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Callias to Socrates (Prot. 335d2-3): «If you go, we’ll not discuss inthe same way (eja;n ga;r su; ejxevlqh/~, oujc oJmoivw~ hJmi`n e[sontai oiJdiavlogoi).»

How then is a discussion with Socrates? Socrates’ answer to thisquestion is the sine qua non condition he exacts in order to continue thedebate: one has to give short answers and keep to the point (dia; bracevwnte kai; aujta; ta; ejrwtwvmena »...¼ ajpokrivnesqai, ibid. 336a7). That is,he adds, what makes the whole difference between dialogical discussion(to; sunei`nai ajllhloi`~ dialegomevnou~) and oratorical performance (to;dhmhgorei`n). Leaving aside the actual practice of Plato’s Socrates –who isfar from averse to embarking upon long speeches– let us concentrate onthe fact that when theorizing dialogue, Socrates defines it by brachylogy.In the Republic, Book VI, the same Socrates presents as the crowningachievement of philosophical education the «power (duvnami~)» or «science(ejpisthvmh)» of discussing1. Here again, rather than showing one’srhetorical skill, discussion seems to consist in exchanging questions andanswers: we will learn in Book VII that the power or science of discussionis nothing else than the power or science of «giving and taking anargument»2, of questioning and answering, as the Cratylus will also say,albeit with less sophistication3. Now, when at last the word «dialectic»(dialektikhv [scil. tevcnh]) appears4, it seems to be the reminder or thesummary of the earlier phrases duvnami~ or ejpisthvmh tou` dialevgesqai.

DIALECTIC WITH AND WITHOUT SOCRATES:ON THE TWO PLATONIC DEFINITIONS

OF DIALECTIC*

Michel NARCY

* A slightly different version of this paper was published under the title «Y a-t-il unedialectique après Socrate?» in F. Cossutta & M. Narcy (ed.), La Forme dialogue: évolution etréceptions, Grenoble, 2001.

1. Republic, VI, 511b4, c5.2. Being not dialecticians is being not dunatoi;... dou`naiv te kai; ajpodevxasqai lovgon

(Republic, VII, 531e4-5).3. To;n... ejrwta`n kai; ajpokrivnesqai ejpistavmenon... kalei`~... dialektikovnÉ (Cratylus,

390c10-11).4. Republic, VII, 534e3, 536b6.

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Thus, the translators are probably right when they translate, right fromthe end of Book VI, to; dialevgesqai (literally «discussing») as «dialectic».To sum up, when we read the Republic, Plato appears to make it clearthat there is no dialectic outside Socratic dialogue.

Yet at least on one occasion, Plato denied this identity of dialogue anddialectic. It happens in that passage from the Sophist where the EleaticStranger wonders if «while we were in search of the sophist, we arelikely to have found the philosopher first»5. Why this doubt? Because ithas just transpired that, in order to show «which kinds (gevnh) are mutuallyconsonant and which are mutually exclusive» (Soph. 253b11-c1), a scienceis needed, analogous to «grammatic», the science of letters and of theircombinations. Now, continues the Stranger, which name are we to givethis science? «Dividing by kinds (to; kata; gevnh diairei`sqai) withouttaking the same form or species (ei\do~) for different nor a different onefor the same», is it not the task of the «dialectical science (th`~dialektikh`~ ejpisthvmh~)»? (Soph. 253d1-3.) As in Republic VI-VII,here again, therefore, dialectic is that science specific to the philosopher.However, as we have just seen, in the Republic this science was firstdenoted as the science of discussing: here dialectic was introduced asthe science that needs «this one who proceeds in the path of argument inorder to show correctly which kinds are mutually consonant and whichare mutually exclusive»6.

In spite of the different phrasing, some scholars do not hesitate torecognize in the «dialectical science» of the Stranger the «science ofdiscussing» of Socrates in Republic VI-VII. William S. Cobb, for instance,writes that the «dialectical knowledge» (such is his translation ofdialektikh; ejpisthvmh at Soph. 253d2-3) is «the knowledge connectedwith the art of discourse or dialogue, dialektike»7. But that would appearto beg the following question. Are we to hold that «discussing» on theone hand and «proceeding in the path of argument» on the other are oneand the same? And if they are, on what grounds is this so? Most translators,including the first two modern translators of Plato’s Sophist, do seem tobe careful not to prejudge the answer. Dia; tw`n lovgwn poreuvesqai istranslated by Schleiermacher as «seine Reden durchführen»8, and by VictorCousin, «conduire son raisonnement»9. Their only disagreement concernsthe meaning of logos in this passage: Schleiermacher opts for a quite

5. Kinduneuvomen, zhtou`nte~ to;n sofisth;n, provteron ajnhurhkevnai to;n filovsofonÉ(Sophist, 253c8-9).

6. \ArÆ ouj metÆ ejpisthvmh~ tino;~ ajnagkai`on dia; tw`n lovgwn poreuvesqai to;n ojrqw`~mevllonta deivxein poi`a poivoi~ sumfwnei` tw`n genw`n kai; poi`a a[llhla ouj devcetaiÉ «Toproceed in the path of argument» is Jowett’s translation for dia; tw`n lovgwn poreuvesqai(Soph. 253b9-c1).

7. W.S. Cobb 1990, n. 59 ad 253d2-3.8. F. Schleiermacher 21824. Ficino had already translated: «sermones peragere».9. V. Cousin 1837.

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general meaning of the word, «discourse», while Cousin adheres to themore restricted «reasoning». All subsequent translations understandablyopt for one of these two, but hardly any offer a hint of a dialogical modeof discoursing or reasoning10.

Admittedly, the interlocutory, or at least al-locutory aspect is notmissing from the indications we are given about this dialectical science:making his way through the logoi, the dialectician, who the Stranger willsoon after call philosopher, is going to «show» and consequently, we cansuppose, show to someone. But unlike the Republic, nothing here tells usthat this figure has to answer or that the philosopher has any need of hisanswer, that he has to «receive» it and to know how to receive it, to havea knowledge of questioning: nothing here suggests that, under the nameof philosopher, it is Socrates who is spoken of –Socrates who in Plato,we should remember, claims no science except this very one, theknowledge of questioning. Let us dwell on this «dialectical science», orrather on what the Stranger tells us about it. It is the knowledge necessary,he says, for making one’s way through the logoi, if one is to show whichkinds are likely to combine and which are mutually exclusive. On whatgrounds are we to acknowledge the necessity of such a science? Becauseit has just been discovered that, from the three kinds that were examinedup to now –being, motion and rest– the second and third necessarilycombine with the first but are themselves mutually exclusive. Thus, kindsare like letters or articulated sounds: consonants need vowels to beart iculated, some consonants combine, meaning that they arepronounceable in combination with certain consonants but incompatiblewith others. There is a science of these compatibilities and incompatibilitiesthat our modern would probably call phonetics but that the Greeks called«grammatic»; at any rate it is the science of what linguists call the firstarticulation of language. How far can we adhere to the alleged analogybetween grammatic and dialectic? If, like grammatic, dialectic is namedafter its object, it should be the science of the logoi, just as grammatic isthe science of the grammata. But this is not the case.

The subject-matter of grammatic is what we usually do when we arespeaking or writing: it is the way we combine sounds or the letters whichrepresent these. There is nothing alike in the case of dialectic. Either it

10. One recent exception : Nicholas P. White 1993, who translates dia; tw`n lovgwnporeuvesqai by «to proceed through the discussion»; it is the Jowett’s translation, modifiedby supposing a dialectical or dialogical content of «argument». But this supposition did notconvince ulterior translators such as Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage and Eric Salem 1996who, though they list White’s translation among those they have «most frequently consul-ted», go back to the quite literal translation «to make his way through accounts» (cf.A. Diès 1925: «se guider à travers les discours»). No more trace of dialectic is to be found intranslations like those of L. Robin 1950: «dans la route qu’il suit à travers ses propos»),R. Wiehl 1985: «[das] Durchgehen der Rede») or N.L. Cordero 1993: «avancer le long desraisonnements»).

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refers to dialevgesqai or to dia; lovgwn, the name dialectic does refer tospeech. But what the dialectician referred to by the Stranger intends todescribe is not the articulation of speech, which is something like a secondarticulation of language; instead, he intends to describe the articulationof kinds. Let us go so far as to acknowledge that making his way throughaccounts is the means of describing or «showing» this articulation; inother words, let us acknowledge that, in the Sophist as in the Republic,dialectic is inseparable from speech. Nonetheless, the case is not thesame as it is for grammatic because, unlike the articulation of sounds,the articulation which dialectic teaches the rules of is not due to us. Wearticulate the sounds of language, we write the letters but we do notarticulate kinds. Kinds are articulated by themselves and the articulationof kinds is not the articulation of speech but of being: being is articulated,but not by us. Once we are taught by the grammatist, we are able to putinto practice his teaching, to do what we learned, but this is not the casewith the dialectician: what dialectic is about, which is namely being, isnot itself dialectical; one thing is the ability that dialectic gives us to makeour way through accounts; but the science it provides us with –thatknowledge of the articulation of kinds– is quite another matter. UnlikeSocrates in the Republic, the Stranger would probably consider the phrase«power of discussing (duvnami~ tou` dialevgesqai)» to be inappropriateand inadequate for referring to dialectic.

A dialectic without dialogue: that is what the Sophist speaks of and,indeed, more than simply speaks of; what comes after our passage, theexamination of the five most important kinds (being, motion, rest,sameness, otherness) should probably be considered as a specimen ofthis dialectic. Of course strictly speaking, this dialectic is not deprived ofspeech, since its name is derived from «proceeding through speech»;nor does it exclude dialogue, since the specimen displayed by the Strangerassumes the shape of a dialogue with Theaetetus. But should Theaetetuswithdraw, the Stranger would not be stopped from making his way,whereas in the Gorgias Socrates is scarcely able to overcome the troublecaused by Callicles’ withdrawal.

So, what about Socrates in the Sophist? About Socrates, who Platoused to portray as the philosopher and according to whom dialecticconsists of a dialogue?

As we know, from the moment when he handed over to the Stranger,Socrates becomes a silent witness to the discussion –a discussion inwhich, as we have just seen, his own concept of dialectic is supersededby another. Do we witness, in the Sophist, a total eclipse of the Socraticdialogue? Not total, if it is correct to recognize the Socratic method inthe fifth definition of the sophist given by the Stranger (230b4-d4): apurely negative method, proceeding by way of interrogation in order toshow the inconsistencies in the respondent’s answers and so to stop him

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from believing that he knows what he doesn’t know; thanks to thistreatment –a katharsis– the latter gets rid of the opinions that inside himare an obstacle to knowledge. «An outstanding summary of the methodof critical examination (“self-knowledge”) brought into play in the earlierdialogues, and still in the Theaetetus», according to L. Robin11. Indeed,one cannot but be struck by the fact that the Stranger is describing forTheaetetus the very method the young man was subjected to on the veryprevious day. It is difficult to believe that Theaetetus does not recognizeit; and it becomes all the more so when in order to describe the beneficialeffects of this cathartic method, the Stranger uses the same wordsSocrates used when describing his own method of midwifery and whenbringing the dialogue to an end by underlining how much having beenrefuted was beneficial for Theaetetus: those who are so confronted withtheir own contradictions, says the Stranger, «are angry with themselvesand grow gentle towards others»12.

Indeed, the passage reveals not only the judgement passed by theStranger on the Socratic method but the way in which this method wasperceived by its latest beneficiary. Actually, it is on the insistence ofTheaetetus rather than the Stranger that the practitioners of the latestmethod the Stranger describes will be called sophists. Too odd a trickfor it to be unintentional on Plato’s behalf. Like all the previous divisions,the fifth is undertaken on the Stranger’s initiative (226b): even though hehas given four definitions of the sophist, he goes back over the difficultyof grasping sophist’s nature because of this figure’s poikiliva, the varietyof his shapes. Once the division is achieved, Theaetetus is asked to namethe kind just obtained, as he was previously asked to do three times outof four13. But this time the Stranger’s question is not purely rhetorical:«those who make use of this art, what name shall we give them? For Iam afraid of saying they are sophists14.» «Why?», asks Theaetetus,surprised, and the Stranger answers: «For fear of bestowing upon themtoo high a dignity15.» So it is up to Theaetetus to argue: «And yet there isa resemblance between what has just been told and that sort of people16.»

11. Op. cit. (supra n. 10), t. II, p. 1456 (n. 1 of p. 278).12. JEautoi`~ me;n calepaivnousi, pro;~ de; tou;~ a[llou~ hJmerou`ntai (Soph. 230b9-c1,

transl. Jowett). For the first member of the sentence, compare Theaet. 151c2-4: eja;n... ti w|na]n levghæ~... uJpexairw`mai kai; ajpobavllw, mh; ajgrivaine. For the second, compare Theaet.210c3: hJmerwvtero~ (scil. e[sh/) swfrovnw~ oujk oijovmeno~ eijdevnai a} mh; oi\sqa.

13. Cf. 223a7, 224c5, 225e2.14. Tou;~ tauvth/ crwmevnou~ th` tevcnh/ tivna~ fhvsomenÉ ejgw; me;n ga;r fobou`mai sofis-

ta;~ favnai (230e5-231a1).15. Mh; mei`zon aujtoi`~ prosavptwmen gevra~ (231a3). Cornford’s construction of the

sentence is the only one possible from a grammatical point of view : aujtoi`~ refers to tou;~tauvth/ crwmevnou~ th`/ tevcnhæ, and not to sofista;`. The reason alleged by Cornford for theStranger’s fear (echoing the Socratic disavowal of knowledge) seems to me less sure.

16. jAlla; mh;n prosevoikev ge toiouvtw/ tini; ta; nu`n eijrhmevna (231a4-5).

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And, at the cost of the nuance introduced by the analogy with theresemblance between wolf and dog17, the Stranger lets himself bepersuaded to call sophists people like Socrates. But in Plato’s work, nobodyis like Socrates, and Socrates is the only one who uses the method inquestion: under the plural used by the Stranger, Plato does not allow usto recognize anyone but Socrates.

This exchange between the Stranger and Theaetetus –reluctance onStranger’s part, resolve on Theaetetus’– can be read as a discussion ofthe real nature of the Platonic dialogue as it had appeared up to then, withPlato having cast Socrates in the role of leading actor. With the fifthdivision, as with the previous four, the Stranger intended to catch thesophist, this «many-sided animal» (226a6-7): the more unexpected wewill then find his reluctance, once this division is achieved, to put thename «sophistics» upon the art he has just described; yet for Plato’sreaders, who are likely to have recognized in this art the Socratic method,this reluctance is comprehensible and maybe even comforting. But theycannot but be upset when Theaetetus, who also is likely to have recognizedthe method he was subjected to on the day before, insists that they callsophists the practitioners of this: fresh as his memory is of having beenconvinced by Socrates of not knowing what he believed to know,nonetheless he appears not to be in the least embarrassed to explain–even in the presence of Socrates himself– that he saw nothing in hisquestioning but sophistics or at least something very similar to sophistics.Now, as we learned in the Theaetetus, Theaetetus has read Protagoras18

and is far from inexperienced (oujk a[peiro~) as regards sophisticaldiscussions19: we are thus allowed to think that he passes an informedjudgement when he maintains that Socratic midwifery resemblessophistics.

The dialogue form, at least in the form in which it was thought of andsubject to theorizing up to the Theaetetus, is thus subsumed undersophistics: in order to maintain the opposition of philosophy to sophistics,

17. This analogy is far from clear. Most readers understand it as meaning that Socrates isto a sophist as a dog is to a wolf –the tamest of animals contrasted with the fiercest. Butconstruing the analogy in this way is not faithful to Plato’s phrasing. Let us look at the Greeksentences: –THEAETETUS: prosevoikev ge toiouvtw/ tini; ta; nu`n eijrhmevna. –STRANGER: Kai; ga;r[scil. prosevoike] kuni; luvko~, ajgriwvtaton hJmerwtavtw/. If we adhere to the distribution ofgrammatical cases, we must understand that kuni; and hJmerwtavtw/ correspond to toiouvtw/tini; –that is, the sophist–, luvko~ and ajgriwvtaton to ta; nu`n eijrhmevna –that is, the descrip-tion of a method in which the Stranger is reluctant to recognize sophistics, and which seemsto be the Socratic method of elenchus. So, while we could expect that he who makes hisadressee hJmerou`sqai (cf. 230c1) should himself be compared to the tamest (hJmerwvtato~) ofanimals, Plato seems to change the roles unexpectedly : yet let us remember that in theApology Socrates compares himself to a gadfly (30e5), an animal which, though small, ishardly tame!

18. Theaet. 152a5.19. Theaet. 155c6; cf. 158 b5-c7, where Socrates reminds Theaetetus that he has already

heard discussions about the indiscernibility of waking from dreaming.

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one has now to dissociate philosophy from dialogue. On the other hand,if Plato wants to maintain the link between philosophy and dialectic20, hehas to coin a new definition of dialectic: the one he puts into the mouth ofthe Stranger in the passage commented upon at the beginning of thisessay. According to this definition, as we have seen, dialectic consistsno longer in discussion, but in the science which makes the philosopherable not to discuss but to «make his way through the accounts» –a phrasethat is vague enough not to exclude discussion but does not make it thecore of the business, either; indeed, this phrase is the proposal of a newetymology for dialektikhv: dia; lovgwn instead of the previous and muchmore plausible dialevgesqai. So dialectic is now distinguished andindependent from dialogue. Whereas Socrates used to mark out the frontierbetween dialectic and eristics by differentiating two modes of discussion21,this frontier is now drawn between dialectic and dialogue. More exactly,between dialectic and Socratic dialogue, or elenchus.

Indeed, whatever Socrates says, the Sophist classifies his practice ofdialectic as a species of the genus eristics: before giving the new definitionof dialectic, it is what the Stranger has achieved through the fourthdivision. The fourth definition of the sophist («money-maker», 226a1) isobtained by a distinction between a certain kind of eristics through whichone makes money, and another through which one wastes money instead.If the proper name of the former is sophistics, for the latter the Strangerhas no name to suggest but ajdolescikovn (225d10), which is usuallytranslated by «babbling». Let us notice that we would have the sametranslation if the text read ajdolescei`n; that is, we miss in the translationthe nuance brought by the –ikov~ desinence. Words with this desinenceusually refer to technical expertise (tevcnai), and Plato coins many wordsof this form to put them into the mouth of the Stranger during hisdivisions. Some of these neologisms may aim at a comic effect, but noneof them so conspicuously as ajdolescikovn, which raises to a tevcnhsuch a childish (or senile) mode of speaking as babbling.

Yet we cannot be sure that it is a real witticism. As G.J. De Vries hasrightly pointed out, wheresoever ajdolevsch~ and its cognates occur inPlato’s works, they are terms of abuse22. We may add that every time

20. Why doesn’t Plato drop dialectic? One may wonder. The plausible answer is psycho-logical rather than theoretical: like many philosophers, and not only philosophers, Plato isnot prepared to acknowledge his change of mind. Cf. D. Sedley 2004, ch. 1, §5: «Plato’sUnitarianism».

21. Cf. Meno, 75c8-d7.22. Cf. G.J. De Vries 1975, 15. As De Vries remarks, the point «seems to have escaped

the lexicographers»: from ten dictionaries he checked, only one (Passow-Crönert, 1912)abstains from giving the word a favourable sense; thirty years later, nothing has changed.Now, for the supposed favourable meaning of ajdolevsch~, ajdolesciva and cognates, thedictionaries can only allege occurrences in Plato: so to decide when Plato uses the termfavourably or not is only a matter of interpretation.

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these words are put into Socrates’ mouth23, they clearly hint at the wayin which he was represented by the comic poets24, who, Plato has himsaying in the Apology, were his first accusers25. The same certainly holdsfor Parm. 135d5 and for Polit. 299b8, the latter being «a strong implicitallusion to Socrates as characterised by his accusers»26, and the former,a clear retort to those accusers. On at least two occasions (Phaedr. 269e4-270a1 and Crat. 401b8-9), one can hypothesize that Socrates usesajdolevsch~ or ajdolesciva ironically27. But what about our ajdolescikovn?At best it is ironical, at least ambiguous. According to Proclus, it is therubric under which the Stranger puts dialectic28; his argument for thinkingthis is that in Plato’s homonymous dialogue, Parmenides calls ajdolescivathe method with which he wants Socrates to train29. But as Proclus himselfremarks, Parmenides «does not simply call his method “babbling” butadds “what the many call babbling”30». As for the Stranger, he abstainsfrom making this point so that it is not clear whether he gives ajdolescikovnthe «Parmenidean» meaning or its literal sense –whether he speaks like«the many» or not.

Now, why should we think he does not speak like «the many»? Fromhim we read no reservation about the common meaning of the word –nomore than Socrates offers us when, in the Theaetetus, he happens to callhimself a babbler31. I do not know of any scholar who has observed areminder of the Theaetetus in the fourth division of the Sophist. And yetit is should be noted that the second to last stage of the division (the verylast being the definition of the sophist as distinct from the babbler) opposestwo kinds of disputation (ajntilogikovn, 225b13-c9): one «about contracts(peri; ta; sumbovlaia)», which is carried out «at random and without

23. Phaed. 70c1-2, Phaedr. 269e4-270a1, Crat. 401b8-9, Resp. VI, 489a1, Theaet.190b10-c2.

24. Cf. Eupolis, fr. 352 Kock = SSR IA 12: misw` de; kai; to;n Swkravthn, to;n ptwco;najdolevschn. At the end of Aristophanes’ Clouds, as he is going to set Socrates’ house on fire,Strepsiades calls it «the babblers’ house (th;n oijkivan tw`n ajdolescw`n)» (Aristoph. Nub.1484-1485).

25. Plato, Ap. 18a7 ff.26. D. Sedley 2003, 100 n. 1.27. It must be said that certain scholars –and prestigious ones at that– think that the

Phaedrus passage must be taken as serious (cf. C.J. Rowe 1986, n. ad 269e1-270a8, p. 204-205; Rowe himself defends the ironic interpretation). According to D. Sedley 2003, 100, inthe Phaedrus passage «we encounter a mixture of irony and earnestness», and the like in theCratylus.

28. Proclus, Commentarium in Platonis Parmenidem, col. 657, 25-26 Cousin.29. Cf. Plato, Parm. 135d4-5: Guvmnasai ma`llon dia; th`~ dokouvsh~ ajcrhvstou ei\nai

kai; kaloumevnh~ uJpo; tw`n pollw`n ajdolesciva~.30. Proclus, ibid. col. 656, 27-30 Cousin.31. Plato, Theaet. 195b10-c2. Contrary to what Proclus (In Parm. 657, 5-15) and most

scholars after him have thought, which is that Socrates would be calling his own practice ofdialectic babbling here, he is actually blaming himself for having previously been mistaken inhis reasoning. In other words, in this passage Socrates doesn’t ironically call the true dialec-tician babbler, but, literally, the bad dialectician he thinks he has just been.

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rules of art (eijkh` kai; ajtevcnw~) », and one which «disputes by rules ofart about justice and injustice themselves (e[ntecnon kai; peri; dikaivwnaujtw`n kai; ajdivkwn... ajmfisbhtou`n)»; the former is not named, but thelatter is labelled as eristic. Now, with due deference to Cornford, whonotices only the opposition without/by rules of art32, it is difficult not tothink of the opposition raised in the middle of the Theaetetus between theman only interested in the question «What injustice have I done to you oryou to me?» and the man who examines «justice and injustice in themselves(aujth`~ th`~ dikaiosuvnh~ te kai; ajdikiva~)»33. So the Eleatic Strangertakes over the difference stated by Socrates in the Theaetetus betweenthe man trained in forensic oratory and the man trained in philosophy;the novelty here –and the surprise!– is that the latter, who Socrates callsa philosopher34, is labelled as eristic by the Eleatic Stranger, who thenobtains the definition of the sophist through a further division inside thegenus so named. As a result, we have to admit that to the Stranger’smind the sophist has the same intellectual interests and is engaged in thesame kinds of discussion as Socrates’ philosopher35. Thus, the onlyrelevant difference between the last two species obtained through thefourth division is either making or wasting money; and so while to theStranger’s mind the sophist appears to be as much a philosopher as theso-called babbler36, it seems highly plausible that Socrates himself isalluded to through the characteristic of not making money: this was whathe used to proudly claim. So the least we can say is that here Socrates ischaracterized not as a philosopher –he has this characteristic in commonwith the sophist– but, among eristics who he otherwise resembles, as amoney-waster instead of –maker: as a «babbler», in a sense very near towhat comic poets and Athenian people influenced by them actually meantwhen they spoke of him. Thus, to the degree that we can hypothesizethat the Stranger uses ajdolescikovn ironically, we may suspect that whileobtaining a fourth definition of the sophist, he passes the same judgementon Socrates as his accusers and condemners. In this respect, the fourthdefinition appears as an appropriate prelude to the fifth according to the

32. F.M. Cornford 1970 [11935], 176.33. Theaet. 175c1-2.34. Theaet. 175e2. This is the only occurrence in the so-called «digression» where

Socrates uses the word filovsofo~ –while attributing it to Theodoros: o}n dh; filovsofonkalei`~. Elsewhere in the same section (172c3-177c2), Socrates uses such circumlocutions as«men who spend much time in philosophical studies» (173c8-9, cf. 172c5, 174b1), «bred inphilosophical pursuits» (172c9-d1), that most of translators abbreviate into «philosopher(s)».

35. This may be of no surprise: as is well known, Isocrates would also use the terms‘eristic’ or ‘sophist’ to label the Academicians as well as actual sophists or rhetors.

36. To be more precise, inquiring into justice and injustice themselves makes, at least tothe Stranger’s mind, no actual difference between the sophist and the philosopher: at thisstage of the dialogue, we have still to learn what this difference actually consists in, to knowwhich kinds or species are likely to combine and which are mutually exclusive –a technicalrather than a theoretical difference.

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which, through a new division, Socrates will be regarded as a sophist –evenif a noble one!

So this eleatic Stranger who will prevent Theaetetus from confusingsophist and philosopher does not seem to be embarrassed in classifyingSocrates as a sophist twice. Moreover, once he has caught Socrates inthe net he has woven with his definitions, he stops hunting the sophist.Are we to understand by this that the actual aim of the sophist huntingwas to catch Socrates? Perhaps this would be going too far. Nevertheless,we must certainly observe how different the Stranger’s method is fromthe Socratic method. Whereas the Socratic rule is to replace a rejecteddefinition with another in the hope of eventually obtaining the truth, theStranger constantly adds one definition after another and puts them sideby side, rejecting none. Thus he fails to comply with the well knownSocratic condition that there should be just one definition37. Admittedly,he will go on to select one of the definitions previously obtained as thebest38, but this selection will not mean rejecting the others; rather, thedefinition of the sophist as a practitioner of contradiction (ajntilogikov~)could be understood as something that approaches the commondenominator of the whole set. It would appear that herein lies the essenceof the Stranger’s method, which is to attempt no refutation: each definitionis good but no single definition is exclusive, so that, as he eventuallysays, the more the better!39 Here Plato confronts us with a paradox: afterthe Stranger was introduced by Socrates (maybe for propitiation) as a«god of refutation»40, he never practises refutation. To be precise, henever practises refutation in the Socratic way, which would mean usingcross-examination. Later in the dialogue he will introduce the «parricide»to be committed upon Parmenides as a «refutation» (e[legco~)41. However,this refutation will not take the shape of the classical Socratic cross-examination : there will be no dialogue with Parmenides, no attempt tomake him contradict himself

42. The Stranger will proceed instead by

inquiring about being and by displaying the intertwining of the five «mostimportant kinds»43, in order to refute Parmenides; and then, in order torefute the sophistic claim that it is impossible to speak falsely, he willdeliver a linguistic analysis according to which sentences, not words,are meaningful and are therefore bearers of truth. At no point is there any

37. Cf. Men. 72a6-73c8; Theaet. 146d3-148d7.38. Soph. 232b3-6. The definition retained by the Stranger as the best is the characteri-

zation of the sophist as ajntilogikov~: it must be noted that this is not one of the sixdefinitions given previously, but the second to last stage of the division that ended in thefourth definition of the sophist as eristic.

39. Cf. Soph. 231c5-6.40. Qeo;~ w[n ti~ ejlegktikov~ (Soph. 216b5-6).41. Soph. 242a8, cf. 241e1, 242b1, 242b2, 242b4.42. Cf. E. Grasso 2006.43. Plato, Soph. 254d4: mevgista tw`n genw`n.

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manner of cross-examination: the method consists in opposing theorywith theory, in displaying the knowledge of which kinds combine andwhich do not, that is the dialectic newly defined, that non-dialogicaldialectic examined earlier in this paper. So we may conclude that to thenew definition of dialectic given by Plato in the Sophist there correspondsan equally new practice of dialectic.

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