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Miscellaneous Risk Topic. Concurrency* Risk Management. DT&E Completion. Concurrency. Degree of Concurrency. > 67% 33 to 67 < 33 % 0. Low Moderate High Very High. Risk Handling Imperatives for Concurrent Programs Insure Adequate Test Resources Are Available - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Miscellaneous Risk Topic

6-1

Miscellaneous Risk Topic

Page 2: Miscellaneous Risk Topic

6-2

Concurrency* Risk Management

DT&E Completion Concurrency

Degree ofConcurrency > 67%

33 to 67< 33 %

0

LowModerate

HighVery High

• Risk Handling Imperatives for Concurrent Programs• Insure Adequate Test Resources Are Available• Have Rapid Corrective Action Process Established• Have Effective Transition to Production Process• Phase Production to Allow for Early Testing• Use Modular Designs When Retrofits Are Expected

* Overlap between Development Test & Evaluation and Production

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Past Problems with DoD Weapons Systems Due to Requirements Development Practices

Characterization of Past Practices

1. Vertical Flowdown Has Often Failed to Address All Products and Processes. This Has Resulted in Premature Selection of Design Features That Provided Little Additional Benefits for the Costs Incurred2. Weapon System Requirements Have Not Been Developed in an Integrated Fashion (i.e., the Definition and Balancing of All Related Items at All Levels)

Future Need

• All Requirements Should Be Addressed and Subsequent Design Solutions Should Be Integrated and Verified Both Vertically and Horizontally

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Objectives of Requirements Analysis

• Articulate Customer Needs– Missions– Environments

• Identify and Allocate Constraints– Design– Cost– Schedule

• Develop and Define Measures of Effectiveness– Functional– Performance

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Requirements Analysis Process

Supplier “Hows”Design Features/

Performance Measures

Utility/RelationshipMatrix

Measures How Well “Wants” are Met.

“Customer Wants”Needs Identification1. Close Air Support2. Deck LaunchedIntercept

Prioritization of Customer “Wants”1. Cost2. Supportability3. Mission Effectiveness

Sensitivity to DesignFeatures

Prioritization of RelativeImportance of Changes in

Design Features

Key Tasks:1. Identify Operational and Environmental Needs2. Identify Customer Preferences3. Prioritize Importance of Design Features

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Requirements Analysis Timeflow

Customer Requirements Systems & Operational Analysis Analysis

Needs &Objectives • Requirement Categories

Defined - Affordability - Sortie Generation - Target Kills• Technologies Identified by Category• Preliminary Ranking of Technologies by Category

• Preliminary RankingAcross Categories

CustomerReaction

Preliminary Assessments

- Effectiveness- Force Structure- Cost/Risk

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Preliminary Ranking of Technologies/Configurations

Sort Systems in EachCategory by Cost

Sort Systems in Each Category by Effectiveness

Determine Affordable SystemsWith Given Budget

Estimate ConfigurationEffectiveness Based on MissionEffectiveness Results

Determine OptimumConfiguration at This Budget Level

IncrementBudget

Cost EffectiveTechnology/Configuration(for given budget)

Approach Explores All Combinations of Options and Determines the Most Effective Technology or Configuration at Each Budget Level

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Quantifying A/C Requirements Impact on Force Structure

ATS Radar Detection Range

ATS Radar Detection Range

ATS

Unit

Eff.

ATS Proc. Quan

Air Wing

Effectiveness

Detection Range

Reasonable Requirements Region

Unit Eff Too Small

#s Purchased Too Small

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Example - Determining TechnicalPerformance Measures for

Multirole Aircraft.

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Sample Multi-Role Aircraft Requirements

Warfare Objectives to Be Achieved

Top-Level Multi-Role AircraftRequirements Identification

Massive Firepower In-Theater“At a Pace and in Numbers Sufficientto Field an Over-Whelming Force”

Direct Support of the GroundCampaign“Slow the Enemy’s Offensive Tempuntil Friendly Ground Forces Can Massand Counter the Advance”

Establish Air Superiority“Denying the Enemy Use of His Airpower and Defenses”

Reconstitution“The ability to Reconstitute a CredibleDefense Faster Than Any Potential Opponent Can Generate an Over-Whelming Offense”

1. In-theatre Sortie Generation2. Supportable

3. Kill Armored Vehicles4. Destroy Critical Chokepoints

5. Destroy Enemy Aircraft in Air and on Ground6. Destroy Enemy Air Defenses

7. Reconstitutable

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Technical Performance Measuresthat Impact In-Theater Sortie Generation

Aircraft AvailableIn-Theater

• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• Vulnerable Area• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie

Sorties Per DayPer Aircraft Available

• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

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Technical Performance Measuresthat Impact Supportability

MaintenancePersonnel

• Maintenance Manhours Per Flight Hour• Average Skill Level Required• Number of Special Skills Required

Cost of Consumables

• Break Rate• Maintenance Manhours Per Flight Hour• Flyaway Cost• Mean Fuel Consumption Per Flight Hour• System Weights

Depot MaintenanceCost

• Break Rate• Maintenance Manhours Per Flight Hour• System Weights

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Technical Performance Measures thatImpact Armored Vehicles Killed

In-TheaterSortie Generation

• Takeoff Distance• Landing Distance• Takeoff Ground Roll• Landing Ground Roll• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

Targets Acquired Per Sortie

• Range• Loiter Time• Max Detection Range• Max Recognition Range• Navigation System Error• Nite/Wx Capability

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Technical Performance MeasuresImpact Armored Vehicles Killed

Targets DestroyedPer Attack

• Deliverable Weapon CEP• Max Number of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Type/Mix of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Targeting Azimuth Limits• Targeting Elevation Limits

• Instantaneous Gs At Combat Conditions• Sustained Gs At Combat conditions• Mil Power Penetration Speed• Ps At Combat Conditions• Acceleration Times at Combat Weight• Time to Bank 90 degrees• Instantaneous Turn Rate

Aircraft LostPer Sortie

• RCS• IR Signature• Visual Signature• Vulnerable Area• Standoff• Threat Sort/Identification Time

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Technical Performance Measures that Impact Vehicle Flow Rate Reduction in Critical Choke Points

In-TheaterSortie Generation

• Takeoff Distance• Landing Distance• Takeoff Ground Roll• Landing Ground Roll• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

Targets Acquired Per Sortie

• Range• Loiter Time• Max Detection Range• Max Recognition Range• Navigation System Error• Nite/Wx Capability

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Targets DestroyedPer Attack

• Deliverable Weapon CEP• Max Number of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Type/Mix of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Targeting Azimuth Limits• Targeting Elevation Limits

• Instantaneous Gs At Combat Conditions• Sustained Gs At Combat conditions• Mil Power Penetration Speed• Ps At Combat Conditions• Acceleration Times at Combat Weight• Time to Bank 90 degrees• Instantaneous Turn Rate • RCS

• IR Signature• Visual Signature• Vulnerable Area• Standoff• Threat Sort/Identification Time

Aircraft LostPer Sortie

Technical Performance Measures that Impact Vehicle Flow Rate Reduction in Critical Choke Points (cont.)

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Technical Performance Measures that Impact Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in the Air

In-TheaterSortie Generation

• Takeoff Distance• Landing Distance• Takeoff Ground Roll• Landing Ground Roll• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

Targets Acquired Per Sortie

• Range• Loiter Time• Max Detection Range• Max Recognition Range• Navigation System Error• Nite/Wx Capability

Destroy Enemy Aircraft in Air

and on Ground

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Targets DestroyedPer Attack

• Deliverable Weapon CEP• Max Number of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Type/Mix of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Targeting Azimuth Limits• Targeting Elevation Limits

• Instantaneous Gs At Combat Conditions• Sustained Gs At Combat conditions• Mil Power Penetration Speed• Ps At Combat Conditions• Acceleration Times at Combat Weight• Time to Bank 90 degrees• Instantaneous Turn Rate • RCS

• IR Signature• Visual Signature• Vulnerable Area• Standoff• Threat Sort/Identification Time

Aircraft LostPer Sortie

Technical Performance Measures that Impact Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in the Air (cont.)

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Technical Performance Measures that Impact Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground

In-TheaterSortie Generation

• Takeoff Distance• Landing Distance• Takeoff Ground Roll• Landing Ground Roll• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

Targets Acquired Per Sortie

• Range• Loiter Time• Max Detection Range• Max Recognition Range• Navigation System Error• Nite/Wx Capability

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Technical Performance Measures that Impact Aircraft Destroyed on the Ground

Targets DestroyedPer Attack

• Deliverable Weapon CEP• Max Number of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Type/Mix of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Targeting Azimuth Limits• Targeting Elevation Limits

• Instantaneous Gs At Combat Conditions• Sustained Gs At Combat conditions• Mil Power Penetration Speed• Ps At Combat Conditions• Acceleration Times at Combat Weight• Time to Bank 90 degrees• Instantaneous Turn Rate • RCS

• IR Signature• Visual Signature• Vulnerable Area• Standoff• Threat Sort/Identification Time

Aircraft LostPer Sortie

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Technical Performance Measuresthat Impact Air Defenses Operating

In-TheaterSortie Generation

• Takeoff Distance• Landing Distance• Takeoff Ground Roll• Landing Ground Roll• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

Targets Acquired Per Sortie

• Range• Loiter Time• Max Detection Range• Max Recognition Range• Navigation System Error• Nite/Wx Capability

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Technical Performance Measures that Impact Air Defenses Operating

Targets DestroyedPer Attack

• Deliverable Weapon CEP• Max Number of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Type/Mix of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Targeting Azimuth Limits• Targeting Elevation Limits

• Instantaneous Gs At Combat Conditions• Sustained Gs At Combat conditions• Mil Power Penetration Speed• Ps At Combat Conditions• Acceleration Times at Combat Weight• Time to Bank 90 degrees• Instantaneous Turn Rate • RCS

• IR Signature• Visual Signature• Vulnerable Area• Standoff• Threat Sort/Identification Time

Aircraft LostPer Sortie

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Technical Performance MeasuresImpact Time To Reconstitute Force

Cost of Reconstitution

• Weapon System Unit Cost• Mean Cost to Remanufacture

ManufacturingTime

• Long-Lead Time• Time to Manufacture/Assemble• Interchangeability• Mean Time to Remanufacture• Service Life

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Multi-Role Aircraft System LevelTechnical Performance Measure List

• Takeoff Distance• Landing Distance• Takeoff Ground Roll• Landing Ground Roll• Airlift Loads/Squadron• Airlift Lbs/Squadron• 24 Hour Repairability• Lbs of Expendables Per Sortie• Taxi Speed• Shelter Park Time• Alert Time• Integrated Combat Turn Time• Mission Initialization Time• Break Rate• Ground Abort Rate• Fix Rate• Mean Repair Time

• Range• Loiter Time• Max Detection Range• Max Recognition Range• Navigation System Error• Nite/Wx Capability• Deliverable Weapon CEP• Max Number of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Type/Mix of Air-to-Ground Weapons• Targeting Azimuth Limits• Targeting Elevation Limits• RCS• IR Signature• Visual Signature• Vulnerable Area• Standoff• Threat Sort/Identification Time

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Multi-Role Aircraft System LevelTechnical Performance Measure List

• Instantaneous Gs At Combat Conditions• Sustained Gs At Combat conditions• Mil Power Penetration Speed• Ps At Combat Conditions• Acceleration Times at Combat Weight• Time to Bank 90 degrees• Instantaneous Turn Rate• Weapon System Unit Cost• Mean Cost to Remanufacture• Long-Lead Time• Time to Manufacture/Assemble• Interchangeability• Mean Time to Remanufacture• Service Life

• Maintenance Manhours Per Flight Hour• Average Skill Level Required• Number of Special Skills Required• Mean Fuel Consumption Per Flight Hour• Flyaway cost• System Weights

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Requirements Handoff - Capturing New Business

Fly

away

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Kill

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Take

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on

sum

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ort

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at T

urn

Tim

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Mis

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n In

itia

lizat

ion

Tim

e

Bre

ak R

ate

Destroy Enemy Aircraft in the Air

Destroy Enemy Aircraft on the Ground

Destroy Enemy Air Defenses

Kill Armored Vehicles

Destroy Critical Chokepoints

Massive Firepower In-Theater

Supportable

Reconstitutable

etc.

THEATER / COUNTRY (FMS) ATTRIBUTES

TASK REQUIREMENTS

PLATFORM ATTRIBUTES

THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT VALUE

Mis

sio

ns

/ T

as

ks

F-1

6C

Blk

50

F-1

8E

F-1

5E

COMPARATIVE AIRCRAFT

EFFECTIVENESS

• • •

GOAL

• •

Customer Preference Function

(High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) Correlation)

GoalThreshold

Preference (Utility)

Example

Range

1

0

Page 28: Miscellaneous Risk Topic

6-28BV41791

Requirements Handoff For Contract Work

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Take

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Tim

e

Bre

ak R

ate

Destroy Enemy Aircraft in the Air

Destroy Enemy Aircraft on the Ground

Destroy Enemy Air Defenses

Kill Armored Vehicles

Destroy Critical Chokepoints

Massive Firepower In-Theater

Supportable

Reconstitutable

etc.

THEATER LEVEL / TECHNICAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES

TASK REQUIREMENTS

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT VALUE

Technical Risk Level (H/M/L)

F-16C Blk 50 (Baseline)

F-18E

F-15E

etc.

Comparative Aircraft

Technical Performance

Levels

Schedule Impact (H/M/L) to Attain Threshold

Cost Impact (H/M/L) to Attain Threshold

Leverage (H/M/L) for Exceeding Threshold

PERFORMANCE GOAL VALUES

Mis

sio

ns

/ T

as

ks

F-1

6C

Blk

50

F-1

8E

F-1

5E

COMPARATIVE AIRCRAFT

EFFECTIVENESS

• • •

Bounds

on

Design

Space

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Sample TPM Warning and ActionThresholds

SystemWeight

SystemRange

Action Threshold

Warning Threshold

Requirement

Requirement

Warning Threshold

Action Threshold

Milestones

x x x xx

x

Milestones

TIME

x - Predicted Value

x x x x x x

Page 30: Miscellaneous Risk Topic

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Requirements Tracking

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Function Decomposition is Taken to aLevel Sufficient to Drive System Synthesis

FunctionalDecomposition

(System Functions {development, operations, etc}to Segments to IndividualFunctions)

F1, F2, F3...

System Synthesis

• System Concept• Architecture• Conf. Item Def.• Phy. Interfaces• Alternative Solutions

Systems Analysis & Control

• Trade-Offs• Effect Analyses• Life Cycle Cost• Risk Management• TPMs• Technical Reviews

Documentation Data Base

• Decision Support Data• System Architecture• System Specification

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Example Functional Decomposition

Primary FunctionsDevelopment Manufacturing Verification Deployment Operations Support Training Disposal

Pre-flight Taxi TakeoffClimb

Cruise/Ingress

Loiter

Escort

CAP

Commit/Engage

Wpn Del Egress

RTB

Post-Fit

Each Individual Function Must Be Assigned An Owner

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Functional Requirements are Owned by IPD Teams

Operations Functions

Pre-Flight

Commit/Engage

Post-Flight

F1 - SearchF2 - DetectF3 - IdentifyF4 - DesignateF5 - Track

Avionics IPD Team

Constraints:

• Cost Analysis/Allocation• Weight Analysis/ Allocation• Rel. & Main Analysis• Other

... ...

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Requirements Should Be BaselinedBut Plan For Change

Requirements will Change, but Baselines put You in Control.

Requirements Baselines:

• Insure a Common Understanding Within the Development Group of the “Current” Set of Requirements (What’s In, What’s Not)

• Provide a Basis for Evaluating the Effects and Impacts of Proposed Changes

• Allows Grouping Changes in Blocks to Minimize Rework

Always Include Changes in Budget and Schedule Planning.

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Requirements Characteristics

• Unambiguous - Every Requirement Has Only One Interpretation

• Complete - Includes All Significant Requirements, Functions, Behaviors, Performance, Constraints, and Interfaces

• Verifiable - Cost-Effective Means Exists for People or Machines to Check Product Against Requirements

• Consistent - Requirements Not in Conflict

• Modifiable - Requirements Are Easy to Change Completely and Consistently

• Correct - No Errors Exist That Will Affect Design

• Traceable - Origin of Requirement is Clear

• Design Free - Design Is Left to the Designer

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Software Requirement Issues

Issues Attributes

Performance

Constraints

Usability

Interfaces

Reliability

Supportability

Bits Processed, Speed, Response Time

Standards, Data Format, Language

Ease of Use, Consistency, Ease of Training,Input Preparation, Output Interpretation

Software, Hardware, People

Frequency of Failure, Severity of Failure,Recovery From Failure

Ease of Upgrade, Ease of Repair, Instability,Expandability, Testability, Flexibility, Portability

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Example of Design-Dependent andDesign-Free Requirement

• Design-Dependent: The Flight Control System Shall Be Quad-Redundant for Safety Problem - Redundancy Was Dictated without Getting to Fundamental Requirement

• Design-Free: No Combinations of Failures within the FLCS, with a Probability of Occurrence Greater Than 10 to 7, Shall Result in a Category 1 Hazard. The Redundancy Level Will Be Determined by Analysis and Trades of Different Redundancy Architectures, MTBFs of Hardware and Allocation of Functions to Hardware and Software During the Design Phase

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Example of a Verifiable Requirement

• Non-Verifiable: A Single Failure (of the FLCS)Shall Result in Minimal Transients

• Verifiable: A Single Failure Shall Result in LessThan +/- 1g’s Normal or Lateral Axis

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Example of Requirements Allocation,Traceability and Decomposition

• Parent Requirement from Weapon System Spec:– WSS102004: The Weapon System Shall Be Designed to Promote

Operational Personnel Safety• One Child Requirement to WSS102004 in Air Vehicle Spec:

– AVE31550: The Diagnostic Function Shall Provide Built-in Logic to Promote Personnel Safety for all Tests

• One Child Requirement to AVE31550 in Vehicle Management System Spec:– VMS01380: Initiated Built-in Test (IBIT) Shall Not Be Enabled Until

Multiple Interlocks are Satisfied• One Child Requirement to VMS01380 in Flight Control System SW Spec:

– FLC13790: FLCS Software Shall Only Allow IBIT to Be Engaged When Weight is on Wheels and Wheel Gear Tachs < x Knots and Engine Thrust is Below Flight Idle and IBIT Engaged Switch is Selected

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The Need for Automated Requirements Management

• System Engineers Need It– Large numbers of requirements (along with the availability of computer

hardware and software tools) makes computer automation very beneficial– Answering customer requirement queries will be easier and more

defendable– Communication within the design team will be enhanced

• Some Programs Require It (Customer Mandate)• Benefits of ARM Approach

– Technical Performance Measures tracking/management– Rapid response for management and analysis– Standard views, reports, analyses available– Multi-user access with configuration controls– Complete traceability of requirements

- Reqts hierarchies- Reqts histories

- Open Issues- Allocation to design elemnets

- Verification methods- Response organizations

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Need and Enabling Technologies Pointto Implementing Automated Requirements Tracking

Changing Requirements

Specialization in Workplace

Distributed Processing Hardware

Requirements Tracking Software

RequirementsAutomation

Distributed Data Entry With

Update Under Configuration

Control Will Allow Specialists

From Different Disciplines to

Work Efficiently as a Team.

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Reasons to Use a Requirements Tracking Tool

• Customer Requests for Changing Requirements CanBe Fully, Accurately, and Efficiently Addressed (Allow for Reasonable Requirements Evolution)

• Enhances Internal Communications within and AcrossManagement, Engineering, Production and Support Functions

• Provides “Corporate Memory” for Future Projects

• F-22 Customer Required Top-Down and Bottom-UpRequirements Tracking Capability to Better Address Cost Issues

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Requirements Data Base Environment

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Sample Weapons System RequirementsDatabase (common data)

Number Type Statement Owner

Development,Manufacturing,Verification,Deployment,Operations,Support,Training, or Disposal

Text statement IPT(or name)

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Sample Weapons System RequirementsDatabase (common data Cont. 1)

WBS Parent Req. Child Req.

Element Number NumberIdentifier

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Sample Weapons System RequirementsDatabase (common data Cont. 2)

Related TPMs

TPM Names

AssociatedTrade Studies

Trade StudyIdentifier

Notes

Text

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Sample Weapons System RequirementsDatabase (unique data by WBS)

• Development: Cost, Schedule (Hardware, Software,Facilities, Data, Materials)

• Manufacturing: Primary Technology, Alternate Technology(Availability, Cost, Risk)

• Verification: Method, Description, Date

• Operations: Performance Threshold, Performance Objective,Weight, Space, Power, Cooling

• Support: MTBF, Inspection Cycle, Spares Investment $, Support Equipment Req.

• Training: ...• Disposal: ...

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Sample Weapons System RequirementsDatabase (unique data by WBS Cont. 1)

Software:- Performance (bits processed, speed, response time)- Constraints (standards, data format, language)- Interfaces (software, hardware, people)- Reliability (freq. of failure, severity of failure, recovery of failure)- Supportability (diagnostics, portability)

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Requirements Tracking Software Tools&

Sample Trade Study

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ARM Comparative Ratings(Performance Capabilities Category)

Wt. Decision CriteriaSLATE(1Q94)

RDD-100(Ver 4.0)

RTM(Ver 2.1)

1. Weights used were 1,2, & 3 with 3 being best.

2. Utility scores used varied from 0 to 10 with 10 being the best.

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ARM Comparative Ratings(Performance Capabilities Category)

Wt. Decision CriteriaSLATE(1Q94)

RDD-100(Ver 4.0)

RTM(Ver 2.1)

3

1. Can the history or rqmts.changes and design decis-ions be maintained and dis-played showing the decision,source and decision date?

2. Is top down and bottomup and lateral traceability possible for all classes of requirements?

3. Can rqmts. be linked to WBS elements in such awaythat will allow WBS elem-ents to be summed, sorted,etc. by various key criteria?

3

3

Yes YesMUM featureand SE facilityin present version

Yes

Provides audittrail of rqmts.etc.

Yes

Reports can begenerated. No graphical display of rqmts.

YesComputationswith “SLATETab” feature

Yes

Graphically ortextually.Many viewingoptions available

Yes

Graphically ortextually

Will link &track

No computations

Will link &track

No computations

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ARM Comparative Ratings

Wt. Decision CriteriaSLATE(1Q94)

RDD-100(Ver 4.0)

RTM(Ver 2.1)

2

2

2

2

4. Can engineering estimatesand customer/mgmt. rqmts.be tracked and sorted? Can difference/variation be deter-mined and sorted as in 1?

5. What stndrd. report for-mats does the ARM toolsupport? RAD,RAM, MIL-STD-490, MIL-STD-2167?

6. Are reports tailorable byuser(i.e., when 2167A is up-dated can the user change the report format to matchthe new standard?

7. Can data fields be addedby the user (addtl. attributesassigned to a class of rqmts.)?

Yes“SLATE Tab”feature will support

Will link & track

No computations

Will link & trackEx. Can recallsuch as all wts>100 lbs

RAD, RAM, 490, 2167A

RAD, RAM, 490, 2167A-with mult.presentations

Can do standardSE reports

YesTailorable by the user, with updates by the developer

YesLabor intensivein present versionNeed additionaltraining

Yes

Easilytailorable

No, but....User defined attributes arebeing considered

YesExtender featurefor schema mods.

Yes

Simple & fast

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ARM Comparative Ratings(Cost Category)

Wt. Decision CriteriaSLATE(1Q94)

RDD-100(Ver 4.0)

RTM(Ver 2.1)

2

1

1

1

1. What is the purchasecost?

2. What is the yearlymaintenance fee?

3. Are updates providedas part of maintenancefee or billed separately?

4. What is the yearlylease cost?

Approx. $30KAssuming noLFWC invstmt.

SD: $29.4KQuantity discnt.for licenses in use by Lockheed

Each station:$7500

12-15%(est.)

15% 15%

Provided Provided Provided

No lease pro-gram planned at this time

$3000/mo.3 licenses Includes 2 daysper month on-site consultation

$1500/mo

4 users

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ARM Comparative Ratings(Training/Support Category)

Wt. Decision CriteriaSLATE(1Q94)

RDD-100(Ver 4.0)

RTM(Ver 2.1)

2

2

1

1. What assistance is pro-vided for initial tool setup?

2. What on-site consultationsupport is provided duringsetup, beyond initial training?

3. What is the training costfor the initial startup?

Local (Plano)TI

Local (Dallas)ALC

As necessary,form IDE(thirdparty) in Dallas

Telephonehotline

On-site consultcould be nego-tiated

Telephonehotline

Paid consults on-site areavailable

By IDE (thirdparty) in Dallas

Undetermined$1500/stud.at ALC$9000: up to 6studts. (on-site)Trained RDD-100 users on staff

$7500: Up to8 students -on site (plusexpenses)

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ARM Comparative Ratings(Host Environment)

Wt. Decision CriteriaSLATE(1Q94)

RDD-100(Ver 4.0)

RTM(Ver 2.1)

1

1

1

1. What hardware systemscan host the ARM tool?

2. What operating systemis needed to host the ARMtool?

3. Is a color display supported?

Sun SPARCUser remoteterminals:X-compliantIBM 386/486types

Mac IIciMac XVQuadra 700, 950Sup SPARCDEC Stn 5000HP 9000/700IBM RS-6000IBM PC 486

Sun SPARC 4.1.3HP 700 seriesIBM RS-6000DEC VMS

UNIX

Apple 7.0Sun OS 4.1.2DEC UltrixHPUX 9.0.7AIX 3.2DOS or Windows

Current for above

Yes Yes Yes - in currentversion

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Evaluate Risk Handling Options

Program Requirements

AssessRisks

Evaluate RiskHandling Options

EvaluateSubcontractor

Risks

Establish CostSchedule/Perf Impacts

ManageRisks

SelectRisk

Items/Drivers

IdentifyOptions

EvaluateOptions

SelectPrime

Options

DevelopTracking

Mechanism

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Risk Handling Options

• Avoidance - Challenge Requirements(s) ( Perform Cost/Effectiveness Analysis)

• Transfer - Re-allocate Requirement Between System Elements

• Information Gathering - Examples:

– Coupon Testing, Trade Studies, Outside Experts

• Assumption - Identify Resources Needed to Overcome Risk If It Materializes

• Control - Examples:

- Multiple Development- Backup Choices- Early Prototyping- Incremental Development- Technology Maturation

- Test-Analyze-and-Fix- Robust Design- Demonstration Events- Use of Standard Items- Mockups

- Modeling Simulation- Key Parameter Control Boards- Process Proofing- Manufacturing Proofing

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Methods for Risk Control

• Multiple Development - Two or More Independent Design Teams

• Backup Choices - Have Low-Risk Backup

• Early Prototyping - Build and Test Prototype Early in System Development

• Incremental Development - Give High-Risk Items Time to Mature (i.e., Preplanned Product Improvement)

• Technology Maturation - Off-Line Development Effort

• Test-Analyze-and-Fix - Have Period of Dedicated Testing to Identify and Correct Deficiencies

• Robust Design/Design of Experiments - Identify and Set Design Requirements So That Minor Variations Do Not Affect Achieving User Requirements

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Methods for Risk Control (Cont.)

• Demonstration Events - Key SEMS Events That Are Used to Determine Whether or Not Risks Are Being Successfully Handled

• Use of Standard Items/Software Reuse - Use to the Extent Possible to Minimize Development Risk

• Two-Phase Production and Deployment (E&MD) - Use First Part of E&MD for Risk Reduction

• Modeling/Simulation - Support Trade Studies and Investigation of System Performance Sensitivity to Various Design Factors

• Key Parameter Control Boards - Control Board Can Provide Management Focus on Particular Critical Design Parameters (e.g., Weight)

• Process Proofing - Critical Manufacturing and Support Processes Should Have Early Process Proof

• Manufacturing Screening - Test Articles Can Be Used to Identify Deficient Manufacturing Processes

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Developing Decision Points forRisk Fall Back Options

1996 1997 1998 1999

ImplementFall Back

Plan?

Testing of Dif.Bonding

Detailed Design

Tooling

MFG

1st PartEngineExhaust

Duct

Establish TitaniumAlloy Design

Develop Diffusion Bonding

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Decision Analysis Exercise

Your decision is whether or not to conduct a final system level factory test on a ground based radar or repair/replace the bad units in the field. The production line has been restarted to make 500 additional radars. Historically, the failure rate in the field has been 4% for units delivered without the final system level test. The cost to perform the final system test is $10,000 per radar. Unfortunately, test procedures require some disassembly and each radar tested will have to undergo some amount of rework. The cost to reassemble/reinstall each radar that passes the test has averaged $2,000. The cost to repair a radar which has failed final factory test is $23,000. Once in the field the total cost associated with repairing a defective radar is $350,000 per radar.

Should you conduct 100% testing on the radars in the factory or accept the 4% failure in the field? Assume the customer is concerned with low cost.

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Evaluate Subcontractor Risks

Program Requirements

AssessRisks

Evaluate RiskHandling Options

EvaluateSubcontractor

Risks

Establish CostSchedule/Perf Impacts

ManageRisks

Identify KeyProcurements

NeededConduct

Workshops

PrepareRequest

ForProposals(RFP’s)

SelectSub-

contractors

NegotiateRisk

AbatementItems IntoContractIdentify

PotentialSubcontractors

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Risk Analysis in the SupplierSelection Process

• Provides Good Way to Discriminate Between Suppliers When Several Are Technically Acceptable

• Prevents “Low Ball” Cost Proposal from Being Sure Selection

• Provides Structural Guide for Product Manager to Keep from Overlooking Potential Problem Areas

• Provides Risk-Issue Profile of Winning Supplier for Management and Contract Negotiation Purposes

• F-16 SPO Has Complemented Risk Analysis Aspect of Source Selections Presented to Them

• Suppliers Feel They Have Been Thoroughly and Fairly Evaluated

• Provides Substantial Source Selection Justification in the Event of a Protest

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