NATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGYOF THEUNITED STATES

FD..:.:TRillt.17.1.01 '; EILI,...,•

Appro • c:7 fa: I.:-...1-)1".c release;Ditraltrotion Unlimited

19980513 064DT; t

ii,TCPZCZED 4PLEASE RETURN TO:

BMD TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION7100 DEFENSE PENTAGO N

WASHINGTON D.C. 20301-7100

AU

U3/ 3)

NATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGYOF THEUNITED STATES

THE WHITE HOUSEAUGUST 1991

PLEASE RETURN TO:

SDI TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

Accession Number: 3131

Publication Date: Aug 01, 1991

Title: National Security Strategy of the United States

Corporate Author Or Publisher: The White House, Washington, DC

Descriptors, Keywords: National Strategy Defense US Soviet Coalition Proliferation Nuclear Deterrence Missile Security UN

Pages: 00034

Cataloged Date: Sep 11, 1991

Document Type: HC

Number of Copies In Library: 000001

Record ID: 22566

Contents

DITRT"--13 C-170717STATEMNT AApproved for public re/ease;

Distribution Unlimited

Preface . . . V

I.The Foundations of NationalStrategy: Interests and Goals . ..1

ANEW ERA. . . 1

OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE1990s . . . 3

II.Trends in the World Today: NewOpportunities and Concerns . . . 5

FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS . . .5

The Soviet Future ... 5

The Growing Roles of Germany and Japan ... 6

The New Europe ... 6

REGIONAL TRENDS . . . 7

The Western Hemisphere ... 8

East Asia and the Pacific ... 9

The Middle East and South Asia ... 10

Africa ... 10

III. Relating Means to Ends: A PoliticalAgenda for the 1990s . . . 13

ALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND A NEW UNITEDNATIONS... 13

THE CONTEST OF IDEAS AND THE NURTURING OFDEMOCRACY . . . 14

ARMS CONTROL . . . 14

STEMMING PROLIFERATION . . . 15

INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS . . . 16

ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE . . . 16

ILLICIT DRUGS . . . 17

IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES . . . 18

IV. Relating Means to Ends: AnEconomic Agenda for the 1990s ... 19

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES . . . 19

MAINTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH . . . 19

GLOBAL IMBALANCES . . . 20

DEBT . . .20

TRADE . . . 20

TECHNOLOGY . . . 21

ENERGY . . . 21

THE ENVIRONMENT . . . 22

SPACE . . . 22

iii

A SMALLER AND RESTRUCTURED FORCE . . . 31

Minimum Essential Military Forces —The Base Force ... 31

FORWARD PRESENCE . . . 27

Across the Atlantic: Europe andthe Middle East ... 27

Across the Pacific ... 28

VI. Toward the 21st Century ... 33The Rest of the World ... 28

V. Relating Means to Ends: A DefenseAgenda for the 1990s ... 25

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE . . . 25

CRISIS RESPONSE . . . 28

Mobility ... 28

Readiness and our Guard and Reserve Forces ... 29

Strategic Nuclear Forces ... 25

Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces ...

Missile Defenses ... 27

26

RECONSTITUTION . . .

Manpower ... 30

Defense Technology

The Industrial Base ...

29

... 30

30

iv

Preface

A NEW WORLD ORDER

A new world order is not a fact; it is an aspiration —and an opportunity. We have within our grasp anextraordinary possibility that few generations haveenjoyed—to build a new international system inaccordance with our own values and ideals, as old pat-terns and certainties crumble around us.

In the Gulf we caught a glimmer of a better future — anew world community brought together by a growingconsensus that force cannot be used to settle disputesand that when that consensus is broken, the world willrespond. In the Gulf, we saw the United Nations play-ing the role dreamed of by its founders, with theworld's leading nations orchestrating and sanctioningcollective action against aggression. But we remain in aperiod of transition. The old has been swept away, thenew not yet fully in place. The obstacles and uncertain-ties before us are quite real — the daunting problemsconfronting the hopes for reform in Eastern Europe andthe Soviet Union, trade disputes and burdensharingdebates among the industrial democracies, and the tur-moil and dangers in the developing world.

Yet, the Gulf crisis showed what the world communityis now capable of, and in the very act of meeting thatchallenge the world community strengthened itself. Ihope history will record that the Gulf crisis was thecrucible of the new world order.

It is up to us — our generation in America and theworld — to bring these extraordinary possibilities tofruition. And in doing this, American leadership isindispensable. That is our challenge.

Our response, outlined in this Report, is shaped bywhat we are as a people, for our values are the linkbetween our past and our future, between our domesticlife and our foreign policy, between our power and ourpurpose. It is our deepest belief that all nations andpeoples seek political and economic freedom; that gov-ernments must rest their rightful authority on the con-sent of the governed, and must live in peace with theirneighbors. The collapse of the Communist idea hasshown that our vision of individual rights — a visionimbedded in the faith of our Founders — speaks tohumanity's enduring hopes and aspirations.

It is this abiding faith in democracy that steels us todeal with a world that, for all our hope, remains a dan-gerous place — a world of ethnic antagonisms, nation-al rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, per-sonal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism. ForAmerica, there can be no retreat from the world's prob-lems. Within the broader community of nations, we seeour own role clearly. We must not only protect our citi-zens and our interests, but help create a new world inwhich our fundamental values not only survive butflourish. We must work with others, but we must alsobe a leader.

V

I. The Foundations of NationalStrategy: Interests and Goals

NEW ERA

The bitter struggle that divided the world for over twogenerations has come to an end. The collapse of Sovietdomination in Eastern Europe means that the Cold Waris over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a newera, one whose outline would have been unimaginableonly three years ago.

This new era offers great hope, but this hope must betempered by the even greater uncertainty we face.Almost immediately new crises and instabilities cameupon us. The Gulf War was a forceful reminder thatthere are still autonomous sources of turbulence in theworld. In the Soviet Union, while we have seen ahealthy retrenchment in foreign policy, we also see acontinuing internal crisis, with a danger of violenceoverhanging the hopes for internal reform. We facenew challenges not only to our security, but to ourways of thinking about security.

For over 40 years, the American grand strategy of con-tainment has reflected an era of expanding Sovietpower, Soviet aggression and Soviet Communism. Wenow find, however, that the Soviet Union is far moreinwardly focused as it wrestles with its internal crises.We do not know what path the Soviet Union will ulti-mately take, but a return to the same superpoweradversary we have faced for over 40 years is unlikely.

That said, the Soviet Union remains the only state pos-sessing the physical military capability to destroyAmerican society with a single, cataclysmic attack and,in spite of severe economic strains, the modernizationof Soviet strategic forces continues virtually across theboard. Even with a START Treaty, the Soviets will retainmore than 6,000 strategic weapons. The Soviets will

also — despite the heartening reductions we have seenin their conventional capabilities — retain some threemillion men in their armed forces. These enduring real-ities cannot be ignored.

Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require anunderstanding of the extraordinary trends at work today— a clear picture of what has changed and what hasnot, an accurate sense of the opportunities that historyhas put before us and a sober appreciation of the dan-gers that remain.

Politically, a key issue is how America's role of allianceleader — and indeed our alliances themselves — willbe affected, especially in Europe, by a reduced Sovietthreat. The positive common basis of our alliances —the defense of democratic values — must be reaffirmedand strengthened. Yet, differences among allies are like-ly to become more evident as the traditional concernfor security that first brought them together diminishesin intensity. We need to consider how the United Statesand its allies can best respond to a new agenda of polit-ical challenges — such as the troubled evolution of theSoviet Union or the volatile Middle East — in theframework of the moral and political values we contin-ue to share.

In the realm of military strategy, we confront dangersmore ambiguous than those we previously faced. Whattype and distribution of forces are needed to combatnot a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threatsof power vacuums and regional instabilities? How dowe reduce our conventional capabilities in ways thatensure we could rebuild them faster than an enemycould build a devastating new threat against us? Howdoes the proliferation of advanced weaponry affect ourtraditional problem of deterrence? How should wethink about these new military challenges and what

1

capabilities and forces should we develop to secureourselves against them?

America will continue to support an international-eco-nomic system as open and inclusive as possible, as thebest way to strengthen global economic development,political stability and the growth of free societies. Buthow can these goals best be attained, especially if theyare not completely shared by all of our economic com-petitors? How will the end of the Cold War and theincreased economic strength of our major trading part-ners influence economic, political and even securityrelationships? In addition to working actively to con-clude successfully the Uruguay Round of MultilateralTrade Negotiations, what other market-opening objec-tives should the United States pursue, and with whomshould we pursue them?

In the emerging post-Cold War world, internationalrelations promise to be more complicated, morevolatile and less predictable. Indeed, of all the mistakesthat could be made about the security challenges of anew era, the most dangerous would be to believe thatsuddenly the future can be predicted with certainty.The history of the 20th century has been replete withsurprises, many unwelcome.

In many ways, if there is a historical analogy for today'sstrategic environment, it is less the late 1940s than it isthe 1920s. In the 1920s, judging that the great threat toour interests had collapsed and that no comparablethreat was evident, the Nation turned inward. Thatcourse had near disastrous consequences then and itwould be even more dangerous now. At a time whenthe world is far more interdependent — economically,technologically, environmentally — any attempt to iso-late ourselves militarily and politically would be folly.

Despite the emergence of new power centers, theUnited States remains the only state with truly globalstrength, reach and influence in every dimension —political, economic and military. In these circum-stances, our natural desire to share burdens more equi-tably with newly-strong friends does not relieve us ofour own responsibilities.

America's role is rooted not only in power, but also intrust. When, in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait,the Saudis invited foreign forces onto their soil, KingFand observed:

I trust the United States of America. I know thatwhen you say you will be committed, you are, infact, committed. I know that you will stay as long asnecessary to do what has to be done, and I knowyou will leave when you are asked to leave at theend, and that you have no ulterior motives.

We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibilityfor solving all the world's security problems. But weremain the country to whom others turn when in dis-tress. This faith in us creates burdens, certainly, and inthe Gulf we showed that American leadership mustinclude mobilizing the world community to share thedanger and risk. But the failure of others to bear theirburden would not excuse us. In the end, we areanswerable to our own interests and our own con-science — to our ideals and to history — for what wedo with the power we have. In the 1990s, as for muchof this century, there is no substitute for American lead-ership. Our responsibility, even in a new era, is pivotaland inescapable.

The Gulf crisis interrupted a time of hope. We saw anew world coming, a world freer from the threat of ter-ror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, more secure in thequest for peace. Democracy was gaining ground aswere the principles of human rights and political andeconomic freedom. This new world is still within reach,perhaps brought closer by the unprecedented interna-tional cooperation achieved in the Gulf crisis.

But even after such a success, we face not only thecomplex security issues outlined above, but a newagenda of new kinds of security issues. Our nationalpower, for example, ultimately rests on the strength andresilience of our economy, and our security would bebadly served if we allowed fiscal irresponsibility athome to erode our ability to protect our interestsabroad, to aid new democracies or to help find solu-tions to other global problems. The scourge of illegaldrugs saps our vitality as a free people, diverts our ener-gies from more positive pursuits and threatens friendlydemocratic governments now plagued by drug traffick-ers. The environmental depredations of SaddamHussein have underscored that protecting the globalecology is a top priority on the agenda of internationalcooperation — from extinguishing oil fires in Kuwait topreserving the rain forests to solving water disputes toassessing climate change. The upheavals of this era arealso giving rise to human migrations on an unprece-dented scale, raising a host of social, economic, politi-cal and moral challenges to the world's nations.

2

A security strategy that takes the Republic safely intothe next century will tend to these as well as to moretraditional threats to our safety and well-being.

OUR INTERESTS ANDOBJECTIVES IN THE 1990sWe need, then, an approach to security broad enoughto preserve the basic sources of our national strengthand focused enough to deal with the very real threatsthat still exist. Such an approach begins with an under-standing of our basic interests and objectives, interestsand objectives that even in a new era are enduring:

The survival of the United States as a free and inde-pendent nation, with its fundamental values intact andits institutions and people secure.

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concertwith its allies, to:

• deter any aggression that could threaten the securityof the United States and its allies and — shoulddeterrence fail — repel or defeat military attack andend conflict on terms favorable to the United States,its interests and its allies;

• effectively counter threats to the security of theUnited States and its citizens and interests short ofarmed conflict, including the threat of internationalterrorism;

• improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifi-able arms control agreements, modernizing ourstrategic deterrent, developing systems capable ofdefending against limited ballistic-missile strikes,and enhancing appropriate conventional capabili-ties;

• promote democratic change in the Soviet Union,while maintaining firm policies that discourage anytemptation to new quests for military advantage;

• foster restraint in global military spending and dis-courage military adventurism;

• prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologiesand resources to hostile countries or groups, espe-cially the spread of chemical, biological and nuclearweapons and associated high-technology means ofdelivery; and

• reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the UnitedStates by encouraging reduction in foreign produc-tion, combatting international traffickers and reduc-ing demand at home.

A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure oppor-tunity for individual prosperity and resources fornational endeavors at home and abroad.

National security and economic strength are indivisi-ble. We seek to:

• promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S.economy;

• ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineralresources, the oceans and space;

• promote an open and expanding international eco-nomic system, based on market principles, with min-imal distortions to trade and investment, stable cur-rencies, and broadly respected rules for managingand resolving economic disputes; and

• achieve cooperative international solutions to keyenvironmental challenges, assuring the sustainabilityand environmental security of the planet as well asgrowth and opportunity for all.

Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relationswith allies and friendly nations.

To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to:

• strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of freenations that share a commitment to democracy andindividual rights;

• establish a more balanced partnership with our alliesand a greater sharing of global leadership andresponsibilities;

• strengthen international institutions like the UnitedNations to make them more effective in promotingpeace, world order and political, economic andsocial progress;

• support Western Europe's historic march towardgreater economic and political unity, including aEuropean security identity within the AtlanticAlliance, and nurture a closer relationship betweenthe United States and the European Community; and

3

• work with our North Atlantic allies to help developthe processes of the Conference on Security andCooperation in Europe to bring about reconciliation,security and democracy in a Europe whole and free.

A stable and secure world, where political and eco-nomic freedom, human rights and democratic institu-tions flourish.

Our interests are best served in a world in whichdemocracy and its idfeals are widespread andsecure. We seek to:

• maintain stable regional nnilitary .balances to deterthose powers that might seek regional dominance;

• promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;

• promote the growth of free, democratic politicalinstitutions as the surest guarantors of both humanrights and economic and social progress;

• aid in combatting threats to democratic institutionsfrom aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion,terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and

• support aid, trade and investment policies that pro-mote economic development and social and politi-cal progress.

4

II. Trends in The World Today: NewOpportunities and Concerns

FUNDAMENTALTRANSFORMATIONSDespite the uncertainties that remain, we see a funda-mental transformation of the global strategic environ-ment in several areas. Our policies and strategy for thedecade ahead must be designed to adapt to thesechanges, and to shape them in ways that benefit theUnited States and its friends and allies.

The Soviet FutureIf Central and Eastern Europe was the scene of thepeaceful Revolution of 1989, the dramatic story of1991 is the deepening crisis within the Soviet Union.The old system of Communist orthodoxy is discredited,yet its diehard adherents have not given up the struggleagainst change. Fundamental choices — of multi-partydemocracy, national self-determination and marketeconomic reform — have been postponed too long.The economy is deteriorating. The painful process ofestablishing new, legitimate political and economicinstitutions has much farther to go.

If reform is to succeed, Soviet leaders must move deci-sively to effect institutional change. When invited andwhere appropriate, we will offer our cooperation. But itis clearly not in our interest to offer assistance in a waythat allows the Soviet government to avoid the hardchoices that in the longer run are the only hope for thepeople of that country. At the July 1991 LondonEconomic Summit, the participants announced theirsupport for special associate status for the Soviet Unionin the IMF and World Bank. This will give the Sovietsaccess to the technical advice they need to formulateand implement their reform program.

The processes of reform inside the Soviet Union havealready had a revolutionary impact on Soviet foreignpolicy. With former ideological imperatives giving wayto a new pragmatism, areas of cooperation haveexpanded. The end of Soviet domination of EasternEurope was a transforming event. Soviet policy towardthe unification of Germany was constructive. Thereduced role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy hasdiminished the importance of many developing areasas arenas of conflict with the West. Soviet support inthe UN Security Council for the resolutions againstIraqi aggression was an important contribution to theinternational effort. We are hopeful that such coopera-tion can be expanded. Of course, the Soviets wouldpay a severe political price for any return to practices ofan earlier era, exploiting regional disputes and instabili-ties for their presumed advantage.

Today, the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict islower than at any time since the end of World War II.With the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet forces fromEastern Europe, the unilateral reductions now under-way and the recently signed CFE treaty (if faithfullyi mplemented), the threat of a sudden, massive offensiveagainst NATO will have been eliminated. Despiteuncertainty over the Soviet internal evolution, anyattempt by the Soviets to restore such a threat wouldrequire lengthy preparation and be enormously costlyand virtually impossible to conceal. Moreover, theSTART Treaty signed at the Moscow Summit will signifi-cantly reduce US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.

But Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant.The Soviet Union is and will remain a military super-power. Beyond its modernized strategic arsenal, theSoviet Union's conventional forces west of the Uralswill dwarf any other national force in Europe. Whilethey no longer pose the threat of a short-warning, the-

5

ater-wide offensive, they could still pose a potent threatto a single flank or region. The size and orientation ofSoviet military forces must therefore remain criticalconcerns to the United States and the overall health ofthe European system will still require a counterweightto Soviet military strength.

It is our responsibility as a government to hedge againstthe uncertainties of the future. Elements of the U.S.-Soviet relationship will remain competitive, and there isalways the danger that confrontations will re-emerge.Our evolving relationship is also not immune to Sovietattempts to lay the problems created by decades ofdomestic tyranny, misrule and mismanagement at thefeet of "foreign enemies". Nor is it immune to thei mplications of the forceful repression of democraticforces, slowing the Soviet Union's progress on a roadthat must be taken if it is to successfully meet the chal-lenges before it. The internal order of a state is ultimate-ly reflected in its external behavior. We will remainalert to the potential strategic consequences of a returnto totalitarian policies.

The Growing Roles ofGermany and JapanOne of the most important and far-reaching strategicdevelopments of a new era — and a major success ofAmerica's postwar policy — is the emergence of Japanand Germany as economic and political leaders. TheUnited States has long encouraged such a develop-ment, and our close ties with these democracies havecreated the climate of reassurance necessary for theirevolution as stable and powerful countries enjoyinggood relations with their neighbors. As these countriesassume a greater political role, the health of Americanties with them — political, military and economic —will remain crucial to regional and even global stability.These links are not relics of an earlier period. They areall the more needed in a new era as these countries'roles expand.

But we frequently find ourselves competitors —sometimes even bitter competitors — in the economicarena. These frictions must be managed if we are topreserve the partnerships that have fosteredreconciliation, reassurance, democracy and security inthe postwar period. In this sense, ongoing tradenegotiations now share some of the strategici mportance we have traditionally attached to armstalks with the Soviet Union.

The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense ofurgency, the question of responsibility-sharing — notonly with respect to sharing the costs and risks of Gulfoperations, but also with regard to sharing the costs ofU.S. forces defending Europe and Japan. Our allies aredoing more, as befits their economic strength, but theissue may grow more acute as we and they adjust to anew era.

The New EuropeIt is Europe more than any other area that has held thekey to the global balance in this century, and it is thiscontinent more than any other that is experiencing fun-damental change. The unification of Germany lastOctober quickened the pace to a new, more promisingera and a continent truly whole and free. As Europe isbeing transformed politically, we are also lifting themilitary shadows and fears with which we have livedfor nearly half a century.

All across the Continent, the barriers that once confinedpeople and ideas are collapsing. East Europeans aredetermining their own destinies, choosing freedom andeconomic liberty. One by one, the states of Central andEastern Europe have begun to reclaim the Europeancultural and political tradition that is their heritage. AllSoviet forces are gone from Czechoslovakia andHungary and withdrawals from Germany and Polandare underway. The military capability of the Sovietforces still remaining in Eastern Europe is rapidly dimin-ishing and the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved.

Basic to the new structure of peace we seek to buildthroughout Europe is the continued vitality of the NorthAtlantic Alliance — the indispensable foundation oftransatlantic cooperation. To keep the Alliance strongand viable in a new environment we must recognizethat there are important tasks beyond the changed —but still important — requirement to balance and deterSoviet military power. NATO must deter and defendagainst the threat of aggression from any state againstthe territory of a NATO member. NATO will also beessential in promoting a stable security environmentthroughout Europe, an environment based on demo-cratic institutions and the peaceful resolution of dis-putes, an environment free of intimidation or attemptsat hegemony. Finally, NATO still serves as an indispens-able transatlantic forum for consultations on issues thataffect common political and security interests.

6

As the European Community heads toward the newmilestone of a single market by the end of 1992, weenter a revolution of relations in the West, perhaps ulti-mately as important strategically as the revolution tak-ing place in the East. It is no accident that Europeansare contemplating greater West European cohesion inthe security field, even while preserving the vitaltransatlantic framework. We will work to adapt NATO'sstructures to encompass European desires for a distinctsecurity identity within the Alliance and we willencourage greater European responsibility for Europe'sdefense. While European governments will naturallytake the lead in developing their own institutions, theseefforts will enjoy our full support as long as theystrengthen the Alliance. We will also work to adaptAlliance command structures to new realities — thereassessment of risks, a new NATO strategy, a differentforce structure — in ways that sustain the unique con-tribution of NATO's integrated military command.

The continued freedom, vitality and national indepen-dence of the new Eastern European democracies arealso critical to the new structure of peace we seek tobuild throughout Europe. Any reversal of the presentpositive trend in Soviet policy would have seriousi mplications. As the North Atlantic allies declared inJune: "Our own security is inseparably linked to that ofall other states in Europe. The consolidation and preser-vation throughout the continent of democratic societiesand their freedom from any form of coercion or intimi-dation are therefore of direct and material concern tous." We and our NATO allies have established a pro-gram of contacts with the militaries of these states tosupport military establishments that will sustain newlywon freedoms and we have extended our bilateralInternational Military Education and Training (IMET)program to strengthen military professionalism and topromote the principle of civilian oversight of the armedforces.

It is i mportant that we not let euphoria over the easingof East-West confrontation blind us to the potentialsecurity problems within a new Europe. Historicalenmities in Western Europe have been largely con-signed to the past but disputes between and amongsome Eastern European states and ethnic groups appearto have been merely frozen in time by decades of ColdWar. In the interwar period, the politics of these stateswere often dominated by economic hardship, compet-ing nationalisms and overlapping territorial claims. Wehave reason to be more hopeful today, but security

problems could emerge in the East in the course of the1990s. The powerful centrifugal forces in Yugoslaviaare particularly worrisome.

The overall structure of peace in Europe must be madesolid enough to withstand the turmoil that loomsahead. We need to develop the processes and princi-ples of the Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope (CSCE) and perhaps other mechanisms to easeethnic and national tensions and to dampen andresolve conflicts.

Europe also may be about to face a new problem, notnew in kind, but in scope: mass migrations and flows ofrefugees in response to the breakdown of the commu-nist world and the magnetic attraction of WesternEuropean prosperity. From the Soviet Union andEastern Europe, from North Africa and the Near East,we could see thousands fleeing economic hardship andseeking a better life. For Western European countries,there could be enormous economic, social and politi-cal strains — an unprecedented challenge to the newEurope, testing its moral and political character.

REGIONAL TRENDSWhile Europe remains a central strategic arena, theGulf crisis reminded us how much our interests can beaffected in other regions as well.

As the effects of the Cold War recede, regional disputesare less likely automatically to be perceived as part of apermanent — frequently dangerous, sometimes violent— global competition, thus allowing broader interna-tional cooperation in their resolution.

Less happily, in some regions this overall positive trendcould unleash local, destructive forces that were for-merly kept in check. As we saw in the Gulf, there is thedanger of locally dominant powers, armed with mod-ern weaponry and ancient ambitions, threatening theworld's hope for a new era of cooperation. We seeregimes that have made themselves champions ofregional radicalism, states that are all too vulnerable tosuch pressures, governments that refuse to recognizeone another, and countries that have claims on oneanother's territory — some with significant militarycapabilities and a history of recurring war. A key taskfor the future will be maintaining regional balances andresolving such disputes before they erupt in militaryconflict.

7

If the end of the Cold War lives up to its promise andli berates U.S. policy from many of its earlier concerns,we should be able to concentrate more on enhancingsecurity — in the developing world, particularly —through means that are more political, social and eco-nomic than military. We must recognize the stark factthat our hopeful new era still has within it dislocationsand dangers that threaten the fragile shoots of democra-cy and progress that have recently emerged.Malnutrition, illiteracy and poverty put dangerous pres-sures on democratic institutions as hungry, uneducatedor poorly housed citizens are ripe for radicalization bymovements of the left and the right. Our response toneed and turmoil must increasingly emphasize thestrengthening of democracy, and a long-term invest-ment in the development of human resources and thestructures of free markets and free governments. Suchmeasures are an investment in our own security as wellas a response to the demands of simple justice.

The Western HemisphereNowhere is this more true than in our ownhemisphere, where our fundamental aims are todeepen the sense of partnership and common interest.

Latin Americans have long argued that U.S. interest haswaxed and waned with the rise and fall of extra-hemispheric threats to regional security. Our policy hassought to allay these fears, as it is founded on theprinciple of a common destiny and mutualresponsibility. The Western Hemisphere is all the moresignificant to the United States in light of today's globaltrends, political and economic.

The resurgence of democracy, the worldwidephenomenon that is such an inspiration to us, isheading toward a dramatic achievement — acompletely democratic hemisphere. This drive gainedmomentum last year with the election of democraticgovernments in Nicaragua and Haiti, the restoration ofdemocracy in Panama, and several other democraticelections. The electoral defeat of the Sandinistagovernment in Nicaragua is especially noteworthy as ithas led to the end of Soviet and Cuban militaryassistance, thereby increasing the security of all ofCentral America. The United States has providedpolitical and economic support for the newgovernment and its program for reconstruction andlong-term development. Despite these successes, werealize that democratic institutions in much of Latin

America remain fragile, and we are seeking ways tostrengthen them.

In our military-to-military relations, we will continue topromote professionalism, support for civilian authorityand respect for human rights. With recent legislativechanges, we can more easily include civilian officialsin our IMET program. Effective civilian control of themilitary will become a reality only when there is acadre of competent civilian resource managers withthe expertise to take the lead in defense issues.

Cuba remains a holdout in the hemisphere's transitionto democracy but it is simply a matter of time beforefundamental change occurs there, too. We willcontinue to press the Soviet Union to reduce its aidand presence in Cuba and we will enlist our friends inthe hemisphere in pressing Cuba to accept theinevitable peacefully. In Central America, we supportthe regional trend toward negotiation, demilitarizationand demobilization. The nations most severelythreatened by guerrilla forces or narco-terrorists — ElSalvador, Colombia and Peru — will receiveappropriate support from the United States.

As many countries make the transition to democracy, astrong tide of economic realism and dedication to mar-ket-oriented reforms is also sweeping the region. Ourinterest in supporting both democratic and economictransitions in Latin America and the Caribbean isdemonstrated by the new Enterprise for the AmericasInitiative. This Initiative, which has been warmly wel-comed in the region, sets out a vision of hemisphericprosperity achieved through expanded trade, increasedinvestment, reduced debt burdens and important sup-port for protection of the hemisphere's vital natural her-itage. Concrete steps have been taken toward a hemi-spheric free trade area, including work on trade andinvestment framework agreements and a Free TradeAgreement embracing both Mexico and Canada. Weare also encouraging countries to take steps to competefor capital and are working to reduce bilateral officialdebt of countries committed to strong economicreforms. We are seeking prompt Congressionalapproval of enabling legislation. In addition, we haveproposed a specific trade preference system (patternedafter the successful Caribbean Basin Initiative) to helpAndean countries break out of their dependence onillegal drug crops. We will also work with our friends todevelop the initiatives that make up the Partnership forDemocracy and Development in Central America.

8

East Asia and the PacificEast Asia and the Pacific are home to some of theworld's most economically and politically dynamicsocieties. The region also includes some of the last tra-ditional Communist regimes on the face of the globe.Regional hotspots tragically persist on the Koreanpeninsula and in Cambodia, and there are territorialdisputes in which progress is long overdue, includingthe Soviet Union's continued occupation of Japan'sNorthern Territories.

In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adven-turism is on the ebb, even while its effects linger. Thisis placing new stresses on Vietnam, Cambodia andNorth Korea as Soviet military and economic aiddeclines and Moscow seeks to improve relations withSeoul, Tokyo and other capitals. China is coming toview its neighbors in a new light, and is graduallyadjusting to a changing perception of the Soviet threat.

Through a web of bilateral relationships, the UnitedStates has pursued throughout the postwar period apolicy of engagement in support of the stability andsecurity that are prerequisites to economic and politi-cal progress. U.S. power remains welcome in keystates in the region, who recognize the pivotal role wecontinue to play in the regional balance. We remain akey factor of reassurance and stability. By ensuringfreedom of the seas through naval and air strength andby offering these capabilities as a counterweight in theregion's power equations, we are likely to remain wel-come in an era of shifting patterns and possible as newfrictions.

Today's basically healthy conditions cannot be takenfor granted. We will continue to be a beacon fordemocracy and human rights. We will meet ourresponsibilities in the security field. We will alsoremain actively engaged in promoting free andexpanding markets through Asian Pacific EconomicCooperation, recognizing that economic progress is amajor ingredient in Asia's political stability and demo-cratic progress.

As noted earlier, our alliance with Japan remains ofenormous strategic importance. Our hope is to see theU.S.-Japan global partnership extend beyond itstraditional confines and into fields like refugee relief,non-proliferation and the environment.

On the Korean peninsula, we and the Republic ofKorea seek to persuade North Korea of the benefit ofconfidence-building measures as a first step to lastingpeace and reunification. We firmly believe that truestability can only be achieved through direct North-South talks. At the same time, the United Statesremains committed to the security of the Republic ofKorea as it continues to open its economic andpolitical systems. We are increasingly concerned aboutNorth Korea's failure to observe its obligations underthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and consider thisto be the most pressing security issue on the peninsula.

China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complexchallenge as it proceeds inexorably toward majorsystemic change. China's inward focus and struggle toachieve stability will not preclude increasinginteraction with its neighbors as trade and technologyadvance. Consultations and contact with China will becentral features of our policy, lest we intensify theisolation that shields repression. Change is inevitablein China, and our links with China must endure.

The United States maintains strong, unofficial,substantive relations with Taiwan where rapideconomic and political change is underway. One ofour goals is to foster an environment in which Taiwanand the Peoples Republic of China can pursue aconstructive and peaceful interchange across theTaiwan Strait.

In Southeast Asia, there is renewed hope for asettlement in Cambodia. Only through resolution ofthe conflict in Cambodia can there be the promise ofour restoring normal relations with that beleaguerednation and with Vietnam. Hanoi and Phnom Penhhave sadly delayed the day when they can enjoynormal ties with us or their Southeast Asian neighbors.Of course, the pace and scope of our actions will alsobe directly affected by steps that are taken to resolvethe fate of Americans still unaccounted for. Theresolution of this issue remains one of our highestpriorities.

Even with the loss of Clark Air Base, we remain com-mitted to helping the Philippines make a success of itsnew democracy and to fulfilling our legitimate defensefunction there as allies and equals. In the South Pacific,we are demonstrating renewed interest in and assis-tance for the island states. Australia retains its specialposition as a steadfast ally and key Pacific partner. We

9

look forward to the day when New Zealand willchoose to resume its responsibilities to the ANZUSalliance and rejoin Australia and the United States inthis important regional structure.

The Middle East and SouthAsiaThe reversal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was awatershed event. Nonetheless, our basic policy towardthe region shows powerful continuity. Americanstrategic concerns still include promoting stability andthe security of our friends, maintaining a free flow ofoil, curbing the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and ballistic missiles, discouragingdestabilizing conventional arms sales, counteringterrorism and encouraging a peace process that bringsabout reconciliation between Israel and the Arab statesas well as between Palestinians and Israel in a mannerconsonant with our enduring commitment to Israel'ssecurity.

The regional environment since Desert Storm presentsnew challenges and new opportunities. Even as weprovide badly needed relief and protection to refugees,we will work to bring about greater security and alasting peace.

• We will help states in the Middle East to fashionregional security arrangements that bolster deter-rence and encourage the peaceful resolution of dis-putes.

• We will work with parties inside and outside theregion to change the destructive pattern of militarycompetition and proliferation. This will involve con-fidence-building and arms control measures as wellas more global forms of control over the supply ofarms, especially weapons of mass destruction andthe means to deliver them.

• We will encourage economic reconstruction andrecovery, using the political and economic strengthsof the victorious coalition to support economicopenness and cooperation. We will also encourageregional states to evolve toward greater political par-ticipation and respect for human rights.

• We will continue the effort to bring about a compre-hensive peace and true reconciliation between Israel

and the Arab states and between Israel and thePalestinians.

• We will continue to demand that Iraq comply fullyand unconditionally with all relevant UN resolu-tions, including Security Council Resolution 687 andits stipulation that Iraqi weapons of mass destructionand ballistic missile-related facilities be destroyed.

• We remain open to an improved relationship withIran. However, meaningful improvement can onlyoccur after Iran makes clear it is lending no supportto hostage-taking or other forms of terrorism.

• We will also continue to monitor Libyan behavior,including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and attempts to destabilize neighboringgovernments.

In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe thatsecurity is best served by resolving disputes throughnegotiations rather than military pressure. The dangersof intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclearproliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, andthis year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclearprogram under the Pressler Amendment. We will con-tinue to encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement andthe adoption of confidence-building measures andother concrete steps to moderate their military competi-tion. We also remain committed to achieving a com-prehensive political settlement in Afghanistan.

AfricaThe end of the Cold war should benefit Africa in that itwill no longer be seen as a battleground for superpowerconflict. In a world at peace, more attention andresources should be freed to help the world's poorest.Nonetheless, many Africans now fear that the outsideworld will lose interest in their troubled continent, justat the moment when many negative trends from eco-nomic decline to AIDS to environmental degradationare likely to accelerate.

In a continent as diverse as Africa, democracy — as itemerges, reemerges, or begins its development — maytake different forms, and its progress will be uneven.But we need not be inhibited in supporting values thathave proved universal — political and human rights,democratic limits on the powers of government, judi-cial independence, free press and free speech. To thosewho think these goals are out of reach because of

10

Africa's poverty and disparate cultures, we say thatdemocracy remains the political system most open tocultural diversity and most conducive to economicadvance. Freedom, in its universal meaning, is Africa'sbirthright as much as it is anyone else's.

In the economic realm, hope lies in reducing the bur-den of statism and encouraging indigenous enterpriseand human talent, especially in agriculture. The most

i mportant steps are those that must be taken byAfricans themselves. Concepts of democracy and mar-ket economics must be applied in a continent whereinitially these concepts were rejected because social-ism was fashionable. That failed experiment has nowrun its course, and political elites across Africa arerediscovering basic truths about political and econom-ic freedom as the source of progress. We need to sup-port this growing realism, which recognizes the failuresfrom the past and which has produced pragmatic newleaders ready to move in new directions. Benignneglect will not suffice.

Africa is not without its beacons of hope. The efforts ofwhite and black leaders in South Africa to move thatcountry into a democratic, constitutional, post-apartheid era merit our active support and we haveprovided it. We have made clear our firm and enthusi-astic support for the brave endeavor on which theyhave embarked.

Elsewhere in Africa, we can be proud of the role weplayed in bringing to an end civil wars in Angola andEthiopia. We continue to play an active role in helpingto resolve other conflicts such as those in Liberia andMozambique.

Africa is now entering an age in which it can benefitfrom past mistakes and build a realistic, self-sustainingfuture. It is in our interest, for political as well ashumanitarian reasons, to help that process.

11

III. Relating Means to Ends: A PoliticalAgenda for the 1990s

ALLIANCES, COALITIONSAND A NEW UNITEDNATIONS

Our first priority in foreign policy remains solidaritywith our allies and friends. The stable foundation ofour security will continue to be a common effort withpeoples with whom we share fundamental moral andpolitical values and security interests. Those nationswith whom we are bound by alliances will continue tobe our closest partners in building a new world order.

As our response to the Gulf crisis demonstrated, ourleadership in a new era must also include a broaderconcept of international community and internationaldiplomacy. If tensions with the Soviet Union continueto ease, we will face more ambiguous — but still seri-ous — challenges. It will be difficult to foresee wherefuture crises will arise. In many cases they will involvestates not part of one or another bloc. Increasingly wemay find ourselves in situations in which our interestsare congruent with those of nations not tied to us byformal treaties. As in the Gulf, we may be acting inhybrid coalitions that include not only traditional alliesbut also nations with whom we do not have a maturehistory of diplomatic and military cooperation or,indeed, even a common political or moral outlook.This will require flexibility in our diplomacy and mili-tary policy, without losing sight of the fundamental val-ues which that diplomacy and policy are designed toprotect and on which they are based. To this end, weare well served to strengthen the role of internationalorganizations like the United Nations.

For over 40 years political differences, bloc politicsand demagogic rhetoric have kept the UN from reach-ing the full potential envisioned by its founders. Nowwe see the UN beginning to act as it was designed,freed from the superpower antagonisms that often frus-trated consensus, less hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism that so often weakened its credibility.

The response of the UN to Iraq's unprovoked aggres-sion against a member state has truly vindicated andrejuvenated the institution. But even before that, theUN had distinguished itself in fostering democraticchange in Namibia and Nicaragua. In the near future,we hope to see it play a constructive role inAfghanistan, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, ElSalvador and elsewhere, assisting with elections andthe return of displaced persons, as well as with peace-keeping.

The role of the UN in improving the human conditionand ameliorating human suffering — development, aidto refugees, education, disaster relief —will continueto attract our leadership and resources. High on ouragenda for international cooperation are the globalchallenges posed by illegal drugs, terrorism and degra-dation of the environment.

The costs of a world organization that can effectivelycarry out these missions are already significant and willincrease as new tasks are undertaken. We have re-stat-ed our intention to pay in full our annual assessmentsand are now paying arrearages. We intend to completearrearage payments no later than 1995 and to pay ourshare of any new peacekeeping requirements. In vol-untary funding, we will pay our fair share and encour-age others to do the same.

13Preceding Page Blank

THE CONTEST OF IDEASAND THE NURTURING OFDEMOCRACY

Recent history has shown how much ideas count. TheCold War was, in its decisive aspect, a war of ideas. Butideas count only when knowledge spreads. In today'sevolving political environment, and in the face of theglobal explosion of information, we must make clear toour friends and potential adversaries what we stand for.

The need for international understanding among differ-ent peoples, cultures, religions and forms of govern-ment will only grow. In a world without the clear-cutEast-West divisions of the past, the flow of ideas andinformation will take on larger significance as once-iso-lated countries seek their way toward the internationalmainstream. Indeed, information access has alreadyachieved global proportions. A truly global communityis being formed, vindicating our democratic values.

Through broadcasts, academic and cultural exchanges,press briefings, publications, speakers and conferences,we engage those abroad in a dialogue about who andwhat we are — to inform foreign audiences about ourpolicies, democratic traditions, pluralistic society andrich academic and cultural diversity. We will increaseour efforts to clarify what America has to contribute tothe solution of global problems — and to drive homedemocracy's place in this process.

ARMS CONTROLArms control is an important component of a balancedstrategy to ameliorate the deadly consequences of glob-al tensions as well as to reduce their fundamental caus-es. Our goal remains agreements that will enhance thesecurity of the United States and its allies whilestrengthening international stability by:

• reducing military capabilities that could provideincentives to initiate attack;

• enhancing predictability in the size and structure offorces in order to reduce the fear of aggressive intent;

• ensuring confidence in compliance, through effec-tive verification.

Our pursuit of these goals has profited from the recent,positive changes in East-West relations. With renewedcommitment to conscientious implementation and theresolution of remaining issues, we are within reach ofcompleting an arms control agenda that few imaginedpossible.

Much has already been accomplished. Within the pastyear we and the Soviets have agreed to cease produc-tion of chemical weapons and to destroy, using safeand environmentally-sound procedures, the vast major-ity of our chemical weapons stocks. We have agreed tonew protocols to treaties on limiting undergroundnuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions forpeaceful purposes, incorporating unprecedented on-siteverification of compliance with the limits set by thetreaties. At the Paris Summit last November, the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union and the other nations of theConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE) endorsed new measures to promote transparen-cy in military dispositions and practices.

Also in Paris, the United States, our North Atlanticallies, the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Unionsigned the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces inEurope (CFE), a historic agreement that will establishnumerical parity in major conventional armamentsbetween East and West from the Atlantic to the Urals.The treaty will require thousands of weapons to bedestroyed and includes unprecedented monitoring pro-visions. Submitting the treaty to the Senate for its adviceand consent to ratification was delayed by Sovietclaims — made after the treaty was signed — that someof its ground force equipment held by units like navalinfantry and coastal defense was not covered by theagreement. The satisfactory resolution of this questionhas opened the way for us to move forward.

Soviet behavior on CFE complicated the completion ofa Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. However, during theLondon Economic Summit, Presidents Bush andGorbachev were able to overcome the last few obsta-cles on START, ending nine long years of difficult, tech-nical negotiations. Signed in Moscow, this agreementwill mark a fundamental milestone in reducing the riskof nuclear war — stabilizing the balance of strategicforces at lower levels, providing for significant reduc-tions in the most threatening weapons and encouraginga shift toward strategic systems better suited for retalia-tion than for a first strike.

14

Our efforts to improve strategic stability will not stophere. We and the Soviets have pledged further efforts toenhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nucle-ar war. We will seek agreements that improve surviv-ability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike andi mplement an appropriate relationship between strate-gic offenses and defenses. In particular, we will pursueSoviet agreement to permit the deployment of defensesdesigned to address the threat of limited ballistic missilestrikes, a growing mutual concern. We are also consult-ing with our NATO allies on the framework that willguide the United States in future discussions with theSoviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclearforces in Europe.

The United States has long supported internationalagreements designed to promote openness and freedomof navigation on the high seas. Over the past year, how-ever, the Soviet Union has intensified efforts to restrictnaval forces in ways contrary to internationally recog-nized rights of access. We will continue to reject suchproposals. As a maritime nation, with our dependenceon the sea to preserve legitimate security and commer-cial ties, freedom of the seas is and will remain a vitalinterest. We will not agree to measures that would limitthe ability of our Navy to protect that interest, nor willwe permit a false equation to be drawn between ourNavy and regional ground-force imbalances that areinherently destabilizing. Recent events in the Gulf,Liberia, Somalia and elsewhere show that Americanseapower, without arbitrary limits on its force structureor operations, makes a strong contribution to global sta-bility and mutual security.

STEMMING PROLIFERATION

As we put the main elements of European and East-West arms control into place, attention will increasinglyturn to other regional and global arms control objec-tives. None is more urgent than stopping the globalproliferation of nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons, as well as the missiles to deliver them.

The Gulf crisis drove home several lessons about thischallenge:

• International agreements, while essential, cannotcope with the problem alone. Iraq is a party to boththe 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1968 Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Notwithstanding itstreaty obligations, Iraq has used chemical weaponsand pursued nuclear ambitions.

• Export controls must be strengthened. Chemicalweapons facilities in Libya and Iraq received tech-nology and equipment from Western companies.Iraq used the deadly product of its facilities againstits own people. Iraqi and several other nations'nuclear efforts and missile programs have also bene-fited from outside assistance.

• A successful non-proliferation strategy must addressthe underlyling security concerns that drive the questto obtain advanced weapons and must encompasscontingency planning to deal with these weaponsshould prevention fail.

We are pursuing a three-tiered non-proliferation strate-gy: to strengthen existing arrangements; to expand themembership of multilateral regimes directed againstproliferation; and to pursue new initiatives — such asthe Chemical Weapons Convention and the initiativethe President launched in May for the Middle East.

This latter effort reflects all the elements of our non-pro-liferation strategy. It includes promising new approach-es, such as a proposed set of guidelines for responsibleconventional weapons transfers to the region and a pro-posal to freeze acquisition, production and testing ofsurface-to-surface missiles. It also seeks to expand themembership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and theBiological Weapons Convention, and to strengthen theapplication of these and other agreements where theyare already in force.

In other areas, we have already tightened export con-trols, streamlining export-licensing procedures whiletaking full account of security needs. New standardswill ensure that the export of supercomputers will besubject to stringent safeguards against misuse. Criminalpenalties and other sanctions against those who con-tribute to proliferation will be expanded.

To thwart the export of chemical and biologicalweapon-related materials and technology, we haveexpanded our own controls over precursor chemicalsand proposed stringent international controls, recogniz-ing that only multilateral measures will be truly effec-tive in a competitive global marketplace. This multilat-eral approach bore fruit in the twenty-nation Australia

15

Group of major chemical suppliers, which agreed inMay to control common lists of chemical weapon pre-cursors and equipment usable in chemical weaponsmanufacture. The best non-proliferation measure, ofcourse, would be a completed Chemical WeaponsConvention.

Our efforts to stem the proliferation of threatening mis-siles center on the multinational Missile TechnologyControl Regime (MTCR), strengthened last year by theinclusion of several new members. Since missile prolif-eration efforts will surely persist, we and our MTCRpartners must improve controls, broaden membershipfurther and reinforce the emerging international con-sensus against the spread of missile technology.

In the nuclear sphere, last year's review conference ofthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty produced a largemeasure of consensus that the NPT remains essential toglobal stability, although intransigence by a few delega-tions blocked unanimous agreement to a final confer-ence declaration. The United States remains steadfast insupport of the NPT and the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA), which provides technical assistance forcivilian uses of nuclear energy while safeguardingmaterials essential for the development of nuclearweapons. Although trouble spots remain, progress hasbeen made. Iraqi nuclear efforts have been set backsubstantially, while the UN Special Commission imple-menting Security Council Resolution 687 seeks disman-tlement of all nuclear weapon-related activities in Iraq.Argentina and Brazil have agreed to accept IAEA safe-guards on all their nuclear facilities and to take stepstoward bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco,which creates a Latin American nuclear-weapons-freezone. Agreement by India and Pakistan to ban attackson each other's nuclear facilities also helped ease thetense nuclear rivalry in that part of the world.

The proliferation of advanced weapons poses an omi-nous challenge to global peace and stability. To meet it,we will work with our allies to address the causes ofstrife while curbing exports to builders of weapons ofmass destruction.

INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMSThe unprecedented scope and pace of change intoday's world — and the increasing number of actorsnow able to threaten global peace — highlight the needfor reliable information and a sophisticated understand-

ing of events and trends. The global reach of Americanintelligence capabilities is a unique national asset, cru-cial not only to our own security, but also to our leader-ship role in responding to international challenges.

The Soviet Union necessarily remains a major concernof U.S. policy. While changes in the Soviet Unionpromise hope, the turbulence of change itself demandsthat we monitor events and assess prospects for thefuture. Our monitoring of Soviet military capabilitiesand the effective verification of arms control treatieswill remain the bedrock of any effort to build confi-dence and a safer world.

In a new era there are also new tasks and new priori-ties. Regional turmoil will place growing burdens onintelligence collection, processing and analysis. At thesame time, we must track the threats posed by narcoticstrafficking, terrorism and the proliferation of advancedweapons. We must also be more fully aware of interna-tional financial, trade and technology trends that couldaffect the security of the United States, including itseconomic well-being.

Sweeping political and economic changes also makefor a more challenging counterintelligence environ-ment. Warmer relations between the United States andformer adversaries will open new opportunities for theintelligence services of those countries. Growing inter-national economic competition and potential regionalinstabilities vastly broaden the scope of the potentialintelligence threat. Our traditional openness, combinedwith recent changes in immigration laws and the sheervolume of information flow in the United States, affordsgreat access to sensitive information and facilities aswell as to individuals who may be targets for intelli-gence collection.

ECONOMIC AND SECURITYASSISTANCEForeign assistance is a vital instrument of American for-eign policy. Now — as we look forward to expandedcooperation with our prosperous fellow democracies,with a growing number of regional organizations andwith a revitalized United Nations — we are revisitingthe direction and priorities of our foreign assistanceprogram. We will focus our efforts and resources onfive major challenges:

16

• Promoting and consolidating democratic values: Ourprograms will be an increasingly valuable instrumentfor fostering political choice, human rights and self-determination. From Central America to South Africato Eastern Europe, we have used our influence toadvance these universal goals.

• Promoting market principles: U.S. assistance mustencourage economic reform and sustainable devel-opment. Multilaterally — through institutions likethe International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade —we foster policies that break down statist barriers toenterprise and unleash the productive forces withinevery society.

• Promoting peace: The bonds of collective defensecan be strengthened through economic and securityassistance. Such programs allow friendly states toachieve the security and stability essential for politi-cal freedom and economic growth. They are also anindispensable tool in cementing our alliance rela-tionships — enhancing interoperability, promotingneeded access and reaping goodwill.

• Protecting against transnational threats: Internationalterrorism, narcotics, AIDS and environmental degra-dation threaten all peaceful nations. Our aid helpscombat these dangers.

• Meeting urgent human needs. We will respondquickly and substantially to the suffering caused bynatural or man-made disasters.

Managed wisely, our aid programs can play a key rolein fostering a world order that comports with our funda-mental values. But we must ensure that our resourcesare adequate, that our programs pursue well-definedgoals, and that we retain the flexibility to respond tochange and unforeseen requirements and opportunities.The changes we have recently proposed to the ForeignAssistance Act will eliminate obsolete and inconsistentprovisions and set a solid foundation for cooperationwith the Congress on a program that can respond tofast-moving events in the world as quickly as theyoccur. Such reform is urgently needed if our aid pro-gram is to be relevant to today's necessities.

ILLICIT DRUGSThe international trade in drugs is a major threat to ournational security. No threat does more damage to ournational values and institutions, and the domestic vio-lence generated by the trade in drugs is all too familiar.Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign gov-ernments of our friends and weaken and distort nation-al economies with a vast, debilitating black market andlarge funding requirements for enforcement, criminaljustice, prevention and treatment systems. Demandreduction at home and an aggressive attack on theinternational drug trade are the main elements in ourstrategy. They must be pursued together.

During the 1990s, cocaine traffickers will likely try todevelop new markets in Europe — particularly in lightof the impending relaxation of border controls betweenEC countries — and in those nations of East Asia expe-riencing rapid economic growth. We can also expectincreasingly energetic efforts to import cocaine andheroin into the United States, including the use oflonger-range aircraft entering U.S. airspace via Canadaand of drug-laden cargo containers transhipped to theUnited States via Europe and the Pacific. Renewedassaults on the U.S. market by increasingly sophisticat-ed traffickers remind us of the need to also attack thedrug trade at the source — its home country base ofoperations.

Such an effort begins with bolstering the political com-mitment of drug producer and transit countries tostrengthen their laws, legal institutions and programs toprosecute, punish, and — where appropriate — extra-dite drug traffickers and money launderers. In theAndean region, where most of the world's cocaine iscultivated and refined, we seek to enhance the effec-tiveness of host-nation law enforcement and militaryactivities against powerful and well entrenched traffick-ing organizations, and to increase public and leader-ship awareness of the drug threat. Our trade, aid andinvestment programs aim to strengthen and diversifythe legitimate economies of the drug- producingAndean nations to enable them to overcome the desta-bilizing effects of eliminating coca and its derivatives,major sources of income. Our heroin strategy will fostercooperation with other countries, to engage theirresources to dismantle their own cultivation and refin-ing industries, and reduce demand for drugs. We willsolicit the assistance of others in influencing producersto whom we have limited access.

17

IMMIGRANTS ANDREFUGEESAs a nation founded by immigrants and refugees, theUnited States has a strong tradition of taking in thosewho flee persecution and seek a better life. We openour doors annually to tens of thousands of refugees andhundreds of thousands of immigrants, welcoming bothfor the diversity and strength they bring the Nation. Wealso have a commitment to help the uprooted who arein danger or in need, a commitment demonstrated inthe past several months by our role in the internationaleffort to assist Iraqi refugees and our reaching out toAfricans and others.

In 1990 the United States welcomed refugees from allregions of the world. As in the past several years, themajority came from the Soviet Union and Asia. InVietnam, we are dismayed by continued human rightsabuses. Hanoi is, however, allowing former politicalprisoners to emigrate. The United States resettled14,000 former political prisoners and their family mem-bers from Vietnam in 1990 and the number willincrease this year. But we cannot take in everyone. Wemust look to other countries to be more receptive tothose in need. Nor can the United States Government

fund and provide for every refugee in this country. As inthe past, our private sector has an important role toplay.

As noted earlier, economic hardship, political uncer-tainty and ethnic strife may generate large numbers ofrefugees in Europe. Some will be true refugees and oth-ers will be economic migrants, those who move toescape economic misery. Though international respons-es must differ between these two categories — to beable to protect those who flee persecution and may bein physical danger — the world's nations must be readyto respond quickly and humanely to both.

For 16 million refugees worldwide, the United Statesoffers assistance through international programs andrecognizes the critical role of nongovernmental organi-zations in providing care. Our budgeted refugee assis-tance levels have increased, and we will do our fairshare. We will also meet our responsibility to search fordiplomatic solutions to the problems that spawnrefugee flows.

A period of turmoil and transition is often a period ofdislocation. If our diplomatic efforts and our aid pro-grams prove inadequate, the volume of refugees andmigrants will be an index of our failure. The worldcommunity will need to be prepared.

18

IV. Relating Means to Ends: AnEconomic Agenda for the 1990s

Events of the past year have reaffirmed the critical linkbetween the strength and flexibility of the U.S. econo-my and our ability to achieve national objectives.Indeed, strong macroeconomic performance on thepart of the United States is not only an economic objec-tive but a prerequisite for maintaining a position ofglobal political leadership.

ECONOMIC CHALLENGESEven as we now see a transformation of the globaleconomy along lines consistent with policies we havepursued for many years, new challenges — the crisis inthe Gulf and its aftermath, the political and economictransformation in Eastern Europe and potentially in theSoviet Union, the resurgence of democracy and marketeconomies in Central and South America — haveplaced new demands on our management of economicpolicy. We must ensure that our domestic economy andour economic involvement abroad are responsive to achanging economic landscape.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and actions taken by theinternational coalition to resist Iraqi aggression, espe-cially tested our economic strength and our ability tohelp manage international economic forces. Economiesaround the world were affected by the volatility of oilprices and the disruption of economic ties to countriesin the Gulf. Egypt, Turkey and Jordan were particularlyhurt. We must continue to work to ensure the econom-ic health of these countries as well as others that havesuffered markedly from this crisis. The United Stateswill provide leadership, but in close collaboration withmajor donors and creditors and with internationalfinancial institutions, particularly the InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank.

As always, a dynamic domestic economy plays a criti-cal role in helping us achieve national objectives in allspheres. Policies to control inflation, reduce the Federaldeficit, promote savings, improve the labor force andencourage competitiveness and entrepreneurial initia-tive remain critical to our overall well-being and securi-ty. As economies expand worldwide, the economicstrength of others will, of course, grow in relative terms.This is not a threat to us, but rather a success ofWestern policies. That said, Americans must realizethat the economic strength vital to our national interestscomes from investing for the future, thus putting a pre-mium on domestic saving. Today's labor force andmanagement, and those of tomorrow, must also becommitted to quality and innovation. These are thefruits of hard work — and a prerequisite for continuedglobal leadership.

We continue to pursue a strategy that expands andstrengthens market economies around the world. Thiswill require international efforts to open markets andexpand trade; to strengthen cooperation among majorindustrial countries and with international financialinstitutions; and to apply imaginative solutions to theproblems of developing countries.

MAINTAINING ECONOMICGROWTHClear signs are emerging that the U.S.economy ispulling out of its brief recession but uncertainty remainsover economic performance in much of the rest of theworld. Therefore, macroeconomic policies in all themajor countries must be designed to sustain global eco-nomic recovery with price stability. Global growth isneeded in order to create a favorable economic andtrade environment for reform and reconstruction in

19

Eastern Europe and the USSR, and ensure as well thesuccess of the democratic, market-oriented measuresthat have been adopted worldwide. The major coun-tries must continue to strengthen global coordination ofeconomic policies to achieve these aims.

GLOBAL IMBALANCESWhile the U.S. trade deficit has continued to decline,trade imbalances with Japan and many other countriesremain substantial. Reducing these imbalances remainsa priority. For the United States this requires a sustainedeffort to reduce and ultimately eliminate budget deficitswhile also encouraging private savings and investmentin order to preserve U.S. competitiveness. Countrieswith large trade surpluses bear a special responsibilityfor maintaining adequate growth in domestic demandand opening their markets further to imports.

DEBTThe aggregate debt of developing countries was pro-jected to reach $1.3 trillion in 1990, according to theWorld Bank. Inappropriate domestic policies in debtorcountries — overvalued exchange rates, large budgetdeficits, investment in inefficient public enterprises andrestrictions on trade and investment — were majorcauses of this debt accumulation and contributed tocapital flight. External shocks, high international inter-est rates and recession in the 1980s also hurt. Recentlythis burden has been exacerbated by the economic dis-locations and fluctuations in energy prices resultingfrom the Gulf crisis.

In March 1989, the United States proposed a new inter-national debt strategy that advanced voluntary reduc-tion of commercial bank debt and debt service to helprestore debtor financial health and pave the way fornew commercial bank lending. Implementation of astrong economic reform program supported by the IMFand World Bank is a prerequisite. So far, Mexico, CostaRica, Nigeria, the Philippines, Venezuela, Morocco,Uruguay and Chile have negotiated agreements underthese proposals. Others are undertaking reforms toobtain such support.

Creditor governments have also made substantial con-tributions to relief through rescheduling of official bilat-eral debt and have recently offered new treatment forthe official debt of lower middle income countries, as

mandated by last year's Houston Economic Summit,and for Poland and Egypt. The Enterprise for theAmericas Initiative also promotes growth in LatinAmerica by emphasizing official debt reduction andinvestment reform.

TRADECountries accept as natural that trade and investmentshould flow freely within national boundaries or withinspecial regional groupings in order to improve econom-ic and social welfare. Internationally, this concept hasmet varying degrees of acceptance. Countries have pro-tected certain sectors for national security, economic,industrial or social reasons.

For the last 50 years, significant efforts have beenundertaken, primarily through the General Agreementon Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to expand trade among allnations by opening markets and resolving trade dis-putes. The latest and most ambitious effort has been theUruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,begun in 1986. The Uruguay Round is distinguishedfrom previous efforts by the intention of GATT membersto extend GATT rules to areas such as agriculture, ser-vices, investment, the protection of intellectual propertyand textiles. At the Houston Economic Summit in 1990,the United States, Canada, Japan, France, Germany,Italy, the United Kingdom, and the EuropeanCommunity committed to removing trade barriers inthese politically difficult areas. The wise action ofCongress in extending "fast track" procedures for tradeagreements is evidence of America's commitment toresponsible leadership.

The promise of the Uruguay Round has yet to be ful-filled, however, primarily because of strong differencesover the scope and pace of efforts to dismantle theenormous barriers to trade in agricultural goods. Giventhe interdependence of modern economies, and theneed to expand trading opportunities for emergingdemocracies and other developing countries, it isi mportant that the Round be brought to a successfulconclusion. This is a test of the ability and willingnessof all countries to rise to the challenges of a new worldorder and will require compromise on all sides. TheUnited States will do its part. A successful Round willnot end bilateral trade disputes but it will enable coun-tries to resolve them in a multilateral context and onthe basis of internationally agreed rules.

20

The United States will continue its efforts to expandtrade further. We are working with Japan under theStructural Impediments Initiative to lower trade barriers.As noted earlier, we are building on the successfulU.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement by undertaking dis-cussions with Mexico and Canada which we expectwill lead to a trilateral free trade agreement linking allthree economies. The Enterprise for the AmericasInitiative and preferential trade programs for theCaribbean basin and the Andean region will also fostertrade liberalization.

TECHNOLOGYThe interrelationship of economic and military strengthhas never been stronger. Both are affected by the waytechnology transfer is handled, particularly with respectto export controls. Balances must be struck. Loss oftechnological leadership can undermine military readi-ness and strength. Not participating freely in worldwidemarkets constrains economic growth. Recent changesto our strategic trade policies reflect a new balancebetween these competing factors.

In cooperation with our Western partners in theCoordinating Committee for Multilateral ExportControls (COCOM), we have completely overhauledexport controls, reducing them to a core list of only themost strategically significant goods and technologies.This action reflects the emergence of democratic gov-ernments in Eastern Europe as well as a reduced mili-tary threat to the United States and our allies from a dis-solved Warsaw Pact and a Soviet army that is with-drawing. The result has been a two-thirds reduction inthe licenses that industry is required to obtain prior toexporting.

Treating the new democracies of Central and EasternEurope differently from the Soviet Union, we and ourCOCOM partners have adopted a wide-ranging specialprocedure for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakiathat ensures that controlled technology imports areused for purely civilian applications. We look forwardto the day when we can remove these countries com-pletely from the list of proscribed destinations. We havea strong interest in promoting the growth of free mar-kets in democratic societies. At the same time we mustbe sure that the easing of COCOM controls does notresult in the proliferation of dangerous technologies toother areas like the Middle East. For that reason, we

have — in close cooperation with other suppliernations — significantly improved controls on technolo-gies useful in developing nuclear, chemical and biolog-ical weapons and the missiles to deliver them.

ENERGYSecure, ample, diversified and clean supplies of energyare essential to our national economic prosperity andsecurity. For the foreseeable future, oil will remain avital element in our energy mix. For geological andeconomic reasons, U.S. oil imports are likely toincrease in coming years. The rate of increase, howev-er, could be reduced by improving the efficiency withwhich oil is used in the economy and by substitutingalternative fuels.

Security of oil supplies is enhanced by a supportive for-eign policy and appropriate military capabilities. Wewill work to improve understanding among key partici-pants in the oil industry of the basic fundamentals ofthe oil market. We will also maintain our capability torespond to requests to protect vital oil facilities, on landor at sea, while working to resolve the underlying polit-ical, social and economic tensions that could threatenthe free flow of oil.

The stability of the Gulf region, which contains two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves, is of funda-mental concern to us. Political and military turbulencein the region has a direct impact on our economy,largely through higher oil prices and potential supplydisruptions. Diversification of both productive andspare capacity is important to providing a cushion tothe oil market. Increased production, in an environ-mentally sound manner, from other areas would alsocontribute to the security of oil supplies.

Because energy markets — particularly the oil market— are global, our energy security requires close coop-eration among energy consumers. The aftermath ofIraq's invasion of Kuwait demonstrates the need toi mprove strategic stock levels within oil-consumingcountries and the value of international cooperation tohelp mitigate damage brought about by sudden, seriousdisruptions of supply. The United States should developcreative mechanisms to fill its Strategic PetroleumReserve to the statutorily required one billion barrels,consistent with sound budgetary practices and avoidingan unnecessary burden on the oil market.

21

Our use of oil is the key source of our vulnerability toworld oil supply disruption. To reduce this vulnerabili-ty, we must work to both reduce oil consumption andto use oil more efficiently. The efficient use of energy inall sectors of our economy is of particular importance.We must intensify the development of alternativesources of energy (nuclear, natural gas, coal and renew-ables) and support aggressive research and develop-ment of advanced energy technologies to provide theclean, affordable, reliable energy supplies we will needin the mid-21st century.

To meet pressing environmental concerns, we mustli mit the harmful effects of energy production, trans-portation and use. The increased, safe use of nuclearpower, for example, can significantly reduce green-house gas emissions.

THE ENVIRONMENTWe must manage the Earth's natural resources in waysthat protect the potential for growth and opportunity forpresent and future generations. The experience of thepast half-century has taught that democratic politicalinstitutions and free market economies enhance humanwell-being. But even as we experience political andeconomic success, we cannot ignore the costs thatgrowth, unguided by wisdom, can impose on our natu-ral environment. A healthy economy and a healthyenvironment go hand-in-hand. Solutions must be foundthat protect our environment while allowing for theeconomic development needed to improve the livingstandards of a growing world population.

Global environmental concerns include such diversebut interrelated issues as stratospheric ozone depletion,climate change, food security, water supply, deforesta-tion, biodiversity and treatment of wastes. A commoningredient in each is that they respect no internationalboundaries. The stress from these environmental chal-lenges is already contributing to political conflict.Recognizing a shared responsibility for global steward-ship is a necessary step for global progress. Our part-ners will find the United States a ready and active par-ticipant in this effort.

SPACEThe time has come to look beyond brief spaceencounters and to commit to a future in whichAmericans and citizens of all nations live and work in

space. We have developed a plan to make this vision areality and the National Space Council, under VicePresident Quayle, is charged with bringing coherence,continuity and commitment to our efforts. We havemade solid progress in the five key elements of ourspace strategy:

• Developing our space launch capability as a nation-al resource: This infrastructure will be to the 21stcentury what the great highway and dam projectswere to the 20th. Reliable space launchers will pro-vide the "highway" to space and the solar system inthe next century.

• Expanding human presence and activity beyondearth orbit and into the Solar System: We are wellunderway with unmanned exploration of the SolarSystem. Magellan, Viking and Voyager have beenspectacular successes, Galileo is on its way toJupiter, Ulysses has launched on its wide-rangingorbit of the sun and soon we will begin missions toSaturn and the Asteroid Belt. The Space ExplorationInitiative will build on the successes and expertisedeveloped in the Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle andeventually the Space Station Freedom programs, ulti-mately establishing permanent human settlementson the Moon and putting humans on Mars.

• Obtaining scientific, technological and economicbenefits and improving the quality of life on earth:Communications satellites already link peoplearound the globe; their contribution to the free flowof information and ideas played a part in theRevolution of '89. We also use space systems to veri-fy arms control treaties. But the potential of space toi mprove life on earth has barely been tapped. A verypromising application is in the area of the environ-ment — monitoring and helping to understand theprocess of ecological change, and holding signifi-cant promise for new sources of energy, material andproducts.

• Capitalizing on the unique environment of space tofoster economic well-being: Private investment inspace will create jobs, boost the economy andstrengthen our scientific, engineering and industrialbase. New commercial markets will be created, andexisting industries will become stronger and morecompetitive in the world marketplace. The recentlyapproved commercial launch policy is a first step inthis process.

22

• Ensuring the freedom of space for exploration anddevelopment: There are now some ten significantspacefaring nations, with others on the way. Spacewill become in the future what oceans have alwaysbeen — highways to discovery and commerce. Butas with sea lanes, space lanes can be closed and caneven be used as springboards for attack. We mustensure the freedom to use space for exploration anddevelopment, for ourselves and all nations.

Assured access to space requires a healthy militaryspace program. We must be able to monitor events inspace, warn of threats and intervene to protect impor-tant space assets. This protection may take the form ofpassive measures to enhance the survivability of criticalsystems. We must also have the option of activedefense systems, including an anti-satellite system, tostop an aggressor before he can use a space system tothreaten objects or people in or from space.

23

V. Relating Means to Ends: A DefenseAgenda for the 1990s

As the war to liberate Kuwait clearly showed, theessential demands on our military forces — to deterconflict whenever possible but to prevail in those thatdo arise — are certain to endure. Nonetheless, the spe-cific challenges facing our military in the 1990s andbeyond will be different from those that have dominat-ed our thinking for the past 40 years.

In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threatto Europe or the danger of global war, the need to sup-port a smaller but still crucial forward presence and todeal with regional contingencies — including possiblya limited, conventional threat to Europe — will shapehow we organize, equip, train, deploy and employ ouractive and reserve forces. We must also have the abilityto reconstitute forces, if necessary, to counter any resur-gent global threat.

As the war in the Gulf made clear, the easing of theSoviet threat does not mean an end to all hazards. Aswe seek to build a new world order in the aftermath ofthe Cold War, we will likely discover that the enemywe face is less an expansionist communism than it isinstability itself. And, in the face of multiple and variedthreats to stability, we will increasingly find our militarystrength a source of reassurance and a foundation forsecurity, regionally and globally.

In the face of competing fiscal demands and a changingbut still dangerous world, we have developed a newdefense strategy that provides the conceptual frame-work for our future forces. This new strategy will guideour deliberate reductions to no more than the forces weneed to defend our interests and meet our globalresponsibilities. It will also guide our restructuring sothat our remaining forces are appropriate to the chal-lenges of a new era. The four fundamental demands ofa new era are already clear: to ensure strategic deter-

rence, to exercise forward presence in key areas, torespond effectively to crises and to retain the nationalcapacity to reconstitute forces should this ever be need-ed

NUCLEAR DETERRENCEDeterrence will indeed be enhanced as a result of theSTART Treaty and U.S. force modernization efforts cango forward with greater knowledge and predictabilityabout future Soviet forces. Nevertheless, even with theTreaty, Soviet nuclear capabilities will remain substan-tialf. Despite economic and political difficulties, theSoviet Union continues its modernization of strategicforces. Even in a new era, deterring nuclear attackremains the number one defense priority of the UnitedStates.

Strategic Nuclear ForcesThe modernization of our Triad of land-based missiles,strategic bombers and submarine-launched missileswill be vital to the effectiveness of our deterrent in thenext century. We need to complete the Trident subma-rine program with the eighteen boats and modernmissiles necessary to ensure a survivable force. The B-2strategic bomber must be deployed so that the flexibili-ty traditionally provided by the bomber force will beavailable in the future. The B-2 will also firmly plantour aerospace industry in a new era of low-observabletechnology and the bomber itself will have uniquevalue across the spectrum of conflict. Finally, we mustcontinue the development of land-based, mobileICBMs in order to keep our deployment options open.

Our command, control and communications capabili-ties are critical to nuclear deterrence and to ensuringthe survivability of our constitutional government under

25

all circumstances of attack. Our civil defense programis still needed to deal with the consequences of anattack, while also providing important capabilities torespond to natural and man-made catastrophes.

The safety, security, control and effectiveness of UnitedStates nuclear weapon systems are also of paramounti mportance. We are incorporating the most modernsafety and control features into our deterrent stockpileas rapidly as practicable and developing new safetytechnologies for future weapons. Older weapons thatlack the most modern safety features are being replacedor retired.

Testing of nuclear weapons plays a key part in assuringthe safety and effectiveness of our deterrent forces.While we test only as much as is required for nationalsecurity purposes, testing is essential to ensure the relia-bility and effectiveness of our weapons, to identify anysafety issues and to prove any corrective measures. Ahalt to nuclear testing would not eliminate weapons orincrease security, but it would erode confidence in ourdeterrent and severely restrict our ability to makei mprovements, especially in nuclear safety.

Just as our weapons must be safe, the facilities that pro-duce them must be safe, efficient, economical, andenvironmentally sound. Our current facilities are beingrenovated and brought up to modern standards. At thesame time we are moving forward to consolidate andreconfigure the current large and older complex, look-ing toward one that will be smaller, more flexible andmore efficient. Our production complex must be ableto respond to potential needs ranging from acceleratedproduction to accelerated retirement of weapons,depending on the security environment in the yearsahead.

We must also recognize that the deterrence issues of anew era are now at hand. Despite the threat still posedby the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, the likeli-hood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state isdeclining and the scenario which we frequently pro-jected as the precursor of their use — massive war inEurope — is less likely than at any other time sinceWorld War II. These developments affect questions ofnuclear targeting, the alert status and operational pro-cedures of our forces and ultimately the type and num-ber of weapons sufficient to ensure our safety and thatof our allies. We have already begun to make adjust-ments to our nuclear forces and to the policies that

guide them in recognition of the disintegration of theWarsaw Pact and changes in the Soviet Union itself.Beyond this, while we have traditionally focused ondeterring a unitary, rational actor applying a relativelyknowable calculus of potential costs and gains, ourthinking must now encompass potential instabilitieswithin states as well as the potential threat from statesor leaders who might perceive they have little to lose inemploying weapons of mass destruction.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces

Below the level of strategic forces, we have traditional-ly maintained other nuclear forces for a variety of pur-poses. They have highlighted our resolve and havehelped to link conventional defense to the broaderstrategic nuclear guarantee of the United States. Thishas helped remove incentives that otherwise mighthave accelerated nuclear proliferation. These systemshave also served to deter an enemy's use of suchweapons and they have contributed to the deterrenceof conventional attack. These needs persist.

In Europe, we and our allies have always sought thelowest number and most stable types of weapons need-ed to prevent war. Indeed, NATO has unilaterallyreduced thousands of nuclear weapons over the pastdecade, in addition to the elimination of an entire classof U.S. and Soviet weapons as called for in the Treatyon Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. Changes inEurope have now allowed us to forgo plans to modern-ize our LANCE missiles and nuclear artillery shells andwe will work to implement the commitments of theLondon Declaration with respect to short-range nuclearweapons currently deployed in Europe.

Even with the dramatic changes we see in Europe,however, non-strategic nuclear weapons remain inte-gral to our strategy of deterrence. They make NATO'sresolve unmistakably clear and help prevent war byensuring that there are no circumstances in which anuclear response to military action might be discount-ed. In practical terms, this means greater reliance onaircraft armed with modern weapons. As the principalmeans by which Alliance members share nuclear risksand burdens, these aircraft and their weapons must bebased in Europe. Such a posture is not designed tothreaten any European state but to provide a securedeterrent in the face of unforeseen circumstances.

26

Missile DefensesFlexible response and deterrence through the threat ofretaliation have preserved the security of the UnitedStates and its allies for decades. In the early 1980s, webegan the Strategic Defense Initiative in the face of anunconstrained Soviet ballistic-missile program and asignificant Soviet commitment to strategic defenses. SDIwas intended to shift deterrence to a safer, more stablebasis as effective strategic defenses would diminish theconfidence of an adversary in his ability to execute asuccessful attack.

Notwithstanding the continued modernization of Sovietoffensive forces and the pursuit of more effective strate-gic defenses, the positive changes in our relationshipwith the Soviet Union and the fundamental changes inEastern Europe have markedly reduced the danger of awar in Europe that could escalate to the strategic nucle-ar level. At the same time, the threat posed by globalballistic-missile proliferation and by an accidental orunauthorized launch resulting from political turmoilhas grown considerably. Thus, the United States, ourforces, and our allies and friends face a continued andeven growing threat from ballistic missiles.

In response to these trends, we have redirected SDI topursue a system providing Global Protection AgainstLimited Strikes (GPALS). With adequate funding, it willbe possible to begin to deploy systems that will betterprotect our troops in the field from ballistic-missileattack by the mid-1990s and that will protect theUnited States itself from such attacks by the turn of thecentury. GPALS is designed to provide protectionagainst a ballistic missile launched from anywhereagainst a target anywhere in the world. The system willbe based on technologies which SDI has pioneered, butwould be both smaller and less expensive than the ini-tial deployment originally projected for SDI.

GPALS offers many potential advantages: the UnitedStates would be protected against limited strikes by bal-listic missiles; our forward-deployed forces would bebetter defended against missile attacks; and our allies,many of whom lie on the edge of troubled areas, couldalso be better protected. The record of the PATRIOTagainst Iraqi SCUDs highlights the great potential fordefenses against ballistic missiles, the critical role ofmissile defenses and the need to improve such defensesfurther.

GPALS could also provide incentives against furtherproliferation of ballistic missiles. If these missiles didnot hold the potential to cause certain and immediatedamage, nations might be less likely to go to such greatlengths to acquire them. Access to U.S. assistance indefenses may also provide an incentive for countriesnot to seek ballistic missiles or weapons of massdestruction.

FORWARD PRESENCEMaintaining a positive influence in distant regionsrequires that we demonstrate our engagement. The for-ward presence of our military forces often provides theessential glue in important alliance relationships andsignals that our commitments are backed by tangibleactions. Our presence can deter aggression, preserveregional balances, deflect arms races and prevent thepower vacuums that invite conflict. While our forwarddeployments will be reduced in the future, the prudentforward basing of forces and the prepositioning ofequipment reduce the burden of projecting power fromthe continental United States. Indeed, certain regions— like Europe and East Asia — represent such com-pelling interests to the United States that they willdemand the permanent deployment of some U.S. forcesfor as long as they are needed and welcomed by ourallies as part of a common effort. But even in theseregions, the size of our forward deployments can besmaller as the threat diminishes and the defense capa-bilities of our allies improve. In other regions our pres-ence, while important, can take less permanent forms.

Across the Atlantic: Europeand the Middle EastIn Europe, Soviet reductions and the dissolution of theWarsaw Pact allow us to scale back our presence to asmaller, but still significant, contribution to NATO'soverall force levels. This presence will include theequivalent of a robust army corps, with a corps head-quarters, associated corps units, and two ground forcedivisions supplemented by several air wings, appropri-ate naval forces, and sufficient infrastructure to supporta return of additional forces. Such a force will preservethe operational, not just symbolic, significance of ourpresence.

As called for in July at the London NATO Summit, wewill work with our allies to make our forces in Europe

27

more flexible and mobile and more fully integrated intomultinational formations. NATO will establish a multi-national Rapid Reaction Corps to respond to crises andwe expect Alliance forces, including those of theUnited States, to be organized into multinational corpsthat would function in peacetime, and not just be con-tingent structures activated in a crisis. We will alsoexploit the prospect of longer warning time in the eventof a major crisis by backing up our deployed forceswith the ability to reinforce them with active andreserve units from the United States, supported by theability to reconstitute larger forces over time should theneed arise.

The aftermath of the crisis in the Gulf portends a needfor some measure of continuing presence in that regionconsistent with the desires and needs of our friends.While the United States will not maintain a permanentground presence, we are committed to the region'ssecurity. We will work with our friends to bolster theirconfidence and security through such measures asexercises, prepositioning of heavy equipment and anenhanced naval presence. Our vital national interestsdepend on a stable and secure Gulf.

Across the PacificOur enduring interests in East Asia and the Pacific alsodemand forces sufficient to meet our responsibilitiesand to sustain our long-term relationships with friendsand allies. While East Asia has been considerably lessaffected by the Revolution of '89 than Europe, thegrowing strength and self-reliance of our friends in theregion permit some reduction in our presence.

A phased approach, responding to global and regionalevents, is the soundest. We have announced our intentto adjust military personnel levels in the Philippines,the Republic of Korea and Japan. This phase isdesigned to thin out existing force structure andreshape our security relationships. Before this phaseends in December 1992, over 15,000 U.S. personnelwill be withdrawn. Later phases will reduce and reorga-nize our force structure further, as circumstances per-mit.

Korea represents the area of greatest potential danger,and reductions there must be carefully measuredagainst North Korean actions. However, we havejudged that the growing strength of our Korean alliespermits us to reduce our presence and begin to move

toward a security partnership in which the Koreanarmed forces assume the leading role. We are alsoencouraged by the progress of the JapaneseGovernment in rounding out its own self-defense capa-bilities.

The Rest of the WorldIn other regions, as the need for our presence persists,we will increasingly rely on periodic visits, trainingmissions, access agreements, prepositioned equipment,exercises, combined planning and security and human-itarian assistance to sustain the sense of common inter-est and cooperation on which we would rely in deploy-ing and employing our military forces. As the Gulf crisisclearly showed, our strategy is increasingly dependenton the support of regional friends and allies. In fact —during crises — the cooperation and support of thoselocal states most directly threatened will be critical fac-tors in determining our own course of action.

CRISIS RESPONSEDespite our best efforts to deter conflict, we must beprepared for our interests to be challenged with force,often with little or no warning. The Gulf crisis wasample evidence that such challenges will not always besmall or easily resolved. Because regional crises are thepredominant military threat we will face in the future,their demands — along with our forward presencerequirements — will be the primary determinant of thesize and structure of our future forces.

The regional contingencies we could face are manyand varied. We must be prepared for differences in ter-rain, climate and the nature of threatening forces, aswell as for differing levels of support from host nationsor others. We must also be able to respond quickly andeffectively to adversaries who may possess cruise mis-siles, modern air defenses, chemical weapons, ballisticmissiles and even large armor formations. Although ourforward deployed forces speed our ability to respond tothreats in areas like the Pacific or Europe, there areother regions where threats, while likely to be lessformidable, may prove no less urgent.

Mobi I ityIn this new era, therefore, the ability to project ourpower will underpin our strategy more than ever. Wemust be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain

28

them in parts of the world where prepositioning ofequipment will not always be feasible, where adequatebases may not be available (at least before a crisis) andwhere there is a less developed industrial base andinfrastructure to support our forces once they havearrived. Our strategy demands we be able to move menand materiel to the scene of a crisis at a pace and innumbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force. The100-hour success of our ground forces in the war to lib-erate Kuwait was stunning, but we should not allow itto obscure the fact that we required six months todeploy these forces. As our overall force levels drawdown and our forward-deployed forces shrink, we mustsustain and expand our investment in airlift, seal ift and— where possible — prepositioning. We must alsoensure unimpeded transit of the air and sea lanes andaccess to space through maritime and aerospace supe-riority. Our security assistance must, among otherthings, enhance the ability of other nations to facilitateour deployments. And, over the longer term, we mustchallenge our technology to develop forces that arelethal but more readily deployable and more easily sus-tained than today's.

Readiness and Our Guardand Reserve Forces

For almost two decades, our Total Force Policy hasplaced a substantial portion of our military manpowerin high-quality, well-trained, well-equipped and early-mobilizing Guard and Reserve units. Compared tomaintaining such a force in the active component, thiswas a cost-effective strategy, a prudent response to aninternational security environment where the predomi-nant threat was major conflict in Europe or global warwith the Soviets, with warning of such a conflict mea-sured in weeks or even days.

That environment has been transformed. Today wemust reshape our Guard and Reserve forces so that theycan continue their important contributions in new cir-cumstances. While we still face the possibility of sud-den conflict in many of the regional contingencies thatcould concern us, these threats — despite their danger— will be on a smaller scale than the threat formerlyposed by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. Thiswill allow a smaller force overall, but those units ori-ented towards short-warning, regional contingenciesmust be kept at high readiness.

Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits usto respond initially to any regional contingency withunits — combat and support — drawn wholly from theactive component, except for a limited number of sup-port and mobility assets. Since many support functionscan be more economically maintained in the reservecomponent, we will still rely on reserve support units inany extended confrontation. The primary focus ofreserve combat units will be to supplement active unitsin any especially large or protracted deployment. Tohedge against a future need for expanded forces to dealwith a renewed global confrontation, which — thoughpossible — is less likely and clearly less immediatethan previously calculated, some reserve combat unitswill be retained in cadre status.

This approach will allow us to maintain a Total Forceappropriate for the strategic and fiscal demands of anew era: a smaller, more self-contained and very readyactive force able to respond quickly to emergingthreats; and a reduced but still essential reserve compo-nent with emphasis on supporting and sustaining activecombat forces, and — in particularly large or prolongedregional contingencies — providing latent combatcapability that can be made ready when needed.

Even as we restructure for a new era, we will continueto place a premium on the quality of our military per-sonnel, the backbone of any effective fighting force.True military power is measured by the professionalskills and dedication of our young men and women. Insix weeks and 100 decisive hours, today's militaryproved it is the most skilled and effective fighting forcethis Nation has ever possessed. As we make the adjust-ments appropriate to a new environment, we will pre-serve this precious resource.

RECONSTITUTIONBeyond the crisis response capabilities provided byactive and reserve forces, we must have the ability togenerate wholly new forces should the need arise.Although we are hopeful for the future, history teachesus caution. The 20th century has seen rapid shifts in thegeopolitical climate, and technology has repeatedlytransformed the battlefield. The ability to reconstitute iswhat allows us safely and selectively to scale back andrestructure our forces in-being.

This difficult task will require us to invest in hedgingoptions whose future dividends may not always be

29

measurable now. It will require careful attention to thevital elements of our military potential: the industrialbase, science and technology, and manpower. Theseelements were easily accommodated in an era whenwe had to maintain large standing forces, when we rou-tinely invested heavily in defense R&D and when newitems of equipment were broadly and extensively pro-duced. We will now have to work much more deliber-ately to preserve them.

The standard by which we should measure our efforts isthe response time that our warning processes wouldprovide us of a return to previous levels of confronta-tion in Europe or in the world at large. We and ourallies must be able to reconstitute a credible defensefaster than any potential opponent can generate anoverwhelming offense.

ManpowerReconstitution obviously includes manpower.Relatively large numbers of personnel, trained in basicmilitary skills, can be raised in one to two years. Butskilled, seasoned leaders — high-quality senior NCOsand officers — require many years to develop and wemust preserve this critical nucleus to lead an expandingmilitary force. This must be reflected in how we manactive, reserve and cadre units over the long term.

Defense TechnologyAnother challenge will be to maintain our edge indefense technology, even as we reduce our forces.Technology has historically been a comparative advan-tage for American forces, and we have often relied on itto overcome numerical disparities and to reduce therisk to American lives.

Our technological edge in key areas of warfare will beeven more important at lower levels of forces and fund-ing, and in the complex political and military environ-ment in which our forces will operate. But maintainingthis margin will become increasingly difficult as accessto advanced weaponry spreads and as our defenseindustry shrinks. Even in regional contingencies it willnot be uncommon for our forces to face high-technolo-gy weapons in the hands of adversaries. This spread ofadvanced systems will surely erode the deterrent valueof our own — and our competitive edge in warfare —unless we act decisively to maintain technologicalsuperiority.

We will, of course, have to decide which technologieswe want to advance and how we will pursue them.Our focus should be on promising, high-leverage areas,especially those that play to our comparative advan-tages and exploit the weaknesses of potential adver-saries, whoever and wherever they may be. Stealth,space-based systems, sensors, precision weapons,advanced training technologies — all these provedthemselves in the Gulf, yet when these programs (andothers) were begun, no one foresaw their use againstIraq. Our investment strategies must hedge against theunknown, giving future Presidents the flexibility thatsuch capabilities provide.

We must be able to move promising research throughdevelopment to rapid fielding when changes in theinternational environment so require. The "generationleaps" in technology and fielded systems that somehave suggested may not be possible. We will have tobuild some systems, as the early production effort is avital component of technology development.Production, even in limited numbers, will also facilitatethe development of innovative doctrine and organiza-tional structures to make full use of the new technolo-gies we field. In an era of tight fiscal constraints, ourdevelopment efforts must also strive to make ourweapons less expensive as well as more effective.

In the competition for scarce resources, emphasis ontechnology development — to pursue those new capa-bilities that may be most decisive in the longer term —may mean accepting some continued risk in the nearterm. But accepting such risk may well be prudent in aperiod of reduced East-West tensions.

The Industrial BaseProviding and sustaining modern equipment to supporta rapid expansion of the armed forces is an equally dif-ficult proposition. We will need a production base toproduce new systems and a maintenance and repairbase to support them. These requirements pose uniqueproblems, as reduced defense budgets are shrinking thedefense industrial sector overall. As we make procure-ment and investment decisions, we will have to place avalue on the assured supply and timely delivery ofdefense materials in time of crisis.

In the near term, some of these problems can be ame-li orated by retaining and storing equipment from unitsbeing deactivated. Over the longer term, however, as

30

stored equipment becomes obsolete, the issue becomesour capability to expand production or use alternativesources of supply. We will need the capacity for indus-trial surge, accelerating orders that are already in thepipeline. We will also have to plan for production fromnew or alternative industrial capacity. It may also bepossible to reduce unneeded military specifications tomake greater use of items that can be created by thecommercial production base. Above all, we must con-tinue to involve the creative resources of our nationaleconomy and ensure that corporations continue tohave incentives to engage in innovative defense work.

A SMALLER ANDRESTRUCTURED FORCEOur future military will be smaller. Assuming there areno unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security envi-ronment, by mid-decade our force can be some 25 per-cent smaller than the force we maintained in the lastdays of the Cold War. The changes we have seen in theoverall international environment have made thissmaller force possible, and the increasing demands onour resources to preserve the other elements of ournational strength have made it necessary.

Minimum Essential MilitaryForces — The Base ForceYet these planned reductions will cut our forces to aminimally acceptable level — to a Base Force belowwhich further reductions would not be prudent. Theseminimum forces represent our national security insur-ance policy and consist of four basic force packages:Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces andContingency Forces.

Our Strategic Forces must continue to meet the endur-ing demands of nuclear deterrence and defense. Theconventional force packages provide forces for forward

presence as well as the ability to respond to crises. OurAtlantic Forces will be postured and trained for theheavy threats characteristic of Europe and SouthwestAsia and must be modern and lethal enough to dealwith these threats. Pacific Forces will be structured foran essentially maritime theater, placing a premium onnaval capabilities, backed by the essential air andground forces for enduring deterrence and immediatecrisis response. U.S.-based reinforcements will belighter than those we envisage for the Atlantic, as befitsthe potential contingencies in the Pacific. ContingencyForces will include the Army's light and airborne units,Marine expeditionary brigades, special operationsforces and selected air and naval assets. They will belargely based in the United States and — since theymust be able to respond to spontaneous and unpre-dictable crises — they will largely be in the active com-ponent. At times, the quick deployment of such a forcein itself may be enough to head off confrontation. Atother times, we may need actually to employ this forceto deal with insurgencies, conduct anti-drug or anti-ter-rorist operations, evacuate non-combatants or — as wedid in Desert Shield — be the first into action whileheavier forces are alerted and moved.

The reductions projected by the mid-1990s are dramat-ic. It will be important to manage their pace rationallyand responsibly. We must accommodate the actionstaken in support of Desert Storm and Desert Shield andwe must be attentive to the professional skills of thearmed forces that have been built up over the pastdecade — and which, as the war made clear, remainvital to our national security. But now that the war hasbeen won, and as long as no unanticipated ominoustrends emerge, we will get back on the spending pathagreed to before hostilities began. Highly effective mili-tary forces can be supported within the levels agreed toby Congress in the 1990 Budget Agreement if we canend unneeded programs, consolidate bases, streamlineprocedures and adjust overall manpower levels withoutarbitrary restrictions.

31

VI. Toward the 21st Century

The 20th century has taught us that security is indivisi-ble. The safety, freedom and well-being of one peoplecannot be separated from the safety, freedom and well-being of all. Recently, the Gulf crisis strengthened thissense of international community. Many of the underly-ing forces now at work in the world are tending to drawthat global community even closer together.Technology, especially the explosion of communicationand information, has accelerated the pace of humancontact. The growing acceptance of the democraticideal — evidenced in the erosion of totalitarianism andthe expansion of basic human freedoms — has alsobrought the world closer together. The expansion ofcommerce and the growing acceptance of market prin-ciples have accelerated the movement toward interde-pendence and the integration of economies. Even thethreats posed by the proliferation of weapons of enor-mous destructiveness have begun to draw the commu-nity of nations together in common concern.

As we move toward the 21st century, this interdepen-dence of peoples will grow and will continue todemand responsible American leadership. Guided bythe values that have inspired and nurtured our democ-racy at home, we will work for a new world in whichpeace, security and cooperation finally replace the con-frontation of the Cold War, and overcome the kind ofthreat represented by Iraq's aggression.

Developments in the Soviet Union and elsewhere haveset in motion a change in the strategic landscape asdramatic as that which the Nation experienced whenSoviet policy first forced the Cold War upon us. Thegreat threat to global peace has ebbed and we now seea Soviet state and society struggling to overcome severeinternal crisis. Notwithstanding the uncertainties aboutthe future course of the Soviet Union, that state's will-ingness — indeed, in many ways, its ability — to pro-

ject power beyond its borders has been dramaticallyreduced for the foreseeable future. Our strategy for thisnew era recognizes the opportunities and challengesbefore us, and includes among its principles:

• reinforcing the moral ties that hold our alliancestogether, even as perceptions of a common securitythreat change;

• encouraging the constructive evolution of the SovietUnion, recognizing the limits of our influence andthe continuing power of Soviet military forces;

• supporting the independence and vitality of the newEastern European democracies even as we deal withthe uncertainties of the Soviet future;

• championing the principles of political and econom-ic freedom as the surest guarantors of humanprogress and happiness, as well as global peace;

• working with others in the global community toresolve regional disputes and stem the proliferationof advanced weapons;

• cooperating with the Soviet Union and others inachieving arms control agreements that promotesecurity and stability;

• reducing our defense burden as appropriate, whilerestructuring our forces for new challenges;

• tending more carefully to our own economic com-petitiveness as the foundation of our long-termstrength; and

• addressing the new global agenda of refugee flows,drug abuse and environmental degradation.

33

We are a rich and powerful nation, and the elements ofour power will remain formidable. But our wealth andour strength are not without limits. We must balanceour commitments with our means and, above all, wemust wisely choose now which elements of ourstrength will best serve our needs in the future. This isthe challenge of strategy.

In this country we make such choices for peace just aswe make the awful choices of war — as a democracy.When President and Congress work together to buildan effective security posture and policy — as was donein the 1980s — we are successful. In the Gulf, ourarmed forces benefitted from the legacy of investmentdecisions, technological innovations, and strategicplanning that came in the decade before. Today's plan-ning decisions will determine whether we are well or ill

prepared for the contingencies that will confront us inthe future.

This is a heavy responsibility, shared between thePresident and Congress. We owe our servicemen andwomen not only the best equipment, but also a coher-ent strategy and posture geared to new realities. Thiscoherence can only come from a partnership betweenthe Branches. Divided, we will invite disasters. United,we can overcome any challenge.

In the Gulf, the dictator guessed wrong when he doubt-ed America's unity and will. The extraordinary unity weshowed as a Nation in the Gulf assured that we wouldprevail. It also sent the message loud and clear thatAmerica is prepared for the challenges of the future,committed and engaged in the world, as a reliable ally,friend and leader.

34