Models for tackling Lebanon’s electricity crisis

Key messages1. Progressrequiresarecognitionofreality.EffortstoreformLebanon’s

electricitysectorhavefailedbecausetheyhaveattemptedtourgepoliticalactorstoimplementchangeswhichrundirectlyagainsttheirownpoliticalinterests.Thereissubstantiveinternationalevidence,includingfromSOASACE’sworkonthesectorinNigeria,thatprogresscanonlybemadewhenthereisaproperunderstandingofthepoliticaleconomyofthecontextandsolutionsareconsistentwiththenatureofthatreality.

2. ‘Secondbest’solutionscanbepoliticallyfeasible–buttheyareuncertainandcomewithrealrisks.Findingsolutionsthatarefeasiblerequiresaprocessofexperimentation;itishardtoknowinadvancewhetheranyparticularapproachwillwork,whichcreatesuncertainty.Moreover,thepoliticallyfeasiblesolutionsthatarefoundmaywellbe‘secondbest’–theymayyieldusefulimprovements,butfailtoaddresskeyweaknesses,leavesomegroupsbehindorevenunderminefaithinthecentralstate.

BriefingPaper

Credit:Fotokon/Shutterstock.com

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IntroductionLebanon’selectricitysectorissufferingseverechallenges,withincreasinglyfrequentandlengthyblackoutsandaseriousriskofthecollapseoftheentiresystem.Thenationalelectricityutility,ElectricitéduLiban(EDL),wasalreadyinafragilefinancialsituation,butthishasbeenexacerbatedbythesevereeconomiccrisisthecountryisexperiencing.Theconfluenceofbanking,financial,socialandhealthcriseshasresultedintheerosionofpublicconfidenceandarapiddeteriorationofbasicpublicservices.Theshortageofforeigncurrencymeansthattheutilityisunabletoobtainequipmentandsparepartsformaintenance,whilefuelsuppliesarealsothreatened.ThesefactorscompoundtheoperationalchallengesofbothEDLandprivatedieselgenerators,pushingcitizenstoseekalternativesolutions.

On4February2021,theIssamFaresInstituteattheAmericanUniversityofBeirut(AUB),incollaboration

1 Thefullwebinarcanbefoundonthislink

withThePolicyPractice(TPP)andtheSOASAnti-CorruptionEvidence(ACE)consortium,hostedawebinarentitled‘ModelsfortacklingLebanon’selectricitycrisis’.ThisbroughttogetherexpertsfromLebanonandaroundtheworldtoexploredifferentstrategiestoaddressthecountry’selectricitychallenges:fromthedecentralisedmodelpromotedbyconcessionssuchasÉlectricitédeZahle(EDZ),tothecentralisedgovernmentplanthatadvocatestheexpansionofthermalpowergeneration.Thediscussionalsoexaminedtheevolvingroleofrenewableenergyinbothmodelsanditsadoptionbyanumberofmunicipalities.

Thisbriefingpapersummarisestheviewsofthekeyspeakersanddiscussants.Itdrawstogetherthekeythreadsofthediscussion–identifyingthecommonalitiesandthepointsofdisagreement–andprovidessometentativesuggestionsaboutthewayforwardforthesector.1

Ali AhmadSenior Fellow, AUB Issam Fares Institute and Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Electricity concession models: achieving reform at the margins

ThecurrentpoliticaleconomycontextofLebanonhasbeenresistanttoanymeaningfulcentralreformsintheenergysector.Consequently,areformed,concessions-basedanddecentralisedpowergenerationwithsubstantialbutwell-regulatedprivate-sectorparticipationappearstobeaneffectivemodeltoaddressthecountry’smostpressingenergyneeds.Althoughthecurrentconcessionmodelisunsustainable–givenitsdependenceonseeminglysubsidisedelectricitypurchasedfromEDLanditsrelianceonimporteddieselfueloil–itprovidesastartingpointforreformforthreereasons.

First,thecurrentlyoperatingconcessions(EDZandÉlectricitédeJbeil(EDJ))havewidepublicsupportwithintheirrespectiveterritoriesduetotheirtrackrecordofgoodserviceprovisionandtheirabilitytonavigatethelocalpoliticalcontext.Second,theyhave

muchbettertechnicalandmanagementperformancethanEDL(suchaslowerlossesandhighercollectionrates),whichultimatelytranslatesintobettercommercialperformance.Third,concessionsarebetterpositionedtograduallyadjustthetariffduetotheirgoodserviceprovision,whichisacknowledgedbyconsecutivegovernmentsasanessentialconditionofpricingreforms.

OurresearchhasshownthattheLebanesepublicarewillingtopaythefullcostofelectricityiftheyreceiveareliableandhigh-qualityservice(Ahmadetal.,2020).Inthelongerterm,thereformedconcessionmodelcouldbeusedtoachievehigherpenetrationofrenewableenergy.Thiswouldbebeneficialnotonlyforenvironmentalandsustainabledevelopmentreasons,butalsotominimisefuelprocurement,whichisamajorcontributortorent-seekingandcorruptioninLebanon.

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Muzna Al-MasriAnthropologist, researcher, consultant and co-founder of the Ebla Research Collective

Clientelism for improved energy services? Observations on community mobilisation

Socio-politicaldynamicshavebeenkeyinallowingEDZtoachieve24/7power.EDZfosteredinstrumentalandaffectiveclientelistictieswiththecommunitytoimproveitspositioninnegotiatingapoliticalsettlementwiththenationalelite.Itdidthisthrough:

1. Quality service: pre-datingthestartofEDZ’sownpowergenerationin2015,EDZoverhauleditsservicesinthe1990s.

2. Strengthening clientelistic ties: EDZprovidedsponsorshiptolocalsportsclub,schools,socialandreligiousinstitutions,journalistsandmediaoutlets,andalsoco-optedandemployedsomeofthegeneratorownerswhowouldhaveopposedEDZ.Since2010,thecompanyhascreatedandutilisedalocalcommitteetosupportitpublicly.

3. Building strong affective ties:advertisementcampaignsandreligious/communaleventshavegarneredsupportforEDZ,galvanizedprideinthecityofZahleandsustainedabondbetweenEDZandthepeopleofthecity.

Thiscommunitysupportwasevidentin2018when10,000peopleprotestedtodemandtherenewalofEDZ’sconcession.EDZleveragedthisinnational-levelnegotiations,whichresultedinthecompanybeinggrantedacontractextension.EDZ’sactionsillustratethevalueof‘bottomup’dynamics,eventhoughthiswasengineeredbyaprivate-sectoractor.

Box 1: The impact of 24/7 electricity in Zahle

Theprovisionof24/7electricitybyEDZhashadawiderimpactinfourways:

1. A decrease in stress,connectedtohavingtoadapttothe‘rhythm’ofelectricity.Intervieweeshavespokenof24/7powerasa‘blessing’andas‘relieffromamajorburden’.Thislargelypositiveeffectisfeltmostlyatthehouseholdlevel,bywomeninrelationtodomesticaffairsandbysmallbusinesses.

2. A sense of dignity.Zahleresidentsseetheprovisionofahigh-quality,reliable24/7electricityserviceasmuchmorethanjusttheproperfunctioningofatechnicalsector;theyattachtheirpositiveevaluationofthecompanytofeelingsof‘dignity’and‘humanity’.AlocalresidentofFerzolvillagedescribedelectricityinZahleasthe‘onlythingthatmakesusfeelhuman’.

3. Questioning the role of the state.TheperformanceofEDZisoftenviewedmorefavourablyrelativetothepoorperformanceofEDLandstateinstitutionsingeneral.WhenexplainingwhyEDZprovidesagoodservice,respondentselaboratedonthelonglistofproblemstheyhavehadwithEDL,includingfrequentpowercuts,low-qualityserviceanddelaysandcorruptioninrepairs.Similarcomplaintshavebeenmadeaboutotherstateservices,suchaswatersupplyandroadworks.OneactivistfromBarEliasexplained:‘ourexperiencewiththestateisreallybad....[Thestate]hasnotbeenhonestwithus...andthisiswhyyouwouldseeusexcitedaboutEDZ,becausetheyhavebeenhonestwithus.’

4. Stronger support for privatisation.ThesuccessofEDZhasledmanytoadoptanarrativeofprivatisation.EDZ’sperformance,comparedtothatofEDLandotherstateinstitutions,isseenasproofthatonlytheprivatesectorcanresolvesomeoftheprotractedproblemsofthepublicsectorinLebanon.

Source:Ahmadetal.(2020).

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Hassan HrajliProgramme Advisor and Project Manager, Energy and Environment Programme, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Mitigating the barriers to the integration of distributed renewable energy schemes

WhilewearewaitingforanewgovernmenttobeformedinLebanonandbegintheoverduereformsinthepowersector,distributedrenewableenergy(RE)canassistthecountrytoachievebetterenergysecurity.However,therearelegal,technicalandadministrativeconstraintsthatlimittherealisationofthefullpotentialofdistributedRE.

ThelegalbarriersarebeingtackledthroughaninitiativetoenactadistributedRElaw,whichissupportedbytheEuropeanBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(EBRD),theMinistryofEnergyandWater,EDLandtheLebaneseCenterforEnergyConservation(LCEC).Thislawwillpavethewayfornetmeteringinallitscategories,peer-to-peeron-siteandoff-sitetradingofREpower,andREequipmentleasingmodels.IfenactedbyParliament,thelawwouldfacilitateandexpandthedistributedREmarketinLebanon.

Yet,achievingeffectiveintegrationofrenewablesrequireswellgovernedcentralinstitutions.ThekeychallengeremainstoempowerandenableEDL’sautonomy,financialintegrityandhumancapacity,aswellasthatofanyentitythatmaybedesignatedwiththeresponsibilityforthemanagementandoperationofthedistributionnetworkundera

restructuredelectricitymarket.ThisisneededtoensuretheintegrationofdistributedREinthepowernetwork,toadministertheallocationofexportedortradedpowerfromdistributedrenewables,andtoenforceappropriatebillingprocedures.TheinnovationspermittedbythedistributedRElawalsorequireoversightfromaregulatoryauthority,onceestablished,toensurefairpricesandstructuresforpowerwheelingandnetmeteringschemes.Untilsuchanauthorityisestablished,distributedREsystemshavetobedesignedtomaximiseinstantaneouson-sitedemandandtominimisetheexportofpower(orusepower-to-Xmodels,includingstorage).Unfortunately,thecentralgovernmentcontinuestoprocrastinateontheimplementationofLaw462/2002,whichrequirestheestablishmentofanelectricityauthority.

Asaconsequence,Lebanesecitizensandinstitutionsarebetteroffreducingtheirrelianceoncentralisedsourcesbygeneratingtheirownpowerthroughmoresustainableandcost-effectivetechnologies.However,thefullpossibilitiesorpotentialofdistributedREgenerationwillnotbeachieveduntilthereareefficientmanagement,assetsandoperationswithinthecentralisedpowermarketwithwhichthesesystemscaneffectivelyintegrateandsuccessfullycomplement.

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Alix ChaplainPhD student in sociology and urban studies, Centre for International Relations Studies (CERI), Sciences Po Paris

The emergence of hybrid mini-grids in Lebanon

Overthelastfewyears,becauseoftheshortcomingsoftheLebaneseState,certainsmall,ruralmunicipalitieshavedevelopedcollectiveelectricitysupplysystemsbasedonrenewables.Comparativeanalysisoffourhybridphotovoltaic(PV)/dieselmini-gridsrevealsthestrategies,relationshipsandintereststhatshapethedevelopmentofthesesocio-technicalinnovations.

● Acommunity-ledprojectinBaaloulembodiesacooperativeandparticipatorymodelandhasstrengthenedthelocalcommunitybyprovidingacollectiveandlocalelectricityservice.Initially,inhabitantswantedtheirowndieselgenerationsystem,buttheythenreceivedagrantfromCaritasandtheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)tobuildandinstallamini-PVgridsystem.

● AsimilararrangementisinplaceinMenjez,withthedifferencebeingthatmanagementofthesystemisnotparticipatorybutrathercomesfromalocalleader/individual.ThemunicipalisationofthehybridPV/dieselmini-gridinMenjezisatoolforlocalgovernmenttolegitimiseanewlycreatedmunicipality,throughacollaborationwithapoliticisednon-governmentalorganisation.

● Themini-gridinQabrikhaembodiesaninternationalexperimentledbyCountryEntrepreneurshipforDistributedRenewablesOpportunities(CEDRO)andUNDPtoreformLebanon’smonopolisticmodel.Thisinitiativeproposesnationalregulationtoallowmunicipalitiestobenefitfromnet-meteringandinhabitantstoreducetheirelectricitybills.

● Finally,inafourth,anonymous,casestudy,severalprivatecompaniesdecidednotonlytobypassthepublicgrid,buttocompetewithitbyofferingconsumersanautonomousenergysupplywithbatteries.Thesemini-gridconfigurationsaimtosupplyelectricity24/7fortheinhabitantsofpoorandisolatedvillagesthroughamarket-drivenstrategywithprivateregulationandatariffthatenablesproviderstomakeaprofit.

However,inthefaceofpersistentshortagesandtheneedforrenewablesolutions,itremainsunclearhowmunicipalandprivateactorscanbegivenmoreopportunitieswithoutdeepeningterritorialdivisionsinLebanon.

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Jamil MoawadSenior Fellow, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) and Lecturer in Politics, AUB

Reforming the electricity sector through the lens of a ‘kind’ state

AtatimewhentheLebanesepeoplearewitnessingboththecollapseoftheeconomicmodelandanincreasinglackoftrustinthegovernmentanditsinstitutions,whatdoesitmeantoreformtheelectricitysector?Leavingasidethetechnicalaspectsofreform,fromapoliticalperspective,oureffortsshouldprioritisethewell-beingofcitizensandequitableaccesstoservices.

Inparticular,reformingtheelectricitysectorisawayforthestatetore-establishitssovereignty,toenhancestate–societyrelationsandtorevivepublictrust.Themissionshouldbetomovefromthepost-civilwar,security-baseddivisionofthecountryintoseveralstatestowardsasinglecivilstatethatactsasaneutraldevelopmentalactor.Thereformofelectricityisawindowofopportunitytoreassertthecentralstate’scontroloverthecountryandtoguaranteeequalityforthepopulation.

Asacompany,EDZhassucceededbecauseofitscloseconnectionwiththecommunityandbecauseitprovides24/7electricity.However,ifwetakeintoaccountenvironmentalconcerns,aswellasconcernsoverthetypeofsocietyandstatewewanttobuild,EDZisnotasuccessstory.Rather,EDZpromotesseparatism(throughitsadvertisementsandgeographicalfocus)andlocalism(byinvolvingonlypeoplefromtheareaofZahle).Italsopromotesadecentralisedmodelofpowergenerationandsupply,whichdoesnotacknowledgetheimportantroleofthecentralstateinmonitoringtoavoidfurtherspatialinequalities.

Generally,whenorganisationsbehaveinthisway,peoplecallthemmafias.Insteadoffurtherentrenchingclientelismandpatronage,whichonlybenefitsthewealthy,thecentralstateshouldberevivedthroughreformoftheelectricitysectortoprovideaservicethatbenefitsallLebanesecitizens.

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Eric VerdeilProfessor, Sciences Po and researcher, Centre for International Relations Studies (CERI), Sciences Po Paris

Towards a more just model for decentralised electricity

SeveralresearchstudiesonthetopicofelectricityinLebanonhaveaddressedthequestionofwhethertocontinuetopushforthereformofEDLorifreforms‘atthemargins’,suchasthosebyEDZ,wouldbeamoreeffectivewayforward.Thefourspeakershaveshownthatattemptsatdecentralisedelectricityprovisionhavethreecommoncharacteristics:

1. Partial autonomy from state supply. BecauseofchronicshortagesandunreliabilityofsupplyfromEDL,additionalpowerisprovidedbyahybridofdieselgenerators,solarPVandsometimesbatteries.

2. The involvement of private companiesabletoinvestandefficientlymanagelocaldistribution.

3. Reliance on municipal and local powers or communities, whicharesupposedtorepresenttheinterestsoflocalcitizens.Thisisaformofpoliticaldecentralisation,whetherofficialornot.

However,thisapproachbegsseveralquestions:dothesemodelsrepresentaneffectivewayofsolvingtheelectricityprobleminLebanon?Isitpossible,ordesirable,tomovetowardscompleteautonomyfromthecentralgrid?Isitpossibletoscaleupfromthesemunicipalprojects?

TheEDZmodelhasachievedareasonablelevelofservicewhileavoidingchangingtheentiresystemand,critically,notchallengingtheinterestsinthefuelsupplychainforthecity.Buttheclaimthatthemodelcouldbereplicatedisdoubtful.OnekeyissueisthelowtariffthatEDZpaystoEDLforcentrallyprovidedelectricity,whichallowsEDZtoextractaprofit.Atthepoliticallevel,localauthoritieshavedisagreementsamongthemselveswhenitcomestothereplicabilityofthemodel,buttheysharethedesiretoobtainthesameprofitablearrangementasinZahle.Yet,thisarrangementhasacostforthewholecountry,which,ineffect,subsidisestheEDZmodel.Italsoshowsthatprivatisationshouldnotbeimplementedwithoutthepresenceofastrongpublicbodytomonitorandcontrolthefinances.Also,sincetheEDZmodeldependsonexternalfundingandexpertise,thisraisesquestionsaboutwhetherallmunicipalitiescouldgarnersuchsupport;ifnot,pursuingthismodelwillgeneratespatialinequalities.

Overall,theexamplesofdecentralisedprovisionshowthatthereisaneedformodelswheretariffstocustomersarebasedonthecostsoftheserviceandnotontheextractionofrents,aswellasformechanismstoreducethelargeinequalitiesinprovisionbetweenregions.

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Pallavi RoySenior Lecturer in International Economics, SOAS University of London, Research Director SOAS-Anti-Corruption Evidence Consortium

Aligning interests for feasible reform

Onethingthatemergesfromthediscussionsisthatbotheconomicandpoliticalriskmitigationarenecessaryforinvestmentsintheelectricitysectorwherethenationalgridisdysfunctionalorunderperforming.Insuchsituations,disaggregatedstrategiesofsupplymakesense,becauseitmaybeeasiertomakeprogressusinglocalnetworksandefficientinformalarrangements.However,sucharrangementsmaybeopposedbyplayerswhohaveaninterestinmaintainingthestatus-quo.Consequently,itisnecessarytochoosestrategiesthatalignwiththeinterestsofpowerfullocalplayers,andthatalsolinktheinterestsofthecommunitywiththoseoftheelectricitysuppliers.Unfortunately,suchstrategiesofpoliticalriskmitigation–asusedsoeffectivelybyEDZ–arelikelytobelessscalablethanstrategiesofeconomicriskmitigation.Thisposesachallengeforthereplicabilityofthemodel.

ThereareinterestingcomparisonsbetweentheLebaneseexperienceandtheworkoftheSOASAnti-CorruptionEvidence(SOAS-ACE)researchprogrammeonthepowersectorinBangladesh(Khanetal.,2020)andNigeria(Royetal.,2020).Inthosecountries,

anti-corruptionstrategiesrelyon‘insiders’havinganinterestinallactorsupholdingtherulesintheirsector.Suchhorizontalenforcementismoreeffectivethantop-downverticalenforcement,whichentailsattemptingtodisciplinepowerful,politicallyconnectedplayerswhohavelittleincentivetoadheretotherules.

Ingeneral,ourresearchhasfoundthatitisextremelyimportanttostudythepoliticaleconomycontextofthesector,particularlywhenlookingatdisaggregatedordecentralisedmodelsofpowersupply.Whileinthelongrun,thereisnosubstituteforthereformofthegrid,usefulprogresscanbemadeatthedisaggregatedscalefirst.Indeed,preciselybecausetheremaybefeasiblewaysofnavigatingthepoliticaleconomycontextatthelocallevelwhennational-levelprogressisblocked,disaggregatedmodelsflipthegrid-basedmodelwithinvestorslookingatnon-urbancommunitysupplyaseconomicallyviable.Suchdisaggregatedstrategiescanalsosolve(butoccasionallycreate)distributionaljusticeissues.Eitherway,thebottomlineisthatanti-corruptioneffortsintheelectricitysectorhavetobefeasibletohaveanimpact.

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Neil McCullochDirector, The Policy Practice

Finding a way ahead

Therearemanypointsofagreementbetweenthevariousspeakersanddiscussantsofthewebinar.Allagreethatthecentralstate’sroleintheelectricitysectorisinurgentneedofreform.AllagreethatitwouldbebestifLaw462/2002–whichcallsforaseriesofgovernancereformsinthesector,includingthecreationofanindependentregulator–wasimplemented.Allappreciatethatelectricityisacorepartofdailylifenotjustatechnicalservice;somethingthatprovidesdignityandwhichshapespeople’sviewsofthestate.Allwouldliketoseeagreaterroleforrenewablestoreducethedependenceonpollutingdieselgeneration.AndallunderstandthatthepoliticalsysteminLebanonisdrivenbyclientelism,whilerecognisingthat,sometimes,localclientelisttiescanbeusedtocreatethepolicyspaceforinnovation.

Buttherearealsotwomajorpointsofdisagreement.

Thefirstisaboutthe extent to which reform at the centre is a necessary condition for progress.HassanHrajliandJamilMoawadhaveemphasisedthecriticalroleofaneffectivecentralstateinbuildinganefficientelectricitysector.Theyseereformatthecentreasthecoreissuethatmustbeaddressed.Whileotherspeakersdon’tdenythevalueofsuchreform,AliAhmadandAlixChaplainhighlightexampleswheresignificantimprovementshavebeenachievedbyregionalorlocalplayerseitherbybypassingthecentre,orthroughstrategiccollusionwithcentralactors.

Thesecondissueisaboutfragmentation and inequality.JamilMoawadandMuznaAl-MasriregardEDZasamodelofclientelismandlocalism,inimicaltothecreationofaneffectivecentralstate.EricVerdeilpointstothewayinwhichEDZextractsrentsfromtherestofthecountry(aswellasitsowncustomers);anddoubtswhetherotherlocationswouldhavetheresourcesandinfluencetofollowasimilarpath.Allthreesuggestthatthiswouldnotbeagoodmodel

forthecountrysinceitwouldexacerbatespatialinequalities.Bycontrast,AliAhmadandAlixChaplainsuggestthatitmightbepossibletoadaptdecentralisedmodelsinawaythatwouldreducetheirnegativeimpactonthestatewhilepromotinginnovationandleadingtobetterservices,atleastinsomelocations.

Whilethereisnoeasyresolutionofthesedifferences,itispossibletodrawtwoimportantconclusionsfromthedebate:

1. Progress requires a recognition of reality.Fortoolong,effortstoreformLebanon’selectricitysectorhavefailedbecausetheyhaveattemptedtourgepoliticalactorstoimplementchangeswhichrundirectlyagainsttheirownpoliticalinterests.AsPallaviRoy’scontributionshows,thereissubstantiveinternationalevidencethatprogresscanonlybemadewhenthereisaproperunderstandingofthepoliticaleconomyofthecontextandsolutionsareconsistentwiththenatureofthatreality.

2. ‘Second best’ solutions can be politically feasible – but they are uncertain and come with real risks.Findingsolutionsthatarefeasiblerequiresaprocessofexperimentation;itishardtoknowaprioriwhetheranyparticularapproachwillwork,whichcreatesuncertainty.Moreover,thepoliticallyfeasiblesolutionsthatarefoundmaywellbe‘secondbest’–theymayyieldusefulimprovements,butfailtoaddresskeyweaknesses,leavesomegroupsbehindorevenunderminefaithinthecentralstate.

Byrecognisingthepoliticalrealityandexperimentingwithsolutions,whileattemptingtoamelioratetheirdisadvantages,itishopedthatLebanonmayfindapathwayoutofitselectricitycrisis.

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ReferencesAhmad,A.,McCulloch,N.,Al-Masri,M.andAyoub,M.(2020)From dysfunctional to functional corruption: The politics of reform in Lebanon’s electricity sector. ACEworkingpaper030.London:SOASUniversityofLondon(https://ace.soas.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ACE-WorkingPaper030-DysfunctionalToFunctional-201214.pdf).

Chaplain,A.(2021)L’émergencedemini-réseauxhybridesd’électricitéauLiban:versunedifférenciationterritorialedesdispositifsdefournitureénergétique,InstitutfrançaisduProche-Orient,https://ifpo.hypotheses.org/10952

Khan,M.,Matin,M.,Zahan,I.,Ashraf,Z.andAjefu,J.(2020)Cheaper, cleaner power: De-risking as an anti-collusion strategy in Bangladesh. ACEworkingpaper023.London:SOASUniversityofLondon(https://ace.soas.ac.uk/publication/de-risking-as-an-anti-collusion-strategy-bangladesh/).

Roy,P.,Iwuamadi,K.C.andIbrahim,J.(2020)Breaking the cycle of corruption in Nigeria’s electricity sector: a political settlements analysis. ACEworkingpaper020.London:SOASUniversityofLondon(https://ace.soas.ac.uk/publication/electricity-nigeria-political-settlement-analysis/).

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About the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium:

ACEtakesaninnovativeapproachtoanti-corruptionpolicyandpractice. FundedbyUKaid,ACEisrespondingtotheseriouschallengesfacingpeopleandeconomiesaffectedbycorruptionbygeneratingevidencethatmakesanti-corruptionreal,andusingthosefindingstohelppolicymakers,businessandcivilsocietyadoptnew,feasible,high-impactstrategiestotacklecorruption.

ACEisapartnershipofhighlyexperiencedresearchandpolicyinstitutesbasedinBangladesh,Nigeria,Tanzania,theUnitedKingdomandtheUSA.TheleadinstitutionisSOASUniversityofLondon.Otherconsortiumpartnersare:

• BRACInstituteofGovernanceandDevelopment(BIGD)• BRACJamesP.GrantSchoolofPublicHealth(JPGSPH)• CentreforDemocracyandDevelopment(CDD)• DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies(DIIS)• EconomicandSocialResearchFoundation(ESRF)• HealthPolicyResearchGroup(HPRG),UniversityofNigeria

Nsukka(UNN)• IfakaraHealthInstitute(IHI)• LondonSchoolofHygieneandTropicalMedicine(LSHTM)• Palladium• REPOA• TransparencyInternationalBangladesh(TIB)• UniversityofBirmingham

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Inauguratedin2006,theIssamFaresInstituteforPublicPolicyandInternationalAffairs(IFI)attheAmericanUniversityofBeirut(AUB)isanindependent,research-based,policy-orientedinstitute.Itaimstoinitiateanddeveloppolicy-relevantresearchinandabouttheArabworld.

TheInstituteaimsatbridgingthegapbetweenacademiaandpolicymakingbyconductinghighqualityresearchonthecomplexissuesandchallengesfacedbyLebaneseandArabsocietieswithinshiftinginternationalandglobalcontexts,bygeneratingevidence-basedpolicyrecommendationsandsolutionsforLebanonandtheArabworld,andbycreatinganintellectualspaceforaninterdisciplinaryexchangeofideasamongresearchers,scholars,civilsocietyactors,media,andpolicymakers.

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