national and regional rail legislation and its influence on services and infrastructure in the...

7/28/2019 National and Regional Rail Legislation and Its Influence on Services and Infrastructure in the London Region

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National and Regional Rail Legislation and its Inuence

on Services and Infrastructure in the London Region

Spatial Planning History, Theory and Policy


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1

Contents

Introduction 2

History of the Rail Network 2

Current Rail Legislative Framework 3

The London Region 5

The Future for London Overground 6

Lessons for Other UK Regions 7

Appendices 9

Glossary 16

Bibliography 17


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Introduction

The delivery and management of rail infrastructure relies on a complex balance of local and

national drivers, this often leads to extremely complex procurement processes involving policy

at many different levels of government. In London the demands on rail infrastructure are greater

than any other place in the country with the 75% of the national rail journeys starting or ending

in London (TfL, 2007) and 33% wholly within London itself. On top of the complex passenger

demands on the network London and the Thames is a major freight hub with freight trains toand from the ports of the Thames estuary and the Channel tunnel utilising the same limited

infrastructure as the passengers.

Following the privatisation of British Rail in 2001 the already complex system of the UK rail

network has become complicated with a mix of public and private control and operation. The

complex demands on the network has resulted similarly in complex legislation within which all

the public and private bodies have to operate. Following the Railways Act of 2005 the structure

of the UK rail network has been changed again, leading to TfL having a much larger stake in

the provisioning of rail services in the London region and most signicantly the creation of the

London Overground.

This essay looks as the development of Britains railways and how current rail legislation has

evolved at a national level. Subsequently the essay looks at the development of the London region

as an entity and its inuence on transport policies. Finally it looks to the future and what recent

developments mean for both TfL in the London region and how it might inuence the nature of

rail policy further aeld.

History of the Rail Network

Following the rst intercity railway in 18301, railways grew rapidly to cover the whole of the

country. As the potential for prot became clear railways were proposed at a rate unimaginable

today with 240 bills for new rail routes put before parliament in 1845 alone (Great British

Railway Journeys, 2012). Besides attaining parliamentary consent, each railway was a separate

company running their own independent services essentially unregulated. The railways were

the dot-com boom of the 1840s and ultimately resulted in a signicant loss of money for many

people as many of the lines failed through inefcient routes or through simply being too costly

or problematic to construct.

Though the boom of railway building passed the railways continued to be operated independently

of each other in many cases in direct competition, the government increased the regulation of

the railways with the Railway Regulation Act 1844 that specied a minimum level of service at a

set rate per mile, subsequently the Rail and Canal Trafc Act of 1854 was brought in, requiring

rail companies to accept virtually any cargo load irrespective of size. Despite the regulations

mentioned the operation of the railways remained largely independent. The advent of the rst

world war saw the rail network nationalised as part of the war effort with the state control

continuing until the Railways Act of 1921. It had been proposed to permanently nationalise the

rail network in an effort to remove the inefciencies and duplication of the independent network,

but ultimately the act held back somewhat from this. The 1921 act did though lead to the

creation of the big four railway companies (London Midland and Scottish Railway (LMS); Great

Western Railway (GWR); London and North Eastern Railway (LNER)& Southern Railway (SR)),

1 Liverpool and Manchester Railway (L&MR)


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which would continue to run the railways as much larger yet still private companies in different

regions of the country.

Full nationalisation eventually followed in 1947 after the Second World War, with the big four

companies facing bankruptcy and with infrastructure ravaged by the war. Though the railways

were nationalised it took a further 15 years for any signicant organisational changes to take

place, with the creation of British Railways Board (BRB) in the 1962 Transport Act replacing the

British Transport Corporation.

The BRB had Dr Beeching as its chair and oversaw a period of modernisation and increased

rationalisation across the network (The Beeching Axe) in an effort to turn the railways back

to protability. During the 1980s BRB replaced its regional structure with a structure based on

service type: InterCity for main fast trains; Regional Railways for local routes and Network South

East serving London commuters with freight services separate again.

During the early 1990s the EU aimed to allow for more access to railway infrastructure that was

generally controlled by national companies. With the aim of allowing more regional operators to

run train services independent of the national companies, the EU issued EU Directive 91/440

in 1991. The EU directive required member states to separate the management of railway

infrastructure from the operation of services at least at a nancial level with train services paying

a fee to use the lines.

The EU directive ultimately resulted in the privatisation of British Rail in a timetable set out in

the Railways Act of 1993. Whilst privatisation had been a big trend of the Thatcher government,

Thatcher herself had regarded privatising the railways a step too far (Coleman, 2005) and it is

perhaps tting that she was replaced by John Major prior to the EU directive in 1991.

The structure of British Rails privatisation was cause for much debate, with the management of

BR preferring a wholesale privatisation of the existing organisation (essentially creating British

Railways plc) but PM John Major preferring a return to the regional companies of the big four era.

The view that eventually won out was a Treasury proposal to create 7 rail franchises (ultimately

25) in order to maximise the governmental revenue from the privatisation.

In 1993 the Railways Act was passed implementing the treasury model for privatisation. The

act created the Rail Regulator as a statutory ofce to control the major or monopoly parts of the

newly privatised rail industry. The main area of oversight for the Rail Regulator was Railtrack

(which became fully privatised as Railtrack plc in 1996), to whom all the railway infrastructure

and stations had been transferred. The 1993 Act also created the Director of Passenger Rail

Franchising who oversaw the issuing of the franchises that would to operate the majority of the

countrys train services.

Current Rail Legislative Framework

Current railway policy is dened by the Railways Act 2005 though its overall structure remains

heavily inuenced by the structure set out in the 1993 privatisation of the national rail network.

Subsequent to the 1993 act the Labour government had abolished the Director of Passenger Rail

Franchising and instead created the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) in 2001 with the intent that it

would take a proactive role with Railtrack in respect of maintaining rail infrastructure. Followingthe 2000 Hateld train crash the SRA oversaw a period in which Railtrack carried out over

580 million of repairs. The damage Hateld (which happened as a result of poor maintenance)

caused to Railtracks image and the nancial impact of the repairs ultimately lead to it going into


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administration and subsequently being restructured as Network Rail. Network Rail, though still

private was limited by guarantee rather than publicly listed due to the accusations that Railtrack

had been more driven by prot than safety in the wake of the Hateld crash.

Whilst Railtrack had lost most of its engineering skills by subcontracting nearly all of the rail

maintenance work, Network Rail began an investment in skills and training, leading to the

announcement in 2003 that all maintenance would be carried out in house following further

rail accidents where private contractors had faced been to blame. In 2004 the government white

paper that ultimately resulted in the 2005 Railways act recommended that in light of impressive

performance in repairs to the rail network and restoration of pre-Hateld reliability levels (KPMG

2010. g.11) Network Rail should be given responsibility for monitoring the performance of the

industry and the development of Route Utilisation Strategies (RUS) for the network, roles that

had previously been assigned to the SRA.

The 2005 act not only gave Network Rail the additional responsibilities but abolished the SRA

completely, transferring its remaining functions to the Ofce for Rail Regulation (ORR) which

itself was created to replace the Rail Regulator. The act placed more responsibility directly on

Secretary of State for Transport who was required to specify what improvements should be

implemented as a utilising the public subsidy of the railways. In addition the Treasury wouldnow impose a limit on the funding available to the ORR (previously there had been no limit to the

amount of expenditure the Rail Regulator could allow).

The process by which the new roles would be implemented is via a process of 5 yearly periodic

reviews largely in line with the control periods that Network Rail had implemented. Network

Rail had retrospectively applied Control Periods (CPs) to the Railtrack period meaning that the

2005 Act fell within Control Period 3 (CP3) which ran from 2004-20092.

Though the control periods were taken from Network Rail, under the act the timetable

is ofcially set by the Ofce for Rail Regulation (ORR), a fact that perhaps hints at the new

more collaborative approach to regulation the 2005 act aimed to implement. Within the ORRsframework the Secretary of State for Transport must produce must produce two documents

detailing the expectations for the rail network until the next periodic review. The rst document

is the High Level Output Specication (HLOS) which sets out the agenda for improvements to the

rail network that the Secretary of State wishes to see. The second document is a more prosaic

Statement of Funds Available (SoFA) which details the level of investment that the treasury will

make available for the delivery of the improvements set out in the HLOS.

The HLOS and SoFA documents subsequently allow ORR to specify access charges3 for the use

of the rail network, which when combined with government subsidy determines Network Rails

operating budget for delivering the outputs specied in the HLOS. The HLOS document denes

the desired outputs from the rail network in general terms, the specics and timings of deliverywithin the control period are determined by Network Rail based on the budget constraints placed

on them by the ORR.

Although in legislative terms Network Rail acts in response to the HLOS document the process

is actually far more collaborative with the responsibilities of Secretary of State, DfT, ORR and

Network Rail all feeding back into the decision making processes. Of particular importance to

the process are the continued monitoring roles that were delegated to Network Rail in the 2005

Act. Network Rail produce a number of documents that form an important part of the planning

process, in addition to the RUS documents that are critical to the process of regulation and

although the process of periodic reviews are run by the ORR it is the Network Rail Initial Industry

2 A list o control periods is included as Appendix 1

3 Access charges are the ees that rail ranchisees and open access operators have to pay Network Rail to use the network.


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Plan (IIP) the guides the ORRs initial advice to the Secretary of State prior to the production of the

HLOS and SoFA. The IIP like many of the other documents produced by Network Rail represents

a coherent view of the rail industry as a whole and involves signicant collaboration with other

rail stakeholders (including TfL in the London Region)

2011 saw the beginnings of an ORR periodic review which will conclude in 2013 (PR13), a full time

line of the various regulatory responsibilities for the delivery of PR13 are enclosed as Appendix 2.

The London Region

Transportation in cities is ultimately a much more complex system than that of a national rail

network, with the integration of multiple modes of transport in a seamless manner, key to both

efciency and performance of the network. In London the development of an integrated transport

network dates back to 1933, satisfyingly to the same year as the iconic London tube map that for

many, particularly tourists, is the London transport network.

From 1933 to 1948 the London Passenger Transport Board (LPTB) controlled Londons

Underground, tram and bus network but actually managed an area far larger than Greater

London4. Following the war and the Transport Act of 1947 (within which the railways were

nationalised) the London Transport Executive became responsible for public transport in London.

As a subsidiary of the British Transport Commission which was predominantly focussed on

repairing and modernising the newly nationalised mainline railways of the country the LTE

oversaw over 15 years of neglect of Londons transport infrastructure. When the British Transport

Commission was dissolved in 1963 the LTE was replaced by the London Transport Board which

continued until 1970.

In 1965 the Greater London Council (GLC) had been created as Londons regional government,though it took until 1970 for the control of the public transport network to be handed over the

GLC. The GLC period saw local governmental management of all public transport in the capital

(with the exception of mainline rail services) for the rst time. The GLC period also saw the

introduction of many aspects of the transport system familiar in London to this day, such as

the Travelcard and other multi-modal tickets as well as the simplied zonal fare system. When

the GLC was abolished in 1986, transport responsibilities transferred to the London Regional

Transport Authority which with the absence of any regional government to report to, reported

directly to the Secretary of State for Transport. The London Regional Transport Authority

managed the transport network via subsidiary companies in a manner similar to that of TfL,

creating London Underground Lines (LUL) in 1985. London Buses Limited was another of the

subsidiary companies, through which bus routes began to be franchised much as they are today.

When the GLA was formed in 2000 the structures set up by the London Regional Transport

Authority formed the basis of the TfL operational structure.

The GLA period saw the introduction of the now ubiquitous Oyster card and fully integrated

ticketing across the various modes of transport under TfLs control. The major sticking point

for the full adoption of Oyster London-wide was the National Rail network, that still remained

outside of TfL control.

The zonal fare structure itself only partially applied to mainline rail stations within it, though

the Travelcard had included mainline rail journeys since 1989 the single fares on the same rail

4 See Appendix 3 or map o the LPTB area


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services did not reect the fare policy on other modes of transport within the zonal area. The nal

unication of zonal fares on national rail with other transport happened in 2007 but ultimately

required the additional powers given to TfL under the 2005 Railways Act to force the mainline

rail companies into the change. Oyster Pay as You Go (PAYG) on mainline rail services proved

even more difcult for to achieve, whilst Travelcards could be loaded to an Oystercard and used

on mainline rail services, PAYG travel was only possible from some national rail stations and was

far from clear for passengers5. Rail franchisees resisted the introduction of Oyster, with South

West Trains at one point demanding payment for accepting Oyster despite the free installation ofequipment at its stations. Ongoing negotiations eventually took until 2010 for PAYG to be fully

accepted on National Rail services in London.

TfLs frustration of dealing with National Rail followed on from a desire for control over metropolitan

mainline services rst outlined in the Mayors Transport Strategy 2001 which stated a desire

to create a London Metro rail service with minimum service standards (GLA 2001, pp.162-

4) as well as the ability for TfL to have much greater input into rail franchising and for closer

collaboration between TfL and the SRA (GLA 2001, pp.157-161).

The Overground Network brand emerged as a result of TfL & SRA collaboration in 2003, effectively

seeking to unify branding on stations that met the walk up and go service level of 4tph6

. TheOverground Network on branding was accompanied by standardised information displays and

CCTV coverage for the relevant stations. The on network, though purely a branding exercise

achieved moderate success and lead in 2004 to more comprehensive proposals from TfL for a

London Regional Rail Agency (LRRA). The LRRA would have seen TfL take full control of suburban

services and some commuter services extending beyond London. The area map (Appendix 6)

shows how the proposed area extended beyond London in a somewhat truncated form of the

LPTB area that existed from 1933-48. The Railways Act 2005 stopped short of the LRRA proposal

despite lobbying from TfL (2004), it did however open the door for the DfT to devolve much more

power to TfL in respect of setting franchises.

The rst movement from DfT in devolution was in transferring the responsibility of the Silverlinkfranchise to TfL. Silverlink had operated services in London on the NLL, WLL and GOBLIN rail

lines as well as services to Watford, franchise extensions and under-investment had left the

service Shabby, unreliable, unsafe, overcrowded (GLA 2006, p.2). Rather than continue with

the previous model of franchised operation TfL decided to operate the routes as a concession,

retaining much of the risk (90%) but setting much tighter controls on the operator by specifying

the trains to timetabling and ticketing. LOROL were awarded the concession in 2007 and opened

a national rail route that fully accepted Oyster and was branded with the familiar TfL roundel

The Future for London Overground

The success of London Overground (TfL, 2011b) has prompted some discussion of its future and

the implications for other similar London rail lines. The decision by the DfT to allow TfL to control

what has become London Overground was at the time seen as a test case, now that is has been

proven a success it would seem entirely plausible that TfL go on to have similar levels of control

over some of the other London specic lines. This is supported by recent developments such as

the McNulty report (DFT, 2011) on the affordability of rail in the UK, the emerging PR13 and a

5 See Appendix 4 or maps o Oyster Pay As You Go Acceptance on National Rail

6 See Appendix 5 or map o high requency Overground Network services


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report on the impressive performance of London Overground, have put the issue of TfLs control

of mainline rail services squarely on the agenda.

For the traditional franchise route, investment in commuter rail services has always been a worse

investment than in long distance services, where individual passengers can be worth upwards

of ten times more per journey. Its a aw that TfLs concession model seems to have rectied by

bringing most of the management in house where bottom line prots are not the main driver

resulting in London Overground having the best quality of service of any rail line in the country.

TfLs response to the HLOS2 (TfL, 2011a) mentions a desire for them to achieve a standard level

of service across London, developing the idea rst tabled in 2001, they discuss that this may be

achieved not purely through London Overground levels of full control but perhaps more subtle

changes to the nature of the franchises in London to enable greater control of services. In less

ofcial channels than the HLOS (HANSFORD, 2011a;b), TfL have been much bolder in their

intentions, with TfLs managing director for rail stating Devolution gives better co-ordination, so

we will continue to put our case to government for it to hear our arguments to devolve control [of

suburban routes] to the mayors control. If government did that, we would get improvements in

services, Behind the scenes it appears talks to further TfLs control of rail franchises are already

underway focussing on the West Anglia Main Line (WAML) and the Southbury Loop in the Leavalley, lines that desperately need improvements if they are to meet the increased demand large

developments in the area will put on them (NETWORK RAIL 2011, pp.14-16). The WAML and

Southbury loop lines form part of the greater Anglia franchise that is currently being retendered

on a short term basis until July 2013/14, the same is true for the Southeastern franchise which

also contains a number of purely London routes, a short term extension takes its renewal date to

March 2014. Beyond 2014 it wouldnt be at all surprising to see much more orange on the tube

map both north and south of the river if TfL can convince the DfT to restructure the franchises.

Lessons for Other UK Regions

Whilst London will always be a bit of a special case when it comes to regions the development it

has lessons that can apply to other regions. Particularly the success of London Overground may

light the way for future changes to the way in which rail infrastructure is delivered in regions

elsewhere in the UK.

Regional control of services in London has historically delivered greater investment in services,

the brief history of the London region shows that the GLA and GLC periods of local control

produced far more development that the periods where control was at a national level. Perhaps

more important that the ability to deliver is perhaps the speed at which this can happen. The

legislative process of national rail is highly collaborative in comparison to 10 years ago, yet it

is still a cumbersome and onerous process and as with all decisions taken at a national level

regional issues can be overlooked, a classic example of this in London is GOBLIN electrication

which despite a relatively small cost and large return has continuously fallen off the agenda of

national investment (with GOBLIN now under TfL control the electrication may eventually come

to fruition under their leadership). Compared to projects delivered by the standard process, TfLs

delivery of improvements to London Overground hand has been extremely rapid due the direct

control of the mayor in both the concept and delivery of the programme.

Whilst the GLA as a regional government body is now unique in England a number of Passenger

Transport Executives (PTE) exist, playing a similar role to TfL in the controlling of transport

services within a metropolitan region. Like TfL historically, they include, limited control over

mainline rail services (Merseyside is an exception to this rule, having historically awarded the


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Appendix 1

Network Rail Control Period Dates

Each control period begins on the 1st of April and end 31st March in order to coincide with the

nancial year.

Note the earlier control periods (CP1 and CP2) were retrospectively applied to former RailTrack

actions, with CP2 being shorter than the 5 year duration.

Control Period 1 (CP1): 19962001









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Appendix 2

Network Rail Timetable of PR13 DeliveryTranscribed from: http://bit.ly/w0RBlY

Network Rail summary:

PR13 will establish Network Rails outputs and funding for Control Period 5 (CP5) which willbegin on 1 April 2014. The review also aims to develop better incentives on the rail industry.

Key dates for the review:

September 2011

Rail industry publishes its Initial Industry Plans

February 2012

ORR provides formal advice to Ministers on outputs and funding

July 2012

DfT and Transport Scotland publish their output specications (HLOSs) and outline available

funding (SOFA)

August 2012

ORR consults on Network Rails outputs

January 2013

Network Rail publishes its Strategic Business Plan

June 2013

Draft Determination

September 2013

Network Rail responds to Draft Determination

October 2013

Final Determination

November / December 2013

ORR issues list of access charges

April 2014

CP5 begins


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Appendix 3

London Passenger Transportation Board (1933-1947) Area Map

The London Passenger Transport Area is outlined in red, with the boards special area, in which

it had a monopoly of public transport services, indicated by a broken black line. The boundary

of the Metropolitan Police District is shown as a blue broken line, and the County of London isshaded in grey. Broken red lines indicate roads over which the Board was allowed to run services

outside its area.

Simplied map based on leafet issued by LPTB, July 1933.

via: Wikipedia.org (http://bit.ly/xXugYZ) Accessed: 15/01/2012


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WestDrayton

WestEaling

CHARING CROSSVICTORIA

WATERLOO

Vauxhall

CANNON STREET

New CrossNew CrossGatePeckham

Rye

Brixton

TulseHill

Balham

Streatham

Common

CrystalPalace

Norwood Junction

Greenwich

Lewisham

BeckenhamJunction

Forest Hill

Elmers End

Coulsdon SouthTattenhamCorner

Caterham

UpperWarlingham

Hayes

BromleySouth

BromleyNorth

Orpington

WoolwichArsenal

Dartford

Swanley

Bexleyheath

Sidcup

Knockholt

TurkeyStreet

EnfieldLock

Enfield TownCrews HillHadley Wood

Feltham

Hampton

HamptonCourt

Surbiton

Kingston

Barnes

Wimbledon

MitchamJunction

West Croydon EastCroydon

Sutton

EpsomDowns

Cheam

Stoneleigh

ChessingtonSouth

Hounslow

RomfordHaroldWood

Sevenoaks

Chingford

Hayes &Harlington

South Greenford

Castle Bar Park

Drayton GreenActon

Main Line

Harringay

Cricklewood

Elstree &Borehamwood

Purfleet

Grays

ChaffordHundredOckendon

City Thameslink

FarringdonOld Street

Moorgate

KINGSCROSS

Highbury& Islington

FinsburyPark

Elephant& Castle

LIVERPOOL STREET

FENCHURCHSTREET

LONDON BRIDGE

West HamBarking

Upminster

SevenSisters

WalthamstowCentral

Stratford

EUSTONMARYLEBONE

Kentish Town

BlackfriarsLimehouse

Essex Road

Barbican

Drayton Park

TottenhamHale

Harrow-on-the-Hill

Harrow & Wealdstone

SouthRuislip

WestRuislip

Amersham

Chalfont & Latimer

Chorleywood

Kenton

South Kenton

North Wembley

Willesden Junction

Gunnersbury

Richmond

Kew Gardens

QueensPark

Kensal Green

Harlesden

Stonebridge Park

Wembley Central

Rickmansworth

KilburnHigh Road

SouthHampstead

Hatch End

Carpenders Park

Bushey

Watford High Street

Watford Junction

Clapham Junction

West Brompton

Kensington (Olympia)

GospelOak

Upper Holloway

Crouch Hill

HarringayGreen Lanes

SouthTottenham

WoodgrangePark

Wanstead Park

Leytonstone High Road

Leyton Midland Road

WalthamstowQueens Road

BlackhorseRoad

WestHampstead

ActonCentral

South Acton

Brondesbury

BrondesburyPark

Kensal Rise

FinchleyRoad &Frognal

HampsteadHeath

Kentish Town WestCamden

RoadCaledonian

Road &Barnsbury

CanonburyDalston

Kingsland

HackneyCentral

Homerton

HackneyWick

Wembley StadiumNortholt

Park

Sudbury HillHarrow

Sudbury& Harrow

Road

EalingBroadway

Greenford

LondonFields

CambridgeHeath

BethnalGreen

HackneyDowns

Rectory Road

Stoke Newington

Stamford Hill

Clapton

St. James Street

Dagenham Dock

Rainham

ST. PANCRASINTERNATIONAL

Headstone Lane

PADDINGTON

This is a simplified diagram andsome lines and stations have

been omitted for the sake of clarity.A London Connections

map is available which showsthe complete network.

Lines and stations whereOYSTER PAYG can be used

Lines and stations whereOYSTER PAYG

CANNOT be used

OYSTERPay As You Go (PAYG)

on NATIONAL RAIL

Information valid from 20th April 2008 Association of Train Operating Companies

Produced by 4.4.2008 (PAYG v3/2.2) www.fwt.co.uk

ActonCentral

EalingBroadway

WestDrayton

Hayes &Harlington

Harrow-on-the-Hill

Wembley Stadium

Harrow & Wealdstone

Hatch End

Greenford

SouthRuislip

WestRuislip

Amersham

NortholtPark

Sudbury HillHarrow

Sudbury && Harrow Road

Chalfont& Latimer

Chorleywood

Kenton

SouthKenton

North Wembley

Clapham Junction

City Thameslink

CHARING CROSSVICTORIA

WATERLOO

Vauxhall

FarringdonOld Street

Moorgate

KINGSCROSS

Highbury& Islington

FinsburyPark

CANNON STREET

Elephant& Castle

LIVERPOOL STREET

FENCHURCHSTREET

LONDON BRIDGE

New CrossNew CrossGatePeckham

Rye

Brixton

TulseHill

Balham

StreathamCommon

CrystalPalace

Norwood Junction

Greenwich

Lewisham

BeckenhamJunction

Forest Hill

Elmers End

Coulsdon SouthTattenhamCorner

Caterham

UpperWarlingham

Hayes

BromleySouth

BromleyNorth

Orpington

WoolwichArsenal

Dartford

Swanley

West Ham

Bexleyheath

Sidcup

Knockholt

Barking Upminster

SevenSisters

Clapton

TurkeyStreet

EnfieldLock

EnfieldTown

Chingford

WalthamstowCentral

Rainham

Stratford

Crews HillHadley Wood

Gospel Oak

EUSTONMARYLEBONE

Kensington (Olympia)

WestHampstead

Elstree &Borehamwood

Willesden Junction

Gunnersbury

RichmondFeltham

Hampton

Hampton Court

Surbiton

Kingston

Barnes

Wimbledon

MitchamJunction

West Croydon EastCroydon

Sutton

EpsomDowns

Cheam

Stoneleigh

Chessington South

Hounslow

Kentish Town

RomfordHaroldWood

Blackfriars

Kew Gardens

Limehouse

LondonFields

CambridgeHeath

BethnalGreen

Essex Road

Barbican

Kings CrossThameslink

Hackney DownsDrayton Park

TottenhamHale

St. James StreetRectory Road

StokeNewington

Stamford Hill

SouthHampstead

KilburnHigh Road

QueensPark

Kensal Green

Harlesden

Stonebridge Park

Wembley Central

Rickmansworth

PADDINGTON

West Brompton Canning TownThis is a simplified diagram and

some lines and stations havebeen omitted for the sake of clarity.

A London Connectionsmap is available which shows

the complete network.

Stratford to Canning Townservice closes 09/12/06

Lines and stations on whichOYSTER PAYG can be used

Lines and stations on whichOYSTER PAYG

CANNOT be used

OYSTERPay As You Go (PAYG)

on NATIONAL RAIL

Stations at whichOYSTER PAYG

CANNOT be used

Valid from October 2006until further notice

Produced by 19.10.2006 (PAYG) www.fwt.co.uk

13

Appendix 4

Partial Oyster PAYG Acceptance on National Rail 2006 & 2008


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16

CP

Control Period (e.g. CP4 - Control Period 4)

ELL

East London Line

ELLXEast London Line Extension

GLC

Greater London Council (1970-1986)

GOBLIN

Gospel Oak to Barking Line

GWRGreat Western Railway

HLOS

High Level Output Specication

LMS

London Midland and Scottish Railway

LNER

London and North Eastern Railway

LOROL

London Overground Railway Operations

Limited

NLL

North London Line

ORR

Ofce for Rail Regulation

PTE

Passenger Transport Executive

RUSRoute Utilisation Strategy

SOFA

Statement of Funds Available

SR

Southern Railway

SRA

Strategic Rail Authority (2001-2005)

TfL

Transport for London

TOC

Train Operating Company

tph

Trains per Hour

WAML

West Anglia Main Line

WLL

West London Line

Glossary


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