modelling authority commitments in two search and seizure cases

Modeling Authority Commitments in Two Search

and Seizure Cases

Matt CareyThomson Reuters

Legal Editorial [email protected]

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

WARNINGThe inferences in the following presentation

depend on the doctrine of precedent as it has developed under the common law. Accordingly,

these techniques should not be relied upon in civil law jurisdictions.

Wattenburg v. United States (1968) 388 F.2d 853

• Stolen Christmas trees• Found in a stockpile with other cut trees• Stockpile located behind defendant's motel• No valid search warrant

"Freshly cut pine trees" by Roberto Verzo. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80• Three growing marijuana plants• Found in a keg under the foliage of a fig tree• Located in defendant's "fenced rear yard"• No search warrant

"Fig tree" by Tomasz Przechlewski. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.


• Stolen Christmas trees• Found in a stockpile with other cut trees• Located in parking area behind defendant's motel• No valid search warrant• Federal court• Evidence suppressed

People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80• Three growing marijuana plants• Found in a keg under the foliage of a fig tree• Located in defendant's "fenced rear yard"• No search warrant• State Court• Evidence admitted

Why Mr. Bradley's reliance on Wattenburg v. United States was "misplaced"

"In Wattenburg, unlike the instant case, the recited facts do not show that any part of the objects seized was visible to a person nearby on the premises...The seized trees thus apparently were covered by other trees, evidence that Wattenburg exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy." Bradley at 85-86.

"Furthermore, although we are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution, we are not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts even on federal questions." Bradley at 86.


i.e. "We could distinguish Wattenburg on its facts."




i.e. "We could refuse to follow Wattenburg."




Where can we find reliable information in judicial opinions?

Problem: Courts like to reserve judgment on critical issues.

Solution: Courts also like to be obeyed.

Conclusion: Because the holdings of an opinion serve as commands to future courts, the holdings are the most explicit and reliable part of the opinion.

Hypotheses about Legal Authority● All substantive legal rules can be restated as

procedural rules for litigation.

●

●

Courts

Opinions

Enactments

Procedures

Factors

Holdings

Six types of objects

COURTS OPINIONS ENACTMENTS PROCEDURES FACTORS HOLDINGS

Effect of Two Issuing Courts’ Holdings in Various Receiving Courts

9th Circuit Court of Appeals

CA Supreme Court

US Supreme Court Persuasive Persuasive9th Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Persuasive

Other circuit Courts of Appeals

Horizontal stare decisis

Persuasive

Federal district courts within 9th Circuit

Controlling Persuasive

Federal District Courts outside 9th Circuit


Persuasive

CA Supreme Court Persuasive DecidedCA Courts of Appeal Persuasive ControllingCA Superior Courts Persuasive ControllingOther state supreme courts

Persuasive Persuasive

Levels of AuthorityControlling

Decided in Current Court

Horizontal Stare Decisis

Plain LanguagePersuasive Only

Ignored


Two Opinions

Wattenburg v. U.S.

People v. Bradley

Date January 19, 1968 October 31, 1969

Issuing Court


CA Supreme Court

Holdings H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6

H7, H8, H9, H10


“Rubber stamp device with adjustable date (Datownik biurowy)” Released to public domain by Wikimedia user “Julo.”


January 19, 1968

California Supreme Court

October 31, 1969

FEDERALConstitutional

Provisions

StatutesAdministrative Regulations

Court RulesCommon Law

Rules

STATEConstitutional

Provisions



Rules

4th Amendment, cl. 1(search and seizure clause)

14th Amendment, § 1(due process clause)

Sovereign Federal Federal

Type Constitutional ConstitutionalEffective December 15,

1791July 9, 1868

Repealed N/A N/A

Modeling Enactments



Search and Seizure Clause

Due Process Clause

4th Amendment 14th Amendment

U.S. Constitution


Provisions



Rules

STATEConstitutional

Provisions



Rules


Authority of

Positing Opinion

ControllingDecided in

Current Court

Horizontal Stare

Decisis

Plain Language

Persuasive Only

Ignored

Ranking Holdings by Enactment and Opinion

Date of Enactment

Date of Opinion



● From the point of view of a given court and date, procedural holdings above the "persuasive only" level can be ordered from most to least authoritative.

●

Legal Procedures


Suppression based on

unreasonable search

Suppression based on denial

of counsel


of right to remain silent

Suppression of Evidence

ID# Type Content

F1 Fact H was a motelF2 Fact D1 operated and lived at HF3 Fact H was D1’s abodeF4 Fact X was on the premises of HF5 Fact X was a stockpile of Christmas

trees

F6 Fact X was among some standing trees

F7 Fact The distance between X and H was more than 35 feet

F8 Fact The distance between X and H was at least 20 feet

F9 Fact X was within as little as 5 feet of a parking area used by personnel and patrons of H

F10 Fact X was within the curtilage of H

Factors



Two Evidence Factors

ID # Factor Type Type of Evidence

In the Form of

Derived From

Offered Against

F20 Evidence S D1F36 Evidence Physical

EvidenceX S D1

F36 F20⊆

EvidenceFacts

F1-F6

F8

F7

F20

F36

F9-F12

F13

F27

F14-F19

F21-F26

F28-F29

F30

F31

F32-F35

Factors


Four Types of HoldingsSubsumption Rule (SR): Indicates that one factor is included within another

Definition Rule (DR): Indicates that two factors are equivalent

Production Rule (PR): Produces new factors as an output when certain inputs are present

Limitation Holding (LH): States that a prior opinion should be read to support different holdings


ID Type Procedure Enactment Input Even If

Output Generality

H1 PR Suppression (search)

4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2 F3 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15

F16 ¬F20 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F11, F12, F17, F18, F19

F13 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F14 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F4, ¬F7, F9

F8 F15 Some, Must

Holdings in Wattenburg


ID# Type Procedure Enactments Input Even If

Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F11, [F21 or (F22 and F23)], F24, F25, F26, F27

¬F36 All, Must


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F11, [F21 or (F22 and F23)], [¬F24, ¬F25, ¬F26, or ¬F27]

Omit (¬F36)

All, Must


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, F35

F30, F34

¬F24 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, F35

F24, F30, F34

¬F25 Some, Must

Holdings in Bradley


Hypotheses about Legal Authority● All substantive legal rules can be restated as procedural rules for litigation.


● From an ontology of factors, an ontology of enactments, and an ontology of legal procedures, an ontology of holdings can be inferred.


Procedure Enactment Input Even If

Output Generality

Suppression (search)

4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 All, Must


Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7

F8 F10 Some, Must


Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6 F10 Some, Must



Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 All, Must


Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F8, F9

F10 All, Must

¬F8 ¬F7⊆

ID Type Procedure Enactment Input Even If Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15


ID# Type Procedure Enactments Input Even If Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1


Omit (¬F36)

All, Must

From People v. Bradley:

From Wattenburg v. U.S.:


HYPO PR Suppression (search)

4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F3, F11, F12, F14, F15, F22, F23, F25, F26, F27

¬F24 ¬F36 All, Must

Combined (F27 F13, F36 F20):⊆ ⊆

Desired result(Evidence is

not suppressed)

Omit (¬F36)

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8All

F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9Some

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8AllMust

F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9SomeMust

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8AllMust

F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9SomeMust

Controlling

Controlling

Thank you!

Matt [email protected]

[email protected]

Modeling Authority Commitments in Two Search and Seizure Cases

mailto:[email protected]

1

Modeling Authority Commitments in Two Search

and Seizure Cases

Matt CareyThomson Reuters

Legal Editorial [email protected]

[email protected]

What I want to do today is formally describe two rather ordinary California appellate opinions about criminal law. I'm going to try to describe how these two opinions created new legal authority, and how that authority will have a predictable impact on litigation procedure in future cases.

But first, I need to start with a disclaimer.

2

WARNINGThe inferences in the following presentation

depend on the doctrine of precedent as it has developed under the common law. Accordingly,

these techniques should not be relied upon in civil law jurisdictions.

That disclaimer is that I don't think the description of legal authority I give here has any applicability to civil law jurisdictions. For me, the concept of judge-made precedent is central to understanding what legal authority is and how it changes over time. So I'm not going to claim any insight into how legal authority works outside common law jurisdictions.

3


• Stolen Christmas trees• Found in a stockpile with other cut trees• Stockpile located behind defendant's motel• No valid search warrant

"Freshly cut pine trees" by Roberto Verzo. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

The first case I want to look at is Wattenburg v. United States, which was decided by a federal court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In November 1965, federal Forest Service agents noticed that some fir trees the size of Christmas trees had been cut down and taken from federal land without permission. The agents traced the trees to a man named W.H. Wattenberg, who was living in a California motel called the Hideaway Lodge. Without a valid warrant, the agents performed a search of a stockpile of cut trees behind the motel. They spent over six hours comparing the trees they found behind the motel to the stumps left behind on federal land. They ended up seizing nine stolen trees from Wattenburg's stockpile.

4

People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80• Three growing marijuana plants• Found in a keg under the foliage of a fig tree• Located in defendant's "fenced rear yard"• No search warrant

"Fig tree" by Tomasz Przechlewski. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

The second case is People v. Bradley, a state case from the California Supreme Court. In 1967, a deputy sheriff received an anonymous tip that a man named Dwight Bradley was growing marijuana in his yard. The deputy and other officers went to Bradley's home without a warrant, and discovered three marijuana plants growing in a keg beneath a fig tree in what the court described as a "fenced rear yard."

5


• Stolen Christmas trees• Found in a stockpile with other cut trees• Located in parking area behind defendant's motel• No valid search warrant• Federal court• Evidence suppressed

People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80• Three growing marijuana plants• Found in a keg under the foliage of a fig tree• Located in defendant's "fenced rear yard"• No search warrant• State Court• Evidence admitted

In both cases, the defendants made motions to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, and the motions were ultimately decided by the appellate courts. The federal court decided that a warrant was required for the Christmas tree search, and that the evidence from that search had to be suppressed. The state court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the marijuana search did not require a warrant, and that the evidence was admissible.

So, as readers, we might have a couple of problems in understanding the relationship between these cases

The first problem is that, while these are criminal cases, the critical facts have nothing to do with whether Mr. Wattenburg and Mr. Bradley actually committed crimes. The critical issue is the purely procedural question of whether the evidence from the search is going to be admitted. So in extracting information from these cases, we don't want to be distracted by the red herring of what the defendants actually did wrong.

The second problem is understanding why these very analogous cases had different outcomes on the suppression issue. My first instinct would be to look for differences in the facts to explain why Bradley is distinguishable from Wattenburg. But the Bradley court's explanation is actually more complicated than simply distinguishing Wattenburg on its facts.

6




The California Supreme Court gives two alternative explanations of why the defendant's reliance on Wattenburg v. United States was "misplaced." First, it says "In Wattenburg, unlike the instant case, the recited facts do not show that any part of the objects seized was visible to a person nearby on the premises...The seized trees thus apparently were covered by other trees, evidence that Wattenburg exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy."

7





In other words, the court could distinguish Wattenburg on its facts. But the second explanation is more interesting. The court says, "although we are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution, we are not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts even on federal questions."

8


i.e. "We could refuse to follow Wattenburg."




In other words, the California Supreme Court could adopt a different interpretation of the federal Fourth Amendment than the one the federal Ninth Circuit adopted in Wattenburg.

And the Supreme Court never decides between these two options. That's the end of the Bradley court's discussion of Wattenburg. And the court later confuses the issue further by mentioning that if Mr. Bradley had exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, the outcome of the case would be the same. If you search the Bradley opinion for the one correct explanation, in terms of values or logic, for why Bradley reaches the opposite outcome from Wattenburg, you won't find it.

But there's nothing inadequate about the opinion in People v. Bradley. A court doesn't actually have to justify its opinions in terms of values or logic. All it really has to do is explain why it has the authority to reach its decision, and then state its decision in clear enough terms to be followed in future cases.

9

Where can we find reliable information in judicial opinions?

Problem: Courts like to reserve judgment on critical issues.

Solution: Courts also like to be obeyed.

Conclusion: Because the holdings of an opinion serve as commands to future courts, the holdings are the most explicit and reliable part of the opinion.

If you read a lot of judicial opinions, you'll notice that courts like to leave their options open on questions of legal interpretation. They like to reserve judgment on issues like what obligations the law imposes on us outside the courtroom, or how future cases are going to be decided.

But there's also a flip side to this tendency, which is that courts like for their opinions to be obeyed. The holdings in an opinion should be viewed as commands to future courts, because they're an attempt to bind the future courts to follow the current court's view of the law. And courts need to make their expectations clear if they want their holdings to be obeyed.

So to get explicit and reliable information out of a judicial opinion, we should look at the holdings. But these holdings are generally not commands directed at the public about how to comply with the law. Instead, the holdings are procedural instructions for litigation, and they're directed at courts.

10



●

●

This leads me to a hypothesis about legal authority, which is that all substantive legal rules can be restated as procedural rules for litigation. And if this is true, I think it would make modeling legal rules much easier, because it's much easier to describe how legal rules work in the limited context of litigation than it is to describe the limitless realms of human activity outside the courtroom that can be influenced by laws.

11

Courts

Opinions

Enactments

Procedures

Factors

Holdings

Six types of objects

To describe how holdings can change rules of legal procedure, I think I need to describe six types of objects: courts, opinions, enactments, legal procedures, factors, and holdings.

12


Effect of Two Issuing Courts’ Holdings in Various Receiving Courts


CA Supreme Court

US Supreme Court Persuasive Persuasive9th Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Persuasive

Other circuit Courts of Appeals


Persuasive

Federal district courts within 9th Circuit

Controlling Persuasive

Federal District Courts outside 9th Circuit


Persuasive

CA Supreme Court Persuasive DecidedCA Courts of Appeal Persuasive ControllingCA Superior Courts Persuasive ControllingOther state supreme courts

Persuasive Persuasive

Levels of AuthorityControlling

Decided in Current Court

Horizontal Stare Decisis

Plain LanguagePersuasive Only

Ignored

A representation of a court issuing a decision requires a function which takes as an input the name of some other court, and returns the authority status of the present court’s holdings in the other court. The possible levels of authority, ordered from strongest to weakest, are “controlling,” “decided in the current court,” “horizontal stare decisis,” “plain language,” “persuasive only,” and “ignored.” “Plain language” is a term I use to refer to legal rules that are clearly stated in legislative enactments rather than cases.

Looking at the table on the right, we can see that the 9th Circuit's holdings in Wattenburg are controlling in the federal district courts, but are only persuasive in any of the California courts. In the same way, the California Supreme Court's holdings in Bradley are controlling in the state trial courts, but they're only persuasive in any federal courts.

13


Two Opinions

Wattenburg v. U.S.

People v. Bradley

Date January 19, 1968 October 31, 1969

Issuing Court


CA Supreme Court

Holdings H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, H6

H7, H8, H9, H10

Next come opinions. The representation of an opinion should include the date the opinion was issued, the court that issued the opinion, and a list of identifiers for the holdings posited in the opinion. A court might also posit the negation of a holding, which would indicate that the implication described by the holding may not be applied, or the omission of the holding from the list of authoritative holdings, which would indicate that the validity of the holding should be considered undecided. But there are no negated or omitted holdings in Wattenburg or Bradley.

There's a difference between the way opinions are represented here and the way opinions would traditionally be represented in a citator or citation index. In a citator, the metadata that would be associated with these two opinions would be their relationship with each other. Bradley might be described as “distinguishing” Wattenburg, or maybe “declining to follow” Wattenburg. But what I want to do here is describe the relationship of the cases to their holdings, and then go on to describe the relationships of the holdings to each other.


“Rubber stamp device with adjustable date (Datownik biurowy)” Released to public domain by Wikimedia user “Julo.”


January 19, 1968

California Supreme Court

October 31, 1969

It's as if every court has one of those adjustable rubber stamps with the court's name and the current date. So every time the court issues an opinion, the court is placing its timestamp on each holding posited by the opinion. On this view, a holding exists independently of any particular opinion, and an important holding might have stamps from hundreds of different opinions from various courts in different jurisdictions.

Each of these stamps is potentially relevant to determine the authority status of the holding, even the older stamps and the ones from lower courts.


Provisions



Rules

STATEConstitutional

Provisions



Rules

4th Amendment, cl. 1(search and seizure clause)

14th Amendment, § 1(due process clause)

Sovereign Federal Federal

Type Constitutional ConstitutionalEffective December 15,

1791July 9, 1868

Repealed N/A N/A

Modeling Enactments


The third type of object is enactments. A representation of an enactment should include the sovereign that enacted it, the type of enactment, and the dates of enactment and any repeal. Like the different courts, the different types of enactment are ranked according to their authority.

In the United States, enactments are ranked first by sovereign, then by type, and finally by time. Federal enactments trump state enactments. In this case the 4th Amendment and the 14th Amendment are both federal, so at the second step we look at which type of enactment they are. They're both constitutional provisions, so the tiebreaker is time. Later enactments prevail over earlier ones, so we can see that the 14th Amendment prevails over the 4th in the case of any conflict.

Common law rules appear on this list of so-called “enactments” because common law rules can be applied in litigation in much the same way statutes can. I want to be able to enforce the rule that every holding is an interpretation of at least one enactment.


Search and Seizure Clause

Due Process Clause

4th Amendment 14th Amendment

U.S. Constitution

It's important to be able to represent one enactment as a subset of another, because courts don't treat enactments as discrete units. For instance, on one day a court might state that a holding is authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment, and on another day it might state more specifically that the holding is authorized by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The more specific claim is slightly stronger, because it wouldn't be called into doubt if some other clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was repealed.


Provisions



Rules

STATEConstitutional

Provisions



Rules


Authority of

Positing OpinionControllingDecided in

Current Court

Horizontal Stare

Decisis

Plain Language

Persuasive Only

Ignored

Ranking Holdings by Enactment and Opinion

Date of Enactment

Date of Opinion

By combining the method for ranking enactments with the method for ranking courts, we get a method for ranking holdings. Essentially, if the holdings are based on two different enactments, you determine which enactment ranks higher. If the holdings are both based on the same enactment, you go on to determine which holding was posited by the highest-ranking opinion.

An exception is that the date of the opinion can't act as a tiebreaker if the opinion is at the “persuasive only” level or lower. Courts receiving contradictory “persuasive only” holdings decide for themselves whether they find any of them persuasive, regardless of which ones are most recent.

Note that controlling authority is the only kind of authority a court can be absolutely required to obey. Courts can only disobey a controlling holding if it's contradicted by an even higher holding.

18




●

So that leads to a second hypothesis. When any two holdings above the “persuasive only” level contradict each other, it should be possible to determine which one ranks higher. But you can't determine that one holding is objectively higher. You can only rank the holdings subjectively, from the point of view of a particular court and date.

Legal Procedures


Suppression based on

unreasonable search


of counsel


of right to remain silent

Suppression of Evidence

Next come legal procedures. In litigation, the parties have to invoke procedural rules to advance the litigation toward a conclusion. Normally the parties don't do that by citing individual holdings. Instead, they normally cite what I call a legal procedure, which is an umbrella concept that refers to numerous procedural holdings. Therefore, I want to enforce the rule that all holdings have to be linked to at least one legal procedure. Much like with enactments, more specific procedures can be subsumed within more general ones.

All ten holdings I represented from Bradley and Wattenburg are linked to the same legal procedure, which is suppression of evidence based on an unreasonable search.

ID# Type Content

F1 Fact H was a motelF2 Fact D1 operated and lived at HF3 Fact H was D1’s abodeF4 Fact X was on the premises of HF5 Fact X was a stockpile of Christmas

trees

F6 Fact X was among some standing trees

F7 Fact The distance between X and H was more than 35 feet

F8 Fact The distance between X and H was at least 20 feet

F9 Fact X was within as little as 5 feet of a parking area used by personnel and patrons of H

F10 Fact X was within the curtilage of H

Factors


The fifth type of object is factors. Every statement that acts as either a premise or a conclusion for a holding is a factor. In Wattenburg and Bradley I found a total of 64 factors, including 36 that related to the suppression of evidence issue. Most of the factors were legal facts like the ten examples shown here.

I represented the legal facts as predicate statements with variables to stand for any concepts referred to in multiple factors. So for instance, Factor 1 was the fact that “H was a motel.”


Two Evidence Factors

ID # Factor Type Type of Evidence

In the Form of

Derived From

Offered Against

F20 Evidence S D1F36 Evidence Physical

EvidenceX S D1

F36 F20⊆

The two evidence factors are especially important because all ten holdings in Wattenburg and Bradley are directed at determining whether this evidence will be admitted or not. The evidence described in factor F36 is a more specific form of the evidence described in F20. F20 covers all evidence derived from search S and offered against the person designated D1. But F36 is limited to physical evidence of an object designated X.

EvidenceFacts

F1-F6

F8

F7

F20

F36

F9-F12

F13

F27

F14-F19

F21-F26

F28-F29

F30

F31

F32-F35

Factors


Factors can also be organized into an ontology. Here, the factors lower on the chart are subsumed by the factors higher up.

Four Types of HoldingsSubsumption Rule (SR): Indicates that one factor is included within another

Definition Rule (DR): Indicates that two factors are equivalent

Production Rule (PR): Produces new factors as an output when certain inputs are present

Limitation Holding (LH): States that a prior opinion should be read to support different holdings


I think most holdings can be divided into four types. The first two types simply state that one concept is included in another, or that two concepts are equivalent. All ten of the holdings in Wattenburg and Bradley fall within the third type, production rules, which produce new output factors when certain input factors are present.

The fourth type is what I call a limitation holding. Limitation holdings state that a certain holding either should or should not be attributed to a prior opinion.


Output Generality




4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15



4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F11, F12, F17, F18, F19

F13 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F14 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F4, ¬F7, F9

F8 F15 Some, Must



There were eight holdings in Wattenburg, but only six related directly to the suppression issue. They're all production rules. Note that factors can appear as necessary inputs for the holding or as “Even if” factors, which are failed undercutters that don't need to be present to invoke the holding.


Output Generality




4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15



4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F11, F12, F17, F18, F19

F13 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F14 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F4, ¬F7, F9

F8 F15 Some, Must



The last column, marked “Generality,” tells you whether the holding applies in “Some” cases where the inputs are present or “All” such cases. It also tells you whether the output of the rule is something the court “May” accept or something the court “Must” accept. When a court isn't clear about which type of implication applies, the defaults are the weaker types, “Some” and “May.”


Output Generality




4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15



4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F11, F12, F17, F18, F19

F13 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F14 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F4, ¬F7, F9

F8 F15 Some, Must



I'm using the negation symbol in an unusual way. When the negation symbol appears in front of a fact factor it represents a finding that the fact is false, but when it appears in front of an evidence factor it means the court has decided to exclude the evidence.


Output Generality




4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15



4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F11, F12, F17, F18, F19

F13 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F2, F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F14 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1 F1, F4, ¬F7, F9

F8 F15 Some, Must



To translate that first holding into English, Factor 1 is “H was a motel” and Factor 2 is “D1 operated and lived at H.” Those are the inputs. So in some cases where those inputs are present, the court must accept the output, Factor 3, which is “H was D1's abode.” While Factor 3 is an output of Holding 1, it's also an input for Holding 3. When all six inputs for Holding 3 are present, the output is the exclusion of the evidence described in Factor 20.

ID# Type Procedure Enactments Input Even If

Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F11, [F21 or (F22 and F23)], F24, F25, F26, F27

¬F36 All, Must


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1


Omit (¬F36)

All, Must


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, F35

F30, F34

¬F24 Some, Must


4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, F35

F24, F30, F34

¬F25 Some, Must

Holdings in Bradley


These four holdings, numbered seven through ten, are taken from People v. Bradley. Of the eleven holdings in Bradley, only the four shown here were relevant to the suppression motion. Holding 8 includes an “omitted” factor as an output. That means that the present legal procedure may not produce the factor as an output, but it doesn't preclude the factor from being produced under some other legal procedure.

In other words, if Holding 8 applies, the defendant can't rely on the the allegedly unreasonable search to suppress the evidence. And note that Holding 8 applies in all cases where the inputs are present, not just some.

Hypotheses about Legal Authority● All substantive legal rules can be restated as procedural rules for litigation.


● From an ontology of factors, an ontology of enactments, and an ontology of legal procedures, an ontology of holdings can be inferred.

So that leads me to the last hypothesis. “From an ontology of factors, an ontology of enactments, and an ontology of legal procedures, an ontology of holdings can be inferred.”

In other words, I'm suggesting that with a proper description of factors, enactments, and legal procedures, you would be able to tell by looking at two holdings whether one is implied by the other.



Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 All, Must


Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7

F8 F10 Some, Must


Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6 F10 Some, Must

That would mean that when a court places its stamp of authority on a holding, that stamp actually ends up on a lot more than the one holding. The court is also lending its authority to every holding implied by the one it actually endorsed.

For instance, if a court holds that a trial judge must accept a certain output in All cases where certain inputs are present, that also implies the court must accept the output in at least Some case where any subset of the inputs is present.



Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F7, F9

F8 F10 All, Must


Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F4, F5, F6, ¬F8, F9

F10 All, Must

¬F8 ¬F7⊆

Or, if a certain output is required in All cases where certain inputs are present, if you substitute one input with a more specific form of the same factor, the output is still required.

In fact, an ontology of holdings would threaten to give us too much information, because it's easy to demonstrate that many holdings can be used to derive an infinite number of trivial and weaker versions of the same holding.

ID Type Procedure Enactment Input Even If Output Generality


4th A., cl. 1 F3, F11, F12, F13, F14, F15




4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1


Omit (¬F36)

All, Must

From People v. Bradley:

From Wattenburg v. U.S.:


HYPO PR Suppression (search)

4th A., cl. 1; 14th A., § 1

F3, F11, F12, F14, F15, F22, F23, F25, F26, F27

¬F24 ¬F36 All, Must

Combined (F27 F13, F36 F20):⊆ ⊆

Let's use this method to look at the state of legal authority in a hypothetical common law system where the only two decided cases are Wattenburg and Bradley. If we had time to look at the holdings of Wattenburg and Bradley factor by factor, we'd see that the two courts framed their analysis somewhat differently, and there's not a lot of overlap between the factors in the two cases. They almost seem to be talking past each other. One way to deal with this is to combine factors from the two cases into a kind of lowest common denominator between the holdings of the two cases. That way we get one holding which is a plausible description of a hypothetical case, such that the two courts are committed to take opposite positions about whether the holding is acceptable.

For instance, this combined holding claims that the evidence should be suppressed where nearly all the factors to satisfy both cases' tests are present, except that the defendant did not show an expectation of privacy in the object seized. The model indicates that it would be largely futile to argue for the combined holding in a lower state court because it would be contrary to controlling authority. On the other hand, it would be much easier to argue for the combined holding in a lower federal court, because it would only require extending an existing holding to cover “all” cases rather than just “some.”

So far, I've tried to show that describing holdings in procedural terms can help track their authority status in different courts. But I also want to suggest that the same procedural data could serve another purpose. It could also be used in a simulation of litigation.

Desired result(Evidence is

not suppressed)

Omit (¬F36)

Let's imagine we're prosecutors in a California state trial court. The defendant has requested suppression of evidence, and we don't want that to happen. We need to invoke a series of holdings with the final output that the evidence is not excluded. So in searching for the right holdings to invoke, we work backwards from our desired result.

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

Holding 8 tells us we can prevent the suppression of the evidence by establishing as few as three factors. We just need one factor from each of the three groups on the left. But maybe we're not sure how to establish those factors, either. So we can continue to work backwards with additional holdings.

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9

Holding 9 tells us how we can negate Factor 24, which would mean to show that the defendant did not exhibit an expectation of privacy in the object seized. So the output of one procedural holding can become the input of another, creating a chain of reasoning.

We also have enough information to describe the defeasibility of these procedural conclusions. In the context of litigation, a procedural holding might be said to be defeasible in three different ways.

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8All

F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9Some

First, a procedural holding might be distinguishable based on the addition of more factors or more specific factors. This can be determined by checking to see whether the court stated the holding applies in “All” cases where the input factors are present, or only in “Some” cases.

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8AllMust

F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9SomeMust

Second, the holding might be defeasible in the sense that it gives the court discretion as to whether to accept the output or not. This can be checked by determining whether the holding is labeled with “Must” or “May.”

Omit (¬F36)

F21

F11

H8AllMust

F22 and F23

¬F27

¬F25

¬F24

¬F26

F3, F22, F28, F29, ¬F31, ¬F32, F33, and F35

H9SomeMust

Controlling

Controlling

And finally, the holding might be defeasible in the sense of being supported by less than controlling authority in the current court, which would mean the court would have the power to disagree with the holding. From the point of view of a California state trial court, Holdings 8 and 9 are both supported by controlling authority.

So one way to visualize legal research would be as a search through a large collection of procedural holdings for possible paths to a desired litigation outcome. The characteristics of the most desirable paths would vary depending on the researcher, but they might include the shortest path, the path that relies on the strongest authority, the path that includes the most mandatory steps, or the path that uses the most factors present in the current case.

Thank you!

Matt [email protected]

[email protected]

Modeling Authority Commitments in Two Search and Seizure Cases

Thanks for your attention! I would love to hear your feedback, so please do contact me by email.

modelling authority commitments in two search and seizure cases

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