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MOVING ‘EAST’ OR ‘WEST’?Jeffrey C. Dixon a , Yetkin Borlu b & Duygu Kasdoğan c

a Department of Sociology, College of the Holy Cross,Worcester, MA, USAb Department of Agricultural Economics and RuralSociology, The Pennsylvania State University,University Park, PA, USAc York University, Toronto, CanadaPublished online: 14 Dec 2011.

To cite this article: Jeffrey C. Dixon , Yetkin Borlu & Duygu Kasdoğan (2011): MOVING‘EAST’ OR ‘WEST’?, European Societies, DOI:10.1080/14616696.2011.638085

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MOVING ‘EAST’ OR ‘WEST’?Examining liberal-democratic values in Turkey,

2000� 2008

Jef frey C. DixonDepartment of Sociology, College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, MA, USA

Yetkin BorluDepartment of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Pennsylvania State University,

University Park, PA, USA

Duygu KasdoganYork University, Toronto, Canada

ABSTRACT: In light of debates over the compatibility of Islam and

democracy, their importance in the EU candidate state of Turkey which has

been led by the religious-based Justice and Development Party (JDP) since

2002, and the paucity of research examining liberal-democratic valuechange, we examine liberal-democratic value change and its sources in

Turkey between 2000 and 2008. The results of our descriptive, factor, and

multivariate analyses of European and World Values Survey data (2000,

2001, 2007, and 2008) indicate that despite Huntington’s (1996) and

Turkish secularists’ pessimism, people in Turkey have not adopted more

politically religious values during this time. However, personal expressions of

religiosity are on the rise, and they are intertwined with politically religious

values to some extent. People in Turkey have generally adopted lesspolitically authoritarian values, but they are more supportive of military rule

in 2008 than before the JDP came to power. Ethnic tolerance peaked in 2007

but declined below its 2001 level in 2008. While human development theory

helps to explain these trends and values, the case of Turkey reveals that

other, more political factors � such as nationalism � may counteract liberal-

democratic value change. The results are suggestive of a political realign-

ment in Turkey that transcends a secular-religious divide. They further

suggest that Turkey is moving neither ‘East’ nor ‘West’; rather, it is verymuch moving in its own direction.

Key words: Muslim; democratization; development; modernization;

values; enlargement

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2011.638085 1

European SocietiesiFirst 2011: 1� 27

– 2011Taylor & Francis

ISSN1461-6696 print

1469-8307 online

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1. Introduction

Reinvigorated by the 9/11 attacks on the USA, bombings in Europe, andthe US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the debate over the compat-ibility of Islam and democracy continues to rage. Many European Union(EU) elites and residents believe that Turkey’s proposed EU entryrepresents a clash between Turkish and ‘European’ values, includingChristianity (e.g., Dixon 2008; Strasser 2008). Former Belgian PrimeMinister Herman Van Rompuy said:

An expansion of the EU to include Turkey cannot be considered as just

another expansion as in the past. The universal values which are in force in

Europe, and which are also fundamental values of Christianity, will lose vigor

with the entry of a large Islamic country such as Turkey. (Waterfield 2009)

Nearly half of EU residents believe that these perceived value differencesshould preclude Turkey’s EU entry (Dixon 2006). Some activist groupsin France have gone so far as to literally strike Turkey from the Europeanmap (Yılmaz 2007); others have circulated pictures of a Muslim womancovered in an EU flag (Kosebalaban 2007). For many, Turkey’s locationwithin an ‘Islamic civilization’ means that its people’s democratic andother values may not converge with Europe’s, with little hope for change(Huntington 1996).

In the context of these debates, research has examined liberal-democraticvalues in Turkey and in the EU as of 2001, along dimensions central to theEU’s Copenhagen Criteria for entry (democracy, rule of law, and minorityrights) (Dixon 2008): People in Turkey held similar evaluations ofdemocracy as people in the EU member and candidate states. However,people in Turkey were more accepting of rule by religious politicians, moreaccepting of authoritarian political values, and less tolerant of minoritiesand immigrants than people in the EU. These value differences were notexplained by Turkey’s location within the Islamic civilization, but rather byTurkey’s lack of economic development relative to the EU.

Nevertheless, much has changed since the above analyses. According toFreedom House (2011), Turkey’s political rights and civil liberties haveimproved between 2000 and 2010. The electoral success of the religious-based, Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 2002, 2007, and 2011,though, seemingly supports Huntington’s (1996) thesis that holds thatreligious identities continue to be prominent in Turkey. The traditionallystrong role of the military may have been eclipsed after another suspectedintervention and its political fallout. Finally, the Turkish state’s relationswith minorities may have been altered by the US-led Iraq war (2003),migration, and EU pressure (Tank 2005; Grigoriadis 2010; see also Dixon

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and Ergin 2010). All of this happened after Turkey experienced a severefinancial crisis in 2001, but rapid economic growth thereafter (Yeldan 2008).

In spite of these changes, previous research has not examined liberal-democratic value change in Turkey (but see Yesilada and Noordijk 2010for trends in tolerance). This oversight has salient political consequencesbecause EU elites and residents continue to believe in Turkish-Europeancultural differences, with some suggesting � like Huntington � that thesedifferences are immutable. This is also theoretically important becauseother social science theories, such as human development theory, suggestthat values may change under certain circumstances (e.g., Inglehart andBaker 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Yet,these theories ignore the particular context of societies and still otherfactors, such as nationalism. And, national identity has not been a focus ofextant survey analyses of Turkey, either (e.g., Tessler and Altinoglu 2004;Toros 2009; Yesilada and Noordijk 2010).

In light of these unanswered questions and their importance, this studyasks two questions: to what extent have liberal democratic values � anti-authoritarianism, ethnic tolerance, and anti-religious rule1 � changed inTurkey between 2000 and 2008?2 Second, what factors explain these valuechanges? To answer these questions, we use descriptive, factor, andmultivariate analyses on four waves of the European and World ValuesSurvey data (2000, 2001, 2007, and 2008).

2. Background

As Inglehart (2000: 96) writes, ‘democracy is not attained simply bymaking institutional changes or through elite-level manoeuvring. Itssurvival depends also on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens’.Scholars have long believed that values are an integral part of democracy(e.g., Lipset 1994). Yet, as a review of the literature indicates, we knowlittle about value change and its sources (Hiltin and Piliavan 2004).

At the heart of this debate is Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilizationsthesis, which holds that inherent and persistent differences between Islamand Western Christianity explain why liberal democracy and relatedvalues are less developed in predominantly Muslim countries. Not onlyhas Huntington’s (1996) thesis been criticized for its monolithic

1. Because previous research has found that Turkey departs from EU states in terms of

these values (Dixon 2008) and comparable measures of democratic evaluations are not

available, we limit our focus to these values.

2. These are the most recent available years available in the EVS/WVS at this time. An

earlier wave is also available, but it is not representative of Turkey due to violence in

the East of Turkey (see Dixon 2008).

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conceptualization of ‘Islamic civilization’ and the assumption that (anunchanging) Islam is the source of undemocratic values, Turkey does notneatly fit into his civilizational classifications. According to Huntington(1996), Turkey is a ‘torn country’. Its leaders have ‘looked to the West’ forliberal-democratic values, but its public may resemble those of otherpredominantly Muslim countries. Huntington’s (1996) thesis thussuggests little possibility of value change in Turkey, except perhaps inthe direction of increasing religious fundamentalism� something that EUpundits and some in Turkey fear.

Human development theory proposes that as societies socioeconomi-cally develop, their people come to accept post-materialistic values,including the liberal-democratic values examined here. This theory hasreceived support across non-Muslim and Muslim societies alike; thus, itrepresents a challenge to Huntington’s (1996) thesis (Inglehart and Norris2003; Norris and Inglehart 2002, 2004). At the individual level, this theoryassumes that people prioritize materialistic before post-materialisticvalues; as such, income and education should be related to more liberal-democratic trends in these values. However, like Huntington’s (1996)thesis, human development theory ignores the particular, historical andchanging context of societies. This is important in the case of Turkeybecause discussion of the military, minorities, and religion are closelylinked to one another as well as to other political factors, such asnationalism.

2.1. The case of Turkey

2.1.1. Authoritarian politics and the military: Turkey’s ‘modernization’project was a largely top-down process with significant military influenceinherited from the Ottoman Empire. It was led by Mustafa Kemal, orAtaturk, who was himself a military commander, Turkey’s first president,and who is viewed by many in Turkey as the leading figure for Turkishmodernization in its early years through today. As the Kemalist ‘guardian’of the Turkish Republic, the military has directly intervened in civilianpolitics on multiple occasions (1960, 1971, and 1980). After the 1980 coup,the National Security Council (NSC) gave the military even more formalpower in civilian affairs. In 1997, the military asked the government tostep down in a ‘post-modern’ coup (Satana 2008). And, there were threatsof another intervention in 2007 (Hurriyet Daily News 2011).

While the military has long occupied an important place in Turkishpolitics, several recent developments have changed its focus. In the wakeof the end of the Cold War, the more ‘post-modern’ Turkish military’sinfluence has been partly driven by a culture of (internal) insecurity, which

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includes perceived internal threats from minorities and religion(Kosebalaban 2002; Satana 2008). The JDP played a role in the waninginfluence of the military, as its election in 2002 and its initial pro-EUstance may have been means by which to undermine the military (Dagı,2005). Aydın and Keyman (2004) claim that with the reforms of the NSCand its (more civilian) composition in 2001, 2003, and 2004, the role of themilitary in politics declined in favour of a more democratic rule.

While recent policy changes in Turkey have moved in a less politicallyauthoritarian direction, it is not clear if values have moved in tandem withthem. In the wake of the Iraqi war (2003), some suggest that nationalism ison the rise in Turkey (Grigoriadis 2010). This is important because asTuran (2007: 338) writes, ‘If not countered by the democratic impulse, theintensification of nationalism might easily open the way for moreauthoritarian politics’.

Support for military rule is but one component of authoritarian values,albeit perhaps the most important in Turkey. On the one hand, Satana(2008: 372) notes, ‘there is a rising trend among the intelligentsia in thelast years toward opposing military interference in politics’, whichsuggests that human developmental factors � especially education �promote anti-authoritarian values. On the other hand, nationalism mayundermine liberal trends in anti-authoritarian values (Turan 2007;Grigoriadis 2010), as well as ethnic tolerance, which is discussed later.

2.1.2. Minority rights: If nationalism was one of the reasons for the fall ofthe Ottoman Empire, it was one of the primary building blocks of theTurkish Republic. In fact, it is one of the six arrows of Mustafa Kemal’sphilosophy, Kemalism (Yegen 2007).3 The Treaty of Sevres (1920) alsohelped spur nationalism in Turkey; this would have reduced the territoryof modern-day Turkey, established an Armenian republic, and granted anautonomous region to the Kurds (Zurcher 2004).

Scholarly and political attention has especially focused on the Kurds,among the ethnic minorities in Turkey. Expressions of ‘Kurdish-ness’ �including in language, education, and even names � were long banned inTurkey (McDowall 2004). During the heyday of Kurdish nationalismin the 1970s, the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan in Kurdish � or, morecommonly known by its initials, PKK � was established and has been inconflict with the Turkish state since 1984 (Zurcher 2004). This conflictevokes Turkish nationalist sentiment and foments intolerance toward theKurds and other minorities in Turkey because of the large number of lives

3. The six arrows of Kemalism are nationalism, republicanism, populism, revolution-

ism/reformism, statism, and secularism (Zurcher 2004: 181�2), but see below for the

meaning of secularism in the Turkish context.

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lost (Barkey and Fuller 1998). And, conflict between Kurds and theTurkish state has not ended: as recently as 2009 the largest pro-Kurdishparty was shut down (Schleifer 2009).4

Today, Turkey faces challenges in an increasingly global context (Dixonand Ergin 2010). The Iraqi war of 1990�1991 increased migration toTurkey (Sirkeci 2005). There is the possibility of more migration in thewake of the most recent Iraqi war (2003), which also raises concerns aboutfurther PKK conflict. However, ‘EU conditionality’ has played a positiverole in Turkey’s human and minority rights policies, especially after itbecame an EU candidate (Kardas 2002; see also Dagı 2001). In line withTurkey’s bid to join the EU, the Turkish state made some reforms in thepast few years to help resolve the Kurdish question; a state-run TV stationmay broadcast in Kurdish for the first time, and Kurdish language isallowed to be taught in some private institutions (Yegen 2007).

Despite these policy changes, scholars still note xenophobia in Turkey �a majority of people in Turkey say that foreigners take our jobs; more thanthree-quarters say that ‘Turks don’t have friends other than Turks’(Carkoglu and Toprak, 2007; Toprak et al. 2009); and prejudice towards theKurds, in particular, is high (Dixon and Ergin 2010). The only study toexamine general tolerance over time in Turkey, though, suggests a recentupswing in tolerance between 1990 and 2005, with income and educationpromoting tolerance, as human development theory would predict(Yesilada and Noordijk 2010). As Turkish history and other studies suggest(e.g., Dixon and Ergin 2010), though, nationalism should be accounted for,as it is likely to promote intolerance of ethnic minority groups, in particular(Yegen 2007). Yet, in Turkey, nationalism is intertwined with secularism,the latter of which is the topic of the next section.

2.1.3. Religion and State: Under the Turkish model of laicism, theTurkish state controls religion (largely through the Directorate ofReligious Affairs; Shankland 1999). Kuru (2009) describes this model as‘assertive secularism’, and others describe it as ‘secularist authoritarian-ism’ (e.g., De Leon et al. 2009: 208).5 Even from the early foundations ofthe Republic, including with the abolition of the Caliphate, this laic modelwas not universally endorsed however (Zurcher 2004).

As another ‘arrow’ of Kemalism, secularism has subsequently beensubject to a broad interpretation. It has been used as a justification for theclosure of political parties, such as the National Order Party in 1971, theNational Salvation Party in 1980, and more recently the Welfare Party in

4. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

5. Turkish laicism is different from traditional Western secularism because the state

officially controls religion in the former model, while there is an official separation of

religion and state in the latter (Shankland 1999).

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1998, as well as prohibitions on the display of religious symbols in public,among other examples (De Leon et al. 2009; Kuru 2009). According tosome (e.g., Dagı, 2005), rather than stifling religious expression, though,Turkish policies may have unintentionally created an increased demandfor the role of religion in political and public life.

Such an increased demand of religious expression is more likely with aconducive ‘political opportunity structure’ (McAdam 1982). The nationalelection in 2002 was crucial in this sense because for the first time apolitical party with an Islamic background � the JDP � had a majority inparliament and was able to establish a single-party government (Onis 2006,2007). This aroused fears that the JDP would reverse Turkish laic policies,including the ban on headscarves in public institutions, and perhaps evenmove to an Islamic state (Turan 2007; Kuru 2009). Voters who regardedreligious freedoms and the headscarf issue important for their votingbehaviour were more likely to support the initially Euro-sceptic JDP thanits counterpart, the Republican People’s Party, RPP (Carkoglu andKalaycıoglu, 2007). Yet, when the JDP came to power, it adopted a pro-Western and -EU stance (Dagı, 2005; De Leon et al. 2009). In 2007 and2011, the JDP won the national elections again.

Similar to Huntington (1996), some Kemalists in Turkey fear thatreligious values have recently grown more fundamentalist. To the extentthat religious values have changed, however, scholars suggest they arerooted in different sources. They may be a product of backlash againsthistorical policies, as well as greater opportunities for more public andpersonal expressions of religiosity as of late (De Leon et al. 2009; Kuru2009).

3. Data, sample, and measures

In order to examine liberal-democratic value change in Turkey and itssources, we examine World and European Values Survey data. Of course,public opinion data are only one source of data that allows for theexamination of cultural change (another data source, for example,are newspapers, which could be analyzed in terms of their content).The advantage of using World and European Values Survey data toexamine cultural change is that the same questions are asked in the sameway over time to nationally representative samples of people from Turkey.While the problem of social desirability is inevitable when using publicopinion data, this problem is likely most acute for questions asking aboutgeneral values concerning democracy (Inglehart 2003), which we do notuse in the analyses.

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In the analyses, we use four waves of the World and European Values

Survey data. The World Values Survey (WVS) data was collected in

Turkey between December 2000 and January 2001, as well as between

January and March 2007 (World Values Survey Group 2009); we refer to

these waves as the 2000 WVS and 2007 WVS, respectively. The European

Values Survey (EVS 2010) data was collected in Turkey between

September and October of 2001 and again between November 2008 and

January 2009, which we refer to as the 2001 EVS and 2008 EVS. Although

it would be ideal to have more time points to examine change, these

periods are important representations of the transition to JDP political

power (2002 to the present), as well as Turkey’s EU candidacy (1999).The potential sample sizes by wave are N�3401 (2000) WVS), 1206

(2001 EVS), 1346 (2007 WVS), and 2384 (2008 EVS), totalling 8,337. We

minimized missing data on independent variables (described later), but we

excluded missing data for each dependent variable, leaving us with varying

sample sizes for each analysis (see the tables).

3.1. Dependent variables

We conducted factor analyses of several questions that represent liberal-

democratic values on their face (see Appendix, Table A1, which also

includes question wording). Based on these results, we created two

additive scales, with questions coded so that higher scores indicate more

liberal-democratic values. The first scale, anti-authoritarian values,

includes questions about if the rule of a strong leader, experts, or the

army is a good thing for the country (a �0.55; see also Norris and

Inglehart 2002 for similar measures). Ethnic tolerance is the second scale,

which includes questions indicating if people of a different race and

immigrants/foreign workers are preferred as neighbours (a �0.68) (see

also Dixon 2008).In order to examine people’s preferences concerning religious rule, we

make use of two individual questions that were widely available across

years/surveys.6 The first asks if a politician who does not believe in God is

unfit for public office (strongly agree� strongly disagree [but reversed]).

The second asks if religious leaders should not influence the government

(strongly agree� strongly disagree), which substantively relates better to

political debates in Turkey.

6. Some of the items concerning the separation of religion and state were not asked in

more than two waves/years, so we use the only item asked across all of the waves as

well as an additional item asked in three waves.

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3.2. Independent variables

In our models, we include a series of binary variables representing year/survey (2001 EVS, 2007 WVS, 2008 EVS, with 2000 WVS as thereference group). To understand the effects of human developmentfactors, we include variables for income (in 2008 Turkish lira)7 andeducation completed (with ‘college’ coded high). For these and othervariables, we also included separate variables indicating if there wasmissing data on them (missing�1; otherwise �0). To examine theimpact of religiosity, we include religious attendance (never�every day), aswell as the importance of God in people’s lives (1�10 with greaterimportance coded high; e.g., Tessler and Altinoglu 2004). As politicalfactors, we include national identity (not at all proud�very proud)8 andpolitical ideology (1�10 with right coded high). Finally, we includestandard demographic controls of age (in years, with mean replacementfor missing data), and sex (male �1, female �0). Descriptive statistics onthe major independent variables are presented in Appendix A, Table A2.

4. Methods and analytical strategy

To answer our first research question concerning trends in liberal-democratic values, we use t-tests of mean (scale) differences and z-tests forordinal items (using the ologit command in Stata). Given survey samplingerror and large sample sizes, we are cautious about interpreting the year/wave coefficients if they do not meet a more stringent criterion ofsignificance (p50.001).

To understand the explanation of these values and their trends, weconduct multivariate analyses. For the two scales (anti-authoritarian andethnic tolerance values), we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.Because the items concerning religion and state are ordinal but do notscale well, we use ordered logit models for each item.9 For everydependent variable, we present the gross trend (Model 0), followed by

7. In order to make the income measure comparable across surveys, we used the

midpoints of the income categories (minus the zeros of Turkey’s previous currency)

and converted them into 2008 inflation-adjusted TL (Turkish lira) (World Bank

2011).

8. Our supplementary ordered logit models indicated that our measures of religiosity

and national identity generally increased during the time period examined.

9. By ordered logit, we mean proportional odds models. We also ran partial proportional

odds models for these items, and the omnibus Brant test revealed that the parallel

regression assumption was not violated in the final models (x2�18.44, p�0.24 and

x2�26.25, p�0.20, respectively).

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controls for demographic (Model 1), human development (Model 2),religious (Model 3), and political factors (Model 4).

5. Results

5.1. Descriptive results

Figure 1 displays the results of the change in anti-authoritarian and ethnictolerance values across the survey years/waves. Contrary to notions thatvalues in Turkey cannot change or change in a liberal-democraticdirection, people in Turkey have adopted significantly more anti-authoritarian (or conversely, less authoritarian) values between 2000 and2008 (p�0.0001), as well as between 2001 and 2008. Yet, supplementaryanalyses of the component items of this scale reveal that this trend is to agreater extent due to a rejection of strong and expert leaders than arejection of army rule, the latter of which has long been a problematicissue in Turkish politics and an obstacle to EU membership. For example,whereas 25 percent of people in Turkey said that having the army rule was

Figure 1. Anti-authoritarian and ethnic tolerance values in Turkey, 2000� 2008World and European Values Surveys (scale means, with the latter multiplied forpresentation).

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‘fairly’ or ‘very’ good in 2001, 33 percent said the same in 2007 and 2008.

As some observers suggest (e.g., Turan 2007), it may very well be that the

JDP’s perceived threat to the military has fermented somewhat of a

backlash in popular opinion. However, this opinion is relatively muted at

the voting polls.10

The pattern for ethnic tolerance values in Figure 1 is more mixed.

Despite a slight dip in ethnic tolerance values in Turkey between 2000 and

2001, ethnic tolerance significantly increases between 2001 and 2007 (see

also Yesilada and Noordijk 2010). Yet, people in Turkey express

significantly less tolerant values in 2008 and 2007 (or, for that matter, in

2008 vs. 2000). These most recent trends may reflect a renewed scepticism

in the wake of some measures designed to improve minority rights (e.g.,

Kurdish broadcasting, education, etc.).Have values concerning religion and state changed? This depends on

which question people are asked. On the one hand, there is a steady decrease

in the percentage of people who ‘strongly disagree’ that politicians who do

not believe in God are unfit for public office. As Figure 2 reveals, this

percentage decreases from 11 percent in 2000 to 5 percent in 2008. This,

though, likely reflects a more personal preference and is probably not very

different from the USA and some European countries, where an atheist

running for political office would risk political suicide. On the other hand,

Figure 2. Responses to questions concerning religion and state: Turkey, 2000�2008.

10. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

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people in Turkey have not become significantly more accepting of a potential

merger of religion and state. A very similar percentage of people across the

three available years/surveys ‘agree strongly’ that religious leaders should

not influence government decisions (2001 EVS �26%, 2007

WVS �22%, and 2009 EVS �28%). Hence, Kemalists’ perceptions of

an increasing personal religious revival or expressions thereof are partially

correct, which the JDP may have promoted with political policies. Yet,

Kemalists’ (and Huntington’s) fear that increasing religious identification

and practice necessarily leads to a blurring of the lines between religion and

state is not borne out by these descriptive data.

5.2. Analytical results

What explains these trends? Looking first at people’s anti-authoritarian

values (their rejection of a strong leader, an expert leader, and army rule)

in Table 1, we see the gross, liberal-democratic trend in Model 0 is not

due to demographic factors; when the demographic factors of sex and age

are added in Model 1, the trend remains. In Model 2, the coefficient for

EVS 2001 becomes significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that anti-

authoritarian values are slightly greater in 2001 than in 2000 after

accounting for human development factors. This trend remains intact

after accounting for people’s religious attendance and the importance of

God in their lives (see Model 3), the latter of which is negatively related to

anti-authoritarian values. And in the final model (4), we see that still other

factors, particularly national identity, play a role in explaining anti-

authoritarian values and trends. People who are more proud of their

national identity are less likely to support anti-authoritarian values, which

is expected given that nationalism and support for authoritarian politics�especially military rule�are confounded (e.g., Turan 2007). Moreover,

after controlling for political ideology and national identity, the difference

between people’s anti-authoritarian values in 2000 and 2001 diminishes in

significance. Altogether, what this means is if education had risen more

quickly, particularly between 2000 and 2001, there would have been a

slightly more liberal trend in anti-authoritarian values. Yet, Turkish

nationalism counteracts these forces and suppresses what would have been

greater, but still small, gains in these values.11

11. In our supplementary analyses using ordered logit models for each item, we found

that the sources of these values were substantively similar, except that the importance

of God was a less consistent predictor of these values and that national identity was

not associated with expert leadership.

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TABLE 1. Coefficients from the OLS regression of anti-authoritarian values on independent variables: World & European Values Surveys,2000� 2008

Independentvariables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

EVS 2001 0.14a 0.14a 0.20**a 0.21**a 0.15*a

(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)WVS 2007 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.29***

(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)EVS 2008 0.41***c 0.42***c 0.49***c 0.50***c 0.49***c

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)Sex (Male �1) � 0.23*** 0.14** 0.12* 0.09

(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)Age � �0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Income � � 0.03

(0.02)0.03

(0.02)0.03

(0.02)Education (college �high) � � 0.22***

(0.02)0.20***

(0.02)0.20***

(0.02)Religious attend (every day �high) � � � 0.00

(0.01)0.01

(0.01)Importance of God (important �high) � � � �0.07***

(0.01)�0.05***

(0.01)National pride (very proud �high) � � � � �0.19***

(0.04)

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TABLE 1 (Continued )

Independentvariables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Political ideology (right �high) � � � � �0.01(0.01)

Constant 7.14***(0.04)

7.04***(0.08)

6.07***(0.12)

6.82***(0.18)

7.26***(0.20)

R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04BIC 29010 29005 28905 28908 28890

Notes: Main entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. N�6806. Models also include binary variables indicating missing

status on independent variables (not shown). The 2000 WVS is the reference group.

*p50.05, **p50.01, ***p50.001 (two-tailed t-tests).aIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from EVS 2008 at p50.001 (F-test).bIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from WVS 2007 at p50.001 (F-test).cIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from EVS 2001 at p50.001 (F-test).

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Next, we turn to ethnic tolerance values � that is, people’s willingness tolive next to someone of a different race or an immigrant/foreign worker. AsFigure 1 earlier revealed, ethnic tolerance in Turkey dipped after 2000, thenincreased in 2007, and then decreased in 2008 (see Model 0 of Table 2). Asthe results of Model 1 indicate, these fluctuations are only partly due to ageand sex. Human development factors are more powerful explanations (seeModel 2). The combination of education and income explains about 45percent of the difference between 2000 and 2001 (calculated as [0.20�0.11]/0.20), about 28 percent of the difference between 2000 and 2008, and thegreatest total amount of explained variance of ethnic tolerance values, asjudged by the R-squared value. Moreover, the WVS 2007 coefficientbecomes slightly significant after accounting for human developmentfactors. Although especially religious � but also political � factors help toexplain these values (see Models 3 and 4), the sum total of the resultsindicate that human development factors best explain ethnic tolerancevalues and their fluctuations. Substantively, this means that ethnic tolerance� at least toward minorities in an abstract sense � is most likely due to asense of material threat among those at the bottom end of a socioeconomicladder.12

However, the story for trends in values concerning religion and state issomewhat different. Table 3 presents results from ordered logit models ofthe two items noted previously in Figure 2 (see Model 0). Althoughdemographic factors account for some of the trend in people’s valuesregarding if politicians who do not believe in God are fit for public office(see Model 1, top panel), human development factors account for a muchlarger proportion of them (see Model 2). After controlling for socio-economic factors on this value, the large difference between 2000 and 2008greatly diminishes, and the slightly significant difference between 2000and 2001 disappears. As expected, religious factors further explain thistrend (see Model 3). People who place greater importance on God in theirlives as well as those who more frequently attend religious services are lesslikely to disagree that politicians who do not believe in God are unfit forpublic office. And, it is somewhat surprising that national identity isnegatively related to this more secular value, as the results of Model 4indicate; as suggested before, this may reflect this item’s more secularnature in personal, as opposed to political, terms. Moreover, it may be dueto the fact that people in Turkey overwhelmingly express a strong sense ofnational identity.

That story changes further when we look at people’s values concerningreligious leaders influencing government, which we argued is a more

12. Our separate logit analyses of each item in this scale revealed that their sources were

substantively similar.

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TABLE 2. Coefficients from the OLS regression of ethnic tolerance values on independent variables: World & European Values Surveys,2000� 2008

Independentvariables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

EVS 2001 �0.19***ab �0.20***ab �0.11***ab �0.10***ab �0.10***b

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)WVS 2007 0.03ac 0.03ac 0.07**ac 0.07**ac 0.09**ac

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)EVS 2008 �0.31***bc �0.29***bc �0.21***bc �0.20***bc �0.19***b

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)Sex (Male �1) � 0.10*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.05*

(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)Age � �0.00*** 0.00 0.00* 0.00*

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Income � � 0.06***

(0.01)0.06***

(0.01)0.06***

(0.01)Education (college �high) � � 0.16***

(0.01)0.15***

(0.01)0.14***

(0.01)Religious attend (every day �high) � � � �0.03***

(0.00)�0.02***

(0.00)Importance of God (important �high) � � � �0.03***

(0.00)�0.02***

(0.01)National pride (very proud �high) � � � � �0.02

(0.01)

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TABLE 2 (Continued )

Independentvariables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Political ideology (right �high) � � � � �0.03***(0.00)

Constant 1.39***(0.01)

1.52***(0.03)

0.70***(0.04)

1.06***(0.06)

1.18***(0.07)

R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.13 0.14BIC 20233 20169 19463 19417 19376

Notes: Main entries are unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. N�8273. Models also include binary variables indicating missing

status on independent variables (not shown). The 2000 WVS is the reference group.

*p50.05, **p50.01, ***p50.001 (two-tailed t-tests).aIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from EVS 2008 at p50.001 (F-test).bIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from WVS 2007 at p50.001 (F-test).cIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from EVS 2001 at p50.001 (F-test).

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TABLE 3. Coefficients from ordered logit models of values concerning religion and state on independent variables: World & European ValuesSurveys, 2000� 2008

Supportive of politicians who do not believe in God being able to hold office

Independent variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

EVS 2001 �0.13*a �0.15*a 0.04a 0.10a 0.02a

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)WVS 2007 �0.05a �0.06a 0.01a 0.06a 0.11a

(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)EVS 2008 �0.42***bc �0.40***bc �0.23***bc �0.20***bc �0.21***bc

(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)Sex (Male �1) � �0.00 �0.17*** 0.15*** 0.06

(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)Age � �0.01*** �0.00 �0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Income � � 0.11***

(0.02)0.08***

(0.02)0.08***

(0.02)Education (college �high) � � 0.32***

(0.02)0.26***

(0.02)0.25***

(0.02)Religious attend (every day �high) � � � �0.14***

(0.01)�0.11***

(0.01)Importance of God (important �high) � � � �0.23***

(0.01)�0.18***

(0.01)National pride (very proud �high) � � � � �0.24***

(0.03)Political ideology (right �high) � � � � �0.11***

(0.01)

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TABLE 3 (Continued )

Supportive of politicians who do not believe in God being able to hold office

Independent variables Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

WVS 2007 �0.07 �0.08 �0.10 �0.11 �0.15*(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)

EVS 2008 �0.11 �0.14* �0.13 �0.13 �0.18**(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)

Sex (Male �1) � 0.02 �0.01 0.10 0.09(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)

Age � 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

Income � � 0.04(0.02)

0.03(0.02)

0.02(0.02)

Education (college �high) � � 0.08**(0.03)

0.07*(0.03)

0.05(0.03)

Religious attend (every day �high) � � � �0.05***(0.01)

�0.04**(0.02)

Importance of God (important �high) � � � �0.05**(0.02)

�0.05**(0.02)

National pride (very proud �high) � � � � 0.18***(0.04)

Political ideology (right �high) � � � � �0.06***(0.01)

Notes: See previous tables. N�7844 for the top panel and 4492 for the bottom panel (which excludes EVS 2001).

*p50.05, **p50.01, ***p50.001 (two-tailed t-tests).aIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from EVS 2008 at p50.001 (x2-test).bIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from WVS 2007 at p50.001 (x2-test).cIndicates that the coefficient is significantly different from EVS 2001 at p50.001 (x2-test).

Opposition to religious leaders influencing the government

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political (rather than personal) value. As was displayed in Figure 2, thisvalue does not change much over the years or across the models (see thebottom panel of Table 3). In Model 3, we see that the importance peopleplace on God and the extent to which they attend religious services � assomewhat more personal religious expressions � are negatively related tothis more political secular value, as Kemalists and Huntington mightexpect. However, these more personal religious expressions have littleimpact on trends in the extent to which people believe that religiousleaders should not influence government. National identity and politicalideology affect these trends somewhat (in Model 4). This stands incontrast to the other values we examined, including the more personalreligious values immediately above, and is further discussed later.

6. Discussion and conclusion

In light of theoretical and political debates revolving around the ‘clashof civilizations’, Turkey’s EU entry, and the role of religious versussecular identity in Turkey, this paper extended research on liberal-democratic values and the sources of their changes in Turkey throughdescriptive, factor, and multivariate analyses of four waves of the Worldand European Values Survey (2000, 2001, 2007 and 2008). Thedescriptive results reveal that Huntington’s (1996) characterization ofpredominantly Muslim countries unable to make liberal-democraticchange, as well as his and Kemalists’ fears of a religious revival inTurkey, are overstated. Despite the JDP’s electoral successes, people’svalues concerning religious rule in a more political sense have notchanged during the time period we examined. However, expressions ofreligious rule in a more personal sense have increased somewhat. Thelatter, in particular, may be due to a new opportunity structure inTurkey, which allows for a greater expression of personal religiosity(e.g., Dagı, 2005; De Leon et al. 2009), as well as the peculiarity ofTurkish secularism more generally.

People’s values in Turkey toward authoritarian rule have moved in amore liberal direction, except with respect to the military. While thisgeneral trend bodes well for democracy, the exception may beworrisome to EU observers who have criticized Turkey for the roleof the military. Also potentially worrisome is that despite a slightuptrend in ethnic tolerance between 2001 and 2007 in Turkey, ethnictolerance decreases overall during the time period examined. However,the available survey items we use reflect general tolerance, not towardparticular ethnic groups. Moreover, conclusions should bear in mind

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that although we have examined critical time periods, our analyses arebased on, at most, four waves of a survey.

What explains these value changes? Although personal expressions ofreligiosity little explain the trends in liberal-democratic values, they arenevertheless associated with ethnic intolerance (see also Yesilada andNoordijk 2010), and even more so than national identity. The patterns inour data are also due to human development factors. This theory partiallyexplains the trends in anti-authoritarian, ethnic tolerance, and morepersonal secular values. Once human development factors (e.g., incomeand education) are accounted for, many of the illiberal trends in thesevalues diminish in importance or the liberal trends become more liberal.

However, Turkey is a good example of why we need to be careful ofrelying on the clash of civilizations thesis, human development theory,or some other broad theoretical notion to explain the particularities of acertain society. In the case of Turkey, political factors � such aspolitical ideology and national identity � are also important explana-tions. On the one hand, they somewhat counteract the forces of humandevelopment on liberal-democratic value changes, such as in the case ofanti-authoritarian values. On the other hand, stronger national identityis very much aligned with political (but not more personal) secularism.

Indeed, this latter finding here may reflect the weakening of religiousversus secular and nationalist political alignments after the JDP came topower. A likely explanation is that international pressures such as theIraqi wars, EU elite, and public opposition against Turkey, and therecent raid (in 2010) on the Turkish flotilla en route to Gaza arouseboth nationalistic and religious sentiment. This offers the JDP anopportunity to politically capitalize on these developments and reinforcethese values by simultaneously using nationalist and religious rhetoric,which may also be easier in good economic times. This suggests thatTurkey is moving neither ‘East’ nor ‘West’; rather, it is very muchmoving in its own direction.

Acknowledgements

A previous version of this paper was presented at the Koc University SocialScience Seminar (January, 2010). The second authors, whose names are inalphabetical order, were generously funded by Koc University duringportions of this project. We thank the European Societies editor andreviewers, as well as Andrew Fullerton and Zeynep Mirza for their veryhelpful comments on previous versions of this paper. We also gratefullyacknowledge the research assistance by Nazmiye Altındas, MeaghanFlanigan, Cansu Oktem, and Lan Truong.

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Jeffrey C. Dixon is an assistant professor of Sociology at the College of the

Holy Cross in the US.

Yetkin Borlu is a PhD student in the Department of Agricultural Economics

and Rural Sociology at The Pennsylvania State University in the US.

Ms. Duygu Kasdogan is a PhD student in Science and Technology Studies at

York University in Canada.

Address for correspondence: Prof. Jeffrey C. Dixon, Department of Sociology,

College of the Holy Cross, 1 College Street, Beaven 224, Worcester, MA

01604, USA. E-mail: jdixon@holycross.edu

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Appendix A

TABLE A1. Partial question wording and liberal-democratic value factor loadings:World & European Values Survey, 2000� 2008

Anti-authoritarian Tolerance

Having a strong leader who does not have to botherwith parliament . . . (Very good� bad)

0.818 0.039

Having experts, not government, make decisionsaccording to what they think. (Very good-bad)

0.810 �0.050

Having the army rule. (Very good�bad) 0.526 0.158Could you please sort out any that you would not like

to have as neighbours? [People of a different race.]0.008 0.867

Could you please sort out any that you would not liketo have as neighbours? [Immigrants/foreignworkers.]

0.015 0.860

Notes: Based on principal components analysis with varimax rotated solutions, which explains

62% of the variance. N�6778. All questions are coded so that higher scores indicate more

liberal-democratic values.

TABLE A2. Descriptive statistics, distributions and question wording/coding formajor independent variables: World and European Values Survey, 2000� 2008

Mean (SD) Question wording/Coding

Sex 48% Male=1; female=0Age (in years) 37.43

(14.14)Age in years, with missing data replacedwith the mean (=37).

Income (monthly) �Less than 500 TL 22% Monthly income in intervals (see text),

using midpoints to convert to 2008inflation-adjusted Turkish lira.

501� 1000 TL 33%1001� 1500 TL 20%1501� 2000 TL 13%2001� 2500 TL 2%2501� 3000 TL 5%3000+TL 4%

EducationLess than primary 16% ‘What is the highest level you have

reached in your education?’Primary 42%Middle 11%High 22%College 9%

Religiousattendance

Never 32% ‘Apart from funerals, about how often doyou attend religious services thesedays?’

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TABLE A2. (Continued )

Mean (SD) Question wording/Coding

Less than once/year

3%

Once a year 5%Only on holy days 22%Once a month 3%Once a week 20%More than weekly 15%

Importance of God 9.26(1.86)

‘And how important is God in yourlife?...10 means very important and 1means not at all important.’

Political ideology 5.87(2.54)

Placement on political spectrum with1=left and 10=right.

National prideNot at all proud 3% ‘How proud are you to be a Turkish

citizen?’Not very proud 6%Quite proud 21%Very proud 69%

Notes: Ns for each independent variable vary because of missing data. Numbers may not add up

to 100% due to rounding.

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