nationalism, democratisation and political opportunism_takougang

Two of the most important developments in the history of post-war Africa are the

rise of nationalism, and the demands for political reform that have dominated the

political landscape in the last decade and a half. But while the nationalist move-

ments of the 1940s and 50s were aimed at overthrowing the alien, illegitimate

(Lewis 1998:14) and often racist, repressive and exploitative colonial system, the

focus of the current pro-democracy movement, labelled by some scholars as

“Africa’s second independence” (Ihonvbere 1996), has been to replace decades

of oppressive, corrupt and tyrannical rule by African leaders that had become the

order of the day following independence (Bayart 1993; Bayart et al 1999; Dia-

mond 1998; Mbaku 2000). Despite the difference in focus on who the culprits

were in both instances, they present some intriguing similarities. Both events pro-

vided opportunities for individuals, often with conflicting ideologies and selfish

objectives, to compete for power rather than adopting genuine national agendas

that would serve the political and socio-economic interests of the people.

With Cameroon as the main focus, this paper examines the political intrigues,

deal-making, political manipulation, intimidation and sheer use of violence that

were used by political leaders in Cameroon during the nationalist period2

and the

recent democratisation process to acquire positions of power and political privi-

leges, often to the detriment of their perceived political agenda. The paper is di-

vided into four sections. Section one examines political opportunism in the

former French trust territory3

and explains how Ahmadou Ahidjo took full advan-

tage of the opportunity provided him by French authorities to establish himself

firmly as prime minister and later, after independence, as head of state. This is

followed by a discussion of the ideological shifts and debates among politicians

in the former British Southern Cameroons as they competed for the best political

course for the tiny territory. The third section focuses on how President Ahidjo,

by exploiting the greed and selfishness of Cameroonian politicians, was able to

gain complete control of the nation’s political machine between 1962 and 1972.

The final section looks at how, despite serious political threat to his regime in the

early 1990s, President Paul Biya has been able to exploit the eagerness of some

opposition leaders to gain access to power and privilege in his struggle to remain

in control during the current democratisation process.

ISSN 0258-9001 print / ISSN 1469-9397 online/03/030427-19 2003 Journal of Contemporary African StudiesDOI: 10.1080 / 0258900032000142455

Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 21, 3, 2003September

Although the Jeunesse Camerounaise Française (Jeucafra),4

founded in 1938

might have been at the forefront of post-war politics in the former French trust

territory, it was the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) founded in 1948

that was the first truly nationalist party in the territory (LeVine 1964; Johnson

1970; Joseph 1977). Unlike Jeucafra and various trade union organisations of the

1930s and 1940s that were more interested in seeking greater political and eco-

nomic opportunities within the colonial system for Cameroonians, the UPC vig-

orously pushed for immediate independence for the territory and reunification

with the British Cameroons. At a time when France was accelerating its exploita-

tion of the territory following World War II, the idea of immediate independence

espoused by the UPC was rejected as being too radical. Ultimately, the UPC’s in-

sistence that both issues be addressed immediately, and France’s refusal to do so,

led to violent confrontations between the UPC and French authorities that culmi-

nated in the banning of the party on July 13, 1955.5

After this banning and cou-

pled with the fact that France had given up its utopian vision of creating a greater

France d’outre-mer (Austin 1984:12) the issue, at least for France, was no longer

a matter of independence for the territory, but one of selecting a leader who

would guarantee a continued preferential economic and political relationship

with France after independence. As Mbaku (1995:12) argues, “the banning of the

UPC was important for French commercial interest in the colony and for indige-

nous political opportunists who could now help design a constitution that would

provide them with opportunities for post-independence rent-seeking”.

That responsibility initially fell in the hands of André-Marie Mbida, leader of the

Parti des démocrats Camerounaise (PDC), who was appointed first pre-independ-

ence prime minister by the French authorities. One of the reasons why Mbida

emerged as France’s choice to lead a coalition government was the fact that he

had portrayed himself as moderate and reconciliationist (LeVine 1964:157), in-

terested in promoting Cameroon’s autonomy and maintaining a Franco-Camer-

oonian relationship. But as it turned out, Mbida was not the right person to steer

Cameroon towards independence. His abrasive personality and uncompromising

attitude, together with a profound reluctance to push for immediate independence

– as France advocated – and reunification not only placed him at odds with

French authorities but also with many of his political friends and foes alike

(Johnson 1970:140; LeVine 1964:165). He was forced to resign as prime minister

by Jean Ramadier, the French high commissioner, on February 17, 1958 and re-

placed by Ahmadou Ahidjo, leader of the Union Camerounaise (UC), who had

served as deputy prime minister and minister of the interior in Mbida’s govern-

ment.

Because of his unimpressive political credentials at the time (Joseph 1978:22),

Ahidjo’s selection was perceived by French authorities simply as a temporary

measure until a better qualified candidate capable of protecting French interests

could be identified from the ranks of indigenous politicians. Nevertheless, Ahidjo

428 Journal of Contemporary African Studies

quickly seized the opportunity to establish himself as a capable leader. Not only

did he express his support for immediate independence for the territory as France

wanted, but he also indicated a willingness to maintain and protect French inter-

ests. That Ahidjo was all too willing to do the latter became evident in a series of

pre-independence agreements negotiated in 1958 between his administration and

the French government that virtually guaranteed continued French control on is-

sues related to foreign affairs, defence, and the monetary system (LeVine

1964:168; DeLancey 1986; Kofele-Kale 1981). Additionally, even though

Ahidjo might not initially have supported the idea of reunification (Johnson,

1970:257), he, unlike Mbida, knew that it was the politically astute thing to do in

order to retain his position as prime minister and win broad political support from

other groups and parties that backed the idea. In fact, Joseph (1978:33) has de-

scribed Ahidjo as a political opportunist who “wears whatever ideas seem appro-

priate at the time, and discards them when they no longer fit or have become

threadbare”. He was even willing to strike a deal with opportunists within the

ranks of the leadership of the UPC and other opposition parties who were willing

to give up their political convictions in exchange for the opportunity to acquire

power and privilege in the administration and to punish those who refused to do

so.

The first measure taken by Ahidjo to establish himself in charge was to create a

broad-based coalition government that included representatives from the major

political parties and regions of the country. According to LeVine (1964:167):

Ahidjo’s ministerial selections provided happy ones. The two MANC

ministers (Assale and Behle) had been among the most vocal critics of the

former government’s policies, and by including one of the co-chiefs of

the Bamileke-oriented Paysans (Michel Njine, who became vice-pre-

mier), Ahidjo incorporated some of the potentially fractious elements

into the cabinet. In this way, he also gave his cabinet a regional equilib-

rium, which it certainly would not have had if most of the ministers had

been of his own party, at that time still predominantly northern-based.

Ahidjo also promised, with some success, to grant amnesty to members of the

UPC who had gone underground following the banning of the party in 1955, if

they gave up their campaign of violence against his administration. The overture

appeared to have been successful. In the three-month period following the am-

bush killing of Ruben Um Nyobe, the general secretary of the party and leader of

the resistance movement in the Sanaga-Maritime region on September 13, 1958

by government forces, and the surrender of his chief lieutenant, Theodore

Mayi-Matip, more than 1200 UPC fighters had surrendered to government forces

(Rubin 1971:96). Another indication that Ahidjo was willing to accommodate

former UPC rebels was his decision in April 1959 allowing Mayi-Matip and the

newly reconstituted internal wing of the UPC known as the rallié upicistes to run

candidates to fill the seats of six legislative members in the the Nyong-et-Sanaga,

Sanaga-Maritime and Bamileke regions, who had either resigned, died or been

Cameroon: Political Opportunism 429

assassinated by UPC terrorists after the December 1956 legislative elections

(Gardinier 1963:88). Even though Ahidjo’s UC candidates could have won those

seats if the party had fielded candidates, Ahidjo decided that the rallié upiciste

candidates stood a better chance of winning if they ran uncontested. The election

provided the rallié upicistes with an opportunity to be represented in the legisla-

ture. An important consequence of recognising the internal wing of the UPC and

also providing an opportunity for that wing of the party to be represented in the

legislature that worked to Ahidjo’s advantage was the rift that the decision cre-

ated between the internal and the external wings of the party that was based in

Conakry, Guinea. In a series of verbal jabs against each other, the external wing

accused Mayi-Matip and the rest of the rallié upicistes of being political oppor-

tunists and imperialist stooges. The rallié upicistes on the other hand accused the

external wing of spreading false propaganda and being uninformed on the do-

mestic realities (LeVine 1979:121). Such friction served Ahidjo well. Although

he was anxious to accommodate UPC members who had surrendered, he dealt se-

verely with those who refused to do so. In 1959, with the intensification of UPC

violence in the Bamileke region, Ahidjo used the event to force through the legis-

lative assembly a request giving him emergency powers that would allow him to

rule by decree until new legislative elections were held in March 1960. He would

ultimately use the emergency powers to request French military support in sup-

pressing UPC resistance.

By the time the former French territory gained its independence on January 1,

1960, Ahmadou Ahidjo, the political opportunist whom the French had perceived

as simply temporary, was well on the way to establishing himself as a viable and

credible leader. Unlike the more uncompromising and abrasive Mbida, Ahidjo

had succeeded by supporting France’s agenda for the territory, as well as by his

ability to form coalitions even with political enemies, modifying his political ide-

ology, and by his skilful use of force and intimidation where necessary. Accord-

ing to LeVine (1986:22), Ahidjo’s position as president provided him with

“opportunities to consolidate his position and to move people onto or off the na-

tional stage as they served his larger purposes”. He would spend the next two

years after independence consolidating his hold on power.

Following independence, the former French trusteeship became La Republique

du Cameroun. According to the pre-independence arrangements with France,

new legislative elections were scheduled after independence in March 1960.

However, concerned that his party would perform poorly in the election, Ahidjo

used the emergency powers that had been granted him in October 1959 to unilat-

erally postpone the election on grounds that the political environment caused by

the UPC insurrection, especially in many of the southern districts, made it diffi-

cult and risky for elections to be conducted. Postponing the election served


Ahidjo’s political agenda well because it prevented the election of a new legisla-

tive body that would have been responsible for drafting a new constitution for the

republic. Instead Ahidjo appointed a special 42-member, mostly pro-Ahidjo, con-

stitutional committee to draft the new constitution. What emerged was a

Gaullist-styled constitution with a strong executive and a weak legislature

(LeVine 1971:81). Despite strong opposition even from some members of the

constitutional committee, the Catholic Church, and several members of the oppo-

sition parties, the new constitution was approved by 60 per cent of the more than

1.3 million voters who had cast their ballots in a special referendum on February

22, 1960. Ahidjo would eventually use the tremendous power granted him by the

constitution to co-opt his political friends and foes and rein in those who opposed

him.

The first opportunity for Ahidjo to use his new powers occurred in April 1960

during the election of representatives to the newly enlarged 100-member Legisla-

tive Assembly, when he was able to shape the electoral laws to favour UC candi-

dates. Since the UC was sure of winning the majority seats in the north, where the

party was well established, the new electoral laws allowed for the creation of a

single-list electoral system in which a party that won the majority seat in any dis-

trict got all the seats in that constituency. By contrast, in many southern districts

where the UC was still not well organised, the elections were conducted on a sin-

gle-member basis. Under this system, victory was based not on the performance

of the party but on the performance of individual candidates. Therefore a party

that won the plurality of votes in any particular constituency did not necessarily

win all seats in the district. This system was detrimental to most of the south-

ern-based parties because it not only allowed candidates from the same party to

run against each other, but severely diminished the chances of any of them win-

ning the majority of seats in the legislature and challenging UC’s control of the

legislative process (Johnson 1970:241; Takougang and Krieger 1998:42). Such

election chicanery allowed Ahidjo’s party to win a slim majority (51 seats), in-

cluding all 44 seats in the north and Bamoun division in the new 100-member

legislature.

In addition to manipulating the electoral process to his party’s advantage, Ahidjo

tried to neutralise many of the opposition parties by co-opting into his party and

his administration many opportunist politicians from the opposition parties who

were all too willing to end their opposition to Ahidjo’s policies in exchange for

the privileges that political power provided. Such was the case in 1960, when, in

exchange for supporting Ahidjo’s election to the presidency, Charles Assale,

leader of the Mouvement d’action nationale Camerounaise (MANC), was re-

warded with the post of prime minister in Ahidjo’s first post-independence gov-

ernment. The new administration also included six members from his UC party,

three from the Front populaire pour l’unite et la paix (FPUP), two from the

Démocrates Camerounais (DC), two from the Progressistes, and one non-deputy

member (Gardinier 1963:109). Just as he had done with the UPC in the years be-

fore independence, Ahidjo was also willing to use force, intimidation and vio-


lence against those who refused to submit to his political whims (Eyinga 1978).

That was the case in July 1962 when four prominent members of other opposition

parties (Charles Okala, André-Marie Mbida, Theodore Mayi-Matip and Bebey

Eyidi) were arrested and ultimately found guilty for publicly criticising the presi-

dent. They were fined and sentenced to long prison terms. Their imprisonment

frightened other opposition leaders and led to a rush by many of them to join

Ahidjo’s party. By July 1962, East Cameroon (as the Republic of Cameroon was

renamed after reunification on October 1, 1961, when the former British South-

ern Cameroons became West Cameroon) had become a de facto one-party state

under the firm control of President Ahidjo and his UC party (LeVine 1971:109).

While the nationalist movement in the French territory was focused on independ-

ence, reunification, and the selection of a leader who was willing to maintain a

Franco-Cameroonian relationship, the situation was more complex in the British

Southern Cameroons. The colonial arrangements between the Southern

Cameroons and the British colony of Nigeria to the west led to the dubious char-

acterisation of the Southern Cameroons as the colony of the region of a colony

(Johnson 1970:94).6

In other words Nigeria, more than Britain, was perceived as

the colonial authority. Consequently, the focus of the nationalist struggle in the

territory included not only the possibility of reunification with the French Camer-

oon but also a future relationship with Nigeria.

Although the idea of reunification with the French Cameroons had first emerged

among French Cameroon immigrants to the British Southern Cameroons

(Takougang 1996:11) and was eventually embraced by nationalist leaders in the

Southern Cameroons, it was used by the latter simply as a ploy to gain some de-

gree of regional autonomy from Nigeria and focus attention on the social and

economic neglect of the territory. Therefore reunification, or what Ardener

(1962) called “the Kamerun idea”, was simply “an effective political horse that

could be ridden by adroit riders” (cited in Welch 1966:159). Details of the nation-

alist movement in the Southern Cameroons have been discussed elsewhere

(Mbile n.d.; Johnson 1970; LeVine 1964; Rubin 1971; Ebune 1992). Suffice to

say that one of the earliest riders of the “reunification horse” was E.M.L.

Endeley. After a brief medical career in Nigeria, Endeley returned to the South-

ern Cameroons in 1947 where he became involved in politics and the organisa-

tion of labour unions. Although it turned out that he was not committed to the

idea of reunification, he nevertheless saw it as an opportunity to demand greater

regional autonomy for the Southern Cameroons. The strategy was successful be-

cause the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution for Nigeria also granted the Southern

Cameroons a quasi-federal status with its own regional House of Assembly, with

Endeley as the leader of government business. Having achieved his objective,

Endeley quickly retreated from pursuing the idea of reunification and increas-


ingly saw the future of the territory as a self-governing region within an inde-

pendent Nigeria. In other words, Endeley had used reunification simply as an

idea and an opportunity to gain power and to extract political concessions from

Britain vis-à-vis the territory’s relationship with Nigeria. The sudden about-face

by Endeley angered John Ngu Foncha and other members of Endeley’s Kamerun

National Congress (KNC), who continued to view reunification as a serious polit-

ical option to be kept alive.

Disenchanted by Endeley’s action, Foncha and some of his supporters left the

KNC and formed the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) in March

1955. While the KNDP advocated complete severance of political ties with Nige-

ria and the administration of the territory as a separate dependency, it felt that re-

unification should occur only after both territories had gained their independence

and had had sufficient time to discuss the future modalities of reunification. It ap-

pears from the KNDP platform, that like Endeley before him, Foncha was not a

committed reunificationist but simply saw reunification as an opportunity to ex-

tract more political concessions from Britain on the future status of the Southern

Cameroons. That neither Foncha nor any Southern Cameroonian politician was

truly committed to the idea of reunification was evident in a letter from the com-

missioner of the Cameroons to the chief secretary to the governor general in

Lagos. This noted that the idea of reunification with the French Cameroons only

surfaced whenever politicians in the Southern Cameroons had difficulties bring-

ing the issue of autonomy for the territory within the Nigerian framework

(Takougang 1996:11).

As the debate on the political future of the territory continued, neither the KNDP

nor the KNC were able to arrive at a consensus on which issues should be put in

front of the voters in the plebiscite. In an effort to exploit the bloodshed and polit-

ical unrest that had raged on in French Cameroon since the banning of the UPC in

1955, for example, Endeley insisted that the options for the voters should be ei-

ther immediate independence and reunification with La Republique du

Cameroun or continued association after independence with Nigeria as a fully au-

tonomous member within the Nigerian federation. The KNDP on the other hand

argued that the issue of reunification should be decided only after the territory

had gained its independence. In other words, rather than clearly articulating an

agenda that was critical to the political stability and economic prosperity of the

territory, each party focused the campaign on the issue that it thought would give

it the political advantage and the opportunity to control the instruments of power

at independence.

As no consensus was reached, both sides were forced to accept the options given

them by the United Nations. The two options to be voted on in the plebiscite

scheduled for February 11, 1961 were immediate independence by joining the in-

dependent Republique du Cameroun or by joining the Federation of Nigeria. The

KNDP, which had no choice but to support the former option, prevailed when

Southern Cameroonians overwhelmingly voted for independence and reunifica-


tion. Although Foncha and the KNDP had been forced to accept a political option

to which neither he nor his party were completely committed, they were forced to

do so because it gave them the best opportunity to become the party that would

lead the territory to independence. Constitutional discussions between Southern

Cameroons political leaders and officials from La Republique du Cameroun,

which had gained its independence on January 1, 1960 culminated in the birth of

the Federal Republic of Cameroon on October 1, 1961 with Ahidjo as president

and Foncha as his vice-president.

At independence, West Cameroonian political leaders were neither experienced

nor well prepared to engage their counterparts in East Cameroon in the difficult

negotiations necessary for crafting a federal constitution. They seemed to be

more interested in the opportunities that reunification would bring to them or

their parties rather than working together to extract the optimum economic and

political advantage for the territory. Consequently, at the Foumban constitutional

conference they were unable to negotiate a constitution of political equals that

would allow each state to retain significant levels of political and economic au-

tonomy (Mbaku 1998). In fact the new constitution, which LeVine (1971:85) de-

scribes as combining attributes of a British-style governor-general, a Fifth

Republic president and an American chief executive, provided Ahidjo with even

more power and authority than the 1960 constitution of La Republique du

Cameroun had given him, thereby handing him the opportunity to create sin-

gle-handedly the Cameroon that he envisioned.

We have discussed earlier that Ahidjo had by 1962 succeeded in establishing a de

facto one-party state in East Cameroon by either co-opting many of his political

enemies into his administration and the UC or forcing them into political obliv-

ion. He would use the same strategy on West Cameroonian politicians, who were

all too eager to sacrifice their political conviction of creating a strong and equal

partnership between the two states on the altar of the political opportunities they

could procure from the establishment of a single-party state. For instance,

Endeley, who had been a strong opponent of reunification, was one of the first

political leaders in West Cameroon to support President Ahidjo’s call for a single

national party or what Ahidjo described as a “grand national unified party”. How-

ever, Endeley and many members of his Cameroon People’s National Conven-

tion (CPNC)7

did not necessarily support the single-party concept because they

thought it was important for the political evolution of the Republic, but because it

could potentially provide political opportunities for the CPNC and other minority

parties in West Cameroon to return to influence and to be represented in govern-

ment (Johnson 1970:262; Kofele-Kale 1987:162, 1986). Concerned that the

CPNC overtures towards Ahidjo’s vision of a single party might undercut KNDP

influence in West Cameroon or even serve as a conduit to federal power by the


CPNC, Foncha quickly initiated the signing of an alliance between the UC and

the KNDP on April 27, 1962 that fell just short of a full merger of the two parties.

The alliance served both Foncha and Ahidjo well because it not only prevented

each of the two parties from organising a branch of the party in each other’s state,

but also prevented them from forming an alliance with opposition parties in each

other’s territory (Johnson 1970:263). Even though the UC–KNDP alliance was

not a complete merger of the two parties, it formed an important first step to-

wards the creation of a single-party state in Cameroon.

The final stages towards the creation of a single party occurred between 1962 and

1966, as politicians and political parties in West Cameroon jockeyed for opportu-

nities and political advantage at the federal and state levels. The most serious in-

cident occurred in August 1963 when, under the provisions of the federal

constitution (article 9, section 3) Foncha had to choose either to retain the post of

prime minister of West Cameroon or become the vice-president of the republic.

He chose the latter believing that it presented the best opportunity, at least at the

federal level, to acquire more power and authority. Foncha’s departure and the

subsequent inability of KNDP leaders to make a unanimous selection of a candi-

date to fill the position of the prime minister of West Cameroon created a power

struggle between supporters of Solomon Tandeng Muna, the federal minister of

transport and communications, who was also a staunch supporter of the federal

structure, and Augustine Jua, minister of finance in the West Cameroon govern-

ment, who was a strong advocate of state rights (Stark 1980:118). Although Jua

was eventually elected by the party to become the new prime minister, the strug-

gle created a rift within the party. In fact, disenchanted by his failure to become

the new prime minister of West Cameroon, Muna together with Emmanuel T.

Egbe, who had also expected to be elected secretary general of the KNDP, left

the party to form the Cameroon United Congress (CUC). This raised the spectre

of a potential CUC/CPNC alliance that could undermine Jua’s administration and

KNDP’s control of the legislature. Soon after becoming prime minister, Jua

adopted two strategic moves in an effort to pre-empt such an occurrence. First, he

instigated the defection of some CPNC leaders by offering them positions in his

administration. For instance, Ajebe-Sone was given the post of secretary of state

for finance, while Honorable Tamfu became secretary of state in the prime minis-

ter’s office (Johnson 1970: 276). Simultaneously, he also moved quickly to es-

tablish an alliance between the KNDP and the CPNC. As a reward for his alliance

with the KNDP, Endeley, the leader of the CPNC, was given a ministerial rank as

leader of the House of Assembly, while N.N. Mbile, Endeley’s friend and loyal

supporter, became West Cameroon’s minister of works (LeVine 1970:99).

The political squabbles among West Cameroonian politicians provided a perfect

opportunity for Ahidjo to push through his idea of a single national party. Like

many of his African counterparts who also favoured the creation of one-party

systems throughout the continent, Ahidjo argued that multipartyism was divisive,

un-African and economically detrimental to good governance and development.

Ahidjo’s vision for a single party was realised on September 1, 1966 when all the


parties in Cameroon agreed to dissolve themselves and form a single party to be

known as the Cameroon National Union (CNU). Stark (1980:292) reminds us

that except for Jua, who as prime minister of West Cameroon had championed

the course of state rights, all West Cameroonian elites found that it benefited their

personal careers to become political clients of President Ahidjo. The opportuni-

ties and personal benefits that these politicians expected by aligning themselves

with Ahidjo’s personal vision for the country therefore far outweighed their will-

ingness to challenge the concept of the one-party state. Commenting on the readi-

ness with which political leaders in West Cameroon accepted the notion of the

one-party state, Kofele-Kale (1987:137) notes that:

the speed with which the principal Anglophone political leaders – men

who had a long history of opposition to the very concept of a single party

– climbed onto the one-party bandwagon would suggest that their inten-

tions were not entirely motivated by pristine ideological considerations.

Individual greed, ambition, and personal aggrandisement as well as the

corporate interests of their class were equally significant motivating fac-

tors.8

Having achieved his goal of a single party in Cameroon, Ahidjo moved quickly

to realise his final vision for Cameroon – the dissolution of the federal structure

that had been established under the 1961 constitution. The first step occurred in

December 1967, when Ahidjo removed any potential obstacle by suddenly and

unexpectedly replacing Jua, the state rights advocate, as prime minister of West

Cameroon with Muna, the federalist. The decision was soon followed on the eve

of the March 1970 presidential election with the unceremonious removal of

Foncha as Ahidjo’s vice-presidential running mate. Muna replaced him as

vice-president. Ahidjo and Muna were eventually elected by over 93 per cent of

the votes cast. Even though we had indicated earlier that the constitution prohib-

ited either the president or the vice-president from holding other elected office, a

special dispensation was made by Law No. 70/LF/1 of May 4, 1972 allowing

Muna to retain both the post of vice-president of the federation and prime minis-

ter of West Cameroon. With the removal of Jua and Foncha, any potential obsta-

cle to the dissolution of the federation was removed. The rest was easy. On May

6, 1972, Ahidjo informed the National Assembly of his intention to replace the

federal structure with a unitary state, and also of his decision to organise a refer-

endum that would allow all Cameroonians to voice their opinion on the matter. In

a hurriedly organised referendum on May 20, 1972, Cameroonians overwhelm-

ingly, by 99.9 per cent of the votes cast, approved the dissolution of the Federal

Republic. A presidential decree on June 2, 1972 formally ushered in the United

Republic of Cameroon.9

Although the unitary constitution made no provision for

a vice-president, Muna’s position as president of the National Assembly still

placed him as the most important politician after the president (Stark 1980:125).

According to Bayart (1978:89), the establishment of the unitary constitution

marked the final stage in the maximisation of presidential powers in Cameroon.


So far, we have seen how Ahidjo used the opportunity that the French authorities

gave him to establish himself ultimately as the undisputed leader in Cameroon. In

achieving that position, however, Ahidjo was not only willing to adhere to the

agenda advocated by France, but he was very skilful and effective in exploiting

the thirst for power and privilege by politicians in East and West Cameroon and

by the ruthless use of force and intimidation to silence potential challengers.

In November 1982, President Ahidjo resigned from office and was succeeded by

Paul Biya, his prime minister and constitutional successor. Despite attempts by

President Biya at instituting some political reforms during the early years of his

presidency, Cameroon remained a one-party state until the introduction of multi-

party politics in December 1990.

In the late 1980s, after nearly three decades of corrupt, repressive and authoritar-

ian rule, African leaders were forced by tremendous international and domestic

pressure to institute political reforms, including the introduction of democratic

governance and respect for human rights. Like many of his counterparts on the

continent, President Biya was reluctant to do so. However, as pressure mounted,

he saw the institution of reforms as the only way to satisfy his French benefactors

and remain in power. Ultimately, Biya had to legalise the formation of multiparty

politics in Cameroon on December 19, 1990. Just as many so-called experts had

underestimated Ahidjo’s staying power and political skill when he was appointed

prime minister in 1958, so too was the case with President Biya. In fact, because

of the discontent in the country and intense demands for political change, many

observers were convinced that the legalisation of multiparty politics in Cameroon

would culminate in Biya’s political demise. They could not have been more

wrong. Like Ahidjo before him, President Biya would exploit the political pro-

cess and the willingness of many opposition leaders to sacrifice their commit-

ment to genuine political reform for an opportunity to gain access to power.

Although he had finally succumbed to demands for change, President Biya was

determined to control the pace and process of the change. That he was willing to

do so became evident as early as 1991 when he steadfastly refused to heed all

calls by the opposition parties for a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to de-

termine the country’s political future. Cognisant of how such conferences had led

to regime change in many other Francophone African states, President Biya ar-

gued that such a conference was irrelevant and had no legal foundation in Camer-

oon, especially since the constitution already allowed political pluralism

(Takougang 1997:170). Instead, after months of procrastination, the president in

late 1991 authorised his prime minister, Sadou Hayatou, to organise the regime’s

version of an SNC – known as the Tripartite Conference. Although the Tripartite

Conference included representatives from civil society and opposition parties, it

was stacked with regime supporters (Ngoh (forthcoming); Fombad and Fonyam

(forthcoming); Takougang and Krieger 1998:141). As a result, after two weeks of


rancorous debates, the final outcome of the conference deliberations known as

the Yaounde Tripartite Accord very much reflected the regime’s political vision

and aspirations. The fact that some of the opposition parties, including the Social

Democratic Front (SDF) – Cameroon’s major opposition party – refused to sign

the Accord was significant in that it showed the friction and division within the

opposition parties. Nevertheless, Biya’s willingness to organise such a confer-

ence served him well by portraying him as a ‘true reformist’, especially to the in-

ternational community. To demonstrate his allegiance to French President

François Mitterrand’s call for Francophone African leaders to carry out demo-

cratic reforms, Biya would later describe himself as one of Mitterrand’s “best pu-

pils” in democratisation.

The fact that the administration’s intention in organising the Tripartite Confer-

ence was mainly for external consumption soon became evident when it refused

to adhere to some of the key provisions of the Tripartite Accord, including the

formation of a technical committee that would be responsible for crafting a new

electoral code and a new constitution. The regime’s refusal to develop a new

electoral code, coupled with the fact that it could manipulate existing electoral

laws to its advantage, was a major reason why some of the opposition parties

boycotted the March 1992 legislative election. Similarly, it is generally agreed by

most observers that Biya’s incumbency and his ability to manipulate the political

process, including the fact that 11 of the 13-member Vote-Counting Commission

were either members of the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement

(CPDM) or from the president’s ethnic group, might have contributed to his vic-

tory in the October 1992 presidential election (National Democratic Institute for

International Affairs 1992). Although the Yaounde Tripartite Accord had also

called for a new constitution, the regime was reluctant to do so. Ultimately, when

it was forced to do so under tremendous domestic and international pressure,

President Biya made sure that the 57-member constitutional review committee

appointed by the president was stacked with regime supporters. In fact, three

Anglophone members of the committee, including Sam Ekontang Elad, Simon

Munzu and Carlson Anyangwe, became so disenchanted with the lack of trans-

parency and consensus in drafting the new constitution that they resigned from

the commission. Their departure served the regime well because in the end the

new constitution, mockingly called by some the `Owona Constitution’ (it had

been crafted by Joseph Owona, secretary-general at the presidency), very much

reflected the parochial view and interests of the regime and the CPDM (Mbaku

1998:2).

So far, President Biya has remained in power through his ability to exploit the op-

portunities of his incumbency, which among other things allows him to deter-

mine the rules and regulations of the democratisation process in Cameroon.

While democratisation provided him with a new challenge, it also revealed the

hypocrisy and opportunistic nature of many opposition leaders who saw political

reform simply as a way of reaping personal benefits. Like Ahidjo before him,

President Biya was effective in exploiting such greed to his political advantage.


An opportunity to do so occurred in March 1992 following the first multiparty

legislative election since the creation of the one-party state in 1966. Although

President Biya and his CPDM had won only 88 seats in the 180-member legisla-

ture, he was still able to maintain control of parliament and avoid a potentially

conflicting and unprecedented power struggle between the legislative and the ex-

ecutive branches of government that could have severely diminished his power

and authority by quickly forming an alliance with the Movement for the Defence

of the Republic (MDR), a minor opposition party that had won all of its six seats

in the Far North province. The decision not only saved the day for the president,

his party and the regime by giving him a slim four-seat majority in parliament,

but also demonstrated how vulnerable some opposition leaders could be, espe-

cially if they could personally benefit from any political opportunity that came

their way. In fact, as a reward for his party’s alliance with the CPDM, Dakolé

Daïssala, leader of the MDR, was subsequently given the rank of a senior cabinet

minister in charge of posts and telecommunications.

In addition to dealing with threats from opposition parties, President Biya had to

contend with secessionist tendencies among English-speaking Cameroonians of

the Northwest and Southwest provinces. Details of what has been characterised

as the ‘Anglophone problem’ have been discussed elsewhere (Eyoh 1998;

Konings and Nyamnjoh 1997; Takougang 1998). Suffice to know that the de-

mocratisation process had brought the perceived marginalisation of Anglophone

Cameroonians to the forefront of Cameroonian politics. The discontent with the

political system felt by many English-speaking Cameroonians undoubtedly con-

tributed to the birth of the SDF in May 1990 in the Anglophone Northwest prov-

ince, and to strong support that the party enjoyed among Anglophones (Konings

and Nyamnjoh 1997). Such support was threatening to the regime, and President

Biya was determined not to let that happen.

The opportunity to undermine the popularity of the SDF, especially among

Anglophone Cameroonians, occurred following the March 1992 legislative elec-

tion with the appointment of Achidi Achu, an Anglophone from the Northwest

province, to the post of prime minister. Achu’s appointment made him the first

Anglophone Cameroonian to hold the post of prime minister since the creation of

the unitary constitution in 1972. Perhaps more important is the fact that his ap-

pointment was seen as an attempt by the president to weaken SDF support among

Anglophone Cameroonians, especially those in the Northwest province – the

birthplace of the SDF. However, political developments between 1992 and 1996

would demonstrate that the strategy had failed to weaken support for the SDF.10

Nevertheless, in September 1996 Biya appointed Peter Mafany Musonge, an

Anglophone from the Southwest province, to succeed Achu as the prime minis-

ter. From all indications, the decision to appoint another Anglophone, albeit from

the Southwest province, has been successful in diminishing SDF support among

Anglophone Cameroonians.11


A similar strategy was used on other opposition leaders and groups. On the eve of

the October 1992 presidential election, for example, Biya signed an agreement

with Frédérick Kodock, leader of the parliamentary wing of the UPC, which had

won 18 seats in the March legislative election. Kodock, like Dakolé Daïssala be-

fore him, was rewarded with the post of minister of state in charge of planning.

The alliance with Kodock was significant. First, it solidified Biya’s support in the

legislature and improved his chances of being re-elected in the October presiden-

tial election. Second, the alliance further increased the rift between the Kodoch

wing and other factions of the UPC12

just as Ahidjo’s recognition of the

rallié-upicistes in the late 1950s had succeeded in weakening and dividing the

party. Finally, it diminished the possibility of an opposition alliance between the

parliamentary UPC and other opposition parties against the CPDM. In another

strategic move following the October 1992 presidential election, Biya appointed

Hamadou Mustapha and Issa Tchiroma, two high-ranking members of another

opposition party – the National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP) – to

cabinet positions. Because both men accepted the position without the consent of

the party’s leadership, they were subsequently dismissed from the party.

Ironically, five years later, following the 1997 presidential election, Bouba Bello

Maigari, leader of the UNDP, who had dismissed the two men for insubordina-

tion, also accepted a cabinet position in Biya’s government without his party’s

approval. In fact, according to some reports following the June 2002 presidential

election, even the SDF, which had been at the forefront of opposition politics in

Cameroon since the early 1990s was willing to join the administration if it was

offered six cabinet positions, including the post of prime minister.13

It is apparent

from the willingness with which some of the opposition leaders were prepared to

join the administration that they were simply political opportunists who saw de-

mocratisation as an opportunity for them to reap personal political gains rather

than change the system (Fombad 2000:242). In other words, for many opposition

politicians, democratisation was seen as an opportunity either to replace the gov-

ernment or participate in it – and either course would do (Ihonvbere, Mbaku and

Takougang 2003).

Biya’s incumbency also provided him with the opportunity to use the military

and other security apparatus to his advantage. In exchange for protecting their so-

cial and economic privileges, especially those of high-ranking officers, the presi-

dent had won the support of the military in protecting the regime since they had a

stake in the regime’s survival. In fact, since the dawn of the pro-democracy

movement in Cameroon, the administration has used various coercive measures

to silence its critics and various opposition groups. Following the highly disputed

1992 presidential election in which the SDF accused the regime of ‘stealing’ the

election, for instance, John Fru Ndi and more than a hundred of his supporters

were placed under house arrest. Additionally, under the pretext of national secu-

rity, a three-month state of emergency was imposed on the Northwest province,

stronghold of the SDF. Other reports also noted that as many as 5000 troops were

deployed in four of the nation’s 10 provinces – the Northwest, Southwest, West


and Littoral – where the opposition had strong support (West Africa, October

26–November 1, 1992). Similar methods have been used since 1992 to intimidate

opposition groups and parties.14

In echoing the role of the military in Cameroon’s

democratisation process, Gros (1995:121) notes that support for the regime by

the military and security forces has been the single most important domestic fac-

tor for the failure of democratic transition in Cameroon and for Biya’s continued

stay in power. If the results of the 1997 presidential elections in which President

Biya was re-elected by over 90 per cent of the votes cast, or the 2002 legislative

election in which the CPDM won 149 seats in the 180-seat legislature, are any in-

dication, it could be argued that President Biya and his regime are more firmly

entrenched in power today than they were on the eve of the pro-democracy

movement in Cameroon, just as Ahidjo had become by 1972 with the dissolution

of the Federation and the creation of the United Republic. Meanwhile, the oppo-

sition parties appear to be increasingly desperate to use the movement for per-

sonal advantage.

The aim of this paper has been to show how political leaders in Cameroon ex-

ploited events during the struggle for independence and the current democratisa-

tion process primarily for their own political gain rather than for the political

benefit or economic welfare of the people they claimed to be representing.

In the case of the former French trust territory, Ahidjo belatedly embraced reuni-

fication only when he thought that doing so was crucial for retaining power in a

post-colonial Cameroon. Similarly, political leaders in the former British South-

ern Cameroons also advocated the idea when it suited them but tried to discard it

when it no longer served their political interest. In the end, Ahmadou Ahidjo

would emerge as the leading nationalist to take the Cameroons to independence,

reunification, the creation of the one-party state and the eventual dissolution of

the Federation in 1972, to be replaced by the United Republic of Cameroon. His

successor, President Biya, continues to control the pace of the democratisation

process which began in the late 1980s. Although the political skills and resilience

of both men were seriously underestimated when they initially took power, they

were able to remain at the helm through their effective use of the military to si-

lence opposition, and their ability to manipulate the political process in their fa-

vour and to exploit the greed and personal ambition of opportunistic politicians.

1. I wish to thank the Taft Fund at the University of Cincinnati for providing the financial sup-

port that allowed me to travel to Taipei, Taiwan, where an earlier version of this paper was

presented at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Association of Third World Studies, De-

cember 27–31, 2002.

2. Although the nationalist period is often described as ending with the achievement of independ-

ence, for the purpose of this paper our discussion will continue until June 1972 because it ef-

fectively marks when President Ahmadou Ahidjo finally achieved his ultimate objective of

creating a single Cameroon nation (the United Republic of Cameroon) under his firm control.


3. Following World War I, the former German colony was divided into two unequal sections be-

tween France and Britain to be administered as League of Nations mandates. With the demise

of the League of Nations at the end of World War II, the territories were renamed United Na-

tions trusteeships but remained under the administration of Britain and France.

4. Jeucafra later reconstituted itself in 1946 and became known as the Union Camerounaise

Francaise (Unicafra).

5. For an excellent discussion of the conflict between the UPC and French authorities, see Joseph

(1977).

6. For a discussion of the administrative arrangement between Nigeria and the British Southern

Cameroons, see Mbile n.d.; LeVine 1964; Johnson 1971; Rubin 1971.

7. In an effort to gain political leverage prior to the plebiscite in the Southern Cameroons, the

Cameroon People’s National Convention was formed in May 1960 by the merger between

Endeley’s KNC and N.N. Mbile’s Kamerun People’s Party.

8. For a similar opinion, see Konings 1999.

9. It is ironic that during the pro-democracy movement in Cameroon in the early 1990s, Muna,

who had been instrumental in the demise of the Federation, was part of an international dele-

gation of Anglophone leaders and politicians campaigning for a return of the federal structure.

10. This conclusion is based on an analysis of various election results held between 1992 and

1996. See, for example, Fonchingong 1998; Takougang 1996.

11. This assessment is based on the results of subsequent elections since Musonge’s appointment

in September 1996 in which the CPDM has performed extremely well in the Southwest prov-

ince.

12. Following the legalisation of the UPC in 1991, the party became fragmented into at least four

different factions – one led by Ndeh Ntumazah, another by Henri Hogbe Nlend, a pro-regime

faction led by Frederic Kodock, and the militant UPC–MANIDEM led by Anicet Ekane.

13. For details on the discussion, see The Herald July 24, 2002. Douala, Cameroon.

14. For an excellent discussion on the use of these tactics, see reports by the US Department of

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