moller from constitutional to international human rights

7/27/2019 Moller From Constitutional to International Human Rights

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Note:thisisaroughdraft.Dontciteorcirculatewithouttheauthorspermission.

KaiMller

FromConstitutionaltoInternationalHumanRights

I.IntroductionPartofwhatsparksthecurrentphilosophicaldiscussionaboutinternationalhumanrightsis

amismatchbetweentheirgreatpracticalandtheoreticalimportanceontheonehandand

whatisperceivedtobeanunderdevelopedgraspoftheirmoralbasisandstructureonthe

other.Broadlyspeaking,twostrategies,towhichthispaperwilladdathird,arecurrently

employed inordertothrow lighton internationalhumanrights:1someapproachthemby

startingfromamoraltheoryofhumanrightsasopposedtospecificallyinternationalhuman

rights, and then ask to what extent a proper understanding of human rights can help

illuminate the phenomenon of international human rights.2 Others focus more on the

internationalsphereofwhichinternationalhumanrightsareapart,tryingtoderiveatheory

ofinternationalhumanrightsfromtherolethatphenomenonplaysoroughttoplayinthe

sphereoftherelationsbetweenstates.3Nothingiswrongasamatterofprinciplewiththose

approaches:afullfledgedtheoryof internationalhumanrightsmustsurelymakesenseof

both international and human rights; thus,whatwe are ultimately looking for is an

integratedtheory.Itthereforeseemsplausibletoassumethatonecanapproachtheproject

ofdevelopingacomprehensivetheoryofinternationalhumanrightsfromdifferentangles,

just asonemight reach the top of amountain from different sides. In this paper, Iwill

develop and propose a theory of international human rights, but Iwill choose another,

previously largely unexplored route, namely one via the philosophy of national

constitutionalrights.

Thereare important structural similaritiesbetweenconstitutional rightsand international

humanrights.Inbothcontexts,compliancewithfundamental(read:constitutional;human)

rightsis,looselyspeaking,oneoftheimportantyardsticksoflegitimacy,beitinthesenseof

constitutionallegitimacyorinthesenseoffallingwithinthesphereofastatessovereignty.

Furthermore,therightsprotectedbynationalconstitutionsandinternationaltreatieslook,

onthewhole,strikinglysimilar.Thissimilaritydoesnotendonthesurfacebutgoesallthewaydown.Europeanlawyerswhoareacquaintedwithbothnationalconstitutionallawofa

jurisdictionthatemploysstrongjudicialreviewsuchasGermanyinitsBasicLawandthe

lawof theEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsknow that thedoctrinal tools, styleof

reasoning,and theoutcomesproducedbynationalconstitutionalcourtsontheonehand

and theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightson theotherarevery similar indeed.As iswell

known,when theUnited Kingdom decided in the late 1990s that itwanted to set up a

systemof constitutionaljudicial review, itdidnotdesign anew,nationalbillof British

1SeeAllenBuchanan,TheEgalitarianismofHumanRights,120(2010)Ethics679,68082.2James

Griffin,

On

Human

Rights

(OUP

2008).

See

also

John

Tasioulas,

Taking

Rights

out

of

Human

Rights,

120

(2010)Ethics647.3Raz;Beitz


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rights(althoughthatisaprojectthatcontinuestobeonthetableintherespectivepolitical

discussions) but instead simply incorporated the European Convention onHuman Rights

intoUK law;4thuseffectivelyadoptingthetextoftheEuropeanConventiontogetherwith

theexistingandfuturejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights5aspartofits

nationalconstitutionallaw.

Structuralsimilaritiessuchastheonesmentionedaboveaswellashistoricalandsemantic

links between the concepts of constitutional and international human rights make it

promising toapproach theprojectofdevelopingacomprehensive theoryof international

human rights via an understanding of national constitutional rights. This route becomes

evenmore appealing in light of the fact that in recent years there has been awave of

scholarship theorising constitutional rights;6 thus, drawing on this work may prevent

philosophersofinternationalhumanrightsfromhavingtoreinventthewheel.

Iwillproceedbysettingoutsomestructuralfeaturesofnationalconstitutionalrightsinthe

nextsection.Thatsectionwillshowthatitismisguidedtobelieve,asmanydo,thatnational

constitutional rights law rests to a considerable extent on contingencies specific to the

national communitywhich has adopted them. Theopposite is true: conversations about

constitutional rightsare,on thewhole,no lessglobal inappeal thanconversationsabout

international human rights. Furthermore, the section will give an overview of those

structuralfeaturesofconstitutionalrightswhichinpreviousworkIhavelabelledtheglobal

model of constitutional rights, and itwill present the basics of a theory of that global

model, focussing on the questions of the scope of rights (which interests ought to be

acknowledged as grounding rights?) and their permissible limitations (under what

conditions is a limitation of a right legitimate?). This will prepare the ground for the

subsequentsection,whichtakesthestepfromnationalconstitutionalrightstointernational

human rights. It examines the case for a view held bymany international human rights

theorists,namely thatwhatever internationalhuman rightsare, theyaremoreminimalist

thannationalconstitutional rights (call this internationalhuman rightsminimalism).Thus,

the paper will ask whether there is room to make national constitutional rights more

minimalist.Myconclusionwillbethatthere isnosuchroom:anysuchattemptwilleither

introducearbitrariness(because,aswillbeshown,reducingthescopeofinterestsprotected

asrightswillnecessarily involvethedrawingofmorallyarbitrarythresholds)orwill ignore

thefactthatconstitutionalrightsarealreadyasminimalistascoherentlypossible(because,

aswillbecome clear, they setupa reasonableness standardofjustification,and treating

policieswhichare less than reasonableas legitimate ismorallyunappealing).Thus, there

exists neither the necessity nor themoral possibility tomake constitutional rightsmore

minimalist. It follows that the moral structures of national constitutional rights and

4HumanRightsAct1998.5Section2(1)oftheUKHumanRightsAct1998:Acourtortribunaldeterminingaquestionwhichhasarisenin

connectionwithaConventionrightmusttakeintoaccountany

(a)judgment,decision,declarationoradvisoryopinionoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights ...whenever

madeorgiven[...].6SeeinparticularRobertAlexy,ATheoryofConstitutional Rights(OUP2002);MattiasKumm,TheIdeaof

SocraticContestationandtheRighttoJustification: ThePointofRightsBasedProportionalityReview,(2010)4

Law&EthicsofHumanRights141;MattiasKumm,PoliticalLiberalismandtheStructureofRights:Onthe

Placeand

Limits

of

the

Proportionality

Requirement,

in

Pavlakos

(ed.),

Law,

Rights

and

Discourse:

The

Legal

PhilosophyofRobertAlexy(HartPublishing,2007),131;KaiMller,TheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights

(OUP2012).


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international human rights are identical. The fourth section will spell out some of the

implicationsofthisview.

II.The

moral

structure

of

national

constitutional

rights

1.Aglobalconversationaboutrights

Intermsoftheirpossiblereachandappeal,contemporarydiscussionsaboutconstitutional

rights are global. Thus, it is emphatically not the case that the moral demands of

constitutional rightsare inextricably linked and intertwinedwithaparticular constitution

with a particular interpretative history, adopted by a particular political community at a

particularpointintime.Theinsightthatconstitutionalrightsdiscourseisgovernedmoreby

freestanding moral discourse about what rights and legitimacy require than by

considerations relating to thehistoryofadocumentorpeople is,however,still relatively

young.Asrecentlyas1996,RonaldDworkinpublishedhisbookFreedomsLaw,

7

whichisacollection of essays dealing with important US Supreme Court decisions on abortion,

euthanasia,hate speech andother controversial topics. The subtitleof thisbook is The

moralreadingoftheAmericanconstitution,whichmakesclearthatDworkinperceivedhis

bookasacontribution toaspecificallyAmericandiscourse.Today, less than twodecades

later, an authorwho published a book dealingwith problems as universal as the ones

discussedbyDworkinandwhorestrictedhim orherselftoonlyoneparticularjurisdiction

wouldrightlybeaccusedofarbitrarinessinthechoiceofhisorhermaterials.Constitutional

rightsdiscoursehasgoneglobal.

Alookatthestructureofconstitutionalrightslawaroundtheworldhelpsexplainhowthis

could happen. Courts around theworld employ a twostage analysiswhen determining

whetheranactbyapublicauthorityviolatesconstitutionalrights.Atthefirststage,theyask

whether the act interferes with (limits, restricts) a right. If so, the second question is

whether the interference isjustifiable.The test that isalmost globally8employed at this

secondstage istheproportionalitytest,accordingtowhichan interferencewitharight is

justifiableifitservesalegitimategoalandisproportionatetothatgoal.Injudicialpractice,

the first stage has become less and less important, largely as a consequence of rights

inflation, that is, thephenomenon thatmoreandmore interestsareprotectedas rights.

Thus, the focus of the analysis has shifted to the second stage, and the proportionality

principle which dominates that stage has become the by farmost important doctrinal

principleofconstitutionalrights lawaroundtheworld. Interestingly,nationalconstitutions

donotgivecourtsanyguidanceastohowtoconducttheproportionalitytest.Constitutions

normallydonotevenmentionthetermproportionality.Instead,theyusephrasessimilar

to thatemployedby theCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,which stipulates that

rightsareguaranteed subjectonly to such reasonable limitsprescribedby lawascanbe

demonstrablyjustified ina freeanddemocraticsociety.9Thepointofthoserathervague

7RonaldDworkin,FreedomsLaw:TheMoralReadingoftheAmericanConstitution(OUP1996)8An

important

exception

isthe

US

jurisprudence.

On

the

issue

of

whether

the

US

Supreme

Court

applies

proportionalityunderadifferentname,seePaulYowell,...SeealsoMller,GlobalModel,...9CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms1982,section1.


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phrases is to release judges from interpretative constraints;10 thus, when courts apply

proportionality analysis, they are not usually bound by textual subtleties, nor are they

bound by the history of the particular constitution they are interpreting. Rather, they

engageinfreestandingmoralreasoningaboutwhatrightsrequire,largelyunguidedbythe

constitutionwhichtheyinterpret.

2.Theglobalmodelofconstitutionalrights11

While it is to be expected that different courtswill often come to different conclusions

whendealingwithaparticular rights issue say, thequestionofwhetherorunderwhat

conditionshatespeechmaybeprohibited,orwhetherassistedsuicidemustbepermitted

at a more abstract level, a remarkable consensus about certain structural features of

constitutionalrightshasemergedinrecentdecades.Ihavelabelledthissetofdoctrinesand

phenomenatheglobalmodelofconstitutionalrights;inthissectionIwillbrieflyintroduce

itsmainfeatures,whichwillpavethewayforpresenting,inthefollowingsectionatheoryof

constitutionalrightswhichfitsandjustifiesthesefeatures.

Theglobalmodelofconstitutionalrightsisbestintroducedandexplainedbycontrastingit

withwhat I call the dominant narrative of fundamental rights. The dominant narrative

holds (1) that rights cover only a limited domain by protecting only certain especially

important interestsof individuals; (2) that rights imposeexclusivelyorprimarilynegative

obligationsonthestate;(3)thatrightsoperateonlybetweenacitizenandhisgovernment,

not between private citizens; and (4) that rights enjoy a special normativeforcewhich

means that theycanbeoutweighed, ifatall,only inexceptional circumstances.Of these

features of the dominant narrative, the general acceptance of the second rights as

imposing negative obligations on the state has already eroded considerably, mainly

becauseofthegrowingrecognitionofsocialandeconomicrights.12Thethirdlimitationtothe relationshipbetweencitizenandgovernment,whilegenerallyheld tobe true,does

notnormallyattractmuchattentionby rights theorists.The firstand the fourth special

importanceandspecialnormativeforcearestillalmostuncontroversial.However,under

theglobalmodelofconstitutionalrightsallfourelementsofthisnarrativehavebeengiven

upandoftenalongtimeago.Thedoctrinesanddevelopmentsinconstitutionalrightslaw

whichhaveledtotheirerosionarerightsinflation,positiveobligationsandsocioeconomic

rights,horizontaleffect,andbalancingandproportionality.

a.Rightsinflation

Constitutional rights are no longer seen as onlyprotecting certain particularly important

interests. Especially in Europe a development has been observed which is sometimes

pejorativelycalledrightsinflation13,anamewhichIwilluseinaneutralsenseasdescribing

thephenomenonthatincreasingly,relativelytrivial interestsareprotectedas(primafacie)

10KaiMller, Proportionality:Challenging thecritics,10 (2012) International JournalofConstitutional Law

709at717.11ThissectiondrawsonideasdevelopedingreaterdepthinmybookTheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights

(OUP2012).12Foratheoreticalaccountofthisdevelopment,seeFredman,HumanRightsTransformed:PositiveRightsand

Positive

Duties(Oxford

University

Press,

2008),

ch.

1.

13Letsas,ATheoryof Interpretation of theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights (OxfordUniversityPress,

2007),126.


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rights. Themost extreme approach is that of the German Federal Constitutional Court,

which has explicitly given up any threshold to distinguish a mere interest from a

constitutionalright.Asearlyas1957itheldthatArticle2(1)oftheBasicLaw,whichprotects

everyonesrighttofreelydevelophispersonality,istobeinterpretedasarighttofreedom

ofaction.14TheCourtprovidedvariousdoctrinalreasonsforthisresult, itsmainargument

beingthatanearlierdraftofArticle2(1)hadread Everyonecandoashepleases (Jeder

kanntunundlassenwaserwill),andthatthisversionhadbeendroppedonlyforlinguistic

reasons.15 Itaffirmed this ruling invarious laterdecisions;most famously itdeclared that

Article2(1)oftheBasicLawincludedtherightstofeedpigeonsinapark16andtogoriding

inthewoods.17

Whileotherjurisdictionshavenot,tomyknowledge,adoptedsuchafarreachingapproach

to the scopeof rights, thephenomenonof rights inflationand thedifficultyof findinga

principledway todistinguish rights frommere interestshavebeenwidelyobserved. It is

importanttonotethatthebroadunderstandingofrightsdoesofcoursenotimplythatthe

stateisprohibitedfrom interferingwiththeright inquestion.Rather,ashasbeenpointedoutabove,thereisanimportantconceptualdistinctionbetweenaninterferencewithanda

violationofaright:aninterferencewillonlyamounttoaviolationifitcannotbejustifiedat

thejustificationstage.Thus,thebroadunderstandingofrightsattheprimafaciestagemust

beseen inconjunctionwiththeproportionalitytestwhichpermitsthe limitationofprima

facierightswhentheyareoutweighedbyacompetingrightorpublicinterest.

b.Positiveobligationsandsocioeconomicrights

Rightsarenolongerregardedasexclusivelyimposingnegativeobligationsonthestate.But

whilemosttheoristsofrightsonlystartedtoreconsidertheirviewsonthis issuefollowing

thegrowingacceptanceof socioeconomic rights (particularly their inclusion in theSouthAfricanConstitution),constitutionalrightslawhadgivenuptheviewthatrightsimposeonly

negative obligations at least since the 1970s when the doctrines of positive duties or

protectiveobligationsbecameestablished.Theideaisthatthestateisunderadutytotake

stepstopreventharmtothe interestsprotectedby (otherwisenegative)rights.Thus,the

statemust,asamatterofconstitutionalrightslaw,putinplaceasystemwhicheffectively

protectsthepeople fromdangersemanating fromotherprivatepersons,suchascriminal

activitieswhichthreaten,forexample, life,physicalintegrity,orproperty;and itmustalso

protect them from dangerswhich do not have a (direct) human cause, such as natural

disasters.

Furthermoreandmaybemoreimportantly,thereistheaforementionedtrendtowardsthe

acknowledgementofsocioeconomicrights,whichobviously imposepositivedutiesonthe

stateandthusconflictwiththedominantnarrativeaccordingtowhichrightsareconcerned

onlywithnegativeobligations.Themostwidelydiscussedexampleofthisdevelopment is

theSouthAfricanConstitution,whichcontainsinitssections26,27and29rightstohousing,

healthcare,food,water,socialsecurityandeducation.

14BVerfGE6,32(Elfes).

15Ibid.,

36

37.

16BVerfGE54,143(PigeonFeeding).

17BVerfGE80,137(RidingintheWoods).


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c.Horizontaleffect

Constitutional rights are no longer seen as affecting only the relationship between the

citizenandthestate;rather,theyapply insomewaybetweenprivatepersonsaswell.For

example, the constitutional right to privacy may protect a person not only against

infringements of his privacy by the state, but also against such infringements by hisneighbour,landlord,oremployer.Thedoctrinaltoolwhichachievesthisiscalledhorizontal

effect of rights,where horizontal as opposed to vertical indicates that rights operate

betweenprivatepersons.ThefirstcourttoacknowledgehorizontaleffectwastheGerman

Federal Constitutional Court in its famous Lth decision of 1953.18 From Germany the

concept travelled to other parts of theworld. It has by now become awellestablished

featureoftheglobalmodelofconstitutionalrights;one indicatorof itssuccess isthatthe

newSouthAfrican constitutionexplicitlyendorseshorizontaleffect in section8(2),which

states in slightlyawkward language: Aprovisionof theBillofRightsbindsanaturalora

juristicperson if,andtotheextentthat, it isapplicable,taking intoaccountthenatureof

therightandthenatureofanydutyimposedbytheright.

d.Balancingandproportionality

Contrary to thedominantnarrative, it isnot the case that constitutional rights generally

enjoyaspecialorheightenednormative force in legalpractice.While it istruethatsome

rightsareabsoluteforexampletherighttofreedomfromtorturemostrightsincluding

the rights to life, physical integrity, privacy, property, freedom of religion, expression,

assembly and association can be limited in line with the proportionality test.

Proportionalityhasbecomethecentraldoctrineofcontemporaryconstitutionalrightslaw,

andhasbeenacceptedbyvirtuallyeveryconstitutionalcourtinCentralandEasternEurope

andisincreasinglyemployedinCentralandSouthAmericanjurisdictions.19Accordingtothetestasusedbymostscholarsworkinginthefield,theproportionalitytesthasfourprongs.

First,apolicy interferingwith the rightmustbe inpursuitofa legitimategoal;second, it

mustbeasuitablemeansoffurtheringtheachievementofthegoal(suitabilityorrational

connection); third, itmustbe necessary in that theremust notbe a less restrictive and

equally effective alternative (necessity); and finally and most importantly, it must not

imposeadisproportionateburdenon the rightholder (balancingorproportionality in the

strict sense). Some courts have adopted tests that look slightlydifferenton the surface;

however,whatall testshave incommon is thatat theircore, there isbalancingexercise

wheretherightisbalancedagainstthecompetingrightorpublicinterest,whichimpliesthat

farfromenjoyinganyspecialorelevatedstatusoverpublicinterests,rightsoperateonthesameplaneaspolicyconsiderations.

3.Theorisingtheglobalmodel:betweenminimalismandmaximalism

a)Thescopeofrights:endorsingrightsmaximalism

18BVerfGE7,198(Lth).EnglishtranslationfromthewebsiteoftheUniversityofTexasSchoolofLaw,

http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/[copyright:

Basil

Markesinis].

19StoneSweetandMathews, ProportionalityBalancingandGlobalConstitutionalism, (20089)47Columbia

JournalofTransnationalLaw72,112.


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The global model does not endorse the once uncontroversial idea that the point of

constitutional rights is to limitgovernmentandkeep itoutofour lives: that idea cannot

makesenseofthedoctrinesofhorizontaleffectandpositiveobligationsandtheincreasing

acknowledgment of socioeconomic rights. The point of constitutional rights under the

globalmodelisnottodisablegovernment;ratheritmustbetoenableeverypersontotake

controlofhisorherlife.Constitutionalrightsprotecttheabilityofpersonstolivetheirlives

accordingtotheirselfconceptions;thus,theyarebasedonthevalueofpersonalautonomy.

Forexample,constitutionalrightsprotectapersonsrighttoengageinfreespeech,believe

inandfollowthepreceptsofherreligion(importantaspectsofpersonalautonomy),control

herprivatelife(includinghersexualandreproductiveautonomy),tobodilyintegrity(partly

a precondition for, partly an element of personal autonomy), and so on. This focus on

autonomynotonlyexplainsthetraditionallyacknowledgedsetofcivilandpoliticalrightsin

theirnegativedimension,itcanfurtherjustifytheexistenceofhorizontaleffectandpositive

obligations: from an autonomybased perspective,whatmatters is notwho violates the

rightbut rather the adequateprotectionof the interest at stake. Finally, the autonomy

basedapproachmakessenseofsocioeconomicrightssuchastherightstofood,healthcare,oreducation,whichprotectthepreconditionsofautonomy.

The crucial question for present purposes is the scope of protection offered by

constitutionalrights:shouldtheycoveranarroworabroadrangeofautonomy interests?

The first feature of the globalmodel (rights inflation) suggests that an approachwhich

regards rightsasprotectingallautonomy interestsofaperson including thoseof trivial

importance,suchasfeedingbirdsorridinginthewoods(tousethosefamousGermancases

again) sits best with the practice of constitutional rights law. Thus, the picture that

emerges is that under the globalmodel, all autonomy interests are protected as rights;

however,this

protection

isnot

absolute

or

near

absolute;

rather

itcan

be

limited

as

long

as

thelimitationisproportionate.Isitpossibletomakesenseofthisarguablycounterintuitive

proposition?Itis indeedpossible,buttodoso,wemustdispenseofadearlyheldviewof

almostallphilosophers,who insistthatfundamentalrightsprotectonlyanarrowrangeof

interestswhilehavingaspecialnormativeforcewhichmeansthattheycanrarely,ifever,be

outweighed by competing considerations. That model is flatly incompatible with the

practice of constitutional rights law around the world, in particular with the global

endorsementoftheproportionalityapproach.Instead,Idefendthefollowingaccountofthe

pointandpurposeofconstitutional rights.Themainentitlement thatapersonhasunder

the globalmodel is to being treatedwith a certain attitude: an attitude that takes her

seriouslyasapersonwithalifetolive,andthatwillthereforedenyhertheabilitytoliveher

lifeinacertainwayonlywhentherearesufficientlystrongreasonsforthis.Appliedtothe

caseofhobbiessuchasfeedingthebirds,thismeansthatweshouldnotaskwhetherthe

freedom to feed birds is an aspect of a narrowly defined set of especially important

interests.Rather,weshouldaskwhetherthestatetreatsapersonsubjecttoitsauthorityin

awaywhich isjustifiabletoherwhenthestateprohibits,forexample,herparticipationin

theactivityoffeedingbirds;andthiswillbethecaseonlywhentherearesufficientlystrong

reasonssupportingtheprohibition.Thus,thepointofconstitutionalrights isnottosingle

outcertainespeciallyimportantinterestsforheightenedprotection.Rather,itistoshowa

particularformofrespectforpersonsbyinsistingthateachandeverystatemeasurewhich

affects a persons ability to live her life according to her selfconceptionmust take her

autonomyinterestsadequatelyintoaccountinordertobejustifiabletoher.Constitutional


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rightslawinstitutionalisesarighttojustification20,thatis,arighttobeprovidedwithan

adequatejustification for every state action (and omission) that affects the agent in a

morallyrelevantway.

b)Thestructureofjustification:rightsminimalism

To say thatapersonhasa constitutional right toX,whereX could stand for freedomof

religion,freedomofexpression,property,etc.,meansnotthatthestatecannot,oratleast

not normally, limit X. Rather it means that when the state limits X it must provide

sufficientlystrongreasons forthis: ifthereasonssupportingthe limitationaresufficiently

strong, then the limitationwill be proportionate and thereforejustified; if they are not

strongenough,thelimitationwillbedisproportionateandtherightwillhavebeenviolated.

Thisraisesthequestionofwhatthestandardforsufficientlystrongreasonsisandought

tobeinthedomainofconstitutionalrights.Twocandidateapproachessuggestthemselves.

Accordingtothecorrectnessstandard,whenastatelimitsaright,itisjustified indoingso

onlyifitspolicyisthebestpossiblethecorrectresponsetothesocialproblemathand.

Bywayof contrast,undera reasonableness standard, the stateacts legitimatelywhen it

choosesareasonable,asopposedtotheonecorrect,policy.

As an illustration, let us look at the problem of assisted suicide. Some peoplewho are

sufferingfroman incurablediseaseandwhodesiretokillthemselveswhentheirsituation

becomesunbearableknowthatwhentheyreachthatstage,theywillnolongerbyphysically

strongenoughtoimplementthatplanontheirown,althoughtheycouldstilldoitwithhelp

fromapartner,friend,orphysician.However, it ispreciselythisassistancewhichinmany,

though by nomeans all, countries is illegal and punishable. The reason given for such

policiesisusuallythatallowingassistedsuicidewouldleadtotheriskofabuse,whereweak

andvulnerablepatientsarebulliedintodeathorevenkilledbyrelativesorcarers.Underthecorrectnessapproach,astatewhichlimitstherighttoassistedsuicidewhichispartofthe

right toprivate lifeorprivacy isjustified indoing soonlywhere this limitation is,asa

matter of substance, the best possible policy. Under the reasonableness approach, the

limitation isjustified if it isat least reasonable (thoughpossiblynot correct).Thus, letus

stipulatethatabanofassistedsuicideisanexampleofapolicywhichlegislatorscaningood

faithbelievetobethebestpolicy(ieitisreasonable),butwhichasamatterofmoralfactis

notthebestpolicy.Underthecorrectnessapproach,weshouldconsiderthispolicyasone

which violates rights,whereas under a reasonableness approach,we should accept it as

justified.

Bothasamatterofthecurrentpracticeofjudicialreviewaroundtheworldandasamatter

ofphilosophicalattractiveness,thereasonablenessapproachispreferable.Thejustification

for this is controversial, however.Mattias Kumm points to the existence of reasonable

disagreement:wheresuchreasonabledisagreementaboutthebestpolicyexists,choosing

one of the reasonable policies must be legitimate.21 I have argued that the notion of

reasonabledisagreement,whilerelevant,cannotdoallofthemoralworkandproposedthat

itistheprincipleofdemocracywhichrequiresthatapolicywhichisreasonable,asopposed

20Kumm,

Forst

21MattiasKumm,TheIdeaofSocraticContestationandtheRighttoJustification: ThePointofRightsBased

ProportionalityReview,(2010)4Law&EthicsofHumanRights141at16870.


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tocorrect,isregardedasconstitutionallylegitimate.22Ifwerequiredthedemocraticprocess

tocomeupwiththebestpossiblepolicywheneveritlegislatesinthedomainofrights,this

would, in lightof thebroad scopeof rightsunder the globalmodel,mean thatoftenor

indeedpossiblyalwaystheoutcomeofdemocraticdeliberationswouldbepredetermined

bythemoralrequirementsofrights.Therewouldbenoroomfordemocraticdeliberation

andgoodfaithdisagreementaboutpolicies;andthismustbe flatly incompatiblewithour

understanding of democracy as a form of government where the people and their

representativesdebateand,usually,faceagenuinechoicewithregardtotheproperwayto

dealwithaparticularsocialproblem.Thus,thevalueofdemocracyrequiresthatweaccept

areasonablenessstandardasopposedtocorrectnessstandardforassessingthejustifiability

ofthelimitationofaright.

This reasonableness standard is reflected in the jurisprudence of national

constitutional courts. I do not have the space here show this point in depth; so a few

observationsmust suffice. The Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the legislature

mustbegivenreasonableroomtomanoeuvre23

,aphrasewhosepoint isto indicatethatthe legislature need not find the one right answer to the rights question at stake. The

German Federal Constitutional Court often uses a negative formulation, stating that the

proportionality test is satisfied if the interference is notdisproportionateor notoutof

proportion.24Soratherthanrequiringpositivelythatthepolicybeproportionate,theCourt

demands negatively that it not be disproportionate; the effect of this is to give the

necessary leeway to theelectedbranches.Occasionally theCourtuses formulations that

indicateevenmoreclearlythattheapproachitusesisreallyareasonablenessapproach,for

examplewhenitstatesthattheremustbearelationship[betweentheseriousnessofthe

interference and theweightof the reasons supporting the interference] that can stillbe

consideredas

reasonable

25

.

c)Theemergingpicture:betweenminimalistandmaximalistapproaches

The picture which emerges is that national constitutional rights are at the same time

minimalistandmaximalist: theyaremaximalistwith regard to the rangeof interests that

theyprotectasrights,andminimalistwithregardtothestandardofjustificationwhichthey

demandwithregardtotheprotectionofthoseinterests.Whileasaconsequenceofrights

inflation all autonomy interests, including those of trivial importance, are protected as

rights,ameasurelimitingarightisjustifiedifsupportedbyareasonable,asopposedtothe

best possible,justification. The underlying idea here is that every statemeasurewhich

affects aperson in amorally relevantway inotherwords, every statemeasurewhichaffectsapersonsabilitytolivehislifeaccordingtohisselfconceptiontriggersthedutyof

justification; and that the standardofjustificationmustbea reasonableness standard in

order to preserve ameaningful sphereof democratic debate about and choicebetween

differentreasonablepolicies.

22KaiMller,TheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights(OUP2012),118.

23R.

v.

Edwards

Books

and

Art,(1986)

S.C.R.

713,

795.

24SeeforexampleBVerfGE65,1,54.

25BVerfGE76,1,51.


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III.FromnationalconstitutionalrightstointernationalhumanrightsWiththeaboveaccountofthemoralstructureofnationalconstitutionalrightsinmind,we

cannowapproachinternationalhumanrights.Asexplainedintheintroduction,theworking

hypothesis of this paper is that themoral structure of national constitutional rights and

internationalhumanrightswillatleastberelated.Thus,thequestiontobeaddressednowiswhatmodifications,ifany,wehavetoapplytothetheoryofnationalconstitutionalrights

presentedabove inorder tomake ita suitable theoryof internationalhuman rights.My

conclusionwillbethatweneednomodificationswhatsoever.

Therearetwoobjectionswhichatheoristof internationalhumanrightscouldhavetothis

view.Thefirstisthatnationalconstitutionalrights,unlikeinternationalhumanrights,reflect

andarebasedonnationalidiosyncrasiesandcontingenciesandarethereforenotasuitable

candidate for a theory of international human rights, which by its very nature must

transcend such contingencies. However, as I have explained above, constitutional rights

discourseisjustasglobalasinternationalhumanrightsdiscourse;constitutionsaroundthe

world containbroadly the same setof rights,and constitutionalcourtsaround theworld

employ the samedoctrinal tools to interpret them,most importantly theproportionality

testwhosepointistoenableafreestandingdiscussionofthemoraljustifiabilityofapolicy.

Theideathatconstitutionalrightsareoroughttobereflectiveofnationalidiosyncrasiesto

alargeextentissimplywrongandoughttobeabandoned.

The second andmore promising objection is that constitutional rights aremorallymore

demanding than international human rights. The idea is that constitutional rights

incorporate and reflect a comprehensive set of legitimacy conditions for a policy or

executive decision, whereas international human rights set only minimum standards.

Correlative to this perceived distance between national constitutional rights andinternationalhuman rights is aperceiveddistancebetween constitutional legitimacy and

nationalsovereignty:noteverythingthat isconstitutionally illegitimate(read:thatviolates

constitutionalrights)alsotranscendsthesphereofastatessovereignty(andconflictswith

internationalhumanrights):mostscholarswouldholdthatthereisroomforpoliciestofall

withinthesphereofsovereigntywhileatthesametimeviolatingconstitutionalrights.

Herearetwoimportantviewsfromtheliteraturewhichadoptthisbasicapproach.Thefirst

talks about the relationship between constitutional and human rights, and the second

focusesontherelationshipbetweenlegitimateauthorityandnationalsovereignty.InJustice

forHedgehogs,RonaldDworkinproposesatheoryofbothconstitutional(inhisterminology:

political)rightsandhumanrights.Hewrites:

Itseemswidelyagreedthatnotallpoliticalrightsarehumanrights.Peoplewhoallacceptthatgovernment

mustshowequalconcernforallitsmembersdisagreeaboutwhateconomicsystemthatrequiresButalmost

noneofthemwouldsuggestthatthemanynationsthatdisagreewithhisopinionareguiltyofhumanrights

violationsWhynot?Humanrightsarewidelythoughttobespecialand,accordingtomostcommentators

andtopoliticalpractice,moreimportantandfundamental.26

The secondquote,by JosephRaz,dealswith the correspondingpointof the relationship

betweenlegitimateauthorityandnationalsovereignty.Myinteresthereisnotinlegitimate

authority but in constitutional legitimacy, and I have no space here to explore the

26RonaldDworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs,???.


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11

relationshipbetween the two.However,Razsbasic intuition alsoworks, Ibelieve, ifwe

replacehisreferencetolegitimateauthoritywithconstitutionallegitimacy.

Wemustnot confuse the limitsof sovereigntywith the limitsof legitimate authority. The sovereigntyof

states sets limits to the right of others to interfere with their affairs. The notion of sovereignty is the

counterpart of that of rightful international intervention. The criteria determining the limits of legitimate

authoritydependon themoralityof theauthoritysactions.However,noteveryactionexceedinga stateslegitimateauthoritycanbeareasonforinterferencebyotherstates,whateverthecircumstances, justasnot

everymoralwrongdoingbyanindividualcanjustifyinterventionbyotherstostoporpunishit.27

Thus, according to the widely held view reflected in the above statements, there is a

distancebetweenconstitutional legitimacyandconstitutionalrightsontheonehand,and

internationalhuman rightsand statesovereigntyon theother.This is theview that Iwill

challenge in this section.My strategywillbenegative: Iwill show that, starting from the

theoryof constitutional rightswhich Ioutlined in theprevious section, there isneithera

morallycoherentwaytocreatethisdistance,noristhereaneedforit.Itfollowsthatifwe

wanttoprotecthumanrightsattheinternationallevel,weshouldacceptpreciselythesame

accountofrightsthatisappropriateatthenationallevel,andthatthemoralboundariesof

constitutionallegitimacyarethesameasthoseofnationalsovereignty.

Structurally,therearetwowaystotinkerwiththetheoryofconstitutionalrightspresented

intheprevioussection inordertomake itmoreminimalist.First,onecouldtrytoreduce

the range of interests protected as rights. Second, one could focus on the standard of

justification (the reasonableness standard) andmake this standard looser. Iwill consider

bothoptionsinturn,concludingthatnoneofthemcanbeimplementedwithoutmakingthe

resultingaccountofinternationalhumanrightsmorallyunappealing.

1.Limitingtherangeofinterestsprotectedasrights

I argued above that under the global model of constitutional rights, all of a persons

(autonomy) interestsareprotectedas rights.Thus,aperson can, toemploy two famous

Germancasesagain,successfullyclaimarighttofeedbirdsinaparkortogoriding inthe

woods. Theunderlying idea of this broad scope of rights is that every state action (and

omission) which affects a person in a morally relevant way requires justification. To

translate this right tojustification28 intoa theoryof rights, it isnecessary toprotectall

autonomy interestsofapersonattheprima faciestage,and toassessthejustifiabilityof

theirlimitationatthejustificationstage,usingtheproportionalitytest.

Now,an

international

human

rights

theorist

might

respond

by

arguing

that

while

itmay

be

appropriatetoprotectsuchabroadscopeofrightsinthecontextofnationalconstitutional

law, it would be inappropriate to do so at the international level. Thus, the range of

interests protected as rights ought to be drawnmore narrowly, introducing a threshold

whichdistinguishesrightsfrommereinterests.

Forthisideatosucceed,however,itwouldhavetobepossibletoidentifyathresholdwhich

pointstoaprincipleddistinctionbetweenthoseinterestswhichdoandthosewhichdonot

attracttheprotectionofrights.Afirstideamightbetodrawthelineinapragmaticway:we

27Raz,

Human

Rights

Without

Foundations

28RainerForst,TheJustificationofHumanRightsandtheBasicRighttoJustification: AReflexiveApproach,

120(2010)Ethics711.


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12

could say thatonly interestsof, say, fundamental importanceattract theprotectionof

internationalhuman rights.But theproblemwithpragmaticapproaches isprecisely their

pragmatic character, that is, theabsenceofprinciple.A second,morepromising strategy

would be to consider the existence of a qualitative difference between rights andmere

interests.Themostpromisingattempt inthisdirectionhasbeenmadebyJamesGriffin in

hisbookOnHuman

Rights.Heargues thatthethresholdcanbederived from the ideaof

personhood:

Human life is different from the life of other animals.We human beings have a conception of

ourselvesandofourpastand future.We reflectandassess.We formpicturesofwhatagood life

would beAndwe try to realise thesepictures. This iswhatwemean by adistinctively human

existenceAndwevalueourstatusashumanbeingsespeciallyhighly,oftenmorehighlythaneven

ourhappiness.Thisstatuscentresonourbeingagentsdeliberating,assessing,choosing,andacting

tomakewhatweseeasagoodlifeforourselves.

Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or, as I shall put it, our

personhood.Andonecanbreakdownthenotionofpersonhoodintoclearercomponentsbybreaking

downthenotionofagency.Tobeanagent, inthefullestsenseofwhichwearecapable,onemust(first)chooseonesownpaththrough lifethat is,notbedominatedorcontrolledbysomeoneor

somethingelse(call it autonomy).[And](third)othersmustnotforciblystoponefrompursuing

whatoneseesasaworthwhilelife(callthisliberty).29

Griffintellsusmoreabouthowdemandingtherighttolibertyis:

[L]iberty applies to the final stage of agency, namely to the pursuit of ones conception of a

worthwhile life.Bynomeanseverythingweaimatmatterstothat.Therefore,societywillaccepta

personsclaimtotheprotectionoflibertyonlyiftheclaimmeetsthematerialconstraintthatwhatis

atstakeisindeedconceivableasmatteringtowhetherornotwefunctionasnormativeagents.30

Griffins idea is that personhood functionsboth as thebasisofhuman rights and as alimitation on their scope: only those interests that are important for personhood are

protected as human rights. However, this account does notwork. Its failure is that the

personhood approach does not offer a coherentway to delineate interests relevant for

personhoodfromotherinterests.ForGriffin,personhoodrequiresautonomyandliberty(in

myterminology,personalautonomy):basically,controloverones life.But itrequiresonly

thatkindofcontroloveroneslifethatisrequiredbythevalueofpersonhood.Thisleaves

open the question ofwhat the test is for determiningwhether some instanceof liberty

(autonomy) isrequiredforpersonhood.Mysuspicion isthat it issimplyimportance.For

example,Griffinexplainsthatthedomainof liberty is limitedtowhat ismajorenoughto

count

as

part

of

the

pursuit

of

a

worthwhile

life

31

.

At

another

point,

he

defends

a

human

righttogaymarriageonthegroundofitscentralitytocharacteristichumanconceptionsof

aworthwhilelife.32Thus,itseemsthatthethresholdofpersonhoodsimplyrefersbacktoa

slidingscaleofimportance:aninterestthatismajorenoughorcentralwillacquirethe

statusofahumanright.Butsuchaslidingscalecannot,asexplainedabove,dothemoral

work.Thethresholdwouldhavetobebetweennotquitemajorenoughandbarelymajor

enoughor notquite centraland barely central.Then,underGriffinsmodel,all that

29JamesGriffin,OnHumanRights(OUP2008)at3233.Griffinssecondpoint,omittedinthequote,isabout

minimumprovisionofresourcesandcapabilitiesthatittakestobeanagent.30Ibid

at

167.

31Ibidat234(emphasisadded).

32Ibidat163(emphasisadded).


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13

separatesaninterestthatisjustbelowfromonethatisjustabovethethresholdisasmall

difference in terms of importance or centrality. This small difference, however, cannot

justifythegreatnormativesignificancethatforproponentsofthresholdmodelscomeswith

oneof thembeinga simple interestand theotherahuman right. Ibelieve that this isa

generalproblemofthresholdtheoriesthatisnotlimitedtoGriffinsaccount.33Ifthatistrue,

thentheonlypossibleconclusionisthatthethresholdrequirementshouldbedroppedand

itshouldbeacknowledgedthatthescopeofinternationalhumanrights,justasthescopeof

national constitutional rights, extends to everything that is in the interest of apersons

autonomy.However,thisbeingso,wemustabandontheideathatbyreducingthescopeof

interestsprotectedasrightswecanmakesenseofthewidespreadintuitionthatthereisa

distance between themoral demands of national constitutional rights and international

humanrights.

2.Loweringthestandardofjustification

The second structural possibility to construct a distance between national constitutional

rightsand internationalhumanrights istorelaxthestandardofjustification.Asexplained

above, under national constitutional rights, a policy limiting a right will be considered

justified if it is reasonable (asopposed tocorrect).Thismeans that tobeconstitutionally

legitimate,thelegislaturedoesnothavetofindthebestpossible,oroneright,answerto

thesocialproblemitaddresses;ratheritactslegitimatelyifitsanswerisreasonable.

The importance of this point cannot be overstated.Much of the discussion about the

justifiabilityofjudicial reviewat thenational level restson themistakenassumption that

whencourts

adjudicate

constitutional

rights,

they

thereby

remove

the

choice

of

policies

from the democratically elected legislature.34 This view is however at least an

overstatement:courtsdonotremovechoiceassuchfromthelegislature;theyremoveonly

thepossibilitytochooseanunreasonabledisproportionatepolicy.Thechoicebetween

allpossiblereasonableproportionatepoliciesremainswiththelegislature.Whenacourt

declaresthatapolicyrespectsconstitutionalrights, itsaysnothingmoreor lessthanthat

thepolicyunder consideration is reasonable; itdoesnotpassjudgmentonwhether it is

correct (this is simplynot thecourts task).Conversely,whereacourtdeclaresapolicya

violationofconstitutionalrights,itdecidesthatthisparticularpolicyisoutsidethescopeof

reasonablepolicies;butitleavestothelegislaturethetaskofchoosingareasonablepolicy.

With this clarification inmind, let us turn toDworkins proposal as to how to delineate

constitutional(political)frominternationalhumanrights:

Wemust insist that thoughpeopledohaveapolitical right toequal concernand respecton the right

conception,theyhaveamorefundamental,becausemoreabstract,right.Theyhavearighttobetreatedwith

theattitudethatthesedebatespresupposeandreflectarighttobetreatedasahumanbeingwhosedignity

fundamentallymatters.

Thatmoreabstractrighttherighttoanattitude isthebasichumanright.Governmentmayrespectthat

basichumanrightevenwhenitfailstoachieveacorrectunderstandingofmoreconcretepoliticalrightsWe

33 For a similar view, cf. Joseph Raz, Human Rightswithout Foundations, in Samantha Besson and John

Tasioulas(eds),

The

Philosophy

of

International

Law(2010),

at

326;

Dworkin,

Justice

for

Hedgehogs,

34JeremyWaldron,TheCoreoftheCaseAgainstJudicialReview,(2006)115YaleLawJournal,1346at1386

1395.


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14

ask:Canthelawsandpoliciesofaparticularpoliticalcommunitysensiblybeinterpretedasanattempt,evenif

finallya failedattempt, to respect thedignityof those in itspower?Ormustat leastsomeof its lawsand

policiesbeunderstoodasarejectionofthoseresponsibilities,towardeitheritssubjectsatlargeorsomegroup

withinthem?Thelatterlawsorpoliciesviolateahumanright.

Thetestcannotbesatisfiedsimplybyanationspronouncementofgoodfaith.Itissatisfiedonlywhena

governmentsoverallbehaviour isdefensibleunderan intelligible,even ifunconvincing,conceptionofwhat

ourtwoprinciplesofhumandignityrequire.35

As the above quote shows, Dworkinmust believe that in the domain of constitutional

(political) rights, legitimacy requires thatgovernmentget it right, i.e. that it find theone

rightanswertotherightsissueathand.Thiscanbecontrastedwiththedomainofhuman

rightswhich, according to Dworkin, require only that government act in good faith. As

Dworkinexplains, thegood faith requirement isnota subjectivebutanobjective test: it

requires that the respectivepolicybedefensibleunderan intelligible conceptionofwhat

dignityrequires.Inlightofthis,IbelieveitisfairtoDworkinsintentionstoequateingood

faithwithreasonable: the functionof thegood faith requirement is toacknowledgea

sphereofacceptabledisagreementwhileneverthelessrequiringthatthepolicyatstakebe

objectivelyjustifiable. Thismust in substance amount to a reasonableness standard: an

unreasonablepolicy isnotdefensibleasenacted ingoodfaithoras intelligible,whereasa

reasonablepolicyisdefensibleinthisway.

CanweuseDworkins ideatocreateadistancebetweennationalconstitutionalrightsand

internationalhumanrightsundertheglobalmodel? Ibelievethatwecannot.Dworkincan

createthisdistanceinhistheoryonlybecausethestandardofjustificationinhisaccountof

constitutional(political)rightsiscorrectness.Icannotassessherewhetherthispositionis

viablewithinDworkinstheoryofrights(Ihavemydoubts).Butontheassumptionthatitis,

itisindeedastructuralpossibilityforDworkintothenrelaxthecorrectnessstandardwhichhe uses for constitutional rights and adopt a reasonableness (good faith) standard for

internationalhumanrights.Bywayofcontrast,inthetheoryofconstitutionalrightswhich

underlies the global model, the standard of review is already only a reasonableness

standard anyway; therefore any further relaxation of this standard would imply that

internationalhuman rightshavenoobjection topolicieswhichaffectpeoples rightsand

whicharenotevenreasonable.Reasonablemeanssomethinglikesupportedbyadequate

reasons. It is implausible tohold thatapolicywhich limitsapersonshuman rightsand

which isnot supportedbyadequate reasonsneverthelesscomplieswithhuman rights. In

otherwords,we cannot go below the threshold of reasonableness, and given that this

thresholdisalreadyemployedbynationalconstitutionalrights,wecannotcreateadistancebetween national constitutional rights and international human rights by relaxing the

standardofjustification.

Theaboveargument isdirectedat the relationshipbetweennationalconstitutional rights

and international human rights. We can examine the same issue by contrasting

constitutional legitimacyandnational sovereignty.RememberRazs claim,quotedabove,

thatthetworefertodifferentstandards,withnationalsovereigntybeingwiderthanwhat

he calls legitimateauthority,andwhat I call constitutional legitimacy.Why is this so, for

Raz?

35RonaldDworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs,3356(emphasisintheoriginal).


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15

As Isee it,thecorepoint,which istoocomplextobedweltuponhere, isthatmuchofthecontentofthe

moralprincipleswhichgovernsocial relationsand the structureofsocialorganisation isdeterminedby the

contingentpracticesofdifferent societies.Hence theprincipleswhich shouldgovern international relations

cannotjustbeageneralisation oftheprinciplesofjusticewhichgovernanyindividualsociety.Howdoesthis

bearon the issueof state sovereignty?Directly itestablishes adegreeof variabilitybetween standardsof

justice and thereby variability in the precise content and scope of rightswhich apply in different political

societies.Thisspeaksforcaution ingivingoutsidersarightto intervene intheaffairsofotherstates. Italso

suggeststhedesirabilityofallowingpoliticalsocietiesfreedomfromtoocloseexternalscrutiny,tobefreeto

developtheirownrightsaffectingpractices.36

ByRazsownadmission,thisisonlythesketchofanargument.Inwhatfollows,Iwillunpack

andinterpretthestatement,andIwillagainreplaceRazstermoflegitimateauthoritywith

constitutional legitimacy; so what follows is the critique of a position which Raz

presumably holds only partially. There is a close connection between constitutional

legitimacy and the principles of justice that govern any individual society. But those

principles of justice will vary from society to society. This is not so because of moral

relativism (whichRazrightlyrejects),orbecausewhateverprinciplesasocietyhappensto

acceptmake thoseprinciplesjust.Rather, it isbecauseofwhatRazcallsabenign social

relativism, according towhich the principles ofjusticewill be sensitive to social facts.

Applied to the issuehere,certainpracticeswillhavedevelopedwithina society,and the

principlesofjusticewhichareapplicabletothatsocietywilloratleastmaybesensitiveto

thosepractices.Henceitisnotpossibletosimplytakeonesocietysprinciplesofjusticeand

applythemtoanothersocietywithdifferentpracticesandstructures;andgiventheclose

connection between justice and constitutional legitimacy, it is not possible to equate

nationalsovereigntywithanygivensocietysstandardsforconstitutionallegitimacy.Inlight

ofthis,cautionisrequiredwhenassessingquestionsofjusticefromtheoutside,andnotoo

closeexternalscrutinyshouldbeapplied.

To illustrate this idea, letus take the exampleof the right to education,which Raz also

considersinhispaper,albeitinadifferentcontext.LetussaythatincountryA,peoplehave

amoralrightagainstthestatetobeprovidedwitheducation,butthatincountryB,people

havenosuchmoral rightbecause,say, thesocialstructuresof thatcountryaresuch that

people can have a rewarding lifewithout formal instruction, or because in that country

education isprovidedby the familyorclanand the stateneednotget involved.Thus, in

countryA,justice requires that thestateprovideeducationand incountryB itdoesnot.

Thus,aninternationaljudgewhoisacitizenofcountryAandwhoiscalledupontoassess

thehumanrightssituationincountryBcouldmistakenlybelievethateducationisahuman

right(based

on

her

experience

at

home);

in

order

to

avoid

such

mistakes

she

should

adopt

anattitudeofcaution,andadditionallysheshouldkeepinmindthefactthatsocietiesneed

freedomtodeveloptheirownrightsaffectingpractices.

Thefirstproblemwiththisapproachistheassumedlinkbetweenconstitutionallegitimacy

andjustice. Constitutional legitimacy is not about securingjustice. Rather, as explained

above, it is aboutwhether apolicy is supportedby adequate reasons:wemay say, it is

aboutwhetherapolicyreliesonareasonable,asopposedtotheonecorrect,conceptionof

justice.Inotherwords,apolicymaybeunjustbutneverthelessconstitutionallylegitimate.

Thismustbetruebecauseifconstitutionallegitimacyrequiredjustice,thentherewouldbe

36 Joseph Raz, Human Rights without Foundations, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The

PhilosophyofInternationalLaw(2010),...


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noroomfordemocraticdisagreementaboutquestionsofjusticerather,onlyone,namely

theonejust,policywouldbeconstitutionally legitimate;suchanapproachwouldbeflatly

incompatible with the value of democracy which requires the people or their

representativestoengageindiscussionsandcontroversiesaboutandultimatelyholdavote

on what justice requires. This means that constitutional legitimacy leaves states a

considerableroomformanoeuvre:allitinsistsonisthatapolicybeareasonableattemptat

justice. From the point of constitutional legitimacy, states have an enormous leeway in

working outwhich conception ofjusticeworks best for them, and theymay take their

structureofsocialrelation,history,andsocialpracticesintoaccountwhendoingso.Thereis

nomoralneed,nor is there themoralpossibility, tomake this leewayevenwider in the

contextofnationalsovereigntybecausedoingsowouldimplyawardingthedignifyinglabel

offalling intothesphereofnationalsovereigntytoapolicywhich isnotonlyunjustbut

which cannot even be defended as a reasonable attempt atjustice. The pluralism and

diversitywhichrightlyoughttobecherishedintheinternationalarenamust,tobemorally

defensible, be a diversity and pluralism of reasonable conceptions ofjustice, not one of

unreasonableandthereforeunjustifiableones.

Inlightofthisclarification,letusassessRazstwoargumentsaboutwhysovereigntyiswider

thanconstitutional legitimacy.Oneofhispoints isthatsocietiesneedfreedomtodevelop

theirownrightsaffectingpractices,andthattherefore internationalsupervisionoughtnot

tobe too intrusive.This argument isunconvincing: the freedom todevelopones rights

affectingpractices issurelyvaluablewhenusedtodeveloprightsrespectingpractices.But

what if a society uses it to develop rightsviolating practices? Societies do indeed need

freedom to develop their own practices, but the only freedom they need is to choose

between different reasonable conceptions of justice, not the freedom to choose

unreasonableones;

and,

as

pointed

out

above,

policies

based

on

reasonable

conceptions

of

justicedonotviolaterightsandremainwithinthesphereofnationalsovereignty.

Razs second point is that there are certain difficulties with outsiders assessing the

requirements ofjustice in a given society. As a preliminary point, these difficulties are

reduced but do not entirely go away when we replace justice with constitutional

legitimacy:theyarereducedbecause itwilloftenbeeasier,especially foranoutsider,to

assesswhether apolicy is reasonable than to assesswhether it is correct;however, the

problems still persist to an extent because the reasonableness of a policy will still be

sensitivetolocalcontingenciestosomeextent.

IbelievethatRazhasavalidpointhere,albeitonewhichleadshimtodrawanunattractiveconclusion.Letustaketheexampleofaninternationaljudge.Itistruethataninternational

judgecannotsimplyrelyontheconceptionofconstitutionallegitimacyadoptedinhishome

countryandapply ittothesocietyfromwhichthecaseonhisdeskoriginates.Rather,he

mustask thequestionofwhetherthepolicyatstake is legitimateunder thestandardsof

legitimacyofthesocietywhosepolicyitis;andestablishingthismayonoccasionbedifficult

orevenimpossibleforhim.However,theproperresponsetothisproblemisnottoloosen

the moral requirements of sovereignty but rather to acknowledge that sometimes an

outsidersempiricaland/ornormativeknowledgeislimited,andthereforetoshowadegree

ofdeferencetowardstheoriginaldecisionmaker.


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Dealingwiththiskindofuncertaintyisthedailybusinessofinternationalcourtssuchasthe

ECtHR,whichhasdevelopedstrategiesanddoctrinestodososatisfactorily. Itsjudgments

usuallycontain longsectionssettingoutthedomesticcontextoftherights issueatstake;

this enables the Court to assess whether the policy is justifiable within the respective

domesticcontext.Furthermoreandmoreimportantly,theCourtsdoctrineofthemarginof

appreciation acknowledges and provides away of dealingwith the specific institutional

limitationsunderwhichit,asaninternationalcourt,operates.Theclassicstatementofthe

marginofappreciationwassetoutinthefamousHandysidecase:

Byreasonoftheirdirectandcontinuouscontactwiththevitalforcesoftheircountries,Stateauthoritiesarein

principle inabetterpositionthan the internationaljudge togiveanopinionon [thequestionofwhethera

restrictionoftherightisnecessary].[...][I]tisforthenationalauthoritiestomaketheinitialassessmentofthe

realityofthepressingsocialneedimpliedbythenotionof'necessity'inthiscontext.

Consequently,Article10(2)leavestotheContractingStatesamarginofappreciation.[...]Nevertheless,Article

10 (2) does not give the Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court,which [...] is

responsibleforensuringtheobservanceofthoseStates'engagements, isempoweredtogivethefinalruling

onwhethera 'restriction'or 'penalty' is reconcilablewith freedomofexpressionasprotectedbyArticle10.

ThedomesticmarginofappreciationthusgoeshandinhandwithaEuropeansupervision.(paras48,49)

ThemarginofappreciationdoctrineenablestheCourttodefertothenationalauthoritiesof

therespectivememberstate inasituationwhere ithasdoubtsaboutthejustifiabilityofa

policy but is simultaneously unable to convince itself of its unjustifiability (because of

epistemicuncertainty).Insuchcases,theCourtwilloftenholdthatthemeasureatstakelies

withinthemarginofappreciationoftherespectivememberstate. Itshouldbenotedthat

themarginofappreciationdoctrineisnotonlyoneofthecornerstonesofEuropeanhuman

rights law,butalsooneofthemostdifficultandcontroversialpartsof it;andtheCourt is

often rightly accused of taking recourse to it too lightly. So my goal here is not to

wholeheartedlydefend theCourtsapproach; rather it is tomake themore limitedpointthat there are indeed caseswhere the doctrine is rightly invoked because of epistemic

uncertainty.

TogiveanexampleofascenariowhereitisdifficultandmaybeimpossiblefortheCourtto

establishtherightoutcome,letusconsidertheRefahPartycase.TurkeybannedtheRefah

PartywhichitconsideredextremistandathreattoTurkishdemocracy,inparticularbecause

of its rightwing Islamic agenda, which included, among other things, a proposal to

introduce aspects of Sharia law. In a nutshell, one of the important issues at stakewas

whetherTurkeywasjustifiedintakingatoughstancetowardsreligious,inparticularIslamic,

parties,in

order

to

protect

its

commitment

to

what

has

been

labelled

militant

secularism,

which in turnwas regardedbyTurkeyasacornerstoneofprotecting itsdemocracy from

beingunderminedandeventually, toput itbluntly, slipping intoan Islamicdictatorship. I

regardthiscaseasaparadigmexampleofthescenarioRazmusthaveinmind,whereitis

extremelydifficultifnotimpossibleforanoutsidersuchasaninternationaljudgetodecide

whetherTurkeysactionofdissolvingtheRefahpartywasjustified,andthereasonforthis

difficulty lies in the fact thatnormative considerationsabout the legitimacyofbanninga

politicalpartyareinextricablyboundupwithquestionsrelatingtoTurkeyshistory,culture,

andpolitics,whichmake itdifficult ifnot impossible foranoutsider to resolve the issue

satisfactorily. So, to repeat, Raz has a point. But if I am given the task to resolve a

mathematicalpuzzlewhich istoodifficultforme,theresponsetomypersonalintellectual

limitations cannot be to relax the standards ofmathematical truth. Similarly,where an


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18

internationalcourtisunabletodeterminewhetheracountryspolicyreflectsareasonable

conception of justice, we should not respond by relaxing the moral requirements of

sovereignty.Rather,weshouldacknowledgethattheproblemofepistemicuncertaintymay

on occasion lead international courts to defer to the respective national authorities

problematic and unsatisfactory as this may be , and at the same time insist that

sovereigntycanbeinvokedonlyinsupportofjustifiable(reasonable)policies.

3.Conclusion

Both strategies of creating a distance between national constitutional rights and

constitutional legitimacy on the one hand and international human rights and national

sovereigntyontheotherfailed.Totheextentthatconstitutionalrightsaremaximalistin

characterbyprotectingall(autonomy)interestsasrights,thiscannotbeabandonedwithout

introducing arbitrariness, and to the extent that constitutional rights areminimalist by

insisting not on a correctness but only on a reasonableness standard ofjustification, afurtherloweringofthestandardisneithernecessarynorcoherentlypossible.Itfollowsthat

national constitutional rights and constitutional legitimacy on the one hand and

international human rights and national sovereignty on the other have the samemoral

structure.Thenextsectionwillfleshoutsomeoftheimplicationsofthisview.

IV.Implications1.Analternativeexplanationofinternationalhumanrightsminimalism,anditslimits

Many scholars believe thatminimalism be it an absoluteminimalism or a relative

minimalism(minimalismofinternationalhumanrightsinrelationtonationalconstitutional

law) isbuilt into themoral structureof internationalhuman rights.However, theonly

defensiblekindofminimalismispragmaticandthereforeexternaltothemoralstructureof

internationalhumanrights.Therearegoodreasonswhymuchofinternationalhumanrights

practicefocusesonpreventingparticularlyegregiousviolationsofhumanrights.Butthose

reasonshavenothing todowith themoral structureof internationalhuman rights; they

simplyreflectjudgmentsaboutpriorities.

While it isplausibletodefendsomeformofminimalismonpragmaticgrounds,wewould

howeverpaintaonesidedpictureofinternationalhumanrightsifwearguedthatallofitis

oroughttobeminimalistforpragmaticreasons.Pragmaticminimalismcanbejustifiedonly

to theextent that it ispolitically impossibleorexcessively costly toprotect international

humanrightscomprehensively. Inotherwords,weshouldworktowardsastateofaffairs

where international human rights are comprehensively protected, and where it is not

necessary to limit theirpractical reach to thepreventionofonly theworsthuman rights

violations. In this sense the theoryof internationalhuman rightsproposedhere ispartly

aspirational.

I say partly because there exists already one instance of a legal institutionalisation of

human rights at the international levelwhichbroadly reflects themodel I advocate: theEuropean Convention onHuman Rights.Approaching thejurisprudence of the European


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CourtofHumanRightswiththeideasofhumanrightsminimalisminmindwouldbefutile:it

is about as maximalist in character as even the most expansive system of national

constitutionalrights.First,wecanidentifyrightsinflationinthejurisprudenceoftheECtHR:

theCourttendstoreadevenrelativelytrivialinterestsintotheConvention,mostofteninto

Article8(therighttorespectforprivateandfamilylife).Togivejustoneexample,inacase

involving residents near Heathrow airport complaining about the noise caused by night

flights, the Court held that Article 8 also covers the right not to be affected by aircraft

noise37dismissivelydubbedthehumanrighttosleepwell

38byGeorgeLetsas.Second,

the Court protects negative aswell as positive obligations in fact, it hasmore or less

dropped the distinction between the two.39 (It admittedly does not, at least not

comprehensively, protect socioeconomic rights,whichwere deliberately left out of the

Convention.) Third, the Court applies the proportionality test and, by and large, has no

scruplesaboutdeclaringameasureofamember statedisproportionateand therefore in

violationofhumanrights.Togive,again,justoneexample:theCourtrecentlyruledagainst

theUnitedKingdom for failing toprotect the rightof an employeeofBritishAirways to

openlywearasmallcrossduringwork,arguingthatBAs interest inmaintainingacertaincorporateimagewasoutweighedbytheapplicantsrighttomanifestherreligion.

40Whilea

comprehensiveanalysisoftheCourtsjurisprudenceisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,itis

fair to say that its approach to human rights is structurally extremely close to that of

national constitutional courts. This being so, it cannot be argued that the model of

internationalhumanrightswhichIproposeinthispapercannotworkinpractice.Itdoes,by

andlarge,workinpractice,namelyinthememberstatesoftheCouncilofEurope,andnot

onlydoes itworksomehow;rather,thejurisprudenceoftheCourt incharge iswidelyand

rightlyregardedastheposterchildofinternationalhumanrightslaw.

2.Whatsthepointofinternationalhumanrightslaw?

If,asIargue,themoralstructuresofnationalconstitutionalrightsandinternationalhuman

rightsareidenticalandifweshouldworktowardsastateofaffairswheretheinternational

orderprotectsfundamentalrightsaswellassomenationalconstitutionalcourtsalreadydo,

thenthis leadstothequestionofthepointofthisadditional layerofrightsprotection.At

firstglance,aninstitutionalisedmechanismfortheprotectionofinternationalhumanrights

whichreliesonthesamestandardsasnationalconstitutionalcourtsmayseemoddandan

unnecessarycomplicationandduplicationofresponsibilities.

Thereis,however,nothingsuspiciousaboutthefactthatunderthemodeladvocatedhere,

national constitutional courts and international human rights courts apply the same

standardsofreview.The internationalmechanismsfortheprotectionofhumanrightswill

only kick inwhen somethinghas gonewrong at thenational level.Thus, ifonewere to

adoptaminimalistapproach to internationalhuman rights, then the internationalactors

wouldonlybecomeactiveafterthenational levelhasfailedtodelivereventhisminimum

standard. Inthemodeladvocatedhere,the internationalactorswould interferewhenthe

37Hattonv.U.K.

38Letsas

39Addexample.

40Eweidav.U.K.


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respectivenationalconstitutionalcourtmadeamistakeandacceptedapolicyascomplying

withtherequirementsofconstitutionallegitimacy(whichareidenticaltothoseofnational

sovereignty)wheninrealityitviolatedthem.Thus,thepointofinternationalhumanrights

lawistopolicetheboundariesofastatessovereignty.

A further question is whether there is a moral obligation on states to create legallyinstitutionalisedmechanisms for the protection of international human rights. I believe

there are, and Iwill focus on twomoral reasons for states to sign up for a system of

internationalhumanrightsprotection.Thefirstcentresoneachstatesdutytoensureand

improveitsownlegitimacyinrelationtoitscitizens.41Oneimportantaspectofitslegitimacy

isitsrespectforitscitizensfundamentalrights.Therearegoodoutcomerelatedreasonsto

hold that an adequate institutionalisation of fundamental rightswill provide not only a

national levelof constitutionalprotectionbut includeanadditional international layeras

well.42First,theinternationallayermaystabiliseacountryslongtermcommitmenttothe

valuesofdemocracy,theruleof law,andfundamentalrights,andmaymake itharderfor

forces seeking to undermine or destroy its democratic culture to succeed. In a nationalcontext, the integrity of a constitutional court ismostunder threatwhen the governing

partiesseek toundermine itswork, forexample through theappointmentofjudgeswho

support the governments ideology, the tinkeringwithprocedural rules,or constitutional

amendments.While it is true that international courts, too, operate in an environment

which involves political pressure (this is clearly visible in the case of the ECtHR which

suspiciouslyoftenbacktracksfrom itsownjurisprudencewhen facedwithresistance from

nationalgovernments), itwillbe impossible foranyonenationalgovernmentgoneastray

and acting in isolation to do serious damage to an international court. Second and

independently, there is reason to assume that international courtswill sometimes reach

betteroutcomes

compared

to

national

constitutional

courts.

National

constitutional

courts

and international courts have their respective weaknesses and strengths. Among the

strengthsofawelldesignednationalconstitutionalcourt isthat itsjudgeswillhavemore

adequatewaysofacquiringtherelevantempiricalknowledgeonwhichthecorrectoutcome

oflegalcases,includinghumanrightscases,oftendepends,andthattheywillhaveadeeper

understanding of the principles of justice applicable to their respective society. An

internationalcourtwill find itmoredifficulttoaccesstherelevantempiricaldata;and,as

discussedabove,willalsoonoccasion find itmoredifficult toassess thejustifiabilityofa

statespracticesfromtheoutside.InthecaseoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,this

oftenleadstheCourttoadoptarelativelyhighdegreeofdeferencetowardstherespective

nationalauthorities,whichpotentiallyleadstoanunderprotectionofhumanrights.There

arehoweveralso importantways inwhichan internationalcourtmaybebetterplacedto

engageinjudicialreview:thehumanmindoftenleadsustotrustwhatwearefamiliarwith,

andthereforeinthecaseofanationalconstitutionalcourt,thejudgesintimateknowledge

oftheirlegalordermayonoccasionprecludeafreshandunbiasedassessmentofthelawat

stake. Insuchsituations,an internationalcourt,asabodymostlymadeupofjudgesfrom

41OnastatesobligationtoimproveitsownlegitimacyseeDworkin,ANewPhilosophyforInternationalLaw,

(2013)Philosophy&PublicAffairs1,17.42Ileaveopenthefurtherquestionofwhetherthereareoutcomeindependentreasons(thatis,reasonswhich

donot

rest

on

the

assumed

ability

of

international

courts

to

improve

the

overall

level

of

rights

protection)

whichnecessitatetheexistenceofarighttoahearingbeforeaninternationalcourt.Forthenationalcontext,

suchaclaimhasbeenmadebyAlonHarel,...andMattiasKumm,...


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otherjurisdictions,maybemoreadequateand inabetterposition,relativelyspeaking,to

identifycertainpathologiesofthepoliticsandpoliciesofanationalcommunity.

The second reason forjoiningan international system for theprotectionofhuman rights

can be derived from a states obligations to people living in other states and can be

explained in the followingway.Human rights flow from a fundamental status of humanbeings which they possess simply by virtue of their humanity; wemay call this status

human dignity. Violations of human dignity are a moral concern for everyone; this

proposition is thebasisof theview,assumedby thispaper, that thesovereigntydefence

doesnotholdinthecaseofaviolationofhumanrights:aviolatingstatecannotclaimthat

itsviolationofhumanrightsisnotthebusinessofotherstates.Thus,everystateisundera

moralobligationtotakeadequatestepsintheinternationalarenatoensurethatthehuman

dignityofpeople living inotherstates isrespected.One importantwayofdischargingthis

moralobligation istoparticipate in internationalsystemsofhuman rightsprotection that

arelikelytoleadtoanimprovementinhumanrightscomplianceinthosestates.Thus,even

acountrywhosedemocraticand rightsrespectingculture isofsuchahighquality that intermsofimprovingitslevelofrightsprotectionathomeithasnothingtogainfromjoining

aninternationalsystemofrightsprotectionwillbeunderamoralobligationtoparticipateif

by doing so it contributes to amore effective protection of human rights abroad. For

example,thecurrentdebateintheUnitedKingdomaboutwhetherthecountryshouldleave

theCouncilofEuropecentresalmostexclusivelyonthequestionofwhattheUKmayget

outof stayingor leaving,andusuallyneglects the fact thatwhatever theanswer to that

question may be, the more important consideration relates to the UKs obligation to

contribute to making the ECHR a success across Europe and improving human rights

complianceinothermemberstateswithalessimpressivedemocraticandrightsrespecting

culturethan

that

of

the

UK.

Which steps are adequate and therefore morally required will of course be a difficult

question,andwill crucially involve strategic considerationsas to the likely successof the

schemeunderconsiderationinimprovinghumanrightscomplianceinthelongrun.Assume

thatthemeasureunderconsiderationisaregionalhumanrightstreatywhich includesthe

rightofindividualstopetitionaninternationalcourtwiththefinalauthorityonquestionsof

interpretation in otherwords, a scheme similar to the ECHR.Where the international

situation is such that itcanbeexpected that thenewlycreatedcourtwill,on thewhole,

functionwelland improvethecomplianceoftheparticipatingstateswiththedemandsof

humandignity,astatewillbeunderanobligationtoparticipate inthisschemeeven if its

rightssituationathomedoesnotneedimprovementandcanbeconsideredentirelystable

even in the long run. Itowes thisdutynot to itsowncitizensbut to thepeopleofother

stateswhose dignity is not currently adequately respected, orwho live in stateswhose

democraticandrightsrespectingcultureisnotsufficientlymatureandneedsthestabilising

effectofthistreaty inordertokeepthecountryonadignityrespectingcourse.Bywayof

contrast,wheretheinternationalsituationissuchthatitcouldbeexpectedthatthetreaty

under considerationwould not contribute tomore respect for dignity in the respective

region for example because onewould have to expect thatmany of the participating

countrieswould send incompetentorcorruptjudges to siton thenewcourt,orbecause

there is no sufficient prospect of the new courts judgments being obeyed no such

obligationwould arise. (However, in such a situation, other obligationswould of courseexist,thecrucialquestionbeingwhichstepsare likelyto improvecompliancewithhuman


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rights over time.) Thus, importantly,my argument isnot thatwhatever the state of the

world or the respective region, international human rights courts ought to be set up

everywhere.Suchcourtsareonlyoneofarangeofpotentialmeasurestostabilisearegions

respect forhuman rights in the long run,and they shouldonlybeusedwhere there isa

reasonablechanceofthemsucceedingwiththeirwork.Thatsaid,wheretheconditionsare

sufficiently favourable, there is an obligation to introduce them, for the reasons given

above.

Theaboveargumentclaimsthatstateshaveanobligationtotakeadequatestepstoprotect

humanrightsinsideaswellasoutsidetheirownborders.Thepointcanbepushedfurther:I

will claim that the creationof an international courtofhuman rightswill,under certain

conditions,itselfbeamatterofhumanrights.Theargumenttothiseffectproceedsintwo

steps and is structurally similar to, though substantively different from, establishing the

existenceofamoralrightunderRazsinteresttheoryofrights.Razhasfamouslyarguedthat

a rightexistswhereapersons interestgroundsduties inothers. Ina structurallyparallel

way, I claim that a person has a right if someone else is under an obligationwhich isgrounded in thatpersons status;and this rightwillbeahuman right if the statusunder

consideration is the status of human dignity. Thus, a person has a human right to the

creationofan internationalhumanrightscourt ifstatesareunderanobligationtocreate

such an institutional protection of human rights and if this obligation flows from that

personshumandignity.Theobligationtocreateaninternationalhumanrightscourt,where

itexists, is,asarguedabove,grounded in thestatusofhumandignityofespecially those

peoplewhosehuman rightsare at riskofnotbeing adequately respected in theirhome

states in the present or the future. This establishes the possibility of the existence of a

humanrighttothecreationofaninternationalcourtofhumanrights.

V.ConclusionThispaperhasdemonstratedthatinternationalhumanrightshavethesamemoralstructure

as national constitutional rights and, in particular, that the widespread view that

internationalhumanrightsaremoreminimalistthannationalconstitutionalrightscannotbe

maintained. As has been shown, international human rights minimalism is neither

coherently possible, nor is it desirable in the interests of a reasonable pluralism and

diversityattheinternationallevel.Itfollowsthatminimalismcan,ifatall,onlybejustified

pragmatically,asanecessarysettingofprioritiesinordertotackleatleastthemosturgent

human rightsproblems.Butweshouldtry to limittheneed for thispragmatism,and the

aspirationexpressedbythetheoryofinternationalhumanrightsendorsedhereisthatofa

worldwhere the same levelof rightsprotection that todayalreadyexistsat thenational

levelinmanycountriesisalsoendorsedandeffectivelyinstitutionalisedattheinternational

level.

moller from constitutional to international human rights

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