Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (1)

NASA EEE Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG)

Quality Leadership ForumJuly 19, 2001

Michael J. SampsonNEPAG Manager GSFC/Code 306Systems Management Office

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (2)

Overview

• Organization - Partnerships/International Cooperation

• EEE Parts Risk Assessment– Relationship between knowledge and risk– Inherent Risk– Risk Matrix– Part Level Stoplights

• The MIL System– Advantages to NASA– Surprises– A Horror Story

• EEE Parts Assurance – Why should NASA have guidelines?

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (3)

NEPAG Organization

Mike Sampson

NASA ARC

Ron Chinnapongse

JPL

David Peters

NASA GSFC

Greg Rose

NASA MSFC

Charles Gamble

NASA GRC

Vince Lalli

NASA JSC

David Beverly

NASA KSC

Eric Ernst

NASA LaRc

Otis Riggins

NAVSEA Crane

Darren Crum

USAF/SMD

Dave Davis

NASDA

Sumio Matsuda

ESA

John Kaëlberg

NASA Centers

Partners

SAE

EIA

AIAA ISO

NEMA

DLA & DSCC

Associates

USAF/SMD

Dave Davis

USAF/SMD

Dave Davis

NEPAG

NASA HQ Code Q

Tom Whitmeyer

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (4)

INHERENT RISK IS INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO KNOWLEDGE• If a part is KNOWN to be high risk, this knowledge can be

used to avoid its use or take appropriate actions to move to medium or low risk

• Lack of knowledge means good parts cannot be distinguished from bad

• Obtaining reliable knowledge about COTS EEE Parts requires:

– Expertise– Time– Vendor visits– Testing and Analysis– BIG BUCKS

ONLY a LIMITED number of COTS part types can be reliably deployed in any one system

EEE Parts Risk Assessment - Risk versus Knowledge

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (5)

Inherent Risks - for EEE Parts

• Manufacturing Factors– Spec– Vendor– Maturity/Qualification Status– Knowledge of Changes– Radiation Sensitivity

• These are risks inherent to the part regardless of:– Redundancy– Derating– Mission Requirements– Mission Budget

Mission Success Starts With Safety

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Risk Levels - Inherent Factors Example

ScreeningGrade 1Class SQML V

Grade 2,Jan Class B,

QML Q

Grade 3,883B Commercial

Agency TeamCertification of Plant andOperators

Yes Yes No No

Electrical Subgroups 1-12 Tested

Yes Some QML No No

Extended Burn-In(Dynamic, 240 hours)

Yes No No None

100% PIND Test Yes No No NoPDA 5% 10% Some NoAttributes Data Yes Yes Yes NoVariable Data(Read/Record)

Yes No No No

Failure AnalysisRequirements

Yes No No No

Mission Success Starts With Safety

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EEE Parts - Risk Management

• FBC means acceptance of risk• This requires definition of an acceptable level of risk (ALOR)• Risk must be managed against the ALOR• Overall ALOR for mission translates to ALORs for systems• Low risk missions may include high risk systems and vice versa• Parts must be selected based on the ALOR of the application• Parts risk is combination of inherent risk and application factors:

– Redundancy– Derating– Criticality

• Parts engineers can provide inherent risk independently but can only modify for application factors with application details

Parts Lists for Review Rarely Include Application Details• Engineers may be pressured to modify risk assessment based on

“implied” but undefined mission factors

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (8)

The MIL System - Advantages for NASA

• Not “Dead” for EEE Parts Anyhow

• Generally offers NASA most economical solution in terms of “true cost of ownership”

– Typically, no additional qual or screening

• Still provides majority of EEE parts used by Agency

• NASA has Custodian status for most EEE parts specs we use:

– Can make “Essential Comments”– Must be dispositioned to our satisfaction or can be

escalated (eventually to OSD in theory)– Audit participation taken Seriously

• Free specs and assistance

• As Government privy to inside information

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (9)

• During NASA’s “Nap” some “surprises” initiated:– Class T– Semiconductor Power Rating

• Class T for microcircuits– Essentially COTS masquerading as MIL– Enacted for commercial interests– High risk due to lack of controls and knowledge– NEPAG eventually gets wording “Not for NASA use” added

• Semiconductor Power Rating– Increased by 25% on product with 15+ years of experience– Change based on theoretical analysis not problem or need– No testing to validate change is not detrimental (continued spec

compliance only)– Changes in place for ONE YEAR before NASA aware– Issue still unresolved

DSCC is supported by $ from depot sales so their interest is to increase business

The MIL System - Surprises

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (10)

A Horror Story - Intro

• Two Sources for MIL QPL Part - Orange and Blue• Orange in NE USA: QPL ~ 15yrs to date, significant

NASA use• Orange sold to national corporation Y ~ 94• Blue in SE USA: QPL

– ~ 4 years until sold to Y in 96– GIDEP Alert in 2000– ~ 4 years until sold to T in 2000 (T has not made similar

product in >10yrs)• T bought by Y in 2001!!!!• Y announces decision to shut Orange facility in March 02

except support to Blue line at T facility– Element fab (Orange design)– QPL test

• NASA and USAF asked to support “streamlined qual”

Mission Success Starts With Safety

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A Horror Story - NASA Knows

• “Streamlined qual” proposed based on:– Heritage element used– Established design ( but not with same element)– Danger of loss of critical single source (blackmail)

• Pre-qual MIL audit (THIS WEEK)– NASA (NEPAG) participation– USAF/SMD, Aerospace Corp (NEPAG) participation– No others except DSCC

• Audit team finds:– Y has just discovered that Orange element WILL NOT FIT in

Blue design without redesign (loss of heritage)!!!!– T personnel poorly trained in process– Y and T were clearly not ready for audit

• If NEPAG was not participant, would we know?????

Mission Success Starts With Safety

07/19/2001 (12)

EEE Parts Assurance - Should NASA have Guidelines?

• Contractors have own systems

• NASA cannot expect contractors to use our system instead of theirs

• So why have guidelines?– To document what we think is needed– To capture our lessons learned– To document our core knowledge– To provide a consistent NASA perspective to the contractors– To preserve our Very Successful culture– To guide participants without systems (Academia etc)

• High level documents can be VCSs but implementation guidelines should be NASA