Modern Philosophies of EducationFourth EditionFoundations of EducationJohn S. Brubacherpp.348-350

RealismSo far the stability and firmness on which the essentialist philosophy of education prides itself has been rooted in a reality that has been idealistic. Ideas rather than external objects have constituted ultimate reality. Some essentialists, however, think that a more solid foundation can be built for their philosophy of education in a theory that these objects have a reality independent of mental phenomena. This philosophy is known as realism. In its more materialistic phases, it even reduces mind itself to an aspect of matter. Possibly excepting this last statement, realism seems a very common-sense point of view. It seems essentialist in that it bluntly recognizes the uncompromising limits within which human educational endeavors must be undertaken.

Education, for the naturalistic realist, is primarily concerned with the world as it is here and now. The universe, for him, is not only external to him, but it is governed by inexorable law. If this seems less true in the social as compared with the natural sciences, it is only because man has not yet perfected techniques for ascertaining and stating the laws of social phenomena. In any event, man has only his intelligence to depend on to survive in his struggle with external nature. Fortunately for him, his intelligence is thoroughly at home in the natural order because its pedigree shows its evolution as an instrument of adaptation to a changing environment.

This reference to mind indicates a further affirmation of a naturalistic realism. Instead of standing outside nature, mind is a naturalized product within it. Mind is biological in origin and developed as a way of adjusting to a precarious and contingent nature. Furthermore, the mind of Homo sapiens is a comparatively recent addition to nature. It appeared late in evolutionary history and is not some primordial stuff which has antedated nature herself. In place of merely contemplating the glory of God’s handiwork, mind is in and of nature, reconstructing it as well as comprehending it. The natural classroom method, therefore, is that of exposition and persuasion. One very important group of educational realists are the scientific realists. The fundamental assumption lying back of most educational science is that the object of research has a definite external physical reality. The educational scientist may fail to describe it accurately, but he never doubts the objective existence of what he is trying to study. This is true whether he is studying the material or the social environment. In either case their external existence sets an undeniably common point of reference for the educational enterprise. It is here that subjective differences of opinion must ultimately come for arbitration. Not even the fact that the objective reality so revered may be subject to evolutionary processes alters this conclusion. Under such conditions educations, especially its scientific study should endeavor to approximate the laws according to which these changes take place. Clearly, the realism depicted in these rugged and unyielding terms has a strong essential flavour.

Reality so defined is to be distinguished from truth. Reality simply is; truth is its image. The test of truth, hence, is its correspondence to reality. If ideas work, it is because they are true to reality and not vice versa. Truth may be the product of the human mind, but not so reality. A creative intelligence,

which creates reality, is discounted in advance. Consequently, the theory of education as a reconstruction of the universe around us must give way to a theory of education as conformity to it. The curriculum, therefore, is composed of the best data on reality to date. Because this must be determined by the most competent investigators, the realist’s curriculum tends to be sponsored in an authoritarian manner. For the same reason, it can readily be required as essential. Indeed there is an inherent and welcome discipline in letting the learner know that his education is conditioned by the inexorable quality of an external reality.

This point of view is, furthermore, the attitude of much scientific study of educational psychology. Particularly is it true of behaviourism. Here, the investigator contents him only with what he sees in the way of overt behaviour. The idea that the psyche of the learner has a super nature, a soul, finds no place in his account. Pretty much the same comment is in order for the neurological and physiological approaches to educational psychology. There is often a materialism and mechanism inherent here which is congenial with a naturalistic realism.

Given such premises, the educational realist is quite naturally committed to a stimulus-response type of learning and human nature. In the strictest sense stimuli are objective. On this account each stimulus and its response is capable of objective study. This in turn paves the way to the theory underlying scientific measurement in education. Tests are found to measure the qualities objectively observable in pupil reactions. The quality most frequently measured is that of accuracy, and it hardly needs mention what the standard of accuracy is where the correspondence theory of truth is assumed.

The same philosophy is implied in the movement to make a scientific determination of educational objectives. What a community values is held to be an objective fact. As much, it should be as susceptible to investigation and definition as any other object of scientific research. And once given the authenticity of science—to most minds incontestable—it becomes invested with the spirit of essentialism. The social or cultural tradition stands for external reality as it is best known to date.

The principal concern of the school is to examine things as they really are in themselves. TheExamination is most effectively made in terms of pure theory. To ensure the purity of theory the school must be detached from the special needs or particular interests of the concrete life of practice. Vocational and professional education will, to be sure, have their place, yet both should be taught, not pragmatically, but in relation to the pure theories which undergird them. Vocational and professional education cannot be trusted to occupy the forestage, because the practical man of action too often has no time for long-range, theoretical perspective.

By confining educational aims within the bounds of the here and now, one but fits his educational philosophy to the dimensions of nature. He omits the eternal, the timeless, from his space-time frame of reference. Man does this because he feels at home in nature. He may not have a complete list of answers to all his problems, but he takes comfort and gains confidence in thinking that none of them is hidden in mysterious riddles of a superhuman or supernatural character. If religion enters his philosophy of education, it is only as a deified nature. God is immanent in nature, and nature is His temple of worship.

Moral education likewise is put on a naturalistic basis. Morals originate in the folkways or mores. These are either enforced by social pressures or are self-enforcing through their natural consequences. Character education, therefore, has no need of an appeal to an authority external to nature. Conscience becomes an echo of social custom rather than divine command.