mona secure multi-owner data sharing

5/28/2018 Mona Secure Multi-Owner Data Sharing

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Mona: Secure Multi-Owner Data Sharing for Dynamic

Groups in the Cloud

ABSTACT:

With the character of low maintenance, cloud computing provides an economical

and efficient solution for sharing group resource among cloud users.

Unfortunately, sharing data in a multi-owner manner while preserving data and

identity privacy from an untrusted cloud is still a challenging issue, due to the

frequent change of the membership. In this paper, we propose a secure multi owner

data sharing scheme, named Mona, for dynamic groups in the cloud. By leveraging

group signature and dynamic broadcast encryption techniques, any cloud user can

anonymously share data with others. Meanwhile, the storage overhead and

encryption computation cost of our scheme are independent with the number of

revoed users. In addition, we analy!e the security of our scheme with rigorous

proofs, and demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme in e"periments.

!"#ST#$G S%ST!M:

#everal security schemes for data sharing on untrusted servers have been proposed.

In these approaches, data owners store the encrypted data files in untrusted storage

and distribute the corresponding decryption eys only to authori!ed users. $hus,

unauthori!ed users as well as storage servers cannot learn the content of the data

files because they have no nowledge of the decryption eys %owever, thecomple"ities of user participation and revocation in these schemes are linearly

increasing with the number of data owners and the number of revoed users,

respectively. By setting a group with a single attribute, &u et al. proposed a secure

provenance scheme based on the cipherte"t-policy attribute-based encryption


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technique, which allows any member in a group to share data with others.

%owever, the issue of user revocation is not addressed in their scheme. 'u et al.

presented a scalable and fine-grained data access control scheme in cloud

computing based on the ey policy attribute-based encryption ()*-+B

technique. Unfortunately, the single owner manner hinders the adoption of their

scheme into the case, where any user is granted to store and share data.

D#SAD&A$TAG!S O' !"#ST#$G S%ST!M:

Identity privacy is one of the most significant obstacles for the wide

deployment of cloud computing. Without the guarantee of identity privacy,

users may be unwilling to oin in cloud computing systems because their real

identities could be easily disclosed to cloud providers and attacers. /n the

other hand, unconditional identity privacy may incur the abuse of privacy.

It is highly recommended that any member in a group should be able to fully

enoy the data storing and sharing services provided by the cloud, which is

defined as the multiple-owner manner. 0ompared with the single-ownermanner, where only the group manager can store and modify data in the

cloud, the multiple-owner manner is more fle"ible in practical applications.

1roups are normally dynamic in practice, e.g., new staff participation and

current employee revocation in a company. $he changes of membership

mae secure data sharing e"tremely difficult.

(O(OS!D S%ST!M:

In this paper, we propose a secure multiowner data sharing scheme, named Mona,

for dynamic groups in the cloud. By leveraging group signature and dynamic

broadcast encryption techniques, any cloud user can anonymously share data with


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others. Meanwhile, the storage overhead and encryption computation cost of our

scheme are independent with the number of revoed users. In addition, we analy!e

the security of our scheme with rigorous proofs, and demonstrate the efficiency of

our scheme in e"periments.

AD&A$TAG!S O' (O(OS!D S%ST!M:

We propose a secure multi-owner data sharing scheme. It implies that any

user in the group can securely share data with others by the untrusted cloud.

/ur proposed scheme is able to support dynamic groups efficiently.

#pecifically, new granted users can directly decrypt data files uploaded

before their participation without contacting with data owners.

We provide secure and privacy-preserving access control to users, which

guarantees any member in a group to anonymously utili!e the cloud

resource.

We provide rigorous security analysis, and perform e"tensive simulations todemonstrate the efficiency of our scheme in terms of storage and

computation overhead.

S%ST!M AC)#T!CT*!:


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+#T!AT*! S*&!%

, (lutus: Scala.le Secure 'ile Sharing on *ntrusted Storage

A*T)OS: M. )allahalla, . 2iedel, 2. #waminathan, 3. Wang, and ). 4u

*lutus is a cryptographic storage system that enables secure file sharing without

placing much trust on the file servers. In particular, it maes novel use of

cryptographic primitives to protect and share files. *lutus features highly scalable

ey management while allowing individual users to retain direct control over who

gets access to their files. We e"plain the mechanisms in *lutus to reduce the

number of cryptographic eys e"changed between users by using filegroups,

distinguish file read and write access, handle user revocation efficiently, and allow

an untrusted server to authori!e file writes. We have built a prototype of *lutus on


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/pen+4#. Measurements of this prototype show that *lutus achieves strong

security with overhead comparable to systems that encrypt all networ traffic.

/ Sirius: Securing emote *ntrusted Storage

A*T)OS:. 1oh, %. #hacham, 5. Modadugu, and 6. Boneh

$his paper presents #i2iU#, a secure file system designed to be layered over

insecure networ and *7* file systems such as 54#, 0I4#, /cean#tore, and

'ahoo8 Briefcase. #i2iU# assumes the networ storage is untrusted and provides

its own read-write cryptographic access control for file level sharing. )ey

management and revocation is simple with minimal out-of-band communication.

4ile system freshness guarantees are supported by #i2iU# using hash tree

constructions. #i2iU# contains a novel method of performing file random access

in a cryptographic file system without the use of a bloc server. "tensions to

#i2iU# include large scale group sharing using the 55& ey revocation


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construction. /ur implementation of #i2iU# performs well relative to the

underlying file system despite using cryptographic operations.

0 #mpro1ed (ro2y e-!ncryption Schemes with Applications to Secure

Distri.uted Storage

A*T)OS: 1. +teniese, ). 4u, M. 1reen, and #. %ohenberger

In 9::;, Bla!e, Bleumer, and #trauss (BB# proposed an application called atomic

proxy re-encryption, in which a semitrusted pro"y converts a cipherte"t for +lice

into a cipherte"t for Bob withoutseeing the underlying plainte"t. We predict that

fast and secure re-encryption will become increasingly popular as a method for

managing encrypted file systems. +lthough efficiently computable, the wide-

spread adoption of BB# re-encryption has been hindered by considerable security

riss. 4ollowing recent wor of 6odis and Ivan, we present new re-encryption

schemes that reali!e a stronger notion of security and demonstrate the usefulness of

pro"y re-encryption as a method of adding access control to a secure file system.


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*erformance measurements of our e"perimental file system demonstrate that pro"y

re-encryption can wor effectively in practice.

3 Secure (ro1enance: The !ssential of Bread and Butter of Data 'orensics in

Cloud Computing

A*T)OS: 2. &u,


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documents. With the provable security techniques, we formally demonstrate the

proposed scheme is secure in the standard model.

4 Cipherte2t-(olicy Attri.ute-Based !ncryption: An !2pressi1e5 !fficient5

and (ro1a.ly Secure eali6ation

A*T)OS:B. Waters

We present a new methodology for reali!ing 0ipherte"t-*olicy +ttribute

ncryption (0*-+B under concrete and noninteractive cryptographic

assumptions in the standard model. /ur solutions allow any encryptor to specify

access control in terms of any access formula over the attributes in the system. In

our most efficient system, cipherte"t si!e, encryption, and decryption time scales

linearly with the comple"ity of the access formula. $he only previous wor to

achieve these parameters was limited to a proof in the generic group model.


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We present three constructions within our framewor. /ur first system is proven

selectively secure under a assumption that we call the decisional *arallel Bilinear

6iffie-%ellman "ponent (*B6% assumption which can be viewed as a

generali!ation of the B6% assumption. /ur ne"t two constructions provide

performance tradeoffs to achieve provable security respectively under the (weaer

decisional Bilinear-6iffie-%ellman "ponent and decisional Bilinear 6iffie-

%ellman assumptions.

A+GO#T)MS *S!D:

#ignature 1eneration

#ignature =erification

2evocation =erification

A+GO#T)MS D!SC#(T#O$:

Signature Generation:


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Signature &erification:

e1ocation &erification


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MOD*+!S:

9.0loud Module

7.1roup Manager Module

>.1roup Member Module

?.4ile #ecurity Module

@.1roup #ignature Module

A. User 2evocation Module .

MOD*+!S D!SC#(T#O$:

,7Cloud Module :

In this module, we create a local 0loud and provide priced abundant storage

services. $he users can upload their data in the cloud. We develop this module,

where the cloud storage can be made secure. %owever, the cloud is not fully


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trusted by users since the 0#*s are very liely to be outside of the cloud users

trusted domain. #imilar to we assume that the cloud server is honest but curious.

$hat is, the cloud server will not maliciously delete or modify user data due to the

protection of data auditing schemes, but will try to learn the content of the stored

data and the identities of cloud users.

/7Group Manager Module :

1roup manager taes charge of followings,

9. #ystem parameters generation,

7. User registration,

>. User revocation, and

?. 2evealing the real identity of a dispute data owner.

$herefore, we assume that the group manager is fully trusted by the other

parties. $he 1roup manager is the admin. $he group manager has the logs of each

and every process in the cloud. $he group manager is responsible for user

registration and also user revocation too.

07Group Mem.er Module :

1roup members are a set of registered users that will

9. store their private data into the cloud server and

7. #hare them with others in the group.

5ote that, the group membership is dynamically changed, due to the staff

resignation and new employee participation in the company. $he group member


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has the ownership of changing the files in the group. Whoever in the group can

view the files which are uploaded in their group and also modify it. $he group

meme

37'ile Security Module :

9. ncrypting the data file.

7. 4ile stored in the cloud can be deleted by either the group manager or the

data owner.

(i.e., the member who uploaded the file into the server.

47Group Signature Module :

+ group signature scheme allows any member of the group to sign messages

while eeping the identity secret from verifiers. Besides, the designated group

manager can reveal the identity of the signatures originator when a dispute occurs,

which is denoted as traceability.

87 *ser e1ocation Module :

User revocation is performed by the group manager via a public available

revocation list (2&, based on which group members can encrypt their data files

and ensure the confidentiality against the revoed users.

S%ST!M !9*#!M!$TS:

)ADA! !9*#!M!$TS:

#ystem C *entium I= 7.? 1%!.


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%ard 6is C ?D 1B.

Monitor C 9@ inch =1+ 0olour.

Mouse C &ogitech Mouse.

2am C @97 MB

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SO'TA! !9*#!M!$TS:

/perating #ystem C Windows


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Gdiv idJHcontentH

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Gh7 classJHtitleHGa hrefJHNHWelcome to 0loud 0omputing#ecurityGFaGFh7

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Gp$he use of cloud computing has increased rapidly in

many organi!ations. 0loud computing provides many benefits in terms of low costand accessibility of data. nsuring the security of cloud computing is a maor

factor in the cloud computing environment, as users often store sensitive

information with cloud storage providers but these providers may be untrusted.

6ealing with Lsingle cloudL providers is predicted to become less popular with

customers due to riss of service availability failure and the possibility of

malicious insiders in the single cloud. + movement towards Lmulti-cloudsL, or in

other words, LintercloudsL or Lcloud-of-cloudsL has emerged recently. $his paper

surveys recent research related to single and multi-cloud security and addresses

possible solutions. It is found that the research into the use of multi-cloud

providers to maintain security has received less attention from the research

community than has the use of single clouds. $his wor aims to promote the use of

multi-clouds due to its ability to reduce security riss that affect the cloud

computing user.GFp

Gimg srcJHimagesFlogo.pngHF

GFdiv


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Gp0opyright OcopyK 7D9? . +ll rights 2eserved.GFp

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#ource codeC


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mona secure multi-owner data sharing

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