modelo ss judgment (ada and title vii)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

NANCY OLIVIERI, CARLOS J. MIRANDA, THEIR CONYUGAL PARTNERSHIP, MINORS CARLOS, CALEB, ISAI, LEMUEL, KEMUEL MIRANDA OLIVIERI

Plaintiffs

v.

ABBOTT LABORATORIES AND ITS SUBSIDIARY ABBOTT JAYUYA OPERATIONS; JOHN DOE AND RICHARD ROE; ABC INSURANCE AND XYZ INSURANCE

Defendants

Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC)

BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

COMES NOW Defendant Abbott Laboratories(hereinafter “Abbott”,

“the Company” and/or “Defendant”) through counsel, and respectfully

states and prays as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nancy Olivieri (hereinafter “plaintiff” a nd/or

“Olivieri”) claims that she was discriminated and h arassed because

of her disability and religious beliefs and was unj ustly terminated

from her employment with Abbott.

Plaintiffs invoke this Court =s jurisdiction under allegations

that the case arises pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities

Act (ADA) of 1990, as amended, 42 USC §12101 et seq . ; Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e et seq .; Puerto Rico Law

44 of July 2, 1985, as amended, P.R. Laws Annot. T. 2 §501 et seq. ;

Case 3:05-cv-01244-ADC-BJM Document 10-18 Filed 03/03/06 of 33

BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) Puerto Rico Law 100, P.R. Laws Annot. t.29 §146 et seq .; Puerto Rico

Law 80 of May 30, 1976, as amended, 29 L.P.R.A. §18 5a et seq.; and

under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civ il Code P.R. Laws

Annot. t. 31 §§5141, 5142. There exists no other b asis for the

exercise of federal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ c laim.

Abbott moves for brevis disposition of the complain t on the

following grounds:

• Olivieri fails to establish a prima facie case

of disability discrimination or harassment.

Statement of Uncontested Material Facts

(hereinafter “Statement ”), ¶¶ 9-13.

• Olivieri admitted that she was accorded an

accommodation. Statement , ¶23.

• The conduct alleged by Olivieri does not rise

to severe and pervasive conduct to constitute

harassment on the basis of religions belief.

Statement , ¶¶ 52-59.

• Abbott has proffered a legitimate and

nondiscriminatory reason for its action that

cannot be proven to be a mere pretext for illegal

discrimination. Statement , ¶¶ 71-76.

As discussed in detail below, Olivieri failed to es tablish a

cause of action under the invoked statutes. Conseq uently, Olivier’s

causes of actions must be dismissed with prejudiced .

Case 3:05-cv-01244-ADC-BJM Document 10-18 Filed 03/03/06 Page 2 of 33

BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC)

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Americans with Disability Act (ADA) of 1990 Cla im

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits

discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability by

reason of the individual’s disability in all employ ment practices

such as job application procedures, hiring, advance ment, firing,

compensation, job training, and other terms, condit ions, and

privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). Su tton v. United

Air Lines, Inc. , 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). The ADA

also requires that an employer make reasonable acco mmodations to

the known physical or mental limitations of an othe rwise qualified

individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1212(b)(3)-(4).

ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disabil ity” as “an

individual with a disability who, with or without r easonable

accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment

position that such individual holds or desires” 42 U.S.C. §. 12111(8);

White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F. 3d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1995).

The ADA lists three alternative definitions for "d isability",

of which a plaintiff must, at least, satisfy one to be accorded any

protection under the statute: (a) a physical or men tal impairment

that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities

of such individual; (b) a record of such an impairm ent; or (c) being

regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) (Emphasis added). Sutton v. United Air Lines , 527 U.S. 471, 144

L.Ed.2d 450 (1999).

In order to meet the first prong of the ADA’s disa bility

definition, Olivieri must prove three elements:

(a) that she has a physical or mental impairment; (b) that this impairment adversely affects a major life

activity; and ,

(c) that it does so to a significant extent or that the impairment substantially limits her ability to enga ge in the particular major life activity. Santiago v. Executive Airlines , 7 F. Supp.2d 114 (D.P.R. 1998).

Not all physical impairments rise to the level of a disability

under the ADA. Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airl ines, Inc. , 213

F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2000); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding , 53

F.3d 723, 725 (5 th Cir. 1995). It is necessary that the individual

can perform the essential functions of the employme nt position that

she holds or desires, with or without reasonable ac commodation , and

that she has the required skills, experience, educa tion, and other

job-related requirements for such employment. 42 U. S.C. § 12111(8).

In determining whether an impairment constitutes a disability, the

question should not be answered “only by analyzing the effect of

the impairment in the workplace.” Rather, what is central to this

inquiry is the effect of the impairment on the plai ntiff’s daily

life. Toyota Motors Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams , 534

U.S. 184; 122 S.Ct. 681, 693 (2002).



The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s ("EEO C")

regulations include among "major life activity" fun ctions such as

caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walkin g, seeing,

hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working . 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(i). With regards to the term “substantially limits”, the

EEOC regulations define this term as the (1) inabil ity to perform

a major life activity, or (2) a severe restriction on the ability

to perform a major life activity as compared to the general

population. 29 C.F.R. ' 1630.2(j)(1).

The plaintiff has the burden to establish a cause o f action

under the ADA. E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc. , 110 F.3d 135, 142 (1 st Cir.

1997); Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc. , 96 F.3d at 511. To establish

a prima facie case of discrimination in absence of direct eviden ce

Olivieri must prove:

a. that she was "disabled" within the meaning of the Act;

b. that she was able to perform, with

or without reasonable accommodation, the essential functions of her job; and

c. that she was discharged or adversely

affected, in whole or in part, because of her disability.

See, Dichner v. Liberty Travel , 141 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1 st Cir. 1998);

Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management , Inc ., 97 F.3d 876, 882-883 (6 th Cir.

1996); Vallejo Serrano v. Cigna Ins. Co. , 970 F.Supp. 78 (D.P.R.

1996).


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) This burden is not onerous, pursuant to the “famil iar burden

shifting scheme” used in discrimination cases, once plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, a presumption arises that the employer

unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff. Then d efendant has the

burden of production to articulate some legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employmen t action. Once

this is done, the presumption of discrimination est ablished by the

plaintiff’s prima facie showing drops out of the picture. See Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 120 S.Ct. 2097 (June 12, 2000);

St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502, 506-507 (1993); Texas

Dept. of Community Affairs , v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981);

Udo v. Tomes , 54 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing McDonnell Dougl as

Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Hicks , supra) ); Mohammadian

v. Ciba Vision of Puerto Rico, Inc. , 378 F.Supp.2d 25, 32 (D.P.R.

2005); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. , 194 F.3d 252,

264 (1 st Cir. 1999).

In the present case, Olivieri fails to establish a single element

of the prima facie case for disability discrimination.

a. Olivieri is not "disabled" within the meaning of the Act;

As evident from Defendant’s Uncontested Material F acts,

Olivieri is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Statement

¶¶9-13.

i. Olivieri is not "an individual with a disability "

First, Olivieri testified that she has a condition known as


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) “recurrent laringotraqueobronquitis”. The conditio n is

characterized by irritation of the respiratory syst em and difficulty

breathing. Olivieri admitted that the condition an d its symptoms

are not permanent. Statement , ¶¶9, 10.

Merely having an impairment does not make Olivieri disabled

for purposes of the ADA. Olivieri needs to demonst rate that the

impairment limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see,

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc . v. Williams , 534 U.S.

184, 195 (2002); EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing, Co. , 246 F.3d 850 (6 th

Cir. 2001); Poindexter v. Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway,

Co. 168 F.3d 1228 (10 th Cir. 1999). A major life activity is

substantially limited if an individual is unable to “perform a basic

function that the average person in the general pop ulation can

perform ” or is significantly restricted in “the condition, manner,

or duration under which [he or she] can perform a p articular major

life activity as compared to an average person in t he general

population.” Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr. , 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8 th

Cir. 1997)(Emphasis added), see, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1). The United

States Supreme Court held that “major life activiti es” refers to

those “activities that are of central importance to daily life” .

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc . v. Williams , supra at

197(Emphasis added).

The applicable regulations and case law have establ ished that

major life activities include caring for oneself, p erforming manual


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathin g, learning,

working, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, slee ping, mental and

emotional processes such as thinking, concentrating , and

interacting, eating, and the ability to control bas ic bodily

functions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), See also , Toyota Motor

Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc ., supra at 197; Bragdon v. Sydney Abbot ,

524 U.S. 624 (1998); EEOC Compliance Manual § 902.3(b) at p. 15;

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatri c Disabilities ,

No. 915.002 (3/25/97), at p. 4.

Olivieri admitted that despite her condition, her daily home

life continued as normal, she performs the typical and common

household tasks such as taking care of the children ; driving; taking

children to school; house cleaning such as sweeping , mopping,

dishwashing, and cleaning clothes. Statement , ¶13. Olivieri only

identified cleaning the bathrooms and the likes as the only activity

that she cannot perform because of her condition. Statement , ¶13.

With regards to that, the United States Supreme Cou rt held that

although “household chores, bathing, and brushing o ne’s teeth are

among the types of manual tasks of central importan ce to people’s

daily lives”, chores as “sweeping” were not a major life activity .

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc ., supra. at 202.

Particularly, the courts have generally held that “ cleaning”, or

more generally, “doing housework”, does not qualify as a major life

activity. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 362 (3 rd . Cir.


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) 2000) (where the court held that cleaning the floor s was not a major

life activity); See also , Colwell v. Suffolk County Police

Department , supra at 643(performing housework other than basi c chores

cannot reasonably be deemed as a major life activit y); Dutcher v.

Ingalls Shipbuilding , 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5 th Cir. 1995); Bear v. Exxon

Mobil Corporation , 2004 WL 2603727 at * 5 (E.D.La. Nov. 15, 2004)

(the inability to complete the single task of clean ing the bathtub

is not a limitation on a major life activity); Mill er v. Wells Dairy,

Inc. , 252 F.Supp.2d 799, 808 (N.D.Iowa, 2003); Lockett v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc. , No. 99 0247-CB-C, 2000 WL 284295, at *8 (S.D.Ala. Mar.

8, 2000); Richards v. American Axle & Man., Inc. , 84 F.Supp.2d 862,

870 (E.D. Mich. 2000).

Accordingly, Olivieri is not an individual with a disability,

for her condition does not limit a major life activ ity.

Moreover, it is important to note that Olivieri sp ecifically

stated that her condition is not permanent . Intermittent, episodic,

temporary non-chronic impairments of short duration , with or no long

term or permanent impact are not disabilities within the meaning

of the ADA, 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. at 339 (1996), e ven if those

conditions required extended leaves of absence from work. Pollard

v. High’s of Baltimore, Inc. , 281 F.3d 462, 467-468 (4 th Cir. 2002);

Halperin v. Abacus Technology Corporation , 128 F.3d 191, 199 (4 th

Cir. 1997); Vande Zande v. State of Wis.Dept. of Administration ,

44 F.3d 538,544 (7 th Cir. 1995). The United States Supreme Court


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) has held that, an impairment must be “permanent or long-term” in

order to be covered by the ADA. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,

Inc . v. Williams , 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002); Sutton v. United Air

Lines, Inc. , 527 U.S. 47 (1999); Morales v. Morovis Community Health

Center , 310 F. Supp.2d 411, 416 (D.P.R. 2004)(“An essenti al aspect

of a claim under the Act requires that a plaintiff’ s “disability”

or “handicap” be permanent or long-term in nature.” ).

Olivieri’s own admission under oath clearly shows that her

condition is only temporary and contingent on her c ontact with any

chemical that produces the reaction. Statement , ¶¶10, 12.

Accordingly, her condition is not covered under the ADA. Pursuant

to the above, Olivieri does not meet the first elem ent of the ADA

prima facie case. This, in and of itself, warrants the dismis sal

of Olivieri's ADA claims.

b. Olivieri was not able to perform, with or witho ut reasonable accommodation, the essential functions o f her job Olivieri worked as Laboratory Technician in Abbott ’s Chemistry

Laboratory. Statement , ¶7. In addition to a supervisor, the

chemistry laboratory operates with laboratory techn icians.

Statement , ¶¶3, 7. The essential duties of a laboratory tec hnician

consist of performing chemical analyses, including potency analysis,

dissolution analysis, raw material analysis, and T3 analysis.

Statement , ¶4. These essential duties were equally important and

had to be performed by all laboratory technicians i n rotations.


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) Statement , ¶4, 6. All these analysis were performed inside the

Laboratory. Statement , ¶5.

Olivieri testified that during 2003 she worked in t he first

shift and that her condition allowed her to perform 50% of the

essential duties of a laboratory technician, T3 an alysis and document

review. Statement , ¶¶7, 20, 25. Olivieri testified that her

inability to perform the remaining essential duties of her job was

because she could not be directly exposed to certai n chemicals that

were sometimes present in the laboratory and used f or some of the

essential analyses. Statement , ¶¶9, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 36, 38,

71. However, Olivieri never received a list of the chemicals that

allegedly caused her condition. Olivieri knew that the raw materials

produced the condition because she noticed changes in her health.

Statement , ¶10.

Because of her condition, Olivieri allegedly could not perform

potency, dissolution and raw material analyses beca use they contained

solvents that triggered the symptoms of her conditi on. Statement

¶¶14, 21. As previously stated, all of these analy ses were essential

duties of the Laboratory Technician position. Stat ement ¶4.

Moreover, the doctors that evaluated Olivieri speci fically stated

that she could not work near or close or in contact with chemicals,

fumes, gases or any irritant of the airways, becaus e she could

potentially develop occupational asthma. Statement ¶¶9, 16, 24,

36, 38.


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) Pursuant to the above and as admitted by Olivieri, she could

not perform three of her positions essential functi ons regarding

analyses and the pneumologist that evaluated recomm ended that she

not work in the laboratory. Statement , ¶¶14, 21. Accordingly,

Olivieri fails to comply with the second element of the prima facie

case, for she was not able to perform, with or with out reasonable

accommodation, the essential functions of her posit ion as laboratory

technician.

c. Olivieri was not discharged or adversely affect ed, in whole or in part, because of her disability Following Olivieri’s leave in 2003, she did not re turn to work

because she could not work near, close, or in conta ct with chemicals,

fumes, gases or any other irritant. The reason for this limitation

was that she could develop occupational asthma. St atement ¶36.

Despite the fact that Olivieri's condition did not rise to the

level of a protected disability, Abbott engaged in an interactive

process to evaluate the possible accommodations alt ernatives for

Olivieri’s condition. Statement ¶¶30, 33-36, 38-40, 42-50. As part

of this process, Abbott offered Olivieri two positi ons which she

refused. Statement ¶¶46, 47. In addition, Abbott, through its Human

Resources Director Miriam Bayron, instructed Olivie ri to visit the

company weekly to inquire about available positions . Statement ¶48.

Besides a single visit for this purpose, Abbott nev er saw nor heard

from Olivieri again. Statement ¶49.


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) During this time, despite the fact that Olivieri r efused to

fill out the documents required for statutory leave s, Abbott granted

her an unpaid leave for one year. Statement ¶¶73, 74.

As of September 2, 2004 Olivieri had been absent f or over one

(1) year from her employment with Abbott and had fa iled to contact

her employer since March. Statement ¶¶49, 73, 75, 76. Accordingly,

Abbott notified Olivieri that effective September 2 , 2004 her

employment with the Company ended. Statement ¶76. Abbott’s decision

to terminate Olivieri’s employment was strictly due to her failure

to return to work after the statutory one (1) year employment reserve

ended. Statement ¶¶71-76. Abbott’s decision, as evident from the

record, had nothing to do with Olivieri’s purported condition.

Pursuant to the above, Olivieri also failed to est ablish the

third element of the ADA prima facie case.

Failure to Accommodate Allegation

Moreover, as previously indicated, it is important to note that

under the ADA, the term Adiscriminate @ includes the employer’s failure

to make reasonable accommodations to the known phys ical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual wi th a disability.

42 U.S.C. '12112(b)(5)(A). Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe,

Inc. , 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1 st Cir. 1999).

A failure-to-accommodate claim has a different set of

requirements. As listed by the First Circuit, a pl aintiff in a failure

to accommodate case must:



(a) furnish sufficient admissible evidence that she is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (b) establish that she worked for an employer covered by the ADA; (C) that the employer, despite its knowledge of the employee’s physical limitations, did not accommodat e those limitations; (d) That the employer’s failure to accommodate the known physical limitations affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of the plaintiff’s employment.

Id.

Olivieri is also unable to establish a cause of ac tion for

failure to accommodate.

Pursuant to the previous discussion and to Defenda nt’s

Statement of Uncontested Material Facts, except for the second

element, Olivieri fails to meet all the remaining e lements of

her failure to accommodate cause of action. Statem ent , ¶¶9-13,

23.

Even in the unlikely event that Olivieri is deemed a

"qualified individual" for the ADA purposes, which we deny,

Olivieri admitted that, prior to 2003 Abbott grante d all her

requests for accommodations. Statement , ¶23.

After the 2003 leave, Olivieri requested, as an

accommodation, to return to her position in the Lab oratory but

to perform part of the essential duties of the posi tion. She

only wanted to perform T3 analysis and Document Rev iew.


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) Statement , ¶50. At that time the pneumologist that evaluate d

Olivieri specifically recommended that she not “wor k near or

close or in contact with chemicals, fumes, gases or any irritant

of the airways”. Statement , ¶36. The pneumologist’s

recommendations clearly showed that Olivieri’s retu rn to the

chemical laboratory was not an option for it put he r at risk

of developing occupational asthma. Statement , ¶¶36, 38.

Moreover, Olivieri did not accept the positions of fered

to her as accommodation, except for one visit in a year, she

failed to heed Bayron's advice that she visit Abbot t to verify

any available position that she might be interested in occupying

as accommodation. Statement , ¶¶43-49.

The record shows that what Olivieri only wanted as an

accommodation was to perform less that 50%of the es sential

duties of laboratory technician. Statement , ¶50. The duty to

provide reasonable accommodation does not require a n employer

to provide every accommodation that a disabled empl oyee request;

but only to a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA and

its Regulations’ standards. Vande Zande v. Stae of Wis.Dept.

of Administration , 851 F.Supp.353, 362 (W.D. Wis. 1994), aff’d

44 F.3d 538 (7 th Cir. 1995).

Even despite the fact that Olivieri was not a qual ified

individual for the ADA purposes, Abbott at all time s did

everything reasonably possible to accommodate her c ondition


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) and requests. Statement , ¶¶9-13, 23. Notwithstanding,

Olivieri’s requests following her 2003 leave were c learly

unreasonable given her doctor’s recommendations and her refusal

to consider the alternative options that Abbott off ered.

Statement , ¶¶20, 21, 24, 25, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 43-49.

To that effect and as previously discussed, Olivier i is also

unable to establish a cause of action under the ADA for failure to

accommodate. Consequently, Olivieri’s claim under ADA must be

dismissed.

Harassment Allegation

In addition, Olivieri also alleges that she was har assed because

of her alleged condition. With regards to harassme nt allegations

under the ADA, the Courts evaluate these allegation s pursuant to

the same standard established for harassment claims under Title VII.

Accordingly, harassment is actionable under the ADA , pursuant to

Title VII’s standards only if it is “so ‘severe or pervasive’ as

to ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employme nt and create

an abusive working environment.’” Faragher v. Boca Raton , 524 U.S.

775, 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (q uoting Meritor

Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91

L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted )); See ,

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 752, 118 S.Ct.

2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (Only harassing conduc t that is "severe

or pervasive" can produce a “constructive alteratio [n] in the terms


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) or conditions of employment”), Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510

U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct.367, 370-371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993);

Arrieta-Colón v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. , 434 F.3d 75 (1 st

Cir.2006)(Court found harassment conduct under the ADA after

plaintiff’s supervisors and co-workers constantly m ocked him for

years due to a condition that he developed after a surgery); See

also , Figueroa Reyes v. Hospital San Pablo del Este , 389 F.Supp.2d

205 (D.P.R. 2005)(Plaintiff failed to establish a h ostile work

environment allegation based on a single alleged ha rassment episode);

Mohammadian v. Ciba Vision of P.R., Inc. , 378 F.Supp.2d 25, 31 (D.P.R.

2005); Rodríguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc. , 967 F.Supp. 653, 663

(D.P.R. 1997.

The nature of the workplace conduct is not measured in isolation;

instead, “whether an environment is sufficiently ho stile or abusive"

must be analyzed “by ‘looking at all the circumstan ces,’ including

the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether

it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a m ere offensive

utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes w ith an employee's

work performance.’” Faragher v. Boca Raton , supra ., at 787,788,

118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 510 U.S.

17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) and M arrero v. Goya

of Puerto Rico , 304 F.3d 7. 18 19 (1st Cir 2002); See Rodríguez ,

967 F.Supp. at 663. Thus, “simple teasing, offhand comments, and

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”

Faragher v. Boca Raton , supra ., at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts shou ld filter out

complaints on “‘the ordinary tribulations of the wo rkplace, such

as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender rel ated jokes, and

occasional teasing.’” Faragher , supra. , 524 U.S. at 788, (internal

citations omitted). “After all, ‘[t]he workplace is not a cocoon,

and those who labor in it are expected to have reas onably thick

skins.’” Marrero , 304 F.3d at 19 (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l,

Inc. , 229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir.2000)). The alleged harassment must

be extreme in nature for it to constitute a change in the terms and

conditions of employment. Faragher , supra ., 524 U.S. at 788.

Olivieri failed to make a concrete a allegation of harassment

because of her condition. As per her Complaint, Ab bott allegedly

harassed her by constantly referring her to differe nt physicians

for evaluation even when they knew her condition. Complaint (Docket

No.1), ¶51. The basis for Olivieri’s allegation cl early does not

constitute harassment under the ADA’s standards for it clearly does

not reach the severe, pervasive or extreme level re quired to establish

a hostile work environment cause of action.

Abbott’s referrals of Olivieri to the Company’s Occ upational

Physician and to a pneumologist clearly show its in tents and efforts

to evaluate Olivieri’s condition and the alternativ es available to

accommodate the same and its participation in an in teractive process


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) to evaluate her request. Statement , ¶¶33, 34, 36, 38, 39. Under

no circumstances, this sole allegation of the effor ts on Abbott’s

behalf constitutes harassment under the ADA. See Figueroa Reyes ,

389 F.Supp.2d at 212-214.

B. Religion Discrimination Allegation under Title VII Olivieri also alleges that she was discriminated an d harassed

because of her religious beliefs in violation to Ti tle VII of the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e et seq . Title VII proscribes

discrimination because of religion in relation to a n employee’s terms

and conditions of employment. 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e-2. Under Title

VII, an employer is liable if the proscribed catego ry C in this case

religion C was the motivating factor in the employer =s decision.

That is, the plaintiff =s religion must have “actually played a role

in [the employer =s decision making] process and had a determinative

influence on the outcome .” See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000) (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins ,

507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).

Under Title VII, Olivieri has the burden of establi shing that

her religion was a determinative factor in her disc harge and other

employment actions, and that Abbott intentionally d iscriminated

against her on account of her religion. Reeves , 530 U.S. at 143;

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Where, as in this case, the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of

discrimination, the Afamiliar burden-shifting framework established



in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), comes into

play. @ Goldman v. First National Bank of Boston , 985 F.2d 1113 (1 st

Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

In order for Olivieri to establish a prima facie case of alleged

religion discrimination she must prove that:

(a) she was a member of a protected class;

(b) she met her employer’s legitimate job

expectations;

(c) she was discharged; and,

(d) her employer recruited someone outside

the protected class.

Olivieri’s religion discrimination allegation is al so subject

to the “familiar burden shifting scheme” discussed in Section II.A.,

pages 5-6, above with regards to plaintiff’s ADA cl aim.

In the present case, even if solely for discussion purposes

we assume that Olivieri met the prima facie case under Title VII;

a review of the uncontested material facts clearly shows that religion

had nothing to do with Abbott’s decisions regarding Olivieri’s

employment. Statement ¶¶71-76.

As evident from the discussion contained above, the reason for

the termination of Olivieri’s employment with Abbot t was based

exclusively on the fact that Olivieri failed to ret urn to work after

the one year leave Abbott granted her ended. State ment , ¶¶71-76.


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) The record is devoid of any evidence that Abbott to ok any action

against Olivieri because of her religion. Abbott’s legitimate and

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions clearly sh ows that

Olivieri’s religion had nothing to do with Abbott a ctions. Statement ,

¶¶71-76. Abbott's reasons are legitimate and non-d iscriminatory

that cannot be proven to be a mere pretext of alleg ed discrimination.

As such, Olivieri’s prima facie showing, if any, vanishes from the

picture. See Reeves , 530 U.S. at 143; St. Mary =s Honor , 509 U.S.

at 511.

Olivieri further alleges that she was also harassed because

of her religion. Olivieri’s religion harassment al legations are

based on her assertion that a case was fabricated a gainst her because

she was religious; that a co-worker, Lymaris Rodríg uez, approached

and asked her if Catholics prayed and Olivieri, who admittedly was

not bothered by the question, replied that she coul d not answer her

question, that someone who practice that religion [ Catholicism] could

answer it and Rodríguez allegedly became altered wi th Olivieri’s

answer. Statement ¶¶52-59.

Olivieri further alleged that her co-workers made jokes about

her religion. Statement ¶¶54-55. For instance, that her co-workers,

mainly Melvin Román and Lumarie García, commented b etween them, not

to Olivieri, “Come, let’s go to pray”; that they pu t their hand in

a person’s forehead and spoke in "angelical" langua ges; and that

many times they changed the lyrics of a song that s aid “There is


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) no God as big as you” to “There is no better rum th an Don Q”. Statement

¶¶54-55. Olivieri was bothered by these comments. Statement ¶57.

Olivieri also alleged at one point that her samples had allegedly

been altered. Statement ¶59.

Although she complained to her supervisors, she ne ver complained

to the Human Resources Department. Statement ¶¶57, 59.

As discussed in the previous section with regards t o Olivieri’s

harassment allegation under the ADA, it is well set tled that

harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is “so ‘severe

or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [the v ictim’s] employment

and create an abusive working environment.’” Farag her v. Boca Raton ,

524 U.S. 775, 786, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (quoting

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399,

91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (internal quotation marks omit ted)); see ,

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth , 524 U.S. 742, 752, 118 S.Ct.

2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (Only harassing conduc t that is "severe

or pervasive" can produce a “constructive alteratio [n] in the terms

or conditions of employment”).

In Rosario Rivera v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewers Authority ,

331 F.3d 183 (1 st Cir. 2003) the First Circuit considered a religiou s

harassment claim. After considering the basis for plaintiff’s

religion harassment allegation, the Court held that while the conduct

depicted by plaintiff was deplorable, it did not am ount to violation

of Title VII. Id. at page 191.



A comparison of the allegations raised by plaintiff as basis

for her religion harassment allegation in Rosario R ivera , supra.,

and the allegations made by Olivieri clearly show t hat if no religion

harassment was found in Rosario Rivera , supra. , there is not even

an iota of evidence in the case at bar to constitut e harassment because

of her religion.

In Rosario Rivera , plaintiff, a Catholic, alleged that

she was subjected to a hostile work environment bec ause of her

religion, that her supervisor treated her unfairly, that he failed

to assign her work, criticized her performance, den ied her vacation

time, did not offer her computer training, and chan ged the office

lock without giving her a new key. Rosario Rivera , 331 F.3d at

185-186. Plaintiff further alleged that she was ca lled “Mother

Theresa”; that her co-workers discussed religion in terminably,

criticizing the Catholic Church, and, in turn, Rosa rio’s ardent

religlosity; that she was subject to co-worker’s ex pletives

regularly; that her co-workers repeatedly made allu sions to her

religion and their portrayal of her as self-righteo us; that a

co-worker sang to her a bawdy Christmas carol menti oning her name

and that, given her deep religious convictions, the lyrics of the

song were offensive to her; and that on her birthda y plaintiff

received in the office a card with a pig wearing a rosary with her

birth date emblazoned at the top. Id. at pages 185-191.

Taking these facts to consideration, the First Circ uit analyzed


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) whether the “rude and unprofessional” conduct to wh ich the plaintiff

in Rosario was subjected to was because of her religion. Ros ario

Rivera , 331 F.3d at 189-191. The Court held “on that sco re, regardless

of the evidentiary course the plaintiff charts, she must show that

alleged discriminatory conduct was not ‘merely ting ed’ with remarks

abhorrent to her religion but actually was, in either character or

substance, discrimination because of her religion . ” Id. at page

189 (Emphasis added). The First Circuit further he ld that “there

is a conceptual gap between an environment that is offensive to a

person of strong religious sensibilities and an env ironment that

is offensive because of hostility to the religion g uiding those

sensibilities. Rosario has not provided us with ev idence or argument

sufficient to bridge the gap.” Id. at page 190.

As previously stated and established, like Rosario ’s,

Olivieri’s religion harassment allegation does not amount as required

by the Court to evidence that these alleged acts oc curred because

of hostility towards her religion. Statement ¶¶52-58; see Rosario

Rivera , 331 F.3d at 190.

Moreover, as established in Abbott’s Statement of U ncontested

Material Facts, upon the investigation conducted by Miriam Bayron,

Human Resources Director, regarding Olivieri’s alle gations, what

did exist in the work place was an environment were Olivieri, as

well as her co-workers, engaged in discussions of r eligion and

politics nature. Statement , ¶¶60-63, 65-68. As per Bayron’s


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) investigation, all employees received a memorandum reminding them

to prevent discussion of religious and political to pics, because

they affected the normal and well proceedings of th e department.

Statement , ¶¶65-68.

As to Olivieri’s allegation that someone altered he r sample,

pursuant to the investigation conducted, Olivieri c ould not even

identify the person who allegedly altered the sampl es, much less

what were his or her intentions. Statement ¶¶64, 69, 70.

As previously stated, a review of the allegations made by

plaintiff as to the basis for her claim of harassme nt shows they

are merely a series of isolated events that fail to demonstrate any

type of discrimination because of her religion. Mo reover, it

important to note that Olivieri has made no connect ion whatsoever,

because it is impossible to do so, with the alleged incidents of

religion discrimination and the adverse employment action taken

against her, that is the termination of her employm ent with Abbott

for her failure to return to work after the one yea r leave ended.

The record shows that plaintiff is simply making a n assumption that

the incidents were discrimination because of her re ligion because

she has no other explanation.

Pursuant to the previous discussion, Olivieri faile d to

establish a cause of action for religion discrimina tion and

harassment under Title VII. Therefore, her claim m ust be dismissed

with prejudice.



C. The claim under Puerto Rico Law 44 Olivieri further alleges that Abbott discriminated against her

due to her disability and failed to accommodate in violation to Puerto

Rico’s Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985. The local discr imination statute

-PR Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985- was enacted to proh ibit discrimination

against individuals with physical or mental disabil ities in public

institutions or private entities that received fund s from the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See , Statement of Motives of Law No.

44 of July 22, 1985. Following the enactment of th e ADA, Puerto

Rico =s Legislature enacted Law No. 105 of December 20, 1 991, with

the express purpose of extending Act No. 44’s prote ction to persons

employed by private institutions in Puerto Rico and to strictly

conform Law No. 44 to the Americans with Disabiliti es Act of 1990.

See Statement of Motives of Act 105 of December 20, 19 91; García

Díaz v. Darex , 148 D.P.R. 364 (T.S. 1999); Ríos Jaimán v. Cidra

Manufacturing , 145 D.P.R. 746 (T.S. 1998).

In order to conform Law No. 44 to the ADA, Law 105 amended the

definition of Aindividual with physical disability @ to include all

persons that have a disability that substantially l imits one or more

of the major life activities; that the person have a history of such

a condition; or that the person be regarded as havi ng such a

disability. See 1 L.P.R.A. '501(d).

Plainly, the definition of disability in Law No. 44 is the same

as the one contained in the ADA. Accordingly, and since it was the


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) Legislature =s express intent of conforming the statute to the A DA,

it follows that ADA’s precedent regarding the defin ition of

disability is applicable to cases arising from the local statute.

UPR v. Asoc. Profesores Universitarios , 136 D.P.R. 335 (1994); Bruno

López v. Motorplan , 134 D.P.R. 111 (1993); Pérez Maldonado v. J.R.T. ,

132 D.P.R. 972 (1993).

As previously discussed in Section A, plaintiff is unable to

establish a cause of action of discrimination due t o disability under

the ADA. Accordingly, plaintiff is also unable to establish a cause

of action for discrimination under P.R. Law 44.

D. The religion discrimination claim under P.R. Law 10 0 Puerto Rico's Law 100 of June 30, 1959, provides fo r civil

liability in religion discrimination actions. 29 L .P.R.A. '146 et

seq. García Pagán v. Shiley Caribbean , 122 D.P.R. 193, 198-199 (1988);

Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Dist. Corp. , 116 D.P.R. 485, 489

(1985). For a plaintiff to establish a cause of ac tion for religion

discrimination pursuant to Law 100, it is crucial t o follow the

procedural scheme specified in Article 3 of the Law . 29 L.P.R.A.

'148; Hernández, Galo Beltrán y la Sociedad Legal de Gananciales

v. Trans Oceanic Life Insurance Company , 2000 T.S.P.R. 115 (P.R.

2000). Article 3 of Law 100 creates a presumption o f unlawful

discrimination in those cases when an employee is t erminated or

adversely affected without just cause by an employe r’s decision.

P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, ' 148. García Pagán v. Shiley Caribbean ,


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) 122 D.P.R. 193, 198-199 (1988); Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Dist.

Corp. , 116 D.P.R. 485, 489 (1985).

In order to establish a claim for religion discrimi nation

pursuant to Law 100, it is the employee’s duty to e stablish the burden

of proof of her claim and, in that manner, activate the presumption

of discrimination. Id. For a plaintiff to activate the presumption

of discrimination, she must establish three element s:

a. that there was dismissal or adverse action; b. that this action was carried out without just cause; and c. must show evidence which demonstrates the form or basis of the discrimination in relation to the dismissal or adverse action.

Hernández, Galo Beltrán , supra ; Alberty Marrero v. Lcdo. Rodríguez

Emma, 99 T.S.P.R. 166 (P.R. 2000); Belk Arce v. Martínez , 98 T.S.P.R.

109 (P.R. 1998). After plaintiff establishes these three elements,

the burden of proof is shifted to the employer, who must then establish

that no discriminatory action was taken.

In Hernández, Galo Beltrán v. Trans Oceanic Life Insurance

Company, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that Law 100’s presumption

of discrimination can only be activated during an e videntiary hearing

celebrated, not during pretrial procedures such as dispositive

motions. 2000 T.S.P.R. 115. Moreover, in Hernánde z, Galo Beltrán ,

the Puerto Rico Supreme Court indicated that Articl e 3’s intention

and the presumption established there is to make it easier for an


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) employee to prove her case, not to relieve or exone rate her from

the necessity of presenting evidence to prove his a llegations. Supra.

In the instant case there are no facts justifying t he activation

of any presumption. First, although plaintiff =s employment was

terminated, such termination was for just cause. A s previously

indicated, Abbott’s decision to terminate Olivieri =s employment was

solely based on Plaintiff =s failure to return to work after her one

(1) year leave ended. Statement , ¶¶71-76.

For the reasons previously stated Olivieri is barre d from

demonstrating and/or even alleging that defendants = legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons for her dismissal were f alse and without

just cause.

As previously discussed, plaintiff cannot establish that the

basis for her termination was because of her religi on. Consequently,

plaintiff cannot establish a cause of action for re ligion

discrimination under Puerto Rico Law 100.

E. Unjustified dismissal under P.R. Law 80 of March 30, 1976.

Pursuant to Puerto Rico’s Law No. 80 of March 30, 1 976, as

amended, P.R. Laws Ann. t. 29, sec.185a et seq., an employer cannot

terminate a person from his employment, except for just cause, or

else, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination ar ises and the

employer has to refute the same. Delgado Zayas v. Hosp. Inter. Med.

Avanzada , 137 D.P.R. 643 (T.S. 1994); Beauchamp v. Holsum Bakery

of P.R. , 116 D.P.R. 522 (T.S. 1985); Rivera v. National Life , 106


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) D.P.R. 512 (T.S. 1977). Law 80 sets forth that any employee in

commercial business, industry or other business or place of

employment that is terminated from his employment w ithout just cause,

has a right to receive from the employer an indemni zation as set

forth by the law. P.R. Laws Ann. t. 29, sec. 185a. Delgado Zayas

v. Hosp. Inter. Med. Avanzada , 137 D.P.R. 643 (T.S. 1994); Secretario

del Trabajo v. ITT , 108 D.P.R. 536 (T.S. 1979).

However, the obligation to indemnify an employee u nder Law 80

arises only when the termination is capriciously ma de, or without

just cause. Mercedes Bus Line v. Tribunal , 70 D.P.R. 690 (T.S. 1949).

That is, in those cases in which there is just caus e for the

termination, the employee has no remedy against the employer.

Law 80 contains certain guidelines to indicate wha t could

constitute just cause for dismissal. Almodóvar v. G.P. Industries ,

2001 T.S.P.R. 4; see Figueroa v. Walgreens of San Patricio, Inc. ,

2001 T.S.P.R. 150. Accordingly, just cause for the discharge of

an employee from an establishment shall be understo od to be:

“a) That the worker indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly conduct; (b) The attitude of the employee of not performing his work in an efficient manner, or of doing it belatedly and negligently or in violation of the standards of quality of the product produced or handled by the establishment; (c) The employee's repeated violations of the reasonable rules and regulations established for the operation of the establishment, provided a written copy



thereof has been opportunely furnished to the employee. (d) Total, temporary or partial closing of the establishment operations. (e) Technological changes or from reorganization, as well as for style, design or nature of the product that is produced or managed by the establishment and changes in the services provided to the public. (f) Reductions in employment which are necessary due to a reduction in volume of production, sales or earnings, anticipated or that prevail at the moment of the dismissal.

A discharge made by the mere whim of the employer o r without

cause relative to the proper and normal operation o f the establishment

shall not be considered as a discharge for good cau se.” P.R. Laws

Annot. t. 29, §185b. (Emphasis added).

As previously established, Olivieri’s employment w ith Abbott

ended after she failed to return to work after her one year leave

ended. Statement , ¶¶71-76. According to the above, Olivieri’s

employment termination was for just cause and pursu ant to Law 80

requirements. As such, her unjustified dismissal cl aim must be

dismissed.

F. Co-plaintiffs Carlos J. Miranda, Carlos Miranda Oli vieri, Caleb Miranda Olivieri, Isai Miranda Olivieri, Lemu el Miranda Olivieri, Kemuel Miranda Olivieri cause of action u nder Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Cod e.

On September 1994, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico ruled that

a spouse of an employee subjected to discrimination has a general


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) tort cause of action based on Puerto Rico’s Civil C ode. Accordingly,

under Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code an employee’s spouse

has a tort claim against an employer if (1) the rel atives have

allegedly suffered a compensable moral (emotional) harm; (2) the

harm was caused by the employer’s discriminatory tr eatment of his

employee, with whom the plaintiffs are related thro ugh blood ties

and ties of love and affection, in such a way that the impact of

the discriminatory treatment received by the employ ee affects them

and causes them harm; and (3) the employer committe d a tortuous act

pursuant to the all-embracing definition given to t ortuous acts in

our jurisdiction. Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air, Inc. , 137 D.P.R. 1

(1994). Nevertheless, the husband cause of action is subordinated

to the employee’s success on her discrimination cla ims. Thus, if

an employee cannot suffice the requirements of the purported cause

of action, her husband cannot sustain any tort clai m under Article

1802.

Pursuant to the previous discussion, Olivieri is un able to

establish a cause of action for discrimination. Ac cordingly,

co-plaintiffs would not be entitled to damages unde r Puerto Rico’s

general tort statute.

III. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested from this C ourt that

it grant the present Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and


BRIEF IN SUPPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Civil No. 05-1244 (CCC) that plaintiff’s claims be dismissed with prejudice and that cost

be awarded to Defendant.

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 3 rd , 2006 we electronically filed

the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system,

which will send notification of such filing to the following: Juan

R. Requena Dávila, Esq. P.O. Box 192259 San Juan, P .R. 00919-2259

and Juan Carlos Cancio Reichard, Esq. 2008 Pedro Al bizu Campos Ave.

Carr. 107 Km. 0.8 Aguadilla, PR 00604 Apartado 2502 63 Aguadilla,

Puerto Rico 00604.

At San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 3 rd day of March of 2006.

S/CARMEN LUCIA RODRIGUEZ VELEZ S/PEDRO J. MANZANO YATES Carmen Lucía Rodríguez Vélez Pedro J. Manzano Y ates USDC-PR No. 216703 USDC-PR No. 207005 Attorney for Defendant Attorneys for Defendant FIDDLER, GONZALEZ & RODRIGUEZ,PSC FIDDLER, GONZALEZ & RODRIGUEZ,PSC P.O. Box 363507 P.O. Box 363507 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936-3507 San Juan, Puerto Rico 00936-3507 Tel: (787) 759-3127 Tel: (787) 759-3240 Fax: (787) 250-7565 Fax: (787) 250-7565 [email protected] [email protected] 599229 N/E 1166 017


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