mongolia case study on accountability in...
TRANSCRIPT
G i t a S t e i n e r - K h a m s i a n d B . B a t j a r g a l 2 0 1 7
Mongolia Case Study on Accountability in Education
This paper was commissioned by the Global Education Monitoring Report as background information to assist in drafting the 2017/8 GEM Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments. It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the Global Education Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments”. For further information, please contact [email protected].
ED/GEMR/MRT/2017/C1/18
Country case study prepared for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report
Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments
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Table of Contents1
1 TheSemanticsofAccountabilityinMongolia
2 ActorsandAccountability
1 BureaucraticandFinancialAccountability
2 SocialAccountability
3 ManagerialAccountability
4 ProfessionalAccountability
3 SmallCaseStudy:TheTAMEProject
4 Recommendations
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ADB AsianDevelopmentBank
ANSA-EAP AffiliatedNetworkforSocialAccountabilityinEastAsiaandthePacific
CHF SwissFranc
CSO CivilSocietyOrganizations
DANIDA DanishInternationalDevelopmentAgency
MASAM MainstreamingSocialAccountabilityinMongolia
MECS MinistryofEducation,CultureandScience
NGO Non-GovernmentalOrganization
OECD OrganisationforEconomicCo-OperationandDevelopment
OSF OpenSocietyFoundation
PETS PublicExpenditureTrackingSurvey
PISA-D ProgrammeforInternationalStudentAssessmentforDevelopment
QUANGO QuasiNon-GovernmentalOrganization
SDC SwissAgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation
TAME TransparencyandAccountabilityinMongolianEducation
UNICEF UnitedNationsInternationalChildren’sEmergencyFund
USD UnitedStatesDollar
1 Written by Gita Steiner-Khamsi, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York & B. Batjargal, Mongolian
EducationAlliance,Ulaanbaatar
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Annex
1 RegulationtoEvaluatethePerformanceofGeneralEducationTeachers:Annextothe
MinisterofEducationandScienceDecreeNo.A/293,August13,2013
2 PerformanceEvaluationSheet–ExtractfromanOutcomes-BasedContractforEducation
Managers
3 CodeofEthicsofGeneralEducationSchoolsandKindergartenTeachers:Annextothe
MinisterofEducationandScienceDecreeNo.41,February12,2007
1. The Semantics of Accountability in Mongolia ThetermaccountabilityandsocialaccountabilityhaveexperiencedaninflationaryusageinMongoliaover
thepastdecade.Forexample,thenewcorecurriculumguidelines,issuedbytheMinistryofEducation,
CultureandScience,identifiesalistofcompetencies(systematicanalysesofproblems,creativethinking,
cooperation,etc.)andvalues(beengaged,beenvironmentallyresponsive,respectgenderequality,etc.)
thatneedtobetransmittedinschoolinordertoensuresustainabledevelopment.“Tobeaccountable”is
oneofthevaluesthatstudentsaresupposedtoacquireoverthecourseofformalschooling(Ministryof
Education, Culture and Science, 2016, page 5). As illustrated with this example from the new Core
CurriculumReform,theterm“accountable”isfrequentlyusedwithoutfurtherspecification.
Moreover,theterms“accountability”and“responsibility”areoftenusedinterchangeably(Davaadulam,
2010;ANSA-EAP,2012). Inanattempt todifferentiate the terms“accountability”and“responsibility”,
severalinternationaldonors,ledbytheWorldBank,organizedmeetingswithresearchersfromdifferent
fields including political science, management studies, and applied linguistics, as well as with
representatives from local CSOs. They reached an agreement to use the term “khariutslaga” for“responsibility”and“egekhkhariutslaga”foraccountability.Theverb“egekh”denotes“tocomeback”or
“toreturn.”Thegroupofexpertsagreedthataccountabilityorsocialaccountabilityincludesarelational
aspectbetweengovernmentandcitizensinwhichthegovernmentisexpectedtoreportbacktocitizens
and,ifnecessary,makenecessaryadjustmentsandchanges(Amarbayasgalan,2016).Thisback-and-forth
betweenthegovernmentandcivilsociety,alsoreferredtoastheverticaldimensionofaccountability,is
bestcapturedinthetermsocialaccountability.Aswillbeshownlaterinthisstudy,severalinternational
donorshavefundedprojectsthatstrengthenthefinancialaccountabilityofthegovernmentaswellasthe
social accountability exerted by the community or CSOs. The main objective of the latter type of
accountabilityistocontroltheflowofgrantmoney.Asaresultofthisfocus,accountabilityistypically
associatedwithfinanceeventhoughmanagerialaccountabilityandprofessionalaccountability,discussed
inthenextsection,areintegralpartofemployees’workenvironmentintheeducationsector.
Theterm“socialaccountability”hasadistinctmeaningthatmaybetranslatedinthreedifferentways(see
Amarbayasgalan,2016):
• associalresponsibility(inMongolian“нийгмийнхариуцлага”[niigmiinkhariutslaga]),• socialreporting(inMongolian“нийгмийнхариуцантайлагнал”[niigmiinkhariutsantailagnal]),
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• citizenmonitor/watch(inMongolian“иргэдийнхяналт”[irgediinkhyanalt]).Socialaccountabilityisreferredastheactofcitizensandcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)todirectlyandindirectlyholdthegovernmentaccountableforactionsinwhichthegovernmentisconsideredtobeliable.
Thegenealogyofthetermmayhelptounderstandthebroadercontextoftheconcept.Inanattemptto
operationalizetheconceptofgoodgovernance,theWorldBankintroducedthetermsocialaccountability
inthe2005studyTheEnablingEnvironmentforSocialAccountabilityinMongolia(Beck,Mendel,Thindwa,
2007).Becketal.contendthatmostpreviousstudiesfocusedonthehorizontalformofaccountability,
thatis,examinedwhatgovernmentalactorsandinstitutionsdotoensuretransparency,safeguardrights
andresponsibilitiesofcitizens,andengageinallkindsofpracticesofgoodgovernance.Thishorizontal
formofaccountabilityemphasizesthe“supply-side”ofaccountabilityandisdefinedintermsofwhich
regulations andmechanisms the government puts in place or supplies in order to act responsibly. Incontrast,the“demand-side”ofaccountabilityrepresentsaverticaltypeofaccountabilityinwhichcitizens
andCSOsdemandthat,andmonitorwhetherthegovernmentactsresponsibly.AsBecketal.(2007)point
out, social accountability is a relativelynewconcept inMongolia, strongly advocatedby international
donorsasameanstoadvancegoodgovernance:
While conventional ways of holding governments accountable have included such actions as
publicprotests,advocacycampaigns,andinvestigativejournalism,thereisgrowingattentionto
socialaccountabilitypracticessuchasparticipatorybudgeting,publicexpendituretracking,and
citizen monitoring of public service delivery, which emphasize a solid evidence base and
negotiationbetweencitizensandgovernmentrepresentatives.(Becketal,2007,pagevii)
2. Actors and Accountability Intheeducationsector,socialaccountabilityhasbeeninterpretedascommunityparticipationandmore
specificallyastheestablishmentofschoolboardsthatmonitortheschooladministrationandholdthe
schoolprincipalaccountablefortheiractions.Thecasestudypresentedinthisreportthereforedealswith
thefour-yearprojectTAME(TransparencyandAccountabilityinMongolianEducation),carriedoutover
theperiod2015-2018.Nevertheless,thisreportattemptstokeepthevarioustypesofaccountabilityin
mind.AntoniVergerandMauroMoschettiidentifysixaccountabilitymodelsthatprevailinpublic-private
partnershiparrangements(2016):bureaucratic,managerial(test-based),market,social,professional,and
network.FortheMongoliancontext,thefollowingfourtypesofaccountabilityarerelevant:
• bureaucraticandfinancialaccountability
• socialaccountability
• managerialaccountability
• professionalaccountability
2.1 BureaucraticandFinancialAccountabilityThe horizontal type of accountability, captured in this report in terms of bureaucratic and financial
accountability, focuses on the supply side of accountability and investigates whether government
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institutionsinMongoliahavemechanismsinplaceforopenaccesstoinformationandformakingstate
budgetstransparent,andforenablingcommunityparticipationineducationpolicyandpractice.
Civilsocietyorganizations(CSOs)andinternationaldonorshaveadvocatedforgreaterbureaucraticand
financial accountability, for different reasons: The Open Society Forum Mongolia promotes the
establishmentofCSOsandencouragestheiractiveinvolvementinMongolia’spoliticalandsocialaffairs
(OSF, 2016). Examples of CSO’s involvement includes monitoring of public services,
monitoring/observation during the elections, budgetwatch initiatives such as Citizen’s BudgetWatch
network, as well as policy studies on the issues related to transparency, accountability and citizen
participation. Theunequal distributionof revenues from theextractive industries (mining sector), the
privateownershipofmedia,andfinancialleakagesinthestatebudgetledCSOstodemandtransparency
innaturalresourcerevenuesandincreasedcitizenoversightofgovernmentexpenditures.Ontheother
hand,internationaldonorsputpressureonthegovernmenttocreatemechanismsthatensuregreater
financialefficiencyinthemanagementofthestatebudget.TheinfluentialPublicExpenditureTracking
Survey (PETS), funded by theWorld Bank, showedmoderate problems with financial leakage in the
educationbudgetbutvastinequalitiesinteachersalariesbetweenruralandurbanschools(WorldBank,
2006). As a result of PETSMongolia, a comprehensive teacher salary reformwas carried out in 2007
leadingnotonly toahigher salarybutalsoa less fragmented, transparent, andpredictable salary for
teachers(UNICEFMongolia,2012).
SeveralinternationaldonorsusedtheirGrants-for-Schoolsprogramsasanincentivetocreatestructures
atschool,district,andnational level that reflectbudget transparency,efficient financialmanagement,
andcommunityparticipation.Typically,thegrantsaregivenforimprovingthelearningenvironmentand
forbuyingequipmentforculturalorsporteventsattheschool.TheDanishInternationalDevelopment
Agency(DANIDA)startedasearlyasin1998todemandthecreationofSchoolDevelopmentPlansand
schoolboardsasconditionsforschoolstoreceiveagrant.TheleaddonorAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB)
followedsuitwiththesameconditionalityintheirUSD17milliongrant“EducationforthePoor:Financial
CrisisResponseProject”fortheirGrants-for-Schoolcomponent.Overall,principalsinschoolsthatserved
aspilotsitesforGrants-for-Schoolsprojectsestablishedschoolboards,submittedschooldevelopment
plans,andalsodisplayed,atleastforthedurationofprojectfunding,theirschoolbudgetsinthehallway
oftheschoolentrance.Itisimportanttobearinmindthatthedemandforgreaterfinancialtransparency
andcommunityparticipationsreflectsasocialaccountabilitymeasure,discussedbelow.Forthisreason,
bureaucraticand financialaccountability (supplyside)andsocialaccountability (demandside)address
similarissues.
Atcentrallevel,twoimportantgovernmentinitiativesdeservespecialmention:theLawofMongoliaon
GlassAccounts(wentintoeffecton1January2015)andthee-MongoliaProject(2005-2012).TheGlass
Account Law requires that all state entities publicize their budgets and make financial transactions
transparent.Amongotherprovisions,theLawprescribesthatallforeignanddomestic loansandgrant
aid,publicandprivatepartnerships,concessionsandguaranteeswhichcreatebudgetarypayablesand
receivableswillonlybecomeeffectiveuponbeingdisclosedtothepublicbyplacingthemonthecentral
“glassaccount”website.Thee-MongoliaProject,administeredbytheInformationandCommunication
TechnologyAuthority,wassuccessfullycompleted. It required fromallgovernmentagencies tosetup
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websites for thepurposeofdisseminatingpublic information,especiallyongovernmentactivities (see
ANSA-EAP,2012).
2.2 SocialAccountabilityTheAffiliatedNetworkforSocialAccountability inEastAsiaandthePacific(ANSA-EAP,2012)listsfour
enablingconditionsforsocialaccountability:
• governmentopenness
• organizedandcapablecitizengroups
• accesstoinformation
• socialandculturalappropriateness
Asevidencedfromthelistofenablingconditionsandasmentionedabove,socialaccountability(demand
side)andbureaucraticandfinancialaccountability(supplyside)areintrinsicallylinked.In2015,theSwiss
AgencyforDevelopmentandCooperation(SDC)funded,incollaborationwiththeWorldBank,aCHF3
millionprojecttostrengthensocialaccountabilityintheeducationandhealthsector.TheMainstreaming
Social Accountability in Mongolia (MASAM) project lasts from September 2015 until April 2019 and
intendstoenablecitizensinpoorlocalitiestohaveincreasedaccesstopublicdecision-makingprocesses
andqualityservicesintheeducationandhealthsectorsthroughsocialaccountability.The2016Annual
ReportofMASAMexplicitlyliststhetwoaimsoftheprojectasfollows:
(1)increasingthecapacityofCSOstoholdgovernmenttoaccount;and
(2)strengtheningtheinstitutionalizationofsocialaccountabilitybyimprovingtheeffectiveness,
formalizationandsustainabilityofdisclosureandparticipationmechanisms.(WorldBank,2016)
InMASAMaswell as inotherdonor-funded social accountabilityprojects,CSOsornon-governmental
organizations(NGOs)areseenasinstrumentalformobilizingcommunitymembers.In2010,therewere
morethan12,400CSOsornon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs)registeredwiththeStateRegistration
OfficeofMongolia(ANSA-EAP,2012).MostoftheCSOsorNGOs,however,areone-personentitiesortax-
exemptbusinessesthatgodormantunless theyreceiveexternal funding from internationaldonorsor
from government contracts. To make things worse, some of these NGOs are QUANGOs (quasi non-
governmentalorganizations)whoserveasprolongedarmsof thegovernmentandcarryout tasks for
whichthegovernmenthasreceivedinternationalfunding.
TheTAMEprojecttargetssocialaccountability intheeducationsectorandwillbediscussedingreater
lengthinthecasestudysectionofthisreport.
2.3 ManagerialAccountabilityManagerialaccountabilityinMongoliaisperhapsmostvisiblymanifestedintheperformance-basedor
outcomes-basedpublicadministrationreform,thatwasfundedwithaUSD25millionloanfromtheAsian
DevelopmentBank(ADB,2003).ThefirstloanwasapprovedinDecember1999,andthesecondforUSD
15.5million,signedin2003,targetedaccountabilityandefficiencyinhealth,education,socialwelfare,
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andlabor.Inthelate1990s,NewZealandbecamethedestinationforpolicypilgrimage.Everymemberof
theMongolianParliamentandsenior-levelstaffattheministriesweresentonstudytourstolearnabout
NewPublicManagement.Theoutcomes-basedregulationwassupposedtoformalizeexpectationsand
reward structures and thereby replace favoritism and nepotism that are based on interpersonal
agreements.Asdescribedinotherpublications(Steiner-KhamsiandStolpe,2006;Steiner-Khamsi,2012),
theMongoliancaseofoutcomes-basededucationreformrepresentsanidealexemplarfordemonstrating
theexcessiveuseofmanagerialaccountabilityor“governancebynumbers”(JennyOzga)inMongolia.
In2003,theMinistryofEducationpublisheda319-pagehandbookonoutcomes-basededucationwith
numerous examples of student benchmarks and teacher scorecards. In 2005, the Government of
Mongoliaintroducedperformance-basedbonusestomakepublicsectorsalariesmorecompatiblewith
privatesectorsalaries.Sincethen,thebonusesarefinancedfromthecentrallyallocatedsalaryfund.They
are supposed to be given to state employeeswho, basedon their outcomes contract [Mongolian: ürdüngiin geree], made with their respective employers at the beginning of the year, performed
exceptionallywell.Thesecontractsarepreparedateachlevelofthehierarchy:betweenschoolprincipals
andteachers,betweendistrictgovernorsandschoolprincipals,etc.andfinally,betweentheMinisterof
EducationandthePrimeMinister.DifferentfromteacherscorecardsinOECDcountries,studentlearning
outcomes constituteonly a small fragmentof theoverall scoreof the contract.Other criteria include
lessonplansandteachingmaterialofteachers,professionaldevelopmentofteachers,organizationofthe
classroom,conditionoftheschoolequipment,moralbehaviorandcommunicationskillsofteachers,and
administrativeworkofteachers(Steiner-KhamsiandStolpe,2006;Steiner-Khamsi,2012).Eventhough
schoolsareatlibertytodesigntheirownoutcomes-contracts,thecontractsareremarkablysimilaracross
schools.TheytendtousethetemplateprovidedbytheMinistryofEducationandonlyminimallyadoptit
tofittheirownschoolcontext.
Eachschoolreceivesfromthegovernmenteverythreemonthsabonusfundinamountsto10-15percent
oftheschool’ssalarybudget[Regulationtoallocatequarterlybonustoteachersandotherstaffatpublic
kindergartensandschools.AppendixtoMinistryofeducationandScienceDecreeNo393.November30,
2013]. The outcomes-based contracts are utilized as a managerial tool to identify low-performing
employeesandtorewardhigh-performingones.There isconsiderableadministrativeeffortassociated
withfillingoutthecontractsandregularlyreportingonactivitiesthattheteachercarriedout.Despitethe
bureaucraticmachinery put in place to preciselymeasure teacher performance, the bonus payments
rarelyamounttoasubstantialamount.Offearofbeingcriticizedforfavoritism,however,principalsprefer
toequalitydistribute the largerpartof thebonus fundtoall teachersandselecta fewteachers fora
sizeablebonuspayment.
Theprevious salary structure thatwas inplaceuntil 2007 requiredamicro-managementof teachers,
because teachersused tobepaidbasedon theactualnumberofhours taught, theactualnumberof
studentnotebooksgraded,theactualnumberofextra-curricularactivitiesorganized,etc.Itwasthetask
ofthedeputyprincipaloreducationmanagertocontrolwhetherteacherscarriedoutthetasksdiligently
andwerethereforeentitledtoreceivethefullamountofthesupplementarypayment.Teacherswere
heavilymonitoredand their salariesor salary supplementswerededucted if theydidnot showup in
school,camelate,didnotgradethenotebooksofstudentsproperly,ordamagedschoolequipment;only
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to list a few examples of the culture of micro-management and control. Teachers were constantly
humiliatedinmanydifferentwaysbyschoolprincipalsandeducationmanagers.Thesituationimproved
drasticallywiththe2007teachersalaryreform,whenteachersinMongoliawerepaid—similartoteachers
inOECDcountries—basedonaweeklyworkloadof40hours.Ofthose40hours,19hoursareallocated
forteaching,10hoursforcurriculumdevelopmentandlessonplanning,5hoursforstudentassessment,
and finally 6 hours are supposed to be set aside for extra-curricular/support activities of students,
professional development (self-study), and work with parents and communities. (Regulation to set
workloadofkindergartenandschoolteachersandsalarycalculationofteachersandotherstaff.Appendix
toTri-MinisterialDecreeNo307/91/237.August31,2007.)
Thebonussystem,introducedin2003,hasstayedinplacetothisdaybutthesalarysystemwasrevamped
in2007.Theweeklyworkloadsystem,introducedin2007,isinstarkcontrasttothesystemthatwasin
placebeforethesalaryreformwhenteacherswereremuneratedbasedontheiractualteachinghours
andtheactualnumberofsupplementaryworkcarriedout.Theteachingloadsystem[Russian“stavka”]wasalegacyfromthecommunistpastfoundalsoinotherpost-communistcountries.Therefore,Mongolia
wasnotaloneindealingwiththechallengesofhavinganequalbasesalaryforallstateemployeeswhich
wascomplementedwithamyriadofprofessional supplementsandallowances that took intoaccount
differencesinjobrequirementandlocationofemployment.Thecomplexityofthesalarygeneratedanon-
transparentsalarycompositionthatmadeteachersvulnerabletothearbitrarysalary,supplement,and
allowancereductions regularlymadebyschoolprincipalsandgovernmentofficials. In retrospect, the
shift fromquantity toqualityof teaching triggeredanewapproach to teachereffectiveness thatwas
based on support rather than punishment of teachers. Against this backdrop, the outcomes-based
contracts need to be seen as an imported,modernized substitute for the previous system ofmicro-
managementandcontrol.Annexes1and2inthisreportincludetheregulationaswellasanexampleof
aperformanceevaluationwhichconstitutesthecoreoftheoutcomes-basedcontract.
TheUNICEFMongoliastudy(2012)examinedingreaterdetailtheteachersalaryreformanditsimpact
onteachersupply,motivation,andprofessionalism.Accordingtothestudy,the2007reformmanagedto
increasetheteachersalarysubstantially,generateapredictableincome,andoverallmaketheteaching
professionmoreattractive.Moreover, thestudy identifiedasignificantreduction in income inequality
amongteachersbasedontheirplaceofemployment,andalsonoticedtheeliminationofteachershortage
inruralareas.However,thestudyalsofoundthattheperformance-basedbonuseswerenotimplemented
as intended, that is, theywere not used as a reward for high-performing teachers only. Instead, the
outcomes-basedcontractsandtheperformance-basedpaymentsbecameatooltoincreaseeveryone’s
salaryincrementally.Onlyinafewschools,werelow-performingteachersexcludedfrombonusbenefits.
Nevertheless, performance-based payments and the bonus system were regarded as a professional
accountabilitytooltomonitorteachers’performancebasedonformalandstandardizedcriteria.
In a similar vein, students became increasingly subject to standardized tests measuring students’
competenciesratherthanonlytheirknowledge. Inparticular,theCoreCurriculumReform(2013–16)
targetsanintegrationofindividualsubjectsintosubjectareas,areductionofsubjectsallowingformore
instructionaltimeofselectcoresubjects,theintroductionofelectives,andrigorousstandardizedtestsat
keystagesofschool.TechnicaladvicetotheNationalEducationEvaluationCenteronhowtoreformthe
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studentassessmentsystemwasgivenbytheprivatecompanyCambridgeInternationalExaminations.To
date,Mongoliahasnotparticipatedinanyinternationallarge-scalestudentassessmentstudy.However,
theMinistryofEducation,Science,CultureandSportsplanstojoinPISA-D(ProgrammeforInternational
StudentAssessmentforDevelopment)in2021(Tungalagtuul,2016,slide3).
2.4 ProfessionalAccountabilityThereexistseveralregulationsthatkeepteachersandprincipalsprofessionallyaccountable.Forteachers,
theCodeofEthics, issuedby theMinistryofEducation,CultureandScience in2007 (Appendix to the
MECS decree 41), and the teacher licensing scheme are relevant. For school principals the
professionalizationofschoolleadershipdeservesspecialmention.Appendix3liststheCodeofEthicsfrom
theyear2007.
TheCodeofEthicsliststheprofessionalstandardsforteacherssuchas,forexample,therequirementto
treatstudentswithoutdiscrimination,notinsistingthatstudentsbuybooksortrainingmaterialsthatthe
teacherproduced,nottodrinkonschoolandkindergartenpremises,etc.Furthermore,theCodeofEthics
specifieshowcomplaintsagainsttheteachershouldbefiled,andlaysouttheconsequencesforteachers
thatwere foundguiltyof a significant infraction. Thereexist EthicCommitteesat school,district, and
provincial levelthatarechargedwithmonitoringtheimplementationoftheCodeofEthics.TheEthics
Committee at provincial level consists of 9-11 elected members and is tasked with assessing the
complaintsagainstanindividualteacher.
The Teacher Licensing Scheme is another tool for holding teachers professionally accountable. In
Mongolia, theschemeisthereforeseenasan instrumentofprofessionalaccountability. Inadditionto
completing a four-year teacher educationdegree, the Education LawofMongolia requires fromeach
teacher toobtaina teaching licensebypassing two typesofexaminations.The license isgivenat the
earliestafteroneyearofteachingandmustberenewedafterfiveandtenyears.Thelicenseisextended
infinitelyaftertenyearsinservice.(Regulationtograntorsuspendteachinglicenseandprofessionalrank.
AppendixtoMinisterofScienceandEducationDecreeNoA/305.August15,2013)
Finally,majorreformswereundertakenintheareaofschooladministration.Inanattempttocurbpolitical
appointmentsandreducecorrupthiringpractices,thejobqualificationsforschoolprincipalshavebeen
professionalizedandstandardized.Schoolprincipalsmusthavesuccessfullyservedbothasteacher (at
leastfor10years)andeducationmanager(atleastfor5years)andmusthavecompletedaMaster’sor
higherthanMaster’sdegree,holdtherankofLeadTeacher,andbespecializedineducationstudiesor
educationmanagementstudies(Regulationtoadoptgeneralrequirementsandsamplejobdescriptions.
AppendixtoMinisterofEducationandScienceDecreeNoA/278.June27,2016).Despitetheseattempts
toformalizetherequiredqualifications,mediareportsonhowapplicantsbribedtheirwayintosecuring
apositionasschoolprincipalexistandareacauseforconcernamongeducatorsandthegeneralpublic.
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3. The TAME Project Transparency and Accountability in Mongolian Education (TAME) is a four-year project (2015-2018)
fundedbytheWorldBank/GlobalPartnershipforSocialAccountability(WB/GPSA)andimplementedby
GlobeInternationalCenteranditsCSOpartners.Theprojectobjectiveistostrengthencivicengagement
intheeducationsectortoimprovetransparencyofbudgetingandprocurementprocessesforthedelivery
of better quality education services in western and central Mongolia (Mongolia-Transparency and
AccountabilityinMongolianEducation,P150842-ImplementationStatusResultsReport:Sequence03and
GPSAGranteeMidtermReport).
Theprojectisbeingimplementedinthreeaimags(provinces)ofMongolia:intheArkhangai,Bulgan,and
Khuvsgul aimags. Even though the Memoranda of Understanding are signed with the Education
Departments in the three aimags, the governments at aimag and soum (district) level are considered
importantcounterpartsintheproject.TheEducationDepartmentfromBayan-Ulgiiaimag,inspiredbythe
process taking place in the fellow three aimags, started using some of the tools and expressed their
interestinjoiningtheproject.Thereistalkofpossiblyexpandingtheprojectinwaysthatwouldallowto
alsoincludethewesternaimagofBayan-Ulgiiintheproject.
Thefollowingarethemainactivities:
Organizing(establishmentandsupport)ofParentTeacherAssociations(PTAs)atthe10projectschools:
Organizinginitialmeetingswithschoolprincipals,teachers,andparents,firstseparatelyandthenjointly,
tointroducethePTAconceptfollowedbysettingupacoreteamofparentsandteacherswhoaregiven
trainingontheprocess(settingup,organizingelections,developingregulations,andrecruiting).Thecore
teammembersthenself-organizethemselvesintoseveralgroupstostarttheprocess.Oneofthegroups
draftthePTAregulations,whileanothergrouptakesonthetaskoforganizingtheelectionsprocess.Once
the PTA is set up, the third group tackles the membership issues by informing, communicating and
recruitingmemberstoPTA.Currently,PTAsaresetupatfiveoftheprojectschools.
MonitoringschoolsusingtheGoodSchoolSupportTool:aschoolenvironment(self-)assessmenttoolby
multi-stakeholder teams examining 3 aspects of school environment - physical, psychological, and
governance.Ajointteamthatcomprisesofrepresentativesofschoolcommunity(teachers,non-teaching
staff,students,parents,etc.)andothercommunities(localgovernment,CSOsandothercivicactorsand
groups,otherpartnersincludingbusinesses)doesthe(self-)assessmentanddevelopsreportwithasetof
recommended actions using the template provided. The report template has two sections: first, the
processreportthatincludestheinformationonthejointteammembers,backgroundinformationabout
theschool,goalandprocessof theassessment,andachievementand lessons learnt,andsecondpart
detailsthecurrentsituation,problemswithconcretecasesandexamples,theircausesandanalysis,and
recommendations on each of the three aspects. At the end, the team holds a meeting where all
stakeholders including the relevant decision-makers and media are informed about the assessment
findingsandrecommendations.Basedontheexperiencessofar,thelocalmediatreatstheinitiativeonly
asanewsitem,buttheprojecthasplansforfurtherengagementwiththemformorecoverage.Theteam
can then be involved in the next stepswhere the school community designs and takes on actions to
improvetheirschool.Anyadditionalsupportneededfromtheoutsideoftheschoolcommunityincluding
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from the provincial Department of Education is identified and sought after. There aren’t any formal
sanctions or rewards associated with the outcomes of the assessment within the current settings;
however,itisexpectedthat,similartomanyotherprojectswiththesamenature,recommendationsfor
policyandorregulatorychangesaretobeproposed.Currently,thewholecycleofassessmentistaking
placeatfouroftheprojectschools.
Monitoringschool/educationbudgetusingBudgetTrustToolsonEducationandProcurement:LocalNGOs
aretrainedtomonitorbudgetandprocurementbytheaimageducationdepartments.Asetof12tools
aredevelopedtolookatfollowingthewholecycleofthebudgetprocessandprocurementsstartingfrom
thechecklisttoseethecommitmenttobudgettransparency(bylookingattheaimag-levelregulations),
to observe if these are practiced in reality (by checking whether information is displayed at the
informationboardofEducationDepartments,websites,etc.)and,incasewhennotpracticed,demand
disclosureofinformationbythetimelinerequiredbyrelevantlegislation.Moreover,theNGOsattendthe
aimagCitizensKhuralsessionswhereaimagbudgetisdiscussedandapproved.Duringtheprocess,the
NGOsarealsoinformingthelocalmediaabouttheprocesssothattheyinformthegeneralpublic.Atthe
end of the fiscal year/cycle, theNGOs develop a set of recommendations based on their continuous
analysisoftheprocesstoimprovetransparencyinthebudgetingandprocurementprocessesandorganize
apublichearing/meetingtopresenttheirfindingsandrecommendations.Theprocessison-goingineach
ofthethreeaimags.ThisisacapacitybuildingprocessforlocalNGOs,atleastthreeNGOsineachaimag,
as they are learning-by-doing.At themoment it is too early to see any impact of both the tools and
involvementofCSOsingeneral;however,thereisagreatpotentialthattheseinitiativescreateenabling
environmentformeaningfulparticipationandthecapacitywillstaywith localCSOswhoarewillingto
continuetobeengaged.
Organizing stakeholder meetings and workshops at local levels: Meetings at aimag and soums are
organized to raise awareness on legislations on (citizen) participation including Budget Law,
Law on procurement of goods, works and services with state and local funds, Law on Information
TransparencyandRighttoInformation,LawonGlassAccounts,andLawonGeneralAdministrationand
educate the public on social accountability in education. As of June 2016, 10meetings took place as
indicated in the GranteeMidterm Report. It is expected that the general public are informed about
differentchannelsthroughsuchawarenessraisingandpubliceducationactivitiesandbecomeactively
involvedinactivitiesthatenabletheirinvolvementinimprovingquality,transparency,andaccountability
ineducation.
Two aspects of the TAME projects are novel as compared to other social accountability initiatives in
education:First,theprojectstrengthensthecollaborationbetweenparentsandteachersineducational
matters. In addition to Parents’ Councils and Teachers’ Councils that traditionally exist and work
separatelyattheschool,thenewlycreatedPTAsareaforumforengagedparentsandteacherswhojoin
forcestoimprovethequalityofeducationattheirschool.ThePTAsonlyhaveconsultativestatusanddo
not constitute a decision-making body. Second, the CSOs in the capital Ulaanbaatar have had the
opportunity in thepast tobuild theircapacity in financialmonitoringofnationalorcentral-level state
institutions.TheTAMEprojecthasextendedtheradiusbyprovidingtrainingtolocalCSOsthatarebased
12
in theprovinces (aimags)andsoums(districts).Theprojectbuilds theircapacity to financiallymonitor
stateinstitutionsandgovernmentswhichoperateataimagandsoumlevel.
4. Policy Recommendations Thisreportoffersthreepropositions:
1. Aswithotherdonor-fundedprojects,thetwocurrentaccountabilityinitiatives—pursuedin
MASAMandTAME—focusonselectpilotlocationswiththeexpectationthatthelineministries
lateronscaleupthepositiveexperiencesnationwide.Thisisunlikelytohappenunlessthetwo
projectsprovideactivepolicysupporttorevisethelegislationinwaysthatensureamore
participatoryformofgovernanceineducation.2. Thereisanover-supplyofformerteacherswhoacquiredthenecessaryqualificationtoapplyfor
thepositionofschoolprincipal.Despitetheprofessionalizationofschooladministrationthat
aimedatcurbingpoliticalappointmentsandeliminatingbribes,corruptpracticesre-surfaceall
fouryearsaftertheelectionswhenthenewadministrationappointsitsownmanagers.Thereis
aneedforamoreprofessional,bipartisanreviewofjobapplicantsandagreaterjobsecurityfor
well-performingschooladministrators.3. Governmentadministrationaftergovernmentadministrationassureareductionofuseless
paperworkandtime-consumingreportingbyteachersandeducationseniormanagersincluding
schoolprincipals.Inpractice,however,everynewgovernmentadministrationaddsitsown
regulation,salarysupplements,andbonusrequirementswithoutreplacingthepreviousones.As
aresult,themuch-awaitedreductioninadministrativeeffort,accompanyingmanagerial
accountability,remainstobeseen.
13
5. References Amarbayasgalan, D. (2016). Social Accountability – Social Responsibility, Social Reporting, or Citizen
Monitor/Watch?AppliedLinguistics,1(16),95–105.
ANSA-EAP.(2012).OpeningtheSpaceforSocialAccountabilityinMongolia.Manila:ANSA-EAP.
Beck,L,Mendel,T.andJ.Thindwa(2007).TheEnablingEnvironmentforSocialAccountabilityinMongolia.Washington,DC:WorldBank,SocialDevelopmentDepartment,SustainableDevelopmentNetwork.
Davaaddulam,T.(2010).Goodgovernanceandsocialaccountabilityterms.Ulaanbaatar:MunkhiinUseg
PublishingCompany.
GlobeInternationalNGO(2016).GPSAGranteeMidtermReport.June2016.
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. (2016). Key areas and requirements of incorporating andimplementing the concept of Education for Sustainable Development I the training and activities ofsecondaryschools.Ulaanbaatar:MECS.
OpenSocietyForumMongolia. (2016).WebsiteofOSFMongolia.DownloadedonNovember1,2016:
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/offices-foundations/open-society-forum-mongolia.
Steiner-Khamsi,G.(2012).Theglobal/localnexusincomparativepolicystudies:analysingthetriplebonus
systeminMongoliaovertime.ComparativeEducation,48(4),455-471.
Steiner-Khamsi, G. and I. Stolpe (2006). Educational Import. Local Encounters with Global Forces inMongolia.NewYork:Palgrave.
Tungalagtuul,Kh.(2016).MongoliainPISA/PISA-D.PresentationheldataUNESCOBangkok“CapacityBuildingWorkshop:PISAforDevelopment,”March1-2,2016.Ulaanbaatar:EducationEvaluationCenter.
DownloadedonDecember8,2016: http://www.unescobkk.org/fileadmin/user_upload/epr/Quality/NEQMAP/Mongolia.pdf
Verger,A.andM.Moschetti(2016).Public-PrivatePartnershipsinEducation:ExploringDifferentModelsandPolicyOptions.BackgroundStudyfortheSymposiumoftheOpenSocietyFoundations,June27-28,
2016.NewYork:OpenSocietyFoundations.
UNICEF Mongolia. (2012). Teachers in Mongolia: An Empirical Study on Recruitment into Teaching,ProfessionalDevelopment,andRetentionofTeachers.Ulaanbaatar:UNICEFMongolia.
WorldBank.(2006).MongoliaPublicExpenditureTrackingSurvey.Washington,DC:WorldBank.
WorldBank(2016).Mongolia-TransparencyandAccountabilityinMongolianEducation(TAME):P150842– Implementation Status Results Report: Sequence 03. Downloaded on Sep 15, 2016:
http://projects.worldbank.org/P150842?lang=en
14
Annex No.1, Decree No A/293, Minister of Education and Science, August 13, 2013
REGULATIONTOEVALUATEPERFORMANCEOFGENERALEDUCATIONSCHOOLTEACHERS
One.GeneralProvisions
1.1. Thisregulationshallbefollowedtoevaluatetheperformanceofgeneraleducationschool
teachers(hereinafter,teachers).
1.2. Thepurposeofthisregulationistoevaluatetheoutcomesoftheperformanceofteachersin
developing,upbringing,anduncoveringtalentsofeverychild,improvingthequalityof
teaching,andcreatingchild-friendlyenvironmentthroughcreativeworkofteachers.
1.3. Theevaluationofteacherperformanceshallbecomethebasisforevaluatingteacher’s
performanceindicatedinthejobdescriptionandemploymentcontract,appraisingthe
fulfilmentofemploymentcontract,andcalculatingthequarterlyperformancebonusand
competencebonus.
1.4. Theprogressandachievementofteacherperformanceshallbeevaluatedbyscoreeveryterm,
theaverageofwhichshallservethescoresforsemi-annualandannualperformance.
1.5. Teachersshalldevelopactionplansforeverytermoftheschoolyear.
1.6. TeacheractionplansshallbedevelopedusingthetemplategivenintheAnnextothis
regulation.
1.7. Theteacherperformanceandachievementsshallbeevaluatedaccordingtotheemployment
contractsignedwithteachersandfulfilmentoftheactionplansdevelopedbyteachers.
Two.Evaluationprinciples
2.1. Befairandobjectiveandbefreefromconflictofinterestandsubjectivity;
2.2. Bedirectlylinkedtothedefinedgoal,objectives,andstudentperformanceandachievement;
2.3. Berespectfulofindividualandprofessionaldignityandrights;2.4. Evaluationcriteriaandproceduresshallbetransparent;2.5. Beaimedatsupporting,motivating,anddevelopingteachers;
2.6. Beacombinationofself-evaluationandexternal([other]teachers,staff,parents,headof
teachingunit,educationmanager)evaluationtoverify;
Three.Organizationofteacherperformanceevaluation
3.1. Theaverageofthefinalscoreofthepreviousyear’sannualperformanceandteacherself-
evaluationscoreatthebeginningoftheschoolyearshallserveasthebaselinescoreforthe
schoolyear.Performancescoreofthe1sttermshallserveasthebaselinescoreforGrade1and
newsubjects.
15
3.2. Teachersshallcompleteself-evaluationoftheirperformanceof1stand3
rdtermsandreportto
theirrelevantteachingmethodologyunitsaccordingtothecriteria4.1.ofthisregulation.
3.3. Inthe2ndand4thterms,theself-evaluationofteachersshallbevalidatedbytheteam,
consistingofteachers,otherstaff,parents,headoftheteachingmethodologyunit,and
educationmanager,establishedbytheorderoftheschoolprincipal.
3.4. Inthecasewhenthedifferencebetweentheteacherself-evaluationscoreandvalidationscore[bytheteam]is10ormorepoints,thequarterlymonetarybonusoftheconcerningquarter
shallnotbegranted.
3.5. Inthecasewhentheteacherdeemsthevalidationscoreinaccurate,theteamsetupbythe
principalordershallreviewandrevalidate.
3.6. Theschoolprincipalconfirmstheteacherself-evaluationandevaluationbytheteambythe
orderoftheprincipal.
Four.Teacherperformanceevaluationcriteria
4.1. Teacherperformanceshallbeevaluatedbythefollowinggeneralcriteria.No Criteria Definition Performanceindicators
1.
Upbringing/20
points/
1. Participation
2. Habits
3. Behavior
1. Levelofcreationofmotivationand
opportunitiesforeverychildtoparticipate
inlearning,voluntary,andpublicactivities
2. Levelandeffortofobedienceofeverychild
tofollowschoolandsocialnorms
3. Embeddingofself-regulatory,self-
expression,positivecommunication/hard-
working,kind,andhelpful/behaviorsto
behaveinthesocialsettings
2
Progressand
attainmentof
knowledgeandskills
achievedbyevery
child/20points/
1. Progress
2. Attainment
1. Levelofprogressinknowledgeandskills
attainmentofeverychild
2. Assessmentoftheachievementofevery
childintermsofknowledgeandskillsby
term
3Uncoveringoftalents
/20points/
Uncoveringand
developingnatural
potentialsandabilities
• Inquiryanduncoveringoftalents
• Levelofdevelopmentoftalents/number
andqualityofthingsthatstudentslearntor
cando/
4
Satisfactionof
educationservice/20
points/
• Ofstudent
• Ofparentsand
caregivers
• Ofotherparties
Outcomesofthesurveys/questionnaires:
1. Teachersupporttothedevelopmentof
everychild
2. Teacherethics
16
5 Health/20points/
1. Healthand
wellbeing
2. Healthy
relationships
3. Healthyand
safe
environment
1. Improvementofchildhealth
2. Contributiontocreatinghealthy
relationships
3. Contributiontocreationofhealthyandsafe
environment
4.2. Thetotalperformancescoreofteachersshallbe100pointswitheachcriterionof20points.
4.3. Incriteria1and5,teachersteachinginGrades6to12canworkasateambyGradelevelor
groupswithingrades.
Five.Teacherperformanceevaluation
5.1. Teachersshallbeevaluatedbythefollowinglevelsbasedontheaveragescoresofperformance
evaluation:
90-100points-“Excellent”
80-89points-“Verygood”
70-79points-“Good”
60-69points-“Average”
31-59points-“Belowaverage”
0-30points-“Unsatisfactory”
5.2. 70ormorepointsor“Good”performanceservesasthejustificationforgrantingteachers
quarterlymonetarybonus.
5.3. Quarterlymonetarybonusshallbegivenquarterlybasedonthemonthlycalculationsonthe
basesalarybytheratedefinedbytheCabinetwithintheamountallocatedforbonusesaspart
oftheannualbudget.
5.4. 80ormorepointsor“Verygood”performanceservesasthejustificationforgrantingteachers
competencebonus.
5.5. Competencebonusshallbegrantedaspercentageofbasesalarybytheratedefinedbythe
Cabinetwithintheannualsalaryfundoftheschool.
5.6. Thedecisiontograntteachersquarterlymonetaryorcompetencebonusesshallbemadeby
theschoolprincipal.
5.7. “Belowaverage”performanceshallbethejustificationforassigningadministrativechargesor
penaltiessuchasnoticeorsalarydeduction.
5.8. Teacherswhoareevaluatedwith“unsatisfactory”performanceshallbegivenadministrative
chargesandprovideda3-monthmentoringsupport.Inthecaseofnoimprovement,thisshall
bethejustificationfornullifyingteachinglicenseorterminatingtheemploymentcontract.
5.9. Inthecaseateacher’sperformanceisevaluatedbelow69points2-3times,therespective
superiorofficialshallbeliableforprovidingprofessionalandmethodologicaladvice/support.
------оОо-------
17
Annex to ”Regulations to evaluate the performance of general education school teachers”
TEMPLATEFORTEACHERACTIONPLAN
APPROVEDBY:PRINCIPAL.....................
Nameofteacher:................
Schooltarget
•
Teachertarget:
•
Classincharge:..................
Subjectsteach:........................
Additionalactivities:
•
Teachersshallplanaccordingtothefollowingareasandsettargetsforthestudentstheyareresponsible
for:
Criteria
Scope
Term1 Term2 Term3 Term4 Endofyear
Baseline TargetAttain-
mentBaseline Target
Attain-
mentBaseline Target
Attain-
mentBaseline Target
Attain-
ment
1.Progressandattainmentofknowledgeandskillsachievedbyeverychild
Students
responsible
Previous
year’sannual
performance
scoreand
teacherself-
evaluation
scoreatthe
beginningof
schoolyear
Attainment
attheend
ofterm1
Attainment
attheend
ofterm2
Attainment
attheend
ofterm3
Average
of4
terms
score
2.Upbringing 3.Uncoveringoftalents 4.Satisfactionofeducationservice 5.Health
ActionstotakePerformance
indicatorActionstotake
Performance
indicatorActionstotake
Performance
indicatorActionstotake
Performance
indicator
18
PerformanceevaluationsheetofeducationmanagersatSchoolNo.…:2015-16schoolyear
No
Indicators
Discipline
/Classteachersareincharge/
20points
Progressandattainmentofknowledgeandskillsofeachchild
/Teachingmethodologyunitsincharge/
20points
Uncoveringand
improvementof
talents
20points/Sections
incharge/
Satisfactionineducation
serviceprovision
20points/Sectionincharge/
Health
20points/classes/
GRANDTOTAL
Participation Habit Behavior
Total
Progress
Achievement
Total
Surveythattheeducation
managerinitiated
Enrolm
entinclubs-
extracurricular
Developmentofstudenttalents
Total
Educationm
anager'ssupportto
developmentofeachstudent
Professionalethics
Total
Wellbeing/activitiescompleted
onhealth/
Healthyrelationship
Healthyandsafe
environment
Total
Names
Studenttimem
anagement
Participationinextracurricularactivities
Resultsandachievementofparticipation
Uniform
,hair
Line-up,discipline
Discipline
Abilitytobehavewellinthesociety
Goodcommunication
%ageofbaselineperform
ance-September
Progressoftheexternalvalidationexam
/percentage/
Varianceofperform
ance/Upordownby10/
Progressandachievementinterm
1andannual
perform
ance
timem
anagement
Documentation/paperw
ork
Completionoftasks
Ethics
Healthyandsafeenvironment
Healthyandsafeenvironment
0,1-1%
1,1-2%
2,1-3%
3.1-4%
4,1-5%
5,1-6%
6,1-7%
7,1-8%
8,1-9%
9,1-10%
Points 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 10 20 5 5 10 20 10 2 2 2 4 20 5 5 5 5 20 100
1Education
manager13.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 18 8.0 10 18.0 5.0 4.0 9.0 18 10 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.094.0
2Education
manager22.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 18 8.3 10 18.3 4.0 4.0 9.0 17 10 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.093.3
TOTAL 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 3.0 2.0 18 8.2 0.0 0 10 18.2 4.5 0.0 9.017.5 10 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 20.093.7
Evaluatedby:Principal:……………..
Appendix to Decree No 41, Minister of Education, Culture and Science. February 12, 2007.
TeachersCodeofEthicsforGeneralEducationSchoolsandKindergartens
Generalprovision
Thecompliancetoteacherethicalnormsservesasoneoftheguaranteestoenjoytherighttoreceivepublic education services equally and to meet the demand to possess complex competences required forstudentstoliveandworkcriticallyandresponsiblyinhumane,civil,democraticsociety.
LegalbasisofthisCodeofEthicsshallbetheConstitutionofMongoliaandotherrelevantlegislations,teacherrightsanddutiesdefinedintheLawonEducation,andchildrightsespeciallytheprovisionsontherightstoeducationprescribedintheUNChildRightConvention.
Every teacher and teacher assistant at public and private kindergartens and schools that provideeducationserviceintheterritoryofMongoliashallfollowthisCodeofEthics.
One.PurposesoftheCodeofEthics1.1.To regulatemoral relations thatarisebetween the teacherandcustomersofeducation settings
duringimplementationofeducationreforms,topreventteachersfromprofessionalmisconductandtoraisethedignityoftheteachingprofession.
1.2.Inconsiderationofthefactthatprofessionalmisconductdiminishesequalopportunityofallcitizenstodevelopthroughsocialandnationalcultureanddepriveself-confidenceofyoungsters,everyteachershallhavethedutytoobeytheprofessionalcodeofethics.
Two.Teacherethicalnorms2.1.InthesightoffulfillingtherightsanddutiesspecifiedintheLawonEducationandtheLawon
PrimaryandSecondaryEducationtoprovidequalityeducationtostudents,theteachershall:
2.1.1. Treat students without discrimination on grounds of social and cultural background, nationalorigin,parentandguardian’seducationandlivingstandard,andtheirownlearningabilityandappearanceandevaluatetheirlearningachievementobjectively.
2.1.2.Notrefusetoenrollchildreninschoolorkindergartenandexclude,dismissortransferchildrenonthebasisofchild’sfamilybackground,physicalandpsychologicaldevelopment,andlearningabilityviolatingtheexisting regulations making sure that all compulsions conform to their physical, intellectual and socialdevelopmentalfeatures.
2.1.3.Keeptheinformationofaconfidentialnaturepertainingtoachildwithacutecareandnotinsulttheirdignityandpointsofviewwithverbalorphysicalpunishment.
2.1.4.Notabusestudentsinachievingsuccessinstudentperformanceortheirownworkbyviolatingstudent’ssubjectselectionrights,deterioratingtheirhealthandreducingtheirholidayandfree-timeandnotunderminequalityofeducationforallbypayingoverattentiontocompetitionsandOlympiads.
2.1.5. Not to push students to purchase books, trainingmaterials and other resources involuntarily,demandtopaypayments,feesandcontributionsnotoutlinedinthelegislationsandofferpaidprivatetutoring.
20
2.1.6.Honordignityofteachingprofessionatalltimes,bearresponsibilitiesforhis/herbehavior,wordsandteachingpractice,andnotbepassiveduring lessonsandtrainingactivitiesandusealcohol inschoolandkindergartenpremises.
2.1.7.Protectstudent’shealthandwellbeingatschoolandkindergartenpremisesduringclasshours,prevent them from sexual abuse and criminal offence and demonstrate concern for student regarding peerpressure,negativeimpactoffamilyandsocialenvironment.
2.2.Inthesightofmaintainingprofessionalreputationandcooperatingwithparentsandguardians,theteachershall:
2.2.1. Ensureparents and familyparticipation ineducation relationsopenly andequallywithoutanydiscriminationbasedonage,sex,ethnicbackground,education,religion,politicalstandandlivingconditions.
2.2.2. Bear responsibilities for students to obtain complex competences and rendermethodologicalassistancetotheparentsandguardiansdependingonurbanandrurallifestyleandemploymentfeatures.
2.2.3.Receiveparent’srequestsanddemandsrelatedtoeducationserviceanditsqualitiesandmakehonestcompulsionsonparentsregardingtheissuesrelatedtotheirchild.
2.2.4.Notacceptanygratuityfromparentsforperformingteachingdutyandnotpressureparentsandstudentstogivevaluablegiftsonoccasionsincludinggraduationandadmissionandpublicholidays.
2.3. In thesightofcooperatingwithcolleaguesandbuildingcreative, friendlyand fair-competitiveenvironment,theteachershall:
2.3.1. Treat his/her colleagueswith respect regardless of diversity in age, sex, personality, position,knowledgeandexperiences.
2.3.2. Not cause loss of organizational or individual’s reputation, health, emotional condition andpropertyofcolleaguesforthesakeofhis/herownororganizationalreputation.
2.3.3. Share pedagogical experiences with others, combine private and organizational interests andhonorcollegiality.
2.3.4. Be responsible in participating in decision-making activities of the organization, bear jointresponsibilitiesandstrictlyfollowlabordisciplines.
2.3.5. Pay attention to the improvement of working condition within the legislations, improvingprofessionalskillsinlinewithdevelopmentalrequirementsandpreventfromlaggingbehindtheoreticallyandmethodologically.
2.3.6.Protectcolleagues’andhis/herreputationfromtheharmfulriskfromthesideofmanagement,colleagues,students,parentsandpublic.
2.4.Insightofrelationshipwithsocietytopromoteeducationforall,theteachershall:
2.4.1.Beabletoparticipateinactivitiesofnon-governmentalorganizationsandbeelectedinvoluntarypositions,butitshallnotimpactonfulfillmentofhis/herfull-timejobduties.
2.4.2.Notcompelhis/herownopinionsandpoliticalbeliefstostudents,parentsandcolleaguesthuscausingdetrimentstohis/herandothers’teachingduty.
21
2.4.3.Safeguardandpromoteeducationquality,interestsofeducationalinstitutionandstudentswhenhe/she exercises authority to use school premises, select and supply learning equipment, textbooks anduniforms.
Three.ImplementationoftheTeacher’sCodeofEthics3.1.TeacherswhoviolatedTeacher’sCodeofEthicsshallbebornetheresponsibilities inaccordance
with Labor law, Regulations to grant and dismiss teaching license and Regulations to award and nullifyprofessionalrankstoteachersandsuchprovisionsshallbeprescribedininternalrulesoftheorganizationandlaborcontract.
3.2.1.Thelevelofliabilitiesbornebyteacherswhomadeethicalviolationsshallbeinaccordancewithlossesbroughtintosociety,organizationandstudents.
3.3.AnunpaidEthicsCommittee/hereinafterreferredtoas“Committee”/underEducationandCultureDepartmentatprovincialandcapitalcitylevelshallfunctiontomonitorimplementationoftheCodeofEthics.
3.3.1.Membersofthecommitteeshallbeelectedfromteacher’sconferenceoftheprovinceorcapitalcity. The committee shall comprise of representatives from the Education and Culture Departmentmethodologists, management of schools and kindergartens, teachers, local public servants, parents andrepresentativefromnon-governmentalorganizations.Thecommitteeshallhave9-11members.
3.3.2.OnthebasisofgenericruleonthecommitteeactivitiesadoptedbytheMinistryofEducation,adetailedoperationalruleofCommitteeoftheprovinceandcapitalcityshallbedevelopedandapprovedbytheHead of Education and Culture Department. The requirements for head of the committee, secretary andmembersandtheirmandateandruleofthemeetingtomakedecisionaboutethicalissuesshallbeprescribedinthisrule.
3.3.3. Thecommittee shallmakeconclusionon thebasisofofficial letterandcomplaints concerningprofessional misconduct borne by education manager, social worker, teacher, kindergarten methodologist,teacher, teacher assistant compiled by school, parents, teachers, students and governmental and non-governmentalorganizationsandinformtherelevantauthoritiesandaninitiatorofcomplaint.
3.3.4.Thecommitteecanconsideranalysis, inspectionandconclusionofstateadministrativecentralorganization in charge of education, specialized inspection department, local state and governmentalorganizationandEducationandCultureDepartmentofcapitalcity.
3.3.5. The committee shall deliver its conclusion to management of the school and kindergarten,province,capitalcityandsoumgovernors,orteacherandmonitortheactivitiestobemadeinaccordancewiththeconclusion.
3.3.6.Theteacherwhoregardsthatresponsibilityforethicalviolationsisnotsubstantialorexcessive,theteachercanmakehis/hercompliantinwritingtotherelevantorganizationswithin30days.