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Project: NORMCORM (Non-repressive Model to Reduce Corruption at Mu-nicipal Level) implemented by RiskMonitor Foundation - Sofia Development Association - MEPCO, Czech Republic

MODEL SYSTEM OF INDICATORSFOR MONITORING THE CORRUPTION LEVELS AT SOFIA MUNICIPALITYTool for Identifying and Measuring Corruption Risks

SOFIA, 2014

1Model system of indicators for monitoring the corruption levels at sofia municipality

MODEL SYSTEM OF INDICATORSFOR MONITORING THE CORRUPTION LEVELS AT SOFIA MUNICIPALITYTool for Identifying and Measuring Corruption Risks

Project: NORMCORM (Non-repressive Model to Reduce Corruption at Municipal Level) implemented by RiskMonitor Foundation - Sofia Development Association - MEPCO, Czech Republic

SOFIA, 2014

2 Model system of indicators for monitoring the corruption levels at sofia municipality

With the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union

European Commission - Directorate General ‘Home Affairs’

Research team and consultants: Diana Kovatcheva, David Koppitz, Milan Puček, Rada

Smedovska-Toneva, Nikolay Yanev, Pavlina Filipova

RiskMonitor Foundation ©

Bulgaria, Sofia 1000, Tzar Osvoboditel Blvd. 29

[email protected]

www.riskmonitor.bg

This publication reflects the views of the authors only and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use, which may be made of the information contained therein.


Table Of Content

INTRODUCTION 4

PROBLEMS IN TACKLING CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 6

OBSTACLES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST

CORRUPTION IN SOFIA MUNICIPALITY 8

ASSESSING THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION AND THE CORRUPTION

RISK IN THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 12

INDICATORS FOR CORRUPTION RISK ASSESSMENT AT SOFIA MUNICIPALITY 14

I. CORRUPTION-RISK INDICATORS (GENERAL) 17

II. INDICATORS FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES 22

III. INDICATORS OF CORRUPT BEHAVIOR 28

CONCLUSION 34

Annex 1: DETERMINING THE INDICATOR FOR FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE (EXAMPLE) 35

Annex 2: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE TO COLLECT INFORMATION REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE INDICATOR FOR MONITORING OF CORRUPTION RISKS 37


Introduction

Corruption has been an indelible part of society’s development since ancient times. Consistent attempts to fight corruption, globally, begin to emerge in the 1980s of the 20th century. The process can be traced back primarily in documents and the work of international organizations which have aimed to streamline their standards through the introduction of international anti-corruption legislation.1

Nevertheless, the continuous process of harmonization and improvement of the anti-corruption law in countries around the world, mainly through the ratification of international legal instruments, has so far been an effective but insufficient mechanism. Equally important in this respect is the efficient implementation of the national legislations as well as a strong political will to tackle corruption. State and non-state actors alike must recognize that the poor enforcement of the national anti-corruption legislation, coupled with a weak institutional system for the detection, investigation and prosecution of corruption-related crimes, undermines democracy and the rule of law, destroys fair competition and hinders economic development.2

For Bulgaria, the fight against corruption is a critical issue with implications at national, European and international level. Bulgaria is a party to all international anti-corruption treaties; the country’s legislation is fully compliant with the European and international standards currently in place. A number of anti-corruption strategies and action plans have been adopted by public bodies. Despite all efforts in the last years, the country has failed to make sufficient progress and Bulgaria has repeatedly ranked in the bottom of international

1 See the following international documents: Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, RESOLUTION (97) 24 ON THE TWENTY GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 November 1997 at the 101st session of the Committee of Ministers); The Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, promulgated in State Gazette Issue 42/27.04.2001; Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, in force from 1 Feb. 2005; The Civil Law Convention on Corruption, in force from 1 Nov. 2003, promulgated in the State Gazette issue 42/23 May 2000; the Code of Conduct for Public Servants, Recommendation No R (2000)10 of the Committee of Ministers, adopted 11 May 2000; Recommendation Rec(2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns; Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, made on the basis of art. K 3 of the Treaty of the European Union, Official Journal C 316 of 27.11.1995; Convention against corruption involving officials or officials of Member States of the European Union, [Official Journal C 195 of 25 June 1997], Framework Decision2003/568; OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, State Gazette issue 61/6 July 1999; United Nations Convention against Corruption, in force from 14 Dec. 2005; State Gazette issue 89/3. Nov. 2006, in force from 20 Oct. 2006 for the Republic of Bulgaria.

2 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Official statement on the occasion of Anti-Corruption Day, 9 December 2009.


corruption studies.3 In addition, corruption is one of the areas subject to monitoring by the European Commission as part of the Union’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.4

Studies show that the political and high-level institutional corruption undermines the citizens’ trust in the public bodies, significantly obstructs the country’s development, blocks the work of the judiciary and deters foreign investments. Political corruption threatens the entire social fabric and opens the door to “state capture”, whereby private interests significantly influence a state’s decision-making processes to their own advantage through illicit and unobvious channels.5 Not less damaging are the effects of corruption on local governments, because the citizens are directly affected by the lack of accountable and transparent administration in their home towns. Most prevalent at this level is the so-called petty corruption.

Therefore, the fight against corruption demands the full attention and daily efforts by everyone at each level of governance. Key element in this process is the use of well-chosen methods, to best tackle the issues at hand. The successful counteraction of corruption requires a comprehensive approach, targeting corruption at both the central and the local level of administration.

This report presents a system of indicators for corruption risk assessment, developed on the basis of good practices from local administrations in EU member-states. Тhe system has been adapted to meet the needs and requirements of Sofia Municipality, providing the local administration with a tool for identifying the areas with higher corruption risks; the tool will enable the municipal administration to conduct its own ongoing corruption risk assessment without external monitoring or external interventions and recommendations.

3 See Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and the World Corruption Barometer at www.transparency.bg

4 See the EC reports at http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm 5 World Bank (2000). Anticorruption in Transition: Contribution to the Policy Debate. World Bank Publications,

ISBN 9780821348024, http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gpBvS3O17S4C&pg=PA3#v=onepage&q&f=false


Problems in Tackling Corruption in Local Government

Corruption in local government is usually the result of the lack of transparent governance (non-transparent allocation of public resources, corruption practices in public procurement/concession procedures, non-transparent decision making process). Complicated administrative procedures create a fertile ground for corruption pressure on citizens and businesses (e.g., the heavy procedures of licensing and issuing of permits), as well as the everyday operations of the administration in the enforcement of the law and various regulations. Corruption activities are easier to observe and identify at the local level. Corruption is likely to affect the quality and timeliness of the administrative services provided by the local administration, and most petty corruption at this level is enabled by the direct communication between the administration and the citizens. Often, corruption in the local government is regarded as an incentive for the administration to perform better or what is frequently referred to as “greasing the wheels” of the administration. Both of these views are not only deeply mistaken, but they stay in the way of developing strong state and local administration built on the principles of professionalism, stability and good governance.6

6 For good governance, cf. art. 2 of the State Administration Act, State Gazette 130/5 Nov. 1998, last amended, State Gazette 27/25 Маrch 2014.


The lack of efficient control mechanisms, the inability to identify corruption practices and to punish the wrongdoers, coupled with the overall perception of the unavoidable wide-spread existence of corruption (i.e., „everybody does it”), are the main stumbling blocks to tackling corruption at the local level. An additional barrier is the fact that local administrations do not have designated units in charge of the analysis and assessment of corruption risks (compliance offices), for handling corruption reports and claims, and imposing disciplinary actions, as for example are the inspectorates in the state administration.

Numerous studies have identified bottlenecks such as these. What is required to tackle them successfully are specific corrective measures, both legislative and organizational, as well as organizing and conducting specialized anti-corruption training of the public servants along with measures to increase the capacity of the public and the local businesses to reduce corruption at the local level.


Obstacles in the fight against corruption in Sofia Municipality

The counteraction of corruption at municipal level is not reflected in specifi-cally designed for the purpose municipal regulations, ordinance or organiza-tional measures7. Sofia Municipality does not have in place an anti-corrup-tion strategy or an action plan with anti-corruption measures. Consequently, any issues linked to the identification of corruption risks, the observance of ethical standards or policies for managing conflict of interests or reporting irregularities by the public servants is not part of the policies of transparency followed by Sofia Municipality8. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Stat-ute of the Municipality clearly states the basic principles to be observed by the municipal administration, among them transparent governance, dialogue with the citizens, transparent public spending, access to information with re-gard to public spending, etc. (art. 1, para. 2). These principles provide good basis for the development of specific policies aimed at guaranteeing trans-parency and accountability in the work of the municipal administration. In a high-risk corruption environment in all sectors of government, it is imperative for Sofia Municipality to develop its own vision and anti-corruption strategy.

The first task towards the development of a long-term strategic document is the analysis and identification of the corruption risks in Sofia Municipality, followed by developing and adopting an internal system for risk assessment, adapted to the specific needs of the municipal administration. Sofia Munici-pality has already made the first step in this regard: at the end of 2013 was conducted a representative opinion poll among citizens and businesses of the capital city, surveying the level of corruption in the city. The results were analyzed and published in the report, which also identified the high-risk areas and most common corruption practices in the municipal administration9.

7 Municipal regulations list among the responsibilities of specific directorates and departments of the administration the review and reporting on citizens’ complaints and claims.

8 Issues such as ethical standards and conflict of interests fall within the responsibilities of the committees under the umbrella of the local parliament, the Sofia Municipal Council. For instance, the Standing Committee on Ethics, Citizens Rights, Claims and Complaints and the Committee pursuant to the Law on the Avoidance and Identifying of Conflict of Interests.

9 The survey was conducted by Alpha Research Agency for Marketing and Social Research in Nov. 2013 within the project „Non-repressive Model to Reduce Corruption at Municipal Level.”


The survey showed that respondents most often identify the lack of control and inadequate disciplinary actions (51%) as reasons for corruption among municipal officers. Almost half of the respondents indicate the condescending attitude of the administration to the citizens – that is, the administration’s feeling that citizens depend on the public servants - as reason for corruption (45%); 43 percent see it in the poor legislation, while for 38 percent the main reasons are political and party clientelism and protection. As concerns the levels of corruption in the Municipality, 2 percent оf the respondents (citizens) and 17 percent оf the interviewed representatives of the local businesses claim that they have witnessed some form of corruption in Sofia Municipality. With respect to the frequency of corruption activities on the territory of the Municipality, the comparative analysis shows that it differs per district.10

The occurrence of petty corruption in the Municipality is further corroborated by the survey; respondents most often identify as cases of petty corrup-tion cash payments or some type of benefit offered to a public servant in exchange of expediting a customer’s case or solving some problem. The occurrence of such types of corruption in the municipal administration is confirmed by 2.5 percent of all respondents. Notable is also the fact that most of the reported examples of corruption, given by the respondents, fall into this category.

Very often the reported cases are directly linked to or related to the sectors of construction & real estate and the respective municipal services, e.g. an apartment, construction permit, agricultural land, approval of a project, real estate fraud, alienation of property, etc.

10 For example, similar percentages are reported for the districts of Vrabnitza, Ovcha Kupel, Ilinden, Podyane, Krasna Polyana, Serdika, Slatina, Studentski grad and Lyulin. Entirely different is the situation with some other district administrations: for Iskar district, 35 percent of the respondents share that they have witnessed some form of corruption. For Sofia City District, this percentage is 33%; for district Oborishte, 26.3%, for district Bankya it is 20%; for Novi Iskar 19%, for Triaditsa 15%, for Vitosha 15% and for Izgrev, 15%.


If you have witnessed some form of corruption in Sofia Municipality, please, give specific examples:

Cash on hand 15.7%

Bribe for faster service 7.8%

For housing 7.8%

Building permit 7.8%

For lease of agricultural land 5.9%

To solve a problem 3.9%

Approval of project 3.9%

Misuse of property 3.9%

Clerical/records office 2.0%

Partition of personal property 2.0%

Alienation of property 2.0%

Unlawful recruitment 2.0%

Misuse of funds from dog shelters 2.0%

Lack of transparency 2.0%

Ignorance of the law on access to public information 2.0%

Document fraud 2.0%

Tenders 2.0%

Parking fines 2.0%

Delay in issuing documents for commercial property 2.0%

Unlawful fines imposed by officials of the Center for Urban Mobility 2.0%

Intervention by an MP to reduce an imposed fine 2.0%

Municipal markets 2.0%

No answer / I cannot give a concrete example 15.3%

[Source: Survey conducted within the project NORMCORM]


The survey shows another alarming trend, namely, a very low percentage of the respondents actually know what to do and how to file a report for corruption – only 17.4 percent respond that they know; however, only 4 percent of the respondents state that they would file a report.

The survey data and the data analysis clearly show that the introduction of anti-corruption measures must be a high priority in the development and implementation of other key municipal policies, such as the policy for avoiding conflict of interests, declaration of property and assets (by the municipal councilors), and filing corruption reports and complaints. Equally important is also an ongoing analysis of the level of corruption in the administration. Strengthening the control over the sectors with a higher corruption risk, as well as imposing commensurable penalties on those who have violated the regulations are also regarded as critical for successfully curbing corruption.

Last but not least, along with the prevention and the punitive measures to tackle corruption, it is of utmost importance to improve the expertise and capacity of the municipal employees to understand corruption and to avoid corruption practices. In this respect, it is recommended to know and follow key national documents such as the Code of Conduct for the State Administration Officers (applicable to public servants and employees in the central and local government), as well as sector-specific Codes of Conduct or Codes of Ethics in place in the respective municipal administration or the Sofia Municipal Council. Proper ethical conduct increases the public trust in the administration and is also a key factor for good governance. As a non-repressive measure, ethical conduct is directly linked to the prevention of corruption at the local level.


Assessing the level of corruption and the corruption risk in the local administration

The level of corruption (prevalence or frequency of corruption incidence) in the local and the central administration is a dynamic process. The degree of corruption occurrence fluctuates, and it may change under the influence of various factors. For anti-corruption policies to be effective it is necessary for the local administration and the leadership to stay informed about the ongoing levels of corruption and the efficiency of the anti-corruption measures in place. Corruption is strongest where the institutions are weak and the control mechanisms and disciplinary sanctions are limited in scope and scale.

The external monitoring of the levels of corruption, the type and prevalence of corruption practices can definitely provide valuable information; yet external monitoring alone is insufficient, mainly because it is done by organizations which may follow different methodologies and pursue their own specific goals.

To successfully curb corruption it is important that the local administration build sufficient capacity to identify and counteract corruption activities. The existence of an internal system for the identification of areas with higher corruption risks facilitates the quick and adequate response in detecting and eliminating corruption-related irregularities and violations.

The experience of local governments in other countries provides successful examples of such internal systems for the identification and counteraction of corruption. When properly implemented, the system can prevent the spread of corruption practices in the long term and diminish the perception of lack of control and impunity in the administration. In addition, similar mechanisms for identifying the corruption risk also help channel the efforts to specific and traditionally high-risk areas such as the allocation of public funds and public procurement. A system of well-defined indicators and the thorough analysis of the results of ongoing monitoring will equip the administration’s leadership


with the tools to recognize promptly the employees prone to corruption or those negligent in their work.

Taking action to identify such weaknesses and negative developments is a way to prevent corruption scandals and to avoid damage to the good name of the local administration and its employees. Fighting corruption is not only a question of the law; it carries significant political implications with a potentially high impact on the quality of governance and the citizens’ assessment of their elected leaders.

Introducing a system of indicators for corruption risk assessment, drawing upon best practices from local administrations in other EU member-states will definitely benefit Sofia Municipality and increase its human resources and institutional capacity for early detection and reaction to corruption risks.

The consistent application of a similar system of indicators will result in improved accountability, openness and transparency in the operations of the local administration. It will contribute directly to establishing an institutional environment and organizational culture based on principles of accountability, in which the employees are internally motivated to follow the law and the requirements of a professional Code of Conduct. This environment will foster and encourage consistent ethical conduct as well, strengthened by the belief that accountability is a value to be promoted and not proscribed.

An accountability-based institutional environment will moreover encourage employees to tackle corruption by reporting corrupt practices or incidents involving other employees (including their superiors and people in highly visible positions of power), who may be prone to taking bribes or other violations/wrongdoings. The added benefit of this type of environment would be in giving people assurance that reporting corruption is not useless; in the long term, this will help remove the employees’ doubts and fear of persecution, and possible repression for whistleblowers inside the Municipality. The expected impact on the employees will be the creation of an environment with zero tolerance for corruption; employees will know that the system for identifying corruption risks works effectively and that in fact corruption may prove to be a high-risk affair.


Indicators for Corruption Risk Assessment at Sofia Municipality

The indicators for corruption risk assessment in Sofia Municipality have been developed by an expert group involving Bulgarian and European anti-corruption specialists. The system steps upon similar models tested and verified in Vienna municipality, which have reported positive outcomes such as reducing the levels of corruption and significant achievements in identifying corrupt practices and prone to corruption employees.

The implementation of this system of indicators is a key prerequisite for an effective strategic management. In the management of corruption risks, the set of indicators that have been chosen must correspond to the specific needs, the internal organizational capacity and the available data in the municipality. When the set of indicators has been adequately chosen and compiled, it is predicted to produce an accurate picture of the strong and weak sides and risks in the municipal administration, enabling the leadership to make effective strategic decisions.

Following the careful analysis of the expert group, the indicators presented below have been adapted to fit the specific environment and the circumstances at Sofia Municipality. The final number and type of indicators have been selected upon consultation with experts, information from roundtable discussions with municipal employees, as well as surveys conducted with employees of the municipal administration and municipal councilors.

The system of indicators has been discussed and presented to experts and members of the municipal Committee on Ethics, Citizens Rights, Claims and Complaints, the Committee on Local Self-government and Local Regulation; it has also been discussed with the office of the Ombudsman of Sofia Municipality. Input and feedback from the consultations has been taken into consideration and included in the final draft of the system of indicators and the methodology for the system implementation.

As a result of the expert discussions and analyses, three groups of indicators


have been chosen as most adequately matching the needs of Sofia. Each group of indicators includes detailed description of the concrete markers that apply to a specific area of monitoring and guidelines on how to collect relevant and area-specific data in support of the risk-assessment analysis.

The proposed indicators have been divided into 3 groups:

I. Corruption risk indicatorsThese are common and key indicators in terms of corruption. Risk assessment of corruption is one of the very important tools for the anti-corruption strategies. Indicators should help to reduce the risk of corruption and its impact.

II. Transparency indicators and anti-corruption measuresTransparency and open government is one of the very important aspects of reducing corruption and improving the quality of governance. Non-transparent decision-making creates opportunities for corruption.

III. Indicators of corrupt behaviorThe third group does not represent classic indicators, but it is an indication (recognition) of corrupt behavior and its manifestation.

General indicators of the corruption risk and transparency indicators should always be set for the specific area (specific activity), which we consider risky in terms of corruption. Based on the analyses made and the results of the sociological survey, the most relevant areas that will be subject to monitoring of the corruption risk are the following11:

1. Decision making and money redistribution

2. Governance agenda and licensing

3. Public procurement

4. Asset management and contractual relationships

The system of indicators allows measuring the corruption risk for the identified areas on a scale of 1 (low level of incidence) to 10 (high level

11 At the discretion of Sofia Municipality, the indicators for risk assessment can be applied to other priority or strategically important areas.


of incidence). The scale thus facilitates a detailed and highly differentiated measurement, with the capacity of registering also the fluctuations in degree in the assessment of the corruption risk. The rating scale of 1 to 10 is optional. The table below shows an example of how the rating scale works with a set of indicative values (points):

Table 1

Benefit – benefit for a

corrupted

Points (indicator)

CriterionMonetary benefit related to the level

of salary

very high and attractive

10 exceeds the equivalent of four annual salaries

very high 9 exceeds the equivalent of the annual salary, but less than 4 years equivalent

high 8 exceeds the equivalent of half of the annual salary, but less than one year salary

higher 7 exceeds the equivalent of a monthly salary, but less than 6 monthly salaries

intermediate - higher

6 exceeds the equivalent of 50% of the monthly salary, but less than 1 month salary

intermediate 5 exceeds the equivalent of 10% of the monthly salary, but less than 50% of the monthly salary

intermediate - lower

4 exceeds the equivalent of 5% of the monthly salary, but less than 10% of the monthly salary

low 3 exceeds the equivalent of 1% of the monthly salary, but less than 5% of the monthly salary

very low 2 is very low - less than 1% of the monthly salary

to be omitted – almost null

1 almost no benefit with regard to his salary


I. CORRUPTION-RISK INDICATORS (GENERAL)

The key to an effective system of anti-corruption measures at the local level is a set of indicators of the corruption risk. Depending on the specific area of activity to be monitored, the relevant set of indicators has to be chosen as well.

For example, corruption in public procurement can be assessed using a set of indicators which can map out the risks associated with the activity. The indicators are broadly formulated to allow for easy adaptation and adjust-ment in the assessment of corruption risks in different sectors/departments/areas of operation. In the frame of the initial assessment, the corruption risk is measured against four groups of indicators: incidence, benefit, impact, and detection.

1. Occurance (OC ) = Number of incidences per year

Incidence relates to the number of occurrences/events per year or 12 months. In the example of public procurement, the information that must be gathered is the number of public procurement bids per year, which are needed to calculate the frequency of the activity and the potential risk – the higher the number of tenders in the municipality, the higher the risk of at-tempts to manipulate the bidding procedure or to obtain personal benefits, and thus, the risk for misuse of public funds from the municipal budget.12 The number of public procurement bids is a quantitative indicator which shows what percentage of the municipal funds is expended through tenders.

Measured on a scale of 1 (low level of incidence) tо 10 (high level of incidence).

2. Benefit/Gain (P) = Benefit in monetary value for the corrupted, compared to his/her monthly salary

The second indicator „benefit/gain” presents the correlation between the amount of probable benefits/gains and the average monthly salary in the sector, the municipal department or the concrete job position. The analysis of public procurement practices, for example, may reveal that the municipal

12 The risk increases not simply because the number of tenders increases, but because more public procurement bids implies spending a larger amount of public funds; the bigger number of tenders requires also heightened control as more attempts for unlawful intervention and influences may be expected, too.


employees are preparing bids for millions of leva from the municipal bud-get but their compensation is inadequately low. Disproportions like this may push the employees to manipulate the tender documentation or to attempt unlawful contacts with potential bidders, in the hope of obtaining personal monetary gains.13 The same applies to decision making, asset management or the conclusion of contracts, which are at the discretion of the administra-tion and where the control mechanisms are not tight.


3. Impact (I) = Impact on the city calculated in money or as a percentage of the municipal budget.

The third indicator „impact” relates to the negative impact of concrete deci-sions or actions by municipal employees on the municipal budget. The deci-sions, actions or inactions in case will bring real damages and losses to the municipal budget or misappropriation of public funds. Examples may include leasing municipal property at lower than market prices or returning project funds to EU donor programs due to reports for corruption activities during the project implementation.


4. Detection (D) = Indicates the probability that the system will detect corruption practices

The fourth indicator „detection” refers to the capacity of the municipality to detect irregularities and corrupt activities, as well as to take disciplin-ary actions against the wrongdoers. Тhis indicator relates to the operations and effectiveness of the bodies responsible for the control and disciplinary sanctions in the local administration. When properly used, the indicator also serves to assess the preventive measures against potential wrongdoers. Data about the number of disciplinary hearings against employees, the penalties

13 It is important to note that modern research on corruption challenges the view that a higher salary/compensation is a corruption deterrent; potentially, any bribe could exceed many times even the highest salary in the administration. Nevertheless, the disproportionately low compensation for municipal employees who are responsible for the allocation and expenditure of sizeable public funds may be tempted to seek other ways to compensate for their low wages. What is more, the very fact that despite the low compensation the employees are not leaving their job may be an indication that they are using their position to obtain unlawful benefits/income.


imposed or the cases that have been filed to other institutions (for example, the prosecution office), demonstrate the capacity of the municipality itself to detect corruption practices and to persecute the people who have committed them. This indicator reveals the dynamic of the process of corruption activi-ties; even in the case of low indicator values during the initial risk assess-ment, the timely actions and prevention measures taken afterwards could significantly reduce the incidence of corruption in a short time span.


As we have seen, the first group of indicators comprises both concrete/tan-gible but also broader (prognostic) indicators. The specific indicators com-prise of:

y the number of public procurement bids during the year,

y the average salary of the employees in the department/section, who are in charge of public procurement,

y the number of disciplinary action or cases filed to the prosecution.

The general indicators encompass, for example, the benefits that an employee might receive; the damage/impact of the corruption act on the municipal budget and the level of probability for the detection of a corruption practice involving municipal employees.

The indicators for the corruption risk (indicators 5-7, Table 2) and the indicator for the risk of competitive advantage through corruption (indicator 8, Table 2), relate to the opportunities for the emergence of a corruption risk, the benefits for the corrupted, and the impact/threat for the city of the detect-ed corruption. Descriptions of each indicator are given in the tables below.

As Tables 2 and 3 show, whenever the frequency of the opportunities for potential corruption along with the probability for considerable gains is high (or the impact on the city would be considerable), while the rate of detec-tion remains low, the corruption risk (RCc) and the indicators for corruption risk (RPNc) are very high as well. To calculate the RPNc, it is necessary to determine the indicator’s scope against the assessment criteria on the scale of 1 to 10 for incidence, benefit/impact, and the rate of detection. The scale is described in the following four tables.


Tabl

e 2:

Cor

rupt

ion

risk

indi

cato

rs a

nd c

alcu

latio

n

Indi

cato

rs 1

- 4:

1. O

ccur

renc

e (n

umbe

r of

inci

dent

s) o

f cor

-ru

ptio

n op

portu

nitie

s (O

ccur

renc

e - O

C),

Bene

fit o

r im

pact

4. D

etec

tion

– pr

obab

ility

of

iden

tific

atio

n ; (

Dete

ctio

n –

D)2.

Ben

efit

(Ben

efit

for t

he

corr

upte

d in

com

paris

on to

m

onth

ly w

age)

; (Pr

ofit-

P)

3. Im

pact

(sev

erity

) on

the

city

(Impa

ct –

I)

Indi

cato

rs 5

-7:

Valu

e of

the

corr

uptio

n ris

k

5. R

isk

of c

orru

ptio

n va

lue

– be

nefit

(RC CP

): RC

CP =

OC *

P

6. R

isk

of c

orru

ptio

n va

lue

– im

pact

(RC CI

): RC

CI =

OC *

I

7. R

isk

of c

orru

ptio

n va

lue-

RC C

: hig

her o

f the

val

ues

RCCP

, RCCI

Indi

cato

r 8:

Risk

of c

orru

ptio

n pr

iorit

y8.

Ris

k of

cor

rupt

ion

prio

rity

indi

cato

r (RP

N C): RP

N C = R

C C * D

The

tabl

e be

low

giv

es a

brie

f des

crip

tion

of th

e in

dica

tors

.


Tabl

e 3:

Cor

rupt

ion

risk

indi

cato

rs –

des

crip

tion

No.

Nam

eUn

itDe

scrip

tion,

com

puta

tion

1Oc

curre

nce

(num

ber o

f in

cide

nts)

of c

orru

ptio

n op

portu

nitie

s (O

ccur

renc

e - O

C)

Num

ber o

f oc

curre

nces

pe

r yea

r

Num

ber o

f eve

nts

per y

ear (

for e

xam

ple,

pub

lic p

rocu

rem

ents

, act

s of

gov

ernm

ent)

of th

e co

mpa

rabl

e ty

pe p

er y

ear.

Base

d on

the

num

ber o

f the

occ

urre

nce,

the

resu

lt is

indi

cate

d on

a

scal

e fro

m 1

(min

or o

ccur

renc

e) to

10

(ver

y hi

gh o

ccur

renc

e).

2Be

nefit

(Ben

efit

for t

he c

orru

pted

in

com

paris

on to

mon

thly

w

age)

; (Pr

ofit-

P)

Scal

e 1-

10

Pote

ntia

l ben

efit

in m

onet

ary

term

s fo

r the

cor

rupt

ed p

erso

n, c

ompa

red

to h

is m

onth

ly s

alar

y (to

be

agre

ed, i

f it i

s th

e av

erag

e sa

lary

in th

e pu

blic

sec

tor,

or in

the

spec

ific

mun

icip

al o

ffice

, or

in re

latio

n to

the

posi

tion)

. Bas

ed o

n th

e am

ount

, the

resu

lt is

indi

cate

d on

a s

cale

from

1

(littl

e - a

lmos

t non

e) to

10

(ver

y hi

gh a

nd a

ttrac

tive)

. Sal

ary

does

not

nec

essa

rily

corre

late

with

va

lues

of p

ublic

pro

perty

adm

inis

tere

d by

a c

ivil

serv

ant.

3Im

pact

(sev

erity

) on

the

city

(Impa

ct –

I)M

onet

ary

unit

or %

of t

he

budg

et

Impa

ct o

f cor

rupt

ion

on th

e ci

ty (t

he c

ity b

udge

t) in

mon

etar

y un

its. I

n lin

e w

ith th

e ab

ove,

the

impa

ct o

n th

e ci

ty b

udge

t in

% is

indi

cate

d on

the

scal

e fro

m 1

(litt

le- a

lmos

t zer

o ex

pens

e) to

10

(ver

y hi

gh).

4De

tect

ion

– pr

obab

ility

of

iden

tific

atio

n ; (

Dete

ctio

n –

D)Sc

ale

1-10

Pr

obab

ility

that

the

curre

nt s

yste

m o

f wor

k w

ill de

tect

the

corr

uptio

n. V

alue

1 o

n th

e sc

ale

mea

ns th

at th

e de

tect

ion

is a

lmos

t cer

tain

(or t

he c

urre

nt s

yste

m w

ill su

rely

det

ect t

he c

orru

p-tio

n), v

alue

of 1

0 m

eans

that

det

ectio

n is

impo

ssib

le (o

r not

pos

sibl

e on

the

basi

s of

the

proc

e-du

res

that

sho

uld

reve

al th

e co

rrup

tion)

. Val

ues

are

linke

d to

the

exis

ting

syst

em o

f con

trol.

5Ri

sk o

f cor

rupt

ion

valu

e –

ben-

efit

(RC CP

)In

dex

RCCP

= O

C * P

Oc

curre

nce

* Pr

ofit

6Ri

sk o

f cor

rupt

ion

valu

e –

im-

pact

(RC CI

)in

dex

RCCI =

OC *

I Oc

curre

nce

* Im

pact

7Ri

sk o

f cor

rupt

ion

valu

ein

dex

RCC:

High

er fr

om th

e va

lues

RC CP

, RCCI

8Ri

sk o

f cor

rupt

ion

prio

rity

indi

cato

r (RP

N C)in

dex

RPN C =

RC C *

DCo

rrup

tion

risk

* De

tect

ion


II. INDICATORS FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES

The second group of indicators is designed to assess the level of transparen-cy in the municipal administration and the specific anti-corruption measures in place. This set of indicators covers issues of major societal consequence and to which by default civil society should have access in order to exercise sufficient level of control. In particular, the indicators are designed to evaluate the extent to which the municipality follows the principles of open and trans-parent governance and offers reliable guarantees for free and easy public access to information about its decision making process as enshrined in the existing legal statutes.

In order to determine the indicator for transparency in the case of corruption risk assessment in public procurement procedures, the municipal administration has to make public the following information, freely and without restrictions:

a) Information has to be provided about the number of public procure-ment bids published on the Internet (including the announcements and the tender documentation; an organization will score high on the scale of transparency if all of the procurement bids are published online). Of significance is the ratio between the value of the procure-ment bids published online, to the total value of all procurement bids.

b) In order to assess the level of transparency it is also necessary to receive information about the number of employees hired through an open call compared to the total number of employees.


c) The value of the indicator depends also on the level of transparency in the management of municipal property (that is, sales, purchases, concessions, leasing). A good practice to improve transparency is publishing the relevant information online or at a designated place in the municipality. Some municipalities go even beyond the require-ments of the law and publish the information in public media or other publicly accessible places. The indicator measures the per-centage of municipal property transactions which are conducted in line with the predetermined transparency regulations. For the indi-cator value to be defined, it is also necessary to monitor all of the transactions with public property, calculating the ratio of all deals compared to those published online.

d) Of significance is also the level of transparency in providing infor-mation about municipal grant making activities and allocation of subsidies. Many of the municipalities in the Czech Republic for ex-ample have grant making procedures for direct beneficiaries, mostly for NGOs. Typically, the funds are allocated through open calls for proposals. However, part of the subsidies are also disbursed direct-ly (by the municipal council) upon request from the organizations. The indicator measures the percentage of grants in absolute mon-etary value disbursed through open calls for proposals compared to the total amount of grant funds. In addition, the number of funded proposals could be considered as well in the determination of the indicator value.


The second set of indicators in this group refers to transparency measures introduced b y the municipality itself. The key figures to observe here are:

a) The ratio between the salaries for the job position of the employees most at risk of corruption to the average salary in the country (cf. above);

b) The severity of the imposed disciplinary action when irregularities or corrupt practices have been detected and proven. It is necessary to define the scale of the possible sanctions (for example criminal liability, loss of employment).

Indicator value of 1 means severe sanctions which can deter corruption. A value of 10 indicates weak sanctions and no public awareness of them.

c) In this group of indicators we have included also the number of corruption cases per year which are identified and investigated by the legal authorities, as evidence of the authorities’ capacity and ef-fectiveness in tackling corruption. The indicator covers all identified cases, including corrupt activities, lack of transparency, nepotism, cronyism, clientelism, etc.

d) Of critical significance in this respect is the existence of a well-functioning and effective system of reporting corruption by the mu-nicipal employees, in particular, the office of compliance and anti-corruption.14 A well-functioning system for whistleblower protection is key to curbing corruption in any organization.

Indicator value of 1 means that whistleblower protection is high and employees are aware of it. A value of 10 indicates a poor protection system and little interest in enforcing anti-corruption reporting.

14 What is meant here is indeed a system for filing and handling corruption reports submitted by municipal employees, and not simply filing reports and complaints by the citizens.


e) For an objective weighting of this indicator, it is advisable to include statistics about the number of corruption reports per year, the num-ber of reports for fraud, for conflict of interests and lack of trans-parency. The indicator covers the total number of filed complaints and corruption/fraud reports (including complaints for no access to information, nepotism, conflict of interests, breach of regulations, etc.), regardless of the merit of each report. This indicator is closely linked with another one, which is related to the number of actions taken in response to the reports filed.

f) Last but not least, another key indicator relates to the number of employees per year who have received anti-corruption training compared to the total number of municipal employees.

The set of indicators described above represent the triade of prevention, sanctions, and training as an effective method to fight corruption. The municipal administration has to decide which are most suited for its purposes – prevention, disciplinary actions, or emplyee training in order to reach the best results in reducing the incidence of corruption.

The table below describes briefly each of the indicators for transparency and anti-corruption measures.


Tabl

e 4:

Tra

nspa

renc

y in

dica

tors

and

ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

mea

sure

s- d

escr

iptio

nNo

.Na

me

Unit

Desc

riptio

n, c

ompu

tatio

n1

Sala

ry to

ave

rage

sal

ary

ratio

%Th

e ra

tio o

f the

sal

ary

of th

e sp

ecifi

c po

sitio

ns (w

hich

are

exp

osed

to th

e co

rrup

tion

risk)

to

the

aver

age

sala

ry in

the

coun

try2

Seve

rity

of th

e pu

nish

men

t if c

orru

p-tio

n is

det

ecte

dSc

ale

1-10

Ac

cord

ing

to th

e cl

assi

cal p

rinci

pal-a

gent

theo

ry, t

here

are

thre

e fa

ctor

s th

at h

ave

the

grea

test

im

pact

on

corr

uptio

n: (1

) the

sev

erity

of t

he p

unis

hmen

t, (2

) mot

ivat

ion-

the

sala

ry, (

3) th

e sy

stem

mea

sure

s- th

e ris

k of

det

ectio

n). I

t is

nece

ssar

y to

det

erm

ine

the

rang

e of

pos

sibl

e pu

nitiv

e ac

tions

(crim

inal

liab

ility,

loss

of e

mpl

oym

ent).

A v

alue

of 1

mea

ns th

at th

e pe

nalti

es

are

very

hig

h an

d st

rong

ly d

isco

urag

e co

rrup

tion.

The

val

ue o

f 10

mea

ns th

at th

e pu

nish

men

ts

are

quite

sm

all a

nd th

ere

is n

o ge

nera

l kno

wle

dge

abou

t the

m.

3Le

vel o

f pro

tect

ion

for t

he c

orru

ptio

n de

tect

ors

Scal

e 1-

10

Crea

ting

a pr

otec

tion

syst

em fo

r the

cor

rupt

ion

whi

stle

blow

ers

and

dete

ctor

s co

ntrib

utes

si

gnifi

cant

ly to

figh

ting

the

corr

uptio

n. A

val

ue o

f 1 m

eans

that

pro

tect

ion

is v

ery

high

and

ev

eryo

ne in

volve

d is

aw

are

of it

. The

val

ue o

f 10

mea

ns th

at th

e pr

otec

tion

is s

mal

l - a

lmos

t no

n-ex

iste

nt a

nd it

is n

ot v

alue

d to

repo

rt th

e co

rrup

tion.

4Nu

mbe

r of c

ompl

aint

s re

late

d to

the

corr

uptio

n, fr

aud,

non

-tran

spar

ent

beha

vior

or c

onfli

ct o

f int

eres

ts.

Num

ber

per y

ear

This

indi

cato

r cov

ers

all c

ompl

aint

s an

d re

ports

rega

rdin

g co

rrup

tion

or fr

aud

(incl

udin

g co

m-

plai

nts

abou

t the

lack

of t

rans

pare

ncy,

cron

yism

, con

flict

of i

nter

est,

dive

rgen

t pra

ctic

es)-

re-

gard

less

of w

heth

er o

r not

they

are

just

ified

. Thi

s in

dica

tor c

an b

e as

sign

ed to

ano

ther

- bea

ring

the

num

ber o

f act

ions

take

n, w

hich

are

bas

ed o

n th

ese

com

plai

nts.

5Nu

mbe

r of i

ncid

ents

indi

cate

d by

the

cont

rol b

odie

sNu

mbe

r pe

r yea

rTh

is in

dica

tor c

over

s al

l of t

he fi

ndin

gs th

at re

late

to d

iverg

ent p

ract

ices

, lac

k of

tran

spar

ency

, cr

onyi

sm, e

tc.

6Tr

ansp

aren

cy in

dica

tors

- num

ber o

f pu

blic

pro

cure

men

ts%

Num

ber o

f the

mun

icip

al p

ublic

pro

cure

men

ts p

ublis

hed

on th

e In

tern

et to

the

tota

l num

ber o

f pu

blic

pro

cure

men

ts. I

t is

nece

ssar

y to

set

a v

ery

low

thre

shol

d fo

r whi

ch th

e pu

blic

dis

clos

ure

wou

ld n

ot b

e m

ade.

7Tr

ansp

aren

cy in

dica

tors

- num

ber-

publ

ic p

rocu

rem

ents

- mon

etar

y un

its%

Valu

e of

the

mun

icip

al p

ublic

pro

cure

men

ts p

ublis

hed

on th

e In

tern

et to

the

tota

l vol

ume

of

cont

ract

s.


8Tr

ansp

aren

cy in

dica

tors

- num

ber o

f pu

blic

pro

cure

men

ts fo

r the

offi

ce%

Ratio

of t

he n

umbe

r of j

ob v

acan

cies

fille

d in

thro

ugh

an o

pen

tend

er a

cces

sibl

e to

all

appl

i-ca

nts

to th

e nu

mbe

r of t

otal

vac

anci

es.

9Tr

ansp

aren

cy in

dica

tors

– a

sset

s%

The

indi

cato

r mon

itors

the

trans

pare

ncy

in p

rope

rty m

anag

emen

t (sa

le, p

urch

ase,

leas

e, lo

an,

etc.

). It

is n

orm

ally

requ

ired

to d

iscl

ose

all o

f the

se in

adv

ance

on

the

notic

e bo

ard

and

on th

e In

tern

et. S

ome

mun

icip

al b

odie

s ca

rry

out t

his

task

in a

ver

y tra

nspa

rent

and

cle

ar w

ay a

nd

ofte

n be

yond

the

law

requ

irem

ents

(mor

e tra

nspa

rent

dis

clos

ure,

pub

licat

ion

in o

ther

med

ia).

The

indi

cato

r wou

ld m

easu

re th

e sh

are

of th

e pr

oper

ty m

anag

emen

t tha

t mee

ts th

e pr

edef

ined

ru

les

for t

rans

pare

ncy.

The

indi

cato

r mon

itors

all

of m

anip

ulat

ion

with

pub

lic p

rope

rty –

we

mea

sure

ratio

of a

ll ca

ses

and

case

s pu

blis

hed

on th

e in

tern

et.

10Tr

ansp

aren

cy in

dica

tors

– c

ontra

ctua

l re

latio

nshi

ps%

The

indi

cato

r mon

itors

the

trans

pare

ncy

in th

e di

sclo

sure

of c

ontra

cts.

In th

e Cz

ech

Repu

blic

, th

ere

is n

o ob

ligat

ion

for m

unic

ipal

ities

to p

ublis

h al

l sig

ned

cont

ract

s on

the

Inte

rnet

yet

(it i

s in

pre

para

tion)

. In

orde

r to

ensu

re tr

ansp

aren

cy, s

ome

mun

icip

aliti

es a

re a

lread

y do

ing

such

st

eps.

The

indi

cato

r wou

ld m

easu

re th

e %

of t

he c

ontra

cts,

whi

ch w

ere

publ

ishe

d on

the

inte

r-ne

t to

the

tota

l num

ber o

f con

tract

s. T

he d

iscl

osur

e ex

clud

es c

erta

in ty

pes

of c

ontra

cts

– e.

g.

empl

oym

ent c

ontra

cts.

Disc

losi

ng c

ontra

cts

prev

ents

us

to a

hig

h ex

tent

from

cor

rupt

ion

– pu

blic

pro

cure

men

t doc

u-m

enta

tion

does

not

incl

ude

final

dra

fts o

f con

tract

s, n

or th

e fin

al p

rices

tend

ered

.11

Tran

spar

ency

indi

cato

rs –

dis

cret

ion-

ary

gran

ts%

The

indi

cato

r mon

itors

the

trans

pare

ncy

in th

e al

loca

tion

of s

ubsi

dies

and

gra

nts.

Mun

icip

ali-

ties

in th

e Cz

ech

Rep.

allo

cate

dis

cret

iona

ry g

rant

s (e

spec

ially

to n

on-p

rofit

org

aniza

tions

) fro

m

thei

r bud

gets

. Mos

t mun

icip

aliti

es a

nnou

nce

the

calls

for p

roje

ct s

ubm

issi

ons.

How

ever

, som

e pa

rt of

the

subs

idie

s is

dis

tribu

ted

dire

ctly

(e.g

. by

the

Coun

cil o

r Ass

embl

y) u

pon

requ

est.

The

indi

cato

r will

mon

itor t

he %

of d

iscr

etio

nary

gra

nts

in m

onet

ary

units

dis

tribu

ted

on th

e ba

sis

of c

alls

to th

e to

tal a

mou

nt o

f dis

cret

iona

ry g

rant

s. A

ltern

ative

ly, th

e nu

mbe

r of g

rant

s ca

n be

ob

serv

ed a

s w

ell.

12Em

ploy

ees

train

ed a

nnua

lly o

n th

e to

pic

of c

orru

ptio

n%

Num

ber o

f em

ploy

ees

train

ed in

ant

i-cor

rupt

ion

beha

vior

to th

e to

tal n

umbe

r of e

mpl

oyee

s in

th

e or

gani

zatio

n.


III. INDICATORS OF CORRUPT BEHAVIOR

Indicators of corrupt behavior are not typical indicators. They are signs and warning signals that solely indicate a higher risk of corruption. Their higher presence does not represent any evidence or proof of corruption yet, but should lead to increased attention of colleagues and superiors. Therefore, in these cases it is advisable to step up the control mechanisms, by undertak-ing unannounced inspections at the work place or by conducting additional checks of a person’s income and property.15

Indicators in this group refer to the following three areas:

a) Group one comprises indicators which are designed to identify cor-rupt behavior in personal contacts. The following sub-indicators also have to be taken into account: contacts with companies and suppliers; style of life and patterns of decision-making; behavior at the work place, involvement in out-of-work activities.

a.1.) In the determination of the indicator “contacts with companies” it is important to gather information about unlawful contacts with sub-contractors, suppliers of business representatives, which could raise doubts about the loyalty and trustworthiness of the employee. Frequent personal meetings with any of the agents referred to above, close per-sonal contacts between the employee and representatives of compa-nies, invitations to lunches or dinners, company parties or seminars are all indications about possible corrupt behavior.

a.2.) The indicator „style of life” presupposes a lavish style of life, ex-pensive hobbies inconsistent with the person’s actual income, changes in the behavior (for instance, self-isolation from colleagues); weak-nesses in character (e.g., gambling), driving expensive automobiles, receiving special offers from one or more companies, etc.

15 This group of indicators has been successfully applied by the municipality of Vienna.


a.3.) With regard to the indicator „decision-making” we have to consider incidents like the following:

y unauthorized intervention on behalf of a company,

y recommendations on behalf of a company or advice against it,

y rejection of a company,

y unjustified change of opinion,

y unfounded decisions,

y repeated favoring of a company or offers of reducing the expens-es of a company,

y appeal to non-regulated procedures,

y attempts to reach concrete solutions in the process of negotia-tions with companies, etc.

a.4.) For the indicator „involvement in out-of-work activities” the moni-toring bodies should pay attention to consulting services, agreements which may become confidential, developing work relations with the companies linked to the office, hiring persons known to be connected to these companies, etc.

b) The second group is comprised of indicators designed to detect corrupt behavior in the municipal administrative procedures. Тhey can be described on the basis of several sub-indicators: general administrative procedures, public procurement and organizational structure of the municipality.

b.1.) For the indicator „general procedures” of significance is the infor-mation about:

y unjustified reduction in the number of public procurement bids,

y violations of legal procedures,

y conflicting decisions on similar cases involving different candi-dates/companies,

y extending or speeding up deadlines and decisions on contracting,


y sudden changes in the agenda,

y time pressure,

y last minute decisions,

y differences in the interpretation of the legal procedures and the contents of the accompanying documentation.

b.2.) With respect to public procurement bids, specific attention should be paid to the following:

y changes in the contract at variance with the initial offer,

y speeding up the process of contracting,

y violations or avoidance of the regulations for contracting.

b.3.) As concerns the indicator „оorganizational structure of the munic-ipality” red flags are, for example, the concentration of tasks in one employee, lack of transparency, lack of efforts/reluctance to introduce anti-corruption measures.

c) The third group includes indicators designed to detect corrupt behavior in relation to the external environment.

For this set of indicators the following activities must be taken into account:

y information about expensive gifts,

y sponsorships,

y unexpected rise in the expenditures,

y changes in the price of supplies,

y unannounced public procurement bids, thus favoring cartels,

y long-term relations with suppliers,

y receiving unusually expensive gifts inconsistent with the position of the recipient,

y inside information benefitting a specific company, etc.


The three groups of indicators require that the oversight and control bodies in the municipality monitor more closely the work of the municipal officers. It may be hard at times to distinguish between the personal and the professional conduct of the employees (for example, personal life style, stereotypical behavior, sudden wealth, which may be lawfully acquired, contacts with other people.) Information like this, which is necessary for the definition of the indicators, can be received from corruption investigations or corruption reports from employees or citizens, as well as drawing upon similar experience in other cases. These are not the core indicators required to determine the corruption risk, but they can supplement the data in the other indicator groups or offer explanations about processes which could not otherwise be associated with corruption risks in the municipality.

32 Model system of indicators for monitoring the corruption levels at sofia municipalityTa

ble

5: In

dica

tors

of t

he c

orru

pt b

ehav

ior

Area

of i

ndic

atio

nGr

oup

Desc

riptio

n of

the

beha

vior

- exa

mpl

es

1) Indi

catio

n of

the

corr

upt b

ehav

ior i

n pe

rson

al c

onta

ct

1.1

Cont

act w

ith s

up-

plie

rs/

com

pani

es

• in

form

al a

gree

men

ts w

ith c

ompa

nies

inst

ead

of w

ritte

n ag

reem

ents

• fre

quen

t per

sona

l con

tact

with

sup

plie

rs a

nd b

usin

ess

repr

esen

tativ

es•

frequ

ent v

isits

to re

stau

rant

s an

d fre

quen

t tra

vel t

o em

ploy

ees

of th

e co

mpa

ny•

rece

ivin

g an

invi

tatio

n to

cor

pora

te p

artie

s w

ithou

t job

dut

ies

1.2

Life

styl

e

• ex

pens

ive li

fest

yle

or e

xpen

sive

hob

bies

in c

ontra

st to

the

actu

al in

com

e•

chan

ges

in b

ehav

ior (

e.g

. tra

nsiti

on to

the

isol

atio

n an

d de

tach

men

t )•

pers

onal

wea

knes

s•

the

use

of e

xpen

sive

car

s, d

istri

bute

d by

one

com

pany

• sp

ecia

l offe

rs (e

.g. h

olid

ays)

from

one

com

pany

1.3

Deci

sion

mak

ing

• un

just

ifiab

le in

terv

entio

n in

favo

r of o

ne c

ompa

ny•

reco

mm

endi

ng a

spe

cific

com

pany

, or v

ice

vers

a to

sup

pres

s a

parti

cula

r com

pany

• qu

ick

chan

ge o

f min

d / a

ttitu

de•

unju

stifi

able

dec

isio

ns o

f all

kind

s•

repe

ated

unj

ustif

ied

prov

isio

n of

exc

eptio

nal t

erm

s of

con

ditio

n or

forg

ivene

ss o

f the

cos

ts fo

r the

pa

rticu

lar c

ompa

ny•

utiliz

atio

n of

the

unor

dina

ry p

roce

dure

s w

ithou

t obv

ious

reas

ons

• st

rikin

g ap

peas

emen

t in

nego

tiatio

ns w

ith c

ompa

nies

1.4

Wor

k be

havi

or

• sp

endi

ng to

o m

uch

time

at w

ork,

refu

sing

vac

atio

n•

hand

ling

som

e bu

sine

ss m

atte

rs a

t hom

e•

impe

ding

job

cont

rol t

o th

e su

perv

isor

or r

epre

sent

ative

s•

exce

ssive

lack

of i

nter

est o

r exc

essi

ve w

ork

(wee

kend

s in

the

offic

e)•

refu

sal t

o tra

nsfe

r to

anot

her p

ositi

on, e

ven

in th

e ca

se o

f pro

mot

ion

1.5

Ext

ra a

ctiv

ities

• co

nsul

tatio

ns, a

gree

men

ts, w

hich

may

give

a ri

se to

the

conf

iden

tial r

elat

ions

• w

orki

ng re

latio

nshi

ps w

ith c

ompa

nies

rela

ted

to th

e of

fice

• th

e em

ploy

men

t of p

erso

ns fr

om c

ompa

nies

, who

are

clo

se to

the

offic

e


2)

Indi

catio

n of

the

corr

upt b

ehav

ior

in m

unic

ipal

pr

oced

ures

2.1

Gene

ral m

unic

ipal

pr

oced

ures

• un

just

ified

sho

rteni

ng o

f the

pub

lic p

rocu

rem

ent

• fa

ilure

to re

spec

t leg

al p

roce

dure

s•

diffe

rent

dec

isio

ns o

n th

e sa

me

subj

ect a

t diff

eren

t app

lican

ts/ c

ompa

nies

• ac

cele

ratio

n or

stre

tchi

ng o

f im

porta

nt d

ecis

ions

, sud

den

chan

ges

in p

riorit

ies

• cr

eatin

g tim

e pr

essu

re, d

ecis

ions

just

bef

ore

the

dead

line

• di

ffere

nces

bet

wee

n th

e ac

tual

con

duct

of t

he p

roce

edin

gs a

nd s

ubse

quen

t doc

umen

tatio

n

2.2

Publ

ic p

rocu

rem

ent

• no

ticea

ble

shift

of t

he c

ontra

ct fr

om th

e or

igin

al p

rice

offe

r•

acce

lera

tion

of th

e pr

ocur

emen

t pro

cess

• ci

rcum

vent

ion/

bid

avoi

danc

e •

depa

rture

from

nor

mal

pro

cedu

res

in th

e pr

ocur

emen

t pro

cess

2.3

Orga

niza

tiona

l st

ruct

ure

of th

e m

unic

ipal

ity

• co

ncen

tratio

n of

the

task

s to

one

per

son

• la

ck o

f tra

nspa

renc

y•

unpr

epar

edne

ss /

unw

illing

ness

to e

nfor

ce a

nti-c

orru

ptio

n m

easu

res

3) Indi

catio

n of

the

corr

upt b

ehav

ior

in re

latio

n to

th

e ex

tern

al

envi

ronm

ent

• co

stly

pro

mot

iona

l gift

s•

spon

sors

hip

• un

expl

aine

d de

viat

ions

from

the

prev

ious

ly e

stim

ated

cos

ts, c

hang

es in

the

supp

ly p

rices

• to

o qu

iet p

rocu

rem

ents

bec

ause

of t

he c

arte

ls•

long

-term

bus

ines

s re

latio

nshi

ps w

ith s

uppl

iers

• su

spic

ious

val

uabl

e gi

fts d

urin

g oc

casi

ons,

inad

equa

te to

the

posi

tion

of th

e re

cipi

ent

• un

expl

aine

d in

form

atio

n ad

vanc

e of

som

e co

mpa

nies


Conclusion

The methodology for corruption risk assessment enables us to develop a comprehensive system for risk assessment and prevention of corruption ac-tivities in the central or local government. Provided that it is consistently and effectively implemented, a well-defined and well-designed system will ensure the required level of transparency in the administrative procedures and work, the prevention of corrupt behavior and activities, as well as will tackle exist-ing or potential corruption schemes.

The introduction of this system will equip the municipal administration with an effective internal mechanism for fighting corruption, at the same time en-able the municipality to conduct ongoing corruption risk assessment so as to avoid potentially high damage to its public image. Successful implementation of the system relies on several sets of indicators adapted to the needs of the municipal administration and taking into account both the general man-agement practices of the institution and the operations of each department/section. A corruption monitoring report that uses these indicators must be prepared at least once per year, in order to compile data for longitudinal sur-veys and analyses, as well as further improvements of the system. As it was mentioned above, for the system to function successfully, it is very important to integrate anti-corruption training modules, including on the anti-corruption indicators, in the annual training and development program of the municipal HR department. Such training will contribute greatly to the employee’s exper-tise and knowledge in detecting and preventing corruption in the municipal administration and their daily communication with citizens.


Annex 1: DETERMINING THE INDICATOR FOR FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE (EXAMPLE)

In 2013 Sofia Municipality organized 257 public procurement tenders and 103 direct contracting procedures with suppliers. The total number of the public procurements for the year is 360.

Using the scale for the frequency of occurrence (see Table 6 below), we can calculate the indicator, i.e. the probability for the occurrence of the corruption activity. This will show us the potential risk, regardless of whether this activ-ity has been identified or not as corruption. The number of procurements per year falls in the range of <100-499>, with an indicator point value of 8 for the frequency of occurrence. This means that the public procurement proce-dures represent an area with a very high risk for potential corruption activity.


Table 6: The range of frequency of occurrence

Occurrence - the in-cidence of corruption

opportunities

Points (indica-

tor)

CriterionOpportunity of corruption occurs:

Very high and repeating 10usually several times a day, repeat-edly, annual frequency is higher than 1000

Very high 9daily, annual frequency is in the range <500-999>

High 8usually daily, annual frequency is in the range <100-499>

Higher 7weekly or several times per week, the annual frequency is in the range of <52-99>

Intermediate - higher 6approx weekly, yearly frequency is in the range of <20-52>

Intermediate 5approx monthly, yearly frequency is in the range <5-19>

Intermediate – lower 4Every year, the annual frequency is in the range of <1-4>

Low 3less often than once a year, but more often than every 5 years

Very low 2 approx once every 5 years

Insignificant 1probable or almost certain, that the opportunity doesn´t occur


Annex 2: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE TO COLLECT INFORMATION REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE INDICATOR FOR MONITORING OF CORRUPTION RISKS

Тhematic priority Public procurement

1. Total number of public procurement procedures in the municipality

Per year Per month

Tenders

Direct contracting (single source procurement)

2. Total value of the public procurement bids in the municipality

Per yearPer month

Tenders

Direct contracting

3. Average monthly salary for: Per month

Management/expert personnel in the department

Administrative personnel in the department

4. Average salary for the municipal administration

Per month

5. What percentage of the budget for public procurement comes from European funds?

2013 2014

Total value of public procurement per year

% funded with EU money

6. Is there a system for reporting irregulari-ties and corruption (by the citizens and the employees)? If yes, how many reports have been filed?

2013Number of

reports

2014Number of

reports

Reports filed by citizens

Reports filed by municipal employees

7. Are there procedures (internal rules) for handling such reports?

Yes No

By citizens

By municipal employees


8. How many cases for public procurement violations have been detected and how many of them have been submitted to the investigation/prosecution office?

2013 2014

Number of detected violations

Number of cases filed with the prosecution

9. What types of penalties have been im-posed?

Number for 2013

Number for 2014

Disciplinary actions

Criminal liability

10. Is there a whistleblower protection sys-tem in the municipality?

Yes No

11. Are there instructions/internal rules/ and a separate document filing and handling system for the protection of whistleblow-ers/people who have filed reports?

Yes No

12. How many complaints/reports for cor-ruption/fraud/conflict of interests have been filed?

2013 2014

By citizens

By municipal employees

13. How many inspections have been carried out for irregularities/corruption/fraud/conflict of interests?

2013 2014

Total number

Linked to public procurement

14. Does the municipality conduct anti-corruption training for the employees? If „yes,“ how many trainings have been conducted and for how many employ-ees?

Yes(number)

No

Number of trainings

Number of employees who have received anti-corruption training

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ISBN 9789542914389

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