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This paper is part of the proceedings of the

2nd

Annual conference on Qualitative Research

for Policy Making, 26 & 27 May 2011, Belfast

Note: Please do not cite or quote without permission from the authors

Money matters in low/moderate income families and the

gender implications of welfare reform in the UK

Fran Bennett

Senior Research Fellow, Department of Social Policy and Intervention,

University of Oxford, UK

(fran.bennett@spi.ox.ac.uk/fran.bennett@dsl.pipex.com)

and Sirin Sung

Lecturer, School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work,

Queens University Belfast, UK (s.sung@qub.ac.uk)

Abstract

The new coalition government in the UK is bound by equalities duties which require it to

have regard to the impact of its policies on various groups, including women. This paper

will investigate to what extent this legislative commitment is influencing ongoing debates

about the government’s radical proposals for long-term welfare reform, and in particular

decisions about the design and delivery of the proposed ‘universal credit’. In doing so, it

will draw on the lead author’s recent experiences aiming to draw policy makers’ attention

to relevant findings from qualitative research (about how low-income couples manage

money and negotiate gender roles), in order to inform these decisions. These qualitative

research findings include in particular a study carried out by both authors, involving

separate semi-structured interviews in 2006 with men and women in 30 low/moderate

income couples in Britain.

A major aim of this research - which formed part of the Within Household Inequalities

and Public Policy project in the Gender Equality Network, funded by the Economic and

Social Research Council (www.genet.ac.uk) - was to facilitate analysis of the effects of

changes in welfare reform policies which took account of gender roles and relationships

within the household. The paper will therefore demonstrate how the findings from these

interviews, and other recent qualitative research studies, can be used to examine the

potential advantages and pitfalls of the universal credit from a gender perspective.

The authors will use this example to explore two broader issues: the value of qualitative

research to policy design and debates, in particular as a supplement to the insights of

economic modelling (which have been highly influential in driving the current

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government’s thinking on welfare reform); and the essential elements of a comprehensive

gender assessment of welfare reform to fulfil the spirit as well as the letter of the current

equality duties.

1. Introduction and background to proposals for universal credit

The current coalition government in the UK has recently introduced proposals for radical

welfare reform, which at the time of writing (May 2011) are being discussed in a Public

Bill Committee (see, for example, Citizens Advice, 2011 for an explanation). These

proposals reflect the government’s focus on ‘welfare to work’ – moving people from

benefits into employment – and redesign the means-tested elements of the social security

system, leaving non-means-tested benefits largely unchanged.

As with all such policy proposals, they are subject to statutory equality duties, which

means that they must be assessed for their impact on protected groups, including women.

We explore the gender implications of the proposals for universal credit, and relate them

to the duty to carry out a gender impact assessment, below. And we demonstrate the

value of insights from qualitative research in ensuring both that such an assessment is

comprehensive and that policies such as universal credit work for everyone. But first we

outline the main aims of the proposals, the background to their introduction, and their

main elements.

The twin emphases of the reform are benefit simplification and work incentives. This is

no accident. The previous Labour government set up a Benefit Simplification Unit within

the Department for Work and Pensions, which had to vet proposals for policy change to

assess whether they were contributing to complexity. Several reports had also been

published, by the Institute for Fiscal Studies and others, drawing attention to the potential

impact on work incentives of the benefits and tax credits system (see, for example, Kay

(2010) and Martin (2009)). Prior to the general election in May 2010, both the Labour

government itself and various think tanks and pressure groups had proposed versions of a

‘single working age benefit’ which was intended to be a response to these concerns as

well as others (Sainsbury and Stanley, 2007; Centre for Social Justice, 2009). However,

these schemes involved the development of means-tested benefit models, which therefore

carried forward the very characteristics of complexity and potential for disincentives

which means testing usually embodies. Very few proposals for welfare reform in the

recent period have managed to escape this paradoxical paradigm (see, for example,

Horton and Gregory, 2009).

The coalition government moved fast on welfare reform, as in so many other areas of

policy. The consultation document published in 2010 (DWP, 2010a) already contained a

clear outline of the ‘universal [sic] credit’ that was at the core of the government’s plans,

and the White Paper (DWP, 2010b) and subsequent Welfare Reform Bill (2011) fleshed

this out without any major changes being made as a result of the consultation process.

Universal credit is to bring together the major means-tested benefits for people ‘in work’

and ‘out of work’, as well as benefits to meet various additional costs, including some

housing costs. In effect, the distinction between being in and out of work is being

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abolished, in that one means-tested benefit will be available whatever hours of work are

being carried out; there will no longer be a step change from an out of work to an in work

system of support once hours of work reach a certain level as there is now.

This fusion is meant to deal with two problems that have figured prominently in recent

analyses of the benefits and tax credits system in the UK. The first is the lack of incentive

to take ‘mini-jobs’ of a few hours per week caused by the very low earnings ‘disregards’

(amounts of ignored income) for many workless groups on means-tested out of work

benefits; the government states that under universal credit ‘all work is rewarded’, from

the first hour onwards. This will overturn a longstanding objection to maintaining people

on benefits whilst doing marginal jobs, which has hitherto prevented moves in the

direction of higher disregards for unemployed people in particular (Millar et al., 2006),

despite evidence from (for example) the voluntary organization Community Links that

this might lead to people working in the informal labour market and pressure from

Gingerbread to change the rules on ‘mini-jobs’ for lone parents.

The government is overcoming this, however, by extending conditionality to people in

work on universal credit (until the level of their earnings means they are not entitled to it

any longer). The second problem that universal credit is intended to deal with is the

disruption to claimants’ income flow caused by having housing benefit reassessed and/or

moving from benefits to tax credits once hours of work reach a certain level. Another

problem emphasized in recent research with claimants has been the scope for confusion

and lack of certainty about entitlement caused by the existence of a multiplicity of

different benefits and tax credits (see, for example, Haddad et al., 2010). There were

various ways of dealing with these problems; but the government decided to solve them

by devising universal credit.

There will be a single payment of universal credit incorporating the various elements

being amalgamated, with a single taper rate applied to this payment until it is exhausted;

this replaces various payments of benefits and tax credits, each with differing withdrawal

rates. (However, some benefits, including council tax benefit and any replacements for

certain one-off payments via the Social Fund which are being abolished, will be

administered locally, and may have widely differing eligibility criteria and withdrawal

rates, thus undermining the much vaunted simplicity of universal credit.) Universal credit

will be phased in from 2013, being paid to new claimants at first, with others transferring

on to it later; there will be transitional protection for any cash losses.

2. Potential gender issues in relation to universal credit

The proposals for universal credit contain a number of structural features which appear to

have implications for gender equality both within and outside the household - and which

on the surface it would be reasonable to expect would be considered in a gender impact

assessment under the statutory equality duties (see below).

First, claims for universal credit by couples will have to be joint, and both partners will

have to fulfill work-related eligibility conditions if appropriate, as well as both being

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responsible for reporting changes in circumstances, being liable for any repayments etc.

As with current means-tested benefits and tax credits, assessment of income and assets

will be joint. Thus, couples1 are being treated as one unit, with sharing of resources

assumed, and an assumption that joint responsibility is unproblematic – whereas, as

demonstrated below, research suggests that this is not necessarily the case in practice,

because of gendered inequalities of power within couple relationships.

Secondly, the coalition government has a clear focus on getting one person in each

household into work as a priority, rather than on facilitating employment entry for all

adults (DWP, 2011b). For many lone parents, this should lead to an improvement in the

return they get from a job – especially ‘mini-jobs’ of a few hours per week. However,

instead of there being additional income for working 16 hours or more per week (or 30

hours or more), the trajectory will be smoother from one hour of employment upwards;

and these bonuses at certain points will be replaced by the extension of conditionality to

people in part-time jobs if it is thought that they should be working longer hours for more

pay. This could have both advantages and disadvantages for lone parents, the vast

majority of whom are women.

However, the converse of this is that one earner per household is the policy focus, rather

than facilitating employment entry for all adults As now, there will be one ‘disregard’

(amount of earned income ignored) for a couple, rather than one for each individual.

Many (actual and potential) ‘second earners’ in a couple will see their incentives to work,

or to work more, worsen under ‘universal credit’, primarily because the current deduction

rate for tax credits will be increased significantly when universal credit is introduced,

according to current plans. More ‘second earners’ are likely to be women. The

government suggests that if the result of this change – and the improved ability of the

main breadwinner to maintain their family which may be brought about by universal

credit - is that some ‘second earners’ give up their jobs (or do not enter employment) this

will increase the family’s choices about their work/life balance. In other words, different

gender roles within couples are not problematized; and work/life balance is seen as a

family rather than an individual issue. (The implications of the faster response to

additional income - and hence withdrawal of a significant percentage as universal credit

is withdrawn – which is planned have not been explored by the government. But previous

research has demonstrated that ‘second earners’ are in general more influenced by

‘disincentives’ than primary earners.)

The third characteristic of universal credit with gender implications is the arrangements

for payment. Couples will be able to choose which partner is the payee (DWP, 2011a).

Universal credit will therefore not be split between partners, as may currently happen

with the rules on tax credits and means-tested benefits (which stipulate that the partner

designated by the couple as the ‘main carer’ should get child tax credit for children,

together with any money to help with childcare costs). And housing benefit will be

absorbed into universal credit, rather than (normally) being paid to the tenant, that is

1 Whilst the focus of this paper is male/female couples, many of the rules of current means-tested benefits

and tax credits, and of universal credit in future, will apply to same sex couples living together as well.

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person liable to pay the rent. (The government will continue to have the power, as now,

to pay benefit to the other partner in the couple if the person getting universal credit is not

maintaining them; but this is only used in emergency cases.) The arrangements for

payment of universal credit, which mean that one person will get the whole payment,

suggest that economic dependence within the family is not seen as an issue of concern;

and that the widely accepted view that money for children should go to the person most

likely to be responsible for spending it (as argued, for example, in evidence to the Work

and Pensions Select Committee’s recent inquiry into universal credit by Ruth Lister) is

not seen as a priority.

Fourthly, payment of universal credit will be likely to be monthly, although this has not

yet been finally decided. Currently many means-tested benefits are paid fortnightly, and

tax credits can be paid weekly or four-weekly depending on the claimant’s choice.

Monthly payment will mean that whoever is responsible for day-to-day spending in low-

income families is likely to feel the brunt of this change; this is most likely to be women.

In sections 4. and 5. below, about our qualitative research with low/moderate-income

couples for the Within Household Inequalities and Public Policy research project, we

demonstrate the relevance of our findings to these key gender issues in relation to

universal credit. First, however, we outline the current situation as regards the

government’s statutory duties in relation to investigating the implications for gender

equality of its own policies, including universal credit.

3. Current equalities duties in the UK

The government must show due regard, when developing new policies and processes, to

their impact on race, disability and gender (including gender reassignment); the Equality

Act 2010, which came into force in April 2011, adds new categories to this list.

Implementation of this duty in practice means that processes should be in place to help

ensure that the government’s (and other public bodies’) strategies, policies and services

are free from discrimination; that departments comply with equalities legislation; that due

regard is given to equality in decision making; and that opportunities for promoting

equality are identified.

In recent years governments have begun to issue impact assessments of their policies, in

order to demonstrate the effects of such policies in general. They may do this at the

Green Paper stage of consultation, at White Paper stage when proposals are clearer, and

when a Bill is published. The Treasury publishes a Green Book to guide government

departments in carrying out such impact assessments.

Under the equalities duties, governments also now publish equality impact assessments of

proposed policies, usually at the same intervals. The Equality and Human Rights

Commission (EHRC) has issued guidance on how such equality impact assessments

should be carried out; in particular, it lays down that they should demonstrate the impact

on protected groups (including women) of the proposed policy changes. This should be

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done, argues the EHRC, in order to ensure that policies do what is intended, and that they

achieve this for everyone.

Part of the purpose of our research, as explained below, was to demonstrate that in order

to conduct comprehensive assessments of policy proposals - especially those which

involve changes to benefits and tax credits, and associated labour market policies, such as

the current proposals for universal credit - more account should be taken of the existence

of gender inequalities within households. We go on here to describe our research and the

findings that emerged that are of direct relevance to the welfare reform proposals

currently under debate in the UK.

4. Qualitative research about gender and money in

low/moderate-income couples: research methods

Recent research that formed part of the Gender Equality Network (www.genet.ac.uk) is

of key relevance to the assessment of the government’s proposals for welfare reform,

including universal credit. This is because its central aim was to find out more about what

goes in within heterosexual couples, in particular in relation to the management and

distribution of financial resources, and to be able to take more account of this in assessing

the impact of welfare reforms and associated policies. The research was known as the

Within Household Inequalities and Public Policy (WHIPP) project, and was a multi-

method project involving qualitative, quantitative and policy simulation elements.2

This paper draws in particular on the qualitative research element of this project (see, for

example, Sung and Bennett, 2007), which involved semi-structured interviews with 60

men and women individually in male/female couples living on low/moderate incomes in

England, Scotland and Wales. The couples had all had children at some point, and were

virtually all of working age (with some having one partner of pension age). Most were on

means-tested benefits and/or tax credits at the time of interview and/or had been in the

past. They were all members of a sample of households originally recruited to the British

Household Panel Survey to boost its coverage of low-income households, and had been

interviewed for the BHPS from the late 1990s to 2001. Though this was not deliberate,

they were all white; and all but one couple were married. Some lived in households with

grown-up children.

The interviews covered how the couples dealt with finances and managed their money in

some detail, but also included questions about their perceptions about benefits and tax

credits and the division of labour within the household. The data was analysed with the

help of the Nvivo software package.

5. Research findings and implications for universal credit:

2 RES-225-25-2001 (www.genet.ac.uk). This research was project 5 in the Gender Equality Network,

funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. The other two principal investigators were Prof Sue

Himmelweit of the Open University (working with Dr Jerome De Henau) and Prof Holly Sutherland of the

University of Essex.

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importance of independent income

Whilst the interviews revealed a deep loyalty to coupledom amongst both men and

women, they also demonstrated that women were more aware of issues to do with

autonomy and independence, whereas men were on the whole not conscious of them.

Women valued access to an independent income, not only via wages but also sometimes

via receipt of a specific benefit in their own right:

‘If I wasn’t [making that contribution via wages] then I’d be dependent on him.

I don’t like being dependent on people. Although [my wages] are, like, family

money, they’re like, my wages.’ (Case 1, woman)

Several attributed their ‘say’ in decisions on household finances to this. We explore the

issues relating to the importance of an independent income in this section.

The interviews also showed that traditional gender roles persisted amongst these couples

in particular in relation to managing the household budget, which previous research had

shown to be often the responsibility of women when resources were limited, and when

such a role could lead to anxiety and stress (though sometimes also pride in a job well

done). In the couples interviewed for the WHIPP project, the women were often

responsible for spending on the children, and for food shopping and purchasing of

everyday items etc. These findings are explained in more detail in section 6. below.

First, however, in relation to the importance of independent income, the first finding to

emphasize is that a clear loyalty to togetherness was demonstrated by the couples in this

research, who had often been married for many years. ‘All in one pot’ was the most

common catchphrase used by both men and women to describe how they dealt with their

money, and members of both sexes talked about their ‘team’/‘partnership’ and said there

was ‘no yours and mine’ in the way they handled resources. Most had a joint bank

account to which both had access and many said they made joint decisions about money.

However, ‘choices’ as exercised by the couples – for example, in terms of who primarily

looked after the children, or did the bulk of the housework, and who had a full-time paid

job – were demonstrably gendered choices. Joint decisions do not always mean decisions

made equally, or with equal impact on opportunities and outcomes.3 Choices as exercised

by couples ‘together’ are not the same as individuals’ choices; and jointness and

mutuality are not the same as gender equality, but could be seen as more akin to the idea

of the ‘unitary’ household in which the interests of its members are seen as one.

Secondly, as noted above, receipt of an independent income, whether via wages or a non-

means-tested benefit, was likely to mean that an individual had more of a ‘say’ on what

happened to household finances; was able to maintain separate finances if they wished to

do so; did not have to regularly ask for money from their partner; or no longer had to

justify their personal spending to their partner:

‘I used to [justify my personal spending], but I think not now I’m earning my own

3 This issue was explored in more detail and across a much wider range of couples in quantitative analysis

of the British Household Panel Survey by our colleagues Prof Sue Himmelweit and Dr Jerome De Henau.

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money. Because he was the main breadwinner, I suppose I felt I had to ask for

money if I wanted it for my clothes and things.’ (Case 18, woman)

Moreover, whilst joint accounts were common, were seen as important by most of those

who had them, and were often seen as symbolic of marriage and togetherness - as well as

being useful in practical terms - this did not necessarily result in either joint management

of finances or equal access to resources. More men than women were said to be the ones

responsible for managing the joint account; this might be because men were more likely

than women to be the ones responsible for paying regular bills by direct debit. Some men

did not access the joint account to draw money out, but again this was often because of

the respective roles of men and women in relation to finances – to generalize, paying bills

(men) and doing the shopping (women). This is expanded on in more detail in section 6.

Women were more likely than men to have their own individual account in addition to

the couple’s joint account. They were also more likely, when they did so, to see this as

important, and to express this importance in terms of independence:

‘I think you’ve got to have a little bit of your own … I wouldn’t say security …

but I’ve never been used to being totally hand in hand with somebody with

finances.’ (Case 27, woman)

Certain benefits and/or tax credits were often paid into women’s individual accounts –

sometimes, it seemed, to balance the (man’s) wage that was going into the joint account.

Other qualitative research has concluded that independent income can give women more

‘say’ in household finances (Goode et al., 1998; Rake and Jayalatika, 2002). A recent

qualitative study that involved interviews with 30 black and minority ethnic women in

the northeast of England living in couple households on low incomes found that some

women had so little access to income that their husbands were in control of virtually all

aspects of their lives (Warburton Brown, 2011). Even for those couples who had a joint

account and who were described by the women as having a financially equal relationship,

subsequent questioning revealed apparent gender inequalities; and those who said that

they had more of a ‘say’ attributed this to having some earnings of their own. Thus this

research confirms the findings of the WHIPP project, described above, that access to an

independent income may be important to women in particular; that this can make a

positive difference to their power within the household; and that neither loyalty to

‘togetherness’ nor the existence of joint accounts can necessarily guarantee equal access

to resources by both men and women.

In section 2. above, characteristics of universal credit with potential gender implications

were highlighted. These included the joint assessment and ownership of universal credit

by individuals in couples, and the position of ‘second earners’ under the reform.

The qualitative research reviewed in this section suggests the importance of an

independent income, via access to wages or benefits. This was the case in particular for

women, who clearly valued this in terms of their position in the household. However, the

Institute for Fiscal Studies – as well as the government’s own policy briefings on

universal credit – has shown that actual or potential ‘second earners’ in many couples on

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universal credit will face much higher losses from each (additional) pound of wages than

they do under the current system. This is before the effects of any changes to help with

childcare costs are included; the percentage of childcare costs taken into account for such

assistance via tax credits has already been reduced from 80 to 70 per cent, and the

government, whilst wanting to include those working under 16 hours per week, does not

wish to expand the spending envelope – which will mean that under universal credit

many (lone parents and) ‘second earners’ in couples will receive lower amounts of

childcare support too.

Moreover, although child benefit is being retained as a non-means-tested benefit

alongside universal credit, and will still be paid to the mother (unless there are good

reasons otherwise), the Secretary of State has hinted in the past that it could be absorbed

into universal credit at some future date. And whilst non-means-tested carer’s allowance

– which provided an independent, albeit low, income for several women in the WHIPP

research study – is also being retained in the welfare reforms, the narrowing of the

eligibility criteria for disability living allowance will be likely to reduce the numbers of

carers who can get carer’s allowance.

6. Research findings and implications for universal credit:

responsibility for spending and managing

In our sample of low/moderate-income couples, we found some continuity of traditional

gendered patterns of money management. One example was that men often seemed to be

responsible for paying the (often monthly) bills, whilst women were mainly responsible

for household shopping, which tended to be more frequent:

‘I’m bills, she’s food etc.’ (Case 17, man). ‘I am mostly responsible for,

like, the food shopping and household things, and [he] deals with rent,

bills, like electric, gas and that sort of thing.’ (Case 17, woman)

So women were more likely to be responsible for purchasing lower cost items that were

needed more frequently. (This could also include giving regular pocket money to the man

for personal expenses, sometimes daily.) This was not universally the case – for example,

if women had a monthly salary, and/or their employment was more stable, the mortgage

might come out of their pay. For one couple, however, in an unusually stark example of

the importance of gendered responsibilities, the solution was to exchange wages:

‘My wages go into [her] bank and [her] wages go into my bank …

the simple reason being because [she] is paid monthly and that pays

the bills, that stops in the bank and pays all the direct debits. I

get paid weekly and [she] does the shopping, and we find it works

a lot better like that.’ (Case 13, man)

The interviews also included questions about individuals’ responsibility for spending on

the children and handing over any money for childcare costs; and about which parent the

children went to if they wanted/needed something. In virtually all cases, the woman was

(or had been) the partner who had carried the main responsibility for ensuring the

children’s needs were met:

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[Who had the main responsibility for spending on the children?]

‘Me … Me I would think really … I think, because the mother

tends to be a bit more with it …’ (Case 9, woman)

Childcare costs were hardly ever incurred, as the vast majority of the couples in our

sample had only informal childcare, if any; children were seen as parents’ responsibility –

or in practice, as noted here, primarily mothers’ responsibility.

Evidence from other qualitative research suggests that women in low-income families are

often the ‘shock absorbers’ of poverty (Lister, in Women’s Budget Group, 2006), trying

to protect their children and partners from its effects. Such evidence confirms that women

tend to manage household budgets in low-income families, where this is often a source of

anxiety and stress (albeit also sometimes pride), rather than power (Goode et al., 1998).

Recent research demonstrates the ‘juggling’ that people on low incomes often have to

practise to get by, using the timing of bills and different income payments to manage

their expenses and debts from week to week (IPPR, 2009). And a range of studies have

confirmed women’s primary role in such families in ensuring that children’s needs are

met (eg Warburton Brown, 2011; Rake and Jayalatika, 2002). Families generally say they

need some security of income, so that they know what amount they will be getting from

one week/month to the next (see, eg, Sainsbury and Weston, 2010). Some lone parents

may at crucial points in their children’s lives prefer to stay in a stable, even if not very

worthwhile, job rather than risk causing more disruption (Ridge and Millar, 2008).

Other characteristics of universal credit with gender implications listed in section 2.

above are the decision to allow couples to choose which one of them is paid (the whole

of) universal credit and the government’s intention to pay it monthly (though this has not

yet been confirmed).

Allowing couples to choose the payee is clearly preferable to a situation in which the

‘main earner’ was paid universal credit. However, when gender inequalities within the

household are more likely to mean that men have financial control, and when gender

inequalities outside the household mean that women are more likely to have no or very

little other income, this arrangement could mean that the more powerful partner (more

likely to be the man) ends up with virtually all the family’s resources. Whilst the WHIPP

research revealed some resentment from men that the label ‘main carer’ made them feel

as though they were being identified as uncaring towards their children (due to the dual

meaning of ‘care’), there was no room for doubt amongst the sample of couples that the

main responsibility fell to mothers in the vast majority of cases, as noted above. The

failure to separate elements of universal credit and label some as being meant to meet

children’s needs, paid to the ‘main carer’, as is the case currently with child tax credit,

may also make it less likely that such money is spent on meeting children’s needs.

The probability that universal credit will be paid monthly rather than more frequently is

likely to mean that it is women who bear more of the pressure to make ends meet towards

the end of the month. This is because, as the qualitative research above demonstrates,

women are more likely to be responsible for buying the daily/weekly items needed for the

household. (Other research has also shown women are more likely to be the managers of

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household debt, so may well be coping with the consequences of a move to monthly

payment as well (see WBG, 2006); but an all in one monthly payment removes some of

the possibilities for juggling when benefits are paid in different tranches at different

intervals.)

Lastly, the more responsive system envisaged for benefit withdrawal if earnings increase

is likely to mean that - instead of a ‘cushion’ of unchanged income for many people on

in-work support (the result of the fixed six-monthly awards, and subsequently the high

annual disregard, in the tax credits system) – in future the operation of universal credit

will mean incomes fluctuating from month to month in a way which may be quite

destabilizing. In addition, the localization of council tax benefit to local authorities, and

the replacement of such benefits as educational maintenance allowance and the Social

Fund by local discretionary schemes, will introduce greater discretion, variation and

uncertainty into other elements of some families’ incomes outside the scope of universal

credit.

6. Discussion: reflections on policy influencing

The involvement of one author (Fran Bennett) in debates on universal credit to date has

included, initially, assistance with a preliminary gender assessment of the government’s

consultation document on welfare reform by Janet Veitch, for Oxfam (reference).

Secondly, help was provided with evidence for the judicial review of the government’s

failure to produce a gender assessment of the June 2010 Emergency Budget by the

Fawcett Society. Most important has been a succession of activities as a member of the

Women’s Budget Group (WBG) (sometimes with other colleagues), including briefings

of, and meetings with, civil servants working on the welfare reforms and a seminar for

officials in the Department for Work and Pensions and the Child Poverty Unit.

Some of these activities involved substantive welfare reform policy issues relevant to

gender; others were related to work on the equality impact assessments that the

government produced at various stages (see below). They also included giving written

and oral evidence from the WBG on the Welfare Reform Bill to the Public Bill

Committee considering the Bill (WBG, 2011). Written evidence was also given in an

individual capacity to the Work and Pensions Select Committee for its inquiry into

universal credit. This gives in total a wide range of policy influencing actions in relation

to the gender implications of universal credit – though no direct contact with ministers,

other than with other MPs at a sitting of the Public Bill Committee. Participation in a

one-off discussion in a Woman’s Hour programme about the implications of universal

credit for families was also involved.

The Financial Times (Sue Cameron, 12 May 2011) has commented on the degree of ease

with which the government has to date managed to proceed with its plans for welfare

reform. There has, for example, been nothing like the current ‘pause’ in relation to the

reforms of the National Health Service, when powerful bodies such as the medical

profession and important individuals within the junior coalition party, the Liberal

Democrats, have managed to persuade the government to put their proposals for GP

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commissioning on hold. The theme of this paper is the use of qualitative research on

low/moderate income families to raise gender issues about the plans for a universal

credit. But it is worth noting first that there are several general factors which make

substantive influencing of these plans particularly difficult.

The first is that the government already had a clear idea about its objectives and its

favoured system of achieving them. This was primarily due to the Secretary of State’s

involvement in the Centre for Social Justice, the think tank which produced a scheme

called ‘Dynamic Benefits’ (CSJ, 2009) whilst the Conservatives were still in opposition

which Iain Duncan Smith took with him into government, with the aim of implementing

something very like it. There does not seem to have been significant Liberal Democrat

opposition to these ideas, and it is clear that the Secretary of State is deeply (and

sincerely) committed to implementing them. Recent cases of conviction carrying all

before it that spring to mind – the poll tax, for example, or the Child Support Act - are not

happy precedents, however.

Secondly, financial constraints to reform have rarely if ever been clearer. Not only is the

reform being undertaken at a time of severe cutbacks in public expenditure to reduce the

public deficit, but it is also being developed in the context of a desire by the coalition

government to maximize savings in the social security budget in order to avoid more

substantial cuts in other public services.

Thirdly, the reform is clearly being driven by an administrative imperative – a desire to

cut down on administrative costs for the government, by assuming that transactions will

be largely online; to make any changes practicable in terms of computer technology (for

example, by having only a single taper rate); and to facilitate employers’ participation in

the forthcoming ‘real time’ PAYE system, under which they will feed changes in

earnings through to the Department for Work and Pensions every month in order to make

adjustment of benefit levels quicker and smoother. It is unclear, however, whether the

lessons learned in terms of administering previous benefits and tax credits systems have

been fully taken on board.

Exchanges during the recent period of policy influencing have suggested that various

assumptions underlie reform in this area. One of these is that ‘you can’t (and shouldn’t)

affect how families deal with money’ - by altering, for example, payment arrangements.

Policy makers did not seem to be persuaded that (for example) money for children should

be paid to the ‘main carer’, despite the wide consensus in favour of this. But, as shown

above, research has shown that who gets income within a family can affect how it is used.

Issues such as this also appeared to be treated as implicitly (less important) ‘delivery’

issues, rather than (what were seen as more important and urgent) issues of design.

Secondly, there seems to be a belief that ‘different households budget and handle their

finances in different ways’, which means that no general rules of behaviour can be

discerned or relied on. But, as demonstrated above, research reveals that there are

common gendered patterns in how many families handle their money; and policy already

intervenes in this area of behaviour in any case (for example, by paying child benefit to

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the mother, unless there is a good reason not to). The policy briefing on payment of

universal credit (DWP, 2011a) also suggests that couples may pay it into a joint account,

implying that this means both partners will be able to benefit. However, it is clear from

the WHIPP interviews and other evidence that whilst joint accounts are a symbol of

togetherness they do not necessarily guarantee either equal management of money or

equal access to it by both partners. In particular, in two cases in which women had

remarried but their own children still lived with them, they found it difficult to draw on

the joint account and preferred to make use of their own sources of money.

So why has this and other research evidence not had more impact on the government’s

thinking? It is true that the WHIPP research was not designed with the specifics of the

government’s proposals in mind, as it was originally developed in 2001. And, unlike the

research reported in Goode et al. (1998), the participants did not always match the

demographic affected by universal credit specifically. But there seem to be other reasons.

6. Conclusions: the value of qualitative research and essential

components of gender analysis of welfare reform

The government’s proposals on universal credit appear to have been influenced by two

documents incorporating new developments in quantitative research. First, a paper by

Brewer et al. (2010) for the Mirrlees review of taxation carried out by the Institute for

Fiscal Studies, and the Mirrlees review more generally, make an economic case for

optimal tax (and means-tested benefit) policies, which include an emphasis on the

participation tax rate being crucial for those on low incomes but not for those higher up

the income scale. This emphasis justifies the tradeoff adopted by the government in its

proposals, which raise earnings disregards significantly at the bottom end.

Secondly, the Centre for Social Justice report Dynamic Benefits (CSJ, 2009) which

modeled the increase in employment and reduction in ‘welfare dependency’ which could

be expected if work incentives were improved for those currently on out of work benefits.

Whilst government documents have been careful to maintain the official tradition in

policy documents of not using such ‘dynamic’ research – which aims to predict

behavioural changes as a result of policy reforms - this nonetheless appears to have

influenced the main stakeholders, by encouraging their conviction that the proposed

universal credit can have significant beneficial effects in terms of reducing worklessness.

MPs’ constituents and others have certainly contributed experiential evidence about the

confusion, uncertainty and fear created by a complex benefits system with different parts

which do not always articulate well together that has influenced the proposals. But many

other factors are also important in people’s real lives, including how benefits/tax credits

systems work in ‘real time’; how households operate as financial units which contain

individuals; and in particular how money is not neutral but has social meaning::

‘… the significance of the source of income, its recipient, and the way

it is“labeled”, for shaping both perceptions and allocation of financial

resources’ (Goode et al. , 1999, 11).

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However, instead of these factors being influential, the government’s proposals appear to

have been shaped – or at least justified – more by specific forms of economic modeling.

Incentives have been seen as key to motivation, and arguments based on the responses of

a ‘rational economic man’ [sic] have been central. Equal sharing of household resources

has been assumed in these models. But the significance of roles and relationships, which

qualitative research can reveal, has not been taken on board in the same way.

This has occurred in part because of the specific ideology informing the government’s

proposals, which is not challenged by the particular forms of economic modeling it relies

on. An out-of-date model of the family is being employed, which sees a more traditional

sole breadwinner pattern as desirable, and does not problematize the application of

‘choice’ to families rather than individuals. But the question of how best to deliver

welfare to all individuals within the household is not adequately answered by using

economic models which adopt the same conventions, and also perpetuate unquestioned

assumptions of equal sharing of resources within the household.

This is unfortunate in particular because it is, ironically, possible that the gender

implications of the plans for universal credit could work against the achievement of some

of the government’s own aims. For example, worse incentives for ‘second earners’ could

undermine the purpose of the individualized conditionality proposed under the Welfare

Reform Bill; if partners are going to be very little better off, if at all, if they go out to

work or work more hours, the government’s efforts to ensure they comply with

conditionality could be wasted. The return to a sole breadwinner model if second earners

give up work or reduce their hours as a result of the changes does not fit well with the

government’s support for shared parenting demonstrated in its proposals for more

flexible sharing of leave after the birth of a baby between mothers and fathers. Neither

does it match the ‘right to return’ of women after maternity/shared leave, that the current

government inherited from the previous administration but continues to support. And,

given that there is evidence that lone parents are more likely to stay in the labour market

if they were earning when still in a couple, any discouragement of ‘second earners’ in

couples may contribute in the longer term to a failure to reduce workless household - one

of the government’s main aims in its welfare reform proposals.

The government is also committed to reducing the so-called ‘couple penalty’ in the

benefits/tax credits systems. This is the disadvantage that, some argue, is inherent in the

amount of money it is possible to claim as a couple rather than as two single people. The

government wishes to give the message that committed coupledom is valued and

encouraged, and sees universal credit as going some way to achieving this. However, it is

possible that universal credit may have the opposite effect. The fact that it is probably

going to be paid in one payment, to one person in the couple, only once a month, gives it

an ‘all or nothing’ quality which could make those contemplating living together as a

couple think twice. The person who is not the payee for universal credit will be likely to

have no other income if they are workless and have no national insurance benefit, other

than possibly child benefit if they have children. But if they do not get any of these, they

will be completely dependent financially on their partner from the stage at which they

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first make a joint claim. This is a highly significant step to take for anyone. For virtually

all the women in one small recent study, for example,

‘the security of some financial independence was described … as providing

the necessary security for the relationship to flourish’. (Lewis, 2006)

It is evident that there is some awareness in government circles of the issues discussed

here. In a recent written parliamentary answer, for example, it is acknowledged that some

men can benefit at the expense of women from shared household income within some

households, particularly those on low incomes (HC Hansard, 2011a). More significantly,

perhaps, the most recent equality impact assessment of universal credit undertakes to

monitor the distribution of income within the household after its introduction – though it

is not clear how this would be done (HC Hansard, 2011b). These signs may indicate that

there is some concern about the gender issues raised by stakeholders – who will need to

ponder the most constructive use of a combination of qualitative and quantitative research

in relation to the implementation of universal credit to take this any further.

In the meantime, the gender impact assessment of the proposals for universal credit in the

Welfare Reform Bill (DWP, 2011c) examined the effects it would have on single men,

single women and couples. And although, as noted, separate and more detailed ‘policy

briefing notes’ have been published about (eg) payment of universal credit and ‘second

earners’, there has still been little examination of the changes in gender relations within

the household and/or over time that may be brought about by the changes involved in

universal credit.

Principles for gender impact assessments of welfare reforms set out in the analysis of the

consultation document published by Oxfam (Veitch, 2010), adapted from Daly and Rake

(2003), went beyond estimates of the numbers of men and women affected by the

proposals and any amounts of money which might be lost or gained by each sex. It was

argued, for example, that the make-up and labeling of any payments that changed the

balance of resources between women and men should be investigated, as should the

impact such payments might have on (gendered) roles and relationships. In addition, any

assessment should examine the potential effects of welfare reform proposals on the

autonomy and financial security of men and women; on the volume, and division, of their

caring responsibilities; and on inequalities within the household, both at the point of

change and over the longer term.

These principles reflect the concerns that informed much of the qualitative research

reported on above. They were in fact cited in the equality impact assessment of the White

Paper on welfare reform published in 2010. But it is clear from this paper that they have

not yet been fully taken on board by the government – and that, if they were, a rather

different picture of the advantages and drawbacks of universal credit might emerge.

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