mitre 1 fast modeling techniques for c4isr problems john furman the mitre corporation mclean,...
TRANSCRIPT
MITRE 1
Fast ModelingFast ModelingTechniques forTechniques forC4ISR ProblemsC4ISR Problems
John Furman
The MITRE Corporation
McLean, Virginia, USA
3 September 2004
MITRE 2
The ChallengeThe Challenge
IO
N
SystemTechnical
Performance
SystemTechnical
Performance
Cognition andHuman Factors
Cognition andHuman Factors
HighDimensionality(Options & Factors)
HighDimensionality(Options & Factors)
How do you calculate the impact of C4ISR* systems on Force Effectiveness?
*C4ISR: An older acronym for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Relationshipto OperationalEffectiveness
Relationshipto OperationalEffectiveness
DistributedFunctional
Processes & IMPerformance
DistributedFunctional
Processes & IMPerformance
MITRE 3
The Taxonomy of C4ISR AnalysisThe Taxonomy of C4ISR Analysis
Tactical or OperationalTask Performance
Based on Info Delivery
Force OperationalOutcome
Mission Branch(Impact of Info Delivery)
Decision Branch(Choice & Outcome)
MoP
MoCE
MoFE Comparison ofAvail Information &Decisions Taken
MoCE
MoPTimeliness Quality
Persistence
QuantityAccess
Synthesis, Fusion,Human Cognition
SystemPerformance
Communications Perception
MoFE
MITRE 4
Basic PrinciplesBasic Principles
• Identify Fundamental Operational Issues“Drivers” --- most challenging aspects (hard problem)Critical Factors for operational executionWhat must I do to succeed? What is a “successful” outcome?
• Model to Support AnalysisBased on comprehensive understanding of problem domain Rapid-response: idea to execution in days or weeksFocus on critical variables and processes (can’t do everything)
• Analyze to Examine the KEY IssuesTask analysisLinkages among tasksTime dependenciesParametric representations of performanceQuantitative measures for outcomesInfluence diagrams as the primary technique
Simple, understandable, parametric
MITRE 5
Linking C4ISR Capability Linking C4ISR Capability
• Mission analysis based on functional decomposition of scenario (Strategy-to-Task) establishes success criteria
• Parametric analysis of capability yields the required Quantitative Threshold Assessment (QTA)
Approach: Strategy-to-Tasks
• Define OPSITs for each conflict condition: Baseline + Excursions
• Establish overall operational goals and effectiveness thresholds• Use / identify functional breakdown of operations process
(single Joint source or hybridize from multiple sources as appropriate) Establish functional performance thresholds Establish (& quantify where possible) relationship between info
and functional performance
• Assess IS support to functions and tasks Directly / inferred from established sources … or
By analysis and best professional judgment, validated by gov’t and military authorities
• Identify gaps, opportunities and potential solution concepts
Approach: Strategy-to-Tasks
• Define OPSITs for each conflict condition: Baseline + Excursions
• Establish overall operational goals and effectiveness thresholds• Use / identify functional breakdown of operations process
(single Joint source or hybridize from multiple sources as appropriate) Establish functional performance thresholds Establish (& quantify where possible) relationship between info
and functional performance
• Assess IS support to functions and tasks Directly / inferred from established sources … or
By analysis and best professional judgment, validated by gov’t and military authorities
• Identify gaps, opportunities and potential solution concepts
MITRE 6
Quantitative Threshold AnalysisQuantitative Threshold Analysis
Mission area analysis based on functional decomposition and Quantitative Threshold Assessment
OperationsCombat/WarArms ControlCombatting TerrorismCounterdrug OperationsNation AssistanceNoncombatant Evacuation Operations…..
Mission AreasAir and Missile DefenseInterdiction Kill 1st Echelon TargetsSEADMaritime/Air/Land Superiority…..
TargetsMoving ArmorWeapons ProductionNational C2ICommunicationsPorts …..
C4ISR FunctionsInformation Acquisition / Situation MonitoringInformation AssessmentDecision MakingPlanningExecution Management (Force & Unit)
ObjectiveDeploy ForcesHalt InvasionDefeat EnemyRedeployment…..
C4ISR Tasks- Detect- ID- TLE/AOI- Report
CONOPsRollbackIn-depth…..
Domain AssessmentCommunicationsCommand & ControlISRInfo TechnologyInfo OperationsInfo Assurance
AssessmentLevels
ExceedsMeetsDoes Not Meet(But Useful)Compromises
PerformanceThresholdsHigh
MediumLow
None
MITRE 7
Common Modeling ApproachCommon Modeling Approach
• Parametric system dynamics modeling
• Implemented in easily available toolsAnalytica™, MatLab,
Mathematica, Python, Smalltalk, SimPy
Open-source when appropriate (cost, risk, or response time)
Strike Lethality
Calc
Percentage of targetbase killed
Assumptions
Cumulative CoalitionGround Losses
Relative to Total Force
Phase
Region
SEAD Condition
State of Air War
Integrity
Indicators
Specific Munitions
Red & Blue Characterisitics and
Performance
Case
Targets
SAMs
Platforms MunitionsUnit
Cost Forecast
Weather
Foliage
Aggregate Air Losses
Sortie Loss Rate
PhasesEst. Cost of Analysis Cases
From All Sources
Can we decisively terminate the MTW ?
Is the ground engagementviable ?
Is the air engagementviable ?
What does a given level of capability cost ?
How rapidly can we eliminate the threat ?
NavalSurfaceLosses
Is the naval engagementviable ?
Mission analysis based on functional decomposition and
quantitative threshold assessment
MITRE 8
Example Model ConceptExample Model Concept
Approach
• Posit evolution of adversaries,forces and capabilities
• Lay down adversary forcesinto defense zones
• Time dynamic, 2-sided, parametriccalculation of expected damage
• If E(damage) < tolerance threshold,then access to zone is obtainedon day N
• Forecast force lethality vs. ground mobile targetsrelative to “complete access”
Simple --- Aggregate --- Rapid
Maritime Engagement Model - MEM
MITRE 9
MEM Top-level StructureMEM Top-level Structure
DefenseZones
AnalysisCase
Combat PowerCombat Power
Threat Forces, Capabilities,Disposition & CONOPs
US Maritime Forces,Disposition, Capabilities &
CONOPs
Attrition ofThreat Forces
Attrition ofUS Forces
Access Achievedby US Forces
E( KPD) / Max( KPD)
•Decision nodes•Chance nodes•Result nodes•Data
Modules contain a process (collection of nodes)
MITRE 10
ISR Modeling in MEMISR Modeling in MEM
Threat RSTA OB
Probability Detection and ClassifyWITH Countermeasures by Threat
Prob Detect, Classify andTrack considering ALL
RSTA Systems
Probability BLUE ForcesClassified and Detected
Physical Attackson RSTA
ISR CapabilityMap
Prob Detect
Prob Classify
Prob Track
CMT Prob Detect,Classify and Track ALL
RSTA Systems
CMT ProbClassify
CMT ProbDetect
Select PhysicalAttacks on RSTA
Select BLUEPlatform
Countermeasures against RSTA
Blue PlatformCountermeasures
against RSTA
The probability that each ISR system independently detects the target is calculated
ISR performance can be degraded by a variety of factors including physical attack or use of countermeasures
Allows individual sensor capabilities to detect/identify/track to be accounted for and influence the output
Probability of detection, classification (ID), and track used as appropriate in expected damage calculations throughout MEM
Decision nodes: controlled set of decisions (tables)
Chance nodes: events not controlled by the decision maker
MITRE 11
ISR Systems ModeledISR Systems Modeled
Space
Air
Ground
Sea
EO / IR Radar SIGINT Acoustic
CommercialAdversary Ally
Missile Launch Det.
TACAIR RecceMPAUAV
Monitor shore / straits
FPBD-E sub
ScientificAdversary AllyGov’t Owned
TACAIR RecceMPAUAV
Monitor shore / straits
Counter-battery Radar
IADS / ATC
MerchantmanPatrol
Adversary AllyGov’t Owned
TACAIR ESMMPAUAV
Monitoring networks
PatrolD-E sub
AcousticD-E sub
Other / CyberSpace - Commercial EO/IRSpace - Adversary Ally EO/IRSpace – EO/IRSpace - Missile Launch Detect EO/IRSpace - Scientific RadarSpace - Adversary Ally RadarSpace – RadarSpace - Adversary Ally SIGINTSpace – SIGINT
Air - TACAIR RECCE EO/IRAir - MPA EO/IRAir - UAV EO/IRAir - TACAIR RECCE RadarAir - MPA RadarAir - UAV RadarAir - TACAIR ESM SIGINTAir - MPA SIGINTAir - UAV SIGINT
Ground - Monitor Shore/Straits EO/IRGround - Monitor Shore/Straits RadarGround - OTH RadarGround - Counter-Battery RadarGround - IADS/ATC RadarGround - SIGINTGround - Offensive EW
Sea - Fast Patrol Boat EO/IRSea - Diesel Electric Sub EO/IRSea - Modern Diesel Electric Sub EO/IRSea - Merchantman RadarSea - Patrol Craft RadarSea - Patrol SIGINTSea - Diesel Electric Sub SIGINTSea - Modern Diesel Electric Sub SIGINTSea - Sea Bed AcousticSea - Diesel Electric Sub Acoustic
Systems can be categorized by time to expedite portfolio analysis
Categorization ensures proper consideration of all systems
MITRE 12
Assessing Operational Assessing Operational EffectivenessEffectiveness
Maritime Mission
WeightedSum
Minimum Maximum
If( (A & B) > GRN ) then Min (C, D)else Min (A, B) x ...
AverageA B C D
A1 A2 A3 B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 D1 D2 D3
Base case
Option 1
Option 2
• Quantitative Threshold Methodology (QTA)Decompose Operational Mission into its basic functionsDevelop rules for aggregating children into their parentsAssess capability at lowest level functions based on
defined quantitative capability thresholdsLowest level assessments and therefore the overall assessment
may change for each option considered
MITRE 13
Automating the AssessmentAutomating the Assessment
• Automated using Portfolio Analysis Machine (PALM)
• Changes in “leaf” nodes are automatically reflected all the way to the top.
• PALM identifies the critical failure path = functions for improvement
• Calculates and displays the rate of increase of the overall mission value foreach unit of increase in node
• Calculates cost and improvement in operational effectivenessfor all combinations of possible improvements
Explores Solution Space Automatically
MITRE 14
Investment AnalysisInvestment Analysis
Mission or Campaign “A”
OperationalEffectiveness
Cost
A Single Solution Alternative(such as the POM)
Cost-EffectivenessEnvelope of All
Combinations ofSolution Alternatives
“Max Effectiveness”Alternative
“Min Cost” Alternative
Set of Potentially“Winning” Alternatives
• For a given portfolio of C4ISR improvements, betterperformance at leaf nodes is traced up the tree to determineoverall mission impact
• Evaluates all possible portfolios and displays cost-effectiveness “efficient frontier”
• Adjusts efficient frontier to account for user-selected inclusionor exclusion of certain improvements
• Displays critical nodes and their potential impact on missionperformance
108 - 109 combinationsof options
108 - 109 combinationsof options
• For a given portfolio of C4ISR improvements, betterperformance at leaf nodes is traced up the tree to determineoverall mission impact
• Evaluates all possible portfolios and displays cost-effectiveness “efficient frontier”
• Adjusts efficient frontier to account for user-selected inclusionor exclusion of certain improvements
• Displays critical nodes and their potential impact on missionperformance
108 - 109 combinationsof options
108 - 109 combinationsof options
PALM- Exhaustive Automated Analysis of Alternatives -
PALM: Portfolio AnaLysis Machine
MITRE 15
Extensible Modeling ApproachesExtensible Modeling Approaches
• Mission analysis based on functional decomposition and quantitative threshold assessment – multiple missions
• Linked parametric system dynamics modeling
Cross mission effects & C4I rivalry
C4ISR module
Combat moduleSTRIKE
C4ISR module
Combat moduleJSEAD
C4ISR module
Combat moduleMaritime
C4ISR module
Combat moduleOCA
C4ISR module
Combat moduleBMD
C4ISR module
Combat moduleGround
Cross mission effects & C4I rivalry
C4ISR module
Combat moduleSTRIKE
C4ISR module
Combat moduleJSEAD
C4ISR module
Combat moduleMaritime
C4ISR module
Combat moduleOCA
C4ISR module
Combat moduleBMD
C4ISR module
Combat moduleGround
Model Development
• Rationalize and extend previously developed C4ISR models for conventional combat
• Calculate bounds onMOPs --> conflict MOFEs in minutes
• Evaluate military worth of … Doctrine and CONOPs changes C4ISR systems improvements Changes to force structure and
weapon systems
MITRE 16
Analytic RigorAnalytic Rigor
• Measure C4ISR effectiveness• Quantify performance:
Comparative performance “System A performs 3 times as well as system B.”
Absolute performance “System A is likely to meet 65 of 85 percent of capability needs.”
• Assess capability needsEvaluates options at the mission or operation levelRecommends solutions that address
Future risk tradeoffs, Force management, Warfighting capabilities, and Economic limitations