more than just financial reform; analysis and observations on the dodd-frank wall street reform and...
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8/8/2019 More Than Just Financial Reform; Analysis and Observations on the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
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August 2010
JONE DAY
WHITE PAPER
MoRE THAn JusT FInAncIAl REFoRM:
AnAlysIs And obsERvATIons on THE
dodd-FRAnk WAll sTREET REFoRM AndconsuMER PRoTEcTIon AcT
http://www.jonesday.com/ -
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Table of Contents
Page
Introduction ..................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... .............. 6
The Financial Stability Oversight Council ..................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... .............. 8Enhanced upervision and Prudenial andards .................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ........... 9
Miiaion of Risks o Financial abiliy .................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ..........10Observaions ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ...................... 1 1
Bre P. Barraae Jordan L. chwarz+1.212.326.3446 +1.212.326.7848
[email protected] [email protected]
Changes in the Regulation of Depository Institutions and their Holding Companies .......................................................................12Acquisiions and Oher Expansion Aciviies............................................................................................................................................................14Concenraion Limis on Acquisiions ...........................................................................................................................................................................14governance ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................15Nonbank Banks and temporary Moraorium on FDIC Approvals ..............................................................................................................15ecuriies Holdin Companies ..........................................................................................................................................................................................15Examinaions and Reporin ...............................................................................................................................................................................................16
Charer Conversions .................................................................................................................................................................................................................16general udy of Bankin Aciviies ...............................................................................................................................................................................16Lendin Limis...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................17Affiliae transacions ................................................................................................................................................................................................................17Inermediae Holdin Companies ...................................................................................................................................................................................17Conflics of Ineres in ecuriizaion transacions ..............................................................................................................................................18Observaions ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................18
Ralph F. MacDonald III (Chip) Caherine R. Reichel+1.404.581.8622 +1.212.326.7866
[email protected] [email protected]
The Collins AmendmentNew Capital Rules Under the Act ...............................................................................................................................19Backround ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................19
the Amendmen ..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................19Effecive Daes .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................19Excepions ..................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .... 20udies ..................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ............ 20Reulaions ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... 20Conclusions and Effecs .................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ....................2 1
Ralph F. MacDonald III (Chip)+1.404.581.8622
The Volcker Rule: New Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act ........................................................................................................23Wha is Covered by ecion 13 .........................................................................................................................................................................................23Permissible Privae Equiy and Hede Funds Aciviies ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ................25
Capial ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................26Effecive Dae ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................27udies ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................27Rulemakin ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................28Observaions .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................29
Ralph F. MacDonald III (Chip)+1.404.581.8622
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected] -
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Are the Reports of TARPs Death Exaggerated? ..................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ................... 30Defici Reducions ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ........ 30Federal Housin Finance Aency Repor and gEs ..................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... 30Observaions................................................................................................................................................................................................................................30
Ralph F. MacDonald III (Chip)+1.404.581.8622
Orderly Liquidation Authority ......................................................................................................................................................................................................31Auhoriy o e Prudenial andards ..................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .............32Auhoriy o Place a Company ino Receivership and Eniies ubjec o Receivership .................... ....................... ............... 33Orderly Liquidaion Fund ......................................................................................................................................................................................................34Powers of he FDIC as Receiver ......................................................................................................................................................................................35Prioriy cheme in Receivership...................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... 36the Claims Process ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... .... 38Avoidance of Fraudulen transfers and Preferenial transfers ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... . 38eoff ..................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ................ 39
Conrac Paries .................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ................ 40udies and Repors ..................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ......4 1Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................42
Mark A. Cody Corinne Ball co A. griffin+1.312.269.4392 +1.212.326.7844 +1.212.326.8371
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Hedge Fund, Private Equity, and Other Advisers ........................................................................................................................................................43Eliminaion of he Privae Adviser Exempion .........................................................................................................................................................43Oher Exclusions and Exempions .................................................................................................................................................................................43New Records and Repors for Privae Funds .........................................................................................................................................................44Cusody of Clien Asses ......................................................................................................................................................................................................45Adjusmen of Invesor andards ..................................................................................................................................................................................45
transiion .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................45
Anhony L. Perricone (tony) Mark V. Minon+1.212.326.7871 +1.214.969.3763
[email protected] [email protected]
Federal Insurance Office...............................................................................................................................................................................................................46
tracy K. raford+1.216.586.7288
Page
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The Derivatives Legislation: Is the World Now Safer? .............................................................................................................................................47the Bi Picure ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................47Do We Finally Have Clariy as o How waps are Defined and Who is Responsible for Reulain them? ...............48Mandaory Clearin ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ......5 1Are You Covered by he Ac? .............................................................................................................................................................................................53Capial and Marin Requiremens .................................................................................................................................................................................55Posiion Limis ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................57
Volcker Rule tradin Limiaions .....................................................................................................................................................................................57the Push-Ou Requiremen (he Lincoln Amendmen) ................................................................................................................................58Pracical Implicaions of he Push-Ou Provision and he Volcker Rule ...................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .... 60New andards of Conduc and Real-time Reporin Requiremens ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ........ 60Exraerriorial Effec ...................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... .....6 1Addiional Impac on Exisin waps ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ............6 1timin ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................62Final thouhs: the Fuure Impac ................................................................................................................................................................................62
Joel . telpner tracy L. Oley+1.212.326.3663 +1.202.879.5416
[email protected] [email protected]
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation ............................................................................................................................................65
ay-On-Pay Voes .................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ............65hareholder Approval of golden Parachues .........................................................................................................................................................65Broker Voin ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ................... 66Proxy Access ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ................... 66Hedin Disclosure..................................................................................................................................................................................................................67Board Leadership Disclosure ............................................................................................................................................................................................67Clawback Provision ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................67Compensaion Commiees .................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ........... 68Exempion from ecion 404(b) for Cerain maller Issuers ..................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....... 68Disclosure of Raio of CEO Pay o Median toal Compensaion .................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... 68tabular Disclosure of Pay-for-Performance .................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... 68
Rober A. Profusek (Bob) Bradley C. Brasser (Brad)+1.212.326.3800 +1.312.269.4252
[email protected] [email protected]
Lizanne thomas Manan hah (Mike)+1.404.581.8411 +1.212.326.3986
[email protected] [email protected]
Investor Protection and Enforcement Provisions....................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ............... 69EC Enforcemen..................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ............ 69Whisleblower Incenives and Proecions ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... 69Aidin and Abein Auhoriy ................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .........7 1the ECs Expanded Auhoriy for Collaeral Bars ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .....7 1Disqualifyin Felons and Oher Bad Acors from Reulaion D Offerins ..........................................................................................72Resricin Mandaory Pre-Dispue Arbiraion Provisions.............................................................................................................................73the New EC Enforcemen Deadline ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ............ 74Oher Key Enforcemen Provisions ................................................................................................................................................................................75
Michael J. McConnell (Mike) Waler W. Davis (Wal) Paricia J. Villareal+1.404.581.8526 +1.404.581.8517 +1.214.969.2973
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Henry Klehm III Rebecca M. thornhill+1.212.326.3706 +1.404.581.8771
[email protected] [email protected]
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Credit Rating Agencies ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................77Increased EC Reulaion of NRROs .......................................................................................................................................................................77Enhanced Inernal Conrols and Conflics of Ineres .......................................................................................................................................77Increased transparency of Rain Mehodoloy .................................................................................................................................................78Expanded Liabiliy and ae of Mind Requiremens in Privae Acions ..................... ...................... ....................... ....................... .... 80Requiremens for NRROs o Consider third-Pary Informaion and o Refer tips o Auhoriies .................... .................8 1niversal Rain ymbols......................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .............8 1
Removal of auory References o Credi Rains ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ..8 1Eliminaion and Exempion from Fair Disclosure Rule ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ....................8 1Fuure udies ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................82Conflics of Ineres and Iniial Credi Rain Assinmens for rucured Finance Producs ....................... ....................... .82timin of Reulaions .............................................................................................................................................................................................................82
Ronald . gross (Ron) glenn . Arden+1.212.326.8331 +1.212.326.7852
[email protected] [email protected]
Edward J. OConnell (Ed) Michelle Poulos+1.212.326.3480 +1.212.326.3998
[email protected] [email protected]
Asset-Backed Securities ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................83
Edward J. OConnell (Ed) Ronald . gross (Ron)+1.212.326.3480 +1.212.326.8331
[email protected] [email protected]
glenn . Arden David E. Conroy+1.212.326.7852 +1.212.326.3823
[email protected] [email protected]
Preemption ..............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................85Conflic Preempion Required ..........................................................................................................................................................................................85Case-By-Case Requiremen ..............................................................................................................................................................................................86Judicial Review............................................................................................................................................................................................................................87
Judicial Enforcemen of Preempin Reulaions ..................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ...................... ....................... .........87 Watters Overurned; Cuomo Codified .........................................................................................................................................................................87
ae Enforcemen Auhoriy ..............................................................................................................................................................................................87Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................88
timohy J. Finn (tim)+1.202.879.3789
Consumer Protection .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................89tile X: the Consumer Financial Proecion Bureau ...........................................................................................................................................89tile XIV: the Morae Reform and Ani-Predaory Lendin Ac ..................... ...................... ....................... ....................... ................... 90
Bre P. Barraae Caherine R. Reichel Jordan L. chwarz+1.212.326.3446 +1.212.326.7866 +1.212.326.7848
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
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InTRoducTIonOn July 21, 2010, Presiden Obama sined ino law he Dodd-
Frank Wall ree Reform and Consumer Proecion Ac (he
Ac). the resul of a year-lon effor o ransform financial
supervision in response o he financial crisis, he sweep-
in leislaion affecs no only banks and oher financialinsiuions bu also has far-reachin consequences for all
corporaions doin business in he nied aes. Alhouh
Conress has aemped o lay he foundaion for lon-erm
financial sabiliy, mos of he acual deails and implemena-
ion of many key provisions of he Ac are reserved for reu-
laors o divine in he comin monhshe Ac explicily calls
for more han 240 rulemakin effors and nearly 70 sudies
by 11 reulaory bodies. the Ac is essenially a 2,300-pae
inroducion o an evenual new financial reulaory environ-
menan incomplee roadmap for he reulaory financial
fuure of he nied aes. Nowihsandin he incomplee
characer of he Ac, he Ac will have a sinifican and
immediae impac on all businesses. the Ac:
Devoes much of is deail o addressin public aner
over he bailou raher han o he acual causes of he
financial crisis.
Deleaes mos deail and auhoriy o reulaory
aencies.
goes well beyond radiional financial insiuions by man-
dain chanes o corporae overnance provisions ha
neaively affec all public companies.
Imposes a sinificanly increased compliance burden on
banks and oher financial insiuions ha is likely o fur-
her indusry consolidaion.
Creaes a public marke for derivaives ha increases he
cos of doin business for mos corporaions.
Is likely o coninue o limi access o capial by causin
banks and oher financial insiuions o lend less o com-
ply wih enhanced reulaory requiremens.
Despie is shorcomins and he deleaion of much of he
deail o rulemakin aencies, financial insiuions and all
oher companies mus bein o plan for he hisoric chanes
o .. bankin, derivaives radin, corporae overnance,
consumer financial proecion, execuive compensaion, and
securiies dealin. I is no secre ha adapin o he emer-
in body of rules will be a challene for all, bu opporuniies
will appear for hose insiuions capable of inernalizin he
Acs mos imporan principles and adjusin o rulemakin
and reulaory implemenaion.
Durin his uncerain rulemakin period, marke parici-
pans will disinuish hemselves from heir compeiors no
hrouh passiviy, bu by anicipain he judmen of poli-
cymakers and he reacion of markes. to his end, he fol-
lowin analysis is desined o help our cliens naviae he
Acs subsanial ambiuiies, undersand is complexiies,
and prepare effecive sraeies for adapin o his new
reulaory environmen.
this Whie Paper analyzes he major opics addressed in he
Ac. the ecions in his Whie Paper are as follows:
The Financial Stability Oversight Council. Describes he
membership and powers of his new council of reulaors,
which is asked wih overseein he enirey of he finan-
cial sysem, focusin on aps in he reulaory framework
and emerin hreas o financial sabiliy.
Enhanced Bank Regulatory Provisions. Oulines he major
hemes of deposiory insiuion and holdin company
reulaion, includin provisions relaed o capial and
liquidiy, reulaory supervision, enhanced supervisory
requiremens for merers and acquisiions, enhanced
reulaion of financial insiuions wih consolidaed asses
of a leas $50 billion, he Collins Amendmen, and he
Volcker Rule.
Orderly Liquidation Authority. Analyzes he resoluion
and liquidaion provisions, hihlihin he differences
beween hose provisions and he Bankrupcy Code, and
examinin he poenial impac ha he new leislaion
would have on various paries in ineres.
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Hedge Fund, Private Equity, and Other Advisers.
Describes how he Ac will affec many invesmen advis-
ers o hede funds, privae equiy funds, and real esae
funds by sinificanly expandin he requiremen for
invesmen advisers o reiser wih he ecuriies and
Exchane Commission (he EC).
Federal Insurance Office. Discusses he creaion of he
Federal Insurance Office, which will collec informaion
and monior developmens in he sae reulaion of insur-
ance, bu has no auhoriy o reulae or supervise insur-
ance companies.
Derivatives. Analyzes he Acs bifurcaed jurisdicional
framework, which submis virually all swaps o reula-
ion by eiher he EC or he Commodiy Fuures tradin
Commission. this secion also describes he clearin-
house requiremen for swaps, hihlihin cerain limied
exempions, and explains new reulaions and require-
mens on eniies enain in swap ransacions.
Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation.
Discusses he rend oward shor-ermism resulin
from new rules overnin corporae America, includ-
in say-on-pay voin, shareholder approval of olden
parachues, he prohibiion of broker voin in cerain
insances; he requiremen of clawback provisions for
exchane-raded companies, requiremens for disclos-
in hedin policies and compensaion raios, and pro-
posed chanes o proxy access.
Investor Protection and Enforcement Provisions.
Analyzes enforcemen provisions aimed a improvin
securiies laws and srenhenin invesor proecions,
which include: addin new whisleblower proecions and
incenives; esablishin aidin and abein liabiliy in EC
enforcemen acions; providin he EC wih he auhoriy
o issue indusry-wide collaeral bars; disqualifyin cerain
bad acors from Reulaion D offerins; resricin man-
daory predispue arbiraion provisions; and esablishin
a deadline for he EC o file an enforcemen acion afer
providin an individual wih a Wells Noice.
Credit Rating Agencies. Describes he increased reula-
ion of credi rain aencies, which include: enhancin
he ECs powers o oversee and reulae cerain rain
aencies; requirin he adopion of specified inernal con-
rols; expandin reulaions inended o address conflics
of ineres; expandin disclosure obliaions o increase
compeiion and add ransparency o he rains process;
and exposin credi rain aencies o reaer poenial
liabiliy o EC enforcemen acions, as well as privae
acions under he securiies laws.
Asset-Backed Securities. Analyzes a number of mae-
rial chanes for he srucured finance marke, includin
credi risk reenion requiremens, which obliaes oriina-
ors/securiizers o reain credi exposure o heir securi-
ized asses, and oher provisions focused on increased
disclosure and reporin requiremens.
Preemption. Discusses new sandards and procedural
requiremens affecin federal preempion of sae con-
sumer laws, focusin on he adopion of he leal san-
dard for preempion se forh by he .. upreme Cour
in Barnett Bank v. Nelson.
Consumer Protection. Discusses he esablishmen of he
new Consumer Financial Proecion Bureau and new mor-
ae lendin sandards.
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THE FInAncIAl sTAbIlITy ovERsIgHTcouncIlthe Ac creaes he Financial abiliy Oversih Council
(he Council) o idenify risks o he financial sabiliy of he
nied aes (he ..) ha could arise from he maerial
financial disress, failure, or by onoin aciviies of lare,
inerconneced bank holdin companies1 or nonbank finan-
cial companies,2 or ha could arise ouside he financial ser-
vices markeplace.3 to faciliae his objecive, he Council
will promoe marke discipline by aempin o eliminae
expecaions ha he .. overnmen will shield hem from
losses in he even of failure. the Council is also iven pow-
ers ha will allow i o idenify and respond o emerin
hreas o he sabiliy of he .. financial sysem.
Membership of he Council is divided beween voin
members and nonvoin members. Voin members each
have one voe, and include he followin 10 individuals: he
ecreary (he ecreary) of he nied aes Deparmen
of treasury (he treasury), as Chairperson of he Council;
he Chairperson of he Board of governors of he Federal
Reserve ysem (he Board of governors or Federal
Reserve); he Comproller of he Currency; he Direcor
of he Bureau of Consumer Financial Proecion; he
Chairperson of he ecuriies and Exchane Commission;
he Chai rperson of he Federal Deposi InsuranceCorporaion (he FDIC); he Chairperson of he Commodiy
Fuures tradin Commission; he Direcor of he Federal
Housin Finance Aency; he Chairperson of he Naional
1 Bank holdin companies are defined by reference o secion2 of he Bank Holdin Company Ac of 1956. H.R. 4173, 101(a)(1). this Ac defines a bank holdin company as any companyha has conrol over any bank or over any company ha is orbecomes a bank holdin company. 12 ..C. 1841.
2 A company is a nonbank financial company if 85 percen of isross revenues or consolidaed asses are relaed o aciviiesha are financial in naure. H.R . 4173, 102(a). Noably, finan-cial in naure is defined in accordance wih secion 4(k) of he
Bank Holdin Company Ac (12 ..C. 1843(k)). nder ha ac,he Board of governors (defined below), in consulaion wihhe ecreary (defined below), is auhorized o deermine whaaciviies are financial in naure. 12 ..C. 1843(k). the ac iselfdeclares a wide-rane of aciviies financial in naure, includinlendin, financial and invesmen advisory services, insuranceaency aciviies, issuin, underwriin and dealin in securiies,and oher common bankin aciviies.
3 H.R. 4173, 112. the conceps of maerial financial disress ando he financial sabiliy of he nied aes are no definedin he Ac. imilarly, he Ac does no define lare, inercon-neced bank holdin company, alhouh provisions reard-in enhanced supervision auomaically apply o bank holdincompanies wih a leas $50 billion in consolidaed asses (dis-cussed in more deail below).
Credi nion Adminisraion Board; and an independen
member wih insurance experise who is appoined by he
Presiden of he nied aes (he Presiden) for a six-year
erm, wih he advice and consen of he enae.4
the Councils nonvoin members, who will serve in an advi-
sory capaciy for a wo-year erm, include he followin five
individuals: he Direcor of he Office of Financial Research
(he OFR); he Direcor of he Federal Insurance Office (he
FIO); a sae insurance commissioner, o be desinaed
by a process deermined by he ae insurance commis-
sioners; a sae bankin supervisor, o be desinaed by a
process deermined by he sae bankin supervisors; and
a sae securiies commissioner (or officer performin like
funcions), o be desinaed by a process deermined by he
sae securiies commissioners.5
nless oherwise saed in he Ac, acion by he Council
requires a majoriy voe.6 Acions requirin a wo-hirds voe
include he deerminaion o subjec a nonbank financial
company o enhanced supervision,7 he decision o rescind
such deerminaion,8 resolvin jurisdicional dispues
amons Member Aencies,9 causin cerain companies
o ake measures ha miiae risk o he financial sysem
(discussed below),10 and recommendin ha he ecreary
appoin he FDIC as receiver of a financial company.11
In order o monior he financial services markeplace o
idenify poenial risks o he financial sabiliy of he .., he
Ac permis he Council o collec informaion from Member
Aencies, oher federal and sae financial reulaory aen-
cies, he FIO, bank holdin companies, and nonbank finan-
cial companies.12 Wih respec o bank holdin companies
and nonbank financial companies, he Council, hrouh he
OFR, may require he submission of repors for he purpose
of assessin he exen o which such company, financial
aciviy or financial marke in which such companys parici-
paion poses a hrea o he financial sabiliy of he ..13
4 H.R. 4173, 111(b)(1).5 H.R. 4173, 111(b)(2).6 H.R. 4173, 111(f).7 H.R. 4173, 113(a).8 H.R. 4173, 113(d).9 H.R. 4173, 119. A Member Aency means any aency repre-
sened by a voin member of he Council. H.R. 4173, 102(a)(3).10 H.R. 4173, 121.11 H.R. 4173, 203(a).12 H.R. 4173, 112(a).13 H.R. 4173, 112(d)(3)(A).
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However, prior o requirin submission of hese repors,
he Council is insruced o rely, o he exen possible, on
informaion available from he financial reulaory aency
responsible for reulain such company.14
If he Council is unable o deermine wheher he financial
aciviies of a nonbank f inancial company pose a hrea
o financial sabiliy based on hese repors, discussions
wih manaemen, and publicly available informaion, he
Council may reques he Board of governors, and he
Board of governors is auhorized, o conduc an examina-
ion of he nonbank financial company for he sole purpose
of deerminin wheher such company should be subjec o
enhanced supervision.15
Once he Council decides o place a company under he
enhanced supervision of he Board of governors, acin
hrouh he OFR i may require repors o keep he Council
informed as o: he financial condiion of he company;
sysems for moniorin and conrollin financial, operain
and oher risks; ransacions wih any subsidiary ha is a
deposiory insiuion; and he exen o which he aciviies
and operaions of he company and any subsidiary hereof,
could, under adverse circumsances, have he poenial o
disrup financial markes or affec he overall financial sa-
biliy of he ..16
the Council, he OFR, and he oher Member Aencies
mus mainain he confidenialiy of any daa, informaion,
and repors submied under his Ac. the submission of
any nonpublicly available daa or informaion will no con-
siue a waiver of, or oherwise affec, any privilee arisin
under federal or sae law o which he daa or informaion
is oherwise subjec.17
EnHAncEd suPERvIsIon And PRudEnTIAlsTAndARds
Nonbank Financial Companies. If he Council deermines
ha he maerial financial disress of a nonbank finan-
cial company poses a hrea o he financial sabiliy of he
.., i is auhorized o subjec such company o enhanced
14 H.R. 4173, 112(d)(3)(B).15 H.R. 4173, 112(d)(4). this provision applies only o .. nonbank
financial companies.16 H.R. 4173, 116.17 H.R. 4173, 112(d)(5).
supervision by he Board of governors.18 the procedures
esablished under he Ac require he Council o: (1) pass a
proposed deerminaion, by wo-hirds majoriy; (2) pro-
vide noice o such company of he deerminaion, includ-
in an explanaion of he basis for he deerminaion; and (3)
allow he company an opporuniy for a hearin before he
Council o cones he deerminaion.19 the Council has 60
days afer such hearin o issue a final deerminaion. the
Ac provides a nonexclusive lis of facors ha he Council
will consider prior o makin a final deerminaion includin,
amon ohers: he exen of leverae of he company; off-
balance-shee exposure; relaionships wih oher sinifican
financial companies; he imporance of he company as a
source of credi; and he naure, scope and inerconneced-
ness of he aciviies of he company.20
If he Council makes he final deerminaion, a nonbank
financial company has 30 days from receip of noice o
seek judicial review in he .. Disric Cour for he Disric
of Columbia (he D.C. Disric Cour) or he judicial disric in
which he home office of such nonbank financial company is
locaed.21 Review of he Councils final deerminaion is limied
o wheher such deerminaion was arbirary and capricious.
Large Bank Holding Companies. A bank holdin company
wih reaer han $50 billion22 in consolidaed asses is auo-
maically subjec o enhanced supervision by he Board of
governors.23 Noably, his sipulaion includes any eniy (or
successor eniy) ha was a bank holdin company havin
oal consolidaed asses of a leas $50 billion as of January
1, 2010, and received financial assisance under or parici-
paed in he Capial Purchase Proram esablished under he
troubled Asse Relief Proram24 (tARP). the Ac provides
an opporuniy for such bank holdin company o appeal his
reamen before he Council, bu he decision o ran an
appeal is o be made by he Council and requires a wo-hirds
18 H.R. 4173, 113(a)(1)-(2); H.R. 4173, 113(b)(1)-(2).19 H.R . 4173, 113(e). If a nonbank financial company does no
make a imely reques for a hearin, he Council will noify suchcompany, in wriin, of he final deerminaion of he Councilno laer han 10 days afer he dae by which he company mayreques a hearin. H.R. 4173, 113(e)(4).
20 H.R. 4173, 113(a)(2), (b)(2).21 H.R. 4173, 113(h).22 the Board, pursuan o a recommendaion by he Council, may
esablish a hreshold above $50 billion. H.R. 4173, 165(a)(2)(B).23 H.R. 4173, 165(a)(1), (a)(2).24 H.R. 4173, 117.
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voe in favor of ranin an appeal.25 If he Council denies an
appeal, i mus reevaluae ha decision a leas annually.
Anti-Evasion. In order o avoid evasion of enhanced supervi-
sion and prudenial sandards, he Ac includes an umbrella
provision applicable o any company ha poses a hrea o
he financial sabiliy of he . ., based on he facors o be
considered for subjecin a nonbank financial company o
supervision by he Board of governors. to apply he ani-
evasion provision, he Council mus make a deerminaion,
by wo-hirds majoriy includin an af firmaive voe by he
Chairperson of he Council, ha:
the company poses a hrea o he financial sabiliy of
he .., based on consideraion of he above menioned
facors;
the company is oranized or operaes in such a manner
as o evade he applicaion of his ile of he Ac; and
uch financial aciviies of he company will be supervised
by he Board of governors and subjec o prudenial san-
dards in accordance wih he ile of he Ac.26
Companies subjec o he Acs ani-evasion provision are
eniled he same opporuniy for review as described above
for he decision o subjec a nonbank financial company
o enhanced supervision by he Board of governors. pon
makin such a deerminaion, he Council mus submi a
repor o he appropriae commiees of Conress deail-
in he reasons for makin such deerminaion. In order o
faciliae supervision, he Board of governors may require
such company o esablish an inermediae holdin com-
pany for purposes of conducin he companys aciviies
ha are financial in naure or incidenal hereo.27
25 H.R. 4173, 117(c).26 H.R. 4173, 113(c).27 H.R. 4173, 113(c)(3).
MITIgATIon oF RIsks To FInAncIAl sTAbIlITy
Alon wih he aforemenioned powers over bank hold-
in companies wih consolidaed asses of a leas $50 bil-
lion and nonbank financial companies supervised by he
Board of governors, he Board of governors is also iven
he auhoriy o impose on such companies exraordinary
measures o miiae risk. the Board of governors, in con-
sulaion wih he Council, mus firs provide such a com-
pany wrien noice ha i is bein considered for miiaory
acion pursuan o his secion of he Ac, includin an expla-
naion of he basis for, and descripion of, he proposed mii-
aory acion. uch company will be iven an opporuniy for
a hearin before he Board of governors. ubsequen o he
hearin, he Board of governors mus noify he company
wihin 60 days of is final decision, includin he resuls of
he voe by he Council. pon an affirmaive voe by wo-
hirds of he Council, he Board of governors can impose he
followin measures on such company:
Limi he abiliy of he company o mere wih, acquire,
consolidae wih, or oherwise become affiliaed wih
anoher company;
Resric he companys abiliy o offer a financial produc
or producs;
terminae one or more aciviies;
Impose condiions on he manner in which he company
conducs one or more aciviies; and
ell or oherwise ransfer asses or off-balance-shee
iems o unaffiliaed eniies, if he Board of governors
deermines ha such oher acions are inadequae o mii-
ae a hrea o he financial sabiliy of he .. 28
28 H.R. 4173, 121.
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obsERvATIons
the Council possesses sinifican power o inervene in
he .. economy in he even i deermines an insiuion
poses a hrea o he overall economy. this power includes
he abiliy o order an examinaion of any bank or nonbank
financial company, subjec hem o enhanced supervi-
sion, and, under cerain circumsances, order he eniy
o cease doin business or sell isel f. I can also apply o
he financial aciviies of any oher company o he exen
he Council deermines hey pose a hrea o he .. finan-
cial sysem. this siuaion could have a sinifican impac
on he way invesors and oher eniies inerac wih cer-
ain banks or oher companies hey feel mih be a risk
o bein subjec o scruiny by he Council, and i is com-
pounded by he reamen of cerain unsecured crediors
under he liquidaion auhoriy in he even he Council
orders a liquidaion of an insiuion. (this opic is dis-
cussed in more deail under he Orderly Liquidaion
Auhoriy ecion.) Furher, i is difficul o believe ha
he Council would be able o successfully idenify risks o
he financial sysem and effecively eliminae hese risks
before i was oo lae wihou creain some deree of
panic jus by virue of he fac ha i was akin acion.
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amoun of coninen capial converible ino equiy in imes
of financial sress. the Chairman of he Council is also
required o carry ou a sudy of he economic effecs of re-
ulaory limiaions inended o reduce sysemic risk under
ecion 123 of he Ac. Implemenin his would have been
much more feasible, less cosly, and less burdensome o he
reulaors and he indusry wihou he Amendmen reard-
in hybrid insrumens.
Stress Tests. In deerminin capial adequacy, he Federal
Reserve, in conjuncion wih he oher bank reulaory aen-
cies and he FIO, mus conduc annual sress ess under
baseline, adverse, and severely adverse condiions wih
respec o any company wih consolidaed asses of $50 bil-
lion or more. All bank holdin companies or oher financial
companies wih consolidaed asses of $10 billion or more
ha are reulaed by a primary federal financial reulaory
aency also mus conduc annual sress ess and repor
he resuls o he Federal Reserve and is primary federal
reulaory aency. Reulaions are o be developed by he
reulaory aencies. I would no be surprisin o see reu-
laors also requirin sress esin of smaller insiuions.
Leverage Limits. Bank holdin companies wih consolidaed
asses of $50 billion or more, and Federal Reserve super-
vised nonbank financial companies, may mainain a deb
o equiy raio of no more han 15 o 1 upon a deerminaion
by he Council ha he company poses a rave hrea o
he financial sabiliy of he nied aes, and ha such a
requiremen is necessary o miiae he risks o he coun-
rys financial sabiliy.
Short-Term Debt. the Federal Reserve may prescribe re-
ulaions limiin he amoun of shor erm deb, includin
off-balance-shee exposures, ha may be accumulaed by
any bank holdin company wih consolidaed asses of $50
billion or more and any supervised nonbank financial com-
pany. the Federal Reserve may impose reulaions and
issue exempions under his provision.
Off-Balance-Sheet Exposures. ecion 165(k) requires bank
holdin companies wih asses of $50 billion or more and
Federal Reserve supervised nonbank financial companies
o have capial ha akes ino accoun off-balance-shee
aciviies. Off-balance-shee aciviies include direc credi
subsiues, irrevocable leers of credi, risk paricipaions
in bankers accepances, purchase areemens, asse sales
wih recourse aains he seller, ineres rae and credi
swaps, commodiies and forward conracs, securiies con-
racs, and oher aciviies or ransacions ha he federal
bankin aencies may define by rule. However, i is unclear
why his provision is needed when i could be covered by
risk-based capial rules.
Prudential Standards. For bank holdin companies wih
more han $50 billion in asses and cerain nonbank finan-
cial companies, he Federal Reserve mus esablish risk-
based capial requiremens and leverae limis, unless
i deermines, in consulaion wih he Council, ha such
requiremens are inappropriae. Furher, he Federal Reserve
is required o impose liquidiy requiremens, overall risk
requiremens, resoluion plan, and credi exposure require-
mens and concenraion limis.
Well-Capitalized and Well-Managed Requirements
Expanded. In addiion o he curren requiremen for heir
bankin subsidiaries, bankin and hrif holdin compa-
nies are required o be well capialized and well manaed
in order o enae in cerain expanded financial aciviies
under he BHC Ac. Likewise, where a holdin company pro-
poses o acquire a bank across sae lines , he are bank
mus be well capialized and well manaed under he Ac,
raher han jus adequaely capialized and adequaely
manaed, as currenly required. Inersae bank merers
also require he resulin eniy o be well capialized and
well manaed, raher han only adequaely capialized and
adequaely manaed, as currenly required.
Countercyclical Capital. thrif holdin companies will
be subjec o capial requiremens for he firs ime under
ecion 616 of he Ac. the Federal Reserve is required o
esablish counercyclical capial raio requiremens for
bank and hrif holdin companies ha will increase capi-
al needed in imes of economic expansion and decrease
capial in imes of economic conracion, consisen wih
he safey and soundness of he company. Addiionally, he
Ac requires bank and hrif holdin companies, and oher
companies ha conrol banks, o serve as source[s] of
financial srenh for heir bankin subsidiaries. Wihin wo
years of enacmen, he respecive federal bankin aen-
cies reulain hese companies will issue rules o ef fec
his requiremen.
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Capital Formation. Alhouh here is much in he Ac ha
requires capial, here is lile ha promoes is forma-
ion EC is direced o chane Reulaion D o require ha
accredied invesors have a minimum ne worh of a leas
$1 million, exclusive of he value of heir primary residence,
ne of any morae deb. One provision ha may be help-
ful is conained in ecion 989(g). this amends ecion 404
of he arbanes-Oxley Ac of 2002 by delein he inernal
conrols esin and aesaion requiremens wih respec o
any audi repor prepared for filers ha are no considered
lare acceleraed or acceleraed filers. this may help facil-
iae capial raisin by smaller companies ha have found
ecion 404 o be unduly expensive and burdensome.
AcquIsITIons And oTHER ExPAnsIon
AcTIvITIEsBank and Nonbank Expansion. Bank holdin companies will
find heir freedom o enae in financial aciviies somewha
resriced. Prior Federal Reserve approval is now required of
holdin company acquisiions of nonbank companies whose
oal consolidaed asses o be acquired exceed $10 billion.
these acquisiions are now subjec o prior Federal Reserve
approval; Har-co-Rodino Ac noices will be required
reardless of Federal Reserve approval.
BHC Ac and Bank Merer Ac (BMA) ransacions will now
be subjec o an addiional sauory facor ha he approv-
in aency mus consider he risks posed o he sabiliy of
he .. bankin or financial sysem by any poenial merer
or acquisiion of a bank or nonbank.
concEnTRATIon lIMITs on AcquIsITIons
the Ac requires he Council o conduc a sudy wihin six
monhs of enacmen reardin he exen o which he con-
cenraion limis under new ecion 14 of he BHC Ac would
affec he followin:
Financial sabiliy;
Moral hazard in he financial sysem;
the efficiency and compeiiveness of .. financial firms
and financial markes; and
the cos and availabiliy of credi and oher financial ser-
vices o households and businesses in he ..
the sudy will make recommendaions as o wheher oher
concenraion limis would more effecively implemen
ecion 14, and wheher a limiaion on he concenraion
of liabiliies in he conex of any merer, consolidaion, or
acquisiion would be appropriae.
the Federal Reserve is o adop reulaions wihin nine
monhs of compleion of he Councils sudy, and in accor-
dance wih he Councils recommendaions. Financial com-
panies, banks, includin deposiory insiuion holdin
companies (such as forein banks reulaed as holdin
companies), and supervised nonbank financial companies
(collecively, for purposes of hese concenraion limis,
financial companies) would be prohibied from merin
wih or acquirin any oher financial company if he oal
resulin liabiliies of he bank exceed 10 percen of he
areae consolidaed liabiliies of all financial insiuions
in he .. as of he end of he precedin calendar year.
For purposes of he BHC Ac, ecion 14, liabiliies are cal-
culaed differenly for .. financial companies and forein
based financial companies. For .. financial companies,
liabiliies are he oal of risk-weihed asses of he finan-
cial company under he risk-based capial rules, less he
oal reulaory capial of he company under such risk-
based rules. For forein insiuions, liabiliies are he oal
risk-weihed asses of he .. operaions of he financial
company as deermined under he risk-based capial rules,
less he oal reulaory capial of he . . operaions of he
financial company as deermined under such risk-based
rules. upervised nonbank financial companies and insur-
ance companies will have heir applicable liabiliies deer-
mined by he pendin Federal Reserve reulaion.
Inersae merers under he BMA are also resriced where
he applican, upon consummaion of he ransacion,
would conrol or already conrols more han 10 percen of
he oal amoun of deposis of insured deposiory insiu-
ions in he ..
these concenraion limis are empered by excepions in
he case of acquisiions of defaulin banks, FDIC-assised
ransacions, and acquirin companies ha experience only
a de minimis increase in heir individual liabiliies as a resul
of he ransacion.
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govERnAncE
the Ac provides for overnance of public companies,
includin shareholder access. pecific overnance provi-
sions are made applicable o bank holdin companies,
paricularly he lares bank holdin companies by ecion
165(h). the Federal Reserve is required o issue reulaions
requirin each bank holdin company ha is publicly raded
and has oal consolidaed asses of no less han $10 billion
o esablish a risk commiee. upervised nonbank financial
companies are also required o esablish a risk commiee
no laer han one year afer he receip of a final deermi-
naion and will be supervised as such under ecion 113 of
he Ac. the Federal Reserve also may require each publicly
raded bank holdin company ha has consolidaed asses
of less han $10 billion o esablish a risk commiee.
the risk commiees are required o:
Be responsible for he oversih of enerprise-wide risk
manaemen;
Include he number of independen direcors deermined
by he Federal Reserve as appropriae, based upon he
companys naure of operaions, size of asses and oher
appropriae crieria; and
Include a leas one risk manaemen exper havin expe-
rience and idenifyin, assessin, and manain risk
exposures of lare, complex firms.
the Federal Reserve will issue rules, which will ake effec
no laer han 15 monhs afer he ransfer dae of Ot
auhoriies o he oher federal bank reulaory aencies.
the risk manaemen exper is similar o he arbanes-
Oxley Ac financial exper. I will be ineresin o see who
qualifies under he Federal Reserves rules.
nonbAnk bAnks And TEMPoRARy
MoRAToRIuM on FdIc APPRovAlsthe Ac prohibis he FDIC from approvin, hrouh July 21 ,
2013, deposi insurance for a credi card bank, an indus-
rial bank, or a rus bank, as hese erms are defined in he
BHC Ac (collecively, nonbank banks). imilarly, he federal
bankin aencies are prohibied from approvin a chane
of conrol of a nonbank bank, excep where he nonbank
bank is in daner of defaul, as a resul of a combinaion of
a paren company or in connecion wih he acquisiion of
voin shares of a publicly raded paren company where
he acquirin roup owns less han 25 percen of any class
of voin securiies.
I is surprisin ha afer he indusrial bank moraorium ha
lased several years and he relucance of he FDIC o ran
insurance o nonbank banks, ha a furher moraorium is
needed. this will resric new enrans ino he markes for
he services provided by hese insiuions, limi he avail-
abiliy of credi o consumers ha may be available hrouh
indusrial banks and credi card banks, and will hinder he
abiliy of various paricipans in he credi card indusry from
sellin heir credi card banks or porfolios. ince he com-
mencemen of he credi crisis, various insiuions have
announced a oal of sellin heir credi card porfolios ,
especially hose of privae label credi cards.
the Comproller general is also requirin a sudy of elimi-
nain he nonbank bank exempions from he BHC Acs
coverae of banks. this sudy mus also sae he conse-
quences and desirabiliy of applyin BHC Ac reulaions o
hrifs. this repor is due no laer han 18 monhs afer he
enacmen of he Ac.
Credi card banks ha are no deemed banks for BHC
Ac purposes will be allowed o expand heir permis-
sible aciviies o issue credi cards o businesses eliible
for BA loans, whereas now hey can only exend credi o
consumers.
sEcuRITIEs HoldIng coMPAnIEs
Bank holdin companies will no loner be able o reiser
o be supervised by he EC under rules promulaed by
he EC applicable o invesmen bank holdin companies.
Insead, he Ac replaces he elecive invesmen bank hold-in company framework currenly available under EC rules
wih a securiies holdin company sysem ha allows an
invesmen bank holdin company wihou a bank or a sav-
ins associaion affiliae o reiser o be supervised by he
Federal Reserve. this chane accommodaes securiies
holdin companies ha are required by forein reulaors
o be subjec o comprehensive consolidaed supervision.
nder his reime:
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ecuriies holdin companies are subjec o capial and
risk-manaemen requiremens se forh by he Federal
Reserve on an individual basis;
the Federal Reserve may examine he securiies holdin
company and any nonbank affiliae and impose record
keepin requiremens; and
ecuriies holdin companies are subjec o applicable
secions of he BHC Ac and cerain provisions of he
FDIA.
ExAMInATIons And REPoRTIng
the reporin requiremens of ecion 5 of he BHC Ac are
expanded o include compliance by bank holdin compa-
nies and heir nonbank subsidiaries wih all oher applicable
provisions of federal law. the Federal Reserves examina-
ion auhoriy is expanded o include no only he safey
and soundness of a bank holdin company or any deposi-
ory insiuion subsidiary, bu also he sabiliy of he coun-
rys financial sysem, as well as moniorin compliance wih
applicable laws oher han consumer laws covered by he
Bureau of Consumer Financial Proecion.
the Federal Reserve is furher required o provide reason-
able noice o and consul wih he appropriae federal
bankin aencies, he EC, and he Commodiy Fuures
tradin Commission (he CFtC), or sae reulaory aen-cies wih respec o holdin company subsidiaries ha are
deposiory insiuions or are funcionally reulaed subsid-
iaries before i commences an examinaion. uch examina-
ions mus be conduced in he same manner, subjec o he
same sandards and wih he same frequency as would be
required if such aciviies were conduced in a lead insured
deposiory insiuion subsidiary of he holdin company.
the bank reulaory aencies powers over holdin compa-
nies are expanded dramaically. In he even ha he FederalReserve does no conduc hese nonbank subsidiary exami-
naions as required, he primary federal bankin aency for
he lead insured deposiory insiuion may recommend ha
he Federal Reserve perform he examinaion. However, if
he Federal Reserve does no bein is examinaion, or does
no provide an appropriae explanaion or plan respondin
o he concerns raised, wihin 60 days afer receivin such
noice, he lead insured deposiory insiuions reulaor
may examine he aciviies of he nonbank subsidiary as if i
were a deposiory insiuion. A fee may be chared by he
appropriae federal bankin aency for any examinaion.
Recommendaions for enforcemen acion may be made as
a resul of such examinaion by anoher federal bank reula-
ory aency o he Federal Reserve. If he Federal Reserve
does no ake enforcemen acion accepable o he federal
bank reulaor ha made he recommendaion, he bank
reulaory aency may ake he recommended enforcemen
acion aains he non-deposiory insiuions subsidiary as
if i were an insured deposiory insiuion.
cHARTER convERsIons
troubled banks and federal savins associaions will
encouner more difficuly in converin heir saus as sae,
naional, or federal associaions, as applicable. Banks oper-
ain under a cease and desis order or memorandum of
undersandin wih any federal or sae reulaory auhor-
iy concernin any sinifican supervisory maer will no
be allowed o conver heir charer o chane heir reula-
or, wihou approvals from boh he federal bank reulaory
aency ha would overn he resulin eniy and he reu-
laory aency issuin he cease and desis order or memo-
randum of undersandin.
gEnERAl sTudy oF bAnkIng AcTIvITIEs
Wihin 18 monhs of enacmen, he appropriae federal
bankin aencies shall joinly review aciviies ha bankin
eniies may enae in and repor o Conress. the repor
will cover he risks posed by various aciviies in which a
bankin eniy may enae and he relaed risk miiaion
aciviies underaken by bankin eniies. the federal bank
aencies will draw conclusions abou he appropriaeness
of he aciviies and he neaive effecs such aciviies
mih have on he safey and soundness of he .. financial
sysem, and any addiional resricions on hese aciviies
ha may be necessary.
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lEndIng lIMITs
the Ac allows insured sae-charered banks o enae in
derivaive ransacions, only if he applicable sae law akes
ino consideraion credi exposure o derivaive ransac-
ions as par of sae lendin. the Ac expressly menions
derivaives, sales of asses under areemens o repur-
chase, and securiies lendin in he lis of credi exensions
o which esablished naional bank lendin limis apply. the
Ac also limis loans o insiders by addin credi exposure
o an insider arisin from a derivaive ransacion, securiies
lendin or borrowin ransacion, and repurchase or reverse
repurchase areemen o he definiion of credi exen-
sions prohibied by he Federal Reserve Ac.
AFFIlIATE TRAnsAcTIons
the Ac furher limis banks ransacions wih heir affili-
aes. the definiion of affiliae under ecion 23A of he
Federal Reserve Ac is expanded o include invesmen
advisers, wihou any reference o such persons bein re-
isered under he .. Invesmen Advisers Ac of 1940 (he
Invesmen Advisers Ac). For he sales of asses wih
areemens o repurchase, he lendin of securiies and
derivaive ransacions are added o he lis of ransacions
ha mus be fully secured by appropriae collaeral a all
imes. the Federal Reserve is auhorized o deermine howa nein areemen may be aken ino accoun when deer-
minin he amoun of a covered ransacion wih an affiliae,
and herefore wheher a ransacion is fully secured.
the Federal Reserves auhoriy o ran exempions under
ecion 23A and 23B of he Federal Reserve Ac and simi-
lar provisions of ecion 11 of he Home Owners Loan Ac
(HOLA), is limied, paricularly wih respec o ransacions
wih financial subsidiaries, which are expressly prohibied.
Durin he credi crisis, he Federal Reserve issued waivers ofhese provisions o many bankin oranizaions wih respec
o heir capial markes operaions. transacions wih hede
funds and privae equiy funds are especially limied, as dis-
cussed more fully in he secion on he Volcker Rule.
transacions wih insiders, includin asse purchases and
sales, are also resriced unless hese are on marke erms,
and, if he ransacion represens more han 10 percen of
he capial sock and surplus of a bank, are approved by a
majoriy of disineresed direcors.
InTERMEdIATE HoldIng coMPAnIEs
If a randfahered uniary hrif holdin company conducs
aciviies oher han financial aciviies, he Federal Reserve
may require such company o esablish and conduc all or a
porion of is financial aciviies in or hrouh an inermedi-
ae holdin company, which shall be a hrif holdin com-
pany. uch requiremen may be implemened by he Federal
Reserve no laer han 90 days afer he ransfer dae of he
Ot auhoriies o he Federal Reserve and he oher appro-
priae bank reulaory aencies. A randfahered uniary
hrif holdin company also may be required o esablish
an inermediae holdin company, if he Federal Reserve
deermines ha such inermediae holdin company is nec-
essary o appropriaely supervise is financial aciviies or o
ensure ha Federal Reserve supervision does no exend
o he non-financial aciviies of ha eniys paren com-
pany. Inernal financial aciviies, such as reasury, inves-
men, and employee benefi funcions, are no required o
be placed in an inermediae holdin company. Imporanly,
a randfahered uniary hrif holdin company ha conrolsan inermediae holdin company mus serve as a source
of srenh o is subsidiary inermediae holdin company,
and mus also be examined by, and repor o, he Federal
Reserve, includin informaion needed by he Federal
Reserve o assess he abiliy of he ulimae paren company
o serve as his source of srenh. the Federal Reserve
reains full enforcemen powers wih respec o he ulimae
paren company as if i were a hrif holdin company and
violaions may be reaed as violaions of he FDI Ac. the
Federal Reserve will also esablish reulaions reardin hecrieria for requirin an inermediae holdin company and
providin resricions or limiaions on ransacions beween
an inermediae holdin company or a paren of such com-
pany and is affiliaes.
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conFlIcTs oF InTEREsT In sEcuRITIzATIonTRAnsAcTIons
the ecuriies Ac of 1933 (he ecuriies Ac) is amended
o preven underwriers, placemen aens, iniial purchas-
ers, and sponsors of asse-backed securiies from enain
any ransacion ha would resul in a conflic of ineres forone year afer he closin of he asse-backed securiy sale.
this prohibiion will no apply o:
Risk-miiain hedin aciviies desined o reduce risk
o he underwrier, placemen aen, iniial purchaser, or
sponsor of he purchased asse-backed securiies in rela-
ion o hose securiies;
Purchases or sales of asse-backed securiies made con-
sisen wih he underwriers placemen aens, iniial
purchasers, or sponsors commimen o provide liquidiy
for he asse-backed securiy; or
Purchases or sales of asse-backed securiies made
consisen wih he underwrier, placemen aen, iniial
purchaser, or sponsors bona fide marke-makin wih
respec o he asse-backed securiy.
obsERvATIons
the chanes in reulaions of deposiory insiuions and
heir holdin companies are a surprisinly small par of
he Ac. Noneheless, hese will require subsanial sud-
ies and rulemakin aciviies and considerable saff ime
a each of he bank reulaory aencies. ome of he
hornier issues will include coninen capial and coun-
ercyclical capial, which will be diff icul o implemen in a
pracical manner. Examinaions and reporin will also be
more difficul and will involve increased reulaory overlap
and poenial conflic.
the lendin limis se forh in he Ac require sae banks o
ake ino accoun off-balance-shee and derivaive ransac-
ions ha may require addiional sae leislaion and will
affec wild card provisions in sae laws reardin lendin
limis. Affiliae ransacion resricions are increased under
various provisions of he Ac, includin he Volcker Rule, and
will require considerable rulemakin and inerpreaion.
Durin a ime when he saffs of he various bank reula-
ory aencies are sreched due o he sressed naure of
he sysem, considerable addiional resources will have o
be added and devoed o sudies and wriin reulaions.
We hope ha hese added responsibiliies will no diver he
reulaory saff from heir already more han full-ime jobs
dealin wih pressin issues in he bankin sysem ha have
and will coninue o exis reardless of he Ac.
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THE collIns AMEndMEnTnEWcAPITAl RulEs undER THE AcTthe Collins Amendmen (he Amendmen) is ecion 171
of he Ac. I applies bank capial sandards o oher finan-
cial services companies, includin bank and hrif holdin
companies. the Amendmen was promoed by he FDIC
and hihlihed by he FDIC press release on he passae
of he Ac. Alhouh raionalized from is oriinal form, he
Amendmen reduces he ypes of capial ha coun for
reulaory purposes. the Amendmen and he oher capi-
al provisions in he Ac are amon he more sinifican and
poenially cosly and disrupive provisions of he Ac.
bAckgRound
the Federal Deposi Insurance Corporaion Improvemens
Ac of 1991 (FDICIA) added ecion 38 o he FDI Ac o
esablish a promp correcive acion (PCA) se of rules
applicable o FDIC-insured banks. the PCA auhorized he
applicable federal bank reulaors o esablish five capi-
al caeories ranin from well capialized o criically
undercapialized. As insured deposiary insiuions capial
fell hrouh hese caeories, hey became subjec o ever
reaer resricions in heir aciviies. Banks ha became
criically undercapialized and were unable o raise capi-
al were required o be placed in FDIC receivership. Bank
reulaors were auhorized o issue PCA direcives requirin
undercapialized banks o raise capial or sell wihin 30 days.
PCA direcives are usually deah senencesmos recipi-
ens are placed in receivership and many imes he recipi-
ens board of direcors consens o a receivership a he
ime a PCA direcive is received. the PCA reime refleced
he sense of he Conress in FDICIA ha i was less cosly o
he FDIC deposi insurance fund o close srulin banks
sooner.
the PCA reime applies only o FDIC-insured deposiory
insiuions and no o heir holdin companies. the Board
of governors of he Federal Reserve ysem has applied
capial rules o bank holdin companies similar o he PCA
capial sandards. Bank holdin companies were able o
use a broader rane of capial insrumens han banks.
avins and loan holdin companies did no have sepa-
rae capial sandards, nor did companies ha conrolled
indusrial banks, credi card banks, and oher eniies ha
were FDIC-insured bu were no banks under he BHC
Ac, as amended. Ofen he Of fice of he Comproller of he
Currency (OCC) or FDIC required he parens of such non-
bank banks o ener ino capial mainenance or capial and
liquidiy mainenance areemens (CALMAs), which had
similar, and ofen more srinen, effecs as bank holdin
company and bank capial reulaions.
THE AMEndMEnT
the Amendmen applies he enerally applicable PCA lever-
ae and risk-based capial sandards (he enerally appli-
cable sandards) on a consolidaed basis o:
Insured deposiory insiuions;
Deposiory insiuion holdin companies (holdin com-
panies); and
Nonbank financial companies supervised (supervised
financial companies) by he Federal Reserve as a resul
of he Ac.
these sandards will be esablished by he appropriae fed-
eral bankin aency, which enerally is is primary federal
reulaor. the enerally applicable sandards will be floors
for he sandards se by he reulaors, and canno be lesshan he curren PCA sandards for insured deposiory
insiuions.
EFFEcTIvE dATEs
the Amendmen applies o any deb or equiy issued by
holdin companies and supervised financial companies on
or afer May 19, 2010. For insrumens issued prior o May 19,
2010, he followin apply o he deducions required by his
secion [171]:
A phase-in, incremenally over . . . 3 years beinnin
January 1, 2013, enerally;
No capial deducions are required for holdin compa-
nies wih less han $15 billion of consolidaed asses and
muual holdin companies, each esed as of May 19, 2010;
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As o any holdin company no supervised by he Federal
Reserve as of May 19, 2010, he effecive dae is five years
afer enacmen of he Ac, excep as o ubsecions 171(b)
(4)(A) and (B);
For BHC subsidiaries of forein bankin oranizaions
ha have relied on Federal Reserve R01-1, he effecive
dae is five years afer enacmen of he Ac, excep for
ubsecion 171(b)(4)(A).
ExcEPTIons
the Amendmen does no apply o:
Capial insrumens issued o he treasury or any oher
overnmen aency prior o Ocober 4, 2010 pursuan o
tARP;
Any Federal Home Loan Bank;
Any small BHC subjec o he Federal Reserves mall
Bank Holdin Company Policy aemen (he small BHC
policy) applicable o BHCs wih $500 million or less of
consolidaed coss; or
Forein oranizaions ha own or conrol a .. holdin
company.
sTudIEs
ecion 174 of he Ac direcs he Comproller general,
in consulaion wih federal bank reulaors o sudy and
repor, wihin 18 monhs of he enacmen of he Ac, on (i)
hybrid capial insrumens includin rus-preferred securi-
ies (hybrid securiies) for bankin insiuions and bank
holdin companies (he Hybrid Capial udy) and (ii) he
capial requiremens of .. holdin companies (inermedi-
ae holdin companies) ha are conrolled by forein banks
(he Inermediae HC udy).
the Hybrid Capial udy mus consider many of he hins
already mandaed by ecion 171, includin:
the curren use of hybrid securiies as tier 1 capial;
Differences in capial componens for banks and holdin
companies, and heir respecive benefis and risks;
the economic effec of prohibiin hybrid insrumens as
tier 1 capial;
Reviewin he consequences of disqualifyin rus-pre-
ferred securiies and wheher i could lead o he failures
or undercapializaion of bankin oranizaions;
Inernaional compeiive effecs of prohibiin hybrid
securiies as tier 1 capial;
the availabiliy of capial for insiuions wih less han $10
billion of oal asses; and
Any oher effecs or financial sysem safey and sound-
ness and poenial economic effecs.
the Inermediae HC udy will consider:
Curren Federal Reserve policy reardin inermediae
companies;
Naional reamen and compeiive opporuniies for for-
ein banks in he ..;
Forein banks home counry capial sandards compared
o .. capial sandards;
Poenial forein reulaory effecs on .. bankin ora-
nizaions operain abroad;
Effecs on he cos and availabiliy of credi in he ..;
and
Oher economic effecs and effecs on safey and
soundness.
Anoher sudy is called for by ecion 174 of he Ac. this
ecion direcs he Comproller general, afer consula-
ion wih he federal bank reulaors, o sudy smaller (in
his case, financial companies wih consolidaed asses of
$5 billion or less) deposiory insiuions access o he capi-
al markes. the repor will be made o he House Financial
ervices Commiee and he enae Bankin Commiees,
and will include recommendaions for leislaive or reula-
ory acion ha would enhance smaller insiuions access
o capial consisen wih safey and soundness.
REgulATIons
the Federal Reserve will need o revise is holdin com-
pany capial reulaions in he Appendices o Reulaion Y
(Re. Y), and implemen sandards for hrif holdin com-
panies when he Ots auhoriy over such companies is
ransferred o he Federal Reserve under tile III of he Ac.
the federal bank reulaors are also required, subjec o
he recommendaions of he Council, o develop addiional
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Issuers wih ousandin securiies ha will be phased ou
as tier 1 componens under ecion 171 may wan o wai
for he udies and Federal Reserve rule chanes before
makin a decision on redempion. the Ac poenially
has creaed muliple capial evens ha would permi
redempion, if he rus-preferred securiies are no oher-
wise redeemable.
All oranizaions subjec o enforcemen acions and
capial plans will wan o updae heir plans early o avoid
surprise and beer conrol heir desinies. the phase-
ou and phase-ins under ecion 171 provide opporuni-
ies for beer plannin, alhouh he bank reulaors may
become more skepical of capial componens limied by
ecion 171.
mall BHCs will wan o ensure ha heir capial srucures
are mainained.
Conress should consider direcin he Comproller
general o sudy he Acs effecs upon smaller holdin
companies up o $15 billion in asses, and add an inflaion
adjusmen o any rulemakin.
the Ac reverses he Federal Reserves lon-sandin rule
of allowin insiuions ha are no inernaionally acive
o issue larer amouns of rus-preferred securiies as a
percenae of tier 1 capial.
Forein bankin oranizaions will wan o consider he
capial srucure of heir Inermediae HCs, and wheher
i may be advanaeous or no o allow heir Inermediae
HCs o raise capial and funds in he .. and oher mar-
kes. Cerain forein oranizaions may deermine no o
remain .. reisrans owin o he new limis on tier 1
capial insrumens available o he Inermediae HCs
under he Ac.
All bankin and financial services companies subjec o
he Amendmen will wan o closely monior reulaory
rulemakin in heir area, and plan alernaive capial sruc-
ures o operae bes wih he final decisions made under
he Ac, and in lih of poenial fuure raionalizaion of he
Amendmen and reulaions when he udies are due.
All insiuio