naciones divididas
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Patterns of Development and Nationalism: Basque and Catalan Nationalism before the SpanishCivil WarAuthor(s): Juan Diez MedranoSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Aug., 1994), pp. 541-569Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/657890
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Patterns of development and nationalism: Basque and
Catalan
nationalism before
the
Spanish
Civil
War
JUAN
DfEZ MEDRANO
University
of California,
San
Diego
Bizkaya,
if
dependent
on
Spain,
cannot address
God, cannot, in practice, be Catholic.
Sabino
Arana
From its
constituting
a
nationality,
Catalonia
derives
its
right
to form a
separate
state,
a
Catalan
state.
From
the current
political
arrangements,
from Catalonia's
long standing
cohabitation
with
other
peoples,
derives a certain
element
of
unity,
of
community,
which these
peoples ought
to
preserve
and
consolidate.
ValentiAlmirall
These
quotations
from two of the
major
ideologues
of
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism,
respectively,
reflect
two
radically
different con-
ceptions
of
what the nation is and two
significantly
different
political
programs
for the
Basque Country
and
Catalonia:
independence
and
adherence to tradition for the
former,
federalism/confederalism
and a
secular and
capitalist organization
of
society
for
the latter. The
Basque
and Catalan nationalist movements
differed
substantially
in
their
char-
acter
despite
the
fact that
they
developed
simultaneously
in
two
ethni-
cally
distinct
Spanish
communities,
that
stood out
in
terms of their
high
level
of
industrial
development
relative to
the rest of
Spain,
and that
had
experienced
intense
immigration
from
the
poorest
regions
of
Spain.
Therefore,
this contrast between
Basque
and Catalan
national-
ism
questions
the
suitability
of
explanations
of
peripheral
nationalism
that stress the role of relative levels of
development,
of cultural distinc-
tiveness,
and
of
the
socially
disruptive
effects of
the
arrival
of
large
numbers of
immigrants.
While
these
explanations
may
be
useful to
explain
the
emergence
and
dynamics
of
nationalism,
they
are
ill-suited
to
explain
what
constitutes the
exclusive
focus
of
this
article,
that
is,
dif-
ferences
in
the
character of
nationalist
movements.
Theory
and
Society
23:
541-569,
1994.
? 1994 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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542
To
explain
these
programmatic
differences,
I
analyze
how
specific
pat-
terns of
development impinged
on
the
different
social
groups
that
formed
Basque
and
Catalan
society.
More
precisely,
I
focus on
how
pre-industrial
social
groups
in
these
societies
experienced
capitalist
development
and on
the
type
of
ties
that the
Basque
and Catalan
capi-
talist elites
established with
the
Spanish
economy
and
polity.
Relative
levels of
development
and
peripheral
political
nationalism
Contrary
to what
scholars
in
the
modernization
theory
tradition,
the
internal colonialism
tradition,
and other
theoretical traditions1
would
predict,
nationalism
in
Spain
has
always
been
stronger
in
its
most
developed
areas,
the
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia,
than
in
its less
developed
areas,
such as
Galicia.
In
1977,
Nairn
suggested
that
uneven
development
is the
primary
explanation
of
nationalism
and,
therefore,
that
peripheral
nationalism
is as
likely
in
overdeveloped
as
in under-
developed
peripheral
areas.2 Nairn
sees uneven
regional development
as an inevitable outcome of
capitalist
expansion
that leads to
periph-
eral nationalism whenever
regional
inequalities overlap
with
ethnic dif-
ferentiation.3 Like Linz
and
Douglass,4
Nairn
posits
that
having
im-
perial possessions
keeps
states from
seeing
a
need to build
national
identities,
largely
because
they
are
able to extract
large
revenues
from
their colonies.5
According
to these
authors,
while
empires
last and
do
not
weigh
too
heavily
on
the
peripheral regions
of
the
core
state,
pe-
ripheral regions
tend to
accept
subordination to the
core.
However,
when the empire begins to unravel, peripheries will rebel against the
new
financial,
political,
and
military
demands made
by
the core.
Nairn
emphasizes
the role of
uneven
development
as a
mobilizing
force: both
underdeveloped regions
and
over-developed 6
regions
are
likely
to
promote
nationalist movements
when
state
membership
no
longer presents advantages.
In
underdeveloped regions
nationalist
movements
mobilize the
population against
the
persistence
of ethnic
economic inequality, while in over-developed regions nationalist move-
ments
mobilize the
population
to
push
for state reforms
that
will
pro-
mote further
regional
development.7
The
Spanish
case fits Nairn's
explanation
for the
development
of
pe-
ripheral
nationalism
quite
well. The
development
of
Basque
and Cata-
lan nationalism
was
in
part
an indirect
consequence
of
Spain's
loss
of
its
imperial
possessions.
The achievement
of
independence
by
the
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543
Latin American colonies
throughout
the
nineteenth
century
worsened
the
state of
Spain's public finances, already
strained
by
the
European
wars of the late
eighteenth
and
early
nineteenth
centuries.8 Faced
with
this
crisis and
in
order to extract more revenues
and to
promote
eco-
nomic
development
in
Spain,
absolutist and
constitutional
monarchs
enacted centralization measures
(political, juridical,
and
cultural).
These
policies impinged
most
severely
upon
the two
communities that
had
preserved
their
particular political
and
juridical
institutions the
longest
and that were still
distinguished
from
the rest of
Spain by
lan-
guage:
Catalonia and the
Basque
Provinces.
In
both
communities,
cen-
tralization
policies
were
opposed by
significant
segments
of their socio-
economic
elites,
who
by
the
end
of
the
nineteenth
century,
in
the
spirit
of
the
time,9
began
to
articulate
their
grievances
through
nationalist
mobilization.
In
the case
of
Catalonia,
the
independence
of
Cuba in
1898 also
had harmful economic
consequences
that intensified con-
flict
between the
Catalan
bourgeoisie
and the
Spanish
state.
The
impact
of the
loss
of
the
colonies on
the
development
of
Basque
and Catalan
nationalism,
however,
should not be
over-emphasized,
for
it
cannot account for
their
programmatic
features.
Nairn
cannot
explain,
for
instance,
the
separatist
and
reactionary
character of
Basque
nationalism,
which
differed
dramatically
from the
pro-capitalist
and
generally
non-separatist
character of
Catalan
nationalism.
Only
the
latter fits
his
expectations
about
the
character
of
nationalism
in
an
overdeveloped
region.
The Basque anomaly raises serious doubts about the validity of a
sociological
explanation
of
types
of
nationalism
based
on
levels of
development.
Differences in
the
character of
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism also
reveal the
limitations of
previous
sociological
work
on
the
relationship
between
economic
development
and
nationalism
(modernization
theory,
ethnic
competition
theory,
the
reactive
ethnicity
perspective).10
Indeed,
neither
underdevelopment
nor
relative
levels of
ethnic
competition
can
explain
differences in
the
character of
Basque
and Catalan nationalism, since both regions were overdeveloped and
characterized
by
similar
levels of
ethnic
competition.
To
account for the
different
types
of
nationalism
that
developed
in
the
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia one
needs
to
stress the
role of
class
interests in
mediating
the
effects of
development
processes
on
na-
tionalist
political
mobilization.
This
strategy,
which
by
no
means
implies
that
ethnic
conflict
is
only
class
conflict
in
disguise,l2
has been
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544
used
by
many
historians
or
comparative
historical
sociologists13
who
have studied nationalism. It treats ethnic
groups
as
socially
differenti-
ated
groups
in which
social actors
pursue
both ethnic
and
class
inter-
ests
through political
action.14
In
doing
so,
it
opens up
alternative
ways
of
explaining
peripheral
nationalism,
focused as
much on
class conflict
within ethnic
groups
as
on
center-periphery
conflict.15
Unfortunately,
work
in
this
historically
oriented
tradition
focuses
almost
exclusively
on
the
relationship
between class
interests
and
nationalism.
What is
missing
in
this work but
present
in
the
three
socio-
logical
traditions criticized above is an
emphasis
on the
relationship
between
development
and nationalism.
In
this
article,
I link the
two
approaches
by analyzing
how
development processes
shape
national-
ism
by creating
constellations
of class
and
ethnic
interests
that
provide
a context
for
center-periphery
relations
and
for
class
relations
within
peripheral
regions.
However,
unlike
previous
work
on
the
relationship
between
development
and
nationalism,
I
stress
specific
patterns
of
development
instead
of levels
of
development.
I
demonstrate
the
rele-
vance of two
major components
of these different patterns of develop-
ment
in
accounting
for the
differences
between
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism:
The extent
to which
traditional
societies
were able
to
benefit
from
capitalist development
during
the
transition
to the
capital-
ist mode
of
production
and
the
strength
of the
ties established
by
emer-
ging
capitalist
elites
with the
state's
economy
and
polity.
My
two
hypo-
theses
are:
1) That traditionalist and separatist political nationalism was more
intense
in
the
Basque
Country
than
in
Catalonia
because
the Catalan
peasantry
and
pre-industrial
elites
were better
able
to
adapt
to and
benefit
from
nineteenth-century capitalist
industrialization
than
were
the
Basque peasantry
and
pre-industrial
elites.
2)
That
the relative
weight
of
traditionalist
and
separatist
political
nationalism
was
more intense
in the
Basque
Country
than
in
Catalonia
because the Basque capitalist elite was not nationalist while the Catalan
capitalist
elite
was.
Although
the
Catalan
capitalist
elite
was
not
separa-
tist,
it
became nationalist
because,
unlike the
Basque
elite,
it was
not
able
to
directly
influence the
Spanish
state's
decisions
-
through
presence
in
the
government
or
through
the
lobbying power
of
its indus-
trial
associations.
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The
relative
prosperity
of
Catalan
agriculture
compared
with
Basque
agriculture
and the
predominance
of
a
capital goods industry
in
the
Basque Country
versus a consumer
goods
industry
in
Catalonia
were
the
main structural factors
that
shaped
the
political
attitudes
of
the
peasantry, pre-industrial
elites,
and
capitalist
groups
in
both
regions.
The
comparative
focus
of
this
article
contributes to
the
explanation
of
Basque
and Catalan
nationalism.'6
It
builds
upon
Linz's work
by
iso-
lating
those economic
factors which
intensified the
crisis of
the Old
Regime
in
the
Basque Country
compared
with
Catalonia,
by
analyzing
the
major
causes of the different attitudes of
capitalist
elites
in
both
regions
toward
nationalism,
and
by
supporting
these
explanations
with
precise
empirical
information,
something
that
is
lacking
in
previous
work
on
pre-Civil
War
Basque
and Catalan
nationalism.
These are
important
analytical
gaps
in
the
literature
on
Basque
and Catalan
nationalism.
Scholars
writing
on
the
Basque
Country
have
provided
a
plausible
interpretation
of
the
development
of
a
traditionalist form
of
nationalism,
but have
not
explained
why
the
bourgeoisie
did not
spon-
sor more decisively a bourgeois form of nationalism.
Conversely,
those
writing
on
Catalonia
explain
why
the
bourgeoisie
became
nationalist
but
do not
explain
why
a
traditionalist form
of
nationalism
was
all but
absent from
the
Catalan
political
scene.17
I
have
relied here on
secondary
literature,
on
the
writings
of
the
most
influential
nationalist
ideologues
and
political
leaders
in
both
Catalonia
and the
Basque
Country,
and on the
Spanish
Directory
of
Corpora-
tions and Financial Institutions of 1922. The information contained in
this
directory
(company,
sector of
the
economy,
location,
assets,
and
members of
the
board
of
directors)
has been
transferred to a
computer
database,
and to
my
knowledge
this is
the
first
systematic
analysis
of
this
valuable
source of
information.18
It
provides
a
very
useful
tool
to
measure
two
major
elements of
the
explanation
offered
in
this
article:
the
difference
in
the sizes
of
Basque
and
Catalan
capitalism
and the
dif-
ference
in
strength
of
the
economic
ties
that
Basque
and
Catalan
capi-
talist elites established with the rest of Spain in the first third of this
century.
Basque
nationalism:
1876-1936
Basque
nationalism
developed
between
the
end of
the
Second
Carlist
War
(1872-1876)
and the
Spanish
Civil
War
(1936-1939).19
Nation-
alist
leaders were
members
of the
lower
middle
class,
who
sponsored
a
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546
traditionalist
form
of
nationalism,
and members of
the local
bourgeoi-
sie,
who
sponsored
a
liberal
form
of
nationalism. As
many
authors have
noted,
the
Basque capitalist
elite
was
not
nationalist
and
supported
the
monarchic
Conservative
and
Liberal
parties.20
Until
1898,
traditionalist
and
liberal
nationalist
leaders
ran
separate
political organizations,
the
Basque
Nationalist
Party
and the Uni6n
Vasco-Navarra
respectively.
They
were
unsuccessful,
however,
because
the
traditionalist
and
liberal
constituencies
favored
political parties
with
a
Spanish
orientation. The
lack
of
political support
for
Basque
nationalism
explains why
the leaders of its two branches
eventually
formed
a
coalition in
1898,
despite
profound
ideological
differences.
This
coalition
kept
the
name of the
Basque
Nationalist
Party (BNP).
Thereafter,
although
the
pro-business
sector
of
the
Basque
Nationalist
Party
provided
many
of the
BNP's
candidates
to
General
Elections and
prevented
extremist
nationalists
from
gaining
complete
control
of
the
Basque
Nationalist
Party, ideological
hegemony
and
legitimacy
belong
to traditionalism. This hegemony was exemplified
by
and reproduced
through
control over
the
main
party
newspapers.
Traditionalism
was
also
the
ideology
of
the
BNP's electoral
base and that
of the
party
mili-
tants
who,
because
of
the
mass
character of the BNP's
party
organiza-
tion,
had
great leverage
over
party
decisions.
In
particular,
traditional-
ists
showed
their
political
and
ideological
superiority
by
winning
a
greater
number of votes
in
the one election
in
which
representatives
of
the traditionalist and liberal
branches
of
the
BNP
competed
electorally
against each other, Bilbao's 1922 Municipal Election.21
I
refer to the
hegemonic type
of
Basque
nationalism
as traditionalist
nationalism.22Its
indisputable ideologue
was the founder
and
highly
charismatic leader
of
the
Basque
Nationalist
Party,
Sabino Arana.
Arana
was the son
of
a
prominent
Carlist
supporter
as
were most of the
early
leaders
of
Basque
nationalism.
His
nationalism,
which
dominated
Basque
nationalist discourse until the
Spanish
Civil
War,23
was
a
defen-
sive reaction against what he saw as the harmful influence of liberalism
in
Basque
society.
His articles
span
the duration
of his
political
life,
from
1890 to
1903,
the
year
in
which
he
died,
and
through
them
one
can
see
clearly
delineated a
political program
essentially
informed
by
religious
concerns.
Arana
presented
his
struggle
for
Basque independence
as a
struggle
for
the
religious
salvation
of the
Basque
race
through
complete
isolation
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547
from other
peoples,
especially
Spaniards.24
n his
view,
anguage
was
as
much
a
shield
againstchange
as
political independence.25Similarly,
Arana hated
Spanish
mmigrants
because
they
were
important
agents
of
change
in
the traditions
and culture
of the
Basque
country,
they
represented
more secular
views than the ones
prevailing
among
the
Basque
population,
and
they generally supported
the
Socialist
party,
instead
of
adhering
to a
religiously
ounded
system
of
paternalistic
relations
between
employer
and
worker.
Finally,
Arana's
equally
vicious attacks
on those
groups
of
Basque
ori-
gin
who had facilitated the
penetration
of liberalism nto the
Basque
Country suggest
that
his
attacks
on
immigrants
were
related
to their
secularvalues and
to the
changes they
were
introducing
n the
Basque
Country,
rather
than to other
factors,
such as economic
competition.
The
target
of
his attacks
were the rulers
of
Vizcaya,
the
Basque
eco-
nomic
and
political
elites,
and
the
Basque
intelligentsia.
Not even his
capitalistpoliticalpartners
n
the
BNP
were
spared
his
invectives,
hus
reflecting
the
gulf separating
he two
conceptions
of
nationalism
hat
coexisted n the BNP.26
The
nationalist
deology
described above remained
hegemonic
until
the
Spanish
Civil
War
and
is
exemplified
in
the
doctrinal
principles
agreed
upon
by
the
BNP in
1930.27
Specifically,
hese
principlespro-
claimed
that Catholicismwas the
true
religion
of
the
Basque Country,
that
political independence
was both a
right
and
the
objective
to
be
achieved
by
the
Basque
people,
that
efforts
needed
to be
made
to
pre-
serve and strengthen he Basque race, and that the old practicesand
traditional nstitutions
of the
Basque
provinces
should
be
re-estab-
lished.
The
nationalist
coalition
formed
in
1898 between
anti-centralist
iber-
als and traditionalists
did
not
increase the
appeal
of
Basque
national-
ism
to
the
Basque
electorate.
Despite
a
noticeable increase
in
its level
of
organization
over the
years
and
an
exceptional
and
short-lived
elec-
toral success in the 1918 General election, the Basque Nationalist
Party
did
not
have much
popular
appeal
until
the
Spanish
Second
Republic. Capitalists
ended to
vote
for
the
Spanish
conservativeand
liberal
parties
( dynastic
arties),
rural
areas were
largely
controlled
by
the
Carlist
party,
a
traditionalist
Spanish
party,
which
advocated a
return
to
the
forms
of
social
and
political organization
hat
prevailed
during
the Old
Regime,28
and
the
working
class,
made
up
mostly
of
immigrants,
upported
the
Spanish
Socialist
Party.
Thus,
the
Basque
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548
Nationalist
Party
had little
support
outside the industrial
province
of
Vizcaya
and
even in
Vizcaya
it was
relatively strong only
at the
munici-
pal
level.
During
the
Second
Republic (1931-1936)
the
BNP
became
one
of the
leading political
parties
in
two
of
the three
Basque
provinces,
Vizcaya
and
Guipuzcoa. Basque
nationalists
benefited
from a transfer
of votes
from traditionalist
parties
and
dynastic parties
to the
Basque
National-
ist
Party. According
to
Heiberg,29
in
rural areas this
vote came
from
farmers
who,
because
of
growing
employment opportunities
in
indus-
try
in
neighboring
cities,
had
gained increasing
economic
independ-
ence,
which freed them from the
political
hold
of small Carlist
land-
lords.
The rise
in
support
for the BNP in urban areas is
less well under-
stood,
but it has been
suggested
that
segments
of
the
Basque
local
bourgeoisie
used
their
votes
to
punish
the
Basque
economic
elite
for
its
support
of the
failed
economic
policies adopted
during
the
Primo de
Rivera
dictatorship (1923-1930).30
The
paradoxical
consequence
of
these
shifts
in
electoral
behavior was
that while most
of
Spain
sided
with the leftist Popular Front, in the Basque Country, one of the two
leading
industrial
regions
in
Spain,
the left was
a
minority compared
to
conservative
forces.31
During
the
Republican
years, Basque
nationalists,
like
Catalan
nation-
alists,
demanded and
worked for a Statute
of
Autonomy.
Various
fac-
tors
contributed,
however,
to
a
delay
in
its
approval:
the
clericalism
and
xenophobic
content
of the first
draft
of the
Statute,
which made
it
unpalatable to the Spanish left; popular opposition in the provinces of
Navarre
and Alava
to inclusion
in
the
Basque
autonomous
community;
and
opposition
by
the centralist
Spanish Right
to the
third draft
sub-
mitted
to
the
Spanish parliament.
Eventually,
the
Spanish
Socialists
supervised
the
drafting
of
a
fourth,
more
democratic,
moderate,
and
somewhat
vague
Statute,32
which
was
approved
in
October
of 1936.
By
then,
however,
the
Spanish
Civil War had
already
begun.
Catalan
nationalism
(1876-1936)
The
period
1876-1936
witnessed
the
development
of a
bourgeois
and
a
progressive
type
of nationalism
in
Catalonia,
both
of which
ques-
tioned
the
centralized character
of
the
Spanish
state and
favored
inter-
vention
in
Spanish
affairs.33The
former was
represented
by
the
nation-
alist
ideology
and
programs
of
the
Lliga
and
was
led
by
businessmen
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and members
of the
intelligentsia.34
n contrast
with
bourgeois
nation-
alism, progressive
nationalism,
which
was
represented by
the
party
EsquerraRepublicana,
was led
almost
exclusivelyby
members of the
intelligentsia.
One
major
difference
between
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism
s,
therefore,
that
the
capitalist
elite
and
the
intelligentsia
were
more nationalist
n
Catalonia
han
n
the
Basque Country.
Both
bourgeois
and
progressive
nationalist leaders
and
ideologues
agreed
that Catalonia
constituted
a
distinct moral
community,
with
a
common culture
(in
which
languageplayed
a
pivotal
role),
a common
history,
and a common
character,
ll of which
distinguished
t from the
rest of
Spain.
They
differed
rom
Basque
traditionalist ationalists
n
the
non-racistnature
of their
discourse,
in
their
acceptance
of
modernity,
and
in
that
they rarely
advocated
ndependence.Although
their
general
justification
for nationalist
political
mobilization was that
Catalonia
constituted
a
nation,
Catalan nationalistauthors
and
political
leaders
also
pointed
out that
contemporary
onditions
n
Spainweighed
heavi-
ly
in
their
decision
to mobilize
politically.
The
state's ow
prestige
after
the loss of Cubaand the Philippinesand its inability o facilitateeco-
nomic
developmentthroughoutSpain,
its
inability
to
guarantee
order
and
to
promote
industrial
development
n
Catalonia,
and its threatto
Catalanculturaland
juridical
nstitutionswere
the
major
reasons that
nationalist eaders
gave
to
justify
heir
nationalism.
The
emergence
of
Catalan
nationalism
was
preceded
by
a
long process
of
cultural
revival,
common to other
areas of
Europe,
that
lasted
the
entire nineteenthcentury,and was partlyinspired by the rapidsocio-
economic
changes
that Catalonia
experienced
during
his
period.
This
increasing
ethnic
awareness,
however,
did
not lead to the
formation
of
nationalist
parties
until the end of the
century.
The
main nationalist
organization
hat then
developed,
and the vehicle
for
bourgeois
nationalism
during
the
period
before
the
Spanish
Civil
War,
was the
Lliga Regionalista (renamed
Lliga
Catalana
during
the
SpanishSecondRepublic). ts mainpoliticalgoalswere to end political
corruption
and state
de-centralization.While
the
bourgeoisie
attached
foremost
importance
to
obtaining
economic
concessions from the
government,
he
intelligentsia
was more
concerned with
juridical
and
language
matters. The
Lliga
dominated Catalan
politics, along
with
supra-regional epublicanparties,
during
the
1901-1923
period
and,
despite losing
its
hegemony
after
Primo
de
Rivera's
Dictatorship,
remained
a
major
electoral force
during
the
Second
Republic.
Fore-
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most
among
the
achievements
of
the
Lliga
during
this
period
was
the
creation
of the
Mancomunitat
Catalana.
This
institution,
founded
in
1914,
was a
supraprovincial
organization
with
the
power
to coordinate
the
administration
of
the four
Catalan
provinces.
Although
it
fell short
of
providing
political autonomy,
it
returned
a
sense
of
historical
unity
to
Catalonia.
Through
the
Mancomunitat,
the
Lliga
tried
to
implement
an ambitious
program
of
economic,
educational,
and
cultural
reforms.
Among
these reforms were the creation of a
strong public-service
infra-
structure to facilitate
economic
development,
the
implementation
of
policies
to extend vocational
training among
workers,
and
the
develop-
ment of an ambitious cultural
program,
which focused on the
promo-
tion
of the Catalan
language
and culture.35
Such
policies
reflected
the
goals
of the main
groups
that
supported
the
Lliga:
capitalists
and
mem-
bers
of the
intelligentsia.
During
the 1901-1936
period,
the
Catalan
bourgeoisie
represented
by
the
Lliga repeatedly opposed
government policies,
such
as tariff
pro-
tection
for
grain
imports,
which
only
benefitted
agrarian
interests
from
the rest of
Spain,
and the taxation of industrial
profits
made during the
First World
War,
which was detrimental
to the interests
of the
Catalan
business
community.
However,
partly
out
of
fear
of
the
revolutionary
Catalan
working
class,36
the
leaders
of
the
Lliga
never
sought
inde-
pendence
for
Catalonia
and
even
collaborated
with the
dictatorial
government
of Primo de
Rivera
(1923-1930),
which the
Catalan
bour-
geoisie
saw as the
only
means
to restore order.
In
fact,
the
political
ambivalence
of the leaders
of
the
Lliga
who,
on
the
one
hand,
constant-
ly opposed governmental policies and, on the other hand, sought the
government's
authority
whenever it needed
to
repress
the
working
class,
eventually
undermined
the
Lliga's
social
base
and
played
into the
hands
of
progressive
nationalism.
Progressive
nationalism
did
not become
hegemonic,
however,
until
the
Spanish
Second
Republic.
It
is
only
then
that
Esquerra
Republicana,
in
coalition
with the
major
anarchist
union,
the
CNT,
and
with
the
Uni6
de Rabaissaires, a rural laborers organization, was able to secure
enough
popular
support
to
replace
the
Lliga
as the
major
party
in
Cata-
lonia.
The
origins
of
progressive
nationalism
can
be traced
to
the
nineteenth
century,
to numerous
republican
organizations
with
a
federalist
char-
acter
that
attracted
members
of the Catalan
intelligentsia
interested
in
improving
the economic
and
political
conditions
of
the
emerging
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551
working
class.
During
the
period
of
hegemony
of the
Lliga Regiona-
lista, however,
nationalist
republicanism
remained a minor
political
force,
mostly
because of the
stigma
of
conservatism which
was
at-
tached
to nationalism
during
this
period
by
the
international
labor
movement.
Unlike the
leaders
of the
Lliga,
nationalist
republican
leaders
actively
opposed
the
government
during
the
dictatorship
of
Primo
de
Rivera.
This
opposition
increased
the
political
capital
of
progressive
national-
ism
at the same time as it
decreased
that
of
bourgeois
nationalism.
Moreover,
it
predisposed
anarchists and other leftist
political
groups
to
collaborate with
nationalist
republicans
when
democratic rule was re-
stored.
In
the decisive
municipal
elections
of
April
1931,
whose
outcome
brought
about the
Second
Republic,
Esquerra
Republicana
emerged
as
the
undisputable
victor.37 Their
program
in
those
elections
clearly
reflected their
nationalist
and reformist
goals.
They
demanded
the
right
to self-determination (their goal being a confederation of Iberian
states),
political
and economic
rights
for
workers,
welfare
measures for
mothers,
children,
and the
elderly, agrarian
reform,
and the
recognition
of
human
rights.
One
day
after the
elections,
Macia,
the
president
of
Esquerra,
pro-
claimed the
Catalan
Republic,
but
was
soon
convinced
by
Spanish
republican
leaders to
settle for
a less
ambitious
compromise
that
kept
Catalonia a part of Spain. This compromise consisted of the symbolic
re-establishment
of
the
Generalitat,
a
Catalan
medieval
governing
body,
while
negotiations
took
place
for
the
approval
of
a
Statute of
Autonomy
for
Catalonia.
This
Statute was
finally
obtained
in
1932.
A
description
of
the
convoluted
dynamics
that
characterized
Catalan
politics
during
the
years
preceding
the
Spanish
Civil
War is
beyond
the
scope
of
this
article.
Especially
after
1935,
Spain
and
Catalonia
entered a revolutionary spiral that tells us little about the social hege-
mony
of
one
ideology
or
another in
Catalonia,
or
about
the
reasons for
their
hegemonic
or
non-hegemonic
character.
Suffice
it to
say
that,
during
those
dramatic
years,
there
was
a
trend
toward
separatism
and
revolutionary
anti-capitalist
solutions
as
against
more
moderate
alter-
natives.
During
those
years,
only
the
Catalan
upper
classes were firm
in
their
support
of
autonomy
within
a
united
Spain,
while
large
sectors
within the
intelligentsia
and within
the
non-manual
working-class
sup-
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ported
a
progressive
form of
nationalism
aiming
at a
Spanish
con-
federation,
and the lower
classes,
less concerned about
the nationalist
issue,
demanded a drastic
transformation of social relations.
Having
outlined the main
defining
traits
of
Basque
and Catalan
natio-
nalism
in
the
pre-Civil
War
period,
I
now focus on those
factors
that
explain
why
nationalism took the form of
traditionalist
nationalism
in
the
Basque Country
while
bourgeois
and
progressive
nationalism
be-
came dominant
in
Catalonia.
Rural
development
and
rural
stagnation
in
the
context
of
industrialization
The
Catalan
road
Catalonia's
industrial transformation
began
in
the
eighteenth
century,
earlier
than
in
most
Spanish regions.
Its
economic
development
was
primarily the product of the combination of two factors: agrarian
development
and the
full
integration
of Catalonia
into the
Spanish
state.
In
1716,
in
the
wake of the War of Succession that
brought
the
Bour-
bon
royal dynasty
to
Spain,
Catalonia was
fully incorporated
into
Spain
by
the
Decreto
de Nueva Planta.38 This
decree
abolished
Catalan
political
and
legal
institutions that had until
then
preserved
Catalan
autonomy.
Full
integration
into
Spain
vastly
increased
the
market
for
Catalan producers, for Catalonia was able to participate more directly
in trade
with the rest
of
Spain
and with the
colonies
of Latin
America.
Catalonia
had the resources
to benefit from
the
new
trading opportuni-
ties.
The
most
important
of these resources
was
agrarian
wealth.
Low
population
density
and the
Sentencia de
Guadalupe,
enacted
by
Ferdi-
nand
of
Aragon
in
the sixteenth
century
to
eliminate
seigniorial
abuses
and
to
grant
freedom
of
movement to the
peasantry,
had
favored
the
development of a prosperous peasantry in Catalonia.
In the
eighteenth
century, demographic pressure
and
new
commercial
opportunities
in Latin America motivated
large
numbers
of
peasants
to
specialize
in
the
production
of
wine
and
eau-de-vie
for
export,
under
increasing capitalist
forms and
relations
of
production.39
These
exports40
encouraged
the
development
of
a
dynamic
commercial
sec-
tor,
a
thriving
naval
construction
industry,
and,
from
the
early
eighteen
hundreds,
a
modern textile
industry.
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The textile
ndustry,
whose
development
was also
facilitated
by
the
pre-
existence of
a
proto-industrial
urban
sector,41
was
the backbone
of
Catalan ndustrialization.
rom the
1830s to the
1850s
the Catalan
ex-
tile
industry
underwent a
technological
revolution
that
brought
it
to
European
standards.
This
progress
s
indicated
by
Catalonia's
ndex of
industrial
production,
which
trebledbetween
1840 and 1860.
By
1860,
the
Catalan
textile
industry
had
captured
about
eighty percent
of
the
Spanish
market
or
textile
products.
The
growthpotential
of this
dynamic
sector,42
owever,
was
limited
by
the small
size
of the
Spanish
market
and
by
high
production
costs,
which
curtailed he
ability
of Catalan
ndustry
o
compete
abroad.
Con-
sequently,
he Catalan
capitalist
ector
came to
depend
on
protectionist
legislation
enacted
by
the
Spanishgovernment.
This
economic
depend-
ence
on
Spain
and
working-class
unrest
during
this
early period
of
industrialization,43
xplain why
the
Catalan
capitalist
class never
spon-
sored
separatist
olutions.
In
summary,
between 1800 and the
Spanish
Civil
War,
Catalonia
advanced
rapidly
in
the
industrialization
process.
Throughout
the
nineteenth
century,
the
Catalan
countryside
prospered
and farmers
invested
their
profits
in
commerce
and
industry.
The
investment of
small
agrarian
and
industrial
capital
n
industry
was
also
facilitated
by
the
relatively
small
capital
requirements
of
the
modern
textile
indus-
try.44
The Catalan
process
of
industrialization
nsureda
relatively
luid
transition rom
a
rural
to an
urban
society
and the
development
of a
culturalandeconomicaffinitybetweenruraland urbanCatalonia.45
The
making
of
Basque
iron-based
industry
With
almost three
percent
of
the
Spanish
population
in
1800,
the
Basque Country
produced
only
two
percent
of
the
Spanish
GDP
and
was one of
the
poorest regions
in
Spain.46
This
poverty
reflected the
limits of Basque agricultureand the commercialand industrialcrises
created
by
the
Napoleonic
Wars,
the
loss
of
the
Latin
American colo-
nies,
and the loss of
markets or iron
due
to
more
competitive
Northern
European
production.
In
the
following
decades the
Basque
commercial
bourgeoisie
followed
different
strategies
o
adjust
to
these new
conditions.
It
made low-risk
investments
n
public
debt
and real
estate,
lobbied
for
the
privatization
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of
mining,
took
steps
to
mechanize
iron
production,
and favored
the
transfer
of
customs
houses,
traditionally
ocated
on
the border
between
Castile
and the
Basqueprovinces,
o the coast.
These
transformations
were
so successfulthat between 1800
and
1860
the
Basque
Country's
GDP increased
faster
than that
of
any
other
region
except
for Madrid and
Catalonia.47Unlike
development
in
Catalonia,however,
development
n
the
Basque Country
was
uneven.
In
the
Basque
Country,
development
n
commerce and
industry
took
place
despite
crises
in
the
agricultural
ector and
even at the
expense
of
agriculture.
While Catalan
capitalistdevelopment
was
partly
initiated
by
broad
segments
of the
peasantry,
Basque
capitalist
development
harmed
he
peasantry.
ndeed,
and
speculation
and
the
privatization
f
municipal
and and of
mining,
both
of which
had
traditionally rovided
supplementary
ents to the
peasantry,
nd
rising
consumer
prices
asso-
ciated
with the
transfer
of
customs
houses to the
coast,
created
unrest
among
the
peasantry.
The discovery n 1856 of the Bessemerprocess for the productionof
steel
by
the direct method revolutionized
the
iron
industry.
The
Bessemer
process
allowed
for
the
production
of iron at
very
low
cost
and
in
very arge
quantities,
and
required
he
exclusive
use
of
hematites,
with
very
low
phosphoric
content,
which were
more abundant
and
closer
to the
surface n the
Basque Country
han
almost
anywhere
else
in
Europe.
The dramaticncrease n demand orBasque ronore thatfollowedthe
discovery
of the Bessemer
process
resulted
n
a
spectacular
ise
in
iron
ore
exports.
Although
these
exports
were almost
entirely
controlled
by
foreign
interests
they generated
extensive
economic
activity
in the
Basque
Country
tself.
They
attracted
nvestors
and
workers,
promoted
a formidable
capital
accumulation
which
benefitted
a
numberof
local
capitalists
nvolved
n
the
mining
sector,
and
created
ncentives
or
the
development
of industrial
sectors related to
iron
production.48
This
industry, ike Catalanindustry,needed protectionbecause lack of a
cheap
source
of coal made
Basque
ndustrial
products
oo
expensive
o
compete
in
foreign
markets.
The
negative
side
of this
spectacular
ndustrial
revolution
was
that
it
had
highly
dislocating
effects on
Basque
society
and
benefitted
only
a
very
small
group
within
the
traditional
commercial
and
landowning
elites.49
This
group
comprised
individuals
who had
purchased
the
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best mines
in the
years
before
the
export
boom,
when
foreign
owner-
ship
of mines was still
forbidden. These
mine owners
then made
their
fortunes
by
charging high
rents to and
becoming
stockholders
in
the
foreign
companies
that
began
to
exploit
these mines in the
eighteen
seventies. Later
on,
they
invested their
capital
in
industrial
and
finan-
cial activities.
Meanwhile,
most commercial
capitalists,
iron
manu-
facturers,
and
big
landowners
were
unable to
compete against foreign
capitalists
and
against
the new
Basque
capitalist
elite.
Patterns
of
development,
ocial
structure,
nd
political
mobilization
Catalan
capitalist
industrial
development
was
endogenous
and driven
in
part by agrarian
capitalist growth.
Basque
industrial
capitalist
devel-
opment,
on the
other
hand,
took
place
without
agrarian
capitalist
growth
and was
greatly
distorted
by
foreign
demand and
investment,
which
fostered
formidable
capital
accumulation
during
the last two
decades of
the nineteenth
century.
The
different
ways
in
which
Catalan and
Basque
rural areas
experi-
enced
capitalism
explain why
the
Basque
peasantry rejected
capitalism
while
the Catalan
peasantry
largely
adapted
to it.
Indeed,
Carlism and
traditionalist nationalism
-
two
different
strategies
to
block the
transi-
tion
to a
capitalist society
-
were
stronger
in
the
Basque country
than
anywhere
else
in
Spain.
For most of the nineteenth century, the Carlist party represented the
aspirations
of
those
sectors
in
Spanish
society
who
opposed
socio-
economic
and
political
change.
During
the two
Carlist Wars
(1833--
1840,
1872-1876)
which
pitted
Carlists
against
Liberals,
Carlism
was
particularly
strong
in
both
the
Basque
Country
and
in
Catalonia,
but
much
stronger
in
the
former
than
in
the
latter.
Indeed,
support
for
Carlism in
Catalonia,
already
much
weaker
than in
the
Basque
Country
in
the
first
Carlist
War,
decreased
considerably
throughout
the
nine-
teenth century, while it remained very high in the Basque Country until
the
Spanish
Civil War.50
The
loss of two
wars
deeply
divided
Carlists
-
or
Traditionalists as
they
are
also known
-
throughout
Spain.
Some
sectors
within the
Carlist
movement even
began
to
approximate
their
views to
those of
the
Con-
servative
Party
in
power.5
Consequently
some
groups
within
the
Basque
Carlist
community
tried to
find new
ways
to
achieve their
tradi-
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556
tionalist
goals.
The
ideology
of
nationalism,
hen so
popular
n
Europe,
offered
the
possibility
of
preserving
raditional
Basque
social
organi-
zation
by isolating
the
Basque
Country
from the rest
of
Spain.
Arana
himself
describes the mental
process
which led
many
Basque
Carlists
toward
nationalism,
when
explaining
how his brother
Luis converted
(sic)
him to nationalism:
...and he made such
an
effort to
demonstrate
to me that
Carlism
was an
unnecessary,
inconvenient,
and
harmful
way
to
prevent Spanish
influence,
to
break-up
ties with
Spain,
and
even to
recover
the
seigniorial
tradition,
that
my mind, understanding that my brother knew history better than me and
that he
was
incapable
of
lying
to
me,
started to
doubt,
and
I resolved
to
study
with
serenity
the
history
of
Biscay
and to
firmly
adhere to
the
truth.52
Arana
rationalizedhis shift
from
Carlism
to
separatist
nationalism
by
saying
that the
Basque
provinces
had
always
been
sovereign,
and
were
therefore
entitled
to
independence
f
membership
n
Spain
threatened
the
survival
of
the
Basque
culture.
The
dislocating
ffectsof
foreign
demandandinvestmentn theBasque
Country
after
the Second CarlistWar
also
explain
why
a
greater
pro-
portion
of the
urban
and
ruralmiddle
classes
supported
a traditionalist
form of nationalism
n
the
Basque
Country
han
n
Catalonia.
Members
of
this
traditional
middle
class,
whose
wealth
still
derived
from
urban
and
rural
property,
lung
the
longest
to the
Basque
dea
of the
Fueros
-
that
is the
Basque
traditional
utonomous
political
nstitutions
after
they
were
banned at the
end of
the Second
Carlist
War.53
ndeed,
these
old institutions, n which rural communitieswere over-represented,
were
their
only
hope
to counter
the economic
power
of
the
new
capital-
ist-elite.
Their
change
roma
pro- Fueros
osition
to
nationalism
was a
semantic
more than an
ideological
one as the
followingpassage
from
a
speech
given
n 1906
by
the
leading
Fuerista
rturo
Campi6n
shows:
We
proudly
called ourselves
Fueristas
in riskier
times
than
today's.
How-
ever,
given
that
there
is
a new
term which
is
more
graphic,
more
intense
and
thoroughly
expressive,
and
that
this term does
not
allow
the
mild-hearted
or
those
who
see themselves
as
sophisticated
(which
is the
same)
to take
refuge
under
it,
I
declare,
without
renouncing
my past,
without
subscribing
to
new
ideas,
without
adopting
new
attitudes,
and,
instead,
in
agreement
with
my
own
modest
history,
that
I renounce
the old
label
and from
now on will
call
myself
a nationalist
(sic).54
In
the
end, however,
regardless
f the relative
proportions
of
traditional
middle-class
groups
excluded
from the
benefits
of
capitalist
develop-
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557
ment
in
each
region,
what made
these
groups
more salient in
Basque
nationalism
was that
in
the
Basque Country
the classes above them
were
not nationalist
while
in
Catalonia
they
were. The next
section
explains why
the
Basque upper
capitalist
classes did
not
become
nationalistwhile the Catalandid.
Regional
capitalism
and
the state: The role of
capital-goods
production
versus
consumer-goods
production
The different
political
strategies
followed
by
the
Basque
and Catalan
upper
classes can be attributed
o their relative
ability
directly
o influ-
ence state decisions.
The
previous
section
points
out the
formidable
effect that
foreign
demand and investment
n
iron
extracting
activities
had
on
Basque
industrialization. ecause of
this,
Basque development
achieved levels of
capital
accumulationunheardof
in
Catalonia.This
section focuses on the relative economic
power
of the
Basque
and
Catalan
capitalist
elites and its effects on the
political
power
of these
twogroups.I relyon the 1922 Directoryof Corporationsand Financial
Institutions.Since
in
1922 the
corporation
was
already
a
major
nstitu-
tion
in
both Catalanand
Basque society,
this
directoryprovides
a
good
approximation
f the main differences
n
economic
structurebetween
the two
regions.55
The
information contained
in
the
directory
shows that the
sizes
of
Basque
and Catalan
capitalism
were
very
similar.
Accumulatednomi-
nal assets throughoutCatalanand Basque corporationsand financial
institutionsamounted to
approximately
he
same
figure
(see
Table
1).
Moreover,
n
both communities the
number of
very
large
companies
(with
nominal assets above ten million
pesetas)
was
approximately
he
same:
Forty-nine
n
the
Basque
Country
and
forty-one
in
Catalonia.
Finally,
at the
Spanish
evel,
the
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia,
along
with
Madrid,
were
Spain's
leading capitalist
communities.
Indeed,
among
the two
hundred
largest Spanish
corporations,
fifty-five
were
Basqueandfiftywere Catalan.Exchanging conomicpowerfor politi-
cal
power
and
ennoblement,
many
owners of
the
largest
corporations
were
steadily
incorporated
into the
Spanish
power
bloc, 56which
included the
most
powerful
membersof the
Spanish
anded
aristocra-
cy, forming
what
Moya
has called the
Financial
Aristocracy. s7
Beyond
these
similarities,
he
Basque
and
Catalan
capitalist
structures
differed in
importantways.
For
instance,
the
distributionof
corpora-
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558
Table 1.
Distribution
by
Nominal
Assets of
Basque
and
Catalan
Corporations (1922)
Ntile Nominal assets Cumulative % of Nominal assets Cumulative % of
Basque
Country
Basque
capital
Catalonia
Catalan
capital
they
represent
they
represent
10%
100,000
0.109
10,000
0.027
20%
229,000
0.450
25,000
0.110
30%
350,600
1.088
60,000
0.312
40%
524,500
2.170
100,000
0.720
50%
1,000,000
3.876
250,000
1.540
60%
1,500,000
6.383
500,000
3.435
70%
2,500,000
10.707
800,000
6.064
80%
4,363,194
18.457
1,500,000
10.800
90%
10,000,000
32.651
3,500,000
21.062
Total
accumulated
assets
2,342,054,947
2,367,928,087
Source:
Anuario
Financiero
y
de
Sociedades
An6nimas
[Directory
of
Corporations
and
Financial
Institutions]
(1922).
tions
by
size was
very
different in the two
communities,
for
capital
was
far more
concentrated in
the
Basque
Country
than
in
Catalonia
(see
Table
1).
Moreover,
as Table 2
shows,
in
1922 the
average corporation
size
in
Catalonia
was half the
size of
the
average
corporation
size
in
the
Basque Country.
An
analysis
of
variance
included
in
this table demon-
strates
that
only
eleven
percent
of this
difference
in
corporation
size
can be explained by the different sectorial compositions of the Basque
and Catalan
corporations.
The
remaining
variance
depends
on
the
relative
average
size of
Basque
and Catalan
corporations
within sectors
of the
economy.
This
difference
strongly supports
the assertion that
before
the
Spanish
Civil War small-firm
capitalism
characterized Cata-
lan
development
while
large-firm
capitalism
characterized
Basque
development.
Finally, what better describes the contrast between Basque and Catalan
capitalism, simultaneously
revealing
the difference
in
economic
power
of the
two
capitalist
elites,
is the
average
size
of
Basque
and Catalan
financial institutions.
As Table
2
shows,
in 1922
there
were
ninety-nine
financial
institutions
in
Catalonia
compared
with
twenty-three
in
the
Basque Country
but
cumulative nominal assets
in
these financial
insti-
tutions were
twenty-one
percent
greater
in
the
Basque
Country
than
in
Catalonia.
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Table 2.
Mean
corporation
assets
by region
and sector
(1922)
(in
Pesetas)
Grand mean:
2,932,741.603
Mean Mean
after
N
adjusting
for
composition by
sector
Basque
Country
4,495,307.0 4,337,257.6
521
Catalonia
2,182,422.2
2,258,315.0
1085
Means
Basque Country
Catalonia
Agriculture
556,900.1
(8)
715,255.1
(32)
Mining
2,975,588.1
(109)
2,148,671.5
(67)
Water,
gas, electricity
6,807,635.6
(44)
7,361,386.4
(83)
Food,
beverages,
tobacco
1,665,893.9
(33)
1,580,627.2
(114)
Textiles
2,277,500.0
(9)
1,833,312.0
(83)
Leather, clothes,
shoes
383,750.0
(4)
394,122.3
(47)
Paper,
press, graphic
arts
3,014,685.7
(35)
411,991.3
(46)
Chemical 8,259,749.6 (20) 940,275.0 (100)
Ceramic,
glass,
cement
1,896,666.7
(12)
1,161,625.0
(16)
Steel
31,750,000.0
(6)
2,000,000.0
(3)
Metallurgy
2,136,678.9
(74)
867,122.49(206)
Construction
1,229,354.8
(31)
1,132,916.7
(36)
Transport,
communication
4,924,769.7
(92)
4,831,256.5
(90)
Commerce
(0)
3,367,777.8
(9)
Financial
21,485,000.0
(20)
4,337,500.1
(83)
Hotels and similar
1,950,000.0
(3)
1,248,916.7
(6)
Diverse
services
859,772.7
(11)
437,608.7
(46)
Foreign banks (0) 1,589,597.6 (8)
Foreign
mining
5,843,832.0
(10)
1,260,040.0
(10)
Source:
Anuario
Financiero
y
de
Sociedades
An6nimas
[Directory
of
Corporations
and
Financial
Institutions]
(1922). (
)
Number of
Corporations.
Note:
Branches of
the Bank
of
Spain
have
not been
included.
In
summ,
because one
can
assume
that,
in
early
twentieth-century
Spain,
levels
of
capital
concentration
and
economic
specialization
were
indicators of the strength of involvement in the Spanish market, Basque
capitalism
was
clearly
far
more
oriented
towards
the
rest of
Spain
than
was
Catalan
capitalism.
This
means
that,
while
in
both
communities
there
was a
very
strong
upper
bourgeoisie,
the
relative
weight
of
the
local
bourgeoisie
was much
greater
in
Catalonia than
in
the
Basque
Country.
It also
seems
that the
economic
distance
between
groups
representing
capitalism
and
groups
representing
traditional
society
was
much
greater
in
the
Basque
Country
than in
Catalonia.
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Further
analysis
of
the
data contained in
the 1922
Directory
of Cor-
porations
and Financial
Institutions,
now
focused
on
members
of the
boards
of
directors
of
these
companies, supports
the
hypothesis
that,
compared
with Catalan
capitalism,
Basque
capitalism
maintained
stronger
ties
with
Spanish capitalism.58
This
analysis
shows
that
out
of
7,581
directors
throughout
Spain,
238
(14
percent
of
all
directors
in
Basque companies) belonged
to the
boards
of both
Basque
and
non-
Basque corporations, compared
to 158 who
belonged
to boards
of
both
Catalan and
non-Catalan
corporations
(8
percent
of all
directors
in Catalan
companies,
see Table
3).
To
gauge
somewhat
better the extent
to
which
Basque
and Catalan
capitalists
tended to be involved
in
economic activities
outside
their
region,
I
have
separately
ranked
directors
in
Catalan and
Basque
com-
panies
according
to the accumulated assets
of
the Catalan
or
Basque
companies
in which
they
were
present,
and selected
the
top
one
hundred
in
each
of the
two
communities.59
Analysis
of the
joint
mem-
bership
in
regional
and
non-regional
corporations
of
the
top
100 direc-
tors in Catalonia and the
Basque
Country
shows that
forty-three
out of
a hundred
were directors
in
both
Basque
and
non-Basque
corpora-
tions,
compared
to
only
sixteen out of a
hundred
who were
members
of
both Catalan
and non-Catalan
corporations.
Similar
findings
were
obtained
by ranking
directors
according
to the
number
of director-
ships
that
they
held and
selecting
the
top
one hundred
in each
region.
Finally,
in
this
review
of
the
linkages
between
Basque
and
Catalan
capi-
talism and the rest of Spain, it is worth considering the strength of the
Table
3. Distribution
of
directors
of
Spanish
corporations
and
financial
institutions
according
to the location
of the
corporations
in which
they
serve
(1922)
N
Basque
1,474
Basque
and
other
238
Catalan 1,881
Catalan
and other
158
Other
in
Spain
3,887
Source:
Anuario
Financiero
y
de Sociedades
An6nimas
[Directory
of
Corporations
and
Financial
Institutions]
(1922).
Note:
The
Total Number
of Directors
is
7,581;
the
sum
presented
above
does
not add
up
to this
number because
twenty
directors
belonged
to
the
board
of
Catalan,
Basque,
and
Other
Spanish
Corporations
simultaneously
and
thirty-five
belonged
to the
board
of
Catalan and
Basque Corporations
simultaneously.
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561
economic ties
Basque
and Catalan
capitalists
maintained
with
the
Spanish
state
apparatus,
for this
conditioned the
political
attitudes
of
Basque
and Catalan
capitalists
toward the
Spanish
state. The
literature
on
this
topic
shows that
Basque industry
depended
to a
larger
degree
upon
state
purchases
than did Catalan
industry.60
This is
undoubtedly
related
to the economic sectors
that were
predominant
in
each
com-
munity,
capital-goods production
in
the
Basque
Country
and
consumer-
goods
production
in
Catalonia.
Consumers
of
Basque
products
were
typically
other industries or the
state,
while
private
individuals were
the
main
consumers of
Catalan
products
such
as
textiles
(with
the
excep-
tion of
army
clothing). During
the
dictatorship
of
Miguel
Primo
de
Rivera
(1923-1930)
commercial
relations
between
the
state
and
Basque
industry
intensified because of
a
vast
program
of
public
works
that
was
undertaken.
According
to
Harrison,
when
the
dictatorship
collapsed
in
1930 and the new
Finance
Minister
decided to
halt infra-
structural
reforms,
an
economic crisis in
Vizcaya,
more
severely
hit
by
this
reversal than
any
other
province,
followed
almost
immediately.
Regional capitalist
elites,
the
state,
and
the
character
of
peripheral
nationalism
In
the
period
that
preceded
the
Spanish
Civil
War,
the
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia
established
themselves as
the
leaders of
Spanish
indus-
trialization.
During
the
process
of
industrialization
the
wealthiest
Basque
and
Catalan
capitalist
families
were
incorporated
into
the
Spanish power elite. However, the previous section has demonstrated
that,
beyond
rough
similarities,
the
economic
structure of
the two
regions
differed
quite
substantially.
Basque
capital
was
more
powerful,
more
concentrated,
more
oriented
toward the
rest of
Spain,
and
more
closely dependent
on
the
Spanish
state.
From
a
socio-structural
viewpoint
the
results of
this
situation
were
1)
the
existence of
a
far
more
numerous
local
bourgeoisie
in
Catalonia
than in
the
Basque
Country
and
2)
the
development
in
Spain
of
stronger
economic link-
ages between Basque and non-Basque capitalism than between Catalan
and
non-Catalan
capitalism.
In
Catalonia,
these
two
characteristics
explain
the
exclusion
of the
Catalan
bourgeoisie
from
the
power
sphere
in
which
they
had
participated
quite
vigorously
for
a
short
period
immediately
preceding
the
Restoration
(1868-1874).
After the
loss of
Cuba
in
1898,
which
was a
heavy
blow
to
Catalan
capitalists,
the
main
Catalan
business
association,
the
Foment
del
Treball
Nacional,
withdrew
its
support
from
the
Spanish
Conservative
party
and
began
to
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562
act as a
pressure
group.
In
this
respect,
the Catalan
capitalist
elite,
still
playing
the
Spanish
card,
supported
a
political
outsider,
General
Pola-
vieja,
in
his bid for
state
power.
Polavieja,
in
return
for this
political
support,
promised
to
grant
fiscal
autonomy
to
Catalonia,
in
a
similar
arrangement
to the one
Basque
capitalists
had
obtained
in
1882
for
their
region.
In
1899, however,
the
government
headed
by
Polavieja
and Silvela failed to deliver
on
its
promise
and,
instead,
approved
a
budget
which
increased
direct taxation of
capital gains.
After
this
disappointment,
Catalan
capitalists
veered
resolutely
toward
what
they
saw as the
only
strategy effectively
to influence
state
policy,
national-
ism.
They
formed an alliance with
groups belonging
to the intelli-
gentsia,
who for
many years
had
sponsored
anti-centralist
pro-Catalan-
ist
political agendas
but had lacked sufficient economic
resources
to
achieve their
goals.
Political events unfolded
very
differently
for the
Basque capitalist
elite.
Because
of
their economic
power
and their
close economic
ties
with
the
Spanish
state,
Basque capitalists
were
always very
well
represented
among
the
Spanish political
elite. A
good
reflection of the
power
Basques
had over the
Spanish
state was the enactment
of fiscal
autono-
my
for the
Basque Country
in
1882,
after intense
lobbying
by
one of
the
heroes
of
Basque
industrialization,
Victor Chavarri. Unlike
Catalan
capitalists,
Basque capitalists
did not need to
rely
on a form
of
region-
alism
to achieve their
goals;
instead
they
could
rely very
effectively
on
their
main business
association,
the
Liga
Vizcaina de
Productores.61
Conclusion
The
emergence
and
ideological
characteristics
of
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism
in
late
nineteenth- and
early
twentieth-century Spain
are a
dramatic
expression
of conflict between
modernity
and tradition
in
the
ethnically heterogeneous
Spanish
state.
Confirming
Nair's
theory
of
peripheral
nationalism,
uneven
development
in
Spain
during
the
nine-
teenth century overlapped with spatially delimited ethnic communities,
Catalans
and
Basques,
thus
enhancing
their ethnic
identity
and
facili-
tating
the
expression
of
class
conflict
in
nationalist
terms.
However,
the
social
bases and the
ideologies
of
peripheral
nationalism
in
each
region
eventually
came to
reflect the different
patterns
of
development
that
they experienced
and the relative
economic
power
of their
capitalist
elites. These
structural
factors
shaped
the
Basque
and
Catalan
nation-
alist
movements
through
their
influence on class
conflict
and class
alli-
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563
ances withinthe
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia,
as well as conflict
and
alliancesbetween these
classes and
the
Spanish
state.
Of
course,
differences
between
Basque
and
Catalannationalism
annot
be
explained
in
purely
structural
erms. The
developmental
actors
I
have
outlined
in this article
helped
to
reproduce onger-term
cultural
and economic
processes,
which
had
progressively
defined the
cultural
identity
of the
upper
classes
in
Catalonia
and the
Basque Country.
De-
scribing
and
explaining
this
process,
however,
exceeds the
objectives
set for
this
article.
This
comparison
of
Basque
and Catalan
nationalism hows that over-
development
does
not
necessarily
lead to
bourgeois
or other
pro-
industrialization ationalist
deologies.
In
particular,
he
Basque
case
illustrates
that,
as
long
as
the
leading
classes
of
overdeveloped
regions
are
able
to influence
state
political
and economic
decisions,
they
will
refrain rom the formulationof
nationalist
programs.
More-
over,
the
Basque
case shows
that
in
the
analysis
of
peripheral
national-
ism, scholars should focus simultaneouslyon the relationshipsestab-
lished
between
the
differentsocial classes in
the
peripheral
community
and the central state and on
those
establishedbetween
classes
within
the
peripheral ommunity.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Le6n Zamosc,CarlosWaisman,GershonShafir,
Akos
R6na-Tas,
Karl
Monsma,
Juan
Linz,
Berit
Dencker,
and the
Theory
and
Society
reviewers or
their
extremely
useful
comments
on
earlier
drafts
of
this article.
Notes
1. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974);
Neil
Smelser,
Mechanisms of
Change
and
Adjustment
to
Change,
in
William
Faunce
and William
Form, editors,
Comparative
Perspectives
on
Industrial
Society
(Boston:
Little
Brown,
1967)
33-54;
Ernest
Gellner,
Nations and
Nationalism
(Oxford:
Blackwell,
1983);
Michael
Hechter,
Internal
Colonialism:
The Celtic
Fringe
of
British
National
Development:
1536-1966
(London:
Routledge
and
Kegan
Paul,
1975);
Michael
Hechter,
Group
Formation
and the
Cultural Division
of
Labor,
American Journal
of
Sociology,
vol. 84
(1978),
293-318;
John
Comaroff,
Humanity,
Ethnicity,
Nationality:
Conceptual
and
Comparative
Perspectives
on
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564
the
USSR,
Theory
and
Society,
vol. 20
(1991),
661-688;
Donald
L.
Horowitz,
Ethnic
Groups
in
Conflict (Berkeley: University
of California
Press,
1985).
2. Other
explanations,
such as Charles
Tilly's
in States and Nationalism in
Europe
since
1600,
Working
Paper
128
(New
York: Center
for
Studies
of Social
Change,
New School
for Social
Research,
1991)
1-12,
and
Eric
J.
Hobsbawm's
in Nations
and Nationalism
since
1789.
Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1990)
provide
alternative
but
complementary arguments
for the
development
of
popular
nationalism
during
the nineteenth
century.
I
emphasize
Nairn's
argument
because his discussion of nationalism facilitates
the transition
to
my
own
explanation
of
programmatic
differences
between
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism.
3. The
greater
ethnic
mobilization
potential
that exists
in these situations
of
overlap
has also
been
emphasized by
Hechter,
Internal and
Horowitz, Ethnic,
among
others.
4. Juan
J.
Linz,
Early State-Building
and Late
Peripheral
Nationalism
against
the
State:
The
Case
of
Spain
in
S. N. Eisenstadt
and
S.
Rokkan,
editors,
Building
States
and
Nations,
Vol.
II,
(Beverly
Hills,
Cal.:
Sage,
1973)
32-116;
William
A.
Douglass,
Introduction,
in
William
A.
Douglass,
editor,
Basques
Politics:
A Case
Study
in
Ethnic
Nationalism,
(Reno:
University
of Nevada
Press,
1985),
1-18.
5. Daniel
A.
Segal,
Nationalism,
Comparatively Speaking,
Journal
of
Historical
Sociology
1
(1986)
301-321.
In his
comparison
of France
with
the
Austro-Hun-
garian Empire, he presents a very different view of the effect of
colonial
posses-
sions
on the
development
of a
national
consciousness.
According
to
him,
colonial
possessions
allow for the
development
of a national consciousness
among
the
bour-
geoisie.
However,
in
view
of the
strength
of
peripheral
nationalism
in
ex-Empires
such
as Great
Britain,
Spain,
and
the
Soviet
Union,
his
argument
does
not
hold,
unless
qualifications
are
made
by introducing
the
effect
of uneven
development
into
the
explanation.
6. Tom
Nairn,
The
Break-
Up,
72.
7.
Donald
Horowitz, Ethnic,
provides
a
very
similar
distinction
between
the
type
of
nationalism
that
emerges
in
underdeveloped
areas and
what
emerges
in overdevel-
oped areas.
8.
Jacques
Barbier and
Herbert
Klein,
Revolutionary
Wars and
Public
Finances:
The
Madrid
Treasury,
1784-1807,
Journal
of
Economic
History,
vol.
41
(1981),
315--
339.
9. See
Benedict
Anderson,
Imagined
Communities
(London:
Verso,
1983)
and
Liah
Greenfeld,
Nationalism.
Five Roads
to
Modernity, (Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1992)
for
discussions
on the
processes
of
piracy
or
borrowing
of the
ideas of
national
identity,
nationalism,
and the
nation.
10.
Seymour
M.
Lipset
and
Stein
Rokkan,
Party
Systems
and
Voter
Alignments
(New
York:
Free
Press,
1967);
Ernest
Gellner,
Nations;
Michael
T.
Hannan,
The
Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries in Modern States, in Michael Hannan and J.
Meyer,
editors,
National
Development
and the
World
System:
Educational,
Eco-
nomic,
and Political
Change,
1950-1970
(Chicago:
Chicago
University
Press,
1979);
Franqois
Nielsen,
Ethnic
Solidarity
in Modern
Societies,
American
Socio-
logical
Review
50,
133-149;
Charles
Tilly,
Ethnic Conflict
in
the
Soviet
Union,
Theory
and
Society
20,
569-581
(especially
574-575);
Michael
Hechter,
Internal.
11.
Although
the theories
listed
above
acknowledge
that
social
differentiation
is
nega-
tively
related
to
ethnic
group
formation
(Michael
Hechter,
Group
Formation... ;
Michael
Hechter,
The
Dynamics
of
Secession,
Acta
Sociologica
35
(1992),
1-17;
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565
Francois
Nielsen,
Ethnic
Solidarity... )
and
positively
related to
ethnic-group
mobilization
(Hudson
Meadwell,
Ethnic Nationalism and Collective
Choice
Theory,
Comparative
Political Studies 22,
139-154),
they
do not take into account
class interests
in their
explanation
of
nationalism.
12.
Indeed,
I
subscribe
to
the view that individuals'
political
behavior is
partly
moti-
vated
by
a desire to
protect
ethnic-group
interests. On this
issue,
Donald
Horowitz,
Ethnic;
Donald
Horowitz,
How to
Begin
Thinking Comparatively
About Soviet
Ethnic
Problems,
in
Alexander
Motyl,
editor,
Thinking Theoretically
About
Soviet
Nationalities.
History
and
Comparison
in the
Study
of
the
USSR
(New
York: Colum-
bia
University
Press,
1992),
9-23.
13. One can include
in
this tradition
the
following
recent
publications:
Miroslav
Hroch,
Social Preconditions
of
National Revival in
Europe
(Cambridge: Cambridge
Uni-
versity
Press,
1985); Kathryn Verdery, Transylvanian Villagers
(Berkeley:
Universi-
ty
of California
Press,
1983);
Segal,
Nationalism;
Eric J.
Hobsbawm, Nations;
John
Comaroff,
Humanity;
Liah
Greenfeld,
Nationalism.
14.
Hechter's recent
work,
under the influence
of rational-choice
theory,
has the virtue
of
taking
the individual as the
starting point
and of
viewing
nationalist
political
mobilization as a social movement that needs
to be
studied
using
the theoretical
tools
developed by
the social movements
literature. See Michael
Hechter,
Prin-
ciples
of
Group Solidarity
(Berkeley: University
of
California
Press,
1987);
Michael
Hechter,
Nationalism as
Group Solidarity,
Ethnic
and Racial Studies
10,
415--
426;
Michael
Hechter,
The
Dynamics. Although
his
focus thus far has been on
the external rewards and
penalties
that
determine an
individual's
participation
in
ethnic
collective
action,
a
strategy
focused on
individuals and on
their
utility
schedules could also be
used to
develop hypotheses
about other
types
of nationalist
behavior,
such as
voting
behavior
and the
decision
to
create a
nationalist
organiza-
tion,
that are less sensitive to selective
rewards and
penalties
imposed by
nationalist
organizations.
15. Marianne
Heiberg,
Urban Politics
and
Rural
Culture:
Basque
Nationalism,
in
Stein Rokkan and Derek W.
Urwin,
editors,
The
Politics
of
Territorial
Identity
(London:
Sage
Publications,
1982)
355-387.
She
points
out that
Basque
national-
ism is particularly interesting because of the important role intra-ethnic group con-
flict
played
in
its
development,
358.
16. Pierre
Vilar,
La
Catalogne
dans
L'Espagne
Moderne:
Recherche
sur les
fondements
des Structures
Nationales.
(Paris:
S.E.V.P.E.N,
1962);
Juan J.
Linz,
Early
State;
Stanley Payne,
El Nacionalismo
Vasco
(Barcelona:
Dopesa, 1974);
Javier Cor-
cuera,
Origenes, Ideologia,
y Organizaci6n
del
Nacionalismo
Vasco
(1876-1904)
(Madrid:
Siglo
XXI,
1979);
Antonio
Elorza,
Ideologias
del
Nacionalismo
Vasco
(San
Sebastian:
Haranburu,
1978);
Juan
Pablo
Fusi,
Pluralismo
y
Nacionalidad
(Madrid:
Alianza,
1984);
Faustino
Migu6lez
and
Carlota
Sole,
Classes
Socials
i
Poder Politic en
Catalunya (Barcelona:
PPU,
1987),
among
others.
17. These explanatory gaps are also present in Eric J. Hobsbawm's own analysis of
Basque
and
Catalan
nationalism;
see
Nations,
119-120.
18. The
Anuario
Financiero
y
de Sociedades
An6nimas
was
published
annually
from
1914 to at
least the late
1950s
by
a
private
publishing company,
based
in
the
Basque
industrial
city
of Bilbao.
For
many years,
the two
persons
responsible
for its
publication
were
Ibafiez and
Marco-Gardoqui.
The
year
of 1922 was the first
year
for
which
extensive information
was
provided
for
both
financial and non-financial
corporations,
which
explains why
I
did not
choose
an
earlier date. The stated
goal
of this
publication
was to
inform
businessmen.
Although
the
information for this
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566
publication
was
voluntarily
provided
by
the
companies
themselves,
the authors
of
this
publication
provide
comparative
figures
to
demonstrate the
completeness
of its
coverage.
Copies
of this
directory
can be found in
many Spanish
libraries. The
library
of
the Banco
de
Espafia,
in
particular,
owns the
entire
collection. Manuel
Gonzalez
Portilla
(La
Formaci6n
de la
Sociedad
Capitalista
en el Pais
Vasco,
1876--
1913
[San
Sebastian:
Haranburu,
1981])
and other
researchers often
use
the
infor-
mation contained
in
this
directory,
but
so far
nobody
had transferred its
informa-
tion to a
computer
database.
Gonzalez Portilla
suggested
the idea of
using
it
for
my
research,
and
I
would like to
thank
Santiago
de
la
Hoz,
Maria
Teresa
Delgado,
and
Sarolta
Petro for their
assistance in
creating
this
dataset.
19.
Stanley Payne,
El
Nacionalismo;
Juan
J.
Solozabal,
El
Primer Nacionalismo
Vasco
(Madrid:
Tucar,
1975);
Antonio
Elorza,
Ideologias;
Javier
Corcuera,
Origenes;
Jose Luis De La
Granja,
El
Nacionalismo Vasco
durante la
II
Republica
(Madrid:
CIS,
1986).
20. Javier
Corcuera,
Origenes;
Javier
Cuesta,
El
Carlismo
Vasco:
1876-1900
(Madrid:
Siglo
XXI,
1985);
Stanley Payne,
El
Nacionalismo;
Antonio
Elorza,
Ideologias.
In
my
own
empirical
research,
by
contrasting
the names of
leading
members
of
the
major
political parties
in
the
Basque
Country
with the names
of members
of the
Board
of
Directors
in
Spanish corporations
and financial
institutions,
I
have
been
able to confirm
that indeed the
Basque capitalist
elite
was not nationalist.
21.
The
BNP
had
previously split
along
the
Traditionalist/Liberal
cleavage;
while the
Traditionalist sector retained the name of the party, the more Liberal branch com-
peted
under the name
Comunidad Nacionalista Vasca
(Basque
Nationalist Com-
munity).
22.
There
is
little
agreement
on how
to
classify
forms of nationalism
(Ernest
Gellner,
Nations;
Ernst
Haas,
What is
Nationalism and
Why
should
we
Study
It Inter-
national
Organization
40, 707-744;
Liah
Greenfeld,
Nationalism).
In this
article,
I
have chosen the terms
traditionailst,
bourgeois,
and
progressive,
because
they
fit
better into
my
characterization of the two nationalist movements
throughout
the
twentieth-century,
which
I
elaborate
in
a
forthcoming
book
comparing
the
two
movements.
However,
using
Haas's
definitions,
one
can
say
that
Basque
national-
ism is a mixture of the traditional and restorative types of synchretist nationalist
ideology.
Catalan
nationalism,
on
the other
hand,
presents
elements
of two
types
of
nationalism;
the
bourgeois
form of
nationalism
is
a
mixture of the
liberal
Whig
and
the
syncretist synthetic types
defined
by
Haas,
while the
progressive
form
of na-
tionalism falls into what Haas calls the Liberal Jabobin
nationalist
ideology.
23.
Engracio
de
Arantzadi,
who
succeeded Arana as one
of the main
ideologues
of the
BNP,
provides
a
telling
illustration of this
ideological
continuity
in his book
Ereintza,
Siembra de Nacionalismo
Vasco,
1894-1914,
which
was
published
in
1935
(San
Sebastian:
Aunamendi,
1980).
24. Sabino de
Arana,
Obras
Escogidas
(San
Sebastian:
Haranburu,
1965
[1897]);
73-75.
25.
Ibid,
207.
26.
Javier
Corcuera,
Origenes,
158.
27. Antonio
Elorza,
Ideologias;
Jose
Luis De la
Granja,
El
Nacionalismo.
28. Jose
Extramiana,
Historia de las Guerras Carlistas
(San
Sebastian:
Haranburu,
1980);
John
F.
Coverdale,
The
Basque
Phase
of
Spain's
First Carlist
War
(New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press,
1984);
Vicente
Garmendia,
La
Ideologia
Car-
lista
(1968-1876) (Zarauz:
Diputaci6n
Foral de
Guipiizcoa,
1984).
29.
Marianne
Heiberg,
Inside the Moral
Community:
Politics
in
a
Basque Village
in
William
Douglas,
editor,
Basque
Politics,
295.
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567
30.
Juan Pablo
Fusi,
Pluralismo;
Jose Luis
De la
Granja,
El
Nacionalismo.
31.
Ibid,
566.
32. Juan Pablo
Fusi,
Pluralismo.
33.
Isidre
Molas,
Lliga
Catalana II
Vols
(Barcelona:
Edicions
62,
1971);
Santiago
Alberti,
El
Republicanisme
Catald
i la
Restauraci6
Mondrquica
(Barcelona:
Alberti,
1972);
Xavier
Cuadrat,
Socialismo
y Anarquismo
en
Catalura
(1899-1911)
(Madrid:
Ediciones
de la Revista
del
Trabajo, 1976); Borja
De
Riquer
and
Miquel
Izard,
Coneixer
la
Historia
de
Catalunya,
Vol.
4
(Barcelona:
Vicens
Vives,
1983);
Gabriel
Sirvent,
Algunes
Notes
sobre
la
Implantaci6
Sindical
de
Socialistes i
Anarquistes
a
Catalunya,
abans
dels
Anys
de
la Primera
Guerra
Mundial,
in
Manuel
Gonzalez
Portilla,
Jordi
Maluquer
de
Motes,
and
Borja
de
Riquer
Permanyer,
editors,
Industrializaci6n
y
Nacionalismo,
(Bellaterra:
Universitat
Aut6noma de
Barcelona,
1985),
555-568;
S.
Tavera
Garcia
Notes sobre
L'Anar-
co-Sindicalisme Basc
i
Catala, 1917-1920,
in
Manuel
Gonzalez
Portilla et
al.,
Industrializaci6n
y
Nacionalismo, 569-578;
Joan
Culla
i
Clara,
El
Republicanisme
Lerrouxista
a
Catalunya
(1901-1923)
(Barcelona:
Curial,
1986);
Manuel Lladonosa
i
Vall-Llebrera,
Catalanisme
i
Moviment Obrer:El
CADCI entre 1903 i
1923
(Mont-
serrat: Publications de
l'Abadia
de
Montserrat,
1988);
M. Dolors Ivern i
Salva,
Esquerra Republicana
de
Catalunya
(1931-1936) (Montserrat:
Publicacions
de
l'Abadia
de
Montserrat,
1989).
My
own
empirical
research,
in
which I
contrast the
names of
nationalist and
non-nationalist leaders
with the
names
of
members
in
the
Board of Directors of Spanish corporations and financial institutions confirms
these studies'
findings.
34.
See works
in
note 33.
35.
De
Riquer
and
Izard, Coneixer,
170.
36. Juan J.
Linz,
Early.
37.
One
important
factor that has also been
mentioned to
explain
the sudden
appeal
of
Esquerra
Republicana among
the Catalan
working
class was the shift
to the
right
by
the
supra-regional Republican
party,
which until
then
had attracted most of
the
popular
vote.
38.
I use the
word
fully
because there is
growing
evidence
that
integration
was
pro-
ceeding quite fast in the years preceding the War of Succession, both at the eco-
nomic
and cultural
levels;
see Carlos
Martinez
Shaw,
Cataluna
en
la
Carrera
de
Indias
(Barcelona:
Critica,
1981);
David
Laitin,
Language
and the
Construction
of
States:
The Case
of
Catalonia
in
Spain,
Wilder
House
Working Papers
10
(1991),
1-33.
39.
Pere
Pascual,
Agricultura
i
Industrialitzaci6
a
la
Catalunya
del
Segle
XIX,
(Barce-
lona:
Critica,
1990);
Pierre
Vilar,
La
Catalogne.
40.
Research
on the
type
of
merchandises
that were
exported
has been
hampered
by
the lack
of official
statistics on
the
composition
by product
of
exports
to
foreign
countries.
Although
authors
agree
that
Catalans
also
exported
textile
products
to
Latin America, the dominant view is that these industrial products represented a
tiny
percentage
of
total
exports
and
that
only
a
very
small
proportion
of
the indus-
trial
goods
that
were
produced
in
Catalonia were
exported.
See J. K.
J.
Thomson,
A
Distinctive
Industrialization.
Cotton
in
Barcelona,
1728-1832
(Cambridge:
Cam-
bridge
University
Press,
1992),
Albert
Carreras,
Cataluna,
Primera
Regi6n
Indus-
trial de
Espana,
in
Jordi
Nadal and
Albert
Carreras,
editors,
Pautas
Regionales
de
la
Industrializaci6n
Espanola
(siglos
XIX
y
XX),
(Barcelona:
Ariel,
1990),
3-22;
Pere
Pascual,
Agricultura.
41.
J. K. J.
Thomson,
A
Distinctive,
12-13.
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568
42. Jordi
Nadal,
El Fracaso de la
Industrializaci6n
en
Espana, (Barcelona:
Ariel,
1975).
43. JuanJ.
Linz,
Early,
7-59.
44. PedroTedde, BancaPrivaday CrecimientoEcon6micoen Espafia,1874-1913,
in
Papeles
de Economia
Espanola
20
(1984),
169-184.
45. Pierre
Vilar,
La
Catalogne;
Jaume Vicens
Vives,
Industrials
i Politics al
Segle
XIX
(Barcelona:
Vicens
Vives,
1958);
Jordi
Maluquer
de
Motes,
La Historia
Eco-
n6mica de
Catalufia,
in
Papeles
de Economia
Espafiola
20
(1984),
268-280;
Albert
Carreras,
Fuentes
y
Datos
para
el Analisis
Regional
de la
Industrializaci6n
Espafiola,
n
Jordi Nadal
and Albert
Carreras, ditors,
Pautas
Regionales,
3-22;
Pere
Pascual,
Agricultura.
46.
Albert
Carreras,
Fuentes.
47. Albert
Carreras,
Fuentes.
48.
Ibid;
Antonio
Escudero,
Capital
Minero
y
Formaci6n
de
Capital
en
Vizcaya
(1876-1913),
in
Jordi
Nadal
and
Albert
Carreras,
Pautas
Regionales,
106-123;
Emiliano Fernandez
de
Pinedo,
La
industrializaci6n
en el Norte
de
Espana, (Barce-
lona:
Critica,
1988).
49.
Manuel
Gonzalez
Portilla,
La
Formaci6n;
Emiliano Fernandez
de
Pinedo,
La
Industrializaci6n;
Albert
Carreras,
Fuentes.
50.
The
clergy,
small
andowners,
and
peasants
were the main
social actors
supporting
Carlism
n the two
communities.
A
detailed
comparative
tudy
of
the causes
for
the
war,
for its
greater
ntensity
n the
Basque
Country
and
in
Catalonia,
and
for
the
reasonswhy it was strongest n the BasqueCountry,has not yet been conducted
and
is
beyond
the
scope
of this
article
(Juan
Diez
Medrano,
Divided
Nations,
forthcoming).
However,
a
comparative
analysis
based
on the
literature
hat has
been
published
on the CarlistWars
suggests
hat the
relative
evel
of
development
of
agriculture
n
the two
regionsultimately xplains
he different
ntensity
of
popu-
lar
support
to Carlism
n the two
regions, by
determining
he
intensity
of
rural-
urbanconflict
(Pere
Pascual,
Industrializaci6;
osep
M.
Mundet
Gifre,
La Primera
GuerraCarlina
a
Catalunya
Barcelona:
Publicacions
de l'Abadia
de
Montserrat,
1990];
Miquel
Izard,
El Rechazo a
la Modernizaci6n
Capitalista,
Cataluiia
y
Euskadi,
Similitudes
y
Diferencias,
n Manuel Gonzalez
Portilla
et
al.,
Industria-
lizaci6n, 375-387; John F. Coverdale, The Basque Phase of Spain's First Carlist
War,
New
Jersey:
Princeton
University
Press,
19841;
Vicente
Garmendia,
La Ideo-
logia;
Jose
Extramiana,
Historia;
Stanley
Payne,
El
Nacionalismo;
Emiliano
Fer-
nandez
de
Pinedo,
Crecimiento;
Pablo
Fernandez
Albadalejo,
La
Crisis
delAntiguo
Regimen
en
Guipuzcoa
Madrid:
Akal,
1975];
Jaume
Torres
Elias,
Liberalismo
Rebeldia
Campesina,
Barcelona:
Ariel,
19731).
51. Javier
Cuesta,
El Carlismo.
52. Cited
in
Javier
Corcuera,
Origenes.
53.
As is well
known
now,
the
preservation
or
suppression
of
the
Fueros
was
not the
origin
of the
war,
nor one of its
major
themes
(Javier
Corcuera,
Origenes).
The
Spanishcentralgovernment,however,used itsmilitary ictory o eliminate hem,as
part
of
its
centralizing
fforts.
For several
years
after
the
revocation
of the
Fueros,
the
restoration
f these
traditional
ights
and
institutions
was
in
the
political
agenda
of
all
majorpolitical
groups
n
the
Basque
Country,
ncluding
ndustrial
apitalists.
However,
in
1882,
an economic
agreement
-
the Conciertos
Econ6micos
-
was
signed
between
Basque
authorities
and the
central
government
which
gave
Basque
authorities
iscal
autonomy.
This
measure
was
greeted
with
enthusiasm
by
the
wealthiest
Basque
capitalists,
who
then decided
to
abandon
the
pro-Fueros
cause.
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569
54. J.
Corcuera,
Origenes,
29.
55.
Actually,
he
corporation
was more extended
n
the
Basque Country
han
in
Cata-
lonia,
wheresmall
amily
irmswere
relatively
more common.
56. Manuel
Tuii6n
de
Lara,
Estudios
sobre el
Siglo
XIX
Espahol,
(Madrid:
Siglo
XXI,
1972).
57.
Carlos
Moya,
El Poder Economico
en
Espaia,
(Madrid:
Tucar,
1975).
58. The fact that
major
capital
owners
still tended to be
membersof the
Boards
of their
companies
in
this
historical
period (they
also
participated
n
political
contests),
justifies
he use of this
Directory.
n the
absence of information n the
place
of ori-
gin
of all
directors,
his
analysis
has used
informationon the
province
where cor-
porations
were
located,
to
compare
the
numberof
directors
belonging
both to the
Board of
Basque
and of
non-Basque outside
of the
BasqueCountry)corporations
with
the number
of
Directors that
belonged
both
to the Board of Catalanand of
non-Catalan
orporations.
59. Because of their intense involvement
n
Basque
or Catalan
economic activitiesone
can
define these
top
100 directors as
Basque
or
Catalan,
regardless
of
place
of
birth.
Moreover,
inking
the names included
in
these lists with
biographical
nfor-
mation available
on
these
persons
and
personal
knowledge
of
typical
Catalanand
Basque
names
suggests
that these
people
were indeed
Basque
or
Catalan
by
eth-
nicity
as well as
by
intensity
of
economic
nvolvement
n
the
region.
60.
Joseph
Harrison,
La
Industria
Pesada;
Manuel
Gonzalez
Portilla,
La
Formacion;
ManuMontero,Mineros.
6
1.
Ignacio
Arana
Perez,
La
Ligna
Vizcaina
de
Productores
y
la
Politica Econ6mica de
la Restauraci6n.
1894-1914,
(Bilbao,
Caja
de
Ahorros
Vizcaina,
1988).