multilevel governance and benefit sharing
TRANSCRIPT
Multilevel Governance and Benefit SharingLegitimacy of arrangements around the world
Anne Larson & Ashwin Ravikumar
II. Study design
Site selection criteria
COUNTRY
REGION
SITE 4
SITE 5
SITE 1: NO REDD+
SITE 3: REDD+
SITE 2:REDD+
Increasing emissions sites
Decreasing emissions sites
REGION 1
REGION 2
REGION 3
* Based on key informants interviews
Theoretical and methodological framework
Policies, institutions & incentives
Land use
decisions
Benefit-sharing
mechanisms
Trends in
livelihoods
(Equity)
Emissions
trends
(Effectiveness)
SECONDARY DATA
• Legal/policy studies (multileveland multisector)
PRIMARY DATA (FIELD WORK)
• >200 Key informant Interviews
IV. MLG and BenefitSharing Results:
Peru and Indonesia
Results overview
Variation at the national level and sub-national levels
Ad-hoc strategies on the ground with multiple benefits
Non-monetary benefits are key so far
Legitimacy depends on multiple factors; not just the type of initiative
Benefit sharing policies & processes
Nationalpolicy
Sub-nationalpolicy
Initiative/Project
• FREDDI• MOF reg. 39 • Inti-plasma
Provincial strategies(poorly defined)
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Ad-hoc strategies and processes
INDONESIA PERU
• National Forest ConservationProgram
• PES laws
Multistakeholder spaces and discussions; draft roadmaps
(no explicit benefit sharing guidance)
Ad-hoc strategies and processes
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Benefit sharing on the ground:Multiple benefits
$$$
Benefit sharing on the ground:Multiple burdens?
Reduced access and tenure security:
6 cases in Peru (2 REDD+ projects)
4 in Indonesia (1 REDD+ project)
WHY DO WE SEE BURDENS INSTEAD OF BENEFITS?
What makes arrangementslegitimate?
Not entirely dependent on initiative type (cross-cutting)
Broad consultation, NOT just representative-based
(cross-cutting)
Community control access is key (Indonesia)
Information flows: what should REDD+ communities be told? (Peru)
Example 1: Expanding natural park
Example 2: REDD+ and Brazil-nutconcessionaires
Example 3: Oil palm in Ucayali
Example 4: Fair and equitable oil palm?
• Consultation
• Conservation
• High inti-plasma payment
• Community buy-in
REDD+ in Peru: Creating Dialogue Spaces?
Regional Environmental
Authority
National Ministry of Environment
Environmental NGOs and Project Proponents
Producer groups
Indigenous Communities
Localgovernments
National Ministry of Agriculture
Regional Directorate of
Agriculture
Smallholder communities
Private Extractive Firms
Takeaways and Conclusions
Slow policies mean ad hoc arrangements
Ad hoc arrangements deliver multiple benefits, but they’renot always legitimate
More legitimate arrangements can be achieved throughbetter participation and tapping customary/existinginstitutions
Integration across scales will be a challenge. Dialogue spaces are opportunities, but they’re imperfect and imperfectly understood
Acknowledgements: Research Peru researchers: Laura Kowler, Jazmín Gonzales Tovar, Dawn
Rodriguez Ward, Carol Burga, Harold Gordillo, Anne Larson,
Support from: Medardo Miranda, Anggela Michi
Indonesia researchers: Rodd Myers, Anna Sanders, support from Rut Din
Tanzania researchers: Martin Kijazi & Joshua Ivan
Acknowledgments: Donors
EC
NORAD
CRP FTA
Further reading
The legitimacy of multilevel governance structures forbenefit sharing: REDD+ and other low emissions options in Peru
http://www.cifor.org/library/5201/the-legitimacy-of-multilevel-governance-structures-for-benefit-sharing-redd-and-other-low-emissions-options-in-peru/
Benefit sharing in context: A comparative analysis of 10 sub-national initiatives in Indonesia (forthcoming)