff. and the discussion below.

31 Twitchett, Financial Administration, pp. 120-123 gives a general survey of the problem. Wang Gung-wu, The Structure of Power, chap. 5 discusses it in some detail relating to the end of T'ang and the beginning of the Five Dynasties.

32 The title chieh-tu-shih can be translated in numbers of ways, "Military Governor," "Frontier Governor," "Regional Commander," "Legate," or "Commissaire Imperial au Commandment d'une Rfgion." Until recently, the fullest discussion of the history and meaning of the title appeared in Des Rotours, Traitg des Fonction- naires, pp. 656-657 (notes 1 and 2). It is now superseded by Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, pp. 149 (note 32) and 106 (note 13).

33 TCTC 220:12/1 Ch'ien-yiian (758), p. 7064; Hou Hsi-i, CTS 124:6a; Li Cheng-i is not mentioned (as Li Huai-yi! or as Li Cheng-i). Li's biography contains useful information. CTS 124:6b; HTS 213.



of imperial authority;34 his son, Li Na, later became one of the Four Princes who put intolerable pressure on the Emperor Te-tsung.

The Tzu-chih t'ung-chien comments: "That was the beginning of the establishment and removal of the chieh-tu-shih by the army."35

The situation contained all the elements typical of most such seizures of power in north China. After the governor died there generally ensued an uproar at his headquarters, usually involving one of his sons. If the governor himself was not a "barbarian" some close associate often was, although the significance of this phenomenon re- quires analysis. The Emperor faced with a fait accompli would usually, until the reign of Te- tsung, confirm the newly chosen victor of the internal struggle for power.

Establishment of the Ho-pei Governors

In 762 the last rebel leader, Shih Ch'ao-i, son of An Lu-shan's late comrade Shih Ssu-ming, still occupied the eastern capital, Loyang, but he was eventually ejected by a Uighur army under the command of a non-Chinese general, P'u-ku Huai-en.36 Shortly thereafter, Shih Ch'ao-i's base in Yu-chou was betrayed by his former confeder- ate, T'ien Ch'eng-ssu, who, after the fall of Loy- ang, had rallied the rebels to resist the imperial forces.37 T'ien now handed Shih's family over to the royal commanders and surrendered. Other rebel generals holding commands in Ho-pei also laid down their arms. They took their oaths of

fealty, however, not to the Emperor, but to P'u-ku Huai-en.Y8 Earlier, the court had issued a nervous proclamation stating that: "In the areas of Loyang, Ho-nan, and Ho-pei, those who accepted rebel offices will not be subjected to official investigation.39

The rebels were allowed by P'u-ku Huai-en to retain their old areas, since he apparently feared that after the rebellion the Emperor might easily be less well-disposed to his supporters. Since the "court was tired of war," the appointments were approved, if for no other reason than that independent commanders could reduce the Emperor's official burden, particularly the financial ones.40

As part of its attempt to bring peace to an area long unsettled by civil war, the court, in the fifth month of 763, decided to redistrict Ho-pei, and the commanderies of Yu-chou (or Fan-yang), Ch'eng-te, Wei-po, and Tse-lu (in Ho-tung) were established.4' P'ing-lu, in Ho-nan, already existed. (For the prefectures within each commandery, see the Chart.)

34Li Cheng-i, CTS 124:6b. 35 The TCTC adds: "The common soldiers could bully

the officers, and they in turn could bully the commanders. It was, then, only natural for the latter to bully the Emperor.... This went on for two hundred years, until Sung received the Mandate of Heaven.... There were then no rebellions and the frontier was calm. The reason for this was that the frontier was reorganized." TCTC, ibid., p. 7064.

36 P'u-ku Huai-en, CTS 121; HTS 224a; TCTC 221: 11/1 Pao-ying (762), p. 7135. P'u-ku's daughter was married to the Uighur khan. The Uighur troops and the Chinese apparently treated Loyang and other liberated areas as captured enemy territory, and looted them thoroughly.

37 TCTC, ibid.

38 TCTC 222: 1/1 Kuang-te (763), p. 7138. 39 TCTC 222:11/1 Pao-ying (762), p. 7136; the editor

points out that the governors who passed their offices on to their sons or other descendants remembered this proclamation.

40 TCTC, ibid., 2/1 Kuang-te (763), p. 7141. Ma Sui, however, who later became one of the chief generals under Te-tsung, suspected P'u-ku Huai-en of wishing to use his connection with the Uighurs and his allies in Ho-pei to undermine imperial authority there. Ma Sui, CTS 134: lb; TCTC, ibid., p. 7148. He was correct. P'u-ku Huai-en became an increasingly serious problem for the T'ang, and eventually led a huge Uighur and Tibetan army on the capital, from which he was only just turned away by Kuo Tzu-i. Soon after convincing the barbarians to make another thrust into China he suddenly died. This occasioned such a struggle for leadership among his followers that the invasion plans fizzled out. P'u-ku's career in the later stages is of great interest and can be traced as follows: TCTC 221:1/1 Kuang-te (763), pp. 7139, 7142, 7148; 223:1/2 Kuang-te (764), pp. 7159, 1761-62, 7165-67; 223:9/1 Yung-t'ai (765), pp. 7176-79.

41 For a complete list of prefectures in each commandery see TCTC 221:1/1 Kuang-te (763), p. 7143. A fuller description, based in part on the Fan-chen chapter, HTS 210, is found in Yang Chih-chiu, Sui T'ang Wu-tai shih kang-yao (Shanghai: Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1957), p. 87, and in Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui T'ang shih (Peking: Kao- teng chiao-yfi ch'u pan she, 1957), pp. 266 ff.



This constituted, quite plainly, part of a policy of appeasement. No history, early or modern, puts it any other way. The classic description may be found in the New T'ang History:

An Lu-shan and Shih Ssu-ming had disturbed the whole country. When peace came, the Emperor and all his ministers were happy and adopted a policy of appeasement, divided Ho-pei, and gave it to former rebel generals. Protecting these rebels led to a great disaster, for those who rebelled later made use of this policy to appoint their own military and civil officials. ... The weapons of the national armies were in bad condition ... and the government had devised no other solution for ridding the country of rebels. The officials merely maintained their dignity and acted as if the whole country were peaceful and prosperous.42

Even Ssu-ma Kuang, whose feelings rarely in- trude into his vast survey, allowed himself a certain bitterness in discussing this problem:

(A number of chieh-tu-shih) . . . gathered the re- mains of An Lu-shan's and Shih Ssu-ming's armies. Each had several tens of thousands of well-trained soldiers. They trained their armies, built fortifications, and appointed their own military and civil officials. They paid no tribute to the court.... Some made alliances of marriage, and otherwise cooperated with each other.... They were uncontrollable, and although officially called Governors of the Frontier, in fact they were only being won over.43

The Careers of the Leaders The governors of Ho-pei and Ho-nan after An

Lu-shan were never more than periodically loyal, and then only when it suited their purposes. Those areas had undergone fragmentation at the hands of a small group of largely independent ruling families, which were to govern their special domains until well after the end of T'ang. Where a family was displaced, it was not, for the most part, an imperial officer who filled the gap, but another powerful local figure. (For the line of succession in the areas under discussion see the Chart.)"

Among the most important provincial governors in this period are T'ien Ch'eng-ssu, Chang Chung-chih (later Li Pao-ch'en), Li Cheng-i, Li Huai-hsien, Li Huai-kuang, Chu Tz'u, and Chu T'ao. T'ien, Chang, and Li Huai-hsien were all given the office of chieh-tu-shih in 763, in the first month of the first year of the Emperor Tai-tsung. Their areas of command in Ho-pei lay, as we have seen, in an area from which operations could be launched against the canal as supplies moved toward the capital. They and the governor of P'ing-lu province in Ho-nan were, thus, always a threat should they elect to menace the great supply route. The careers of these three men are of first importance. Chu Tz'u and Chu T'ao are also discussed in this section.45

T'ien Ch'eng-ssu T'ien Ch'eng-ssu came from Lu-lung, later

called Yu-chou or Fan-yang, in northern Ho-pei.46 His grandfather and father served in the Lu-lung armies, and T'ien himself, in the last years of the K'ai-yfian era (713-742), became a cavalry commander under the Governor An Lu-shan. Owing to his successes fighting the Turks and the Khitan, T'ien (like Chang Chung-chih) received a leading position when An Lu-shan rebelled and captured Loyang. T'ien gained the prefecture of Wei-chou, a position he continued to hold under Shih Ch'ao- i, whom, as we have seen, he eventually betrayed to P'u-ku Huai-en. The latter, wishing to insure his paramount status in Ho-pei, persuaded the Emperor to confer a succession of titles on T'ien, culminating in that of chieh-tu-shih of Wei-po.

In Wei-po, which comprised seven prefectures in southern Ho-pei, T'ien set about the construc- tion of a powerful military organization. He took the census, increased taxes, put the old soldiers to

42 HTS 210:la. 43 TCTC 223:7/1 Yung-t'ai (765), p. 7175. 44 For a breakdown of these families in, for instance,

Wei-po, Ch'engte, and Yu-chou, see HTS 210, esp. 2a. Also Wu Feng, Sui T'ang Wu-tai shih (Peking: Jen-min

ch'u-pan she, 1957), p. 163; Chang ChUn, T'ang shih (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua, 1958), p. 130; Ts'en Chung- mien, Sui T'ang shih, p. 268. Ts'en calculates the tiny fraction of provincial governors actually appointed by the court before the end of the T'ang.

45 Other important leaders such as Li Na and Wang Wu-chtin appear in the course of the rebellion itself, which is the subject of another study by me.

48 T'ien Ch'eng-ssu, CTS 141; HTS 210.



farming, and drafted the young ones into what soon became a large and highly trained guard.47 At first this may appear like typical "colonizing," but putting the young men into the army reduced the productivity of the military colonies and farms, and since the young recruits were promised tax relief both by the Emperor and by their individual commanders, the resulting strain on the less productive and diminished farming population must have been severe.

T'ien Ch'eng-ssu himself appointed subordinate officials and neither reported his census nor paid taxes to the court. We have already noted that the take-over of local administration by the provincial magnates was to be a developing phenomenon well into the tenth century. "Though in name he was a provincial governor, in actuality he did not behave like one."18

In the ninth month of 773, T'ien erected a shrine to the "Four Sages," An Lu-shan, Shih Ssu-ming, and their sons. Although it was a direct slight to the T'ang court, the Emperor merely ordered that the monument be razed in some unobtrusive manner.49 Despite T'ien's outrageous behavior, the Emperor showed him increasing favor, creating him honorary Chief Minister, then prince, with a fief of 1,000 families, and finally giving a royal princess in marriage to one of T'ien's sons.50 It was a sign of Tai-tsung's desire to bind

T'ien to the court, to create feudal ties, rather than allow the separatist trend to become such that an area could become undependable, unpre- dictable and actually dangerous.

In the eleventh year of the reign of Tai-tsung, 773, the Prefect of Hsiang-chou, Hstieh Sung, died.5' The usual uproar over the succession ensued among the soldiers, and T'ien Ch'eng-ssu took advantage of the turmoil to encourage a rebellion.52 On the pretext of putting it down he sent an army to Hsiang-chou intending to incor- porate the area into his already vast jurisdiction.53 The Emperor at once dispatched a messenger to Ho-pei to command all the governors to stay within their own borders, 4 but the royal emissary was forced by T'ien to inspect two provinces in which the generals clamored for T'ien to lead them.

Consequently, in the fourth month, Tai-tsung issued the following statement describing his past kindnesses to T'ien, and explaining that now he must be reprimanded:

T'ien had served the rebels, but because the common people of Wei had suffered long enough under Shih Ssu-ming, and could no longer farm, the court decided to appease, rather than punish him. It therefore installed him as chieh-tu-shih . .. and gave him other offices, the highest to which a non-member of the T'ang royal family of Li could aspire. His children could become great officials and his wives, concubines, and servants could all receive court titles.... Yet he occupied an area in which he appropriated all the goods and taxes.... Hsiang-chou was outside his jurisdiction, but he forced the troops there to rebel, and then attacked while it was still in disorder; his plots are obvious.... He seized the armor, horses, weapons, supplies, grain, and well-trained troops, and carried them off to Wei-chou. This is unpardonable. But the court, wishing to be generous ... sent an envoy to Wei-chou ... nonetheless, T'ien commanded his nephew T'ien Yfieh to enter the captured prefectures in order to inflame the generals and

47The guard was called the ya-ping. See Huang Chien- shu, Chung-kuo chfin-chih shih (Changsha: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, 1940), pp. 227-236, which traces the word from its beginnings as one of the major divisions in the T'ang military structure.

48 T'ien, CTS 141: lb. This, of course, is the evaluation of an orthodox historian thinking in terms of central control. In fact, military governors usually behaved this way, and while the degree of their independence is an index of imperial weakness, it was also the price of security in times of the growth of foreign power along the imperial borders.

49 TCTC 224:9/8 Ta-li (773), p. 7222. L. S. Yang writes that the expression (sheng-jen) must be interpreted as Emperors, and as such "was perhaps more an indication of open defiance of the T'ang court, rather than of real respect for the four revolutionists." L. S. Yang, review of Arthur Waley's biography of Po Chti-i in HJAS, XV, (1952), 264.

60 TCTC 225:3/9 Ta-li (774), p. 7226; T'ien, CTS, ibid.

61 TCTC 224:1/8 Ta-li (773), p. 7219; Hsiieh Sung, CTS 124; HTS 111:8b. The latter source puts his death in the seventh year, p. 9a.

52 TCTC 225:10/9 Ta-li (774), p. 7228. 53 T'ien, CTS, ibid.; HTS 210, sb; Hsiieh, CTS 124:la;

HTS 111:8b; TCTC, 225:1/10 Ta-li (775), p. 7228. "4 TCTC, ibid.



to cause an uproar. This can all be proved, and if it is tolerated, then indeed there is nothing which can be considered a crime.55

The Emperor dispatched a number of chieh-tu- shih to Wei-po to threaten T'ien Ch'eng-ssu and shortly thereafter reduced him to the rank of Prefect.56 T'ien, in response, spent the next months playing a complicated game of cat and mouse with the court, alternately surrendering and attacking, whenever he could enlist the aid of some other discontented governor.57 One of these was the Governor Li Ling-yao, who was suppressed only after difficult campaigns lasting the entire year.58

Only when Li Ling-yao had been captured and beheaded, and when in 776 the royal forces were once more ordered to attack him, did T'ien ask to be forgiven. But since "the Emperor could do nothing," in 777 T'ien was re-confirmed as governor of Wei-po.59 At last, in 781, the second year of Te-tsung, secure in this power and at the age of seventy-five, he died, to be succeeded by his nephew T'ien Ytieh,60 one of the Four Princes.

Chang Chung-chih (Li Pao-ch'en) Another former rebel commander who received

a governorship in 763 was Chang Chung-chih of Ch'eng-teA'1 Chang, originally a non-Chinese from Fan-yang, had been adopted by a former Chinese general of the region, whose name he

bore.2 When An Lu-shan served as governor of Fan-yang, he placed Chang 'in charge of his archers (T'ien Ch'eng-ssu, it will be remembered, was a cavalry commander in the same army), for since his youth Chang had gained renown for his marks- manship and skill as a horseman. He accompanied An Lu-shan to Ch'ang-an and later, when his master rebelled, Chang fled back to Fan-yang where the rebel chief rewarded him by conferring on him the surname An.

However, although Chang evidently enjoyed considerable trust from An Lu-shan, Shih Ssu- ming and their sons, in 762 he eventually surrendered to the Emperor with the five provinces in his charge, allowing the royal forces to enter a crucial pass.63 For this service he, like TVien Ch'eng-ssu, was given a governorship, that of the Ch'eng-te army, including six prefectures in central Ho-pei. He also received the royal surname of Li, and was known, henceforth, as Li Pao-ch'en. His chief deputy, a Khitan named Wang Wu-chtin, with whom he had a marriage bond, would also play an important future role as one of the Four Princes.64

The descriptions of the way Li Pao-ch'en organized his area sound familiar: he, too, paid no taxes, collected a sizable army, made new weapons, established marriage relations with other governors-his younger brother married T'ien Ch'en-ssu's daughter-and plotted to insure the inheritance of his position.65

Owing to a family squabble with T'ien Ch'eng- ssu, Li at first cooperated with the government when it sent armies to attack T'ien, but T'ien cunningly played on his adversary's vanity and neutralized Li Pao-ch'en by promising him that he would help him seize his native place at Fan-

6 T'ien, CTS 141:lb-2b; TCTC, ibid., pp. 7228-29; this was at the end of 774 and the beginning of 775. The proclamation is an example of the kind of material on which Chinese historians drew for their narrative; it forms the bulk of the TCTC account.

5"Tai-tsung, CTS 11:24b; TCTC, 225:4/10 (775), p. 7230.

67 TCTC 225:2/11 Ta-li (776), p. 7237; T'ien, CTS 141:2b. Other details may be found in the biographies of Li Cheng-i, Chu Tz'u, Chu T'ao, and Li Pao-chen. Dates are clearly indicated in Tai-tsung, CTS 11:25a-26b.

58 For these see the biographies mentioned in the pre- ceding note, and that of Ma Sui, CTS 134:2a-3a; TCTC 225:5/11 (776), p. 7337.

69 TCTC, 225:3/12 (777), p. 7241; IT'ien, CTS, ibid. 80 T'ien, CTS 141:3a. 61 Chang Chung-chih (hereafter Li Pao-ch'en), CTS

142; HTS 211.

62 For the institution of adoption-and several of the governors had been adopted-see 0. Lattimore. Studies in Frontier History; Collected Papers, 1928-1958 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 535-537.

63 Li Pao-ch'en, CTS 142:la. 64 TCTC 226:1/2 Chien-chung (781), pp. 7291-92; a long

editorial comment on Chang's career is included. 68 Li Pao-ch'en, ibid.



yang.66 Soon thereafter Li Pao-ch'en realized that T'ien's promises had been merely to divert Li from attacking him, and he angrily abandoned the rebel side-i7 Later, in the reign of Te-tsung, his vanity and superstition were again aroused and he once more harbored grand designs, this time of an imperial nature, but in 781 he died from drinking a potion guaranteed to "put him in touch with the gods." Despite his erratic loyalty, the Emperor, hearing of his death, refrained from attending court for three days.68 As will be related below, Te-tsung's objections to his son, Li Wei- yuieh, succeeding him triggered the full-scale revolt of the provincial governors.

Li Huai-hsien Li Huai-hsien, like Li Pao-ch'en also a non-

Chinese, was a Khitan from Fan-yang.69 His family had early surrendered to the T'ang and held positions as commanding generals in Ying- chou, the birthplace of An Lu-shan. Li, too, par- ticipated in the great rebellion, and eventually became rebel governor of Fan-yang. When the tide of events began to turn in favor of the royal armies, and P'u-ku Huai-en drove Shih Ch'ao-i from Loyang, Li Huai-hsien lured Shih into his camp and there beheaded him.70 Like Li Pao- ch'en and T'ien Ch'eng-ssu, Li was one of the ex- rebels selected by P'u-ku Huai-en to reinsure his position in Ho-pei, and he forthwith received from the Emperor the governorship of Yu-chou, which he used to establish his own independence from the court.71 Yu-chou had produced An Lu- shan; now, a few decades after his great rising, a group of his generals, all sprung from the same frontier soil, rose up to continue what he had begun.

Chu Tz'u and Chu T'ao In 768, Tai-tsung's sixth year, Li Huai-hsien

was murdered by his own cavalry commander Chu Hsi-ts'ai.72 In this murder Hsi-ts'ai had the cooperation of two other Yu-chou officials, the brothers Chu Tz'u and Chu T'ao. (Although they bore the same surname, there is no evidence that the brothers and Chu Hsi-ts'ai were related.)73 Styling himself provisional governor, Chu Hsi- ts'ai shortly thereafter repulsed an attack by the governor of Ch'eng-te, Li Pao-ch'en.74 The Em- peror then sent an envoy to Yu-chou to take over the staff of office, but although received politely enough by Chu Hsi-ts'ai, this official felt himself in no position to contest the governorship, and after a few days he returned to Ch'ang-anZ76 There being little else the court could do, in the eleventh month Chu Hsi-ts'ai was confirmed as governor of Yu-chou.6

But his attitude must have been overbearing, because in 722, the fifth year of his appointment, he was, in his turn, slain by his soldiers.77

For a time confusion filled the camp as the army failed to decide on its next commander. Chu T'ao, who as a favorite of Hsi-ts'ai had commanded the Guard, sent agents amongst the soldiers to shout the name of his brother Chu Tz'u, then general of the forces north of Yu-chou.78 The troops there- upon acclaimed Chu Tz'u as provisional governor, and in the tenth month of 772 Tai-tsung named him governor of Yu-chou.79

The Chu brothers, like most of the rebels of

6" A description of T'ien's entertaining method of cutting a "prophecy" in stone and burying it where Pao-ch'en would be sure to discover it may be found in the latter's biography, CTS 141:2a-2b.

67 Li Pao-ch'en, ibid. 68 Li Pao-ch'en, ibid.; TCTC 226:1/2, p. 7292. 69 Li Huai-hsien, CTS 143; HTS 212. 70 TCTC 222:1/1 Kuang-te (763), p. 7139. 71 TCTC 223:5/1 Yung-t'ai (765), p. 7175; Li, CTS,

143, lb.

72 TCTC 224:6/3 Ta-li (768), p. 7200; Chu does not have his own biography, but his later career is described from the end of the biography of Li Huai-hsien.

73 Chu Tz'u, CTS 200; HTS 225:3b; Chu Tao, CTS 143; HTS 212.

74 TCTC 224:6/3, p. 7201; not in Li Pao-ch'en's biography.

75 Li Huai-hsien, CTS 143:lb; TCTC, ibid. 7 Li Huai-hsien, CTS, ibid., twelfth month, which was

actually the date of his acting status; TCTC 224:11/3, p. 7203.

77TCTC 224:7/7 Ta-li (772), p. 7219; Li Huai-hsien, CTS 143: lb; Chu Tz'u, CTS 200: la.

78 TCTC, ibid. 79 TCTC, ibid.; Tai-tsung, CTS 11:21b; Chu Tz'u,

CTS 200:lb.



this period, came from another family long situ- ated in Fan-yang.80 Their grandfather and father had both served as military officers of high rank, and their father rose, too, to the position of general under An Lu-shan. After Li Huai-hsien became "loyal," Chu Tz'u became a prefect and provisional governor of an army, the P'ing-lu, serving north of the Great Wall.81

Among Chu Tz'u's first acts as governor of Yu- chou, one demonstrated what seemed singular loyalty to the Emperor. Since the An Lu-shan rising the Yu-chou army had never been more than nominally under the control of the capital. In 773 Chu Tz'u sent Chu T'ao, at the head of a sizeable force, to Ch'ang-an, whence they were to proceed northwest to Ching-chou for the annual "autumn defense" against the barbarians.82 The Emperor, pleased by this show of fealty, per- mitted the Yu-chou army to pass directly through the capital. In addition to this unprecedented favor, he treated Chu T'ao with special consider- ation on his return from the frontier and, engaging him in "informal" conversation, inquired which of the two brothers was the more capable. To this T'ao is recorded as replying: "We differ in a number of ways. In leading troops and making plans I am inferior to Tz'u. But I am only twenty-eight, and have already received an audience from the Emperor. In this regard he is the lesser."83

This cunning reply, which pleased the Emperor, had its effect. The following year, 774, Chu Tz'u himself led an army to the capital, thus making a truly remarkable display of fidelity, for since the An Lu-shan rebellion no Ho-pei governor had been seen in Ch'ang-an. This was, in fact, such a great occasion that crowds lined the streets as the Yu-chou army marched through the gates.84 The delighted Emperor showered him with a profusion of rich presents, including "seventeen hundred"

suits of clothes, and ordered that a mansion be erected for Chu Tz'u during his stay in the capital. In later years, while serving as Censor, Po Chii-i commented cynically on demonstrations of "loyalty" by provincial governors, noting that when the Emperor appeared strong the governors would strive to cleave closer to him, even desiring to take up residence in Ch'ang-an, where they would command great influence and make important friends.85 From his protestations about Chu Tz'u's loyalty at the height of Chu's rebellion, it would seem that Lu Ch'i, the Chief Minister, had been won over in just such a way.

Chu T'ao spent the next year attempting to force T'ien Ch'eng-ssu to abandon his expansionist schemes. Quite possibly prudence rather than loyalty was his motive, since Chu T'ao himself harbored ambitions. He may have felt concern that T'ien's activities would bring overwhelming imperial pressure to bear on all of Ho-pei.

During the same period, Chu Tz'u held successive commands at Feng-t'ien, Feng-hsiang, and Ching-yfian; in 774 he was created honorary Chief Minister.86 In 782, as his brother's activities became more suspect, Chu Tz'u was recalled to Ch'ang-an.87 Although he was heavy with titles and still in name governor of Yu-chou, in fact full power in northern Ho-pei now unquestionably lay in the hands of Chu T'ao.88

The split may have occurred between the brothers when Chu Tz'u requested that T'ao be appointed provisional governor of Yu-chou while he, Tz'u, remained in the capital to take charge of frontier defenses against the Tibetans. It is equally possible, on the other hand, that the change was due to a plot of the kind described by Po Chti-i, and that in Ch'ang-an Chu Tz'u played the part of his brother's agent. Although Chu Tz'u insisted he was loyal, in 782 when T'ao showed signs of disobedience and his correspondence with Tz'u 80 Chu Tz'u, CTS, ibid.

81 Chu Tz'u, CTS, ibid. 82 TCTC 224:8/8 Ta-li (773), p. 7221; Chu Tz'u, CTS,

ibid; Tai-tsung, CTS, ibid.; Chu T'ao, CTS 142: lb. These sources have varying figures for the size of T'ao's army.

83 Chu T'ao, CTS, ibid. 84 TCTC 225:7/9 Ta-li (774), p. 7227; Chu Tz'u, CTS

200:lb; Chu T'ao CTS, ibid.; Tai-tsung, CTS 11:23b.

85 See E. Fiefel, Po Chii-i as a Censor (The Hague: Mouton, 1961), pp. 58-59.

86 For these positions see CTS 200: lb-2a; HTS 225:3a. HTS is especially hopeless for dates.

87 TS, ibid. 88 HTS 225:3b.


80 STRUCTURE OF REBELLION: A Successful Insurrection During the T'any

was exposed, the Emperor prudently had Tz'u placed under house arrest.89

When, at Ching-yuan, Chu Tz'u was replaced at the order of the Emperor, it aroused the anger of the Ching-yiian garrison,90 for Chu Tz'u was a popular commander. In 783, when they "reversed their spears" and captured Ch'ang-an, it was Chu Tz'u whom they elevated eventually to the position of "Emperor."

Were the Rebels Barbarians? One of the reasons adduced by traditional Chi-

nese historians for the revolt of the provincial governors is that they were Hu, or barbarians. With the possible exception of Ch'en Yin-k'o this explanation is still generally accepted as suffi- cient.9'

To be sure, many of the major figures were non- Chinese: Li Huai-hsien and Wang Wu-chtin were

Khitans; Li Huai-yii was a Korean; Li Pao-ch'en (or Chang Chung-chih) was a Hsi; P'u-ku Huai- en was a Uighur; and An Lu-shan himself was of partially Turkish origin.92 Ch'ien Mu has calcu- lated that from the middle of the reign of Hsuian- tsung through that of Te-tsung, more than forty naturalized Hu acted as provincial governors, of whom seventeen served in the latter reign alone, occupying more than half the available positions.93 How significant is this fact, and does it help to explain any of the events of this period or the motives of the personalities? How did the court manage affairs in the northeast? Was it more successful elsewhere? In this section we will attempt an answer after first examining theories on both sides.

Ch'ien Mu describes these barbarians as badly educated men who were suddenly given great power, causing the better ones to feel proud and independent, while the less good became out-and- out rebels. During the T'ang, he writes, part of Ho-pei was separated from Chinese culture; before Sui, great Chinese clans which did not flee south cooperated with the conquering barbarians, who thus received a Chinese education and desired to become worthy rulers.94 The provincial governors in the eighth century, on the other hand, originally nothing but common soldiers of little learning and no cultural inclinations, did not nurture the am- bition to create noteworthy, lasting regimes. They wanted only to occupy a given territory and to strengthen their hold upon it. The governors knew only how to select able-bodied young farmers for their armies and private guards. The fact that they were able to exploit the farmers in this fash- ion, Ch'ien Mu contends, is an indication of the collapse of the agrarian economy of Ho-pei, a col-

89 TCTC 227:2/3 Chien-chung (782), p. 7328; Chu Tz'u, CTS, ibid.; HTS 111:4a; Chu T'ao, CTS, ibid.; HTS 212: lb. A most interesting but unfortunately unreliable source on the split between the brothers is the biography of Ts'ai T'ing-yfl, HTS 193:2a. It contains long "conversations" between Ts'ai, an old follower of An Lu- shan, and Chu Tz'u. I say unreliable because such "conversations" between individuals, outside the court, are impossible to verify. Ts'ai is supposed to have warned Chu Tz'u of the consequences of rebellion (p. 2b). Later, Chu Tz'u divided his command into a number of ''armies" under their own commanders; he was warned, then, by Ts'ai and others that Chu T'ao was usurping his position and attempting to induce his elder brother to go to Ch'ang-an to get him out of the picture in Yu-chou. Chu Tz'u paid no attention, and Ts'ai accompanied him to the capital. There he persistently tried to intervene between Chu Tz'u and Chu T'ao when the latter sent letters to Ch'ang-an. Through some intrigue T'ao managed to have Ts'ai banished to a dangerous place, but on the journey Ts'ai killed himself (p. 3a). The Emperor is then supposed to have recognized his true worth, as did Li Sheng, the general who retook the capital in 784. Ts'ai is said to have planned the division of Yu-chou to weaken it and to lessen the possibility of disloyalty.

90 His successor was Chang I, CTS 125; HTS 152; for the series of events surrounding the Ching-yiian transfer see J. Mirsky, "The Life of Tuan Hsiu-shih," Journal of the China Society, I (Taipei, 1961), 63 (note 60).

91 For Chinese historical views of the barbarians see Li Tsung-t'ung, Chung-kuo shih-hsieh shih (Taipei: Chung-hua wen-hua, 1953), p. 182.

92 For a discussion of An Lu-shan's background see Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, chap. 1, passim.

93 Ch'ien Mu, Kuo-shih ta-kang, p. 331. 94 A. Waley, The Life and Times of Po Cha-i (London:

Allen and Unwin, 1949), p. 51, also discusses this cooperation, as does Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, p. 154 (note 4). Their conclusions, however, differ, Pulleyblank main- taining that there is no evidence that these families actually supported An Lu-shan.



lapse resulting in the lowering of the level of the culture north of the Yellow River.95

The drastic effect of the governors is described not only by traditional modem historians like Ch'ien Mu; Ts'en Chung-mien, a noted scholar of Communist China, goes even farther than Ch'ien in attributing long-range barbarization in Ho-pei to the frontier leaders.96 Ts'en's most notable conclusion is that the collapse of the economy of the north lay at the root of more than the slow disunion of Ho-pei ;97 all future invasions-Khitan, Liao, Mongol, and Manchu-no longer came from the west but through the area once commanded by the provincial governors. Whether, in fact, such invasions came through north China when

the country was disunited is open to question; further, Ts'en's analysis, like Ch'ien Mu's, is based on economic collapse, which seems not to have occurred in Ho-pei where grain and silk production continued.

Validity of the Barbarian Theory Pulleyblank has shown that until the time of

An Lu-shan and the Chief Minister Li Lin-fu most of the provincial governors were men whose ambitions focused on the capital.98 Li, however, "openly advocated a policy of appointing barbarians as provincial governors." He claimed they were better fighters than the Chinese, and were used to frontier life.99

After An Lu-shan, pressure from the Tibetans and Uighurs and uncertainty along the borders made it necessary for the T'ang to depend even more heavily on the northern provincial commanders, and to face the fact that the frontier lands themselves were no longer fully under central control. The entire structure of power was changing. "Historically, when we find frontier affairs recorded primarily in terms of negotiations with barbarian chiefs, the society of the frontier people in question is still tribal; when the most important administrative events recorded are al- locations of territory, the social system is passing from the tribal to the feudal." 100 The comparison of An Lu-shan as a powerful local individual before 755 with the governors who wanted their families to control specific areas after 763 illustrates the phenomenon of political change.

Lattimore has shown how the Chinese government, in its relations with frontier populations, often tried to use "tribal" organization for its own purposes.'0' Chinese sovereigns naturally desired

95 Ch'ien, ibid., pp. 331-336. As discussed above, the economy of Ho-pei did not collapse in the period after An Lu-shan. It is nearly impossible to discover how the governors managed their finances, but what little evidence there is indicates that grain and silk continued in production. See Twitchett, "Provincial Autonomy," pp. 230-231.

9B Ts'en Chung-mien, Sui T'ang shih, pp. 270-271. 97 For statistics showing the resulting tax burden on

south China in the ninth century see TCTC 237:12/1 Yuan-ho (807), pp. 7647-48; CTS 17:21a; Ch'en Yin-k'o, T'ang-tai cheng-chih, p. 19 also gives these figures.

For the economic unrest at the end of the T'ang, see Twitchett, "Lands under State Cultivation," pp. 201 if.; Howard S. Levy (trans.), Biography of Huang Ch'ao (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1955), passim; Y. Muramatsu, "Some Themes in Chinese Rebel Ideol- ogies," in A. Wright (ed.), The Confucian Persuasion, p. 259.

Ts'en Chung-mien, ibid., asserts that, as in the Spring and Autumn Period, instability at the top of the political pyramid eventually affected the peasantry for the worse. This was not a class problem in the T'ang, according to Ts'en, because the generals represented no particular group, but the dialectical clash between the military and the farmers weakened the agricultural base in north China for more than two hundred years. Fortunately, since the south was China's granary, it was the farmers of the Yangtse basin who kept the rest of the country from starving and prevented total anarchy in the eighth century. The common people of north China, deprived of their livelihood, suffered all the damage immediately following the rebellions of 755, and reaped none of the rewards. Thus, unlike the situation at the end of the T'ang in 875 when rebels enjoyed large-scale peasant support, the farmers in this period played no significant political role.

98 For Li Lin-fu, see Pulleyblank, An Lu-shan, chap. 7, passim.

99Ibid., p. 95. 100 Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, p. 525. This

is in marked contrast to the central and southern provinces which remained under civilian administration, pat- terned on the earlier period of the T'ang.

101 See, for instance, his introduction to L. M. Schram, The Monguors of Kansu, now collected in Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, pp. 514-541.



to prevent complete tribalism, which would result in a disastrous disappearance of all loyalty to the center, and encouraged instead "feudal levies," which were fixed geographically. By preventing tribal shifting the Emperor could halt dangerous alliances which might culminate in a particularly strong "Khan," and he could at the same time be somewhat confident of imperial strength in a given area.

Wang Fu-chih's (1619-1692) thesis on barbarian invasions and the unity of China throws further light on the basic nature of the governors. They were in charge of their own areas, protected their own lands, and selected and trained their own armies. In vulnerable periods, Wang ex- plained, the central government tended to leave such commanders much to themselves, while in periods of dynastic strength the armies of the capital sent to the frontiers would have neither the experience nor the desire to defend them, but were intended for short-term striking purposes. Thus, a certain defensive advantage could grow out of dynastic weakness, in that during non- expansionist periods the frontiers were manned by permanent professionals.'02 (Such a phenomenon is notable in the later T'ang which was free of Tibetan attacks, although far from strong cen- trally.)

Clearly, making local magnates wardens of the marches was fraught with peril. Such men might turn against their rulers or exact concessions in exchange for continued obedience. This was evidently the main anxiety for Tai-tsung and Te- tsung.

When the An Lu-shan rebellion ended in 763, there resulted more than thirty provincial com- mandries. This arrangement was to remain essentially the same until the Huang Ch'ao rebellion of 875. A survey of the governorships in 763 re- veals that almost twenty were of professional military background. Only south of the Yangtze were there civilian officials.103

At various times in Chinese history local frontier rulers were allowed the feudal right of hereditary succession.104 Central control of their areas was indirect and it was the local leader who collected taxes and led the army, not officers from the capital. The responsibility of these chieftains was to protect the Emperor against yet more distant threats and less obedient feudatories. The governors of Ho-pei tended to think of themselves in these tribal/feudal terms. Both they and their soldiers seemed to regard the commander as a kind of Khan, and expected his son, the young Khan, to succeed him.

But even though they had nearly total local control, politically, economically, and militarily, the provincial governors of the T'ang lacked the final-and basic-feudal "right": hereditary succession. And yet it was precisely this "right" which was one of the most characteristic elements in frontier life. In 781 when the "Four Princes" swore their oath, it was hereditary right which they swore to defend.'05

Yet demanding the "right" of hereditary succession did not guarantee that a single family would govern a given area for more than a few decades, if that long. Indeed, only in Ch'eng-te, from 821 to 907, did one family, the six descendants of a Uighur, Wang T'ing-tsou, rule for any lengthy period. The family of Li Cheng-i-who was Korean-stayed in power in P'ing-lu fifty- four years from 765 to 819. Elsewhere, in Yu-

102 Wang Fu-chih, Tu T'ung-chien fu Sung lun (Shanghai: Shang-wu yin-shu-kuan, n.d.), 15:3.

103 Wu T'ing-hsieh, "T'ang fan-chen nien-piao," Erh-shih-wu shih pu-pien, VI, pp. 7283-7570 contains the

basic information for this kind of survey. It must be aug- mented with biographical materials. Of the governors in 763, nine acquired their positions without prior confirma- tion by the Emperor; this includes, of course, the Ho-pei governors, particularly those whose commanderies never again were controlled by Ch'ang-an. Civilian control elsewhere in China was gradually reasserted so that by 820 the picture differed markedly from 763. The military and often hereditary nature of control in most of Ho-pei was fixed following the great rebellion.

104 It was known, for instance, in Yuan. See, for instance, F. W. Cleaves' studies of the Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1362, HJAS, XII (1949), 1-33, mentioned in Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History, p. 522.

105 TCTC 227:11/3 p. 7336. Chu T'ao, CTS 143:2b, HTS 212:2b. T'ien, CTS 141:6a.



chou, Wei-po, and Chao-i, twenty-four to forty years for one family was the rule.

What is as clear as the desire of certain north- eastern governors for hereditary succession is the frequency of mutiny and attempted usurpation within the provincial armies which were the well- spring of local power. Ho-pei governors depended on the approval of their soldiers rather than on imperial sanction. The hereditary "right" was intimately connected with the army's "right" to choose its commanders. Very likely none of the independent governors, save during the long rule of the Wang family in Ch'eng-te, ever felt secure in their positions, for the armies they commanded ultimately decided the fate of their commanders.

Despite the obvious hazards, it was necessary for the government when assigning men to key frontier areas to be realistic as well. By 751 Chi- nese armies had been soundly defeated in Central Asia by the Arabs; by 756 the T'ang was no longer the dynamic aggressor capable of overawing all who came within reach. For an Emperor to insist on normal bureaucratic procedure in the appointment of frontier officials, when he had already accepted their virtual independence as the only chance to protect himself, would have been empty pride. It is relatively useless to give much weight to the "Chinese" or "Barbarian" background of individual personalities on the frontier in this period-it is the situation which should attract our attention.

That many of the T'ang governors were "non- Chinese" is undeniable, but in the absence of factual evidence with which to replace Chinese chauvinism, the importance of the governors' particular backgrounds to our understanding of their disloyalty must remain undetermined. Nothing in their biographies nor in any other reli- able source suggests significance in their Turkish, Khitan, or Uighur descent. What is highly significant, however, is that their "Chinese" counter- parts, T'ien Ch'eng-ssu, Chu Tz'u, Chu T'ao, and others, acted in much the same way, had similar backgrounds and careers, and shared similar goals. All the men discussed so far came from Fan-yang in northern Ho-pei, the region which spawned An

Lu-shan, but two of the Four Princes were "Chi- nese" and two were not.'06

This blurring of distinctions could have broad implications. Previously, great political upheavals in the Dynasty, such as the seizure of power by the Empress Wu, took place in the capital, and provincial rebellion could not but fail because of the resulting greater "weight" of the Kuan-chung area. (The concept of heaviness, geopolitically speaking, was used by the great Minister Lu Chih.) Only when the capital lost its commanding position could provincial leaders hope to succeed.'07 "Blood" was not a decisive factor. Central to our understanding is Owen Lattimore's thesis that an unstable frontier produced military commanders of uncertain cultural and national identity, in "a world permeated by the influences of both China and the steppe, but never permanently mastered by either." ]08

Conclusion This investigation has attempted to demon-

strate the possibility of successful but limited rebellion in imperial China. Usual explanations for the appearance of Chinese insurrections do not suffice here, perhaps because the explanations were formulated only for cases of total defeat or complete victory. The possible continuity of both dynasty and rebels is not included in the theory of the dynastic cycle nor in most modern explanations.

What had come to pass on the frontier was the development of a number of magnates whose actual racial background, Chinese or barbarian, is insignificant, for they thought of their leaders

108 Chu T'ao, HTS 212:4a. Although related in only one source, a highly important story exists that after the Four Princes enthroned themselves at the end of 782, they presented gifts to the Uighur Khan, putting themselves at his disposal. Thus, these astute leaders could ensure friendship beyond the frontier, while not snap- ping the last links which bound them also to Ch'ang-an.

107 This concept has been developed at length by Ch'en Yin-k'o, T'ang-tai cheng-chih, pp. 50-51.

108 0. Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (2d ed., New York: Capital, 1951), p. 468. The thesis is widely explored in this invaluable work.



as Khans and the internal struggles remind us of the later rise of Mongol Power. Almost all had their origins in Fan-yang, the birthplace of An Lu-shan. Hence it is the non-Chinese aspect of the rebel ideology which was important.

Establishing groups of interlocking military colonies, assessment of taxes, control of vital supplies of grain and silk, and considerable military freedom were the privileges wrung from the T'ang Emperors by the Ho-pei provincial governors.

We would do well to remember, however, the character of Te-tsung, who fought the governors hardest but yielded most. The Emperor, in this period, made fundamental errors in judgment about both friends and enemies. Greedy and pas- sionate, he could not bear the whittling away at his domains by the provincial governors. But his unswervingly loyal critic, the great Minister Lu Chih, who was certainly aware that south China could increasingly furnish the tribute lost from Ho-pei, ultimately persuaded him to listen to reason. Lu Chih grasped that the situation had to be a bargain: "feudal" concessions and enor- mous losses in tax revenue from the northeast, in exchange for some stability and military security. The real danger, the Tibetans, was of first concern. But such concessions were granted by Te-tsung only when his back was pressed flat against the wall, indeed only when driven into temporary exile by Chu Tz'u. Fifteen years later Lu Chih, now Chief Minister, was to urge still greater independence for the Ho-pei armies.

The institution of governor plainly was not going to be eliminated. T'ang Emperors learned not only to endure it, but to exploit it with considerable success. What stuck in the throat of Te-tsung was granting the right of hereditary succession, agreeing to which meant abdication of fundamental control over his army.

Hereditary succession, however, was basic to frontier rule; until it was guaranteed by a weakened government, none of the Ho-pei provincial governors felt their sway to be assured. When the Emperor Te-tsung threatened to deny this "right," they united and rebelled. In doing so, they harkened back to the great period of feudalism and to the oppressive measures taken against such as themselves by early Han Em- perors.

That the rebellion succeeded was owing in part to the limits set on its objectives. Unlike Chu Tz'u, the other rebels made no attempt on the life of the Dynasty itself, but stirred internal fires, relying on Tibetan pressure and dynastic military weakness to do the rest.

The middle of the eighth century in China, then, witnessed the dwindling of a great Empire, which was thereafter threatened from without by foreign invasion and from within by violent local magnates. In the T'ang, after 763, Tibetans, Uighurs, and provincial governors caught the Emperor between hammer and anvil. By granting internal autonomy in Ho-pei the Dynasty hum- bled itself; by conceding a measure of success to a rebellion, it endured.

CHART OF GOVERNORSHIPS OF YU-CHOU, CH'ENG-TE, WEI-PO, AND TZU-CH'ING, 763-784

YU-CHOU (FAN-YANG) (Northern Ho-pei. Prefectures: Yu, Cho, Ying, Mo, P'ing, Chi, Kuei, T'an)

First Governor: Li Huai-hsien; General under An Lu-shan; killed; succeeded by

Chu Hsi-ts'ai; killed; succeeded by Chu Tz'u; first of four in family to hold office;

supplanted by his brother

Chu T'ao; succeeded eventually by his grand- son.

CH'ENG-TE (Central Ho-pei. Prefectures: I, Ting, Chao, Shen, Chi)

First Governor: Li Pao-ch'en (orig. Chang Chung-chih); General under An Lu-shan; succeeded by his son

Li Wei-yikeh; killed; succeeded by



Wang Wu-chiin; first of nine members of his family to hold office.

WEI-PO (Southern Ho-pei. Prefectures: Wei, Po, Pei, Hsiang, Ch'an, Wei, Ming)

First Governor: T'ien Ch'eng-ssu; General under An Lu-shan; first of seven members of his family to hold office; died; succeeded by his nephew

T'ien Yiieh; killed, succeeded by T'ien Ch'eng- ssu's son

T'ien Hsii. TZU-CH'ING (P'ING-LU) (Ho-nan. Prefec-

tures: Tzu, Ch'ing, Ch'i, Hai, Teng, Lai, I, Mi, Ts'ao P'u, Yen)

Hou Hsi-i; installed by Li Cheng-i (orig. Li Huai-yti); killed, succeeded by

Li Cheng-i; first of four members of family to hold office; died; succeeded by his son

Li Na.

[See glossaries on pages 86 and 87.]



GLOSSAMr

(Persons aNnearint in text)

An Lu-shan 37; X Li Wei-yueh 4 4 Ohang Chung-zhih (Li Paooh Ln). ,) Liu Taung-yuan ;P @ % Olang I Lu Chli '1

Chang Taai Lu Chihl

ChOen Yin-k o P Ma Sui IL b _ Ch'ien Mu 41 Plu-ku Huai-en f & I0 Chu Hsi-to ai 4i 4 5) Su-tsung Chu Tlao, Tai-taung 4kl t Ohu Tz'u ; Te-toung ,

Hon Hal-i WA ' T'ien Chleng-sou i7 4 Hsueh Sung - ) Tlien Yueh 7 Huang Tsung-hsi Ts'ai T'ing-yLs ; Ku Chi-kuang L - Ta'en Chung-mien ta+ b Kuo Tzu-i J % Tu YuIn Li Cheng-i (Li Huai-ytl) eA MJ(d4t) Shih Chlao-i Li Huai-hsien 4 , Shih Ssun-ming Li Huai-knang W Wang Fa-chih > Li Lin-fu t W i Wang Hsutan-chih b , Li Ling-yao r ij.

(Places)

Chlan XL Chi (N. Hopsi) Ol C

Cao C Ci (0. Ho-pei) F Fan-yang Chao-i Xt Ch Ii Feng-hiaing Ak~w Chesng-te T' Chiing-yan ML A^ Hal 4

Chling


Hlsiang (S. Ho-pei) 4 Pei. Tetao i HIsiang C Pling Tse-lu

Ptinglu Tsu ;Q Kuel 4 Po Wei (S. Ho-pei) Lai 4 P'u Wei, (C. Ho-Pi)) Lu-lung Shen Wei-po $e f4

T'anTo

Ming Teng ying No Ting Yu AN

ohieh-tu-ahih f ji . feng-chien I t ya-ping .4 chn-hsien s .4 eheng-ren t K

(Works in o ited) Tzu-,hih t'ue-hien 2 I

Tzu-chih tuchien Ktao-i

itAn.Si- I-an chlien chih Ho6-pei tao" L k t ; T'an-tai

_hen-chih-shih shu-lun kaoi Kuo-shih tak A

u-vinti chih-tu nen-chiu ,4 4j , 4 ti Tsang Hui~no ,) - Ghiu Tlang-a-hu

H8i Ttano-shu k 2 $

'Chung-kno tzu-Jan ohing-chi" A I. .i Liu Ho-tuna chi

Fen&-ohie It * ii ~ ~ A% Sui Ttant Wiu-tai shih kanp&.yao __.i ' g . t ;j

Sni ashith u ih

hung-kuo ohun-chih uhih s i

zis &cg-hien fu, Sung lun i t g }g 'Tfang fan-ohen nien-piaow / 5j 4 4 ;

87


Article Contentsp. 67p. 68p. 69p. 70p. 71p. 72p. 73p. 74p. 75p. 76p. 77p. 78p. 79p. 80p. 81p. 82p. 83p. 84p. 85p. 86p. 87

Issue Table of ContentsJournal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 89, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1969), pp. 1-310Front MatterSumerian Similes: A Panoramic View of Some of Man's Oldest Literary Images [pp. 1-10]The Authority of the Brother at Arrapha and Nuzi [pp. 10-17]Southeast Semitic Cognates to the Akkadian Vocabulary. III [pp. 18-22]Modern South Arabian Determination-A Clue Thereto from Shari [pp. 22-27]Jacob Mossel's Treatise on the Customary Laws of the Velllar Chettiyars [pp. 27-50]Redundancy in Mahbhrata verse Composition [pp. 50-58]The Sound of a Tarng Poem: "Grieving about Greenslope," by Duh-Fuu [pp. 59-67]Structure of Rebellion: A Successful Insurrection during the T'ang [pp. 67-87]The Governors of Mosul According to Al-Azd's Ta'rkh Almawil [pp. 88-105]A Reexamination of Maimonides' "Statement on Political Science" [pp. 106-111]The Morphology of the Verb in Modern Syriac (Christian Colloquial of Urmi) [pp. 112-127]Review ArticlesReview: The Small Caves of Qumran [pp. 128-141]Review: Contributions to the Mdhyamika School of Buddhism [pp. 141-152]

Brief CommunicationsThe Guarantor at Elephantine-Syene [pp. 153-157]Diplomatic Relations between Emperor K'ang hsi and King John III of Poland [pp. 157-161]

Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 162-165]Review: untitled [pp. 165-166]Review: untitled [pp. 166-167]Review: untitled [pp. 168-169]Review: untitled [pp. 169-170]Review: untitled [pp. 170-172]Review: untitled [pp. 172-174]Review: untitled [pp. 174-178]Review: untitled [pp. 178-181]Review: untitled [pp. 181-182]Review: untitled [pp. 182-183]Review: untitled [pp. 183-185]Review: untitled [pp. 185-187]Review: untitled [pp. 187-189]Review: untitled [pp. 189-190]Review: untitled [pp. 190-191]Review: untitled [pp. 192-193]Review: untitled [pp. 1

mirsky on an lu-shan 1969 598280

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