myplace (memory, youth, political legacy and civic … 5 youth sections of... · region author(s)...

MYPLACE 31st January 2014

MYPLACE: FP7-266831 www.fp7-myplace.eu

Deliverable D7.1: Ethnographic Case Studies of Youth Activism

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MYPLACE (Memory, Youth, Political Legacy And Civic Engagement)

Grant agreement no: FP7-266831

WP7: Interpreting Activism (Ethnographies)

Deliverable 7.1: Ethnographic Case Studies of Youth Activism

Vse Doma

Region

Author(s) Daria Krivonos, Natalia Fedorova

Field researcher(s) Natalia Fedorova

Data analysts Daria Krivonos, Natalia Fedorova

Date 10.1.2014 Work Package 7 Interpreting Activism (Ethnographies)

Deliverable 7.1 Ethnographic Case Studies of Youth Activism

Dissemination level PU [Public]

WP Leaders Hilary Pilkington, Phil Mizen Deliverable Date 31 January 2014

Document history

Version Date Comments Created/Modified by

1 20.01.2014 First draft Daria Krivonos, Natalia Fedorova

2 28.01.2014 Comments to authors Phil Mizen

3 31.01.2014 Second draft Daria Krivonos, Natalia Fedorova

4 31.01.2014 Final version Phil Mizen, Hilary Pilkington

http://www.fp7-myplace.eu/index.php




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Contents

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3

1.1 Description of the case ‘pro-Kremlin movement: the new version’ ................................. 4

1.2 Academic debate on the state-managed youth activism in Russia ................................. 6

2. Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 7

3. Key Findings ....................................................................................................................... 9

3.1 Structure, careers and hierarchies in the movement ....................................................... 9

3.2 Street rallies and campaigns, discipline and daily life ................................................... 13

3.3 Attitude to politics, patriotism and relationships with state power .............................. 17

3.4 Understanding of history and historical memory .......................................................... 19

4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 22

5. Future Analysis ................................................................................................................. 23

6. References........................................................................................................................ 24

7. Appendix: Table 1: Socio-demographic profile of respondents ...................................... 27




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1. Introduction Youth groups and civil solidarities, demonstrating various forms of cultural resistance, were present even in the former Soviet Union (Omel’chenko and Sabirova 2011). For some youth organisations and subcultures, political participation has constituted a sign of protest against the existing social structure (e.g. anarchist movements, oppositional and nationalist groups). Recently, however, the main space of struggle for youth with oppositional views has been Internet forums and spaces for online chats (Omel’chenko 2006). Events at the end of 2011 dramatically transferred this online communication to offline and urban space. The electoral campaign of 2011-2012 clearly involved confrontation between pro- and anti -governmental organisations and political movements. This included, inter alia, accusations of election fraud, heated online discussions about political participation (video ‘Nashi Activist Sveta from Ivanovo [Nashistka Sveta iz Ivanovo]1,’ February 2012), the hacked email of Rosmolodezh’s press secretary Christina Potupchik (February 2012), a hunger strike in Astrakhan (April 2012), Navalny’s trial and the Communist Party’s request to check the financing of the ‘Seliger‘ forum. In this context of political controversy, a focus on youth participation in the field of pro-governmental activism is particularly valuable and the case study selected here was one such movement; the patriotic youth movement Nashi. The focus of interest is the civic and institutional dimensions of this youth activism, as well as the stories of young people active in this organisation. In the past decades, the ‘youth problem’ has been of particular importance in Russia. Social and political transformations, which took place in the late 1990s, following the collapse of the USSR and the resulting change in the political regime, provoked new youth solidarities, groups and associations. Post-perestroika youth research redefined the youth question in terms of urban, subcultural, informational, and other spaces (Omel’chenko 2005). Contemporary academic debates now construct moral and ethical discourse about the lost generation of the 1990s, which positions youth as a marginalized group at risk and in need of supervision and control (Chuprov et al. 2001). The focus of this youth research is often youth subcultures, which are usually understood as marginalized social groups (Kozlov 2000, Kostyushev 1999, Gromov 2009). Youth civil and political engagement has been assessed as low, which is also embedded in the discourse of the ‘lost generation of the 1990s‘ (Ivanova 2012). In the contemporary official discourses, particular attention is paid to the role of youth in modern Russia, where a special place is given to youth movements who have ideological and financial support from the state. Researchers rarely focus on the everyday life of young people involved in these movements, and often study the moral dimensions of young people’s participation. Therefore, the study of various aspects of young people’s daily lives provides a more complete picture of their social reality. Thus, the focus of researcher has shifted onto different bodily practices in the process of self-organisation and intra-group communication (Shchepanskaya 1999), and consumption practices (Omel’chenko 2006). The study of youth solidarities allows us to examine forms of

1 Nashistka Sveta iz Ivanovo // https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24XBX0Wkmpw Access on 16.12.13

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24XBX0Wkmpw




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communication and emotional ties that arise between people who share certain values and existing cultural practices. In this study, ‘Vse doma’, a pro-Kremlin political youth project and one of the followers of the controversial ‘Nashi’ movement is the object of analysis. The movement, associated with managed political activism, has been strongly stigmatized like other state-controlled youth projects. This study aims to tell the hidden stories of activists and explore their understandings of citizenship, political participation, and historical memory; issues that have received little attention in research on state-managed youth participation.

1.1 Description of the case ‘pro-Kremlin movement: the new version’ This study emerges from the youth project ‘Nashi’, which gave birth to a number of autonomous movements, which remain socially visible. ‘Vse doma’ is one of the followers of the ‘Nashi’ movement and is included in the state programme of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs in Russia (Rosmolodezh’). The youth movement ‘Nashi‘, which was modernized in 2005 from the movement ‘Walking Together’ (‘Idushchie vmeste’), itself for several years a leading youth organisation, is known for its large-scale and provocative rallies. The main goals of the movement were the preservation of the sovereignty and integrity of Russia during the ‘colour revolutions‘ in post-Soviet states, the development of civil society, and the modernization of the country. The movement’s main focus became anti-fascist activity, namely opposing nationalist and extremist organisations by means of open confrontations against them. ‘Nashi’ was created as a youth democratic anti-fascist movement, but declared itself as democratic, anti-fascist, anti-oligarchic, anti-capitalistic and anti-liberal. The movement started with a mass rally ‘Our Victory’ in May, 9 2005 in Moscow, commemorating the 60th anniversary of the victory over the Nazis, with 60,000 young people participating. Such a debut gave Nashi a sense of identity based on the exploitation of cultural memory, construction of foreign and domestic enemies, and commemoration of the Great Patriotic War. Another significant event organised by the movement - ‘Russian March’ (Russkiy Marsh) in 2011 – involved young people holding the posters of the heroes of Russia – mothers of large families, veterans of the war – and the ‘shame’ (pozor) of Russia – oligarchs, human rights activists, casino owners, oppositional politicians. Ironically, independent media pointed to the fact that the examples of ‘shame of Russia’ greatly outnumbered the ‘heroes of Russia’. In general, the movement has been widely criticized; in particular, for its explicit patriotic education programs and close partnership with state structures. ‘Nashi’ has been compared to the ‘Hitler-Jugend’ in Germany (similarly, activists of ‘Nashi’ were often called ‘Putin Jugend‘) as well as with Soviet teenage and youth organisations like Octobrists, Pioneers and the Komsomol, though apparently, the level of ideological indoctrination is weaker compared to the Soviet period (Ishkanian 2008; Chebankova 2013). The movement played an important role in the political socialization of young people. The political engagement of young people in Nashi was expressed in their fragmented/situational participation in the political life of the country, especially large-scale rallies in Moscow. In 2009, with the end of the electoral campaign, and therefore an end of the need to mobilize young people against the ‘Orange threat’, ‘Nashi’ fell into a crisis. This resulted in the project’s




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split into several autonomous projects, targeted on social issues - with ‘Vse doma’ among them. The ideology of these new political projects differed from the previous doctrine of ‘Nashi’ when a new focus on state-run youth activism emerged: healthy lifestyles (‘Run with me‘, ‘Begi za mnoy’), housing and communal services (‘Vse doma‘, ‘All houses’), control of the sale of expired products in food stores (‘Piggy’s Against’ ‘Khryushi protiv‘), the fight against illegal car parking (‘StopHam‘) and art projects (‘Art parade‘) among them. These new political projects emphasised their autonomy and independence from the state and state run sponsors. ’Nashi’s’ political activities are now conceptualized as negative by Vse doma activists and the project attempts to distance itself from ‘Nashi’ and deny participation in its previous rallies. Therefore, a new identity as a civil activist is being constructed within the new movements such as ‘Vse doma’. However, the methods of managing these new projects - for instance, youth mobilization in cases of political urgency, control over projects from the main office in Moscow, the annual educational forum ‘Seliger’, organisation and recruiting – were inherited from ‘Nashi’. Despite the different focus of the new pro-Kremlin projects, the management style of the movements is thus similar. First, their ‘ideological centres’ are located in Moscow, wh ich distributes funding and decides on the priorities. Second, the projects are interconnected in their symbolic values and practices: several projects combat illegal casinos in Russia (projects ‘Stal‘, ‘Vse doma‘), control of the unauthorized distribution of alcohol to underage individuals (‘Stal‘, ‘Khryushi protiv‘). The project’s activities are closely intertwined, and no rigid boundaries between social, cultural and political activities can be distinguished. This leads to competition among the projects, as well as explicit and implicit confrontations. One of the projects, which was chosen for this case study - ‘Vse doma’ - aims to improve housing and communal services. Its value as a case study is that it was one of the most well-funded, multifarious and active organisations, judging by the number of events it organised in St. Petersburg. A crisis in the movement was witnessed, when the main activity of the project concerning the 2011-2012 elections came to an end and members of the movement found themselves powerless in the current political situation. After the elections the main political activity of the projects was reoriented to social problems; however, all the movements were mobilized for the political rallies and campaigns if needed. The project was stopped in November 2012. One of the traits of these projects is that their boundaries are not clear-cut so that young people can be involved in several pro-Kremlin projects like ‘Khryushi Protiv’ - controlling the sale of expired products in food stores, ‘StopHam’ – fighting against illegal car parking, and ‘Begi za mnoy’ (‘Run with me’), which promotes healthy life styles. Therefore, some of the research participants are involved in other projects along with ‘Vse doma’ (‘Khryushi protiv’, ‘Begi za mnoy’, ‘StopHam’). The decision to interview young people who are involved in several projects including ‘Vse doma’ is also based on the fact that most of the political campaigns and rallies brought together in one space youth from different pro-Kremlin movements. Moreover, the project’s activity ceased in November 2012, when the headquarters of the project were closed in St. Petersburg and led to young people from ‘Vse doma’ having to move to other youth projects (‘Khryushi protiv’, ‘Begi za mnoy’, ‘StopHam’), which are similar to ‘Vse doma' in targeting social issues and being mobilised for political reasons.




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1.2 Academic debate on the state-managed youth activism in Russia In academic research, ‘Nashi’ evoked considerable interest; however, the movement has been mainly approached through the macro-political via such themes as civil society, youth policy, and Russian political youth movements. ‘Nashi‘ has been mainly regarded as a state-managed project created ‘from above‘ that reflects specific demands of youth ‘from below‘, as, for example, political participation and social activities (Horvath 2011; Gavrov 2010; Zuev 2013; Gromov 2009) . In this research the principal data derives from the project leaders and major political figures, so that activists are presented as passive recipients of the state/official agenda. Furthermore, most of the studies concern earlier periods of the movement’s activism with few attempts to study its more recent reorganisation, repoliticization and crises (Duncan 2013). In general, many studies analyse the movement as an example of the patriotic education of young people, political socialization and bringing up the ‘right’ type of voters (Borusyak 2005; Kamnev 2007, 2009). The movement was also approached as a platform for nationalist ideas, which attaches to the movement the label: agent of civil nationalism (Verkhovskii 2011). Furthermore, researchers write about the phenomenon of pro-Kremlin extremism, when the main pro-Kremlin youth project caused a rise of chauvinism among youth (Chebankova 2013). Similarly, when analysing the movement’s campaigns and rallies, researchers write about radicalization, media orientation and theatricality (Marchenko 2006). Young people are described as ‘combative actors’ (boevoi actor) of civil society, who use violent methods in the organisation of their campaigns (Radina 2011). Researchers also emphasise the oppressive methods of activism (Robertson 2009) and references to radical right movements (Varga 2008). Describing young people who participate in the movement, existing research shows that there is a strong community network in the project, which created successful mechanisms of recruitment. The main source of potential young activists is the universities, which created local youth movements with the support of administrative apparatuses (Stanovaya 2009; Borusyak 2005). University students – in particular, career oriented ones - are the main group that is involved in pro-Kremlin activist groups like Vse Doma (Borusyak 2005). Researchers mark the influence of public discourse in the construction of ideological views on patriotic attitudes among pro-government youth (Omel’chenko, Pilkington 2012). For instance, ‘Nashi’ is seen as a successful project of military-patriotic ideology (Kudryavtsev 2011). Many researchers raise the question of the cooperation of VSE Doma with Kremlin policies that eliminate young people’s agency and identities (Atwal 2009; Lassila 2012; Hemment 2012). Atwal writes about the problem of existing preconceptions in the studies of state-sponsored development in Russia, which ignore the political autonomy of activists (Atwal 2009). Researchers write that the movement is often analysed through a particular cultural lens as a confirmation of Russian authoritarianism and of democratic failure. A negative public image of the group creates a bias in academic research, when observers of the movement seek confirmation of negative representations of Russian civil society (Hemment 2012). Despite such an awareness of the possible ‘foreknowledge’ in the research on pro-governmental organisations, activist’s own biographies and understandings are mainly left




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unexplored while official documents, manifestos and media texts are the primary source of data for understanding these movements. In doing so, there is the danger that participant’s identities derived from this approach are presented as stereotypical, unquestioning and subservient to the hierarchical relations between the state and youth. ‘Nashi’ is also studied in the context of historical memory and state policy in the field of social memory (Laruelle 2011; Lassila 2009, 2012; Mijnssen 2012). The movement’s identity is based on the politics of memory, particularly the exploitation of the memory of the Great Patriotic War, as a reflection of public consensus about the essence of the nation, as well as nostalgia for the Soviet past. Through an analysis of documents and media texts of the movement, researchers conclude that despite the public demand for patriotism, the movement did not become an ideal of young people due to its failure to communicate their ‘political ideas’ (Lassila 2012). The movement could not reconcile the need for a strong state with the interests of an apolitical youth (Lassila 2012). For example, techniques such as ‘banter‘ (styob) in promoting patriotic ideas caused no understanding in the larger society, which has more conservative views on the expression of civil views. The movement is also analysed from the point of view of gender, where certain constructs of femininity and masculinity, traditional gender roles, and homophobia transmit certain political ideology (Sperling 2009, 2012). The research shows how traditional gender values and homophobia are used in the construction of normative political femininities and masculinities, as well as the pursuit of ‘Nashi’s’ own political views and downplaying of its opponents. As seen from this brief review, there is a need for in-depth qualitative research, where young people, their stories, biographies and careers are the main research focus of enquiry. Furthermore, it is also important to describe and understand the movement’s periods of crisis as well as the general development of pro-Kremlin youth activism, as opposed to seeing the movement’s history as a homogeneous and linear process of development.

2. Methodology

The researchers’ task was to understand the mechanisms of a VSE Doma and describe the practices of its civil activists, participating in pro-Kremlin projects. The ethnographic fieldwork included participatory observation in pro-kremlin projects, in such events as the annual educational camp ‘Seliger’, a rally in Moscow supporting Putin during presidential elections (March 4, 2012), a rally against oppositional movements, a campaign against the adoption of Russian children by USA citizens (February, 2013). Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were also conducted with members and a database of news regarding pro-kremlin projects during the period of March 1, 2012 through March 1, 2013 was assembled. Online messages and forums were monitored and observation journals were kept during this period. The researchers first joined the activities of the project in March 2012 during the election campaign in Moscow when ‘Vse doma’ expressed their support for the presidential candidate Vladimir Putin. Participation in this was the starting point of the researchers’ inclusion in the




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group of activists, who the researchers joined as participant observers. During the year of fieldwork, the researchers participated in five events of the movement: ‘transbor ‘ - a training workshop in the suburbs of St. Petersburg on 28-29 April 2012, Putin’s inauguration on May 7, 2012, the annual youth camp ‘Seliger‘ June 30 - July 10, 2012, and a rally against the adoption of Russian children by Americans , February 2, 2013 Moscow . In addition, the researchers participated in the formal and informal meetings of participants: the project’s seminars and lectures in the House of Youth, organised by the members of ‘Nashi‘. The fieldwork was conducted between March 2012 and March 2013, where was collected all interviews with the activists and ethnographic fieldwork. The total time spent in observation is 250 hours. During the film production (‘Our former ‘Nashi’’, directed by Dmitry Omel’chenko), the researchers participated as observers in the pro-Kremlin street protests of other projects: ‘Khryushi Protiv‘, ‘Stop Ham‘. During the film’s production, 8 semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants of the projects; these were also included in the data set. The decision to include in the analysis not only members of the 'Vse Doma' project arose during the observation of mass rallies. The boundaries between different pro-kremlin projects are quite obscure; one person can easily claim membership in several pro-kremlin projects. As mentioned above, one of the traits of these projects is that their boundaries are not clear-cut so that young people can be involved in several pro-Kremlin projects at the same time. In this particular case, young people from ‘Vse doma’ also participated in such projects of ‘Nashi 2.0’ like ‘Khryushi Protiv’ - monitoring the sale of expired products in food stores, ‘StopHam’ – fighting against illegal car parking, and ‘Begi za mnoy’ (‘Run with me’), promoting healthy life styles. The largest part of the data was collected in the ‘Seliger’ youth camp, where the researchers spent 10 days as participants of the forum. Ethnographic fieldwork in ‘Seliger’ was one of the main events in the research. This was not only a unique opportunity to see one of the key sites of pro-Kremlin activism, but to experience and observe directly their forms of control and discipline. The fieldwork raised problems of establishing trust, rapport and overcoming the issue of almost total control of the forum’s space. The problem of establishing trust mainly arose from the absence of private space, where researchers could have private conversations with the movement’s activists. At the beginning, the researchers also experienced mistrust, especially from the project managers. Such a low level of trust was due to the fact that during the period 2011-2012 elections, the opposition media started a campaign against ‘Nashi’, actively uploading videos and posts about pro-Kremlin movements. Any invitation to activists to participate in the research provoked the leader’s caution and suspicion. The biggest challenge came from the leaders of the movement; the project leaders and activists who tried to avoid communication with us. Only later, due to the change in the management of the movement, did the participants start discussing political topics with the researchers in any great detail. One ethical issue during the research was the problem of participating in rallies and actions that conflict with the personal political and ethical views of the researchers. The public manifestation of political views, which contradicted the researchers’ own understandings of the country’s political system, was the most problematic issue in the field.




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In the course of the study 22 interviews were conducted: 7 in the forum ‘Seliger‘ in July 2012; and another 15 during the period from August 2012 to January 2013. The total time spent interviewing was 30 hours. The composition of these interviewees was young men and women aged 16-35 and living in St. Petersburg, Petrozavodsk, Kaliningrad and Kondopoga. In the recruitment process, a gender balance was sought but in general young women outnumbered men in the movement. This should be set in the wider context that in the prokremlin movement young men have been involved with projects such as 'Fight Club' (pro-government project 'Boystovskii klub) and 'Narodnaya druzhina'; 'Nashi' activities which are always paired with traditionally masculine practices (protection during demonstrations, etc.). Research participants were recruited mainly through the ‘snowball‘ method. It turned out to be a successful strategy since there is a strong social network among participants. In the course of the research and the film production, it was decided to interview also the participants who are also involved in other projects along with ‘Vse doma’ (‘Run with me‘, ‘Khryushi Protiv‘, ‘ StopHam‘, ‘Volunteers of Petersburg‘), who are also former members of ‘Nashi‘. During the fieldwork it emerged that participants of ‘Vse doma’ are simultaneously involved in other projects of ‘Nashi 2.0’ so the boundaries of these project are blurred. A database of visual images and videos – 608 files – was also created. This was comprised of images and videos taken/of: Moscow, March 4, 2012 (50 Photos); Moscow February 2, 2013 – (101 photos); transbor (28 photos); Moscow May 7, 2012 (61 photos); and ‘Seliger‘ (368 photos). Additionally, a news database was created, involving 151 posts about the movement in Russian newspapers. These newspapers included: Polit.ru , Fontanka.ru, Newsru, Izvestiia, Gazeta , Interfax, Lenta.ru. The search was made with the use of keywords ‘Nashi’, ‘pro-Kremlin projects’, ‘youth movement’. The purpose in building this news database was to show the discursive field that has been constructed around youth political activism.

3. Key Findings

3.1 Structure, careers and hierarchies in the movement Many participants of the project are students of construction and architectural faculties, so ‘Vse doma‘ is often seen as an opportunity for professional development in these fields. Another important feature is the experience of geographic mobility: many members of the St. Petersburg branch of the movement moved there from other parts of Russia. Moving to the new city is described as a significant part of their biography, and the contrast in the available opportunities between St. Petersburg and their hometowns emerged as an important theme. As Alisa told us: ‘Then I said that I would not stay in my town because there is absolutely no future for me there, no career, no personal growth’ (Alisa). Moving to St. Petersburg is thus seen as a key educational and career strategy :

I got very bored with all this environment, I had a feeling that I understood everything there and it all made me so sad and I decided that this city is too small for me and I will not find any challenges there. (Alisa)




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Inclusion in the project is seen as a strategy of socialization in the new environment, finding new friends and networking in the professional sphere. In addition to ‘Vse doma’, the activists get involved in other activities: in projects belonging to ‘Nashi 2.0‘, volunteering and student services in universities, which help them adapt in the new city:

Since my first year in college I've been volunteering, and as soon as we were introduced, he invited to join ‘Nashi’. I understood that this was pretty interesting, especially since I was only in my first year- I didn't really know anything, and everything was interesting. And to this day, it's all interesting. (Alisa)

After moving to St. Petersburg, young people live in the dormitories provided by the university or share an apartment with friends and classmates. Despite migrating to another city, the participants are not financially independent and rely on their parent’s support. The social background of their families can be described as working-class with an average family income. In most of the cases, parents therefore indirectly support their children’s involvement in the Vse Doma project. However, the young people also hide from their parents the political side of their involvement and some even hide the existence of their activism completely. Inclusion in the movement is located by the participants in a certain biographical context, which they consider as a period of personal stagnation, lack of personal challenges or boredom with their daily routines:

It was a very difficult period of some personal stagnation. I did not know at all what to do or where to go, I needed some new experience and new impressions, because I had to move on in my life. (Galina)

Describing their motivations to participate in ‘Vse doma’, many participants based their arguments in the category ‘dvizhukha‘, which became a separate analytical category. The slang term stems from the Russian word ‘dvizhenie’ (movement); ‘dvizhukha’ is understood as an active and interesting pastime in the company of other young people – literally, ‘something that moves’. In addition, ‘dvizhukha‘ describes also civic activism as any vigorous activity, which may presuppose helping other people, or any activity in the broadest sense :

Interviewer.: What did you like most of all in the activism? Spiridon: Dvizhukha. It is just interesting. I’m for any kind of dvizhukha except for a hunger strike, as I said . Interviewer.: And what is dvizhukha for you? Spiridon: It’s something to keep you busy, something interesting to do, to be engaged in something, to help someone. Do something interesting, something to get seen (raskrutit’sya), to show myself. I am already on YouTube, on the photographs in the newspapers, I remember seeing myself in a few of them.

So inclusion Vse Doma is not always associated with civil activism per se or even active




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support for the government. Their reasons for participation also may not be well articulated and defined, as in the quote above. Quite often the project attracts young people as it responds to the activist’s demand for new social networks, communication, and group solidarity. The structure of the movement reflects several strategies of inclusion in pro-governmental activism and careers within the project, which are also the basis for the Vse Doma’s hierarchies. One of the motivations for young people to get involved in the project is based on its function as a form of leisure and a source of a new circle of friends. The project is also seen by some participants as a way to get to the ‘Seliger‘ forum, which in this group of activists is understood to be a leisurely, fun and interesting summer event. They are less interested in the possibility of building careers through the grants given at the forum. ‘Vse doma’ may be understood as one of the ways of spending free time along with other projects of ‘Nashi 2.0‘, in which young people may be involved as well. A professional or thematic focus of the movement in this case is not always of interest:

I would not say that someone is crazy about housing services and utilities, there is a group of people in each organisation who honestly believe in what they do. I think that housing services is not the field that gets you involved, but so far, I think that 10 percent actually enjoy it. The rest either came here because they were attracted or convinced by someone, or came here to get some bonuses [here bonuses mean political career and new social networks]. (Sveta)

Therefore, activity or ‘dvizhukha’, that is, public participation is seen by young people as a strong advantage of the project. Young people’s explanations are often based on the contrast of ‘monotonous everyday life’ before the project and the anticipation that Vse Doma will be the beginning of a new, active and brighter life. Another strategy of participation in the project is finding career opportunities in the field of construction and housing. As noted above, Vse Doma is heavily constituted by students of construction and architecture. They primarily see educational and career advantages in the project such as training and internships, as well as opportunities for networking in the professional sphere. In this case, the project is defined by these young people in terms of its professional orientation, which is regarded by many as the main advantages of the movement. So, when describing a successful activist within the framework of the project, the participants mentioned professional qualities and competencies in the housing field. There is, however, also a small group that participates in the project to support the current political regime and Putin. Activists of the project can be divided into three groups according to their position in the movement’s hierarchical structure: commissars (komisar), activists, and common activists, which were often called ‘myaso’ (meat). Let us consider each in turn. The Commissar’s community is a closed group, whose structure resembles a closed male fraternity or community with the mandatory initiation of participants and a high degree of secrecy regarding group practices. A Commissar is an activist of ‘Nashi‘ who was secretly




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initiated as a Commissar (posvyaschenie) in the secret headquarters of the movement. Among the requirements for Commissar candidates are at least 3 years of participation in the movement and mandatory participation in ‘Seliger‘ and federal rallies. Commissars form the elite of the movement and represent its main ideological core. Commissars are also often the leaders of pro-Kremlin campaigns. The members of the community wear an identifying sign: a Commissar’s icon with an individual identification number. Several times a year they hold private events for the participants in the movement and have year-round access to the Commissars’ house near the city of Pskov. Many Commissars do not have formal jobs and earn money through the activities of the movement. However, the role of the community has weakened recently, and Commissars have lost their status as ideological leaders. Basically, being a commissar does not presuppose particular benefits nowadays due to the crisis in the movement in general. The second category is activists. These are permanent members of Vse Doma who regularly participate in its campaigns, rallies, meetings and recruitment activities. They can be assistants of managers and commissars; usually they are involved for about 2-3 years in the movement. Activists can also be divided into ‘senior‘ and ‘junior‘ activists. The duties of ‘senior‘ activists include the announcement of upcoming events, the administration of social media groups and communities, supervision during rallies, and exercising control over the ban on alcohol and drug consumption during trips to Moscow. At the same time, these activists (or so called ‘pyatidesyatniki’ – activists who supervise groups of young people during rallies in Moscow, who are usually over 50 years old) must answer to another, higher level of the hierarchy: ‘They just call you by phone and say: ‘You are to supervise a bus of activists going to Moscow’ and it does not matter if you want to or not’ (Olga). This group includes activists mainly focused on a political career. They see Vse Doma in terms of its affiliation with governmental structures and the opportunities for self-promotion that these may allow. These activists are more knowledgeable of the history of the project and consider ‘Vse doma‘ as a continuation of ‘Nashi‘. In this case they also see ‘Nashi’ as a successful project, which gave young people many opportunities for self-development. The final category is ‘Junior‘ activists, who participate in the activities organised by the project, as well as initiating new activists. They do not have any privileges or responsibilities. Communication and friendship during campaigns and rallies are strictly hierarchical, where the leaders of the movement call other participants ‘myaso’ (meat) or ‘deti’ (children). However, such rhetoric is driven by their professional duties:

There were a lot of events when I supervised a bus [full] of people going to Moscow: truly, these people are like meat (myaso). We go there. Nobody understands what is happening or where to go. They move people here, make them stand there. Make them take pictures. (Olga)

‘Myaso’ are young people who participate in the rallies and other campaigns from time to time. Usually they are recruited for the federal actions in Moscow, which have significant media coverage; the aims of these rallies are not always clarified to them. These young people are recruited through ‘Vkontake’ social media; they are attracted by the opportunity




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to visit Moscow for free and make new friends. This group of young people responds to the project’s demand for mobilization at rallies, which require a certain amount of young people in order to have much of an impact. Contrary to popular opinion, these young people are not paid for participation in these campaigns. Quite often a career in the movement starts with participation in a campaign - local, federal - or ‘Seliger’ forum. Another key strategy for recruitment involves friendship and university networks. First, young people may find out information about youth projects in their hometowns through people undertaking recruitment in schools, colleges and universities. This is another characteristic of pro-Kremlin projects like Vse Doma: they do their main work of recruitment in non-central regions of Russia because St. Petersburg remains a problematic zone for such projects. This can be explained by the fact that Moscow funds the regional offices more than those in St. Petersburg. Youth in St. Petersburg have more economic, cultural and social capital like attending cultural events, meeting new people, access to a high-quality education, finding better jobs without the use of the movement compared to young people from smaller cities of Russia. Despite the professional and career orientation of some activists, most of the young people interviewed are very positive about the existing modes of friendship and togetherness in Vse Doma: participants not only come to the movement with friends, but also find new friends and manage to maintain communication with outside the movement. Unlike other ‘Nashi 2.0‘ movements, such as ‘Steel‘, for example, ‘Vse doma’ has more horizontal friendship networks, which can be explained by the weaker political and career orientation of the participants. However, it is also worth noting that all existing internal conflicts are based on the aforementioned differences in understandings of the project. Thus, for example, it is frowned upon when young people take part in the project solely for the opportunity to go to ‘Seliger‘ or as a way to spend their free time. Inclusion in the project presupposes the willingness to be active in the organised activities and meetings, as well as a readiness to perform required tasks and duties. Also, a decision to move to another project causes negative reactions due to high levels of competition among recruiters for new activists. The field of housing, according to them, is unattractive for young people, so the group tries to keep present participants from going to more interesting movements.

3.2 Street rallies and campaigns, discipline and daily life The politics of the movement are based on massive rallies, which often take place in Moscow. In such cases the daily routine of young people is based on strict discipline and control of their activities. The following practices are regulated, in particular: alcohol and drug consumption, obligatory registration prior to participation in the event, which is done through the collective photo before and after the rally, with mandatory wearing of the t-shirts, caps and badges with the movement’s symbols. The organisers of the event define certain rules and conditions, with which all the participants have to comply. The discipline is enforced from above (bodily discipline, behavior rules, space organisation) and supported by the internal rules of the group. Therefore, all the participants are subject to the controls of both real and symbolic




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power. However, the activists also invent tactics to resist this power. Groups of activists and leaders post announcements about an upcoming trip/rally in groups on ‘Vkontakte’. Quite often the rallies have a national character, so the announcements are posted in all regional project groups. The aim of the event is described as a free trip to Moscow for one day with an overnight stay on the bus. A meeting is then organised in the outskirts of St. Petersburg, where groups of 40 people are placed on the buses, which are supervised by the police on their way to Moscow. The head of the group instructs young people about the rules and regulations of the trip as well as the itinerary while driving. During the trip, which lasts on average between 11 to 15 hours, participants meet each other, play games, and discuss what they will do in Moscow. Quite often, the true purpose of the trip is not revealed until the start of the campaign. Control over the activities of the group is documented by a series of reports: during the action the group leader must take at least three photos: at the beginning near the bus, during the action itself and before the departure. All the activist’s faces should be visible in the photo. Personal data (passport information) of the protesters, together with the photographs, is sent in the form of a report to the leaders of the project, who then distribute money for each rally. Each participant gets instructions and movement’s emblems (T-shirts, flags):

May, 7 2012, Putin’s inauguration: Everyone got 14 pieces of Russian tricolor ribbons and a few pieces of St. George ribbons. Young people tied them on their wrists, hair, clothes, bags. They were told that they need to distribute them between 11 am and 6 pm to those who came to the celebration in honor of Putin’s inauguration. They also were supposed to photograph people with the sign ‘Putin loves everyone‘ or ‘I love Putin‘, if they agree, of course. I did not get a sign. We had six signs for our group and lots of ribbons. The head of the group said: ‘We will have to stand on St. Nicholas Avenue near ‘Jean-Jacques’ restaurant. If anyone starts throwing eggs at the president, catch those eggs! We will start going home at 8pm and we will not wait for anyone!‘ (Fieldwork diary, 7 May 2012)

However, some participants resisted these instructions. For example, some refused to participate in the rally, ran away from the group and came back when it ended. What is more, there are no sanctions for such behavior. Sometimes their resistance had a provocatively aggressive manner:

On our way to Moscow some young people started drinking alcohol, smoking and misbehaving. The head of the group stopped the bus and kicked them out. They started screaming aggressively that they do not care about Putin and hate the whole event. Then after they got out, we realized that they had pierced our tyre and we had to spend other two hours in the car tyre fitting. (Fieldwork diary, 4 March 2012)

Similar mechanisms of control and discipline take place in ‘Seliger’. The participants of the forum are disciplined on several levels: regulation of daily life (day regimen, body discipline) as well as rhetorical discipline like construction of the normative image of a civil activist.




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Regulation of everyday life is primarily represented in an arranged daily regimen. The schedule of all the activities is organised so that the participants have no time for privacy. The precise regulation of everyday life is done through a strict schedule: set times for waking up, assembly (postroenie), breakfast, study sessions until 1 pm, lunch, daytime session from 2.30 to 7 pm, dinner at 7 pm, evening assembly at 9 pm (postroenie), then bedtime at 11.30 pm. The only free time allotted for the participants is in the evening after the evening forming-up until 11.30 pm. After that, all the participants have to be in their camps, getting ready for bed, with the official bedtime around 1 am. The study sessions are held in the tents, and sometimes in the open air. During the lectures the camps are constantly checked by guards to make sure that all the participants of the forum are studying. If a guard notices someone outside the study area, he makes a mark on his or her badge. Three marks on a badge mean dismissal from the forum. The space of the camp is organised so that it is easier to control its participants. The territory is limited by two checkpoints, which control access to the camp. The space of the camp is also divided into zones, to which the participants have varying degrees of access depending on their status. For example, there are zones for teachers, commissars and instructors of the forum; zones for sports activities and studying. Therefore, this disciplinary power controls young people’s access to spaces, prescribing certain spaces where one can stay, which is similar to Foucault’s idea of the Panopticum (Foucault 2002). The authorities create a collective body through disciplinary practices and imposing certain norms of behavior. There is almost a complete lack of private space and everything is open to the public gaze: from toilets to cutlery. The forum tends to unify all the participants, removing their status markers and providing them with the same conditions: living together in tents, eating the same meals, lacking electricity, and control by guards. All the participants are visibly labeled according to their status in the camp, so that they can be identified by their T-shirts and badges. The higher the status of the participant, the greater the power and possibilities he or she has, for instance the ability to leave the territory or stay for longer outside after bedtime. The discourses in the forum construct a normative image of a citizen and participant of the forum. Being in ‘Seliger’ requires abstinence from drinking alcohol, swearing, and limited smoking. However, the forum’s ideology encourages (hetero)sexual activities and even marriage. Some activists – both male and female - said that a chance to find a partner during the campaign or ‘Seliger’ is a strong motivation to participate in the movement’s activities:

Watching sunset over the lake in the evening, so romantic! I don’t get how I did not understand during my first trip here that everyone wants to date. Now I do not care with whom, do not care where these people come from – the most important thing is to hook up with someone for seven to nine days. (Valentina)

Similar to the control of space, the bodies of participants are also regulated. The body is a product of discipline, regulated through the deprivation of its natural traits – smell, size etc. (Foucault, 2002). Such intimate body practices such as sex, hygiene and eating are controlled and regulated in the forum. The body of the participant is constantly exposed in the public




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space; all its actions - including physiological ones - undergo de-privatization. This is expressed in the construction of public toilets and washbasins, which are all connected to form a square. All the hygienic manipulations of the body such as washing and brushing teeth, as well as eating, become collective activities and make a ‘collective body’. Twenty participants and instructors eat at a common table three times per day. Additionally, there are compulsory group exercises, which everyone must attend. Every morning boys go jogging 5 km, while girls do fitness near the main stage with a professional trainer. Through such repeated body practices, common rules get internalized in an individual body, having been imposed by a certain order. Bodily functions take on a particular manifestation through the hygienic regimes established by the forum. Ideas of body discipline, particularly control over its ‘purity‘, are analysed by Goncharova in her study of prison regimes in women’s prison settlements (Goncharova 2012: 58). The study shows that besides officially established rules, prisoners themselves create their own norms and regulations. Therefore, the prison culture produces its own laws for social life while simultaneously being controlled by external and general restrictions. Similar processes can be found in the ‘Seliger’ forum, where young people establish their own rules and practices of resistance to exterior controls. Young people start negotiating power with the guards of the forum – whom they call ‘Perimeter’ - by giving them offensive nicknames, for example: ‘Perimeter’ is so cute this year, we call them ‘Bydlo from Bryansk’. We go for a walk at night, smoke wherever we want. And then everyone wonders where so many cigarette butts come from’, as Aksin’ya said (Fieldwork diary, 21 November 2012). Young people may also reorganise the system by establishing their own rules. For instance, the group determines by itself where smoking is allowed in their camp, even though it is officially prohibited to smoke in any place other than near the bonfire. Young people also resist the disciplinary system by informal economic practices. So, they introduce new ‘currency’, like salt, sugar and cigarettes instead of normal money. Using this new ‘currency’ the participants can obtain an extra portion of food or some extra free time after or during official bedtime:

We were sitting near the bonfire after 1 am. Then ‘Perimeter’ came up to us, ordering us to go to bed. Oleg said: ‘Let us speak some more, please. Do you want cigarettes (giving him five cigarettes)? The guard takes them and asks us to sit further from the main road so that others would not notice us. ‘Everything is sold and you can negotiate things’ – Oleg said. (Fieldwork diary, 29 July 2012)

Such informal economic practices are also customary for prison regimes (Goncharova 2012). However, many other participants internalize the norms and values of the camp, supporting its regimes and controlling practices. Total discipline and control can become the price for the larger advantages that the camp offers:

I came here for other reasons - to get a grant and just enjoy my time communicating with young people. I don’t care about these wars against or for Putin, ideologies, discipline. I have my personal aims and interests here. (Vera).




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Discipline is also manifested through language regulation, like a ban on criticism of ‘Nashi‘. The leaders of the forum try to distance themselves from the more politicized ‘Seliger‘ of the past – which used to be the ideological core of ‘Nashi’ - so any mention of the movement in the public space is outlawed. Alternative or competing discourses that come into conflict with the dominant one are suppressed and negatively perceived by the participants. For example, a young man, who was trying to impress the Minister of Education by referring to his successful career in ‘Nashi’, was mocked and booed by the audience. The episode also shows stigmatization of insincerity and politicized views among youth:

A guy from the crowd started presenting himself to the Minister: ‘I participate in seven different branches of ‘Nashi’. In this forum I participate in ‘Art Parade‘ and ‘Vse doma‘. I also do urban development’. In response, everyone in the audience started immediately making jokes about him. ‘I also write political poems. I just finished a novel. It is because everyone knows how creative people from Nashi are’. Everyone started booing and mocking him: ‘Boo that! You are Nashist!’ (Fieldwork diary, 25 June 2012)

Young people, it is suggested here, start sharing the values of pro-Kremlin youth movements through such disciplinary practices as well as the project’s promises about future political careers. Therefore, disciplinary practices, control and regulation of bodies and spaces produce a collective body that can be easily mobilized at the state’s command. All of the practices, regulation and taboos are aimed at bringing young people into a single collective body that meets the specific requirements of the political agenda: depersonalization, collectivity, easiness of management and control.

3.3 Attitude to politics, patriotism and relationships with state power Despite their frequent involvement in political rallies, the activists strongly deny possessing any of Vse Doma’s political objectives and distance themselves from any relation to ‘Nashi‘. Young people consider ‘Vse doma‘ to be an autonomous professional project aimed at solving specific problems in the housing sector and carrying out public control in this area. The participants may not know about the ‘Nashi’ movement at all or may reproduce the negative public discourse on the movement. At the same time, personal attitudes to politics clash with their public political participation. Their personal attitude to political life is indifferent or negative: the political sphere is not seen as a space for self-realization, and is often associated with dishonesty, ‘showing off’ and ‘adulthood’, entrance to which requires significant cultural and social resources and competencies. Relationships between the political sphere and young people are articulated almost exclusively through such institutions as the presidency and political parties, which one should know in order to present oneself as a competent citizen. Young activists also describe their disappointment in the political youth activism that forced them to leave the project, like in the case of activist Olga, who withdrew from the project later:

I got disappointed in some methods of political campaigning. ... the fact that there




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is a lot of showing off, for example. The best example: while there are elections, Gazprom’ is actively building sports centers for children, playgrounds etc. Once elections are over - back to reality again. Nothing works, nothing is built. Then the next elections come - again they start active work. Just it seems to me that somehow it’s all so rotten. (Olga)

Despite personal distancing from the political sphere and denial of any relation to the state, young activists accept public political participation, like rallies, supporting the government. However, they do not categorize such actions as political activities. This represents the main paradox of the movement: personal rejection of politics alongside active involvement in this sphere. Participants also address the issue of misunderstanding the purposes of such rallies, in which they participate, and the discomfort that arises from such activities:

Actually, we do not have a clear relation to the state power. That is, if someone asks: ‘Who do you support? Communists or United Russia?’ Who cares? We just want the housing to work properly! In this regard, in my opinion, we have nothing to do with politics. Although we are political just because there are people who used to be involved in politics. Well, plus the fact that we mobilize our resources, when it is necessary to do something in politics. Although now, thank God, they said that we will not do it anymore. (Olga)

In general, young people also tend to conceptualize political life in the context of their personal lives and the lives of their families. That is, they assess any political situation in terms of their families’ standards of living, when satisfying basic needs like education, university scholarships, employment and consumption correlates with the country’s stability and secure political situation. For example, in the following excerpt, Nina thinks about possible solutions if she becomes dissatisfied with the situation in the country, solutions like an oppositional movement, and says that she is satisfied with everything:

Nina: If a person does not like anything in his or her country, he or she can always migrate. I would like to live in Norway, for example, since it is a beautiful place. Int.: Is it easier for you to migrate? Nina: Well, surely, I will never migrate to Norway. Probably, I will just put up with the situation if things go bad. But I do not even know what can go bad. At the moment I am satisfied with everything, I live, study, eat, I’m happy about my life, I do not think anyone is being suppressed. I am totally fine.

Political participation in the form of rallies supporting the government is not regarded as a reactionary act and is not seen as an expression of political views or as a significant sphere of their life. From the perspective of the traditional approach to political activism, however, youth participation in the rallies is understood as a responsible act, an expression of active citizenship, while in our interviews, participants distance themselves from their involvement in politics, while actively participating in the pro-government rallies. It is noteworthy that young people talk about their exclusion from political life and the impossibility of influencing the situation in the country. Young people tend to focus on their personal lives, build relationships in the team and develop personal professional careers, rather than invest in




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political and civic activism. Therefore, the movement represents the conflict of public and personal understandings of politics. Young people actively participate in the political life of the country in a conventional sense – being involved in public rallies and demonstrations in the squares of Moscow. However, in most of the cases, young people distance themselves from politics, expressing disappointment, mistrust and a sense of exclusion from the political life of the country. Explaining their participation in political rallies, young people do not point to the meanings of political activism or civil engagement, but talk about social networks, group risks and pleasures, solidarities and ‘dvizhukha’. Therefore, there is a clash between the public expectations towards young people to be politically active and young people themselves having opposing understandings of political and public engagement. What gains more importance is that young people feel moral obligations towards the group and a sense a duty to participate in the action driven by the group solidarity, even if he or she disagrees with its theme. For example, in the following excerpt Spiridon talks about his feeling of obligation and moral duty to participate in the political event, although he does not want to:

Usually when I do not like something or I disagree, I do not do such things. But sometimes they called me for actions, which I physically could not take part in – I had to do other things. But people relied on me, I just could not betray them. And then I had a weird feeling, I was in a rally and thinking: ‘Why am I here if I have to be in another place?’ I try to forget about such moments, of course. (Spiridon)

Another discourse related to participation in the rallies is about risks, pleasure and glorification of their participation. For example, young people interviewed had to spend a few days in Moscow during one of the political rallies supporting Putin and stay over night in a place with very poor conditions. Even though this can be interpreted that the state uses young people without providing them with adequate living conditions, young people tend to idealise their being there and with pleasure accept it as a life challenge. As Polina says:

We suffered physically there, we had difficult living conditions, we were sleeping on the floor, and someone also added phenolphthalein to our food. It was hard but we all understood that we had to do it, we were all motivated, we became stronger and for other people it was a personal challenge. I even made up a poem after this event for the first time in my life, because it was born in me at that moment. And after that we all became like brothers. (Polina)

As seen in the excerpt, the meaning of politics or revolt against such treatment is not central in the narrative, but instead, social ties, solidarity, risk-taking and a heroic view of activism construct the key meanings of conventional political participation.

3.4 Understanding of history and historical memory In relation to history, young people mainly treated our questions as an assessment of his or her knowledge on the subject. History is understood more as a school subject, an area which




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requires precise knowledge rather than a topic for normal discussion. For example, young people repeatedly said that their knowledge of history is very poor when the interviewer asked them to think of any historical events which are significant to them. Young activists believe that the answers to our questions about history should be found in the textbooks, with no room for personal interpretations. Yet, one of the key reference points in the understanding of history is the mythologized image of the Soviet Union. This historical period is romanticized and seen through positively moralized categories like duty, solidarity, mutual support among people, devotion to work: ‘at that period it was a shame to be a parasite [tunejadets], not to work for country and family. Today everyone is on their own, living for themselves’ (Spiridon). The image of the Soviet Union is shaped through positive moral values; and the past is judged through moral categories, in general. Young people are nostalgic about the Soviet past and find the ideal of moral values in this period attractive. Contrasting the Soviet past with the present day, young people show disappointment in the absence of solidarity among people and growing social inequality, which is a great issue of concern for them. Through the creation of the ideal image of the Soviet Union, young people articulate the absence of common ethical ideals and values, and the prevalence of competitiveness and individualism in contemporary Russia. In general, young people support traditional values, idealize family values, and reproduce homophobic discourses. They also respond positively to state representations of the external enemy, trying to defeat the strong traditional values of Russia, for example, the campaign against the adoption of Russian children by Americans, which was driven by state law. Young people are also nostalgic about Soviet leadership in the world, the unity of several national republics and economic development, which, in their opinion, might have been possible due to solidarity and interdependence among people. As Olga told us:

Yet, I don’t understand how the country could return to its normal state after the war [Great Patriotic War] so quickly. There was a real boom and rise! I do not know how to explain this; maybe, because we won? Or maybe, it is because of the Soviet spirit, when ‘all people are brothers’? And ‘we will build a great country together’ There was a real rise. (Olga)

Besides, the Soviet period is positively associated with the figure of Stalin. Recent research has shown a tendency towards a positive opinion about Stalin’s rule and a state agenda what that is redefining this historical period more positively. Young people seem to reproduce this positive discourse about Stalin and express the demand for a strong authoritative ruler of the country, doing real politik. The country’s leadership and authority in the international arena seems more important than the standards of living and position of individual:

People portray Stalin as a tyrant or despot. I disagree because he forced the country into great development and we won the war thanks to him, other countries started respecting us. The same with Peter the Great. He brought in some development during the stagnation of that period. Of course people will always hate them and the changes they made. (Alisa)




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If the Soviet period is romanticized and idealized, the decade of the 1990s is considered the period of ‘wrong history’ and the degradation of the nation. Such a negative depiction of this historical period is common knowledge among all pro-Kremlin activists. In supporting this position, young people rely on their own experiences, when they were kids aged 3-5 years old, as well as their parent’s experiences. Young people frequently argue in ways that reproduce key sources of historical knowledge, especially from school textbooks and the family:

Everyone - grandmothers and grandfathers - talk about how great it was in the USSR. We had everything! Nothing was wanting. But now my mother can’t travel anywhere. At that time, she travelled to Bulgaria on vacation every summer. Regularly! Now she can’t afford it. (Vera)

Also, the representation of a national enemy is an important reference in the understanding of both the past and the present of Russia. For example, the presence of an enemy during the Great Patriotic War allowed the nation to feel united and, therefore, progress later on. So the main meaning of the war is illustrated through the term ‘splochenie’ (unity). Similarly, oppositional movements, which are seen as an internal enemy, are understood as a threat, which in the present day can split the country. The fear of a divided country and civil war in general, which are constantly actualized in their narratives about the past, are strong images for young people. The unity of the nation, and a search for common values, are the main vectors of understanding of history and civil values. Evidently, the historical timeline conceputalised by young people in their narratives represents a heroic and victorious past, where the central event is taken by the Great Patriotic war. In recent years the Russian government has extensively used the image of the war, which also lies at the centre of patriotic youth education. As seen from our interviews, the narrative about the heroic past of Russia is easily raised in discussions of the past among young people. Again the previous heroism and success of the country becomes possible due to the specific ‘spirit’ of people living in that period: the priority of the country and family as opposed to the selfishness and individualism of today. As one of our participants, Kristina, says:

I really hate it when people say we live in a terrible country, that it’s impossible to live here, that there is no upside, no possibility for development, that they’re gonna go off to America. Well, firstly, they ought to leave, since they couldn’t do anything good for our country anyway, if he doesn’t believe in it. And secondly, many people who do achieve something say that everything is possible in Russia, that nowhere else is it easier to succeed. (Krisitina)

Additionally, the meaning of patriotism, in general, is constructed through the protection – mostly physical – of the country against enemies. Talking about the ideal image of patriotism, young people instinctively refer to the Great Patriotic war. Therefore, the key understanding of history is constructed through the attribution of certain moral values to the past, which are lost in contemporary Russia. Such values are solidarity,




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mutual support and interdependency, devotion to the country, family, and community. Young activists construct a nostalgic and mythologized image of the country, whose symbols and ideal values are situated in the past. Being nostalgic about these values, which they find in the Soviet past, young people also point out the different structural conditions today, when an individual should think of his or her own life and compete for scarce resources. Young people automatically point to the Soviet imperative for patriotism and the ideal of loyalty to the country, when the modern state does not provide young people with sufficient resources (as it did in the Soviet period). Thus young people combine a commitment to common values and nostalgia for solidarity with contemporary demands for competitiveness and individualism.

4. Conclusion

Despite an attempt to distance itself from the stigmatized political connotations of ‘Nashi’, ‘Vse doma’ plays a role in the political socialization of young people, as well as functions as an easily mobilized resource for the government. Additionally, the main strategies of recruitment, management, organisation of rallies, and mobilization of people are inherited from the past of ‘Nashi’. Even though there are attempts to find a new language of talking about patriotism in Russia nowadays2, the state continues to build its relations with young people on the moral imperatives of duty and love of the country. Such an attempt to establish a model of youth policy leads to the transformation of the concept of ‘patriotism‘ into a pragmatic resource of career advantage as career-builders of ‘Vse doma’ show. The relations between the state and youth in ‘Vse doma’ can be described as a mutual exchange of resources, where the leading activists organise mass campaigns supporting the government, while the state provides them with the capital for building a future political career. The creation of a patriotic mythology as a form of political identity for young people has the opposite effect and leads to the complicit adaption of political behavior to the ‘requests‘ of the state. What makes us uneasy is how responsive young people in ‘Vse Doma’ are to the state agenda and how sometimes they reproduce the imposed new values of citizenship – homophobia, anti-immigration sentiments, purity of the nation, traditional gender norms – as well as how the image of the country is framed around the images of internal and external enemies. The ‘moralizing narrative’ and idea of pure moral values, which the country and its citizens have to protect against the enemies, is easily insinuated into the thinking about the country, its past and position in the world, and citizenship. This is also shown by young people’s nostalgia about the past, which is strongly mythologized and romanticized from parents and school. The past for them is mainly represented as an ideal of moral values: solidarity, sacrifice for the country, strong family and community values. However, young people find themselves in a

2 See, for example: Belokonev, S. ‘”Nashi” pravil’no sdelali chto rastvorilis’’, Polit.Ru 24.09.2013. http://polit.ru/article/2013/09/24/belokonev; ‘“Nashi” stali chuzhimi’, Kommersant 29.01.2008 . http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/846635

http://polit.ru/article/2013/09/24/belokonev




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conflict between the state’s demand for young people’s sacrificial service to the country – mainly idealized by the image of the Great Patriotic war – and contemporary ideals of personal success, career-building, and competitiveness, which is shown by activist’s hopes concerning moving to St. Petersburg. ‘Vse doma’ use a particular language of citizenship, which is framed around the country’s moral values, strongly supported by the officially transmitted historical narratives. In the end, this shows the state’s hypocrisy in imposing a moral order on young people, while giving no social guarantees back. Paradoxically, young activists find themselves simultaneously actively involved in and excluded from the political life of the country. Young people in ‘Vse Doma’ express disappointment in the political sphere, associating it with dishonesty and unfairness, and consider it an elite sphere requiring sufficient capital. Their formal presence in political life through participation, in the political rallies and protests, is motivated by non-political values such as group solidarity, ’dvizhukha’, moral obligation to a group, the pleasure of risk-taking, and the idealisation of confrontations against the opponents. Risk and pleasure, rather than the formal belonging to one side of the political spectrum, start playing a more important role in the political battles on the streets. This implies the need for some redefinition of the term ‘political participation’ and greater flexibility in searching for the meanings of ‘political’ among young people.

5. Future Analysis As a continuation of the research, the career development of informants might be followed. How successful were members of ‘Vse doma’ in building their adult careers? Was this trade-off of the loyalty to the state for the hope of career promotion justified? On the one hand, it is possible to speak about ‘moral’ careers, when members become disappointed in activism and rethink their previous experiences of participation. What bonuses does participation offer in the institutionalized activism of others cases? In terms of cross-case analysis, comparisons might be made of observed hierarchies within pro-government movements as well as the exploration of gender dimensions of the activism of groups or participants. It would be interesting also to compare the Russian case with other countries’ state-managed youth movements in terms of young people’s motivations to become a part of the project. Is the finding of this study, that youth becomes involved in the project to obtain social capital and career benefits, a common trait of state-controlled or other formally organised activism? Finally, a theme for further analysis might be the question of whether participation in pro-government movements is associated with a tendency towards deterritorialization of the locality, and how strong that tendency is? It might also be of interest to explore how the totalitarian past is understood within pro-government movements in other countries sharing this political heritage.




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6. References

Atwal, M. (2009) ‘Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability: autonomy, agency and activism’, Europe-Asia Studies, 61(5): 743-58. Borusyak L. (2005) ‘ ‘Nashi’: kogo I kak uchat spasat’ Rossiyu’, Vestnik obshchestvennogo mneniya, 5: 17-29. Chebankova, E. (2013) Civil society in Putin’s Russia, Routledge Press. Chuprov V., Zubkov Y., Vil’yams S. (2001) Molodezh’ v obshchestve riska, Sankt-Petersburg: Nauka. Duncan, P. J. S. (2013) ‘Russia, the West and the 2007–2008 Electoral Cycle: Did the Kremlin Really Fear a ‘Coloured Revolution’?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 65(1): 1-25. Fuko, M. (1994) Slova i vezhi. Arheologia gumanitarnjih nauk, Sankt-Petersburg: A-cad. Fuko, M. (2002) ‘Vlast’ i telo’ in Intellektuali i vlast’: isbarnije politicheskie stat’i, Moskva: Praktis, pp.161-71. Gavrov, S. (2010) Modernization of Russia : the post-imperial Transit, MGUDT: Moscow. Hemment, J. (2012) ‘Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making Sense of Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia’, Slavic Review, 71(2): 234-60. Goncharova N. (2012) ‘Rezhimji normalizatsii i kontrolya telesnosti v zhenskoi tur’me: tyuremnaya gigiena’ in E. Omel’chenko (ed.) Do i posle tur’mi. Zhenskie istorii, Sankt-Peterburg: Aleteya, pp.53—68. Gromov D. (2009) ‘Dvizhenie ‘Nashi’. 2007 god’ in M. Martinova M. (eds) Molodezhnie subkulturi Moskvi, Moskva: IA RAN, pp.115-72. Horvath, R. (2011) ‘Putin’s ‘Preventive Counter-Revolution’: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet Revolution’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63(1): 1-25. Ishkanian, A. (2008) Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia, Routledge Press. Ivanova E. (2012) 'Problema pokolenii i vosproizvodstvo naselenia: teoreticheskie podkhodi I real’nost’', Sociologicheskie issledovaniia, 4:42-53. Kamnev D. (2007) ‘Provlastnie massovie molodezhnie organisatii i problema politicheskogo uchastiya molodezhi’ in Y. Urnov, L. Polyakov, G. Ivanchenko (eds) ‘Politicheskoe’ i ‘sotsial’noe’ v informatsionuyu epokhu, Moskva: GU-VSHE, pp.147-56.




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Kamnev D. (2009) ‘Analiz osnovnikh modeley politicheskoi sotsailizatsii molodezhi’ in N. Zhelnakova (ed) Molodezh’ v sotsiokulturnoi srede regiona: materialii regional’noi nauchno-practicheskoi konferentsii, Starvopol’: Vozrozhdenie, pp.212-18. Kamnev D. (2010) ‘Sub’ektno-institutsional’nij podkhod v issledovanii deyatel’nosti molodezhnikh organisatsii ‘Molodaya Gvardia’ i ‘Nashi’ po politicheskoi sotsiailizatsii molodezhi’ v sovremennoy Rossii’ in G. Morozov (eds) Politicheskoe obrazovanie I grazhdanskaya pozitsija molodogo pokolenia Rossii, Kazan’: Kazanskij federal’nij universitet, pp.110-20. Kudryavtsev M. (2011) ‘Mesto molodezhnikh politicheskikh dvizhenii v sisteme voenno-patrioticheskogo vospitaniya grazhdan’, Vestnik MGOU, 2: 230-33. Laruelle, M. (2011) ‘Negotiating History. Memory Wars in the Near Abroad and Pro–Kremlin Youth Movements’, Demokratizatsiya, 19(3): 233-52. Lassipa J. (2009) ‘ ‘Druzhba narodov’ i ’black and white parties’: Bor’ba s fashizmom v ritorike Democraticheskogo Antifashistkogo Molodezhnogo Dvizheniya ‘Nashi’ in E. Omel’chenko (ed.) Neokoncheniy analiz: Ksenofobskie nastroeniia v molodezhnoi srede, Ul’yanovsk: Ul’yanovskii universitet, pp. 123-137. Lassila, J. (2012) The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II. The search for Distinctive Conformism in the Political Communication of Nashi, 2005-2009, ibidem-Verlag: Stuttgart. Marchenkov A. (2006) ‘Ne ‘nasha’ molodezh’: molodezhnoe dvizhenie v sovremennoi Rossii’, Neprikosnovennnii zapas, 1(45): 95-102. Mijnssen, I. (2012) The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I. Back to Our Future! History, Modernity and Patriotism according to Nashi’, 2005-2012, ibidem-Verlag:Stuttgart/Hannover. Omel’chenko E. (2005) ‘Molodezhnii aktivizm v Rossii i global’nie transformatsii ego smisla’, Dhurnal issledovanii sotsial’noi politiki, 3(1): 59-86. Omel’chenko E. (2006) ‘Pop-kul’turnaya revolutsiia ili perestroechnii remeik? Sovremennii kontekst molodezh’nogo voprosa’, Neprikosnovennnii zapas, 1 (45):127-136. Omel’chenko E. and Sabirova G. (eds) Noviie molodezhnie solidarnosti. Ul’yanovsk: Ul’yanovskii universitet. Omel’chenkoe E. and Pilkington H. (eds) (2012) S chego nachinaetsya Rodina: molodezh’ v labirintakh patriotism, Ul’yanovsk: Ul’yanovskii universitet. Radina N. (2001) ‘‘Neprotivlenie zlu nasiliem’: o kharaktere aktivizma rossiiskikh nepravitel’stvennikh organisatsii’, Dzhurnal issledovanii sotsial’noi politiki, 9(2): 207-18.




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Robertson, G. B. (2009) ‘Managing society: protest, civic society and regime in Putin’s Russia’, Slavic Review, 68(3): 528-47. Sennet R. (2002 ) Padenie publichnogo cheloveka, Moskva: Logos. Shchepanskaya, T. (1999) Antropologiia molodezh’nogo aktivizma in V. Kostyushev (ed.) Molodezhnie dvizheniia i subkulturi Sankt-Petersburga, Sankt-Petersburg: Norma, pp. 262-302. Sperling, V. (2012) ‘Nashi Devushki: Gender and Political Youth Activism in Putin’s and Medvedev’s Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 28(2): 232–61. Stanivaya, T. Molodezh’nije organisatsii v sovremennoy Rossii, POLITKOM.RU, 2009. http://www.politcom.ru/2009/analit275.php. Varga, M. (2008) ‘How political opportunities strengthen the Far Right: understanding the rise in far-right militancy in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 60(4): 561-79. Verkhovskii, A. (2001) ‘Evolyutsiia postsovetskogo dvizheniya russkikh natsionalistov’, Vestnik obshestvennogo mneniya, 107(1): 11-35. Zuev, D. (2013) ‘The Russian March: Investigating the Symbolic Dimension of Political Performance in Modern Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 65(1): 102-26.

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7. Appendix: Table 1: Socio-demographic profile of respondents

Pseudonym Gender Age Ethnicity (self-declared)

Educational status Employment status Family status Residential status

1 Dima M 24 White/Russian Completed University Unemployed (in army) Single Lives alone

Lives with parents

2 Sasha M 31 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time employment Divorced Lives alone 3 Vika F 21 White/Russian Current undergraduate Unemployed Single Lives with

parents 4 Alisa F 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time employment Single Living in student

hostel 5 Galina F 22 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time employment Single Lives with

parents 6 Kristina F 19 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time (irregularly)

employed In partnership Lives with

parents 7 Valentina F 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time (irregularly)

employed In partnership Living in student

hostel

8 Nikita M 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Unemployed In partnership Living alone

9 Alina F 21 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time (irregularly) employed

Single Lives with mother

10 Olga F 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Unemployed In partnership Living with parents

11 Polina F 30 White/Russian Completed University Works as a teacher Married Lives with husband

12 Spiridon M 21 White/Russian Current undergraduate In full time education In partnership Living in student hostel

13 Sveta F 22 White/Russian Completed University, post-graduate student

Works as a teacher Engaged Living with parents




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14 Iana F 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time (irregularly) employed

Single Living independently

15 Aksinia F 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time employment Single Living in student hostel

16 Faina F 19 White/Russian Current undergraduate In full time education Single Living with parents

17 Matvei M 24 White/Russian Completed University, post-graduate student

Works as a teacher Single Lives independently

18 Vova M 19 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time (irregularly) employed

Single Living in student hostel

19 Petr M 20 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time employment Single Living in student hostel

20 Lika F 26 White/Russian Completed University Works as a teacher In partnership Living with parents

21 Luba F 21 White/Russian Completed vocational school

Part-time employment Single Living with friends

22 Vera F 19 White/Russian Current undergraduate Part-time employment Single Living in student hostel

myplace (memory, youth, political legacy and civic … 5 youth sections of... · region author(s)...

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