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THE h~TIONAL WAR COLLEGE

STRATEGIC STUDIES REPORT ABSTRACT

TIT~E: "the Case For A Second-cla_~.s Navy: N i l i t a r y Reform .~nd Reagan 's F l a r it ime Strategy

~UTHOR: Joh:~ J. BecKer . I r . . , Commander, USN

DATE : .Apt i I 1S85

Re;nar~<s concerning the U.S. Navy's Mari±irne Strategy, criticism of

the hlar itime S+.rategy by military re-Former._~, and proposal of an

Alter. n.~'(ive S~r-ategy tha.~ er, con~passes rnos~ of reformer '~ ideas. The

two s ± r a t e ~ i e s are examir, ed ~nd s.~me s ± r a t e ~ ic pa radoxes are s u g g e s t e d . Co.qcIL#dir, 9 remarK:_. _~Li~gest sorne prescrip±ive measures which can be.

taken +-o _~olve the problerns highlighted, bu± not solved, by the

r e.~o.~.r~.e ~ - :. ,

/"

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander John J. BacKer Jr. , USN, (hl.~. , U.S. Naval Postgradua±e

School ) has ~erved at sea in destroyers, fr agates and amphibiou~ ships.

Other as_~i~nmen+.s have included command of fas± patrol craft in Vietnam

and du±y as an analyst at the Oe~eqse Intelligence r~gency. Commander

BecKet ii a ~rad..Ja±e o~ the National l~ar College, Class of 1885, and is

the prospec±i'~e cor.~r.',ar, dirJ~ officer of the USS ~ntrim FFG-2~)).

EXECUTIVE SUMhI~RY

Reagan

Soy let

espec i al ly

c a r p iers •

reformers ,

cr, i s ~ i o r , s .

rnis~ ion or

consensu~ has been reached by many military reformers that the

a d m i n i _ : . t r a t i o n ' s ~ ' l a r - i t i m e S t r a t e g y o f t h r e a t e n i n g t o s t r i K e t h e U n i o n in r e s p o n s e t o an a t t a c k i s n o t s t r a t e g i c a l l y s o u n d ,

when t h o s e c o u n t e r a t t a c k s u o u l d be c o n d u c t e d by Navy

The .~l ternat ave Strategy, advocated by most of the

calls ;or th~ Navy to confine itself to "sea control "

They would either el iminate the carrier po,.,e-r projection

gr-e_~tly proscribe it,

t~e ither t h e Mar. it i m e S t r a t e g y

S t r a t e g y o f f e r c o m p l e t e l y s a t i s f y i n g

Navy. The Her itime Strategy, &s

deterrence and s u p p o r t s N6TO's forwar

concept f r o m t h e c e n t r a l Crc.n ~ , t o t h e a p r o l o n g e d c o h v e n t i

rat i o n a l e fc, r u s i n

~ - ' e : , J e r t h e l a s s , .is -~ t.}

, : o n v e n ± i o n a l tJar o 3-~ra+.e_~.. ' r&nge_:, f r

n e e d t o b e d e v e l o p

T o m a h a u K o f 4 . e n s ~ . , - e . ' o u p l e d with Kee.pi

initially, o f f e r s or.,

in it tat ave and d e _ : . t r

confl act t h e r e s h o u t

and perhap~ ~ n oppof

' t h e cart ier~, by r..ot

onal war, the .M~r

g the present

arf ight ing doctr i

r one ±h~+. escalate

om an irrelevantcy

e d f o r these " w o

c o n , J u c t e d by SSNs ng the c~rr ier bait

e solu±ion. Dur i

oy t h e Soviet Nay

d be s o m e i n d i c a t

t u n i t y ~or t h e be

9oing in her rr, ' s

n o r t h e r e f o r m e r s ' r 3 1 t e r n a t i v e

r a t i o n a l e s f o r t h e use o f t h e

declaratory policy, reinforces

d defense doctrine, extending the

northern and southern flanks. In

itime S t r a t e g y offers t h e b e s t

and p l a n n e d fleet s t r u c t u r e .

.he, it is : :oo r igid. In

s t o r, u c l e a r w a r , t h e

to a recip = - for disaster .

rst case" s c e n a r l o s .

a g a i n s t n a v a l b a s e s and

!e groups in reserve,

n9 t h e bL~vy's attempt t o gain t h e

y in t h e in i t i a l pet- i o d o { a

i on o f how t h e l a n d war i s g o i n g

g i n n i r , ss o f p o l i t i c a l o v e r t u r e s .

way u n t i l t h e t i m e i s r i j h ± - - b o t h

a short

Mar it ime

O p t ions

An ear I y

airf ields

at least

:all i~ar il/ and pol i+.icall;,--could ,epr. e_~er}± important bargaining chip~

in war tcrrninat ion ne9o± tat ions.

i r t h i s r e ~ . ) . r d j t h e re -~o rmer '~ -~ea c o n t r o l n a v y o f 4 e r s I i ± ~ l e

i e ' , , e r a g e . G i v i n g up t h e "-levy '5 p o w e r p r o j e c t i o n c a p a b i l i ± y , as

"'=-F:-.~_sented b';, the big-decK carrier., .~.rd +.hreatened by the Naritime

~r._~tegy, makes li±~le sense. The ;le"ibility and power of a carrier

b ~ + . t ' e ~ r o u o a r e r i g . h t l > , fe.~.red by S o v i e t p l a n n e r s . I ' l e v e r ± h e l e s s , t o

r~& t , - h t h i s ~ l e x i b l l i f > ' iF: t h e s t r a t e g i c ar. en_~ a n d +o f u l l ; . , e x p l o i t t h e .feter:-ent value o ~, the U.S, Ha'Jy., a broader range of ~tr. ateg ic opt ions

i': .-e:~u i~ed .

The Case For. f% S e c o n d - c l a s s Navy:

M i l i t a r y Re fo rm F~nd R e a g a n ' s Mar i t ime S t r a t e g y

One of the grea± frustrations o~ the "rail itary reform movement:' is

their failure ±o influence %he LI,S. Navy. While the

claim, '.~ith some .justification; to have moved Brmy

r~ar, euver tear. dire, they ~.a'~,e },et to have a n y iuccess

Navy .~pprosch to the c,:,r, ducf c, z. ;.~ar at sea, In

reforn~ars ,-riticism has ~ocu-_-.ed on the Rea~.~n administration's plan 9or

r e f o r m e r ~ can

th ihK ins toward

in chang ins the

recen± y e a r s the

employtr, 9 the ~'~t...y in .~. conver;+.i:~nal ~.Jar ~Qith the Soviet Union, Thi~

admir, istration ha:, called ..'~,:.t o~I~ for increases in the ~ize 04 the

Nat::.,--~he " ~ _'-.hip navy . . . . bu t al~.o f o r s e e s a more a g g r e s s i v e r o l e f o r

iF.age f o r c e s :~r, der t F , e N..~r i t ime S t r a t e g y , < I )

M,ARITI>~E STR~,'rEGY: THE 9EST DEFENSE IS ~ GOOD O=FENSE

k~at is this .~lan? Made ~ublic via postur = _ sta±ementl and budget

te:.tirr, on.v early ir~ the Rea~c-.r~ ~drnir~is+.ration, the_ Maritime Strategy is

ze'.,ed to natior, a! ar, d allied, p_~r±i,zul.~rly .NATO, sira±egy. It calls

~or U,S, a.',~ ~.llied f o r c e s . , i n c l : . ; d i ~ air ar~d ~round uni±i, to Tight on

~,~.-i l.~r.d ~,~d -e~ fl.~r,V~ oF E..~:'ope ar~d ~-~ ia in re.spot, so to Soviet

-~g~--r-__:.~ ! o r . . The bat±l.~= To- "t!-,e.:.e Fli:,Ks : 4 i l l support the

cer~tr 31 frc, r,t land b..~t%le t.y p'-otec+in9 r. ei,~orcemen± sea

,:.:,r.'.r,.:~ications ',SLOCs) as zar "fo-,.:~.rd" as possible. This.

~or~j.Ird or extended defe;'.~.e r:~ea~: - the.t the zel l~r. e5 b:il! be

~.> c:- ier, dly ;orces pl ic i~t9 thes:-~e!ves • between ±he SLOCs and

b~se_~ i,', the ~o.-ve~iar, --_e~ ~rnd th~ ~br±h-bdest PaciTic. The

~'..,Id at+.err.F.t %o de_'-.troy ~:~e a±tacKins force~, pushing the

pro~res_=.i..,e!~' Xur+.he ~" back '~r, til +.he ~oviet homeland itself

thr e.9.+_ e ned .

E u r o p e a n

lines of

oonce~t of

protec±ed

Soy let

ai i ias

Soy lets

could be

- I -

second f u n , z t ion o f t h i s s t r a t e g y i s t o

T h i s means p r e v e n t in9 t h e S o v i e t s f r o m

g e c , ~ r a p h i c a l l y - - p l a c i n g " them on t h e d e f e n s i v e

p o s s i b l e . T h r e a t ~-- t o S o v i e t f l a n k s ~ i l l a l s o

9 round ~ o r c e s t h a t co:.~Id o ± h a r ~ i s e be emp!o>,ed

s e i z e t h e in i t t a t i r e .

1 i m i ± i n ~ t h e c o n ÷ l i c t

w o r l d w i d e as soon a~

tie down Soviet air Ind

on t h e c e n t r a l ~ r o n t .

The Mari±irne Strategy has. thr~ee Fha_~e~--a rising ten, ion phase, a

d-~en_~ ire phase in '.~h ich the So'.., ie+.~ at±acK, and a th ird phase where

tXe -~ll ies cou-,ter att.~cv. Outing Phase I the M&r-itime

4c.r ~.Jirning ~he crisis and deterrir,~ further escalation

-~eF..~.-. !ng For. global confl ic± by increasing readiness and

into fo:-ward de4en~ ire ~.-~s it io~,s. Our ing th is F, hase ,

British and ~u±ch Marines ,~,:,:.~Id rein~c, rce Norway.

~hase ~. I b e ~ i r : s ~ i~h ..~ rcajor Soviet attack that e x p a n d s

COr, Zlict ',.~i±h +•he U-S. .-.nd its allies. The objective of the

S t r a t e g y c a l l s

as w e l l as

mov ing f o r c e s

f o r e x a m p l e ,

t o global

U.S. Navy

a:'d ott. er fo~-ces assigned to the Mar it ime Strategy is to seize the

!r, iti_~±ive as. far forward .'. i.e. as close to the Soviet Union) as

pc, s s ~ b l ~ . Goa ls d u r i , : j t h i s s t a ~ e i r . . c lude d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e S o v i e ±

n ~v~,.' , Fro±ect ion o, z ~ ierd'.?' shipp ir,~ and p o s i t i o n i n g for

Ir PFa~.e ill, cart ier battle ~roups (CVBGs) will conduct strikes

on Soy iv± bases, ar, d amph i5 ious assau its may be uied to capture choke

poirts such as the OanisV -~t:-.~it~ o - to re,aim Ioz. t all ted territory.

The ~oal of the Mariti~,:e 3t:'~=_~y i s .'..J.=.r terrrir:ation or. favorable terms

.~i~h t J e s t e r r , seapower- F~ov id in_q ~ e s t r . a t e ~ i c d i - f e r e n c e for . the l a n d

bs.tt~,e on +.he cent~-~i 4re .t~

CRI'rIcIsIdS OF "HE N'AR~T!.~IE ST,q?A"-EGY

~I 1 of the rr it it_'-, c,¢ the .h!ar i t irne ~ ~ r ~ t e ~ y a g r e e on one

/' 2 -

point--there i s a need {or change.(2) Out o f this imperative comes the

4irst criticism of the S t r a t e g y . . namely t h a t it is "more o+ t h e

s a m e " - - i t d o e s n o t r e p r e s e n t e n o u g h o f a n e ~ s t r a t e g y , T h e r e + o r m e r s

a r g u e t h a t t h e g r o u t h o f S o v i e t f o r c e s i n t h e I S S B s a n d 1 3 7 ~ s a n d t h e

relg.tive d e c l ir, e in the balance o f U.S./Soviet n a v a l pot~er t o a " g r e y

erea :~here oat±her side can be said to be ahead"<3)

requirement For . i "; e t:, s t r . a t e g y that exF i i c i t l y

situation. The>, claim ±h~t t h e M a r itime S t r a t e g y

outnnoded ce.r. cept o# mar it i.-r:e .and nuclear supremacy

enjoyed in the aftermath .:,+ World [,Jar. II but has now

4 o r s e e a b l e ~ u t u r e . T h i s s i t u a ± i o n has p l a c e d t h e U n i t e d

has created a

r. ecognizes this

is based on an

that the U.S.

lost f o r t h e

States at a

i ~ a t e r s h e d - - a "h i =.tot ic t u r ' r , i n s p o i n t " < 4 ) one

"comparable to that leading to primary tel iance on

in ~he early l~5~s. " ( 5 ) "the reformers as-.art

obser, v e r called

n u c l e a r , deterrence

t h e new s t r a t e g y ,

w h a t e v e r i t i s , w i l l h a v e t o b e t h e

p r o p o s a l s f,:,~" F u n d a r . ' e r ~ t a l c h a n g e s i n

n o t b- : a b l e t o c . : , . . "~ t i - .ue t~ ;e F r e s e r , t

. - = E & .iq,J air - * , r C B S ,

Grc, t41s_~ .:..at o~: %hi~ cor~±erit ior~ is

.:c,-_=.t too rr.uch +.o b:.~ iid the ~orces needed

result o f c!,oices between competing

American _:.trategy. The U,S. will

p c : l icy o f .mair, tainir~g large land,

a related complaint--it will

+.o ztipport a ~t:'ategy based on

r,',ar it ime i. uper ior ity.

.*.he Mar it ime S±r..~%eg'.: 's

a~ai,~st an e~er:,y bJho

Th is ~r_~urner:% takes ~.everal +or :ns. One i s that

~lo':-al sc.:.Fe .:;i!i =Freed U.S. f,ircas too thin

" . - ~ ~.-~ -.d st. taB = _ 04 oFer~,t ins :Dr, interior"

J e f f : - a y Re , - : . r d , . - l a i - n s , "~'he

* - . t r . ~ t e ~ ' , . ' is. .~.,:,t " n i l : . ' t ~ r i l ' , '

b e ± r a y i n g a n

t o e & f a _ c t i u e l y c a r r y o u t +.he

t e . o s e , - :ou p l a n n e d . One d e f e n s e

Rea_=~ ,~dmi,~i_~tration's declared

d e : . e c t i'.~e, "..t is +ooi i_=h!~

Har it i~

analwst,

rail itary

ambitious,

ur~b-. i ,a, g e a b l . ~ ~by--..s b e t - 4 e e n ~. .=pi : -at ; . , - , r~=. and r e s o u r c e s . " < 7 ;

In his article "Maritime S±~ategy vs Coalition Defense," Robert Komer

c r e d i t s t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i on w i t h a "rnore v i g o r o u s a t t a c k on t h e

' m i s m a t c h ' p r o b l e m t h a n any o f i t s l a s t t h r e e p r e d e c e s s o r s " ( 8 ) b u t t h e n

argues t h a t major increases in the Havy r-ecluired under the Maritime

Strategy can only c o m e a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e o t h e r s e r e i c e s and

u l t i m a t e l y r~t t h e e x p e n s e o • comrni~men+.s t o ou r a l l i e s u n d e r ou r

present "co,il it ion " strategy.

another cost c r i t icism o f

unsustainable pol icy. This i_~

navy w ithc 15 CVBGs. Michae 1

written t h a t h i s ± o r i , za l I v ,

~ . h i p b u i l d i n g ~unds ±o :.ustain

r. otei that past "under in;estme~':t"

because +.he ~leet ,.;~-~ _:.hr irKirg as

I~ +.he U.S . has ± r u l y r e a c h e d

the Mar it ime Strategy is that it is an

particularly applicable to a ~00 ship

MccGwire, a noted naval analyst, has

Congre_:s has n o t a p p r o p r i a t e d enough

even +.he I_ ° c a r r i e r l e v e l . ( 9 ) MccGwire

in mar i +ime forces was possible

[ 4o r l d ±Jar I I 5hiF, s were r e t i r , ed .

a c r o s ~ r c , ad and must make h a r d ,

either-or choices based on the c o s t s o-F strat=-gic alternatives, the

choice o~ a rnarit!~-e strategy *..Jill, in the eyes o~ _~.ome critics, result

i~: a we~k, er, in5 oG -ela÷.;,ons :.~ith our al!ie~.

Our chief all ies ,~ould ~'_~icKly percieue the imp! icationz of a

-r,.iri±irqe strategy; particularly iq b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t s

c o m p e l l e d vs t o w~ ire o f f as u n s u s t a i n a b l e our l a n d / a i r co.T,r~itmer,±s $.o the de,erie o~ Wes±er.n Europe ~ r , d Persian Gulf

o i l . Few L.Jc. uld welcor.;e _~ -.,aritime '--.t~ategy aimed p r i m a r i l y aT n a v a l dom inance . , e~,en i-F i t p : ' o t e c ± e d t h e i r o,~n t r a d e , i4 t h e p r i c e were t o exF.?.-=~ ±~-r,': %c de.~ea +. ~t h,:,me. Our a l r e a d > '

~ e s t i v e a l l i e s L~oul,~ c . : , - r e c t i : , p e r c e i v e such a U.S . s t r . a t e ~ y

as e . t best a qorm o bv. il.~+er~l U:S, _~!obal i!~terve.~±ioni~m

i ~ d ~ t w o r s t a ; ::. r rr o f r,e,.~ i s o l a t ion i l r n . P r e ~ s u r - e s , f o r

a c c o m o d a t ior, w i t h t he U , S , S . R . '.Jou I d be p o w e r f u l l y

er,~, ~.r, ced . < 1 0 )

~.no ther comp1.~in± i s th_~t ±he M.~.r i t i rne S t r a t e g y

g r o u p s , -e :n te red ~--oui-~d !_~.rc-e , z ~ r r i e r s . The c r i t i c s b _~t+. I e

t h e s e

e r a o~

~h~F-- .~r.e ±oo 1 .~.r~e.. ±oo e x p e n ~ . i v e , t o o d e t e c t a b l e ,

stoat± a n t i s h i p ~,15: i l e ~ end n u c l e a r w e a p o n s ,

emphasize_~ carrier

ar3ue that

and , in an

p a r t i c u i a r l y

/" -- 4 -

v u l n e r a b l e . B e c a u s e o { t h e i r e x p e n s e t h e U . S . c a n n o t a ~ C { o r d v e r y m a n y

o f t h e s e C V B G s a n d i s ~ o r c e d t o p u t " t o o m a n y e g g s in o n e b a s k e t . " f~s

a consec[uence ue c a n n o t a f { o r d t o r i s k t h e s e u a l u a b l e , i r r e p l a c e a b l e

• ~ssets i~ ~artime, especially against those Soviet "{lanKs" ~here they

~.~ill be o p p o s e d by t h e ~ u l l : a e i ~ h t o { S o v i e t a i r a n d s ~ ' b s u r ~ a c e f o r c e s .

till!sam Lind argues that as a pr-imaril,/ 5tlbrharine navy, the Red Navy is

r~ot v,.~Inerable to CVBG3 ~.th their 1 imited numbers o~ HSW aircraft.< II)

O~e c#~ticisrq o{ fhe ,~b.ritime Strateg/ that emerged early

~ e a g a r , ~ d m i , ' , i s t r a t i o ~ i s p t - o b a b l y b e s t s u m m a r i z e d

a.~-t i c 1 e " ~ . q a d v e r . t a n t ~ l u c ! e a r td.~r ~ E s c a l a t i o n ~ d

F l a r , ~ < , " H i s t h e s i s i s t h a t t h e ~ a r i t i m e S t r a t e g y , b y

K o l a Per , i r . s u l a b a s e s a n d t h e S S B H b a s t i o n - , ip. t h e

• ='~'o'-'o~4~- i " d e { e n s ~ . c.{ the~ ~ , o r n e l a n d " . r e s p o n s e i n

i n t h e

i n B a r r y P o s e n ' s

N ~ T O ' s N o r t h e r n

t h r e a t e n i n g t h e

B a r e n t s S e a w i l l

t~h i c h t h e S o y i e t s

s t r i k e a g a i n s t "Could de,-ide th~.t a nea-l,v certair,-±o-succeed ..uclear

±h.:,-.,=_ ± h r e a t e n t r i g c a r r i e r s ua.s b o t h l u c r a t i v e a n d n e c e s s a r y . " ( 1 2 )

Pe~ ~ . t e d .~re..~.s ,:.~ c o ~ c e - n a r e t h o s e o t h e r e l e m e n t s o { t h e M a r i t i m e

St~- ._~ te~y t h ~ . t ~ , l o u l d p r e p a r e t h e w a y ~ :or t h e CVBGs s u c h a s B - 5 2 a n d

Tcrr, m.hat.Ju: . : , t r a c K s on £:.~'_-.s i a r , b a s e s . ( 13> 14o1,l w o u l d ± h e S o y i e t s K n o w t h a t

t h e s e s i r . i k ' e s ,.aer. e " t a c t i c a l " a n d n o t " s ± r a t e g i c " O

~ir~atlv, the Maritime Strategy il. criticized as a no-win strategy.

Je÷~rey Record ha.- s.~id that it "encourages the ÷ailacious cor, cl,:sion

+,h:..t t h e o u t c o m e o { t h e -,Jar a t - -e& u i l l be d e c i s i v e i;', ~ ~ i o b a l

cot~-~ i [,:t tJ i t h t h e S o , . : i e t ' J , - io~- , : "," 14.'-' ~ o b e r t k'.OFr:er c l a i . T ~ t ! - , :~t e v e r , t h e

- o m p l ~ t e _ 5 u c , - e i . -. o { t h e ~4.~r. ,~iq'~e.. ~ -~ra te9> ' , . i ~ o u l d , ric, t se r . i o u s l y h u r t a

• =~-eat Eu.~a_=.ie.-; hear-tlz.-.d ;o'Jer I iKe the Soviet Union,(15) The decisive

b a ± t l e t 4 i ' . l be f o - J g h t or, "~.e c e n t ~ . a l f ~ - o n t , ~ i t h s e a p o ! a e r p l a y i n g o n l y a

: -upF~.- ,r t i~_: ~ o l e i"~ F , O t ~ , - f f i ~ 9 t - e : 'e i: '~=o~-cer.qer~±'=..

ALTERNATIVE STR~%TEG'<: ,'HE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD DEFENSE

,~s has been ~howr,, there are several arguments against the

M~ritime Strategy, each with a particular slant to its criticism.

~emedies also uary arnong different proponents. Nevertheless, there is

enough comrno. ~, ground to draL~ the outl ines c,~ an "Al±erna±ive Stratesw"

th.Dt br-irgs ~oge±her. the proposals c.f rna.ny of the reformers.

The ce,'~tral +.hrus~ o~ +.he ~l+.ernatiue Strategy is to shift away

from atternFts et "for.',Jard" defer~:.e and "cart-wing the ~ight to the

er~er~y" fo ._; ,_4a.Zer, si,.;e orientation i~,here the Navy concentrates on local

s~_.. cor, t~ol in the r-einforcemer.÷. SLOCs , The Navy power- pr. ojec±ion

miss ion i~ gre.ltly redu.-ed Jr, scot = ar, d "e ~_ ... :-.-alator-y" attacks on Soviet

terr. itor.>, are held t, ack[.'i I~; In ter. r~s of the t4aritirne Strategy, the

:-e~ormers wo~id "~ver _=.~!Ft from Pha_--.e IS to Phase llI. Horizontal

e - - . c a l a + , i o ~ +.o o t t e r t h e a t r , es i s n o t c o n d u c t e d l~ i t h t h e h o p e t h a t

hostl] itles ~,Jill remai-~ 1 ~mite.d to a _~ingle theatre. Some reformers

',Jo'..,1 4 g o e ' , : e ~ f ~ r t ~ : e ~ a r : d ! i m i + . r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t o t h e f l a n k s t o

4ef=_nsive sl'stems o;',l>. 8~-~->' -~ose~n For e>.:arr~le, suggests

th~ rr, o',:er-e-.t o{ ~a-,Y',' "~a'.~9.1 .~..-.. i±_= , such as car-r ier. task

~c,;"ce_ ~. , 5~,~ lo'~3 range , h igh-pa;,,load, land-ba~ed ~tr-iKe

a i - . , - r - a f ~. . _ : u c h s--. L I : S . P la t i r . e f ~ - - ~ E s , t o t h e n o r t h o f N o r w a y

c o u l d b e d e ~ e r r , e d i t . c , r _ = r t o : e d u c = +~,~ S o v i e t i r ~ c e n t i ~ , e t o

m.:, '~,',t a m a j o r a r i a , - : < o n " - l o r ' . t h e , n ,~.lor. l ~ a y , < 1 7 )

R o l e ,3~ +.he C~/BG i n +.he ~ l ~ e r : , . ~ t i ' . ;e S t r - & t e g ; ~

The l a r g e c a r r i e r . . : . - ' i r . r e - , t ! > ' i t , c o m r n i s ~ i o n ~c. : .~Id e > - c h a n g e t h e i r

: t t ~ c ' ~ . s = , u . ~ d r c n - . ~ c , r n-~.:,--e .= i g h t e r ).r,d ASL4 _~.i :- .--r t~. +. t o d e { e n d t h e S L O C s ,

z.-... ~.. e ~tl ant i.- * h e at r e l i "h ~. ;,'. ".J o u ', d oper a±e south of the

3 - - ~ _ e n l % r . d - S c e l . g n d - l . h z { t e d "t i-',5.4, on , < G - I - I J K ) 3 a F . , B y n o t g o i n g i n h a r m ' s

u~>- t h e cart i e r - . : ~ i ! l , ' . . :,t ; r o v i 4 e t h e _-4c,<. , iets a s m u c h i n c e n t i v e t o u s e

r. t t c l e a : w e a # o r , s ~'-:d +.he>' , : . : u l d .a l_=o a c t £..z ~ s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e < 1 8 >

-~.- ~ . ehe tiers could still assume the _~ :..,~.d t~.a w~r go ;'~uc' ear , [4h il e . . .ziP

power projection role, t h i s mission would increasingly be assigned

under the "distributed ~irepower" doctrine(19) to other ships and

submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles. The big-decK Nirnitz CVN,

stripped of its offensive punch, would lose much of its raison d'etre

under this s±rategy, so the reformers would cancel further- construction

of these ships and "diitribute" the flee± 's aircraft over a greater

number o~ srnaller-, cheaper carriers. Since the land-attacK aircraft

~ould n o t be needed, a sm_~ller carrier could meet the operational

re~ui;-ernents o~ the ~Iternatiue Strategy wi±h fewer aircraft. While

some reformers like the British Invincible class VSTOL carrier, a U.S.

c ~ p y o f t h e n e u F r e n c h CVDI d e s i g n r e p r e s e n t s an a p p e a l ing c o m p r o m i s e

t h a t ~ou ld s a t i s f y most o f the sma l l c a r r i e r a d v o c a t e s . ~ t j u s t under

48,008 +.ons,

launching the

about forty

Role of +.he

the Charles DeGaulle l ~ i l l have two catapults capable of

F/~-I8 and E-2C aircraft, Total air group will number

p l a n e s ,

LiKe

de&ensive

SSN in the .~Ite*na± ire S±ritegy

the carrier ba±tle groL~ps, +.he SSN force would

m i s s i o n s . Co,','.;o.v d i r e c t s u p p o r t a s s i g r , m e ~ : t s

p e t r o l s

SLOC~..

SSSNs,

' a o u l d a t t e m p t t o p r e v e n t S o v i e t s u b m a r i n e s f r o m

B e c a u s e 04: t h e d i q g e - c,~ e / c a l . . ~ t o r y e n . z o u n t e r ~

U.S. and allied at+.ac#~ :.ubmar ines would avoid

b a . - - ~ i o n s , U , S , S S N s ' ~ o u l d : - . . ~ ; i l b e e~uiF'ped ' . . J i t h T o r n a h a u ~ K s

"d ~. .s t~ i b u t e d ~ C i r e p o , 4 e r , , d : , c + , ",- .e. . '.):.:t t h e lo ld . . ' . , . ~± l . J o u i d

,_-'.r. v e n t l o ~ . ~ l ~.3.~.rhe.~.d ..~.:-,ti.=.'-.ip t r , d l..~.r:d ~ t t a c K . m i s s i l e s ,

be ass igned

and barr ier

;'each ing the

uith Soy iet

Known SSBN

u n d e r , t h e

~_mphas ize

' , ' ~ . ~ d.: ,~e , a a n t e ~ . t ~ , ~ - . . - - . t , a t e g > , t o d o ? F o r cornF, a r i s o n

cc.n~-.!der the t~uc. strate_~ie_:, rot or~ly as varfi~h~ing plans bu±

p u r p o s e s

also & z

- 7 -

declaratory policy, f~s declaratory policy the ~irst level o~ analysis

for any maritime strategy must be hoi~ well it ~its with the national

strategy. When one considers that the corners±one o~ U.S. strategy is

de±errence c,~ S o v i e t a g g r e s s i o n thr. ough rail i±ar.y strength and threat o~

retaliation, ire f~Iternative Strategy fails its ~irst test. Worse, it

:~e-_,v:ens d e t e r r e n c e by r e d u c i n g t h e Soy Set r ask f a c t o r . I t a s s u r e s t h e m

_~ecure Fl~nKs during ag~r-ession should they decide to concentrate on

the central ~ront and, by el i..'n in .~t ins the threat o~ horizontal

~scalatio'~, ~ives them +.he ini+.iative to choose in what theatres

. Z i g h t i n 9 ~,~ill o . :cu- . . ~+. ~ i l l a l l o ~ them t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r - l a n d / a i r

~ o r c e s accord ir.g ly. The ~Iterr:at ire Strategy also represents a

F~oter, t ial decoupl ing ~r. orr nuclea.r escalation r ask by providing ~or SSBN

sanctuar ia-~ and a .se.zure ,homela~d,

T,Ka A.Iterr...~tive 3t~aleBy, .~.~. declaratory do-trine, is unl iKely to

be r . e . ~ s s . ; r i ns t o o u r a l I i e s . .~ ~avv r e s t r ac ted t o l o c a l de,~ense o~: t h e

~LOC.:. ",,-',~ o n l y repr-eser.±~ a b r e ~ ; : ~ ~ith N~.TO's { o r ' ~ a r d defense d o c t r i n e ,

but it al=-o irF~l ie~ a '~ill ir~gr~ess r~o± tc, seriously oppose limited

-c . r . qt~e--.tc-, c , : ~II ted terr i t o r - y o n t ~ _ ~lar, k,s. R a i n ~ o r c e r r , e n t s t o a r e a s

oth~_r than the E,.,r.o.=exn ca~tral f,-o:~±<2-3) t~ould be at ri~K without U.S.

Na~..'. - ,uFpo."~, Tt i s dc, ut t~, .~ l .. : o r e '<arnele, t . ha t Br. i t i s h , C a n a d i a n , and

~,utck~ ~c,r..-es ~ i l I ~o t o , ~ r w a ~ .'.~h~_~ U . 9 , c a r r i e r b a t t l e g r o u p s a r e

~'-e_~r acted ±o operat in9

pot.Jer projec±ion missio~

.~r~ at÷er.~pt to restor'e

~,art ime goal .

~ e d ~ c e d

~eDr. es~ts a

.;.outh o~ the G-I-UK gap. -he .Zorsar. inj of the

• ;or sea cor:+rol is 1 iKe-.:t~e i:-,-ompatable '~ith

pre-ho=-.til it;.' ter-ri+.ori~l boundaries--another

t o it_--, e-~.erca, the sea cont:-.o!/local

, - e t r e a ± - - i .... a±he r ,-es+.r ic±ed { - u t u r e " ( 2 1 )

Iirnits r~ot or:ly .~t i 0;% ior, s ir~ o.=pos in9

d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y

w h e r e t h e U . S .

a g g r . es. s i o n b u t u l t i m a t e l y i t s

- 8 -

own credibil Sty as an ally. By giving up the carrier power projection mission

the U.S. Navy uill lose one of its trump cards--a capability developed at great

cost and one in which U.S. expertise is not only unequaled but unlikely' to be

approached for decades. It is a capability the Soviets are trying to develop

for themselves. Can ue afford to neutralize this force under the Alterna±ive

Strategy? .~lany of our ali ies uould perceive such a move as a return t o the

p o s t - V i e t n a m r e t r e n c h r r , e n t u h e r - e t h e L I . S . w a s s e e n a s unwi!l ing t o t a k e risks f o r

i t s e l f or its friends.

f%s a Luarfighting _~.trategy; providing the Soviets secure flanks under- the

~Iternative Strategy gives them ±~o options not available

S t r a t e g y . T h e f i r s t o p t i o n i s t o t r a n s f e r ~ o r c e s f r o m

t h e a t r e s t o t h e f i g h t i n g a r e a . T h e s e c o n d S o v i e t o p t i o n

Maritime Strategy and encircle the .Allies from +.he flanks.

invol'.,e seizir, g advanced b.~ses iF, No,'u_~y and gaining control o{ the Baltic and

TurKish S+.^aits.

Oper.~tir, g ~r. orn advar, ced base=~, possibly on ca,~,tured ~II ted territory, the

Sovie+.s could greatly multiply the effectiveness of their forces, particularly

str. ik:e airc-.a~t. Writir,9 {or the Na,Jal [Jar- College Review in 1981, ~.ieutenant

Commar , d e r G . L. U n d e r w o o d , U S C G , examined t h e G e r m a n c a p t u r e of N o r w a y '

W o r l d I~}ar. If. He f o u n d _= .eve~a ]

~ t l a n t i c S L O C s .

Id i th Norway it. Sov Set

imFl Scat ior~s f o r - +.he Soviet t h r e a t

control, they could

o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e , N o r t h S e a a n d Nc, r u e 3 i a n S e a ,

r a n g e of a i r c r a f t a n d _:.h i .=s s.,:, t h a t t h e y c o u l d

a t t a c l < NF~TO SLOC-_--.- r e - c + . r i c t t h e p o u e r o f t h e

establish air "-'uper'i3rity .-rd .p,-c, tect their. .v, ola

a r i d g e l ± i t b~se ; _ , ~ e i . - . . . < 2 2 >

under the Maritime

the u n e n g a g e d f l a n k

is to reverse the

In Europe this would

protect their

increase t h e

more easily

.~'4~TG fleet,

Pen insula

C o t t h e ~ J e - t . e : , e r , t h e u a r ~.+. s e a , d e _ = . p i t e i t s o s t e n s i b l y , ' - e d u c e d

r asks ur.de~- the loc~l de~a?~se ,_~c..--tr ine, uould inevitably, have tough

9 o l n _ : ~ S o ' ~ , i e t 6 o r . : e s ,4.-.:4"d { i ' 3 d SLOC i n t e r r u p t i o n an e a s i e r t a s K . By

.-eding the flank l~nd ar.J _~em are.~s, ;_;~S. and ill ted ability to collect

during

to the

- 9 -

e a r l y w a r n i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e and use w i d e - a r e a ASW assets e f f e c t i v e l y

w o u l d l a r g e l y d i s a p p e a r . W i th r e s p e c t t o F~SW, o n l y s u b m a r i n e s c o u l d

c o n t i n u e t o o p e r a t e ~ i t h o u t m a j o r l o s s e s . SOSUS s t a t i o n s , P-Ss and t h e

civilian-manned towed array (T-AGOS Stallwar± class) ships will be

totally v u l n e r a b l e and the ±owed array ~ri~ates and P-3 airfields

nearly so. It is hard to imagine any of these units using their

: I p a b i l ± t i e s f o r e ' : + . e n d e d - r a n g e f~SW w i t h o u t s u p p o r t ~ rom c a r r i e r b a t t l e

~rc .up$, Even ±he So, v i e ± s u r f a c e navy w o u l d pose a f o r m i d a b l e t h r e a t t o

• .~I 1 ted ~Sl3 f o r c e s i4 t h e c a r t i e r s were u i ± h d r a w n t o l o c a l d e f e n s e

p o _ ~ i t i o n s s o u t h o~ t h e G - I - U K g a p .

Fewer l a r g e - d e c K c a r r i e r s , as pr. opo~ed

mear~ f e w e r K -14s and E - 2 s . ~s a resu1~( , a i r

become more of a cruise missile defense problem than an extended.

b a ± t l e . E u e n pr . o p o r ~ e n t s o f t h e f ~ I t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e g y m u s t a d m i t

two or three ,~S-4s &re a more difficult target than their

1 lun,zh a i r c r a f t . A t t a c k i ng Sou l e t f o r c e s a o u l d be g u a r a n t e e d

r i d e " ' ~ n t i l t h e y e n t e r e d loc..~.l d e f e n s e p e r ± m e t - i t s , The

the attackers i~.suld remain unimpaired as i~ould

cont-ol E . : ' s ± e m s ,

P.n ex~l ic it go~l c,~ the Alternat ire Strategy

t h e So,J l e t s an i n t e n t i v e t o use n u c l e a r weapons b y

~&~ ~r'O?~ "the Soviet horrelar,,J. "let ever, while opera±in9

protec±in£ the SLOC~, ±h,~ CVBGs will remain v:.i!nerable

o~.~c!~e.r ,,Jeapons, ~Irr, c,s± ~_.y d e f i n i t i o n , t h e SLOC_: :~i!l be

of "-L'Cl e.ar-ca.=.able subr,'.er in~_ s. .and lor, 9-rar, ge aircraft.

kh~_~tr e b..~lli-=.±ic r,',issile has the range to a l i . o threaten

E.ss~cer; ". ~tlar.±ic, LIe-.tarn Pacific, hledi±erranean and

S L O C s • ", 2 3 " T h e

by the reformers, would

defense of the SLOCs would

the ir command

air

that

BacKf ire

a " f r e e

l o g i s t i c s o f

and

is to avoid 9 ivin9

operating the CVBGs

in the "rear- "

attack by

the targets

The SS-20

CVBGs in the

Rrab ian Gulf

t o

q u e s t i.-.,n r e m a i r , s i-." c a r r i e r -~ , c o u l d a v o i d b e c o m i n g

- 10 -

.t arge.t s f o r nuclear

c..~rriers assigned . t o

offensive a c . t i o n .

In .the absence o&

h a v e procured f o r c e s

b u t a l s o f o r t h e ~ a i d e

s i r ~ c e t J o : - ' i d [..Jar I I ,

.~rr,:er i . z a n s e a p ¢ , : a e ~ ,

. t h o s e f o r c e s .t h &.t h ~ v e

em~ : o y m e n . t "_-. r e r,._~- i o _:. - - . t h e

_~.nd escor.t ships th.9.+.

adv&n.tage c, ~ t~e srr, al]

con.- ~ p't ---.the "e ~ g ~. "

ir *. L: i.t i',: e I :,' p ! e_:,5 . ! r ig

~eapons r e g a r d l e s s o ~

SLOC p r o . t e c . t i o n r e p r e s e n . t

s u b s + . i t u . t e # o r t h e b i g - - d e e ' <

m'~ 1 ± i r n i :.--. i c~r, e f 4 . e c . t i t . ~ e r , e.-_..~

r, o t b e +.oo rr:uch. ~rnaller, -~nd

nur. 'ber._=. requ i r e d .to * ' ,ak 'a

, : ~ ' , c e l ~_d r, l i - r . . : i . t z C V F I s ,

"their loca.t ion, Even

a la.ten.t capabil i.ty for

h o s . t i l i ± i e s L~ith .the Sov ie . t U n i o n , Navy l e a d e r s

no.t o n l y f o r c o n f l i c t w i . th ou r p r i n c i p a l a d v e r s a r : J

'~,..~r ie.ty of "peace.t irae " cr is is miss ions that,

have so -f. re~uen.tly resul.tad in .the exercise of

Th.a ~lar, i.t ime Stra.tegy offer, s addi.t tonal uses for

.the mos.t e f ~:ec.t in .the w ides.t ranBe of

big-deck car:'.ier- and "the associa.ted aircra~C.t

mak'e ~F a moderr., carrier batttle group. The

ca-r ier Iies it', +.he "di~,tr ibu.ted fir. epower"

.-, r. e i:', many "ba~.Xe.ts, " bJh il e .this is an

c o t ; c e p t , it fails in prac.t ical .terms as a

-&r'r ier_ ~ seal i =_r carrier , .to retain

as +.he cer~+.e?.piece .:.f a ba.t.tle 3roua, could

:.J o,J I d p r o b a b l y n o t be p r o c u r e d in t he

up {'c,r the lo_~t o.~fens i r e capab i l i . t y o f

~1o_:..t e:.~Fe,'.t-:, ha~,e r::,.u 9 i,.,er, up on .the seal ! cart ier . It does

.~-~o+. =---_,,)e a,~,gugh "qone',' %0 jug+. i~Fy a rna.jof l..~s_ ~ in aircraf±

?umt.÷rs, -=r:d the ,~'i'ni%z-,:lass i~ nov a full,,, developed shiF.

~.~,;-" net~ sh ip ,~o'_'..!d .taKe year5 .to ,_-:,ea.te and probably be

r~aar, ly as e;'per,-.ive., and , ,,%he ini.t i_~l urge to a 15-carrier

f o r c e has alread,.v b e e f f u ~ i d e d , ( 2 4 )

:,~" t l ;=_ U . S ,

; ~,.',:,re ~ by

• _ - 3 r -~'. i ~ F "

• _=. o r,~e ~J h a.t

doubtful %hat Corgr. 9_:.s would agree .to a sisni-Ficant enlargement

carrier ;or. ce ir~ c,:--tier "to get .the ~mal let cart iers

iha ~-e-F,:,r. rrie!'-s . A.drr, iral S.tan_~.f ield Turner , one of the srnal 1

proponen.ts, ~'~s .;~c~ir:.te4 ou.t "tha.t "a larger number of smaller

F, robably ~Gould r~ot p,-.e_~.en.t any savings, and might even cos.t

m,z, re 5ec ~:~.e 04: ad4 i.t tonal oper-.~t in9 cos.is -For manpower ,

11 -

Tuel, etc."(25) b-leverthele~s, with carriers now being K e p t in service

f o r nearly half a century, ~dmiral Turner would KeeP the large

c a r r i e r s a t t h e i r p r e s e n t l e v e l s and b e g i n ~ h a t he s e e ~ as t h e

inevitable t r a n s i t i o n to smaller flattops. In +.he i n i t i a l stages o f

t h i s ±ransition period, the ~maller carriers would supplement their

larger sis+.ers. Over the long run however, it is difficult to see how

±he ,:ar~- ier ! a n d at%acK/po~er pro.j ec± ion c a p a b i l i t y c o u l d be

:.ust a i:',ed ,

WHST ~ 8 0 U T SOVIET S T R A T E G Y ?

9 o r b t h e M a r i t i m e S t r a t e g y a n d t h e r e f o r m e r ' ~ F l l t e r n a t i r e

S t r a t e g y c o n c e n t r a t e , a t l e a s t i n i t a l l y , o n SLDC p r o t e c t i o n , D e s p i t e

the i ~ c r e a s e i n ar, t i_=.5 i p p i n s or" i e n t a t i o n oq t h e l a t e s t S o v i e t

~ . r s h i F . s , < S E ) m o s t Soviet e x p e r t s do n o t s e e t h e SLOC a t t a c k m i s s i o n

e,s v e . " y high on -':he S o v i e t N a ' . ; y ' s ~r. ic, r i t y l i s t . D i s c u s s i n g likely

~Jar t i r , - , e ~ ' o l e s f o r t h e 3 o v i s t ~%~.,,,-', N o r m a n F r i e d : c : a n w r o ± e

~ - l a n r , e r s , - co r , s i d e , i r ~ a tear. ~ g a i r : s t t4F~TO, +.,4~

t s i ~ t , ~ + h e . . . . . ~ i m , .Jo, ' l .J b e t h e s e i z u r e .;~

F: ' , : ' t , a b l v e,~.,.,is.~._=e t b r . ee v e r y d i f f e r , e n t r o l e s

T h e ¢ i r s + . r o l e '..:o,.+14 t ,e t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f

:4e:_FC, r.c ~+. ~ e a . , , Thi: i . ,Jould be

.:,F e~" at io ",s c on',t, i :" ~,~ ~4ith of 4en

d i - . e c t , - , d . ~ ; ~ i r s ± t-.Jr%T0 ball i s ± i c

secor , d theme , g i u e o t h e pr imacy o

t h i r , Y i r , g , ~Joul d b e t h e p r o t e c + .

w e a p o n s , It seem~ IiKely that at

p r e f e

such

s i n k

o f rue

• - , : , r t h a r n

Z o ' , - r - . e o ~

E:.;t- 0 7 e .-

:'~ 05.~ .b l y

G r,~. ] .= t-,d

c ..~.;'. r i~_r

,~hich, at the

~destern Europe

for the ir navy.

i4estern nuclear

achieved by ant i-cart ier

sive ant isubrnar ine warfare

missile s u h r n a r i n e s . . . FI

f nuclear ,ae.apons in Soy iet

io~ of ±heir our: nuclear

least at f i r s t they would

r. to cc.,J-~r the SSBN holding _~reas ~.:-:d, incidentally,

coastal areas as bIurrnansK, re±her than to attempt to

shipping in the ~,~?.+.h ~tlantic .... Gi,~en the seizure

sterr, Europe a~ .=. pr imary aim, the third major role of

l e e r ~ 4 o u ] d b e +o ~ : : s i . - t t h e a ~ . m y , p a r . t i c u l a r l v or , i t ' s

f ] ~r.K . . . . '.-'or.J!:, er" , g i',:en 3 o v i e t cor:cepti o f the

a v~r,. e.'~d ~heir e>::pe,-tation o~ a quick victory in

Sot, ie± :, I ~, r. r, e ,- .--.. cor, cer r, ed with the .~q~TO navies

~,ir~: ,e "_;y ut their ability , . . .-b ; ~ abe , to t h r e a t e n t h e

• ~nd the o.F ¢er:-~. i,,:e forces ashore by such rnean~, a~

st;"iKe~. .:n air-."ie~.d : .( 2~

- 12 -

I f t h i s i s t h e c a s e , t h e ~ t h e M a r i t i m e S t r a t e g y m a y p l a y i n t o S o v i e t

hands by sending the carrier battle groups into harm's way at a time

uher. ~¢,rward defense o{ the SLOCs has become meaningless to the land

war, ]'he question then becomes whether either strategy is planning for

the

"to

the

r i g h t i,~ar. Is a p r o l o n g e d c o n v e n t i o n a l

shou ld be p l a n n i n ~ -~or9 Genera l Rogers ,

have to re:[uest nuclear release a u t h o r i t y

event of a Sou iet a t t a c k in khe central

war in Europe the scenario

the curren± S~CEUR, expects

"in days--not weeks" in

f r o n t . ( 2 8 )

S O F ~ S T R A T E G I C P g R ~ 0 X E S

I f the A l t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e 9 7

doctrine o~ ~ar-fighting strategy,

of the reformers? tJhat the

fails as

is there any

r e f o r m e r s do is

vu.~nerabilities t h . . ~ t r , u s t b e c o n s i d e r e d w h e n

C o ~ , : p a r i = . o n o ~ t h e Maritime ~ r , d . ~ l t e r . n a t i u e

three stra±egic ,maradcx~_s,

-Pol itic.~] earadox : ~ m a r it irr~e

" ' .~TO ' s forward d e f e n s e doctrine

• . : : ± i r n a t e ! y ~J ~._~X e n the _~.II lance

cony inc ing declaratory

value to the criticisms

p o i n t ou t p i t f a l l s and

employing either strategy.

_~±- ~ t e g ies a l s o s u g g e s t s

s t r a t e g y t h a t is in

may cause Fol it ical

because o{ al 1 ted

a ~ t a c K i r , g S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y .~nd b e c _ ~ . u s e t h e f o r c e s

M ~ r itime S t r a t e g y ' rr, a y ~.~ .... ~--o rm.,cl; t h a t t h e I : . S .

i . Z f o r d a d e ~ . : . ~ a t e g r o u n d f o r c e s ~ o r t h e , c e n t r a l front.

• - ~ - ! u c l e ~ r . P a r a d o x : 1.4k~t t r ia l ' b e ( a r g u a b l y > t h e b e _ ~ t

concert with

frict ion and

s e n s i t ivit~ t o

required for the

~on'± be able to

strategy for

e : r p 1 o y r r ~ n t o f n av..~. 1 ¢ .-,~" .s e :-

d e ~ a - , i . e " - - r . . a y b ~ t h e [vc, r s +. r, u c l e a r

n : , . - _ l e a r e s c a l a t i o n . TP:~_ S o v i e t s

.3per .&+. ic , r ,s , : , : , -~terr , p l ~.~{r~ ur d e r t h e

e s c a l a t ~..3n t o t . h e a t ~ ' e r, u c l e s , r ~.Jar .

i:'J a C O r : V ~ - ~ +. ion~l :,Jar - - "forward

_ ~ t r e . t e g y s .nd r..'~ay e v e r , c o r , t r . i b u ± e t o

w o u l d pr. o b a b l y v i e w t h e o f f e n s i v e

Ha . ̂ i t irr, e S t r a t e g y a s p r e p a r e r i o n s f o r

- 1 3 -

-Land War P a r a d o x : Wh i l e NATO's l and f o r c e s seek ±o d e t e r an a t l a c K

by ~. declared readiness to escalate to nuclear ;~eapons, the hlari±ime

S t r a t e g y p l a n s o n l y f o r a c o n v e n t i o n a l wa r . e~Iso, t h e Mar i± ime

S t r -a tegy e n v i s i o n s ±he use o f a s s e t s t h a t c o u l d be used d i r e c t l y in the

central front. These include Qir Force fighters, bombers and F~bJ~Cs

aircr, a~±(~9) and At. my and D4ar ire troop'_-.. Will the Soviet air/land

a s s e t s " t i e d down" on the f lanK,s Keep a I i K e number o f a l i i e d f o r c e s

occup ied?

.~RESCR IPT ION

How _~.hould ±he ~ . u e s t i o n a b l e a s p e c t s o f t h e M a r i t i m e

tha s t r a t e g i c p a r a d o x e s be r e s o l ' v e d ? C l e a r l y u n c e r t a i n t y

Stra±e~y and

will al~ays

be ? r e s e n t . |Je w i l l n o t be p r i v y t o S o v i e t p l a n s nor can we be c e r t a i n

o~ hoL~ c,-~r, all ies uill act in the fu±ure. We should therefore avoid

beco~ir, g cor,',mi+.ted to a. single strategy. In the final analysis,

flaxibility at the pol i+.ical , strategic and tactical levels is the Key

to resolving ±he paradoxes outl ined by the reformers. The Navy, as

presently s±ructured, has excellent po±ent ial to exercise ~his

# l e x ib i l ity ,

At the pol it ical le~,el , 1~e must pt#rst~e efforts to coor-dinate the

Plat i±ime Strategy and NF~TO nuclear pol icy, if General Ro@ers believes

it will be necessary to request nuclear release after only a few days

,.~f i~ar, then even SLOC prc, J(ection may be an inappropr late navy miss ion.

The Maritime S+.ra±egy, ~=. it presently exists, .=.hould be only one

c,p±ion--±ha± of i protracted conventional war in which dec is ion on i~he

c e n t r a l f r o n t is dependen t upon r e i n f o r c e ~ i e n t , The Navy s h o u l d a l s o

d e v e l o p ti~o n u c l e a r o p t i o n s . The f i r s t is a f o l l o w - o n t o the c u r r e n t

~aritime ~tra~egy ~ha± ~surnes nuclear, weapons :Jill be used a~ter ~orne

- 14 -

period of conventional conflict. The second option should assume the

early or immediate use of nuclear weapons. All of these options should

be part of a Maritime Strategy that is only a part of a ha±tonal and

allied strategy. Even ±hough the other services have important roles

in the current Mar itime Stra±egy, there should be F~r.my and F~ir Force

s±rae, e g i e s t h a t s p e l l o u t t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e Navy c o n t r i b u t i o n

±o f h e i r m i s s i o n ,

tJith regard to +.he Maritime Stra±egy at the tactical level , the

core of +.he problem is +.he shift from the defensive (Phase II) to the

c o u n t e r a t t a c k as p r o p o s e d by Phase I I I in t h e M a r i t i m e S t r a ± e g y . I f we

s h o u l d c a r r y t h e f i g h ± t o +.he S o v i e t h o m e l a n d , ho~ s h o u l d . w e do i t a n d ,

more important, l~hen should we do it? ms declaratory policy and in

terms of force structure ~le should retain the opt ion to threaten power

p r o . j e t ± i o n bu+. we s h o u l d no± v i e ~ +.his. m i s s i o n as a g o a l in i ± s e l f .

7-here _=.hould be precorditions for transitioning to +.he offensive.

:.~riting Tor ±he Qrmed Force--- Journal, F~nthony Cordesman notes that

carrier bat+.!e grc.ups must mee+. the follo:.Jing criteria: (a)

arr . i ue in t i m e +.o a f ~ e c ± + . h e ou tcome o f a war t h a t may i n v o l v e a~. l i t t l e i s 4 8 - 7 2 h o u r s o f w a r n i n g , ( b ) s u r v i v e +.he

combined thr. e~± of Soviet air. power, missiles, and

--ubr~arinec-.~ (c) deliver sufficient cor~.ventional air, missile,

c~nd gur. Fo~der +.o alter the outcome of the ~ir/Land battle in

a ~,'s.y .zommer..sur.~+.e ~ith their cost and trade -off value, and

'~d ~, be a b l e "to sur f , i r e and f i g h t in a ± h e a ± r e n u c l e a r e:~.J i r opine_n+.. ', 3B)

In t h e ra i l it~.~.y r e ~ I m , t h e s+.atus o f t h e t~ar in ±he c e n t r a l ÷ r o n t

i s c : ' u c i a l . Have r, u c l . ~ a r ~e.~pon_~ been used? bJil I SQCEUR be soon

Corz~.d +.o use them? D~.or-e i r n p o r t a n t , J i l l be + .he p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n s .

D.lhat i s t h e s t a t u s , i f a n y , o f t~ar t e r m i n a t i o n n e g o ± i a ~ i o n s ? Is a l o n g

tJ~r r+ow con+.empl a~ed? u~ue ,~ov ie+. i n t e n t i o n s become c l e a r ?

In a d d i t i o n ~co t h e g r o u n d b a t + . l e , t h e a t t r i t i o n o f a i r c r a f t ,

f r i e r , a l ly and S o v i e t rr, US+ be a f ~ . c t o r . The a i r L~ings o f f o u r o r

b o t h

f i v e

- 15 -

J

• . +

carriers may not be a significant percentage of allied air power at the

beginning of a conflict, but after one or two weeks of central front

air battles they could well be an important factor. We should

seriously consider Keepin3 the carriers as a strategic reserve for

conventional as well as nuclear ~ar. On the "flanKs," the offensive

could well be an "SSN-only" operation.

The Navy is already doing some of the-things the reformers w,.~nt.

Firepower is being "dis±ributed" in the form of Tomahawk and Harpoon

cruise missiles and this issue is now one oT how many and how fast to

procure ~hem. With regard ~o carriers, the l~asp class LHO, funded in

RY84, is designed to be convertible between amphibious assault and sea

control missions.(31) The bJasp, in her sea control configuration, will

embark about for±y aircraft, probably F~V-8 Harriers and ASW

h e l i c o p t e r s .( 3. ° ) The U . S , Navy s h o u l d c r o s s - d e c K R o y a l Navy Sea

H ~ r r ! e r s , ~ a r ± i c u l a r l y a f ± e r ~hey h a v e c o m p l e t e d ± h e i r a i r i n ± e r c e p t

radar up~rades ,( 33) to evaluate a similar F r'ogram for the Marine

Harriers. With visual rules of er~gagemen± the order of the day for

"peacetime" encounters ~ith hostile aircraft, the agile Harrier could

F, e r ~ o r m u s e f u l - . e r v i c e as a c l o s e - i n fighter. T h i s c o u l d a l s o a p p l y t o

t h e Span i s h Navv ~ a r r i e r s , O t h e r e:Kper imen±s ~ i ±h smal I e r c a r r i e r s

.--..ee.-., in o r d e r . The hlidLJe.y c o u l d t r y S e c r e t a r y Lehman '~ 2[3 ( a t ± a c K OR

.0S6J p l u s f i g h t e r ) a i r g r o u p ( 3 4 ) ~Ji th F / A - 1 B s r e p l a c i n g F - 4 s and Q - 7 s .

In t h e a r e a o f n u c l e a r ~Gar a t s e a , t h e Navy s h o u l d c o n s i d e r some

fc.~m c.f defense agai",-:.± bell is±ic missiles. Perhaps

version 3Z the SP.I-2, it. stalled aboard ~EGIS crL~isers, will

ir:t~_rim solution. In t~-.e lonc run, some spinoffs from the

D~_-~e~se In it iative ( Star 6Jar~) may contribute ar. swer.s.

the nuclear

provide an

Strategic

- I G -

CONCLUS I ON

F~ consensus has been r e a c h e d by many

+.hat t h e Reagan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Mar i t i m e

s . t r i K e t h e S o v i e t Un ion in r e ~ p o n ~ e t o an

.~ound, e s p e c i a l l y when t h o ~ e c o u n t e r a ± ± a c K s

c a r r i e r s . The A l t e r n a t i v e S t~ .a+ `e~y - -wh i ch

r - e . ~ o r r a e r ~ - - c s l l ~ .~or + .he N a v y ±o ~ -on f i ne

~: iss ior. s c e n t e r e d a r o u n d local protection

commun i c a t i o n ~ . They t~oul d

p~c,. jec+. ion ~ i_~s ion o r g r e a t l y

~ith the Soviet Union ~ould

E u r o p e a n cen+ . ra l f r o n t .

Ne i±her the Mar i t i~e

of the rail itary reformers

Strategy of threaten ing to

a t t a c k i s n o t s t r a t e g i c a l l y

w o u l d be c o n d u c t e d by Navy

is a d v o c a t e d by most o f t h e

i t s e l f t o " sea c o n t r o l "

of t h e sea iines o÷

either el iminate the carrier power

proscribe it.. The Navy role in a war

be ±o protect reinforcements enroute to the

Str. ategy nor the reformers ' Alternatiue

S t r a t e g y o f f e , " cor~p le+.e l~ s a t i s T y i n g r ~ t i o n a l e s f o r t h e use o f t h e U .S .

Nay;, in a ~ar ~i+`h the Sovie+` Union. The Mar it ime Strategy, a~

d e c l a r a ± o r y p o l i c y , r e i n f o r c e s d e t e r r e n c e and sL~ppor ts NATO's f o r w a r d

defe?.se doc±r, i n e , e~,<~;endir, g t h e cc, ncep± From +.he c e n t r a l f r o n t t o t h e

n o r ± h e r r , ~-'~d ~.outher,~ ~lanVs, In a p r o l o n g e d c o n v e n ± i o n a l w a r , t h e

Plat i~ i ' r ,e Str.~teg::., ,-,Tfer.:. the ~-,e~t r a t i o n a l e f o r u s i n g t h e p r e s e n ± and

p!ar, neA. flee~ _~truc±L're. Nevertheless, as a war-fightin~ doctrine, it

i s ±oo r ! ~ i d . T h i s s±re .+ .egy 's c l a r i o n c a l l f o r a t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e

c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e - - c a r r y i n ~ t h e f i g h t t o t h e e n e m y - - w i l l , even in t h e

b e s t o f c o n v e n t i o n a l t,Jar c i rcurr , st_~.nces, r e q u i r e an e x t r a o r - d i n a r y sense

c,~ rnil itary and pol it i.zal t ir:~.ir3 ,.',n the part of the tasK force

cornrnar, der . F u t u r e war ~.---.rr, es s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e

±r~r.-.- t t i on pha~.e o f +.he ~!ar i t i m e S t r a t e g y .

to

i t . +.he t~ors+, c a s e s . - - a s h o r t c o n v e n + . i o n a l war. o r one t h a t e s c a l a t e d

nuclear ~ar--the Mari+.i~,e Strategy r-~.nges from an irrelevantc~ ~o a

17 -

I"

recipe for disaster. ~dditional strategic op±ions need to be developed

for these "worst case" scenarios. To this writer, an early Tomahawk

offensive conducted by SSNs against naval bases and airfields coupled

~ith Keeping the carrier battle group5 in reserve, at least initially,

offer~ one solution for hedging our bet. Since even the Naritime

Strategy e~..'~ect_"-, initi.-.~l reverses once the war. begins, some time ~ill

be r~ceded dur in~ the attempt to ga in the in i± tat ire and destroy the

Sov~.et Havy d u r i n g Phase ! I . Du r i ng t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e s h o u l d be some

i n d i c a ± i o n o f ho~} the land Ld.).r is ~0 i~9 and perhaps an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r

the beginnir, g_ ~. of political overtures. The carriers, by not going in

har~j's '.:ay until the

pol itically--could represent

terminat ion negot ia±ior, s,

± ime is r i . gh t - -bo±h rai l i t a r i l y and

i m p o r t a n t b a r g a i n i n g c h i p s in war

In this r. egard, the reformer's sea

leverage, Giving up the Navy's power

?.apr. esented by the big-decK carrier, and

Strategy, maKe~ l i t ' t l e sense.

control navy offers 1 title

projection capab il i±y, as

threatened by the Maritime

The flexibility and pot~er of a carrier

bat±le group are rightl,~, feared(35> by Soviet planners.

±o n~atch ±his flexibil i%y in the strategic arena and ±o

the de±err-ent value of the U,'5. ~.lavy , a broader range

opt io~ys is r. e q u i r e d ,

Never±he Iess,

fully exploit

of strategic

- 18 -

NOTES

I, John behman, "Rebir±h of Naval Strategy," Strategic Review, Surmmer

1981, e. 14.

e. m a u l S c h r a t z , " Y e a r n i n g F o r C h a n g e , " S h i p m a t e , N o v e m b e r 1 9 9 4 , p . 6

3. George C. W i l s o n , "U.S. Has Los t Naval S u p e r i o r i t y , Over S o v i e t s , Leaders T e l l H i l l P a n e l , " [ ~ash in j t on Po_'-.t, 6 Feb rua ry 1881, p. l e .

m. Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Preparing For The

Unexpected: The Need For F~ Neia Nil itary Strategy," Foreign F~ffairs,

Fal ! 1982, p. 122,

5 . R o b e r t K o m e r , "Mar i t ime S t r a t e g y vs C o a l i t i o n D e f e n s e , " F o r e i g n . ~ f f a i r s , Summer 1 9 8 2 , p . 1 1 2 4 .

6, 3ef~r. ev Record, "Joust ing With Unreal ity: Reagan's Military

S t r a t e g y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , W i n t e r 1 9 8 3 / 8 4 , p . 11 .

7 . Ibid. p . 18.

8 . K o m e r , p . 1128.

9 . Michael MccGuire, "The Navy And r - l a t i o n s l S e c u r i t y , " Unpublished

paper, ~5 April 1983, p . 3.

18. K o m e r . , p. 1134.

l l . W i l l i a m S. L i n d , Commen t a n d D i s c u s s i o n on " T h e F u t u r e o f U . S . S e a p o , ~ e ' - , " b;/ T . 8 . H& l~ [ Ja rd , U . S . N a v a l I n s t i t j a t e P r o c e e d i n g s , J u l y 1 9 7 9 , p . 2 3 .

12, IBar~-;~ R. Posen, "T-.adver tent t4ucle_~r War? Escalat ion and NFiTO's

Nor~herr. PlanK," Internat'on._~l Security, Fall 1989, p, 31. .~iso see

.Josh~aa E p - . t e i n , " H c . - i z o r . t a l E ~ . c a l ~ t i o n : Sour- h.lote_~. On A R e c u r r e n t The_me .. Internat ior;~l Secur its" , [ein±er .88o/84 and Captain Linton c

BrooKs; USN, "Escalation ar;d Naval Stratesy," U,S. Naval l~stitute

~r. o c e e d ing~., P.ug:~st 1 9 8 4 .

_ , ' ' ~ _ Th e T I o , ' i e u t e n a n t m a u l G. .loh-~s. o n ; :_I.=N, "T,-~:.m.;-i&wK: ..mpl i c a t i o n s Of

Str._~tegic/-Factical Mix," U.S0 t-!ev._~.l Institute Proceedings, f!.F:-il 1982.

I~ . ' m e c o r d , p. 13.

',m. Ko,:er, p, 1133.

I,~ ~ose-~: pp.s 51 .5 , Po:s ug~es+.s ~hat all war. plan~, force

:-t:- ~.--~-~'-e ar.d decllrato:-y Fol ;.-_y be ~evieued for -their "escalatory

--ote~±ial " b'/ a s.peciall.., cc.r,~.tituted 9FOUr of civil tan and nil itary

o~ z t c i a : s .

17. Po-.eh, #.. 53,

18. The idea o f the a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r as a s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e was

probably best argued by Captain Linton BrooKs in his article

" E s c a l a t i o n and Naval Strategy," U.S. Naval Insti±ute Proceedings,

August IS84, pps. 33-37. An earlier proponent o~ this idea was

Commander Robert C. Powers, USN, in Comment and Discussion, "The

P o t e n t i a l B a t t l e o f ±he ~ ± l a n t i c , " U.S. Naval I n s ± i ± u t e Proceedings,

December 1979, p. 9£I and h i s a r t i c l e " E s c a l a t i o n C o n t r o l , " U.S. Naval I n s t i t u t e Proceedings, January 1388, p. 55.

19. ~dmir~.l Elmo R. Zumwal%, USN, "Naval B a t t l e s We Could L o s e , " In±ernatior..al S ~ c u r i t y Review, Summer 1981, p. 14~.

28. See "N~TO's SinKing Feeling," The Economist, B June 1981, p. 51 for

an overv ie'.~ o f +.he Royal Navy role in protec± ins re in~orcements.

~-1. Michael Vlahos, "A Crack In The Shield: The Capital Ship Concept

Under F~±tacK," The Journal of Strategic Studies, May 197S, p. 74.

Vlahos discusses the capital ship (i.e. the big-decK carrier) as a

symbol o~ ~.merican commitment to it's allies.

2~. Lieutenan± Commander G. L. Urderwood, USCG, "Soviet Threat To The

~tlantic Sea Lines Of Communication: Lessons Learned From The German

Capture O~ N o ~ , ~ . > ' In I~48," Naval War College Review, May-June 1881, p.

#7.

33. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Mili±ary Power, April 1884, p.

52.

24. F~nthony H. Cor. desman, "The 800-Ship Navy : !%hat Is It? Do We Need

It? Can We Get It?," Armed Force_:. Journal, April 1884, p, 70.

25. Turner, p. 134.

2G. Norman Fr iedmar:, "The Soviet Flee± in Transit ion," U.S. Naval

Ins±i±u±e Proceedings, Naval Review 1883, p. 162.

2 ~, Ibid. ~ p. IGI.

~_~. On +.he thir-t~-fifth anniversary of !".L~T0, General Ro~er's stated that

Jr, the even +. of a Soy let attack he Mould have to revues± nuclear

release "in a matter of days--not weeks." Interview with SACEUR on

~rrned Forces Network (Europe) Ne:..s, 4 ~prii 1984.

2S. Lieu±enant Commander =redricK J. Glaeser, USH, E-JA (F~WACE;): ~n

Untapped Mar itime Suppor~ Resource," U.S. Naval Insti±ute Proceedings,

Augu-.t IS7~, pps. I~_8-II@.

3@. C-.rdesma~, p. 7~.

~:1. Depar-tmen~ c.f the Navy, Ships, ~.ircra~± And Weapons Of The United

St~±es Navy, ~ugust 19:B~, p. 14.

3 2 . C o m m a n d e r G. P e t T i e r r , e y , USN a n d C o l o n e l b ! y r l W. R l l i n d e r , USMC, "AV-R..B/L. '-QhlPS . ~ , I K - I I I L H D - C I ~ . - - . s s h i p s , " U . S . N a v a l I n s t i t u t e P r o c e e d i n g s ,

I'qc, v~rnbe~'. 1384, pp_.. . ~4@-145.

33. See Fl i~ht In±ernational, 30 July 1983, p. 23~ and 8 December 1884,

p. 1545 f o r d e t a i l s o f the Sea H a r r i e r p rogram. B r i t i s h p l a n s i n c l u d e r e t r o f i t t i n g a F e r r a n t i p u l s e - d o p p l e r r a d a r w i t h l ook down-shoo t down c a ; a b i l i ± y , AMRAAM a i r - t o - a i r mis-~ i l e s , Sea Eagle a n t i s h i p m i s s i l e s , r e l o c a t i n g ±he S i d e w i n d e r l aunch p o s i t i o n ±o the H a r r i e r w i n g t i p , and f i ± ± i n g l a r g e r drop t a n k s .

34. John Lehman, Aircraf± Carriers" The Real Choices (Beverly Hills:

Sage) P. Sl.

35. Engineer-Captain 2nd Rank V. Yel iseyeu, "S±rategic Forces Reserve,"

MorsKoy SborniK, No. 8, 1973, p. .35.

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