nato: the power of partnerships...10.1057/9780230297500 - nato: the power of partnerships, edited by...

NATO: The Power of PartnershipsH. Edström; J. Matlary; M. PeterssonISBN: 9780230297500DOI: 10.1057/9780230297500Palgrave Macmillan

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NATO: The Power of Partnerships

Edited by

Håkan Edström Janne Haaland Matlary

and

Magnus Petersson

10.1057/9780230297500 - NATO: The Power of Partnerships, Edited by Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson

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New Security Challenges Series

General Editor: Stuart Croft, Professor of International Security in the Depart-ment of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK,and Director of the ESRC’s New Security Challenges Programme.

The last decade demonstrated that threats to security vary greatly intheir causes and manifestations, and that they invite interest and demandresponses from the social sciences, civil society and a very broad policy com-munity. In the past, the avoidance of war was the primary objective, but withthe end of the Cold War the retention of military defence as the centrepieceof international security agenda became untenable. There has been, therefore,a significant shift in emphasis away from traditional approaches to security toa new agenda that talks of the softer side of security, in terms of human secu-rity, economic security and environmental security. The topical New SecurityChallenges series reflects this pressing political and research agenda.

Titles include:

Jon Coaffee, David Murakami Wood and Peter RogersTHE EVERYDAY RESILIENCE OF THE CITYHow Cities Respond to Terrorism and Disaster

Tom DysonNEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND DEFENCE REFORM INPOST-COLD WAR EUROPE

Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (editors)NATO: THE POWER OF PARTNERSHIPS

Christopher Farrington (editor)GLOBAL CHANGE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE NORTHERN IRELANDPEACE PROCESSImplementing the Political Settlement

Kevin Gillan, Jenny Pickerill and Frank WebsterANTI-WAR ACTIVISMNew Media and Protest in the Information Age

Andrew HillRE-IMAGINING THE WAR ON TERRORSeeing, Waiting, Travelling

Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’LoughlinTELEVISION AND TERRORConflicting Times and the Crisis of News Discourse

Paul Jackson and Peter AlbrechtRECONSTRUCTION SECURITY AFTER CONFLICTSecurity Sector Reform in Sierra Leone


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Bryan MabeeTHE GLOBALIZATION OF SECURITYState Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy

Janne Haaland MatlaryEUROPEAN UNION SECURITY DYNAMICSIn the New National Interest

Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper and Mandy Turner (editors)CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICALECONOMY OF PEACEBUILDING

Brian Rappert and Chandré Gould (editors)BIOSECURITYOrigins, Transformations and Practices

Brian RappertBIOTECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITSAn Inquiry into Research and Methods

Brian Rappert (editor)TECHNOLOGY AND SECURITYGoverning Threats in the New Millenium

Ali Tekin and Paul A. WilliamsGEO-POLITICS OF THE EURO-ASIA ENERGY NEXUSThe European Union, Russia and Turkey

Lisa WatanabeSECURING EUROPE

New Security Challenges SeriesSeries Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–00216–6 (hardback) andISBN 978–0–230–00217–3 (paperback)(outside North America only)

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NATO: The Powerof PartnershipsEdited by

Håkan EdströmLecturer and Researcher, Norwegian Defence University College, Norway

Janne Haaland MatlaryProfessor of International Politics, Department of Political Science,University of Oslo, Norway

and

Magnus PeterssonSenior Research Fellow, The Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norway


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Selection and editorial matter © Håkan Edström, Janne HaalandMatlary and Magnus Petersson 2011All remaining chapters © respective authors 2011

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of thispublication may be made without written permission.

No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmittedsave with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of theCopyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licencepermitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency,Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS.

Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publicationmay be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

The authors have asserted their rights to be identifiedas the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright,Designs and Patents Act 1988.

First published 2011 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN

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Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companiesand has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978–0–230–27377–1 hardback

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Printed and bound in Great Britain byCPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne


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Contents

List of Tables and Figures vi

Acknowledgments vii

About the Authors viii

List of Abbreviations x

1 Utility for NATO – Utility of NATO? 1Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and Magnus Petersson

2 Partnerships and Power in American Grand Strategy 18Sean Kay

3 The ‘Natural Ally’? The ‘Natural Partner’? – Australia andthe Atlantic Alliance 40Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer

4 Partnerships to the East and South: A ‘Win-Win’ Policy 60Janne Haaland Matlary

5 Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine 83Tor Bukkvoll

6 NATO and the EU ‘Neutrals’ – Instrumentalor Value-Oriented Utility? 112Magnus Petersson

7 Sweden and NATO – Partnership in the Shadow ofCoalitions and Concepts 131Håkan Edström

8 Potential NATO Partners – Political and Military Utilityfor NATO 163Ryan C. Hendrickson

9 Political and Military Utility of NATO for Argentina 181Federico Merke

Index 209

v


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List of Tables and Figures

Tables

1.1 Research design on perspectives of alliance partnership 75.1 Summary of empirical findings 105

Figures

7.1 Views of the NATO partnership in the Swedishparliament: the four non-socialistic parties areenthusiastic, the Social Democrats’ pragmatic, and thetwo other red-green parties skeptical 135

7.2 Two possible extreme positions when it comes toNATO’s future direction 153

vi


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Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank Alexandra Webster, Christina Brian,and Liz Blackmore at Palgrave Macmillan, for their excellent coop-eration and support. Their professionalism has, with gentle hands,guided us throughout the publishing process.

We also wish to thank the NATO in a Changing World Research Pro-gramme, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, for financialsupport.

The environment provided by our employers – the Department ofPolitical Science at the University of Oslo, the Norwegian Institute forDefence Studies and the Norwegian Defence Command & Staff Col-lege at the Norwegian Defence University College – has been a greatsource of inspiration. The academic discussions we have enjoyed withour colleagues have provided a strong foundation for this book.

Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the panel at ISA’s51st annual convention, New Orleans, LA, USA, 17–20 February 2010.We truly appreciate the insights we gained there from discussion withinternational experts in the field.

vii


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About the Authors

Dr Tor Bukkvoll Senior Research Fellow and head of the Russiaprogram at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, for-mer lecturer of International Relations at the Norwegian MilitaryAcademy, and former researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo(PRIO). Dr Bukkvoll is an expert on Russian and Ukrainian defenseand security politics.

Dr Håkan Edström Lecturer and researcher at the NorwegianDefence University College, and Lieutenant Colonel in the SwedishArmy. Between 2003 and 2007, Edström served at the Departmentof Strategic Analysis in the Headquarters of the Swedish ArmedForces.

Dr Stephan Frühling Lecturer in Graduate Studies in the Strat-egy and Defence Program, Strategic and Defence Studies Center(SDSC), Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies at the AustralianNational University in Canberra, and managing editor of the journalSecurity Challenges.

Dr Ryan C. Hendrickson Professor of Political Science, EasternIllinois University. Professor Hendrickson teaches courses in Inter-national Relations, American Foreign Policy and International Orga-nization. His research focuses on American military action abroad,congressional–executive relations over the use of force, and vari-ous aspects of NATO, including NATO expansion and leadership inNATO.

Dr Sean Kay Professor of Politics and Government, Chair of Inter-national Studies Ohio Wesleyan University, and Associate, MershonCenter for International Security Studies at the Ohio State Uni-versity. Dr Kay specializes in international politics, internationalsecurity, globalization, international organizations, and US foreignand defense policy.

viii


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About the Authors ix

Dr Janne Haaland Matlary Professor of International Politics at theDepartment of Political Science, University of Oslo, and former StateSecretary for Foreign Affairs of Norway (1997–2000). Her main fieldsare the European Union as a political system, its foreign and securitypolicy, European security at large as well as the importance of humanrights, ‘soft law,’ and public diplomacy.

Dr Federico Merke Researcher at the National Council for Scientificand Technological Research (CONICET) and Lecturer of InternationalRelations at the Universidad de San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina.His research interests include IR-theory, International Politics andSecurity, Latin American international relations, and Argentine andBrazilian foreign policy.

Dr Magnus Petersson Senior Research Fellow at the NorwegianInstitute for Defence Studies, and former Research Fellow, Directorof Studies, and Head of Research and Development at the SwedishNational Defense College. His research interest is on NATO, militarytheory, and strategic theory.

Dr Benjamin Schreer Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence StudiesCentre, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies at theAustralian National University in Canberra. His research interest ison NATO, Australian and Asia-Pacific strategic policy, and strategictheory.


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List of Abbreviations

ABACC Argentine–Brazilian Agency forAccounting and Control

ABCA NATO members America, Britain, and Canadawith Australia

ACAK Argentine Joint GroupingADF Australian Defence ForceANZUS Australia, New Zealand, and US Security

TreatyASCC Air Standardization Coordinating

CommitteeASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASG Abu Sayyaf GroupAWACS Airborne Warning and Control SystemB&H Bosnia–HerzegovinaCC Contact CountriesCCEB AUSCANNZUKUS Naval C4 Organization,

Combined Communications ElectronicsBoard

CENTO Central Treaty OrganizationCFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

EuropeCoE Council of EuropeCOIN Counterinsurgency OperationsCSD South American Defense CouncilDP Distinctive PartnershipEAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership CouncilEC European CommunitiesECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America

and the CaribbeanENP European Neighbourhood PolicyEU European Union

x


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List of Abbreviations xi

FARC Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias deColombia, English: The Revolutionary ArmedForces of Colombia

FMF Foreign Military FinancingFPDA Five Power Defence ArrangementsFTAA Free Trade Area for the AmericasGCC Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the

Gulf, often referred to as ‘Gulf CooperationCouncil’

HAW Heavy Airlift WingICI Istanbul Cooperation InitiativeID Intensified DialogueIFOR Implementation ForceINTERFET International Force for East TimorIOs International OrganizationsIPAP Individual Partnership Action PlanIPP Individual Partnership ProgramIR International RelationsISAF International Security Assistance ForceJI Jemaah IslamiyaKFOR Kosovo ForceMAP Membership Action PlanMD Mediterranean DialogueMERCOSUR Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur, English:

Southern Common MarketMNNA Major Non-NATO AlliesMNTF-S Multinational Task Force SouthNAC North Atlantic CouncilNACC North Atlantic Cooperation CouncilNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNDP New Democratic PartyNPA New People’s ArmyNPT Non-Proliferation TreatyOAS Organization of American StatesOSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in

EuropePARP Planning and Review ProcessPfP Partnership for PeacePRT Provincial Reconstruction Team


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xii List of Abbreviations

PSE Partnership Staff ElementsQDR Quadrennial Defense ReviewRSM Rajah Solaiman MovementSAC Strategic Airlift CapabilitySACEUR Supreme Allied Commander EuropeSAF Swedish Armed ForcesSCEPC Senior Civil Emergency Planning CommitteeSEATO Southeast Asia Treaty OrganizationSFOR Stabilization Force in Bosnia–HerzegovinaSHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeSOFA Status of Forces AgreementSTANAGS Standardization AgreementsSTART Strategic Arms Reduction TreatyTTCP Technical Cooperation ProgramUAV Unmanned Aerial VehicleUNASUR Union of South American NationsUNPROFOR UN Protection ForceUXO Unexploded OrdnanceWMD Weapon of Mass DestructionWNP Washington NATO Project


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1Utility for NATO – Utilityof NATO?Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary, and MagnusPetersson

The problem and the purpose of the book

In the aftermath of World War II, the Truman doctrine and astrategy of containment was adopted. A central element of this con-tainment strategy was the US-centered alliance system; while theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the European partof the system. There were similar alliance formations in other partsof the world. What makes NATO unique, however, is the fact thatit is the only treaty organization that survived into the new millen-nium. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was dissolvedin 1977 after the Vietnam War, the Central Treaty Organization(CENTO) was dissolved in 1979 after the revolution in Iran, andthe Australia, New Zealand, and US Security Treaty (ANZUS) as suchlost its relevance in 1986 when the US suspended its commitmentstowards New Zealand.1

It can be argued that the reason for NATO’s ‘survival’ is that thealliance, in addition to its standing organization, has managed tostay relevant as a tool for managing modern conflicts while beingopen and inclusive, not only for new members but also for differentkinds of partnerships.

When studying NATO, the focus is often on the member states,their policies, differences, and conflicts. In contrast to research onthe European Union (EU), relatively little has been written on theinstitutions within NATO and the dynamics of its decision-making.2

This is also true for NATO’s partnership structure. Although large andcomplex, it has not received any significant scholarly attention. We

1


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2 Utility for NATO – Utility of NATO

do not know whether NATO’s partnerships are the result of a politicalstrategy and design or whether partnerships have evolved as a prag-matic and perhaps ad hoc response to problems that have presentedthemselves. Neither do we know whether NATO has an overall planfor all the different types of partnerships that have developed – fromthose with states that are potential members to those with states thatare close to the US, but not necessarily to NATO.

Today NATO has several partner countries that can be clusteredinto different kinds of categories. In addition there are states whichrecently have established a relationship with NATO, such as Pakistanand Argentina, that might develop into a full partnership. Do thesestates have anything at all in common in terms of their relationshipswith NATO? Does NATO make security policy through an extensivepartnership strategy, or is there no such plan behind it? What is theutility for NATO of all these partnerships, and what do partner statesseek to achieve?

Framing the problem

In the EU, there is a political plan behind membership policy aswell as a ‘partnership policy,’ which entails several types of rela-tionships, from the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to globaltrade agreements. These ‘partnerships’ have also received scholarlyattention. When it comes to NATO, this is not the case.

In this study we propose to investigate NATO partnerships: Arethey based on a policy, and if so, to what end? We will also presentcase studies from the perspective of the partner countries: Whatdoes partnership status bring? Hypotheses about both these questionsevolve around the question of security: Is it true that a partner statederives security benefit from such a status? If so, such a state mayachieve such benefits rather easily, without the politically cumber-some process of membership. Similarly, NATO can extend its security‘sphere of influence’ easily, without political cost. It would seem thatpartnership can be a win-win option in general security policy terms.The political utility seems mutual: Few strings attached, yet a clearsignal to the outside world that NATO’s influence extends to thepartner state.

But what about the military utility? Sometimes the partner statereally contributes heavily on the military side, like Australia inAfghanistan. Why? Here the utility for NATO is obvious. But what


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Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson 3

is the objective from the partner state’s perspective? Perhaps it liesin the closeness to the US that is achieved, and that the bilateralrelationship is what is desirable. If so, is NATO used as a vehicle foralignment with US security policy?

Another aspect is related to time. The concept of partnership was –more or less – introduced on an ad hoc basis to handle the chaotic sit-uation in the aftermath of the Cold War. In NATO’s strategic conceptfrom 1999 the rationality of partnerships was explicitly articulated.The strategic concept could not, however, foresee the new strategicsetting caused by the events of 11 September 2001. How has the con-cept of partnership developed over time? What impact have changesin the global security situation had during the last 15 years? Andwhat about the future? Will the trend toward global partnershipscontinue? Will the concept of partnership fade away if most of thecurrent partners become members?

Thus, there are important questions raised by NATO’s large part-nership portfolio. In the following we will go into these questions ingreater detail.

In the Euro-Atlantic region, NATO has, step by step, created newmechanisms for cooperation. The North Atlantic Cooperation Coun-cil (NACC) was created in 1991, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)in 1994. The decision in 1997 to create the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil (EAPC) can be seen as a sign of NATO’s desire to move evenfurther in this type of partnership cooperation.

In the Eastern European region, NATO has taken other steps in addi-tion to EAPC. The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is sucha step and was launched at the Prague Summit in 2002. Further-more, special relationships with the Ukraine have been developedsince 1997. The signing of the NATO–Ukraine Charter on a Distinc-tive Partnership (DP) is the latest step in this bilateral cooperation.Another example from Eastern Europe is the special NATO–GeorgiaCommission set up after the Russian intervention in 2008.

In addition, there is a NATO–Russia Council. The council, however,serves other purposes than all other partnerships. The NATO–Russiapartnership can, as Martin A. Smith has argued, be described asmainly ‘pragmatic,’ in some ways as ‘strategic,’ but definitely notas ‘normative,’ that is, shaped by ‘agreement on a common set ofbehavioral norms, values and standards’. All other NATO partner-ships contain such an element, in addition to the pragmatic and


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strategic feature (Smith, 2006, p. 12). The NATO–Russia partnershipwill therefore not be elaborated on in this volume.

In the region of the Greater Middle East, NATO’s MediterraneanDialogue (MD) was initiated in 1994, and the Istanbul CooperationInitiative (ICI) was launched at the Istanbul Summit in 2004. ICI aimsto offer countries of the region security partnership with NATO.

In the region of the Western Pacific, significant steps were takenat the Riga Summit in 2006. The steps intended to increase the rel-evance of NATO’s cooperation with other partners, not only in theEuro-Atlantic region, but across the globe. These steps were rein-forced by decisions at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which defineda set of objectives for these partnerships and created possibilities forenhanced political dialogue. Often referred to as ‘Contact Countries’(CC), these partners and NATO share similar strategic concerns (moststates would claim to share democratic norms and values).

What political and military relevance do all these types of partner-ships have for the alliance and for the partners? What is their goal –is it strategic, operational, or tactical?3 Are the partnerships a tool ofburden-sharing or are they a manifestation of a new ‘global’ NATO?And what about the key members? What is it, for example, that theUS wants from partnerships as opposed to the bilateral mechanismsit has established beyond NATO? And, finally, what about the part-ners? Is the utility of cooperation the same for partner countries asfor the alliance? And if not, is that a problem?

To sum up, this book uses an inductive approach to scrutinize andilluminate the function of different forms of partnership betweenNATO, on the one hand, and non-member countries that have somekind of formal connection with NATO on the other. Which politicaland military utility do the different forms of cooperation have forNATO? Which political and military utility do the different forms ofcooperation have for the connected states? Answering these researchquestions will teach us more about how NATO functions, and, inaddition, how alliances interact with the external environment ingeneral.

Research design

An overarching problem, touched upon above, that has to be dealtwith is how to explain the logic behind the actor’s preferences andbehavior. Is it built on a ‘rational’ or ‘non-rational’ foundation?


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Could it, for example, be explained from an idealistic/liberalistic orrealistic – that is, ‘rational’ – perspective? Does it, hence, rest on anambition to reach a ‘democratic peace’ and a safe world order builton international law (liberalism), an interest-based strategic and/orgeopolitical calculation (realism)? In that case, is the process drivenmainly by internal or external forces?

Or is it rather an uncontrolled bottom-up bureaucratic process –that is, a lack of rational/strategic thinking – that best can explainthe behavior of the actors? Maybe the ‘logic’ behind the partnershippolicy is best explained through a constructivist perspective? Anotherimportant question is who the key actors are: are they the samein different contexts? There are not many answers to these impor-tant questions in the existing scholarly literature.4 We will thereforereturn to them – and discuss them in greater detail – when we presentthe findings later in this chapter.

As noted above, there are many types of partnership arrange-ments between NATO and non-member countries. We have chosento divide them into three different categories:

The first can be called ‘NATO as a complement to the US.’ In thiscategory we find countries that are so called major non-NATOallies (MNNA) of the US and have some formal connections withNATO. This category includes CC-, MD-, and ICI-partners such asAustralia, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco,New Zealand, and South Korea.

The second category can be called ‘potential NATO members.’ Weare aware of the fact that the may be potential NATO membersin the other categories as well, but in this category we find coun-tries that are neither MNNA nor EU members, but are partners tothe alliance within the frame of IPAP or DP. Many, if not all, ofthe countries in this category might be hoping to become a fullNATO member in the future.5 The category includes Armenia,Azerbaijan, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova,Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine.

The third category can be called ‘NATO as a complement to theEU.’ In this category we find partners that are EU members andtake part in the EAPC, but have no immediate plans of member-ship. The category includes Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, andSweden.


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The research design for the book is to present a country perspectiveand a NATO perspective from each category, focusing on the politicaland military utility of partnership, and further, to compare the resultsboth with regard to a country and NATO perspective and between thedifferent partnership categories.

Regarding the first category, ‘NATO as a complement to the US,’we have chosen an Australian perspective on the utility of partner-ship. Australia is, together with Japan, both NATO’s and the US’smost important partner in the ‘East’ (Jain and Bruni, 2004), andsince Australia, but not Japan, is contributing with forces to NATO’smilitary operations, it is useful to pick Australia as a case study –the country contributes to combat operations, unlike many partnerstates. In this case, NATO seems to benefit, yet we do not know howAustralia benefits politically, especially perhaps from the US. Thiswill be further elaborated in the chapter on the NATO–Australianpartnership.

Regarding category two, ‘Potential NATO members,’ we have cho-sen to study the political and military utility of NATO from aUkrainian perspective. Ukraine has participated in several NATOoperations, but above all, it is a key country, along with Georgia, inthe debates in NATO about potential members. The analysis of theNATO perspective on this category of states is general and not con-nected to the Ukraine case in particular. Regarding the next category,‘NATO as a complement to the EU,’ we have picked Sweden as a casestudy. The motive is that Sweden, compared with the other partnersin the category, seems to have made the largest efforts to transformits defense forces in a way that is relevant to the NATO expeditionarywarfare.

We will, however, also include an analysis of a fourth categoryof states interested in NATO, but without any formal affiliation tothe organization, here labeled as ‘Potential NATO partners.’ In thiscategory we find MNNA countries that might become partner coun-tries. The category includes Argentina, Pakistan, the Philippines, andThailand. Here we have chosen Argentina as a case study. The rea-son is that Argentina seems to have closest relations with NATO; thecountry has, inter alia, contributed with forces to NATO operationsin the Balkans.

Table 1.1 gives an overview of the various partnership categories:


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Table 1.1 Research design on perspectives of alliance partnership

Categories of partnershiparrangements

Internal (NATO)perspective

External (country)perspective

‘NATO as a complement to theUS’ (Australia, Bahrain, Egypt,Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait,Morocco, New Zealand, andSouth Korea)

Political andmilitary utility forNATO of thecategory as such

Political andmilitary utility ofNATO for Australia

‘Potential NATO members’(Armenia, Azerbaijan,Bosnia–Herzegovina, Georgia,Kazakhstan, Moldova,Montenegro, Serbia, andUkraine)


Political andmilitary utility ofNATO for Ukraine

‘NATO as a complement to theEU’ (Austria, Finland, Ireland,Malta, and Sweden)


Political andmilitary utility ofNATO for Sweden

‘Potential NATO partners’(Argentina, Pakistan, thePhilippines, and Thailand)


Political andmilitary utility ofNATO for Argentina

To be able to fully evaluate the external value of the different NATOpartnerships, the utility of NATO, the context of each of the fourcategories will serve as a natural point of departure. The partnershipis hereby approached with the non-NATO security arrangements inmind. The added value of the NATO partnership, compared to theco-existing arrangement, is hence a critical question.

Also, when it comes to the evaluation of the internal value of thedifferent NATO partnerships, the utility for NATO, existing securityarrangements can serve as points of departure. One option might,for example, be to explore the utility for NATO in cooperating withindividual states compared with the utility of regional organiza-tions. In some cases NATO might even have established cooperationwith other organizations, hereby indicating that a critical question isrelated to the value the specific country partnership might add.6

Our ambition is to shed as much light as possible on differentaspects of the NATO partnership phenomenon. Therefore, we do


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not intend to provide a set list of research questions to be answeredin each chapter. Instead, we leave chapter authors some leeway indefining how military and political utility can be understood. In thatsense, the overarching research method is inductive.

The individual chapters will bring valuable knowledge on specificaspects of partnership, and a comparative aggregated knowledge ongeneral aspects of partnership. There is no rationale for generaliza-tion for each of the partnership categories, yet it may be possible togeneralize about NATO partnership policy when we see the empiricalfindings as a whole.

The study of both internal and external perspectives will, we hope,lead to a deeper understanding of how political and military utilityis calculated and evaluated from country and NATO perspectives. Inaddition, it will shed light on the logic behind the policy and actionsof the alliance on the one hand, and the policy and actions of thedifferent countries on the other.

The findings

What, then, is the function of NATO’s different forms of partnership?Which political and military utility do the different forms of coop-eration have for NATO? Which political and military utility do thedifferent forms of cooperation have for the partners?

From a NATO perspective, the political and military utility seemsto differ not only between the different kind of partnerships butalso within each specific arrangement and over time. In Chapter 2,Sean Kay discusses partnerships as a key mechanism for Americangrand strategy. His findings indicate that NATO partnerships havebeen crucial for promoting American interests since the Cold War.The utility of the partnerships has, however, changed over time.During the 1990s, the principal utility was political; initially ‘sig-naling strategic restraint,’ evolving into ‘a mechanism for extend-ing American primacy via alliance expansion.’ After 11 September2001 the character of the partnerships has gradually transformed,serving both political and military needs. Hence, the principal util-ity has been more instrumental, ‘a tool of achieving responsibilitysharing in security management’ worldwide. Kay’s findings indi-cate that this transformation will continue as the US global powerdeclines.


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In Chapter 4, Janne Haaland Matlary, analyzes the utitility forNATO of having partners that is potential members (Armenia,Azerbaijan, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova,Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine). She introduces two hypothesesabout NATO’s policy regarding these states; ‘NATO seeks to extendit geo-political power through memberships and partnerships to theEast’ (hypothesis 1) and ‘NATO’s membership and partnership strat-egy is based on the idea that democracies ensure peace, and is aimedat domestic socialization’ (hypothesis 2). She finds that NATO’s policycontains both elements, but that the ‘democratic peace’ hypothesisis prevalent. She also finds that these states contribute with troopsand logistical help to NATO connected to ISAF operation, which gen-erates military utility for NATO. Nevertheless, it ‘seems clear,’ sheargues, ‘that there is no NATO strategy towards membership in thesecases.’ Partnerships carry no risk for NATO, but do not bring muchgeopolitical influence. Yet NATO seems to be content with piecemealinfluence through projects with partners, she argues.

In Chapter 6, Magnus Petersson discusses the utility for NATO ofthe partnership with the EU ‘neutrals.’ His findings indicate thatNATO’s relationship with this group of states is mainly ‘ad hocdriven’ and that it is focused on military rather than political utility.Petersson argues that since there is a ‘strategic commonality’ betweenNATO and these states the partnership is unproblematic from a polit-ical perspective. The consequence of this is that more focus can beput on developing practical military cooperation. Although the groupis politically homogenous, the states differ when it comes to ‘the“hard” objectives of the PfP program’; Sweden and Finland seem to bemore willing to contribute to NATO’s military efforts than the othercountries in the group. According to Petersson, Sweden and Finlandare ‘very eager to do “everything” as a loyal partner except securityguarantees.’

In Chapter 8, Ryan C. Hendrickson’s findings correspond well withthe findings of both Kay and Petersson. Hendrickson, who is analyz-ing four of America’s MNNAs (Argentina, Pakistan, the Philippines,and Thailand), that is potential NATO partners, strengthens Kay’sfinding on an increased use of partnerships by the US, even beyondthe NATO context. From a NATO perspective, however, the utility isnot always very obvious. A closer relationship between NATO andeach of the four countries might even raise ‘new diplomatic and


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human rights questions for the Alliance to consider,’ Hendricksonargues. The utility for NATO seems to be military and related tothe global struggle against terrorism and instability. According toHendrickson, the potential lies primarily in ‘each MNNAs’ militarycapabilities and proclivities toward international peacekeeping.’ Thefact that these military capabilities differ corresponds well with thepatterns in Petersson’s chapter.

From a partner country perspective, the picture is also differentiated.In Chapter 3, Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer demonstratethat the principal utility of the NATO partnership for Australia ‘liesin its function as a temporary complement to the US.’ They con-clude, however, that partnership with NATO is only one strategicoption in the US–Australia context. Other options include part-nership with and/or membership in other organizations servingAustralia’s national interests. In that sense, Australia’s partnershipwith NATO after 11 September 2001 ‘reflects more a continuation ofa previous pattern of pragmatic and practical cooperation.’ Accord-ing to Frühling and Schreer, the limit of the partnership from anAustralian perspective is defined by the degree of ‘overlap of strate-gic interests.’ As long as NATO maintains its ‘customer approach,’the political utility of the partnership for Australia is obvious. Themilitary needs of Australia will most likely continue to be managedthrough Anglo-Saxon cooperation.

In Chapter 5, Tor Bukkvoll analyzes the utility of the partner-ship with NATO for Ukraine from the perspective of three differentdomestic political forces; the politicians, the military and the defenseindustry. By using different analytical levels and different types ofmotivation, Bukkvoll concludes that the European identity-orientedmotivation is most relevant when explaining the general Ukrainianapproach to NATO. Without overlapping motives ‘it is question-able,’ according to Bukkvoll, ‘whether it would have been possible tomuster the elite consensus necessary to engage in the presently veryactive partnership policy.’ A precondition for Ukraine’s relationshipwith NATO is, however, a preservation of functioning relationshipsbetween Ukraine and Russia. In addition, Bukkvoll points out that,even if Ukraine officially aims for NATO membership, ‘there is noelite majority willing to push for membership today.’ Bukkvoll’s find-ings indicate that the main utility of the partnership for Ukraine isneither political, nor military, but rather cultural.


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In Chapter 7, Håkan Edström follows Bukkvoll’s example by ana-lyzing the utility of the NATO partnership for different domesticpolitical forces. Edström, however, offers a more in-depth analysis ofone of these forces – the political parties represented in the Swedishparliament. His findings indicate that parties to the left (includingthe Green Party) tend to be skeptical of the partnership and anti-American in their approach, while parties to the right tend to beenthusiastic about both NATO and the US. According to Edström,parties to the left tend to evaluate the utility of the partnership froman idealistic standpoint, while parties to the right tend to use a real-istic point of departure. For leftist parties, Edström argues, the utilityof the partnership is foremost political; it ‘provides a forum for dia-logue and consultations, mainly between the West and Russia, andprimarily related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferationof WMD.’ Parties on the right, on the other hand, see the utility onboth the political and the military level. As in the Australian case,these parties tend to relate the utility to Sweden’s national interests.

In Chapter 9, Federico Merke discusses the utility of NATO for thepotential NATO partner Argentina. Merke uses three levels of anal-ysis: the global, the regional, and the domestic. At the global level,both political utility, ‘to participate in an active way in the reshapingof the international security agenda,’ and military utility, ‘the par-ticipation of Argentine troops in the NATO-led missions,’ are to befound, according to Merke. At the regional level the utility is mainlypolitical and has ‘to do with prestige and balance of power patterns’in Argentina’s relationships with Brazil and Chile. At the domesticlevel, Merke, like Bukkvoll, connects the utility of the relationshipswith NATO to the cultural dimension rather than to the political ormilitary. Naturally, in the Argentine case, it is not to a European butto a Western identity Merke relates his findings. However, as in caseof Australia, the most important relationship is not with NATO assuch, but with the US. Merke’s results thus agree with the findings ofFrühling and Schreer.

Conclusions and suggestions for further research

The picture of NATO’s political and military utility of NATO partner-ships presented above is complicated, disparate, and not all exhaus-tive. Some answers to the general and particular research questionswe have proposed can, however, be suggested. It can, for example, be


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argued that some (positive) utility can be found in all types of NATOpartnerships investigated, both from a NATO perspective and fromthe partner or potential partner state’s perspective. This is, however,not a very important or unexpected finding.

Although there does not seem to exist a NATO partnership strategy,as underscored in several chapters, the utility for NATO in havingall these partnerships appears obvious. They ‘provide’ more securitythan they ‘consume.’ But, as mentioned above, the utility for NATOof partners seems to change over time; several of the chapters demon-strate that political utility was more prominent in the 1990s, whilemilitary utility seems to have been more important after 11 September2001. This is not only connected to strategic or global terrorism, butalso to the decline of the US as hegemonic power. The US cannotcarry out several operations alone over a sustained period of time,as we see in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a real needfor military input from others across the spectrum of operations. Theneed for military burden-sharing is set to continue, and this makesthe partnership concept increasingly important.

From a partner or a potential partner state perspective, the chapterfindings strongly support earlier research that partners have a quitestrong position, and significant room for maneuver. In the ‘absence’of a clear NATO partnership strategy or ‘demanding’ policy, the part-nerships seem to be quite ‘partner driven’ or ‘consumer driven.’ Thatcan also, at least partly, explain the differences between the part-ner’s and potential partner’s behavior and perceived utility of thepartnership with NATO.

The ‘partner-driven’ partnerships also seem to give the partners orpotential partners great possibilities to shape the partnership accord-ing to their own national interests – to take and give ‘what they want’from NATO and to prioritize other relationships when it is consideredconvenient. For Argentina and Australia, the US relationship is farmore important than the NATO relationship; for Sweden, EU mem-bership has priority over the NATO partnership; and for Ukraine, therelationship with Russia is, as Bukkvoll writes, ‘a precondition’ for therelationship with NATO.

A more specific question proposed above is the role of NATO’s dom-inant actor, the US, in NATO’s different partnerships. The chapters inthis book show, not surprisingly, that the role of the US is central –from both a NATO perspective and a partner country perspective.


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As Kay demonstrates in his chapter, the use of partnerships ‘as atool for managing the international security environment’ has beencentral in US policy since the end of the Cold War, and that has, nat-urally, heavily influenced the development of NATO’s partnerships.

The rational for partnership arrangements has moved from politi-cal inclusion and security-building in Europe in the 1990s to militaryburden sharing in global operations after 11 September 2001. Itcan be argued that this development has ‘served’ partners’ interestsmore than members’ interests, since it has blurred the distinctionbetween member and partner as contribution to a NATO operationbecomes more important than formal affiliation. A heavily contribut-ing partner can be more valuable for the alliance than a reluctantmember.

As already mentioned, the role of the US is very important, butvarying with partners. For Argentina the relationship to the US seemsto be intertwined with the relationship to NATO. As Merke arguesin his chapter; when the relationship to the US became closer inthe 1990s, the relationship to NATO developed along the same pat-tern, and when the relationship to the US became more distant after11 September, Argentina also retreated from NATO. In the case ofAustralia the relationship to the US seems to be essential; Australia‘exchanges,’ as Frühling and Shreeer clearly demonstrate in theirchapter, military contribution to the US/NATO operations for USpolitical support. The role of the US in the Swedish and Ukrainianpartnership seems important, but more vague and indirect. As indi-cated in Edström’s chapter, the ideological preferences of differentpolitical parties might impact on their views on the role of the USand hence also NATO.

A second, more specific, question proposed above is the militaryrelevance of the partnerships for the alliance and for the partnerson the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. However, as thediscussion above has already indicated, it is not always simple todistinguish between political and military utility. As Merke, andFrühling and Shreer show in their chapters, the Argentine troop con-tribution to NATO’s operations in the Balkans, and the Australiancontribution to the operation in Afghanistan, is not primarily ofmilitary relevance for these countries.

The answer to the question also depends on the perspective. Froma NATO perspective, it can be argued that the military utility of the


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partnerships was more connected to the strategic level in the 1990s; itwas seen as important to reform, and democratize the defense forcesin the former Warsaw Pact countries that became partners, both perse as well as to prepare them for future membership. But when NATOstarted to conduct ‘sharp’ military operations, first in the Balkansand then in Afghanistan, the operational and tactical levels becameincreasingly important. Troop contribution to ongoing military oper-ations are, as Kay, Matlary, and Hendrickson show in their chapters,essential to the US and NATO.

This picture can, however, be nuanced. The military utility forNATO of the EU ‘neutrals’ was mainly their contribution on the oper-ational and tactical level in the former Yugoslavia even in the 1990s.Also, when applying a partner perspective, it can be argued that theoperational and tactical levels have been important over the wholeperiod for the EU ‘neutrals.’ Since NATO standards have become closeto universal in peace operations, these countries have been eager toadapt to these standards. As Petersson argues in his chapter,

The ability to develop interoperability through the PfP program,aiming at being a better peace keeper can, in sum, be a distinctfeature for the relation between NATO and the EU ‘neutral’ part-ner countries (plus Switzerland), compared to many of the EasternEuropean countries who sees the PfP program, first and foremost,as a way of becoming a NATO member.

The military relevance from a partner perspective can also, as Edströmshows in his chapter, be seen as strategic. For the Swedish gov-ernment, the NATO partnership seems to be a strategic tool formodernization, reform, and transformation of the armed forces. Thequestion of the military utility of the partnerships is therefore acase of sophisticated interplay between the military and politicalspheres, as well as within the military organization (that is strategic,operational, and tactical levels).

A final, more specific question proposed above is how to explainNATO partnerships from a meta-theoretical perspective. Will thedevelopment of the partnerships be explained first and foremostfrom a realist, a liberal, or a constructivist perspective? Or do weneed other tools for explanation? As already touched upon, it can beargued that all three perspectives have explanatory power in this case.


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NATO’s own partnership policy might best be described as mainlyliberal in the 1990s and mainly realistic since 11 September 2001.As Hendrickson shows in his chapter, the establishment of globalpartners and potential partners for contribution in global militaryoperations, and to handle the terrorist challenges after the turn ofthe millennium can be seen as typical realistic behavior. The multi-lateral security architecture that was built up by the US and NATOin the 1999s that included the PfP program, that Kay describes in hischapter, can be seen as typical liberal behavior.

From a partner perspective, realist behavior seems to dominatemore clearly. Argentina and Australia have already been mentioned,but also the previous Swedish center-right cabinet seems, as Edströmshows in his chapter, to base its partnership with NATO mainly onquite clearly formulated national interests. There exists, however, alsoquite strong institutional arguments as well, not least the interest incontributing to UN-sanctioned peace operations that are shared byall the parties in the Swedish parliament.

As Bukkvoll shows in his chapter, the Ukrainian partnership isclearly in line with constructivist theory on national as well assectoral and individual level. There is some explanatory power from arationalist/realist perspective, but the European identity, according toBukkvoll, ‘has the strongest explanatory power.’ As shown in Merke’schapter, one can also trace constructivist elements in the Argentinecase, but – as mentioned above – stemming from a Western ratherthan a European identity.

What are the main conclusions of this book? How are these rele-vant for our knowledge about alliances and partners to alliances ina wider sense? The concept of political and military utility has beencentral in this introduction, and the authors of the chapters belowhave discussed it in depth from eight different perspectives. A funda-mental question is whether the utility of the partnerships is mutual,and if not, if that is a problem. The short answer is that the part-ners seem to gain more utility from NATO than NATO gain from itspartners.

But that is not necessarily a problem as long as the overall politi-cal and military utility for NATO in having partners provides securityfor, rather than consumes security from, the alliance. As Frühling andSchreer have recently suggested, NATO could benefit even more fromits partnerships if the alliance establish ‘a clearer conception of what


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the policy instrument of NATO “partnerships” entails in functionalterms’ (Frühling and Schreer, 2010, p. 54). This is most certainly true,but we also need more research – analytical, comparative, and empir-ical – on partnerships, and not least because it is quite reasonable tobelieve that we will have to live with partnerships for a long time, oras Kay puts it in his chapter:

The chapter concludes by demonstrating that, due to a dra-matic decline in American power and significant overseas militaryburdens, a new phase of partnership is emerging with seriousimplications for global and regional security in the twenty-firstcentury.

Kay argues that partnerships can be ‘the key transition point’ into anew multi-polar7 international system. If he is right, it will be of greatimportance to understand, in depth, the power of partnerships.

Notes

1. The US-Australia and the New Zealand-Australia legs are, however, stilloperative and have arguably become much closer.

2. There are some exceptions from this ‘rule,’ for example Hendrickson (2006)and Deni (2007).

3. For a thorough analytical discussion on that specific topic, see Betts (2000)and Luttwak (1987).

4. There are, however, a few very good exceptions, for example Moore(2010a, b) and Frühling and Schreer (2010).

5. Since this book focuses on different partnerships, we will not, though,pay any further attention to problems related to the applications andprocedures for membership.

6. For example GCC in category 1, EU in category 3, and ASEAN andMERCOSUR in category 4.

7. For a further discussion on multi polarity, see for example Kissinger (1994),Craig and George (1995) and Deutsch and Singer (1999).

Bibliography

Betts, R. K. (2000) ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’, International Security, Fall, Vol. 25,No. 2, pp. 5–55.

Craig, G. and George, A. (1995) Force and Statecraft (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress).

Deni, J. R. (2007) Alliance Management and Maintenance: Restructuring NATO forthe 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate).


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Deutsch, K. W. and Singer, J. D. (1999) ‘Multipolar Power Systems andInternational Stability’ in P. Williams, D. Goldstein and J. Shafritz (eds)Classic Readings of International Relations (Orlando: Harcourt Brace CollegePublishers).

Frühling, S. and Schreer, B. (2010) ‘Creating the Next Generation of NATOPartnerships’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 155, No. 1, pp. 52–7.

Hendrickson, R. C. (2006) Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary Gen-eral and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia: University of MissouriPress).

Jain, P. and Bruni, J. (2004) ‘Japan, Australia and the United States: LittleNATO or Shadow Alliance?’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4,pp. 265–85.

Kissinger, H. (1994) Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster).Luttwak, E., N. (1987) Strategy – The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge:

Belknap Press).Moore, R. R. (2010a) ‘Partnership Goes Global: The Role of Nonmember,

Non-European Union States in the Evolution of NATO’ in G. Aybet andR. R. Moore (eds) NATO in Search for a Vision (Washington: GeorgetownUniversity Press).

Moore, R. (2010b) ‘NATO’s Partners in Afghanistan: Impact and Purpose’,UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 22, January, pp. 92–115.

Smith, M. A. (2006) Russia and NATO since 1991: From Cold War Trough ColdPeace to Partnership? (London: Routledge).


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2Partnerships and Power inAmerican Grand StrategySean Kay

Introduction and overview

This chapter demonstrates the relationship between Americannational security objectives and the use of partnerships as a toolfor managing the international security environment. Partnershipsemerged in American grand strategy during the 1990s as a way to sig-nal reassurance to new friends and old adversaries about Americanpower. This policy of restraint shifted, however, into one of expan-sion in which partnerships played an important role in an offensiveorientation of American grand strategy. Partnerships were also uti-lized to manage coalitions for military engagements led by the US.These trends are demonstrated in this chapter through the use ofpartnerships developed by the US via the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-nization (NATO). The chapter concludes by demonstrating that, dueto a dramatic decline in American power and significant overseasmilitary burdens, a new phase of partnership is emerging, with seri-ous implications for global and regional security in the twenty-firstcentury.

Partnerships and American grand strategy

The partnership framework originated in bilateral contacts betweenthe US and the Soviet Union in 1990 during discussions over how tomanage post-Cold War European security. The notion of a strategicpartnership was advanced by the Soviets with the objective of main-taining influence for Moscow over European security architectures.1

18


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Sean Kay 19

Following from this, the concept emerged in the language ofAmerican decision-makers as they sought to engage via former adver-saries who were aligning with Western norms. Other similar phraseshave included strategic dialogue, special relationships, enhancedrelationship, constructive strategic partnership, comprehensive part-nership, long-term comprehensive partnership, long-term stable con-structive partnership, and good-neighborly mutual-trust partnership.Conceptually, there are three general applications of the partner-ship concept that the US and other states developed: consolidat-ing post-Cold War stability, strategic reassurance and restraint, andbalancing.

Consolidating post-Cold War stability

Partnership concepts are consistent with an effort by the US touse bilateral and multilateral relationships to consolidate Americanprimacy in the international system. The concept fits with real-ist explanations of international security relationships, which assessboth offensive and defensive theories of state behavior relative totheir position of power in the international system. To offensive real-ists, partnerships are consistent with expanding American power andinfluence. By using partnerships to consolidate international coop-eration according to the American traditions of political, trade, andsecurity relations, the US position in the world would be enhanced(Brown et al., 1997; Glaser and Kaufmann, 1998; Van Evera, 1998). Todefensive realists, the partnership mechanism was a way to extendthe range of allies and potential allies in the event of future con-flicts or the need to organize coalitions to manage threats. In amore benign assessment, partnership was a mechanism of build-ing cooperative architectures for advancing state interests in peaceand security, which was consistent with the new dominant liberalorder after the Cold War (Ikenberry, 2001; Deudney and Ikenberry,2009). In this sense, partnerships were important procedural mecha-nisms for using institutionalized security relationships to consolidatepeace and promote liberal Western principles and norms after theCold War.

By 2010, NATO had moved beyond partnership and had insteadincorporated new members (and made commitments to include moreas allies such as Ukraine and Georgia). Washington was not eager inthe early 1990s to expand the NATO alliance to former Warsaw Pact


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20 Partnerships and Power in American Grand Strategy

countries. It was willing, however, to extend a hand of partnershipto them. This outreach laid a framework for the eventual enlarge-ment of NATO while, at the same time, assuaging Russian oppositionto the encroachment of American power. These outcomes were con-sistent with the argument that great powers seek, absent balancing,to acquire as much influence as they can and thus expand primacy(Mearsheimer, 2001). Meanwhile, those states that opted into thepartnership model would make gains by adapting to criteria set forthby the US. Such activity reflects ‘bandwagoning,’ which is the ten-dency of states to gravitate toward the power that can best distributepolitical, economic, or military gains (Walt, 1985; Schweller, 1994).NATO’s approach did have significant strategic consequences, how-ever, that were not always favorable. In particular, there emerged anembedded perspective in Russia that the US had broken its commit-ment to restraint that had helped ensure a peaceful end to the ColdWar. As Deudney and Ikenberry write:

[M]uch of this souring is the result of American policies [ . . . ]American foreign policy, so successful at the moment of settle-ment, has pursued goals contrary to the settlement’s principles.This occurred through the administrations of both Bill Clintonand George W. Bush as the United States pursued short-term andsecondary aims at the expense of more fundamental interests.

(Deudney and Ikenberry, 2009, p. 49)

Partnerships can be a grand scheme for managing systemic change,but they may also simply be a rhetorical device used by diplomatsto work grey areas of international relationships. American officialsvalue the concept’s lack of clarity because partnerships can justifyflexible bilateral and multilateral architectures. The partnership con-cept can help to facilitate bilateral relations with countries whoserelative power forces a relationship out of ‘Realpolitik.’ For exam-ple, partnership has been used to describe the US–China relationship.This relationship reflects close economic interdependence. Yet, fun-damental political differences and disputes over issues like humanrights create difficulties for defining that relationship as too friendly.In November 1996, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher deliv-ered a speech at Fudan University in Shanghai. The initial drafthad the word ‘partnership’ in the text to define the US–China


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Sean Kay 21

relationship. However, according to Winston Lord, Assistant Secre-tary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the word was removedbecause it was ‘a little too positive, naïve sounding.’ According toLord ‘partnership can suggest an alliance if you’re not careful [ . . . ] Soyou don’t want to overuse that term [ . . . ] You need to reserve it forgood friends’(Quoted in Opall-Rome, 1997). Nonetheless, a year later,Lord’s successor, Stanley Roth, told reporters that regarding US–Chinarelations:

(W)hat we’d really like to do is to try to achieve a [ . . . ] strategicpartnership [ . . . ] Meaning a relationship that – rather than justbeing based on a series of bilateral problems, whether it be trade,human rights, non-proliferation, market access – has a broaderframework to it, one in which we identify areas where we can workand cooperate together.

(Quoted in Opall-Rome, 1997)

By late 1997, President Bill Clinton and Chinese President JiangZemin agreed to a joint statement stating that they were ‘deter-mined to build toward a constructive strategic partnership betweenthe US and China through increasing cooperation to meet interna-tional challenges and promote peace and development in the world’(White House, 1997b).

The ‘constructive strategic partnership’ was inherently vague.When asked what the term implied in a US–China context, a Pen-tagon official directly involved in crafting US–China policy said:‘We don’t know what it means and we would never use it at theDepartment of Defense’ (Quoted in Opall-Rome, 1997). Unease overimplications of the US–China ‘constructive strategic partnership’intensified when President Clinton visited China in summer 1998.Japan had specific cause to wonder whether the US was now givinga higher priority to its partnership with China rather than its tradi-tional alliance with Japan. While the ongoing presence of US forcesin Japan (and South Korea) remained the key indicator of this tradi-tional commitment, the emerging US–China partnership introduceduncertainty into the regional security architecture.

Early in the administration of President George W. Bush, the ideaof partnership with China was dropped in diplomatic language.A new tone emphasized that China was a ‘strategic competitor’ of


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the US. Even then, a sense of ‘Realpolitik’ would pervade the Bushadministration as its China policy reflected one of stability and gen-erally good relations.2 The ‘Realpolitik’ behind this relationship wasunderscored by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on her first offi-cial visit to China in early 2009. Secretary Clinton made it clear thatthe US would press China on issues involving human rights: ‘But ourpressing on those issues can’t interfere on the global economic cri-sis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis’ (AgenceFrance Press, 2009).

The labeling of a relationship as a partnership also caused confu-sion as to the nature of the alliance between the US and Turkey. In the1990s, in order to broaden the bilateral relationship and to compen-sate for Turkey’s lack of EU membership, the US and Turkey begantalking in terms of partnership. In April 1998, Secretary of DefenseWilliam Cohen stated that the US and Turkey:

(H)ave a strong strategic partnership with shared interests thatinclude preventing Iraqi aggression, promoting stability in theMiddle East, and working together for stability in the Balkans,where Turkish and American soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder.

(Department of Defense, 1998)

The nature of this relationship, however, was confused by the factthat the US and Turkey are also treaty-based allies in NATO. TheUS also would simultaneously develop a strategic partnership withEgypt. The US–Egypt partnership was even more institutionalized,with specific committees addressing comprehensive and just peace,regional stability, and economic development and progress as well asby a ‘strategic dialogue’ between the US Department of State and theEgyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.3

Meanwhile, the US developed a strategic partnership with Israel,which included architectures for substantial military ties between thetwo country’s armed forces, technology upgrades, and intelligencesharing. Turkey followed suit by building its own strategic partner-ship with Israel and another one with Ukraine to address concernsabout security in the Black Sea (British Broadcasting Service, 1998).Thus, in the case of Turkey, the meaning of partnership had a rangeof applications, since the US first raised the concept in its bilateralrelations with Ankara. Turkey has turned the partnership concept to


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Sean Kay 23

its own advantage beyond its historical alliance role in NATO (Kayand Yaphe, 1997).

Strategic reassurance and restraint

Partnerships also emerged as a tool to spread reassurance in the inter-national system to states seeking to align with American nationalsecurity priorities, while also signaling restraint to Russia. The USused this partnership concept to link with states from Central andEastern Europe, and, more broadly, into Eurasia. In addition to mul-tilateral concepts like NATO’s Partnership for Peace, the US builtbilateral partnership programs to reassure Romania (which eventu-ally became a NATO member), Ukraine, and Georgia about theireventual path toward an alliance commitment. The US used sucharchitectures to consolidate these relationships without extendingsecurity guarantees. Romania was the first to receive this architectureafter it was rejected for NATO membership in 1997. President BillClinton travelled to Bucharest and declared that the US and Romaniahad ‘agreed to establish a strategic partnership between our nations,a partnership important to America, because Romania is importantto America – important in your own right, important as a model inthis difficult part of the world’ (White House, 1997a).

While the US–Romanian partnership established a path towardNATO membership for Romania, the case for Ukraine and Georgiawas less clear and more complicated. The US–Ukraine partner-ship began in September 1996 as an effort to bolster Ukrainiansovereignty. This was a similar purpose to that which was behind theUS–Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission established in 2009.Both relationships evolved as bilateral processes and were seen asimportant in Washington, given the significant lack of consensus inNATO for these countries’ membership.4 NATO, meanwhile, had alsodeveloped special partnership commissions with both Ukraine andGeorgia while signaling that eventually they will become members,even if the consensus on this outcome was elusive. The NATO–Ukraine relationship added a new phrase to the partnership lexicon,described officially as the ‘Charter on a Distinctive Partnership.’

The US also used the partnership framework to keep Russia engagedpositively. Russia sought reassurance and guarantees that the Westdid not seek to take advantage of its weaknesses. Despite majordisagreements on issues like Kosovo, human rights, and Russia’s


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behavior in its former Soviet space (especially the 2008 war withGeorgia) partnership remains a vital ingredient the US–Russian rela-tionship. Russia has generally failed to take advantage of variousinstitutional opportunities to deepen the partnership principle, espe-cially with NATO. Nonetheless, even when there have been dif-ficulties involving relations, such as during the Kosovo conflictand the Russia–Georgia war, these differences were often quicklypapered over in the name of a cooperative architecture. By 2009,the US was seeking mechanisms to ‘reboot’ its relationship withRussia.

Balancing

The partnership concept has become embedded as a tool in theinternational system as other states have adopted the approach,and to counterbalance American interests. The partnership modelhas been applied by potential adversaries of the US to signal diplo-matic messages, constrain American influence, or even as nascentbalancing coalitions against American power. For example, in July1998 just weeks after the initial US–China partnership architecturewas announced, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers met andhailed their ‘cooperative strategic partnership at the helm of theUnited Nations’ (BBC, 1998). This partnership would become for-malized in the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,which further embedded Russian and Chinese cooperation in a rangeof issue areas including the pursuit of a more multipolar worldorder (Kay, 2003a). Further complicating the dynamic, China alsoestablished a ‘long-term comprehensive partnership’ with America’sNATO ally France, a ‘comprehensive partnership’ with Britain, a‘long-term stable constructive partnership geared to the twenty-firstcentury’ with the EU, and a ‘good neighborly mutual trust part-nership’ with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)(Kay, 2000).

NATO’s partnerships: Political and military utilityto the US

NATO has been central to the American approach to buildingregional and global partnerships. There are three distinct phases andoutcomes associated with this effort. The first phase was consistent


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Sean Kay 25

with the effort to expand the institutional architectures of the Euro-Atlantic community while signaling restraint toward Russia. Thesecond phase was the more operational mechanism of facilitatingeventual membership in NATO for aspiring candidate countries. Thethird was to use partnerships to enhance coalition military opera-tions led by NATO. All three of these approaches reflected shiftingand evolving roles for partnerships in American grand strategy, andin terms of objectives were generally successful.

NATO partnerships and strategic restraint

Soon after the Cold War ended, NATO adjusted to a view that itwould go ‘out-of-area or out-of-business’ (Asmus et al., 1993). Rec-ognizing that new missions were necessary to sustain the institutionand that an opportunity existed to consolidate stability in emerg-ing democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the NATO alliescrafted partnerships. This approach was, however, initially developedas an alternative to the enlargement of NATO and was consistentwith the post-Cold War settlement of restraint relative to Russia. InOctober 1993, the NATO allies agreed to defer decisions on enlarge-ment and instead adopted the Partnership for Peace as a gradual,slow, and deliberative process of engaging all interested countriesfrom Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia, in cooperativerelationships. The idea was to ‘pick up NATO’s standard operat-ing procedures, habits of cooperation, and routines of consultation’(Aspin, 1993). This policy would eventually lead to new membersjoining the Alliance, while also signaling this would occur as part ofan evolutionary process, taking into account political and securitydevelopments in the whole of Europe (NATO Office of Informationand Press, 1994). Meanwhile, specialized relationships would open upbetween NATO and interested partners, who could demonstrate theirability to contribute to security (and perhaps eventually join NATO)via the Partnership for Peace. This program included engaging withNATO to develop

[T]transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic con-trol of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises,and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fieldsas peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations.

(NATO Office of Information and Press, 1994)


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The Partnership for Peace was consistent with an effort by NATO touse its institutional mechanisms to consolidate peace and stability inthe new European security environment. The program was coopera-tive, inclusive, and reassuring in nature (Sens, 2001). For some statesseeking NATO membership, the Partnership for Peace was, however,evidence of Western weakness in the face of Russia. Describing theprogram, a senior advisor to Polish President Lech Wałesa invokedmemories of Britain’s appeasement of Hitler when he complained:‘We’ve gone from Chamberlain’s umbrella to Clinton’s saxophone’(Quoted in United Press International, 1994). Nonetheless, overtwo dozen countries quickly engaged in the program. It eventuallyinvolved hundreds of direct or ‘in the spirit of’ NATO or bilateralprograms. The Partnership for Peace helped to prepare interestedpartners for NATO’s multilateral planning norms, thus easing thecosts of military restructuring and possible NATO integration. As onesenior US defense official asserted: ‘(S)hould the situation deterio-rate in the East and Russia, and it became necessary at some stepto draw the line between Eastern and Western [ . . . ] the Partnershipfor Peace would put us in a better position to do that’ (White HouseInformation Service, 1994).

This model of partnership through NATO would have an importantimpact on security provision in the Balkans. When NATO agreed in1995 to engage in peace support operations in Bosnia–Herzegovina,the mission was enhanced by the Partnership for Peace initiative.Eager to contribute to a NATO operation and thus (for some) toenhance prospects for membership in NATO, 13 of 27 partners joinedthe mission. These countries were a force multiplier to the American-led NATO operation, IFOR. Exercises that the partner countries hadconducted with NATO paved the way for the integration of contin-gents from partner countries, which contributed nearly 10,000 of thetotal 60,000 IFOR forces organized by NATO. For example, in October1995 (just prior to IFOR deployment) staff officers from nine Partner-ship for Peace countries participated in operation ‘Cooperative Light’as a command post exercise simulating the establishment of a bufferzone between two warring parties. Meanwhile, via the Partnershipprocess, these same countries took operational lessons learned fromthe multilateral integrated force environment and fed that back intotheir own national security architectures and planning.

This period of partnership culminated in a strong signal of inclu-siveness and restraint, with genuine efforts to include Russia in the


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Sean Kay 27

development of European security architectures. Russia was pleasedthat the Partnership for Peace signaled a gradual and transparentprocess toward enlargement. Moscow also insisted that it shouldhave a ‘special status’ in NATO’s cooperative mechanisms in addi-tion to the actual Partnership for Peace program. In spring 1994,Russia signed the Partnership for Peace framework document andalso a joint NATO/Russian declaration stressing Russia’s unique rolein European security. Yet, by late 1994, the American rhetoric onNATO enlargement had shifted toward a more precise commitmentso that the question of new members in NATO was not a question of‘whether’ but rather ‘when.’ To this, Russia’s President Boris Yeltsinstated in December 1994:

A system of blocs, that is to say something we have left behind, isnow coming back – the NATO bloc on the one hand – and Russiaon the other [ . . . ] Without compromise on the issue betweenNATO and Russia, there would be no point in continuing a part-nership [ . . . ] Otherwise we will go our own ways, and why have apartnership at all?

(Quoted in Reuters, 1994)

From NATO ‘partnership’ to ‘enlargement’

Post-Cold War NATO enlargement began with invitations to nego-tiate membership being sent to Poland, Hungary, and the CzechRepublic in 1997. These three finalized membership accession inspring 1999. After this first round, the question of partnershipbecame diluted as a race to join NATO began for Bulgaria, Romania,Slovenia, Slovakia, and the three Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia,and Estonia) who received invitations in fall 2002, followed byAlbania and Croatia in 2008. Once enlargement began, NATOshifted from partnership to an individualized Membership ActionPlan (MAP) for remaining candidates. While the Partnership forPeace remained a mechanism for association with NATO (especiallyfor European neutral states), the MAP became the key associa-tion for states awaiting membership invitations. The issue becamecontentious for Ukraine and Georgia, which each sought MAParrangements unsuccessfully. NATO hedged around this issue byannouncing that these countries would eventually join NATO,though did not identify any timeline. Russia responded in private


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statements questioning the legitimacy of Ukraine to even exist asa state.5 More overtly, Russia responded with a military invasion ofGeorgia.

The Ukraine and Georgia issues exposed important questionswhich had emerged about the difference between membership andpartnership in the NATO context. First, ironically, some NATO part-ners in the 1990s, like Albania and Macedonia, had American troopsstationed on their territory while new NATO members did not, thusraising a question of which had a more credible security guarantee,partner or ally? As the Polish Prime Minister said in August 2008‘Poland and the Poles do not want to be in alliances in which assis-tance comes at some point later – it is no good when assistancecomes to dead people’ (Quoted in Shanker and Kulish, 2008). Second,did ‘partnership’ status increase or decrease security vulnerability?This question became significant in summer 2008 during the shoot-ing war between Russia and Georgia. The images of Russian troopsoperating within the sovereign territory of a Western-leaning coun-try seeking NATO membership raised alarm among several NATOmembers about the credibility of security guarantees. In this view,the failure to extend NATO invitations to Georgia signaled weak-ness to Russia and thus invited the invasion. Alternatively, the factthat NATO was even considering Georgian membership might haveprovoked the war.

NATO partnership and coalition military operations

During the presidency of George W. Bush, the US placed value inNATO mainly to integrate coalitions-of-the-willing in support ofAmerican-led military operations outside Europe. This shift beganafter the terrorist attacks by al Qaeda against the US on 11 September2001. On 12 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council declaredthe terrorist attacks to be attacks on all of its members. The Alliance’smilitary response, however, was limited to providing a few AWACSaircraft to monitor US airspace. NATO was left out of the subsequentAfghanistan invasion, even though the European allies wished tocontribute. NATO assumed a lead role in Afghanistan peace oper-ations in 2005, but only after the US-led coalition and the UNestablished initial operations. NATO was not engaged in the US-ledinvasion and occupation of Iraq because many member governmentsand most European publics did not support the war. Overall, NATO’s


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role in the international campaign against terrorism was limited torelatively small initiatives like naval patrols in the Mediterranean andhelping with the Olympic security in Greece in 2004.

In this context, the significance of ‘member’ versus ‘partner’ statuswas less important than the ability of states to contribute to US-ledoperations. NATO command structures and operational experienceswere thus an important, but not necessarily essential, component ofthis new model of coalition warfare. The limits were clear in howNATO would contribute. For example, the US gathered political sup-port from what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called ‘newEurope’ for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. ‘Old Europe’ reflected thetraditional members of NATO like Germany and France, who wereopposed to the Iraq war. Using NATO as an operational mechanism,or even new NATO allies, however, proved problematic as a meansof achieving force projection. This was especially true as numeroussmall force contributions are much harder to integrate into a com-mon military command structure than very large national armedforces. As an extreme example, Estonia was praised for providingpolitical encouragement to the US invasion of Afghanistan and asbeing among those East European countries who endorsed the inva-sion of Iraq. However, when it came to sending troops to Afghanistanfor peace support operations, Estonia’s initial total military commit-ment was limited to five men and three dogs (Kay, 2003b). WhenNATO agreed to send troops to Afghanistan in summer 2004, theinitial total was 7000 forces. Also in 2004, NATO agreed to send 300military instructors into Iraq. However, only 16 of 26 members agreedto actually participate in this training mission. The Supreme AlliedCommander Europe (SACEUR), General James Jones, called this trend‘disturbing.’ He said that once NATO decides on a mission it is ‘essen-tial that all allies support it [ . . . ] when nine, 10, or 11 countries in theAlliance will not send forces the burden falls on the other 14’ (Quotedin Burgess, 2004).

Despite these limitations, some influential advocates of an enlargedrole for NATO saw the institution as a foundation of a new ‘globalNATO’ (Daalder and Goldgeier, 2006). In this vision, NATO’s rolesince 2005 combined with a network of relations with like-mindednon-members such as Australia and Japan to facilitate integrationinto command structures. Indeed, a broad range of partnerships havedemonstrated unique value as a complement to NATO operational


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activities. The relationships developed between the US with Australia,Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea have had particular value forfacilitating these countries into NATO operations in Afghanistan.Meanwhile, states like Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, andMorocco have been essential to a broader outreach in integrat-ing like-minded states into a broader architecture for security inthe Middle East and North Africa, and for information sharing oncounterterrorism and anti-piracy activity. In this more ‘global’ con-text, NATO retains its core mission of territorial defense, but at thesame time serves as a mechanism for coordinating global securitymanagement.

This approach had, by 2010, demonstrated limitations as Europeanmembers of NATO were substantially undersupplying troops toAfghanistan and public opinion in both the US and Europe focusedinward. Two additional problems within Europe also challenged thisbroadened partnership vision for the Alliance. First, newer NATOmembers preferred to see NATO refocus priorities on territorial collec-tive defense, not on global operations. Second, most of all Europeancountries, either for global projection or for collective defense com-mitments, were cutting military spending. Overall, the EuropeanNATO members spend about two-thirds of what the US does ondefense, but only have about one-third of the capabilities. Fur-thermore, there is a disconnection between the types of militaryoperations the European allies are prepared for. The US emphasizespower projection and, increasingly, counterinsurgency warfare. YetEurope has little doctrine, training, or experience with either. The USmight thus find it necessary to go beyond NATO to find new partnersfor extended military operations.

Strategy and partnership: The implications of Americandecline

The initial concept of partnership was designed in the Americanperspective to expand its engagement in world affairs (Kay, 2006).This view pervaded the American national security apparatus duringboth the Clinton and Bush administrations. The primary differ-ence was that the Clinton administration chose ‘enlargement andengagement’ via multilateral forums while the Bush administrationtended toward unilateral actions such as the invasion of Iraq. By


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2010, however, global economic crisis and substantial military over-reach pushed the US into a serious crisis requiring a major strategicreassessment. Partnership remained important, but as a tool of facil-itating a handover of American power to share burdens or to reduceoverseas commitments.

America’s strategic disconnect

As Robert Pape has shown, the US’s relative economic position hasbeen in rapid decline in the early twenty-first century while the eco-nomic capacity of China has grown consistently (Pape, 2009). Papeuses comparative economic data to show that America’s share ofgross world product is one of the largest declines in modern history.This decline is only surpassed by the collapse of the Soviet Union.The US might be forced to retrench and reorient its strategic objec-tives to better reflect the emerging distribution of power (Gilpin,1981). New American vulnerabilities became clear even before thefall 2008 economic collapse. According to former US Treasury Secre-tary, Hank Paulson, when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, he wasinformed that a high-level Russian overture was made to co-optChina in a plan to simultaneously sell holdings in Fannie Mae andFreddie Mac (large US government holdings). This move would haveforced the US to spend massive amounts of government treasuriesto shore up these domestic holdings (Krishna Guha, 2010). Chinarejected this Russian overture. However, by 2010, a new attitude hadtaken hold in China. In response to an American announcement of$6.4 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, China said that it would ceasemilitary-to-military partnership cooperation with the US and that itwould impose economic penalties on related American companies.China accused the US of ‘rude,’ ‘arrogant,’ and ‘Cold War think-ing’ in selling these weapons to Taiwan. A leading daily newspaperwith close ties to the governing Communist Party of China indicatedthat:

It’s time the US was made to feel the heat for the continuing armssales to Taiwan [ . . . ] It would be folly to underestimate the Chineseunity over the Taiwan question [ . . . ] Punishing companies that sellweapons to Taiwan is a move that would be supported by mostChinese.

(BBC News, 2010)


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Meanwhile, the US had continued to increase defense spending,even when major global security challenges were not amenable tomainly military solutions. The 2010 US budget proposal included a3.4 per cent increase in regular defense spending plus an increase infunding for Iraq and Afghanistan operations. The total US defensebudget for 2010–2011 was $708 billion including an additional$159 billion for ‘overseas contingencies operations.’ President Obamawould also ask Congress for a supplemental increase of $33 billion topay for an increase of 30,000 troops he opted to send to Afghanistanin late 2009 (Whitlock, 2010). The regular defense budget and newallocations for Iraq and Afghanistan would come on top of the othercosts already totaled in the Iraq war, including over 4000 Americansoldiers killed and over 30,000 wounded. The Iraq war alone had cost$700 billion by 2010 and one credible study shows that it will even-tually cost the US economy $3 trillion as a ‘conservative’ estimate(Bilmes and Stiglitz, 2010).

The most serious threat to American national security over thelong-term are global economic trends and, in particular, its $12trillion debt. Yet, Washington trended toward increased interna-tional commitments and more defense spending. As one estimateby Kori Schake suggests, the annual defense budget could be cutby $35.4 billion and still maintain global technological and con-ventional supremacy. Democrats, however, fearful of being labeledweak on security have seemingly been unwilling to cut defense bud-gets. Thus Schake (who was a principle foreign policy adviser to JohnMcCain’s presidential campaign in 2008) argues that ‘[C]onservativesneed to hearken back to our Eisenhower heritage, and develop adefense leadership that understands military power is fundamen-tally premised on the solvency of the American government and thevibrancy of the US economy’ (Schake, 2010).

While American military commitments were growing exponen-tially, the American willingness to sustain them was in freefall.According to Pew Research public opinion polling released inDecember 2009, the US public had moved sharply isolationist (PewResearch Center, 2009). According to the survey, 41 per cent ofAmericans believe the US plays a less important role in world affairsthan it did ten years previously. This was the highest number everrecorded in a Pew Research survey. Some 44 per cent of the Americanpublic viewed China as the world’s leading economic power and


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Sean Kay 33

only 27 per cent identified the US as the world’s leading economy.A year previously, 41 per cent had identified the US and 30 per centChina as the leading economic power in the world. Most Americans,57 per cent, believe that the US should sustain its position as theworld’s sole military superpower. Yet the number of Americans whosaid that the US should ‘mind its own business internationally andlet other countries get along the best they can on their own,’ a mea-sure of isolationist sentiment, was an all-time high of 49 per cent. InDecember 2002, only 30 per cent of Americans agreed with this per-spective. There has been a significant disconnect between elite viewsand the American public over time as a huge majority of members ofthe Council on Foreign Relations strongly support the US playing anassertive role in global affairs.

Partnerships and American defense planning

In February 2010, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) wasreleased by the US Department of Defense. This review emphasizedpartnerships in overseas military operations. It was, however, unclearif these were to support a continuation of expansive American pri-macy, develop burden-sharing responsibility, or create a means oftransitioning security management to allies and partners. Partner-ships are now seen as a key transition point whatever direction mightbe needed as the international system evolves. For example, in theQDR draft of December 2009 it is stated that:

The rise of China, the world’s most populous country, and India,the world’s largest democracy, will continue to shape an interna-tional system that is no longer easily defined, one in which the USwill remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly rely onkey allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

(Department of Defense, 2009 – Emphasis added)6

Partnership has continued value in that it can enhance burden-sharing and make military-to-military relations more efficient as theglobal security environment shifts. Meanwhile, partnership allowsfor continued ‘Realpolitik’ with transitioning countries, such asChina and Pakistan. Significantly, partnership would also be impor-tant in places like Pakistan and Yemen where the US had nationalsecurity interests in combating terrorism but which are places where


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visible American presence fuels local resentments. In the QDR it isalso indicated that:

The ability of the United States to build the security and gover-nance capacity of key partners and allies will be central to meeting21st century challenges [ . . . ] Building the capacity of allies andpartners, together with efforts to prevent and deter conflict frombeginning or escalating, can help reduce the need for large andenduring deployments of U.S. forces in conflict zones.


In this sense the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the heavyforce presence that each continued to require by 2010 was an indi-cator that capacity building among partners could also be a veryexpensive and long-lasting engagement with a heavy overseas mili-tary footprint. The QDR appeared drafted, however, in a vacuum thattook little account for America’s relative decline in the global econ-omy. For example, in its core mission, the Defense Department is:‘Extending a global defense posture comprised of forward-stationedand rotationally deployed U.S. forces, prepositioned equipment andoverseas facilities, and international agreements.’ This activity isgenerally achieved via foreign military sales and financing, officerexchange programs, and educational opportunities at the lower end.Security force assistance missions provide ‘hands on’ efforts ‘con-ducted primarily in host countries to train, equip, advise, and assistthose counties’ forces in becoming more proficient at providingsecurity to their populations.

Models of this kind of partnership outreach include US forcesworking in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Africa, Columbia,and Pakistan, under the rubric of counterinsurgency (COIN) oper-ations. Traditionally, as noted in the QDR, such missions haveinvolved special operations forces. However, this goal is largely mis-sion dependent, as the decision to increase the US force commitmentin Afghanistan in fall 2009 demonstrates. COIN lies at the heartof an expanded American global military engagement in the QDR.Major mission initiatives to support building partner capacity forCOIN includes: 1. institutionalizing general purpose force capabil-ities for security force assistance, 2. enhancing language, regional,


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Sean Kay 35

and cultural ability, 3. strengthen and expand capabilities for trainingpartner aviation forces, 4. strengthen capacities for ministerial-leveltraining, and 5. creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid trans-fer of crucial material. Missing from this assessment is the commonrefrain about wars like Afghanistan: they are not conflicts that will beresolved militarily, but rather through diplomacy, economic progress,and especially civilian capacity.

Beyond operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US peacetimeforces include approximately 400,000 military personnel eitherforward-stationed or rotationally deployed to ‘help sustain U.S.capacity for global reach and power projection.’ At the same time,it is indicated in the QDR that the US must be prepared to respond tochanges in the international security environment. In addition, it isindicated that the US cannot accomplish its goals alone given the dif-fusion of power in the world. Thus, the Department of Defense would‘seek a new architecture of cooperation, one that generates opportu-nities for the US to work together with allies and partners on sharedregional and global security opportunities and challenges.’ In partic-ular, the US will ‘continue to develop its defense posture to enhanceother states’ abilities to solve global security problems.’

The assumption is that the US force presence overseas provides a‘powerful catalytic effect in promoting multilateral security coopera-tion and regional security architectures that serve both the U.S. andpartner states’ interests.’ This assumption does not test the proposi-tion that this presence simultaneously promotes security dependenceand substantial costs for the US, depletes its resources in strate-gic reserve, and does long-term damage to its economic security.As US Ambassador to Afghanistan (and retired Army General andNATO Commander) Karl Eikenberry argued in the fall 2009, US troopincreases would bring ‘vastly increased costs and an indefinite, large-scale, US military role in Afghanistan.’ Eikenberry concluded that theexpanded US role will ‘increase Afghan dependency, at least in thenear term, and it will deepen the military involvement in a missionthat most agree cannot be won solely by military means’ (Quoted inThe New York Times, 2010). Most disconcerting was that a core req-uisite for COIN operations in Afghanistan was that there should bea reliable partner in the Afghan government, which by fall 2009 didnot exist.


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Conclusion

Partnerships have served as a key mechanism for American grandstrategy since the end of the Cold War, and NATO has been at the coreof a growing and complex partnership dynamic. Initially, partnershipfacilitated post-Cold War outreach to former adversaries while sig-naling strategic restraint. Partnerships evolved into a mechanism forextending American primacy via alliance expansion. Subsequently,partnership became a tool of achieving responsibility sharing in secu-rity management. By 2010, partnership reflected strategic confusionas the US faced growing pressures to reduce its global commitments.The central conceptual question is whether the next phase of part-nership is one that focuses on a major handoff of internationalsecurity responsibility so that partners become the ‘lead party.’ Inthe European context this means that capacity building might focusmore on building conditions for the EU to take a lead role in regionalsecurity management. The central challenge will be how the USwill use partnerships to manage the pressures for American disen-gagement and global trends toward multilateralism. If handled well,partnerships could become the key transition point of stability in amultipolar world. The challenge will lie in whether Washington iscapable of making substantive changes in its national security priori-ties to better reflect the realities of the evolving international securityenvironment.

Notes

1. This statement is based on an off-the-record interview with a high-levelAmerican defense department official involved in this process.

2. The author is grateful to Thomas Christensen, former Deputy AssistantSecretary of State for Asia in the second Bush Administration, for a detailedelaboration of this point in a public talk moderated by the author at OhioWesleyan University, January 2009.

3. Press statement by James P. Rubin, spokesman, US Department of State, 15July 1998. The US–Egypt Strategic Dialogue was initiated on 10 July 1998at a meeting between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and ForeignMinister Mahmoud Moussa. The initial agenda focused on the status of thepeace process in the Middle East, counterterrorism, developments relatedto Iraq and Iran, and African regional issues.

4. The US–Ukraine relationship evolved substantial bilateral commissionsand committees meeting on a regular basis to discuss issues that included


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Sean Kay 37

promoting Ukraine’s external security by strengthening its military,Ukraine’s integration into European and transatlantic security structures,and US–Ukrainian military-technical cooperation and defense-industryconversion, and compliance with international arms agreements and non-proliferation norms. See US Department of Defense ‘U.S.–Ukraine Secu-rity Committee Report,’ 15 November 1996 and Department of Defense(1997b) ‘Remarks Prepared for Delivery by U.S. Secretary of DefenseWilliam S. Cohen,’ Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 12 July 1997.The US–Georgia relationship included a $1 billion package of bilateralUS assistance to Georgia with the stated goal of reducing vulnerabil-ities to internal security and external economic and political pressureby assisting in the resettlement of displaced persons; supporting coreinfrastructure, including energy and transportation; investments; restoringborder security and law enforcement capabilities; and strengthening demo-cratic institutions and processes, and the rule of law. See Voice of America‘U.S.–Georgia Partnership,’ 29 June 2009.

5. Off-the-record conversation with senior US official from the Departmentof State, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2008, Washington, D.C.

6. In the final published version, the word ‘rely’ was dropped and replacedwith ‘cooperate.’ The official version is published at http://www.defense.gov/QDR/.

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3The ‘Natural Ally’? The ‘NaturalPartner’? – Australia and theAtlantic AllianceStephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer

Introduction: Utility is a two-way street

Among the long list of states with which NATO intensified itsrelations after September 2001, Australia appears to be a ‘natural part-ner’ for the Alliance (Myrli, 2008). As a Western liberal democracyrooted in the Westminster tradition, it is culturally and politicallyclose to both European and North American countries. Throughoutits history, it has been closely allied to the UK and, since WorldWar II, to the US. Through the ANZUS Treaty, the US and Australiahave exchanged pledges of mutual assistance. Australia also has a sig-nificant number of troops deployed to the NATO-led InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, most of which areoperating in Oruzgan province in Regional Command South. With1550 personnel, Australia was the largest non-NATO troop contrib-utor to ISAF in 2010, ranking 10th out of 43 troop-contributingnations overall (NATO, 2010a).

Political and military ties between Australia and the Alliance havebeen strengthened in recent years. Since 2006, NATO recognizesAustralia as a ‘global partner’ or ‘partner across the globe,’ and theAustralian government posted a defense attaché to Brussels. NATOand Australia have deepened information sharing arrangements, andAustralian personnel participate in select activities of the Partnershipfor Peace (PfP) ‘toolkit.’ Finally, some commentators have even men-tioned the possibility of full NATO membership for Australia (Daalderand Goldgeir, 2006). This idea fell short of consensus within the

40


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Stephan Frühling and Benjamin Schreer 41

Alliance, but there is general agreement among NATO allies that therelationship with Australia is important and should be strengthened.However, while from a NATO perspective Australia’s attractivenessafter 2001 as a contributing nation in Afghanistan, a close ally of theUS, and a highly capable force provider is clear, little research hasso far been conducted on the utility of NATO for Australia.1 Againstthis background, this chapter analyses whether Australia really is a‘natural’ partner for the Alliance. What are Australian strategic prior-ities, and how do they influence its relations with NATO? What arethe prospects for deeper relations between Australia and the AtlanticAlliance? And to what extend do Australian strategic decision-makersperceive cooperation with NATO as a complement or substitute todirect cooperation with the US?

In order to answer these questions, the chapter is laid out insix sections. This introduction places the chapter’s main questionswithin the context of the book. The second section examines NATO’sapproach to partnership with Australia. The third section reviewsNATO-Australia cooperation activities before 2001, including duringthe Cold War, and the fourth examines the pattern of increased coop-eration that followed the terror attacks of 11 September 2001. Indoing so, it will identify both changes and continuities in the politi-cal and military relationship between NATO and Australia. The fifthsection analyses the priority order of Australian strategic interests,derived from its strategic debate and several strategic reviews since11 September 2001, which will serve to demonstrate the particularcontext within which the closer cooperation between Australia andNATO after 2001 has arisen. The sixth and final section will drawconclusions and highlight future prospects for cooperation betweenAustralia and NATO. In doing so, the chapter will examine the util-ity of NATO for current and future Australian defense policy; to whatextent the Alliance could become more relevant for Australia; andwhether the increased cooperation after 2001 was a product of theparticular circumstances at the time, or a harbinger of things to come.

With a population of just 22 million on an island the size of thecontinental US, Australia traditionally pursues a policy of defense‘self-reliance,’ the ability to defend the country without direct assis-tance from US combat troops. This position consistently leads thecountry to focus defense investment and policy decisions on theirconsequences for Australia’s volatile region. This was true during the


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42 The ‘Natural Ally’? The ‘Natural Partner’?

last decades of the Cold War, when Australia hosted US intelligencefacilities but otherwise did not focus its defense effort on the globalbalance. And it remains so today, when the majority of Australianforces are earmarked for their own neighborhood, and deploymentsbeyond the region are motivated by US alliance considerations asmuch as by a desire to be a ‘good international citizen.’

In this chapter, NATO’s utility for Australia will therefore be exam-ined on the basis of the concept of strategic interests, rather thanshared values. For the purpose of long-term planning in Australiansecurity and defense policy, strategic interests are best understood asthose factors in the international system that reduce the likelihood ofa direct threat to Australia developing, or factors that would reducethe severity of any such threat. This concept of strategic interests hasshaped the development of Australian defense policy since the early1990s (White, 2008), and continues to be applied explicitly as thebasis of current defense policy guidance. In addition, however, theAlliance’s approach to engagement with Asia–Pacific partners, includ-ing Australia, determines NATO’s relevance with regards to thesestrategic interests. In this context, NATO’s difficulties to find con-sensus on its future role in general have also affected its ability todefine clear goals and strategies for the development of substantialpartnerships ‘across the globe.’ This has led the Alliance to adopt a‘customer-driven’ approach to its partnerships (Frühling and Schreer,2010), which, however, obscures the fact that not all partnerships willbe ‘demand-driven’ by partners reaching out to the Alliance.

In fact, as this chapter will show, the emphasis on issue-basedcooperation in the partnerships, particularly in the framework ofthe operation in Afghanistan, has served Australia’s interest in amilitary-technical exchange focused on practical benefits, ratherthan on political-level dialogue with European NATO members.Australia’s pragmatic approach did not change significantly afterSeptember 2001 despite increased cooperation in the context ofthe Afghanistan mission. Increased cooperation with NATO, espe-cially in Afghanistan, was due to changed circumstances, namelyjoint military operations and increased engagement by both sides onglobal issues, and not due to a fundamental change in Australianstrategic policy or interests. In this sense, the utility of NATO inthe early twenty-first century for Australia could be classified as a‘temporary complement’ to its alliance with the US, conditional on


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circumstances and not rooted in shared strategic priorities that couldform the basis for a long-term and more substantial partnership.Attaining a different quality of relationship would depend on theAtlantic Alliance’s ability and willingness for credible and substantialengagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

NATO’s policy debate on partnerships: More debate thanpolicy

After the end of the Cold War, NATO developed a whole array of part-nership formats to underpin its changing role as an alliance that tookon security roles beyond the treaty area. As NATO expanded its oper-ational reach after 2001 to include Central Asia, the Middle East, andAfrica, the need to forge closer political and military ties with coun-tries beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area further increased. Inthe Asia-Pacific region, nations like Australia, Japan, New Zealand,and South Korea appeared particularly attractive to the Alliance,given their military capabilities and shared values with NATO allies,and it is in the context of NATO’s transformation from a regionalto a more multifunctional, globally oriented security organizationthat the issue of a partnership with Australia first arose. However,despite a general consensus within the Alliance to seek closer rela-tions with countries as far as the Asia-Pacific region, the aim andscope of these relationships became subject to intense debate. At theheart of the dispute was, and still is, the political question of whetherNATO should assume a global ordering function. Allies such as theUS, Canada, and the UK tend to argue for a more global role forNATO. In this context, Anglo-Saxon allies lobbied for the establish-ment of an institutionalized ‘global partnership forum’ with other USallies, especially Australia and Japan, in 2006 (Kamp, 2006). However,many continental European allies, including Germany and France,have tended to reject such an approach, insisting that security in theEuro-Atlantic area remain the top priority for the Alliance. In fact, thedivide among allies on this issue is but one in a whole set of strate-gic issues on which allies find it difficult to reach consensus in anAlliance of now 28 members (Noetzel and Schreer, 2009a).

The difficulties of allies to find consensus on how far relations withcountries like Australia should go is reflected in NATO’s official lan-guage. The analysis of declarations at summit meetings is particularly


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useful since these documents provide insight into allied consensus ordisagreement on strategic issues, including relations with Australia.The first NATO summit declaration after the 11 September attacks,in November 2002 in Prague, did not mention Australia or any otherAsia-Pacific nations; it vaguely spoke about the need for new partnerinitiatives (NATO, 2002). The summit focused on defense transforma-tion aspects, and the NATO operation in Afghanistan was still in itsearly stages. The next meeting in Istanbul in 2004 was more specific.While the summit declaration made reference to, inter alia, CentralAsia, and the broader Middle East, it did not mention Asia-Pacificas a region with which to build deeper relations (NATO, 2004a). Inthe summit communiqué, the allies ‘welcome the interest shown byseveral countries who are developing individual, mutually beneficialdialogues on security matters’ and single out Australia as a particu-lar example of ‘contact country’(NATO, 2004b). Not identifying anyNATO goals or strategies for these relationships, the communiqué wasa clear indication of NATO’s ‘customer approach’ toward these newpartners.

NATO’s next summit in Riga again mentioned ‘contact countries’and opened the PfP ‘toolbox’ to these partners. As the only specificbenefit to the Alliance, the summit declaration stated that participa-tion in Alliance operations had ‘demonstrated the political and oper-ational value’ of working more closely with partner countries (NATO,2006). NATO allies perceived the contribution of troops, especially tothe Afghanistan operation, identified as the Alliance’s ‘key priority,’as the most important function of the partnerships with countrieslike Australia. Before the summit, allies had disagreed about the USinitiative to establish institutionalized partnership formats at thepolitical level of NATO, in particular a ‘Global Partnership Forum.’NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, had named Australia,New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan as those countries to build‘global partnerships’ with, given that their values and security inter-ests reflected those of the Alliance (de Hoop Scheffer, 2006). However,the agreed declaration itself did not identify any specific country.

At the next meeting, the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO’s focuswas again on the ISAF operation in Afghanistan (NATO, 2008a). Thesummit declaration made it clear that the predominant value ofwhat it now called ‘relations with other partners across the globe’continued to lie in these countries’ contributions to the operation in


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Afghanistan, stressing that NATO did ‘particularly welcome signifi-cant contribution by Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore toNATO-led efforts in Afghanistan.’ The document reemphasized that itwas up to the partner countries to individually determine their degreeof relations with NATO in the context of ‘Tailored Cooperation Pack-ages’ (NATO, 2008b). Finally, the latest, 2009 summit communiqué ofthe meeting in Kehl and Strasbourg reiterated the new term ‘partnersacross the globe’ and their ‘significant contributions [. . .] to NATO-led operations, and in particular those by Australia, Japan, NewZealand and the Republic of Korea to our mission in Afghanistan’(NATO, 2009).

For nearly a decade, NATO has, thus, still not formulated a clearand coherent policy on what it seeks to achieve with its ‘part-nerships across the globe,’ other than valued support to opera-tions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. NATO allies remain divided onwhether relationships with countries like Australia should primarilybe burden-sharing exercises for operations in Afghanistan, or whetherthe Atlantic Alliance should use them to ‘become the hub of a globe-spanning web of various regional cooperative security undertakingsamong states with the growing power to act’ (Brzezinski, 2009). Con-sequently, NATO’s ‘customer-driven’ approach to partnerships haslargely left it to the partners to decide on areas of interaction, whichhas made it possible for NATO to advance partnerships at a practicallevel without facing its own disagreements on the more fundamentalaspects of its relationships with partner countries.

When examining the utility of NATO for Australia, this leads toan important caveat: Under the ‘customer approach,’ most practicalareas of cooperation are demand-driven by the partner state. How-ever, cooperation is not the same as ‘partnership’ and its politicalconnotations, which implies ‘an undertaking with another or oth-ers, especially [ . . . ] with shared risks and profits.’2 The Alliance is farfrom developing a strategy of how to engage the Asia-Pacific region(Frühling and Schreer, 2009b), which remains the region of foremostconcern to Australia’s security. In this context of NATO’s indecisionabout the nature of its global partnerships, Australian demand forpractical cooperation cannot automatically be taken as an indicatorof demand for a broader ‘partnership’ that implies a level of politi-cal commitment. This is especially the case as practical cooperationbetween NATO allies and Australia long predates the current debate.


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Australia and NATO allies during the twentieth century

For the first 150 years of its existence, the defense of Australia wasintimately linked to its status as part of the British Empire: first asindividual colonies on the Australian continent, and from 1901 asa federated, self-governing dominion. While Australia looked to theRoyal Navy to protect it from European naval powers and, in theearly twentieth century, Japan, Australian forces participated in mostof the Empire’s wars from the second half of the nineteenth century,including both World Wars. They remained deployed in South EastAsia until the end of the Vietnam War alongside larger US and UKforces. Participation in far-flung conflicts alongside its Anglo-Saxonallies has thus formed an important part of Australian strategic cul-ture during the twentieth century, and remains important to this day(Evans, 2005; Kilcullen, 2007). Australia was an important partici-pant in the fighting on the Western Front of World War I. DuringWorld War II, however, the Japanese threat, and the inability of theUK to prevent the fall of Singapore, led Australia to focus its strategicattention on its own region, and look to the US as its main ally. Bothshifts were firmly ensconced in policy and practice by the early 1950s(Frühling, 2009). Unlike Canada, Australia thus did not participate inthe Allied effort to defend Western Europe against the Soviet Union.It remained outside the political commitments of the WashingtonTreaty, and the technical and operational integration throughNATO.

In the Asian context, however, Australia did build links with sev-eral countries that were also NATO members. The flagship amongAustralia’s strategic commitments is the ANZUS Treaty with NewZealand and the US, signed in 1951. It commits all partners to assisteach other in the case of attacks in the Pacific area, albeit in a some-what weaker formulation than that of the North Atlantic Treaty.3

At the multilateral level,4 Australia was a founding member of theSoutheast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, together withNATO members France, the UK, and the US. Hopes that SEATO mightevolve into the equivalent of an Asian NATO proved misplaced,however, as the organization and treaty suffered, inter alia, froman incongruous membership (which included the Western powersas well as Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines); sagging com-mitment to the region by France and, later, the UK; and the fact


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that there were little political or practical incentives for the US towork through the organization when it engaged itself militarily inIndochina (Buszynski, 1983). SEATO was finally abolished in 1977.Australia, however, remained engaged in the region through theFive Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which commit Australia,New Zealand, and the UK to assist in the defense of Malaysia andSingapore. As part of FPDA, Australian and UK military personnelcontinue to be part of the international staff manning the IntegratedAir Defence System on the Malay Peninsula.

In parallel with this history of political commitments with NATOmember countries in Asia, Australia also cooperated at the techni-cal level. In the political shadow of the ANZUS Treaty, Australiaformalized the habits of wartime cooperation of NATO membersAmerica, Britain, and Canada with Australia, in the ‘ABCA’ format.ABCA arrangements allow exchange of information and personnel,and coordination and standardization across a range of fields. Theyinclude formal programs such as the Air Standardization Coordinat-ing Committee (ASCC), the AUSCANNZUKUS Naval C4 Organiza-tion, Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB), or theTechnical Cooperation Program (TTCP), as well as numerous infor-mal exchanges and contacts, especially at the service level. There isa close correspondence between ABCA and NATO’s StandardizationAgreements (STANAGS), in that STANAGS are often based on earlierABCA definitions, and in turn are often re-badged as ABCA docu-ments (Young, 2003). Through ABCA, Australia thus benefits fromNATO’s standardization efforts especially at the service level, but itcan do so while working in the culturally more homogenous, andless formalized, environment of Anglo-Saxon cooperation.

In contrast, relations with continental European powers weremore limited, and focused nearly exclusively on the procurementand sustainment of major defense equipment, including French-designed Mirage III aircraft, German Leopard tanks and ANZACfrigates, Swedish-designed Collins-class submarines, and Italian-designed Huon-class minesweeping vessels. In this context, Australiacooperated in a very limited form with NATO as well. For exam-ple, in 1990 the NATO Council approved Australia’s participation inthe NATO Sea Sparrow Consortium, as the only non-NATO mem-ber to date (NATO SEASPARROW Project Offices, 2010). When NATOestablished standardized principles for the storage and transport of


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ammunition and explosives, Australia adopted these in 1981 forreasons of interoperability as well as best practice considerations(Auditor-General, 1988; Joint Committee of Public Accounts, 1990).Since 1994, Australia has been a full member of NATO’s InsensitiveMunitions Information Centre, now the Munitions Safety Informa-tion Analysis Centre (Phillips, 1996), with observer status in therelevant Conference of National Armaments Director’s AmmunitionSafety Group (AC 326). In practice, Australia is represented in theseforums through exchange officers posted to the UK Ministry ofDefence (Auditor-General, 2003).

After a long hiatus following the Vietnam War, Australia beganto deploy forces overseas again in the late 1980s. Support to USmilitary deployments to the Persian Gulf became one of the few vis-ible Australian contributions to the US alliance, beginning with an(aborted) minesweeping mission at the end of the Tanker War in 1988(Beazley, 2008). Australia has had a presence alongside US forces inthe Gulf from 1990 to this day. Following the British withdrawal from‘east of Suez,’ however, and despite the close ABCA relationship at theservice level, there were no close relations with any European countryat the strategic level: Unlike New Zealand, for example, Australia didnot send naval forces to the Falklands War in 1982, while France’sstatus as a South Pacific power – with nuclear tests and regionalresentment of colonialism – was, overall, a hindrance rather thanboon to cooperation with Australia.

Since the early 1990s, Australia participated in several UN opera-tions alongside European NATO members, without, however, makingsuch deployments a policy priority in, for example, the 1994 DefenceWhite Paper (Department of Defence, 1994). Rather, in Namibia(1989–90) it fulfilled a commitment made several years earlier; inCambodia (1991–93) regional considerations were paramount; whilein Somalia (1992–93) and Rwanda (1994–95) it was motivated primar-ily by humanitarian considerations. When Yugoslavia disintegrated,New Zealand sent forces to participate in the UN Protection Force(UNPROFOR), in line with the internationalist defense policy set outin its 1991 White Paper (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 1991).Australia, again, did not. Besides the absence of US requests, concernsabout tensions in the Australian Yugoslav community played a rolein this decision, which meant that Australia was also not involved inNATO’s subsequent intervention in Kosovo.


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That said, the increased frequency of joint intervention operationsduring the 1990s led to technical initiatives such as the Multina-tional Interoperability Council formed in 1996 by the US, the UK,France, Germany, Canada, and Australia, outside the NATO frame-work. When NATO members including Canada, France, Germany,and the UK participated in the Australian-led INTERFET interventionin East Timor in 1999, they again did so outside the NATO frame-work. But with the exception of the former colonial power, Portugal,they did not maintain a long-term presence while Australian andNew Zealand forces remain deployed to East Timor to this day. Bythe beginning of the twenty-first century, Australia thus displayedneither a political aversion to engagement with NATO, nor a partic-ular preference for using NATO to engage with its member countries.The overlap of activities by NATO and Australia was simply verysmall: Australia was not involved in any of the security issues in theEuro-Atlantic area that preoccupied NATO’s attention, especially inthe Balkans, and it had alternative fora, especially through ABCA, toengage in much of the more mundane, technical activities of NATO’svarious agencies. This was the context in which both NATO andAustralia had to adjust to the new security environment followingthe 11 September attacks in 2001.

A new era? Australia’s cooperation with NATO afterSeptember 2001

The message of the Australian conservative Coalition governmentunder the then Prime Minister John Howard to its US ally after the11 September attacks was one of full support. Just as NATO for thefirst time invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Howardgovernment invoked Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty. Australia senttroops to participate in US-led operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.Additionally, strategic guidance was adjusted to emphasize the threatposed by global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. The Department of Defence went so far as to declare that‘Australia’s vital interests are inextricably linked to the achievementof peace and security in the Middle East’ (Department of Defence,2005, pp. 8–9), and there was academic speculation of a ‘paradigmshift’ in Australian strategic policy that would raise the importanceof global security affairs over regional ones (Hirst, 2007).


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As NATO simultaneously expanded its operational reach and activ-ities far beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, increased political, opera-tional, and technical cooperation between the two sides seemed tobe a logical evolution. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downerdeclared in a speech to the North Atlantic Council in 2004 thatAustralia and NATO shared common interests in the global fightagainst terrorism and should, therefore, seek enhanced cooperation(Downer, 2004). This view was met with approval by Jaap de HoopScheffer during the first official visit of a NATO Secretary Generalto Australia in April 2005, when both sides agreed on the exchangeof classified information (NATO, 2005a). On this occasion, Australiaannounced the appointment of a military attaché to NATO to facil-itate political and operational cooperation with the Alliance (NATO,2005b). The Alliance also offered Australia participation in activitiesfrom the PfP program ‘toolkit.’ Australia thus expanded its low-level,technical engagement with Alliance activities and bodies, and hassince taken part in, for example, exchanges relating to civil–militarycoordination; chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological incidentmanagement; logistics conferences; and the submarine commanders’conference. In 2007, the 2005 Exchange of Letters on informationsharing was superseded by a formal treaty on the security of infor-mation, which eventually entered into force in May 2009 (AustralianTreaty Series, 2009).

From 2006, the Australian contribution to a Dutch ProvincialReconstruction Team in the Oruzgan province in Afghanistan – partof the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan – provided an addi-tional impetus to cooperation between the Alliance and Australia.Australian liaison officers are embedded in ISAF and higher NATOheadquarters, and Australian government officials have participatedin political discussion within NATO at the ambassador and minis-terial level. For example, current Foreign Minister Stephen Smith,like his predecessor Alexander Downer, has addressed the NorthAtlantic Council, and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd participated in theAfghanistan-related discussions at the NATO Summit in Bucharest inApril 2008.

While these steps certainly reflect a growing overlap betweenAustralian and NATO activities after September 2001, the opera-tion in Afghanistan has became the focal point of the relationship,especially at the political level. In this context, NATO, with its


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political as well as military capabilities, has become a complementfor Australia to the US alliance relationship. However, this has notalways worked in favor of a more positive portrayal of the relation-ship as Prime Minister Rudd and his ministers repeatedly and publiclydemanded increased commitment to the operation by NATO’s con-tinental European allies (Myrli, 2008; Shanahan, 2008). On the onehand, this was a reflection of the difficulty of NATO allies to agreeon strategy and to commit more resources to the struggle against theAfghan insurgency, which exposed the limits of NATO’s utility forAustralia. On the other hand, however, criticism of NATO also servedto obscure the fact that Australia’s own contribution is also strictlylimited in terms of numbers and national caveats (Epstein, 2010).Hence, increased cooperation and joint operations in Afghanistanafter September 2001 were not necessarily indicative of a potential forfuture cooperation between Australia and the Atlantic Alliance. Thisbecame even clearer as defense policy resumed the traditional focuson Australia’s Asia–Pacific strategic interests in the 2009 DefenceWhite Paper.

Australian strategic interests and the Atlantic Alliance

Like the previous government’s White Paper from 2000, the RuddLabor government’s White Paper of 2009, ‘Force 2030,’ providesstrategic guidance for Australian defense policy on the basis of a hier-archy of four strategic interests, which are firmly rooted in Australia’sregional geography in the Asia-Pacific region (White, 2009). Foremostof these is the enduring interest in the defense of the country itself.This requires the ability of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) todefend the Australian continent and its maritime approaches with-out relying on the combat troops of its US ally. The second priorityis to support the internal stability and freedom from external threatof countries in Australia’s neighborhood, that is in the south-westPacific and in Indonesia. The third priority is to maintain strategicstability in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in South-East Asia. Onlythe fourth and last strategic objective concerns Australia’s contribu-tion to a rules-based, liberal global order, including the Middle East(Department of Defence, 2009, pp. 41–4).

The continuity of Australia’s strategic focus on the Asia-Pacificregion – in the context of a rising China that is seen as challenging


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the regional balance of power – has also been underlined by recentADF capability developments. Australian long-term defense planningis focused on a significant expansion of the country’s air and mar-itime capabilities, with the planned procurement of up to 100 F-35Joint Strike Fighters, a doubling of the submarine fleet to 12 boats,and the replacement of eight frigates with much larger vessels withincreased anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Despite recent opera-tional experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the expansion of the armywill remain capped at eight battalion-sized battle-groups, and in the2009 White Paper it is explicitly stated that the ADF would not bedeveloped to participate in combat in urban areas outside the Asia-Pacific region (Department of Defence, 2009, pp. 70–81). There isthus an enduring focus on regional sea denial and power projectioncapabilities for contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region.

Given Australia’s enduring strategic interests, two main issues standout with regard to NATO’s utility for Australia: NATO’s contributionto strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and Australia’s andNATO’s role in global security affairs. As regards NATO’s role in theAsia-Pacific, it must be noted that the Alliance so far has failed to for-mulate any policy of how to approach the region. Despite the factthat their most powerful ally, the US, assigns ever greater empha-sis to the region, with significant consequences for the Alliance asa whole, most European allies do not support any role of NATOin Asia-Pacific security. Therefore, without a major disruptive eventin the region, NATO’s impact on regional security and the areas ofAustralia’s priority interests will remain very limited.

NATO’s limited role in the Asia-Pacific, and Australia’s increasingconcerns about the regional order have important ramifications forthe practical relevance of NATO for Australia. The first implication isthat apart from the alliance with the US, a number of other defenserelationships are much more important for Australia than the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. For instance, Australia maintains commitmentsand close cooperation with New Zealand under the ANZUS Treatyand the ‘Closer Defence Relations’ agreements. In recent years, NewZealand and Australian troops have deployed together to a number ofoperations in the South Pacific, including in Bougainville, East Timor,Solomon Islands, and Tonga. In South-East Asia, the FDPA continuesto play a useful role in maintaining defense cooperation and foster-ing regional stability (Thayer, 2007). Moreover, important bilateral


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defense relations exist with Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines,and Japan. Therefore, Australia can make use of a substantial set offormal defense relationships within the Asia-Pacific region which,unlike NATO, do contribute to the country’s three main strategicinterests.

This leaves Australian contributions to a rules-based, liberal globalorder as the area where Australia’s and NATO activities are mostlikely to overlap in the future. In this context, however, it is impor-tant to note that, political rhetoric aside, Australia’s contribution tothe ISAF operation in Afghanistan is still predominantly a meansto demonstrate its commitment to the bilateral defense relation-ship with the US (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2009). Justlike some of NATO’s East European members, Australia is thus ulti-mately operating in Afghanistan for reasons that lie much closerto home: ANZUS remains Australia’s ultimate guarantor of defenseagainst an existential threat, and the close relationship with the USin terms of access to technology, logistical support, and intelligenceunderpins the ADF’s ability to operate independently in Australia’simmediate neighborhood. Australia’s engagement in Afghanistanand Iraq after September 2001 was thus more the consequence ofalliance solidarity with its ‘ultimate protector,’ the US, than a signof any intention to increase the country’s role in global securityaffairs. Despite the post-11 September operations in Afghanistan andIraq, stability in the immediate neighborhood and the broader Asia-Pacific region remained the dominant concern in Australian strategicthinking.

The primary utility of NATO for Australia in global operationshas, therefore, been that of a temporary complement to the US ina specific operation, namely Afghanistan. Cynics might see the mainbenefit for Australia of working with the Atlantic Alliance as provid-ing a political opportunity to hide behind NATO allies when it comesto justifying a relatively limited troop contribution vis-à-vis its USally. Whatever increased exchanges at the technical level will persistinto the future, any de-emphasis of NATO’s role in global securityaffairs, as advocated by many European allies (Noetzel and Schreer,2009b), would certainly reduce the political relevance of NATO forAustralia even further. In other words, the momentum for increasedpolitical and military cooperation between Australia and NATO maywell have peaked already.


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Australia and NATO: Temporary utility but lastingfamiliarity?

In conclusion, NATO’s main political and military utility for Australialies in its function as a temporary complement to the US in thecontext of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In general, though,Australia’s increased cooperation with the Alliance after September2001 reflects more a continuation of a previous pattern of pragmaticand practical cooperation, than a decisive shift in Australian strategicthinking. From Australia’s point of view, the limited overlap of strate-gic interests is largely confined to the Afghanistan operation, anddoes not warrant greater political integration. Consequently, NATOissues still do not rank highly in strategic debate among Australianstrategic decision-makers and security pundits. At the end of the day,NATO is but one among a number of partners to work with whenit comes to serving the Australia’s ‘wider strategic interests.’ Thisis reflected in the latest Defence White Paper of 2009, which onlybriefly mentions the partnership with NATO: In fact, the documentdevotes equal attention, and the same formulations, to cooperationwith the EU (Department of Defence, 2009, p. 100. See also Markovic,2009).

What does this imply for the future of Australian–NATO relations?For the time being, Australian strategic decision-makers will be per-fectly satisfied with the country’s current status as one of NATO’s‘partners across the globe,’ without formal institutional access. Theydo not have any interest in joining an ‘alliance of democracies,’ nei-ther today nor in the foreseeable future. Participation in an institu-tionalized political NATO format would not correspond to Australia’sprimary focus on the Asia-Pacific, and may in fact reduce Australia’spolicy flexibility in the face of a highly dynamic Asia-Pacific securityarchitecture (Grey, 2006, p. 30). Already, the Australian governmentneeds to strike a delicate balance between its traditional orientationtoward the ANZUS alliance with the US and increased economic inte-gration with China. In recent years, Australia was thus, for example,a very hesitant participant in the so-called ‘quadrilateral’ dialogueswith the US, Japan, and India (Medcalf, 2008), and deeper politicalrelations between China and the Atlantic Alliance would thereforecertainly be a precondition for Australia to substantially increase anddeepen political ties with NATO (Fogh Rasmussen, 2010).5


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Increasing NATO’s utility for Australia will ultimately depend on acommonality of core strategic interests. For Australia, these remainwedded to regional instability and shifting relativities in the balancebetween Asia’s great powers. In light of these challenges closer tohome, there is very little support on either side of the political aislefor a more substantial global role. As long as NATO has no substan-tial and credible strategic role in the region of greatest concern toAustralia’s security, close political engagement with NATO provideslittle added value. And in the light of the rise of China and India,Australia’s traditional focus on stability in the Asia-Pacific region willonly increase. Thus, any new impetus for developing the relationshipmust come from NATO itself. The Alliance would need to develop astrategy for its future engagement in the Asia-Pacific and to movebeyond the current focus on troop contributions (Lyon, 2008). Alas,it is difficult to conceive NATO allies agreeing on such a course.

More likely, NATO will maintain its ‘customer approach,’ in whichthe Alliance largely leaves it up the partners to define their desiredareas of cooperation. Such an approach does not entail significantpolitical, military, and financial commitments for NATO. But it wouldallow Australia to continue the increased level of more mundanetechnical exchanges and cooperation of recent years. Somewhat para-doxically, however, one of the effects of increased familiarity andengagement with NATO for Australia was to create a host of newbilateral defense relationships, for example with the Netherlands overAfghanistan, and the Czech Republic over weapons of mass destruc-tion incident response, that are taxing the limited resources of theinternational policy department in the Australian Department ofDefence. Hence, when the 1st Battalion of the Royal Australian Regi-ment participated in a month-long training exercise in 2008 at the USArmy’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany,it did so not in the framework of NATO, but of the Anglo-Saxon coop-eration in ABCA (Department of Defence, 2008). Australia may be a‘natural partner’ for NATO, but that does not mean that the reverseis true as well.

Notes

1. Exceptions include Grey, 2006; Lyon, 2008; Frühling and Schreer, 2009a.2. Definition of ‘partner’ in The Oxford Dictionary of English.


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3. Article IV of ANZUS states that ‘Each Party recognizes that an armed attackin the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its ownpeace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dan-ger in accordance with its constitutional processes.’ See Australian TreatySeries, 1952 no. 2 (Canberra: Department of External Affairs).

4. The ANZUS Treaty is a tripartite treaty between the US, Australia, and NewZealand. The US suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand in1986 after that country did not allow access to New Zealand ports bynuclear-powered US Navy vessels, but the treaty remains in force betweenAustralia and New Zealand, and Australia and the US.

5. At the 2010 Munich Security Conference, the new NATO Secretary Gen-eral, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, advocated for the Alliance to become a globalforum for consultations on security issues. In his view, China should bepart of such a forum.

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4Partnerships to the East andSouth: A ‘Win-Win’ PolicyJanne Haaland Matlary

Introduction

In this chapter we analyze the effects of NATO partnerships inthe European rim, to the south (Balkans) and to the east (CentralEurope and beyond). The states included are: Bosnia-Herzegovina,Serbia, and Montenegro in the Balkans, and Moldova, Armenia,Azerbadijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the Ukraine in the Caucaususand Central Asia.

For the first group there exists a political commitment toward even-tual membership for all these states, provided that the conditionsstipulated by NATO are met: the partnership is, therefore, a step onthe way to membership. For the Caucasians and Central Asians, how-ever, the situation is different: Although NATO has an ‘open door’policy, not all these states want membership. Only Georgia amongthem still desires membership. The Ukraine, after the presidentialelection of pro-Russian Janukovich in 2010, announced that part-nership suffices, as discussed in Bukkvoll’s chapter. Kazakhstan andArmenia explicitly do not aim for membership, probably due to closerelations with Russia (McDermott, 2008, p. 616).

Partnership in this part of the world is, therefore, not a step towardmembership. The partnership–membership dynamic is a very impor-tant one in terms of its effects for NATO because the latter can putpressure on states that aim for membership, but not those who aresatisfied with being partners. I analyze this political dynamic later inthe chapter.

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Janne Haaland Matlary 61

The question of utility also depends on the strategic vision thatNATO has, if any: Does NATO aim for a specific political or militaryutility in its partnership policy?

In this chapter we first discuss what strategic thinking regarding part-nerships to the east and south means. Then we ask what kinds ofeffects strategic assumptions imply. Does NATO seek certain effectsin these states? Or are the effects more spontaneous results that mayor may not materialize? Are they primarily political and less military?Turning to the empirical analysis, we give an overview of the partner-ship activities of the countries in this group, highlighting the mostimportant states, and looking at strategy and effects.

Strategy vs. policy

Is there a partnership strategy in NATO? There is a partnership pol-icy in NATO.1 It consists of a hierarchy of partnership stages,2 policygoals, and ways of reaching them. But a policy is not a strategy. Strate-gic thinking is goal-oriented, that is, it specifies a clear goal and themeans to reach it. But unlike policy, which may also do both thesethings, a strategy is also marked by its interactive character: it takesinto account countervailing powers and adversarial actors, and calcu-lates which moves should be made in light of this interaction (Baylisand Wirtz, 2007). This would mean that possible opposition to NATOpartnership or membership is considered, that is, that NATO consid-ers how Russia may or may not react to its plans. A strategic visionof, for example, Georgian membership would imply that NATO fore-sees a Russian military reaction and plans for its own reaction, andthat NATO has considered the relevance of Article 5 in the case ofGeorgian membership. Does NATO have a membership–partnershipstrategy in this sense?

During a series of interviews in October 2009, I posed this questionto NATO officials and diplomats at NATO headquarters in Brussels.They all agreed that there was no clear strategy behind the develop-ment of partnership policy. Both enlargement and partnership weredriven more by commitments than by strategy, said one; the possibil-ity for extending NATO to new states opened up after the Cold War,and the process of both partnership and later membership was drivenby the demands of the states that wanted to join rather than byNATO. ‘The processes were driven by events,’ said one official, ‘there


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62 Partnerships to the East and South

was no plan for memberships as a result of membership, but NATOwanted to build bridges.’3 As pressure for admitting the Visegrádstates increased in the 1990s, the partnership policy has to evolveas well, and MAP was created.

In security and defense studies, realism and variants of this strategictradition have traditionally been the key point of departure (Collins,2007). Central concepts are balance of power and ‘Realpolitik’(Collins, 2007, chapter 2). On such a view, partnerships are use-ful in order to balance against a potential enemy state, either as ageo-political factor in creating a ‘buffer’ zone, and/or in ensuringthat the partner brings military assistance to bear. Partnerships onNATO’s rim bordering on Russia will be useful in this ‘buffer state’respect and ensure that NATO’s geo-political reach increases, to theextent of actually bordering on Russia. Enlargement, including theUkraine and Georgia, would increase NATO’s geo-political scope, andthis would seem to be a interesting strategy for a military allianceas long as Russia remains a source of potential insecurity for NATOstates. In the Soviet era such a strategy was of course impossible, butafter the Cold War NATO enjoyed a decade and more of a very weakRussia, and memberships and partnerships to the East were created ata rapid pace (Solomon, 1998). It would, therefore, seem to be a rea-sonable hypothesis that NATO followed a realist strategy of extendingpartnerships in this period:

Hyphothesis 1: NATO seeks to extend its geo-political power throughmemberships and partnerships to the east

But partnerships have not only been extended in the direction ofRussia, but also to Balkan states. Indeed, NATO memberships andpartnerships seem to follow the same pattern as do new membershipsfor the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe (CoE), and so on. All theseorganizations have absorbed new members after the Cold War at abrisk pace, in a way that is oftentimes called ‘therapeutic member-ship policy’ (Matlary, 2002). The strategy has been to include newstates as members before they were really ready to make this move,on the philosophy that they would educate themselves in democraticnorms and secure a democratic development through being grantedmembership. As discussed below, NATO memberships were, roughlyspeaking, decided at the same time, as was EU membership for theCentral European states; NATO partnership often coincides with CoE


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and/or OSCE membership. EU and NATO membership are the hard-est and most prestigious to achieve, whereas almost every state mayjoin the OSCE and the CoE, which is the ‘outer circle’ (Matlary,2002).

To create stable peace through democratization is the major con-tending theory to that of realism. The ‘democratic peace’ theory iswell established as a basis for empirical research (see Østerud, 2010,for a critical survey). The major conclusion is that democracies donot wage war on each other. The idea that democratization is thevery key to security policy has also become extremely prominent inEurope after the Cold War, to such an extent that coercive militarydiplomacy seems outdated (Buzan and Wæver, 2004).

Memberships and partnerships for NATO as well as other interna-tional organizations (IOs) logically seem to result from this desire tosocialize new states into a democratic framework. Alexandra Gheciu’scase study of the role of such socialization in the NATO membershipprocess toward Central Europe shows that the role of socializationwas deemed very important on the part of NATO and that it formedthe basis of membership policy toward the Czech Republic andPoland (Gheciu, 2009). In her case studies Gheciu found that NATOworked on the assumption that socialization into liberal-democraticnorms is the key to peace and security. The same conclusion isvery evident in Rebecca Moore’s study of NATO after the Cold War(Moore, 2007).

In this book Moore traces the development of membership andpartnership policy and aptly calls NATO’s policy ‘a vehicle for democ-racy promotion.’ In Moore’s analysis there is no trace of strategicthinking on the part of NATO in these years: everything is centeredon the development of liberal democracy in formerly Communiststates. She makes a convincing case for the ‘democratic peace’ theory,but works primarily from official documents and does not attemptto test a realist hypothesis, something which is a weakness whenwe know how sensitive such strategic considerations are in a mili-tary alliance, and that they are thus generally not a topic for opendiscussion.

We can, therefore, formulate a second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: NATO’s membership and partnership strategy is basedon the idea that democracies ensure peace, and is aimed at domesticsocialization.


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When MAP-status for Georgia resulted in strong Russian reactions in2008, to the extent that Russia invaded Georgia when given a plausi-ble reason – to be discussed below – it seems clear that NATO stateshad not thought much about the consequences of extending theArticle 5 guarantee to Georgia as part of the planned membership.From a realist strategic angle, this is the main issue: Am I prepared todefend a new member of the alliance militarily? But from the ‘demo-cratic peace’ angle, Article 5 is no longer the main priority. In Europe,it was as if the Russian reaction in the Georgian case were one ofsurprise; as if the use of military power in Europe and its vicinityhad been superseded for good. It seemed as if NATO had granted thepromise of membership for Georgia without considering the Article 5implications. This indicates that hypothsis 2 is more plausible thanhypothesis 1.

In sum, under a H1 realist security strategy NATO would prefermembership of new states only where the obligation of Article 5seems theoretical, and here NATO will benefit both militarily andpolitically from many members and many partners. It may preferpartners in terms of contributions, as members have an equal sayin NATO decision-making. Partners have no say and may even beinterested in membership and therefore contribute much.

What about H2 effects? If NATO’s strategy toward the east andsouth is based on the ‘democratic peace,’ how will partnerships fare?Here it is a matter of influence on the domestic structures of the statein question. A democratic state is assumed to be a peaceful state, andthe main point of security policy is to develop and deepen the struc-tures of rule of law, democracy, and balance of power. NATO, likethe EU, can wield maximum influence when a state is a candidate formembership, as the findings of Sedelmeier (2001) shows. Once a stateis a member, it has equal rights to that of other states; if a state is notintending membership, neither the EU nor NATO have any leverageover it. As we gather, the difference is one of power: Both as a mem-ber and as a partner, the ‘new’ state has equal power to EU or NATOstates. But as a candidate, the EU or NATO wields power over it.

Effects of partnerships: How important is membership?

The political dynamics of partnership–membership are of key impor-tance. From research on EU membership conditionality we know


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that states without a membership prospect are unmotivated to effectchanges (Sedelmeier, 2001). Studies of EU enlargement show thatrational utility calculations play a greater role than learning andsocialization: The work by Schimmelfpennig and Sedelmeier (2005)is an empirical study into how conditionality works. They find thatcandidate states for membership can be leveraged into change. Butthis form of power disappears once a member. In short, ‘the hopeof EU membership is a major incentive for reform among prospectivemembers’ (Barnes, 2010, p. 434). They also found that the motivationis instrumental rather than value-driven.

Does NATO pursue a strategy of turning partners into members?A natural starting point is to look at the EU’s expansion east- andsouthwards after the Cold War. There is a stated parallel betweenNATO and the EU in terms of which states that became members:the two organizations have followed the same pattern of expan-sion. They also have similar philosophies about membership, thatis to spread certain values that amount to liberal democracy: humanrights, democratic process, the rule of law. This includes the civiliancontrol of military forces in the case of NATO, and also the premisethat democracies lead to peace. Building peaceful Europe throughdemocratization is the raison d’être of the EU.

In the EU, the criteria for membership are the so-called Copen-hagen criteria of 1993, consisting of rule and law, human rights,democracy, and the market economy, and there is also provision forthe peaceful settlement of disputes and good neighborly relations.Similarly, NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) states that aspiringmembers are assumed to ‘settle their international disputes by peace-ful means, demonstrate commitment to the rule of law and humanrights, settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes includ-ing irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peacefulmeans in accordance with OSCE principles and pursue good neigh-borly relations, establish appropriate democratic and civilian controlover their armed forces, refrain from the threat or use of force [ . . . ]’(NATO, 1999, pp. 1–2).

The EU has had five rounds of enlargement since 1950, but onlyafter the Cold War with enlargements to the east did it begin it applyconditionality: ‘the Copenhagen criteria (of 1993) indicated that theEU was prepared to go much further than it had done in the pastto influence the applicant states’ (Barnes and Barnes, 2010, p. 420).


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In the latter part of the 1990s, conditionality also became common indevelopment aid and trade agreements (Matlary, 2002). By contrastto the EU, NATO has not exercised conditionality in its projects underthe PfP.4 On the contrary, participation in such projects has been vol-untary. The EU also has a ‘neighborhood policy’ (ENP) which wouldbe the counterpart of NATO’s partnership policy. It was developedfurther into an Eastern Partner’s Initiative, launched by the Councilof Ministers in May 2008. The ENP is not aimed at potential mem-bers, but is an alternative for those states that may never apply foror achieve membership. It is the EU’s ‘mechanism for ensuring themaintenance of shared values beyond its borders’ (Barnes and Barnes,2007, p. 433), and includes Moldova, Georgia, and the Ukraine.

In sum, the EU has a clear membership policy in terms of whatprospective members must conform to, and it has an actor capacityin the form of the Commission and its powers that can put pressureon candidate countries. The impact of the EU on these states has beenformidable. The same is not true, however, when it comes to the EU’spartnership policy, the ENP.

Turning now to the NATO-partner state, how is that relationship?As we have seen in the case of the EU, the Commission has a lotof leverage over candidate countries throughout the period of adap-tation. In the case of NATO, there is no such leverage: ‘Fewer leversthan that of the EU,’ says one official.5 Both enlargement and partner-ship are, in the main, the results of demands by states that want thesecommitments, and not the result of NATO strategy to get new mem-bers. Further, the content of the partnership relationships varies verymuch, unlike in the EU where there is a number of areas that haveto be negotiated in the candidacy process. In NATO partnerships, thestates themselves decide which projects they want to undertake evenwhen they aim at membership.

The very active partners Sweden and Finland, called ‘non-NATOallies,’ are maximally present in all partnership activities as wellas in international operations (see Petersson’s chapter), followed byAustria, Switzerland, and so on. For these states the interest is not inprospective membership, but in modernizing the armed forces. NATOoffers professional military interoperability and training possibilitiesas well as actual experience in multinational operations. Thus, thereis the paradoxical situation that partners that do not aim at member-ship are extremely active in their partnership relations with NATO


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whereas others that may become members, such as the Balkan states,are not so eager to ‘perform.’ There is not necessarily a partnership–membership dynamic in the NATO-candidate relationship becausethere is not such a specified program of adaptation to follow as in theEU case.

The MAP-process has, however, resulted in more detailed annualreports from partner states than before. These reports used to be verygeneral and uninteresting, said one NATO official,6 but with MAPthey became more orderly and focused. There is an ‘inspection’ byNATO: a visit from HQ that lasts about a week, where problemsare discussed and where one talks with other representatives fromorganizations such as the EU, OSCE, and so on. There may be coop-eration between NATO and the EU on the ground, so to speak, saidanother official, but centrally, in Brussels, there is no coordination.The EU takes no interest in what NATO does in the states where ithas candidate processes going on. There is thus no exploitation ofthe potential of common action, pressure, or leverage from the EUand NATO combined. Instead, they both have their own processes.

There is no indication of a common effort to influence partnerstates on the part of European IOs. The EU wields influence because ithas a comprehensive program for potential members and is a unitaryactor with major powers over the applicant state. But NATO has nomembership plans for the partner states, no comprehensive program,and no central actor in Brussels that can drive processes of changeand influence.

In conclusion, NATO may exercise power over membership can-didates, but not to the same extent and with the scope of the EU.In the case where membership is not the specified goal, NATO hasmuch less leverage over the partner country. Based on interviews withNATO officials it seems that there is no strategic reasoning about thisat NATO headquarters. Partners are offered projects and assistance,but not arm-twisted into accepting these.

Effects of partnerships for NATO

When asked about effects, one ambassador to NATO from a part-ner state replied that NATO achieves general political influence ina democratic direction and gets some troop contributions, while thepartner states sometimes derive simple benefits like learning English,


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modern, democratic control of the armed forces, interoperability, andso on.7 The NATO ‘footprint’ in the partner states is weak.

If we think along the lines of the two hypotheses outlined above,the expected effects of memberships and partnerships will vary withthe assumptions made. Given H1, we can deduce that membershipwill entail a major risk in terms of having to defend the new mem-ber according to Article 5, but that the threshold for manipulating amember will be much higher than manipulating a partner becausethe latter does not enjoy the Article 5 guarantee. From the point ofview of the potential member, membership is preferable if it fears itsneighbors, but from the point of view of NATO, membership carriesvery high risk in terms of obligation to defend a new member. NATOtherefore can be assumed to prefer partnerships with states that areat risk unless NATO itself has major security interests in these newstates.

Given this logic, NATO should prefer partnership and not mem-bership for states such as Georgia and the Ukraine, given that NATOwillingness to risk Article 5 defense of these states is small if not non-existent. The cost-benefit calculus is such that NATO’s security gainfrom a larger geo-political ‘footprint’ on Russia’s border is less thanthe obligation incurred by Article 5. Yet when we look at NATO his-tory regarding these two states, they were both declared to be in theprocess for membership. This indicated that H2 rather than H1 wasthe basis for NATO policy, as argued above. There is no indicationthat NATO aimed to achieve the effect of a larger geo-political reach.

With regard to other and more country-specific effects of part-nership, we can divide these into military and political effects. Themilitary effects are here defined as contributions to operations withmodern training and equipment. Few new members or partners havesubstantial offers here, except for Poland and the Ukraine, but wenote that all sorts of contributions can be useful in Stabilisation &Reconstruction operations that are long-lasting and comprehensive.Provincial Reconstruction Teamss in Afghanistan are but one exam-ple. As most operations are non-Article 5, it does not matter whetherthe state is a member or a partner, although it may be much moreimportant for a prospective member to contribute than for a statewith less commitment to NATO. The political legitimacy that ratherunimportant military contributions represent is also useful. Whena partner state makes a token contribution to, for example, ISAF, it


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counts as one more country in the large coalition. To have a largecoalition of states behind an operation is increasingly important,especially if some of these are Muslim states and the operation islinked to anti-terrorism causes.

Thus, partnerships bring political advantages to NATO, both interms of contributions to operations and in terms of domestic changein the liberal-democratic direction of the partner state. To the state inquestion, the advantages are military in a direct sense of project assis-tance and learning, but this also counts as a political advantage insidethe state, in the democratic direction, and as a great political advan-tage abroad, as the partner state becomes part of the internationalcommunity that ‘counts.’

Regarding the political effects of partnerships under H1, the pref-erences of the political elite decides. If the state wants a Western andEuropean orientation, the move toward NATO and EU membership isthe way. If not, partnership may still entail the international politicaladvantages mentioned above. A partner may seek its primary securityrelationship with Russia, yet reap benefits from being a NATO part-ner, as Bukkvoll discusses in his chapter. Military modernization isnecessary regardless of political orientation, and NATO is the fountof learning and money.

The military effect that NATO can derive from partners under H2assumptions lies in the reform of the armed forces and in completecivilian control of these. This in turn can lead to useful militarycontributions to international operations. Further, the main effectboth politically and militarily is that the state in question becomesa true democracy, thus ensuring a postulated ‘perpetual peace,’ toparaphrase Immanuel Kant.

In sum, the main difference between H1 and H2 is that H1 is con-cerned with traditional military security and defense policy, takinginto account the ‘Realpolitik’ and the importance of the balanceof power. According to this perspective, Article 5 is of paramountimportance, and there is a major difference between membership andpartnership. In H2, however, the only relevant concern for NATO isthe extension of democratic values. The effects that NATO derivesfrom partnership therefore differ in how they are viewed by NATO,according to which hypothesis we start from.

It thus seems that NATO has pursued a H2 strategy toward both theeast and the south: partnerships that focus on reform with an ‘open


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door’ toward membership if the partner so wishes. In the Balkansthis seems to be a workable way forward, as all the states desire mem-bership, with the possible exception of Serbia. However, to the east,Russia has a clear stance against Ukrainian and Georgian member-ship. NATO has an equally clear stance on its right to admit all statesthat are ready and desirous of joining. Yet we witnessed the interven-tion in Georgia. This means that NATO finds itself in a realist logic,regardless of its own will. Internal reform, according to the criteriaof NATO enlargement, is therefore a necessary but not sufficient con-dition for joining NATO, just as it is in the EU; as pointed out, thelevel of such reform is very varied, so there is no objective standardagainst which to measure preparedness for membership. Without‘Grosspolitik,’ we see that the normal political process of enlargementproceeds from partnership to membership in both organizations, butwhen the question becomes one of great power politics, this politicaldynamic grinds to a halt.

The most spectacular case of this in NATO is Georgia, where therewas a political commitment to eventual membership given at theBucharest Summit in April 2008, a subsequent Russian military attackon the country in August the same year, and a careful backtrackingon the membership promise on the part of NATO in the aftermath.Although the wording on potential Georgian membership is retainedin documents, as we shall see, there is no political will to continuewith this process on the part of NATO today. While the US is in favor,most European states are opposed. The same is true in the EU. Turkeyis a candidate country and, although negotiations continue, it is clearthat the issue of membership is a political one at the highest inter-national level, and two EU states, France and Austria, have alreadyvoiced negative views on Turkish membership.

Thus, great power politics and security balancing override internal reformprocesses, which of course always remains the only one voiced bythe official political process. The official process does not speakabout power balancing or spheres of geo-political interest, but onlyof creating democratic peace through the dissemination of liberal-democratic norms. But H1 trumps H2 in the cases where other statessee themselves as affected, in this case Russia. This very importantfactor naturally makes up the most important ‘effect’ factor whendiscussing the power of partnerships and memberships.


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Partnerships to the east and south: Effects for NATO

The EU and NATO extended membership to approximately the samestates in the post-1990 period: All the Central-European states aremembers of both organizations today, and there is a process towardeventual membership of the Balkan states. The initial debates aboutenlargement were tough and quite conscious of a ‘Realpolitik’ logic,as Solomon’s study shows (Solomon, 1998). NATO extended mem-bership to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, and toseven new members in 2004 – the Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia,Rumania, and Bulgaria. In 2009 Croatia and Albania were admit-ted, and Macedonia was told that it may join NATO as soon asit has resolved the name question with Greece. The EU extendedmembership to all ten East-Central Europeans in 2004 with Bulgariaand Rumania joining in 2007, while negotiations with candidatecountries Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia are far advanced. Itwas expected that Croatia could join in 2009, but this has nothappened yet.

Yet the pattern is similar in both organizations: Membership ofthe East-Central European states was accomplished by mid-2000; theBalkan states are in a process toward membership and in state ofpartnership for the most part, whereas the connection between part-nership and membership in the CIS-area is much less clear. Withregard to NATO, Montenegro has achieved MAP-status while Bosniaand Serbia are in the IPAP. Georgia and the Ukraine have a spe-cial set-up, so-called Georgia-NATO and Ukraine-NATO commissions.The Georgia-NATO Commission was set up after the Russian attackon Georgia in August 2008, on 15 September the same year, and‘expresses grave concern over the military conflict in Georgia, itsgenesis, and Russia’s actions’ (NATO 2008a). It also reaffirms thatGeorgia may become a NATO member.

NATO has also extended partnerships to Central Asia and the otherstates in South Caucasus. All the five ‘stans’ are partners: Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. They havebeen members of PfP since 1994, with the exception of Tajikistan,who joined only in 2002. A NATO special representative for thesepartnerships, Robert Simmons, was appointed in 2004. Each state’scooperation with NATO differs, as it is the states themselves that


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select projects they want to participate in. Kazakhstan has a widearray of partnership projects, and agreed on an Individual PartnerAction Plan (IPAP)8 in 2006. The other three states have less coop-eration, but all five have assisted in the ongoing ISAF-operation.A number of projects on security sector reform, disaster relief, mod-ernization of the armed forces, and so on have been carried out(See NATO, 2009, for details). All these states retain their majorsecurity orientation toward Russia, despite NATO partnerships. Inthe case of the one state with IPAP in this group, Kazakhstan, astudy concludes that despite all Western military aid and coopera-tion, ‘it merely scrathes the surfaces when considered in the contextof Kazakhstan’s innately Russian leanings and security dependency’(McDermott, 2008, p. 640).

Looking at partners in South Caucasus, we find three states:Armenia, Azerbadijan, and Georgia. They joined NACC in 1992 andPFP in 1994, and soon thereafter started planning and review pro-cesses with NATO. In 1999, Azerbadijan and Georgia contributedforces to KFOR, and in 2002 Azerbadijan contributed forces to ISAF.There have also been also joint exercises in Georgia (‘CooperativePartner 2001’ and ‘Cooperative Best Effort 2002’) and in Armenia(‘Cooperative Best Effort 2003’). At the Istanbul summit in 2004 therewas special emphasis placed on Central Asia and the Caucasus, and inthe same year Georgia finalized the IPAP, Armenia contributed sometroops to KFOR, and ISAF was allowed use Georgian territory for tran-sit. In 2005, Armenia and Azerbadijan finalized their IPAPs, and allthree states opened information centres on NATO in collaborationwith the latter’s Public Policy Division. There is also the same specialrepresentative for this region as for Central Asia (NATO, 2007a).

But, as Moore points out, there is limited cooperation betweenNATO and these states, and such as there is mainly on a bilateralproject basis between some states in NATO and the partner (Moore,2010, p. 100).

In 2006 NATO opened the so-called ‘Intensified Dialogue’ withGeorgia, and in 2007 the country hosted a joint air exercise, ‘Cooper-ative Archer 2007.’ In April 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, Georgiawas promised MAP status and the issue of membership was dis-cussed. In August 2008 Russia intervened militarily in Georgia. Inmid-September the same year a NATO–Georgia Commission wasestablished at a meeting in Tbiblisi (NATO, 2008a). Georgia has


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offered 1000 troops to ISAF, but on the issue of membership NATOremains deeply divided. France and Germany are opposed, the US isin favor.

The official description of Georgia’s relationship with NATO statesthat ‘NATO and Georgia actively cooperate on democratic, institu-tional, and defence reforms, with the aim of preparing Georgia foreventual membership in the alliance, as agreed by Allied leaders inBucharest in April 2008’ (NATO, 2010a). At that summit, Georgia hasachieved a very clear commitment to membership, in a language thatleft nothing ambiguous. It bears quoting in full:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirationsfor membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countrieswill become members of NATO. Both nations have made valuablecontributions to Alliance operations [ . . . ]. MAP is the next step forUkraine and Georgia on their direct way to membership. Today wemake clear that we support these countries’ applications for MAP.Therefore we will now begin a period of intensive engagementwith both at a high political level to address the questions stilloutstanding pertaining to their MAP applications. We have askedour Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment at their December2008 meeting. Foreign ministers have the authority to decide onthe MAP applications for Georgia and the Ukraine.

(NATO, 2008b, Paragraph 25)

This is very different diplomatic language from the normal cautionedapproach to partnership and membership. Here there is no stress onconditionality. On the contrary, the issue of membership has beendecided already, regardless of the developments in these two states.Not only are the heads of state decided on the speedy granting of theMAP, as stated, mandating the foreign ministers to speed ahead onthis, but the heads of state declare that both states will become NATOmembers. The language of the whole paragraph is unusually strongin terms of diplomatic discourse. One gets the clear impression thatmembership will be rushed for both states, not depending in any wayon their domestic development, and that nothing will stop NATOfrom pushing ahead here.

In light of this, the fact that there was a Russian reaction isnot surprising. There was evidently a strong wish on NATO’s part


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to underline that Russia would not be able to dictate the allianceregarding membership for these two states. Yet this is exactly whathappened when Russia attacked Georgia some months later, underthe pretext of aiding Russian nationals in breakaway republics SouthOssietia and Abkhazia. President Shakasvilii made a major mis-take when he let Georgian forces intervene against separatists inSouth Ossietia, seizing Tskhinkvali. This resulted in a major Russianresponse, the first use of force in a foreign state since the invasion ofAfghanistan in 1979 (Giragosian, 2008).

The NATO reaction was slow and weak. Instead of an officialresponse from NATO, the EU High Representative at the time, JavierSolana, travelled to Tbiblisi. There were reactions from individualstates, but NATO did not address the situation at first. Later on itresorted to the process of MAP with Georgia, but there was no fur-ther talk of membership. The attack and disproportionate use of forcewas condemned, and the plan for Georgian membership reiterated:‘At an emergency meeting of the NAC on 19 August 2008, Alliedforeign ministers called for a peaceful and lasting solution to theconflict based on Georgia’s independence, sovereignty, and territo-rial integrity’ (NATO, 2008a). At this time the MAP was dropped andthe NATO–Georgia Commission created instead.

The ‘Realpolitik’ of the Russian reaction was clear, and NATO loo-ked the other way and did not respond. The Georgian case illustratesthe difference between H1 and H2: NATO was unprepared for Russianaction based on ‘Realpolitik,’ and had no real response to this.

As regards the Ukraine, there has been a special NATO–UkraineCommission since 1997, when the heads of state signed a Charterof Distinctive Partnership. In 2000, the Status of Forces Agreementwas signed (SOFA), and in 2002 then-President Kuchma announcedUkraine’s intention of membership in NATO. There has been anaction plan from that time onward, and the Ukraine contributesto various NATO operations. After the Orange Revolution there wasintensified cooperation toward the goal of a MAP, while the then-Prime Minister Janukovich tried to slow the process, announcing in2006 that the people were not ready to consider NATO membership(NATO, 2007b). When he was elected President in 2010, he reiteratedthis, opting for continued partnership, but making it clear that mem-bership was not on the agenda.9 On 27 April 2010, there was a majoruprising in parliament during the decision on the renewal of the


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Russian right to use the Sevastopol naval base, which involved physi-cal fighting among the politicians (Aftenposten 2010). This shows thedeep divisions within the Ukraine regarding the security orientationtoward Russia.

What can we conclude about effects for NATO of these partner-ships? First, the effects are not very major ones. There is improvementin terms of military modernization and political values, we mayassume, as a result of the various projects between NATO-states andthese partners, but several of them retain their allegiance in secu-rity policy to Russia. With regard to the Georgian case, the effect forNATO is extremely negative: the process of Georgian membership hasbeen halted by the Russian intervention. This has implications for thebalance of power and the deterrent effect of NATO. The question thatremains unanswered is this: Will NATO dare to admit Georgia?

The nuts and bolts of partnerships

Let us now look at some partnerships in more detail in order to see ifthere are effects that are of interest. Starting with the Balkan partners,it makes sense to look at the partnership with Bosnia–Herzegovina(B&H) because this is the country where NATO was engaged in mil-itary operations in 1994–95. The fact that the country today is aNATO partner testifies to the important development that has takenplace in Europe in the last few years. B&H is a relatively new PfPpartner, joining in 2006. From 2008 the country has been ‘engagedin an Intensified Dialogue with NATO in its membership aspirationssince April 2008’ (NATO, 2010b). This is a partner that works towardmembership. The NAC also agrees; it decided that the country wouldget a MAP (Membership Action Plan) in 2009, however, ‘the extent ofcooperation ultimately depends on the country’s willingness to con-tinue its democratic, institutional, and defense reform process. Thecountry is also expected to cooperate fully with the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ (NATO, 2010b). Thus,membership depends on conditionality, and NATO has a lever to apply. Thelanguage from the NAC is much more reserved than in the Georgiancase and explicitly states conditions for membership.

The actual cooperation consists of the standard themes for part-nerships. Internal reform in the country and preparedness forinteroperability with NATO members in international operations.


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As of 2009, B&H deploys some few officers in ISAF, as part of theDanish and German contingents, after having signed the SOFA (Sta-tus of Forces Agreement) and provided overflight rights to NATO aswell as the use of Mostar, Banja Luka, and Tuzla as reserve airports.There is also military capability in the field of UXO and demining.Although not a NATO operation, in Iraq B&H deployed both such ateam and an infantry platoon. In sum, there is a modest beginningin military contributions to international operations.

In terms of domestic defense reform, the three ethnically basedentities of the federation have now been consolidated into onedefense structure. In the army, the former enemies Bosniacs, Croats,and Serbs have now been integrated into one structure, under a sin-gle command. This is no small accomplishment, and is one thatcan be attributed to NATO. Yet NATO has had the power to enforcemilitary change in B&H since the Dayton Agreement was signed in1995. This enforcement role has gradually become one of coopera-tion for modernization, headed by NATO’s military headquarter’s inSarajevo.

This case is a unique one in the class of partnerships. From a situa-tion of full-scale civil war in the period 1991–95, B&H has been undertotal NATO domination militarily until 2002, when the EU took overthe military operation, while NATO continued to work in the coun-try along the stages of partnership: IPP from 2006, PARP from 2007,IPAP from 2008, and MAP promise as soon as feasible, with member-ship also a promise, given enough progress. In this case we see rapid,concerted action on the part of NATO, transforming a wartorn countrytoward a democratic state with a modern armed force as soon as possible.Furthermore, the cooperation on war criminals has by now becomesatisfactory, thanks mainly to American pressure that brought bothMilosevic and other criminals to the Hague. The arrest of RadovanKaradžic also testifies to this. Thus, the goal of membership is notonly desired by both NATO and B&H, but is also possible as soon asreforms are implemented.

The ‘democratic peace’ theory appears to be very applicable in thiscase: A backlash in the country is a risk as long as it is not firmlyembedded in Western liberal structures. Partnership in this case isa practical vehicle for bringing the country to a stage of militaryand democratic development which is sufficient for granting mem-bership. NATO’s interest is in stable, democratic government in the


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Balkans, and membership is the way to ensure this. H2 applies inthis case.

Azerbadijan and Armenia: Let us now take a look at two of the part-nerships in Southern Caucasus, the foes Azerbadijan and Armenia.Azerbadijan joined NACC in 1992, PfP in 1994, at its founding, andIPAP in 2005. Neither Azerbadijan nor Armenia seeks NATO member-ship, and this is stated clearly in the NATO presentation of Armenia,which is a country that traditionally seeks close security cooperationwith Russia.

Azerbadijan contributes to international operations: it sent a unitto KFOR in 1999 and participates with approximately 45 officersin ISAF. The security cooperation with NATO ranges from conver-sion of a dangerous rocket fuel oxidizer into fertilizer, reform of thearmed forces and learning how to develop civilian control of themilitary, improving military education, and so on. About 30 coop-erative projects have been funded by NATO states (NATO, 2010c).In this case, there are advantages for Azerbadijan in terms of con-crete projects, and some advantage for NATO in terms of militarycontributions to ongoing operations. However, the latter is neg-ligible. For NATO, the political effect of contributing to changein a democratic direction must be said to be the important one.Small democratic developments under the tutelage of the Councilof Europe, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE all work in the same direc-tion. Yet Azerbadijan retains the power to control the process; as itdoes not seek membership, NATO has no leverage over it.

H2 would seem to apply also here: the gradual democratization andlearning process of liberal norms create the conditions for peace. Weshould also note that the long-standing conflict between Armeniaand Azerbadijan over Nagorna-Karabakh is entirely outside NATOinfluence. It is officially handled by the OSCE, but there has beenno progress on this issue for many years despite the willingness ofthe OSCE to present land-swop proposals that could make up a sen-sible solution. The fact that Azerbadijan has refused this indicatesthat it is not very interested in terminating the conflict. This in turnindicates that the country prefers to decide on security and defenseissues alone, and hence has no interest in a larger role for NATO inAzerbadijan.

What about the partnership with Armenia? This country was inPfP from the beginning, joined PARP in 2002, and IPAP in 2005.


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Armenia contributed to KFOR from 2003 onward with approximately85 officers. There is discussion about an ISAF contribution.

In the Armenian case, the official description of the partnershipstates that membership is not the goal (NATO, 2010d). A key prior-ity is to ensure democratic control of the armed forces. A numberof projects dealing with modernization and civilian control of thearmed forces have been started. These are clearly in Armenia’s polit-ical and military interests, and they are certainly in the interest ofNATO in a general political sense. H2 seems to apply in this case aswell. The NATO impact does not extend to major geo-political secu-rity policy through these projects, but NATO can effect piecemealchange in the country.

Summing up, we see that NATO has a partnership as preparationfor membership policy for the Balkan states, but one that only aimsat domestic reform for several of the Caucasian and Central Asianrepublics. NATO can influence the states that seek membership muchmore than those that only want partnership. The political dynamicof this relationship is discussed below. Further, we have seen thatNATO had a very active and determined policy toward offering mem-bership to Georgia and the Ukraine. In the former case, all serioustalk of membership was gone after the Russian intervention in thecountry in August 2008, and in the Ukrainian case the new politicalleadership does not want membership.

Conclusions

Which utility for NATO from these partners? So far it seems thatNATO can influence domestically with good results in terms ofreform, modernization, and control of the armed forces. These arethe goals of partnership stated in the official booklet on partner-ship (NATO, 2005). But beyond this kind of influence it is very clearthat NATO has a major impact both geo-politically and as a leveron domestic affairs if a partner country also seeks membership. IfH2 applies, that is, that NATO seeks to influence the domestic sit-uation in order to help a state and to make it democratic, therebyensuring security; there is also scope for H1 in the cases of Georgiaand the Ukraine. The eagerness on the part of NATO for underlin-ing that these states were to be admitted indicates that H1 was inplay, and, as we have witnessed, it was certainly perceived in thisway by Russia. However, the surprise with which NATO met the


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Russian attack shows that H1 must have been strangely absent fromthe deliberations of the NAC.

First, there seems to be little degree of strategic thinking behindNATO’s partnership policy. There is no evidence of a policy that seespartnership and membership in connection, and NATO headquar-ter’s does not exercise leverage over partners as a conscious strategy,even if they are in a partnership where membership is desired asthe outcome. There is no one actor in NATO that can conduct pol-icy actively akin to the European Commission. Rather, partner statesdesign their own partnership agenda by selecting which project theywish to participate in. There does not seem to be any strategy behindthese partnerships apart from the hope that H2 may work.

Second, there is no indication that NATO has thought in H1 termsabout membership and partnership. The continuous extension ofpartnership and membership to all interested states in the CentralEurope and to the Balkans, but also to the Ukraine and Georgia, hascontinued without discussions about Article 5 obligations and therisk involved in extending this guarantee to new states without muchstability, situated near or next to Russia, and without much modernmilitary capacity. The only strategy that seems to have played somepart is the hypothesis of the ‘democratic peace.’

Third, partnership policy has not been driven by considerationsof which military and/or political effects these partnerships wouldbring to NATO or of how they fit in with the policy of other IOs,like the EU. There has been and is minimal contact between thesetwo IOs. On the contrary, interested states have simply asked forpartnerships, and these have been granted in all cases. The guidingstar of membership and partnership policy appears to have been thegeneral idea of extending the values of democracy, as Gheciu alsofinds (Gheciu, 2009). Only with the return of Russian strength and‘Realpolitik’ did NATO have to reconsider this policy.

Fourth, the military utility to NATO is primarily related to the ISAFoperation: It has been helped by bases in some of these states, like theones at Manas airport in Bishkek, in Dushanbe, and Termez. In addi-tion, these states have granted overflight rights. Kasakhstan is alsoassisting a PRT in Afghanistan. The political legitimacy of large coali-tions behind multinational operations is more important to NATOthan these military contributions.

Fifth, on the political side, NATO also benefits from these partner-ships in terms of extending its influence through values and concrete


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projects. The multilateral meeting structure is important, 28 NATOstates meet the 26 partners at ambassadorial level each month inBrussels in the EAPC, annually at ministerial and chief of defenselevels. The five ‘stans’ all have ambassadors to NATO, and three ofthem are represented in the partnership ‘cell’ in SHAPE. The H2 of‘democratic peace’ fares badly when it comes to the ‘stans,’ as RebeccaMoore points out (Moore, 2010, p. 98). There are very considerabledemocratic problems in all these states, as also evidenced by the coupd’état in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. NATO has needed and still needs basesand overflight rights from these states in connection with ISAF, andderives military utility from this. Moore cites both lack of democ-racy and Russian reactions as reasons for NATO’s careful approachto these states (Moore, 2010, p. 98). It seems clear that there is noNATO strategy toward membership in these cases, as several of thesestates are strongly oriented toward Russia. There have been severalproblems relating to the air base Manas in Kyrgyzstan, probably areflection of tug-of-war between pro-NATO and pro-Russian domesticactors. Of these states, the cooperation with Kazakhstan is the mostdeveloped, and it is developing interoperability with NATO wheresecuring energy interest has been of particular importance to the US(McDermott, 2008).

In conclusion, in ‘good weather’ politics NATO benefits from thedissemination of democratic values and know-how about militaryreform in the partner states. In the long run, such effects may amountto a major geo-political effect in terms of the ‘democratic peace.’ Part-nerships that are planned to lead to membership allow NATO muchmore leverage over the partner state than in a mere partnership rela-tion, but in ‘rough weather,’ the obligation of Article 5 to membersmay become a major risk and problem. Hence, on the part of NATO,in such cases partnership is preferable to membership. Partnershipsare ‘win-win,’ but oftentimes NATO does not win very much.

Notes

1. See NATO’s booklet (NATO, 2005) on partnership policy, ‘NATO: SecurityThrough Partnership.’ (This booklet has evidently not been updated forseveral years.)

2. The partnership ‘hierarchy’ consists of an IPP (Individuals PartnershipPlan), which is where Serbia is at present. Above this is the PARP, the


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Planning and Review Process, which consists of annual reviews of mem-ber states’ activity, delivered by the states themselves. Above this is theIPAP, the Individual Membership Action Plan, instituted in 2002, whichis where Georgia and Azerbaijan are. At this point we get to the ID-level,Intensified Dialogue, which is the pre-stage to MAP. Only those states thatwant membership can enter this stage, although the MAP does not leadto membership. Georgia entered the ID in 2005 and was granted MAP inApril 2008.

3. Official working on partnerships to the south and east in Europe, 28September 2009, NATO HQ.

4. Interviews, NATO HQ, 12–13 October, 2009.5. Interview, NATO official, October, 2009.6. Interview, NATO official, October 2009.7. Interview, diplomat from Western partner state, Brussels, October 2009.8. The IPAP was agreed as a NATO policy in 2004, aimed at creating a focused

action plan with advice from NATO. Kyrgyzstan has a low level of cooper-ation with NATO, but participates in the PfPs Planning and Review Process(PARP) as of 2007.

9. The reader is referred to Tor Bukkvoll’s chapter for further analysis ofthis case.

Bibliography

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Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Barnes, I. and Barnes, P. (2010) ‘Enlargement’, in Cini, M. and Borragan (2010)

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and C. S. Gray (eds) Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press).

Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2004) Regions and Powers: The Structure of Interna-tional Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collins, A. (ed.) (2007) Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Gheciu, A. (2009) NATO in the New Europe: The Politics of International

Socialization after the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press).Giragosian, R. (2008) ‘Georgian Planning Leads to Failure’, Asia Times, 21

August 2008.Matlary, J. H. (2002) Intervention for Human Rights in Europe (Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan).McDermott, R. (2008) ‘US and NATO Military Cooperation with Kazakhstan:

The Need for a New Approach’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 21,pp. 615–41.

Moore, R. R. (2007) NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold WarWorld (Westport, CT: Greenwood).


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Moore, R. (2010) ‘NATO’s Partners in Afghanistan: Impact and Purpose’,UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 22, January, pp. 92–115.

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NATO (2007a) Partners in Southern Caucasus (NATO: Brussels).NATO (2007b) NATO-Ukraine: A Distinctive Partnership (NATO: Brussels).NATO (2008) ‘NATO-Georgia Commission’, http://www.nato.int (home

page), date accessed 20 April 2010.NATO (2008b) ‘Bucharest Summit Declaration’, http://www.nato.int (home

page), date accessed 20 April 2010.NATO (2009) Partners in Central Asia (NATO: Brussels).NATO (2010a) ‘NATO’s Relations with Georgia’, http://www.nato.int (home

page), date accessed 20 April 2010.NATO (2010b) ‘NATO’s Relation with Bosnia–Herzegovina’, http://www.nato.

int (home page), date accessed 20 April 2010.NATO (2010c) ‘NATO’s Relations with Azerbadijan’, http://www.nato.int

(home page), date accessed 20 April 2010.NATO (2010d) ‘NATOs Relations with Armenia’, http://www.nato.int (home

page), date accessed 20 April 2010.Schimmelpfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) The Politics of EU Enlargement:

Theoretical Appraoches (London: Routledge).Sedelmeier, U. (2001) ‘The Path to Eastern Enlargement’, paper presented to

ISA, Chicago.Solomon, G. B. (1998) The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990–1997 (Washington:

CSIS, The Washington Papers).Østerud, Ø. (2010) Hva er krig (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget).

InterviewsI conducted 13 interviews at NATO HQ and in partner and member coun-tries’ embassies in Brussels. The interviewees included: Ambassadors from twoNATO member states and from one partner state, two senior diplomats fromNordic missions to NATO, one NATO assistant secretary general, two NATOofficials working on public affairs, and five NATO officials working with part-nerships on a full-time basis, many of whom had been in these positions sincepartnership policy begun. The interviewees talked on condition of anonymity.They were interviewed at NATO HQ in late September 2009. My colleague,Magnus Petersson, IFS (Norwegian Institute of Defence Studies) and I are verythankful to Marlene Arboe-Rasmussen, Liason Denmark-Norway in NATO’sPublic Diplomacy Division, for setting up these interviews for us. We arenaturally also very grateful to all the interviewees.


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5Political and Military Utility ofNATO for UkraineTor Bukkvoll

Introduction

Ukraine has been an active participant in NATO partnership activitiesalmost since the country became independent in 1991. The intensityof Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO increased markedly through-out the 1990s, and even more after Ukraine’s announcement inJune 2003 of its ambition for NATO membership. While the motivesbehind both the partnership and membership policies are numerousand complex, the main argument of this chapter is that Ukraine’sdesire to build a strong European identity is the most important.Thus, in terms of the scholarly debate on the sources of states’ for-eign policies, this study provides empirical evidence in support of theconstructivist claim that states’ identities have significant explana-tory power (on this claim, see for example Wendt, 1999, especiallypp. 231–3; Katzenstein, 1996, chapters 2, 8, 9, 10 and 11; Ashizawa,2008, pp. 571–98; Checkel, 1993, pp. 271–300).

Parts of the Ukrainian political elite have come to support integra-tion with NATO, both because of a fear of Russia and because theysee an eventual Ukrainian NATO membership as a natural part ofrestoring the country’s European identity. However, despite the June2003 decision, there is currently no majority for NATO membershipeither within the population or within the elite. On the question ofpartnership, on the other hand, there is a majority in favor in both.

Only about 20 per cent of the Ukrainian population support NATOmembership in most opinion polls (Razumkov Centre). The popularskepticism to membership has made the NATO issue more a bone

83


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84 Political and Military Utility of NATO for Ukraine

of contention within the political elite than it otherwise would havebeen. Anti-NATO rhetoric and slogans win many votes in eastern andsouthern Ukraine, and some of the NATO skepticism now voicedby Ukrainian politicians, especially belonging to the eastern andsouthern elites, is probably at least as much motivated by electoralopportunism as it is by political conviction.

There are fewer opinion polls on the popular attitudes towardpartnership with NATO. One survey from February 2002 found33.6 per cent in favor of partnership but not membership, and20 per cent in support of membership (Kiev International Institutefor Sociology). Since it is reasonable to assume that those in favorof membership also support partnership (while waiting for mem-bership), this survey indicates a slight popular majority in favor ofpartnership at that time. Furthermore, since popular opinions onthe NATO issue have tended to be relatively stable since 2002, itseems fair to conclude that roughly half the Ukrainian populationsupport partnership with NATO. In the mentioned opinion poll only19 per cent explicitly opposed any cooperation with NATO (KievInternational Institute for Sociology).

This chapter seeks to identify and explain why, since 1993, Ukrainehas sought partnership with NATO. The question is difficult toanswer without also discussing the membership issue. Ukraine rep-resents the ‘potential NATO member’ category of countries in thisbook. As will be clear from the analysis and the conclusion, this is avery fitting label for Ukraine. Still, given that one of the main aimsof the book is to bring forward empirical and theoretical insights on‘partnership with military alliances’ rather than ‘membership in mil-itary alliances,’ more focus will be on partnership than membership.Since many more Ukrainians want partnership than membership,there must be other motives for partnership than just seeing it asa preparatory step for membership. Thus, one of the crucial aspectsto be explained in this chapter is the motives of those who supportpartnership but oppose membership.

The variety of perspectives on NATO partnership and membershipin Ukraine indicate that a unitary actor model would not be thebest choice in order to explain policy. Thus, the ‘black box’ will beopened. Motives will be discussed at three levels: the national level(unitary actor, national interests), the sectoral level, and the individuallevel. At all three levels expectations of utility drive the partnership


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Tor Bukkvoll 85

and membership policies. Three types of utility will be discussed:identity-oriented, collective action-oriented, and rationalist. Theseroughly correspond to three of the main schools of theory withininternational relations (IR), constructivism, liberalism, and realism.However, because this is not a unitary actor-based analysis, using themore basic human conduct concepts of identity-oriented, collectiveaction-oriented, and rationalist seems more appropriate than usingthe systemic IR concepts.

Identity-oriented utility should be understood as how NATO part-nership is seen by Ukrainian politicians as useful for the iden-tity formation of the Ukrainian state and for individual Ukrainianpoliticians. Collective action utility should be understood as howimproved security can be achieved through cooperative rather thanunitary action. Rationalist utility should be understood as a selfishsearch for benefits in terms of material resources, power, and security.Each main type of utility will be discussed on each of the three mainlevels of explanation.

The chapter consists of a short history of Ukrainian NATO rela-tions in addition to three analytical sections and a conclusion. Eachof the analytical sections discusses one of the three main types ofmotivation identified above. The parts that discuss identity-orientedand collective action-oriented types of utility are considerably shorterthan the one discussing rationalistic utility. This does not meanthey are less relevant or necessarily have weaker explanatory power.Instead they reflect the simple fact that there is less empirical detailto be found about those two types of utility.

History of Ukrainian–NATO relations

There are in particular six defining moments in the relationshipbetween Ukraine and NATO: 1. in February 1994 Ukraine becamea member of the Partnership for Peace program; 2. in May 1997NATO opened an information centre in Kiev; 3. in July 1997 aNATO–Ukraine Commission was established; 4. in November 2002the first NATO–Ukraine action plan was adopted; 5. in June 2003the Ukrainian parliament adopted, with 319 against three votes, anew law on national security that for the first time stated that thecountry was striving for full membership in NATO; and 6. in April2008 Ukraine together with Georgia as denied Membership Action


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Plan (MAP) status at the NATO Bucharest Summit. At this summit,nevertheless, NATO declared that the two countries at some point inthe future will become members. Despite this declaration, pro-NATOpoliticians in Kiev tend to see the April 2008 decision against MAPstatus as a Western prostration to Russia.

The entrance of Ukraine into the Partnership for Peace programin 1994 was largely uncontroversial both in the elite and the pop-ulation. Russia did not officially object to Ukraine entering thisframework, but suspicions already ran high in Moscow that the initia-tive was little more than a preparation for NATO eastward expansion.Russia herself, after long internal debates, hesitantly joined theprogram four months after Ukraine.

In 1997 discussion was heating up between pro-NATO and anti-NATO forces in Ukraine, and also between Ukraine and Russia.Russia protested heavily against NATO’s plans for eastward expan-sion whereas Ukraine took a neutral position. Although both Russiaand Ukraine negotiated agreements with NATO more or less inparallel (in fact, if anything Russia was ahead of Ukraine in for-malizing relations with NATO), the two countries did this for verydifferent reasons. Russia wanted to influence NATO. Ukraine wantedto be influenced by and, potentially in the longer run, protectedby NATO. Additionally, Ukraine wanted its own agreement withNATO because the country feared that the Russia–NATO agreementwould divide Europe into spheres of influence. President Kuchmamade this worry explicitly clear during a trip to Washington inMay 1997.

Russia has since harbored few illusions about what it sees as ‘thetrue intentions’ behind Ukraine’s NATO policy. Anxiety about pos-sible Ukrainian NATO membership has been a constant in RussianUkraine policy ever since, and especially after the 2004 Orange Revo-lution. The main Russian reading of much of Ukrainian NATO policyis that some Western countries in an unholy alliance with a smallnationalist segment of the Ukrainian elite are trying to pull Ukraineinto NATO against the wishes of the vast majority of the Ukrainianpeople.

In parallel with striving for membership, Ukraine has cooperatedwith NATO in international operations (Iraq), involved NATO heavilyin the domestic defense reform, and at least partly supported NATOon controversial international issues. The partnership policy is likely


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Tor Bukkvoll 87

to continue even if the membership issue now temporarily is put onice. For example, in January 2010 it was announced that Ukraineand Finland, as the only non-NATO countries, have declared theirwillingness to commit forces to NATO Rapid Reaction Forces for the2015–16 period (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2010b).

In the Ukrainian political elite there are today three broad strandsof thought with regard to NATO, each of them connected to one ofthe three main political forces in the country. The pro-NATO camp,connected first of all to the now disintegrating political block OurUkraine, wants membership as soon as possible. Our Ukraine’s disin-tegration does not mean that this strand of thought will disappear.There will continue to be a significant part of the Ukrainian politicalelite, pro-Western, mostly with a political background from westernand central Ukraine, who will continue to argue forcefully for NATOmembership. The second strand of thought, the wait-and-see camp,is for membership in principle but would like to postpone the issuebecause of the divisive effect it has on the Ukrainian population. Thisstrand of thought is first of all represented by former Prime MinisterYulia Timoshenko and her Biut political block. According to the Biutprogram, they understand ‘the benefits of Euro-Atlantic integrationand that no country can confront new challenges alone. However,the reality is that the issue of NATO membership is not an immedi-ate priority for the majority of the people.’ Thus, Biut concludes that‘Accession of Ukraine to NATO cannot happen before the majority ofUkrainians understand all the benefits of membership in comparisonwith non-alliance status or accession to the Tashkent Pact’ (The Basisof Byut Foreign Policy, 2009).

The third strand of thought, the anti-NATO camp, argues forUkrainian neutrality, and is connected first of all to the Party ofRegions and to the Ukrainian left (the Communist Party, SocialistParty, and Progressive Socialist Party). It should be noted here thata majority of the representatives from the Party of Regions voted infavor of the June 2003 amendments to the law on national defensethat proclaimed membership a goal. According to the Ukrainianweekly Zerkalo Nedely, when asked about the discrepancy betweentheir voting in 2003 and their later opposition to membership theysay with a smile that ‘at that time nobody took the issue seri-ously because nobody believed in the possibility of Ukrainian NATOmembership’ (Silina, 2006).


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This statement suggests that Party of Regions opposition to mem-bership is not necessarily deeply rooted in ideology. Rather, it seemsto be an issue of little importance to many of these politicians, andthus something that can easily be changed based on which stanceis likely to give the most benefit in terms of electoral support andpolitical power. The no-membership stance is clearly stated in theparty program, but it is interesting to note that the wording in theprogram is that the party ‘at the present stage’ considers a non-aligned status to be the best (Party Program, Section VI). Thus, thereis a small opening for the possibility that this could change in thefuture.

While the views on membership, as demonstrated above, arevery different, the views on partnership are not. Except from somemarginal politicians on the Ukrainian left, all major political forcesin Ukraine support partnership with NATO. There are occasional dis-agreements about the content of the partnership, and how far itshould go, but the fact of its existence, as will be explained in greaterdetail later, enjoys very broad support.

One other point of importance for this analysis needs to be men-tioned as well. Defense and security policy is not high on mostUkrainian politicians’ agenda. For most of them, even though theymight declare otherwise, this is a very secondary issue area. One ofthe most important causes, among several reasons for the low polit-ical interest in defense policy, is probably the fact that the militaryis of little relevance in the domestic power struggle. The security ser-vices on the other hand, because they have a more direct role to playhere, are much more on the political agenda and also significantlybetter funded. Ukraine is, together with Kazakhstan, one of the coun-tries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that spendthe lowest proportion of its GDP on defense (Bukkvoll and Koren,2007, p. 17).

This lack of political attention has two consequences in partic-ular. First, defense and security matters, if they are suitable, oftenbecome tools in political struggles about domestic affairs. Second,the Ukrainian military is underfunded but also given great auton-omy to decide its own development. In relation to the partnershipwith NATO this means that aspects of the partnership are sometimesdisturbed because they are used in political struggles. For example,several naval exercises in the Black Sea have been cancelled because


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Tor Bukkvoll 89

the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, has not ratified the foreigntroops’ right to training on Ukrainian soil. There are good reasonsto believe that these non-ratifications had more to do with the polit-ical infighting among different political forces than they had to dowith principled political opposition against foreign troops. On theother hand, the secondary status of defense policy means that muchof the partnership remains below the political horizon. This gives theUkrainian military a relatively free hand to form and give content tothe partnership.

Identity-Oriented utility

Ukraine was a partner to NATO for eight years before declaringits intention to become a member. The partnership was perhapsespecially important in the first years after independence, becauseit was seen domestically as a symbolic recognition of Ukraine’sEuropeanness. Both partnership and membership in NATO are oftenmotivated by reference to civilization identity. Former Defense Min-ister Yurii Yekhanurov called Ukraine’s close relations with NATO a‘civilizational choice’ (Yekhanurov, 2008, p. 46), and another previ-ous Defense Minister, Anatolii Hrytsenko, has even gone as far as tostate that ‘if the aim was only military security guarantees it wouldnot matter whether we chose NATO or The Tashkent Treaty, but ifwe take defence of individual humans as our point of departure, thenthere is no question that we need to go to Europe,’ by which he meantthe EU and NATO (Vedernikova, 2009).

On the desirability of partnership with NATO, Biut and OurUkraine are, as expected, very positive in what they write in theirprograms, but even the main antagonist of membership, the Partyof Regions, is positive on the partnership issue. According to theirprogram, ‘Ukraine is currently developing a comprehensive cooper-ation with NATO both in this organization’s capacity as a politicaland as a military block. This cooperation is taking place in full accor-dance with Ukraine’s national interests, and in agreement with thenorms of international law laid down in the statutes of the UNand the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’ (PartyProgram, Section VI). In early 2010, party leader, and now Presi-dent, Viktor Yanukovych, reaffirmed his support for partnership withNATO. However, at the same time he also stated that the present


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level of partnership is sufficient, that is there was no need to expandit further (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2010a).

On the national level, the main political forces in Ukraine all stressthe cultural/civilizational belonging of Ukraine to Europe. The Partyof Regions, Biut, and Our Ukraine all have Ukrainian membershipin the European Union as their goal. The pro-European positions ofBiut and Our Ukraine are no surprise, but the strongly pro-Europeanlanguage in the program of the Party of Regions is notable:

Ukraine is a European democratic country which bases its develop-ment and actions on contemporary European values. [ . . . ] Ukrainenever was, and neither is the country today, just a ‘new neigh-bour’ to the European Union. Our country is an inseparable partof European history and culture, and a strategic member of theEuropean system of security on its eastern flank.

(Party Program, Section VI)

For a party that is often portrayed as pro-Russian, and that, at leastin times of elections, does nothing to discourage this impression,the European emphasis in the party program is striking. In the run-up to the 2010 presidential elections, the Party of Regions activelytried to portray itself as the Ukrainian partner of Russia’s domi-nant United Russia party. The ways in which these two parties seetheir respective countries in relation to cultural/civilizational belong-ing is, nevertheless, markedly different. In United Russia’s programthere is no mention of Europe or European values. On the con-trary, in that party’s program Russia is said to be a country with aunique and ‘non-repeatable’ (nepovtorimyi) cultural-historical inher-itance, and the party sees as one of its main priorities to ‘repelattempts to force alien values upon Russia’ (Rossia). United Russia’sposition here is strongly supported by Russian popular opinion.When asked by the Levada centre in 2008, ‘Would you like to live ina country that actively defends its culture and traditions or a countryopen to the whole world and all modern trends?,’ only 18 per centof the respondents preferred the second option, whereas 77 per centpreferred the defense of culture and traditions option (Sedov, 2009).

It should be stressed here that the above analysis is based on theUkrainian parties’ programs, rather than on any investigation of whatpolicy moves they have made. It is a well-known fact that politicians


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Tor Bukkvoll 91

representing these forces in daily politics do things that far from pro-mote the European course. They easily diverge from the Europeancourse to pursue more parochial ends. It is essential to keep in mindthat the social basis for most Ukrainian political parties is made up ofbusiness clans and not broader sections of society. Nevertheless, theparty programs do indicate what the dominant discourse is on theseissues within the political forces.

Sectoral and individual levels

The two most important sectoral actors in Ukraine that have substan-tial stakes in the issues of partnership and membership with NATOare the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian military industry. Onecould easily imagine these two sectors as lobbyists for both Ukrainianpartnership with and membership in NATO. Potential rationalist util-ity for such lobbyism will be discussed later, but identity-orientedutility is also possible to imagine. For example, both sectors couldhave been motivated by a desire to see themselves as being parts ofthe European military establishments and European/Western armsindustries respectively in the future. Many individuals from boththese camps no doubt also do that. For example, in 2005 the thenDeputy Head of the General Staff, General Hryhorii Sakovskyi, con-cluded in an essay that the main goal for defense reform in Ukraineshould be to make the country able to ‘on equal terms take a seat inthe great family of European nations’ (Sakovskyi, 2005, p. 23). Still,as will be detailed later, neither of these sectoral actors have becomestrong pro-NATO lobbyists.

There is probably more of a case for arguing that ideational factorshave explanatory power on the drive for NATO integration on theindividual rather than on the sectoral level. In the 1990s, especially,partnership with NATO opened up an opportunity that would oth-erwise not be there for top rank Ukrainian politicians to act on theinternational arena and to feel internationally important and as ifthey were members of a prestigious club. This is not to suggest thattheir only motivation for integration with NATO was to individuallybask in the sun of international attention. Most likely, they were alsomotivated by the opportunity to influence NATO–Ukraine relations.

Still, the attraction to Ukrainian politicians of being seen as oneamong equals with European and Western leaders should not beunderestimated as an explanation for the Ukrainian partnership


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policy. One should keep in mind that the elites in the non-Russianrepublics prior to the fall of the Soviet Union were only ‘local digni-taries’ that after the dissolution suddenly found themselves in chargeof independent states. They had had almost no time to establish theiridentities as statesmen, and therefore eagerly embraced most oppor-tunities that presented themselves. In addition, when these leaderstravelled to Moscow, they often found that they were still treated asthe provincial satraps they had been instead of the leaders of inde-pendent states that they now were. In the West, on the other hand,they often felt they were being treated in the way they were entitledto. Thus, there was little question where it was best to go in order tofeel respected and statesman-like.

The argument about individual identity-oriented reasons for pro-moting partnership with NATO is admittedly more difficult to sub-stantiate empirically than some of the other claims for explanatorypower in this chapter. However, there is at least one incident thatclearly seems to support the claim. In November 2002, UkrainianPresident Leonid Kuchma was not invited to the NATO summitin Prague, although he had been invited many times before andhad expected to be invited this time, too. The reason for his non-invitation was that Kuchma, according to US sources, personally hadcleared a sale of Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq. Still, Kuchma sowanted to be present at the summit that he decided to show up unin-vited, thus creating a minor diplomatic scandal. The exact reasoningbehind this move is, of course, known only to Kuchma himself, butit is still evidence of how important participation at such venues hasbeen and probably continues to be for Ukrainian political leaders.

Collective action utility

Collective action utility should here be understood as cooperativeactivities aimed at increasing security for all. In the case of Ukraine, itis fruitful to distinguish between the global and the regional contexts.

In the global context, Ukraine has, in partnership with NATOand other international organizations, taken part in a number ofinternational peace operations. According to the Ukrainian Min-istry of Defense, Ukraine was for several years the largest Europeancontributor of troops to UN peace operations (The History of theArmed Forces, and Woronowycz, 2001). Forces have been sent on


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missions to numerous places: Congo (UN), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UN),Kosovo (UN and KFOR), Moldova (common peacekeeping forces inPridnestrovia), Georgia (UN), Lebanon (UN), Liberia (UN), Sudan(UN), and Iraq (Woronowycz, 2003; Chernyshov et al., 2007). All inall since 1992, a total of 34,000 Ukrainian troops have taken partin various international missions, and 47 soldiers have been killed(The History of the Armed Forces . . . ). According to the State Programfor development of Ukraine’s armed forces for the period 2006–11,Ukraine can at any time participate in 4–5 peace operations with onetactical battalion group in each, or alternatively in 1–2 missions withone tactical brigade group in each (Tsymbaliuk, 2006).

The economic burden of this activity is further evidence of theUkrainian elite’s commitment to international collective action. TheUS for a period covered some of the Ukrainian forces’ expenses inKosovo, but in May 2005 the Ukrainian political leadership decidedto cover all costs (US $3.2 million annually) themselves. Major Gen-eral Sergei Bezlushchenko, head of the administration of Ukraine’speace operations, argued that Ukraine should stay on in Kosovoat its own expense because of the ‘state’s prestige, the experiencegained from peacekeeping operations and the consequent trainingof personnel’ (Tsymbaliuk, 2006). The Ukrainian strategy for peaceoperations, adopted by presidential decree on 15 June 2009, reads asfollows:

In acknowledgement of its responsibility to support internationalpeace and security, and in recognition of the country’s commit-ments as a member of the United Nations and the OSCE [ . . . ]Ukraine considers participation in international peace operationsas an important element of its foreign policy.

(‘Pro stratehiiu mizhnarodnoyi diialnosti Ukrayiny’)

Similar quotes can probably be found in the official documents ofmost NATO member and partner countries. It is inevitably the politi-cally correct thing to say, and as such can hardly be taken as evidenceof a dominant collective action utility.

In general, both the presence and absence of collective action util-ity can be hard to substantiate by evidence. It might be that the onlycase in which one, with some degree of certainty, could say that suchmotives were dominant, would be if there were no apparent unitary


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benefits to gain, neither rationalist nor identity-oriented on any ofthe three levels of analysis. In short, if no other plausible explana-tion could be found, that would leave a genuine desire to make acontribution to global security as the only option. Since the absenceof such rationalist and identity-oriented utility is not the case here, agenuine desire to participate in collective action on the global scalein order improve international peace and security will be hard bothto corroborate and refute by evidence.

Moreover, it should be noted that Ukraine is a country that stillsees itself as in the process of recovering from 80 years of Communistrule, and it is located in a very uncertain and unstable part of theworld. This means that Ukrainian politicians, although they oftenwill not say so, are likely to think that because they do not yet havethe economic and political abilities of Western democracies, less canreasonably be expected of them in terms of efforts ‘to save the world.’Internationally, Ukrainian politicians still probably see the countrymore on the receiver than the donor side.

In the regional context, the main collective action argument wouldbe that NATO’s eastward expansion through partnership and mem-bership broadens a ‘zone of democracy, peace and stability,’ thusincreasing security for all. Despite the sometimes high-flown lan-guage in which this claim is made, it might actually be part of theexplanation for why Ukraine wants partnership with, and possiblemembership in, NATO.

One example here could be Polish–Ukrainian relations. Thesedemonstrated a significant potential for conflict in the early 1990s,mostly for historical resons. Later, on the other hand, relationsgreatly improved, and Polish prospects for and finally fulfillmentof NATO membership seem to have played an important part inthat positive change of atmosphere (Spero, 2002, pp. 155–77). Onecould, of course, argue that this would have taken place irrespec-tive of Ukraine’s partnership with NATO, and thus that it cannotbe used as an example of how Ukraine has been motivated to seekpartnership out of a desire to promote regional security throughcollective action. However, it is likely that the presence of NATOpartnership fora as venues for dialogue and promoters of commonvalues has helped in cementing and further improving the good rela-tionship between Poland and Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukrainianobservers see few of the same effects in the relations with another


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NATO member, Romania. Some Ukrainian observers even think thatNATO membership made Bucharest feel it had an even freer handin putting pressure on Ukraine in bilateral territorial conflicts (Kulyk,2009). Thus, the Ukrainian experience is mixed in terms of how col-lective action through NATO partnership might improve regionalsecurity.

The collective action motivation is probably also connected to theidentity motivation. If reference to collective action, both withinNATO and in the wider world, is an important discourse in NATO,then participation in this discourse as well as action to back it upboth become necessary in order to promote the European identityof Ukraine. Consider the following statement by General MykolaTsitsiurskii, first Deputy Head of the Ukrainian General Staff:

Taking into account the future membership prospects, theUkrainian armed forces must [ . . . ] become able to offer a signif-icant contribution to NATO capabilities. Their restructuring musttherefore give priority to the type of capabilities that are mostneeded in NATO and that Ukraine has special abilities to provide.

(Tsytsiurskii, 2008, p. 63)

General Tsitsiurskii here goes notably far in his willingness to struc-ture the Ukrainian armed forces for collective action rather than forthe unitary action of preparing for Ukraine’s territorial defense.

Rationalist utility

On the national level, the 2003 declaration of membership as theultimate goal is relatively easy to explain from a rationalist perspec-tive. It is a classic case of balance-of-power politics vis-à-vis Russia.Membership would provide Ukraine with Article 5 guarantees. Thesewould not only give Ukraine access to foreign military assistance incase of a conflict with Russia, but more importantly make Russia morecareful in its policy toward Ukraine in peacetime. Given the differ-ences in size between the two countries’ military capabilities, many inUkraine doubt that the country by its own efforts will ever be able toafford a sufficient deterrence against Russia. And even if that shouldbe possible, it would most likely place an intolerable burden on the


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Ukrainian economy. Thus, NATO membership might be the only eco-nomically sustainable way to achieve a satisfactory level of deterrenceagainst Russia. In addition, central promoters of Ukrainian NATOmembership also mention the possibility to influence NATO’s Russiapolicy as an advantage that membership would bring (Horbulin,2007, p. 9).

The politicians

Our Ukraine’s and Biut’s support for both partnership and member-ship can, therefore, in addition to identity-oriented and collectiveaction-oriented utilities, be easily explained by rationalism on thenational level. However, the Party of Regions’ support for partner-ship cannot, since they do not see partnership as a step towardmembership. Therefore, for the Party of Regions the explanation oftheir support for partnership must be sought elsewhere. As alreadystated, it is likely that for them an identity-oriented utility appearsto have been most important on both the national and individuallevels, because of their aim to have Ukraine’s European identity con-firmed. In addition, the fact that Russia has no principal objectionsto Ukrainian partnership with NATO is, of course, crucial for thisparty. They think Russian approval is decisive for Ukrainian nationalinterests, and they, furthermore, see this approval as of vital impor-tance to their own political party. Supporting membership wouldhave put the party’s relations both with the Russian leadership andwith large parts of the population of eastern and southern Ukraine,at risk.

Furthermore, there is no reason to think that, on the individuallevel, politicians from the Party of Regions have any less desire tobe seen as European statesmen by partaking in NATO partnershipactivities than politicians from the other two main political camps.

Representatives of the Party of Regions have, in a rationalistic man-ner, also pointed to the possibility of using the partnership as a sourcefor extra funding for the military. In August 2009, Party of Regionsrepresentative and Deputy Chairman of the Rada’s (the Ukrainianparliament) Committee for European Integration, Dmitrii Vecherko,gave the following motivation for partnership with NATO:

Ukraine may limit itself to cooperation with NATO in order tomake some money out of it. Russia is a good example here. This


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country has been able to make about 3.5 to 4 billion USD in profiton the cooperation with NATO, whereas we so far only have beenable to get headaches and shit.

(Geda, 2009)

Thus, simply saving budget money by getting financial assistancecan also be one of the rationalistic reasons for wanting partnershipwith NATO.

The Ukrainian military

The question here is as follows: Are there sectoral actors in Ukrainethat support and promote NATO partnership and/or membershipbecause they expect certain benefits to accrue from these types ofassociation for their own sector? As already identified, the only reallyrelevant such sectoral actors are the Ukrainian military and theUkrainian military industry.

On the question of how and to what extent partnership with NATOhas had an impact on the development of the Ukrainian military itis difficult to get a comprehensive overview. Much of the assistanceand guidance has come in the form of bilateral agreements betweenUkraine and the different NATO countries. Still, it is possible to piecetogether a reasonably representative picture based on informationprovided by the Ukrainian MoD website, and by statements fromUkrainian military and other officials. The effects of partnership canin particular be seen in three areas: 1. changes in military mindsets asa result of interaction among Ukrainian and NATO officers and train-ing of Ukrainian officers in NATO countries; 2. changes in militaryorganization; 3. and simply the fact that NATO assistance has madeUkraine financially able to initiate activities it otherwise not wouldhave initiated.

Many Ukrainian officers have returned for duty after receiving mil-itary education in the West, and observers have commented thatUkrainian military curricula now are ‘increasingly Euro-Atlantic inorientation’ (Sherr, 2002). This means that a new generation of moremodern officers is now slowly taking office, including some in highoffice. Military commentator Valentin Badrak mentions, in particular,Generals Leonid Holopatiuk and Valerii Muntian as representativesof the new ‘Western’ type of officers (Badrak, 2004). Thus, it is likely


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that the partnership with NATO has at least contributed to the cre-ation of a core of officers with a new military mindset. However,this process is probably only in its initial stage. One of the mainarchitects behind Ukrainian defense and security policy since themid-1990s, Volodymyr Horbulin, admitted in December 2005 thatdespite progress in reforming the Ukrainian military according toWestern standards, ‘the organization is nevertheless internally dom-inated by a post-Soviet mindset. In content this mindset is muchcloser to the Russian, or even Soviet mindset than it is to the mindsetsof NATO countries’ (Horbulin, 2005, p. 3).

As for the Soviet military culture, Anatolii Pavlenko sees some ofits most disturbing effects to be the absolute subordination to yourimmediate superior, the necessity to hide your own point of view, andthe tendency to adapt to present conditions rather than to changethem (Pavlenko, 2003). All of these cultural norms will be problem-atic for an organization that needs to change. The dominance of theold mindsets and cultural traits might be eroding slowly, but thisdepends on the Ukrainian military’s ability to hold on to the newgeneration of officers, which is already a big problem. Unless modern-minded officers become a more numerically significant force, the oldSoviet mindset might continue to dominate and even partly renewitself.

In terms of organization it can be said that ‘Westernization’ becamethe buzzword for the direction of military reform. Despite consid-erable indecisiveness in the general Ukrainian foreign policy orien-tation, especially under President Leonid Kuchma, ‘Westernization’remained the model for military reform at both rhetorical and prac-tical levels. Military cooperation with Russia in certain spheres hascontinued, and is still valued by many Ukrainian officers, but no seri-ous efforts have been made in Ukraine to try to turn military reformin the direction of a Russian blueprint. The two political forces thatcould potentially have been expected to do so, the Soviet-educatedUkrainian military elite and – at least rhetorically – the pro-Russianeastern Ukrainian political and economic elite, have never triedanything like that.

Defense officials from NATO countries working in Ukraine areoften frustrated by what they perceive as unwillingness or inability tocarry out organizational reform, but Ukrainian officers, on the other


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hand, can often be very optimistic in this respect. Deputy Chief of theGeneral Staff, General Mykola Tsitsiurskii, for example, claims that

[T]hanks to the continuous methodological assistance from mil-itary professionals from the NATO countries, the leadership ofthe Ukrainian armed forces has been able forcefully to changethe country’s systems of defence planning, military education andforce generation.

(Tsytsiurskii, 2008, p. 60)

When it comes to more direct financial assistance, there is no wayto get overall figures on how big this assistance has been and howefficiently the funds have been spent. The Ukrainian MoD’s own web-site contains much evidence of such assistance, but the bullet pointsbelow should still only be seen as examples and not as in any wayrepresenting the overall volume of NATO assistance to Ukraine:

• Since 1994 more than 200 joint exercises with NATO have takenplace with the participation of Ukrainian military personnel underthe Partnership for Peace program

• Since 1995, more than 20,000 Ukrainian officers have taken partin various seminars, conferences and courses organized by NATO

• 400 Ukrainian scientists have taken part in various exchangeprograms with NATO

• Ukraine has received 200 scientific grants from NATO for researchto be done in Ukraine

• NATO has donated about ¤500,000 to Ukrainian universities forthe purchase of computer equipment

• In 2007 NATO donated ¤265,000 to a project for the reha-bilitation of land for civilian use at closed Ukrainian militarybases

• In the years 2001–07 about 4000 former Ukrainian officers tookcourses financed by various NATO countries in order to qualifyfor civilian jobs, and this cooperation continues (‘SpivrobnitstvoUkrayiny z Nato’).

In addition to these data, it can be added that according to FirstDeputy Commander of the Ukrainian Navy, Vice-Admiral Viktor


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Maximov, NATO funding for joint naval exercises now has a deci-sive effect on the training standards of the Ukrainian Navy. Thereare very few other funds available for the conduct of such exercises(Samus, 2009).

One of the main dilemmas in the relationship with NATO as seenby many Ukrainians is this: Should the country, under a presumptionof NATO membership at some point in the future, structure andequip its armed forces so as to fit within a military alliance? Or,should it not take this chance, and instead prepare for unitary ter-ritorial defense? Many pro-NATO Ukrainian politicians and militaryofficers fear that by choosing the latter course Ukraine might becomeless attractive to NATO in the sense of having fewer and less adequatemilitary resources to bring into the Alliance, and thus reducing thechances for membership.

In many ways, Ukrainian military planning until the 2008Bucharest Summit was based on an underlying assumption aboutfuture NATO membership. But, after Bucharest, and even moreafter the Russia–Georgian war, there has been a significant reem-phasis on deterrence and territorial defense. This has necessarilyhad to come at the expense of developing capabilities that couldfit within NATO structures for missions other places in the world.For example, in January 2009 it was decided to maintain conscrip-tion for another five years and halt the reductions in the numberof troops. Originally, the plan had been to reduce the number oftroops to 143,000 by 2011, but according to the new decision thenumber in 2011 (and possibly later) was to be 162,000 troops. Thismeant more money to maintain a larger level of troops and lessmoney to train professional forces that would have been welcomein NATO. Ukrainian experts saw this decision at least as partly result-ing from rising skepticism in the presidential administration towardthe membership prospects (Kastelli et al., 2006, p. 29; Kucherk,2009).

Military reform in Ukraine was largely haphazard and withoutdirection during the first seven to eight years of independence. Basi-cally, all that happened was that the number of troops fell drastically,mostly due to financial constraints. In the years 1997–2001, on theother hand, a number of important NATO-inspired concepts anddocuments were adopted. These laid the foundation for more seri-ous and guided reform. The documents furthermore indicated that


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the political leadership of the country had finally turned its eyes tothe military. Thus, at the beginning of the new century there wasconsiderable optimism, even among long-time critics of Ukrainiandefense policy. In the words of Ukrainian military expert ValentinBadrak, ‘the ice has broken’ (Badrak, 2002). Deputy General Secretaryof NATO John Colston said in July 2007 that

Ukraine today has armed forces of which it can be proud, becausethey are much more modern and capable than they used to be.Ukraine is today the only partner country that wants to and isable to make contributions in all NATO missions.

(‘Ukraina mozhet gorditsia svoimivooruzhennymi sylami [ . . . ]’)

Military reform was moving ahead most notably in military educa-tion, organization, training, and convergence to NATO standards.The drivers behind this progress seem to have been occasionalsupport and active help from the president, entrepreneurship anddedication among progressive Ukrainian officers, and, what is par-ticularly relevant here, advice and material support from Westerncountries, bilaterally as well as through NATO.

Thus, given this far from trivial impact on the development ofthe Ukrainian military one could easily imagine that the militaryhad become an actor who, motivated by its own sectoral interest,had become a promoter of Ukrainian integration with NATO. That,however, does not really seem to be the case, at least in terms of mem-bership. There are two reasons for this. First, the Ukrainian militarylacks political clout. In contrast, for example, to the Russian military,the Ukrainian military have more or less totally stayed out of highpolitics. Second, although the Ukrainian military are more positivetoward NATO than the general population, opinion polls indicatethere is no majority for membership here either.

A February 2009 opinion poll among personnel in the UkrainianMoD, General Staff and National Military Academy (a total of 2127respondents) revealed a number of interesting findings. On the ques-tion of Ukrainian NATO membership 40 per cent were in favor and50 per cent against, and only 15 per cent saw NATO membershipas an urgent issue. This was the case despite the fact that a major-ity saw NATO as a positive force in the world (45 per cent against


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35 per cent who thought it was a negative force); a generally verypositive attitude toward the current cooperation (partnership) withNATO (44 per cent would like to expand the current cooperation,28 per cent would like to maintain the cooperation on the currentlevel, and only 17 per cent would like to reduce the cooperation),and despite the fact that a majority thought membership, if it shouldhappen, would prove beneficial for Ukrainian military capabilities(44 per cent thought membership would be beneficial for capabili-ties, 22 per cent thought it would have no effect, and 14 per centthought it would reduce military capabilities). Those who did notfavor membership in NATO mentioned 1. worsened relations withRussia, 2. risk of having to fight the wars of the USA, and 3. dete-rioration of the Ukrainian military industrial complex as their mostimportant reasons (‘Stavlennia viiskovosluzhbovtsiv [ . . . ]’).

In addition, when asked about whether they thought their owncareer prospects would better with NATO membership, 43 per centexpected neither a positive nor a negative effect, 22 per cent thoughtthey would profit personally, and only 9 per cent thought they wouldlose personally (‘Stavlennia viiskovosluzhbovtsiv [ . . . ]’). The majorityperspective in the Ukrainian military establishment seems to be thatNATO is both good in itself and good for Ukraine, but that in terms ofmembership the advantages still do not outweigh the disadvantagesof destroying relations with Russia.

The military industry

The Ukrainian military industry was until the end of the Soviet Unionan integral part of that country’s military industry, and the ties to theRussian military industry especially are still strong. Leonid Kuchma,who was elected Ukrainian President in 1994, made his career withinthis industry. He was elected on a pro-Russian platform, but his illu-sions about Moscow’s willingness to treat Ukraine as an equal partnerwere soon gone after his first few visits to Moscow. He then shiftedto his ‘multivector’ foreign policy. One of the reasons for this policyshift was a change of attitude in the Ukrainian military industry indirection of a more pro-Western stance. In the latter half of the 1990s,the Ukrainian military industry became one of the sectoral actorsarguing for closer relations with NATO (Bukkvoll, 2002, pp. 131–53).

Over the years this opening to the West has given a numberof positive results. The book Ukrayina–NATO: Oboronno-promyslova


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perspektyva (Ukraine–NATO: The Military Industrial Perspective) listsa total of 27 examples of successful military-technological andmilitary-industrial cooperation between Ukraine and NATO (Zhuretset al., 2008, pp. 110–201).

The main attraction of NATO for the Ukrainian military industry isthat it can ease access to Western technologies. Sergeii Bondarchuk,director of the state Ukrainian arms trader, Ukrspetseksport, sums upmuch of the thinking in the Ukrainian military industry in thisrespect when he states that ‘our company has for a long time (afterthe fall of the Soviet Union) exploited the technological base thatwas created during the Soviet period. Today, though, we feel that thisbase has been exhausted’ (Bondarchuk, 2008, p. 50). The Ukrainiansnever had any doubt that the West had more to offer in this respectthan Russia (Zhurets et al., 2008, p. 6), and it was additionally notedin Ukraine that the new NATO members from the former Easternbloc at times scored significant offset agreements after joining NATO(Badrak, 2008, p. 78).

Those in the Ukrainian military industry who favor closer relationswith NATO know, of course, that there is no direct link between closepartnership or membership on the one hand, and new orders fortheir companies on the other. But, partly based on their own expe-rience, they hope and think that close Ukraine–NATO relations canopen new arenas where these companies have better opportunitiesto demonstrate and sell their products and services. The Ukrainianmilitary industry has, for instance, gained increased understandingof these processes due to the Ukraine–NATO Joint Working Group onmilitary-technological cooperation that was established in 2004.

Moreover, this raises the question of whether the differencebetween partnership and membership is of any importance forincreasing military-technical cooperation. It is perhaps a paradoxfor leaders in the Ukrainian military industry that Russian com-panies at present have more cooperation with NATO than theirUkrainian colleagues (Shekhovtsov, 2008). This reality is of coursea reflection of the fact that the Russian military industry is muchlarger than that of Ukraine, but it must still be a thing to ponderthat the very different political relations to NATO that Russia andUkraine have seem to have so little significance for the prospectsof technical-industrial cooperation. The relative successes Russia hashad in establishing industry-to-industry cooperation seem to suggest


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that partnership could be enough. However, membership wouldprobably have opened doors that partnership does not.

The mentioned offset successes of the new member countries pointin this direction. The difference in opportunities between partnershipand membership is also noted by representatives in the Ukrainianmilitary industry. For example, Yevgenii Borisov, director of a majormilitary ship-building design bureau in Mykolayiv, has complainedin connection with the joint Ukrainian–French corvette project that‘unfortunately, unless Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, she willnever get access to the full range of NATO standards. The secretparts of the NATO standards are as of today unavailable to Ukraine’(Borisov, 2008, p. 89).

Thus, the military industry has, because of hopes that this willincrease access to new technologies and new markets, a potentialmotive as a sectoral promoter of partnership and/or membership. Fora brief period in the late 1990s, this seems to have been the case,and some of the industry’s representatives are still very pro-NATO.Nevertheless, today it would almost certainly be wrong to arguethat the Ukrainian military industry is a sectoral lobbyist for NATO-integration. First of all, it seems as if the majority of industry leadershave lost faith in the perspective of broad-based cooperation withthe defense industries of NATO countries. According to one source,a majority of the managers of the Ukrainian military industrial com-plex now, in contrast to the late 1990s, look with skepticism at theprospects for military-technical and industrial cooperation with theWest and with NATO countries (Zhurets et al., 2008, p. 6). Not thatthey do not want it, but they doubt it is going to happen. Second,the Ukrainian military industry today has relatively limited abilitiesto impact on policy as a sectoral lobby.

Ukraine inherited about 30 per cent of the Soviet military indus-try. At the time when Ukraine gained its independence, 1.3 millionpeople were employed by companies that only produced militaryequipment in Ukraine. Therefore, in the early years of independencethe military industry was a significant part of the Ukrainian economy.But, due to little or no orders from the national armed forces up untiltoday, more or less only enterprises with export potential were able tosurvive. In 2008, the 170 remaining companies of the Ukrainian mil-itary industry employed in excess of 250,000 people. That amounts


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Tor Bukkvoll 105

to about 1.2 per cent of the labor force and about 4.3 per cent of theindustrial labor force.1

The export income from arms sales in 2008 was about $1.2 billion,which amounted to about 1.8 per cent of total export earnings(Bogdanov, 2009, p. 4). Thus, the military industry cannot claim tobe a major economic player in Ukraine as it is in Russia, neither interms of the number of companies, people employed, nor contribu-tion to the country’s export earnings. And, if you are not a majoreconomic player you are also less likely to be a major political player.The Ukrainian military industry might have more political influencethan its size would suggest because it is one of the very few high-techexport industries, and because of its significance for national security,but this is not enough to make up for its limited size.

Conclusion

The motives behind Ukraine’s partnership policy with NATO, as dis-cussed in this chapter, are multifaceted. The following Table 5.1 sum-marizes the main findings (aggregated interpretation of the empiricalfindings with page references):

Table 5.1 Summary of empirical findings

National level Sectoral level Individual level

Identity-oriented

European identityfor Ukraine

European identityfor the armedforces and for themilitary industry

European andstatesman identityfor Ukrainianpoliticians

Strong explanatorypower (pp. 6–7)

Weak explanatorypower (p. 8)

Strong explanatorypower (pp. 8–9)

Collectiveaction-oriented

Improve Ukrainiansecurity throughcooperation withother states on theglobal and regionallevels

Not relevant Not relevant

Medium explanatorypower (pp. 9–11)


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Table 5.1 (Continued)

National level Sectoral level Individual level

Rationalistoriented

For some: increasechances ofmembership that inturn will increaseUkraine’s deterrencecapability

For the armed forces:improve thequality of theirsector

For Ukrainianpoliticians:pro-NATOopinions will yieldfew extra votes toindividualpoliticians becauseof populardisinterest in thepartnership issue,and resistance tomembership

For others: getorganizational andfinancial assistancein the developmentof the country’sarmed forces

For the militaryindustry: access tonew technologiesand possibly newmarkets

For Ukrainianmilitary: somebenefits in terms offoreign educationand so on



Weak explanatorypower (pp. 1–2, 12and 17)

As the study has indicated, of the three types of motivation pre-sented in the beginning, the European identity-oriented motivation(both on the national and on the individual levels) has the strongestexplanatory power. Without this motive, shared by all three majorpolitical forces, it is questionable whether it would have been possi-ble to muster the elite consensus necessary to engage in the presentlyvery active partnership policy. Ukraine–NATO relations could theninstead have been similar to the present very low level of Belarus–NATO relations. However, a precondition for the European identityutility to have had this effect has been that partnership with NATOcould be pursued without destroying relations with Russia. Act-ing upon the European identity utility by seeking partnership withNATO does not come with unacceptable political costs. By intro-ducing the concept of political costs we are already moving fromidentity-oriented to rationalistic utility.


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Tor Bukkvoll 107

There is a very significant part of the elite that on rationalis-tic grounds would like membership as soon as possible because itwould entitle Ukraine to Article 5 guarantees, and thus deter Russiaboth in times of peace and war. The cost, however, would be seri-ously deteriorating relations with Russia. This is a cost both theUkrainian population and a majority of the elite at present are notready to pay. The resistance to membership in the population is rel-atively stable, whereas, as detailed in this chapter, the resistance inthe elite is more contingent. Nevertheless, because of the popularresistance there is no elite majority willing to push for member-ship today. Thus, aspiration for future membership is an importantbut far from sufficient explanation for Ukraine’s partnership policywith NATO.

Partnership is also based on other rationalistic utility calcula-tions such as help in reforming and even funding the armed forces(national level), and provision of benefits for the Ukrainian militaryand/or the Ukrainian military industry (sectoral level). Examples ofsuch utilities have been presented in this chapter, but their explana-tory power on the partnership policy is probably weak. The verylimited interest in defense policy in much of the Ukrainian politicalelite seems to indicate that concern for the future of the armed forceshas not been a strong motive for the partnership policy. Some rep-resentatives of the Ukrainian military and military industry appearmotivated both by sectoral self interest and a desire for a Europeanidentity for their sectors, but in none of these two sectors do theserepresentatives seem to be in a majority. In addition, neither theUkrainian military nor the Ukrainian military industry has muchpolitical clout as lobby groups.

The collective action utility of increasing security for all throughpartnership cannot be dismissed, but it is difficult to demonstrateempirically. On the global scene, Ukraine has been a very active par-ticipant in peace operations, and on the regional scene, at least,relations with Poland seem to have profited from both countries’close relations with NATO. However, since one can also easily findrationalist and identity-oriented explanations for much of whatUkraine has done in the global and regional arenas, collective actionsutility becomes difficult to disentangle from the two other typesof utilities. Collective action utility might have a rightful place in


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the explanation of Ukrainian partnership policy with NATO, but theexplanatory power is very hard to determine.

In the short term, Ukraine is likely to continue its active partner-ship with NATO but without pushing for membership. In the longerterm, though, the membership issue might very well bounce back.It is my reading of the situation that those in the elite who arein favor of membership are committed to this view, whereas manyof those who are against hold this view mainly in order to gainelectoral support in times of elections. Popular resistance to NATOmembership can at least partly be explained by the fact that thosepoliticians who argue for membership are the same politicians thatare responsible for the absence of political reform and progress inthe country as such. If Ukraine was to get a political leadership thatactually moved the country forward in terms of efficient economicpolicies, battled corruption, and streamlined the state apparatus andso on, and at the same time were in favor of NATO membership, thiscould potentially make many current opponents of NATO member-ship see things differently. This could especially be the effect amongthe younger generations of Ukrainians.

Note

1. Bogdanov (2009, p. 4, plus author’s own calculations based on statis-tics from the Ukrainian State Committee of Statistics, http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/, date accessed 22 December 2009.

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6NATO and the EU‘Neutrals’ – Instrumentalor Value-Oriented Utility?Magnus Petersson

Introduction

It has been underscored several times that NATO partnership policyis, and has always been, something more than a preparation, or awaiting room, for NATO membership. In a speech in Munich inFebruary 1995, for example, NATO Secretary General Willy Claesdescribed the PfP program as a political project: ‘The fact that formerneutrals such as Sweden, Finland (and soon also Austria) are part ofthis endeavor only serves to underline the unique role of our Allianceas an agent of political change’ (Claes, 1995).

The group of EU ‘neutrals’ within NATO’s PfP program – Austria,Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden – is perhaps more than anyother group of NATO partners representing that fact, as they seeNATO partnership not as a way of becoming NATO members, but as acomplement to EU membership. As Roisin Doherty points out, theirrelationship with NATO ‘is not motivated by insecurity and remainsbounded by a wish to remain outside the alliance.’ ‘These countries,’she continues, ‘do not see PfP as the slippery slope towards NATOmembership’ (Doherty, 2000, p. 73). They want to borrow anothermetaphor from Laura Ferreira-Pereira, to be ‘inside the fence but out-side the walls’ (Ferreira-Pereira, 2006). But why, then, do NATO andthe NATO members want partners that do not want to be membersin the foreseeable future? What is the political and military utility insuch an arrangement?

112


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Magnus Petersson 113

In this chapter the group of EU ‘neutrals’ will be scrutinized inthree ways. First, it will be investigated if these states can be viewed asa homogenous group of states that can be dealt with in a similar way.Second, the political and military contribution to NATO from thesestates will be analyzed. The five main objectives for the PfP programwill be the point of departure in that analysis, namely 1. trans-parency in defense planning and budgeting, 2. democratic controlof defense forces, 3. non-combat operations under UN or OSCEauthority, 4. cooperative military relations with NATO in joint plan-ning, training and exercises, and 5. force interoperability over thelonger term with NATO members, including through participationin Combined Joint Task Forces. Third, and perhaps most impor-tantly, the rationality behind NATO’s policy and attitude towardthese states will be discussed. The utilizing of Max Weber’s distinc-tion between instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value-rationality (Wertrationalität) can be a useful tool for that reason.Instrumental rationality is, in a literal sense, instrumental and focuseson practical results. Value-rationality, on the other hand, is expressiveand focuses on the realization of the symbolic meaning of the activityin itself (Weber, 1947, pp. 115–18).

It is easy to imagine that NATO partnership policy against theEU ‘neutrals’ can be categorized in these terms. Is, for example,NATO policy against Malta mainly value rational, not so focused onthe results, but rather than on the symbolic meaning of, for exam-ple, inclusiveness? And is, as another example, NATO policy againstSweden mainly instrumental, focused on the results rather than onthe activity of having a partnership with Sweden in itself?

Applying Weber’s typology of rationality when discussing NATO’sand the member states policy toward these states can hopefully helpto identify interesting patterns that can make us better understandthe rationality (and/or non-rationality) behind the NATO partner-ship concept in general, and the partnership with the EU ‘neutrals’in particular.

The EU ‘neutrals’ – A homogeneous group?

It might not be totally fair to define all five countries in the group ofEU ‘neutrals’ as neutrals. The historical differences between the coun-tries policies are important and so are the different developments of


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114 NATO and the EU ‘Neutrals’

the policies since the Cold War ended. During the Cold War, it wasfair to say that all five countries practiced a neutrality policy, but thepolicies rested on different ground: the Finnish, Irish, and Swedishwere clearly political in nature, the Austrian legal (that is entrenchedin the constitution), and the Maltese was first political and then legal.

After the Cold War it can be argued that the Finnish and theSwedish neutrality policies were abandoned and replaced by a policyof non-alignment (that is the word ‘neutrality’ is not in use any-more), that the Irish policy was still expressed as a policy of militaryneutrality, and that the Austrian and Maltese neutrality policies werestill incorporated in the constitution (for an overview, see Atack andMcCrum 2009; Newby and Titley, 2003).

Despite the differences, it can be argued that the EU ‘neutrals,’ asa group, still is analytically useful when studying NATO partnershippolicy. The group is, compared to other partner countries, or groupsof partner countries, in many important respects a homogeneous anddistinct group of partners that can be dealt with in a similar way.They can, for example, in general be seen as exemplary partner statesfulfilling the ‘soft’ objectives of the PfP program. The defense plan-ning and budget process has, and has long been, transparent in thesecountries and none of them lacks democratic control of the armedforces.

Nevertheless, considering the ‘hard’ objectives of the PfP program:Non-combat operations under UN or OSCE authority; cooperativemilitary relations with NATO in joint planning, training and exer-cises; and force interoperability over the longer term with NATOmembers, including through participation in Combined Joint TaskForces, the picture is more nuanced.

Already when looking at ‘facts and figures,’1 it can be argued thatwithin the group of EU ‘neutrals,’ there have been, and still are,more or less reluctant partners: Finland and Sweden stand out asthe least reluctant ones, followed by Austria, Ireland, and Malta.One important reason for that can be, as mentioned above, that theneutrality policies of Finland and Sweden have transformed into anon-alignment policy after the end of the Cold War.

When the PfP program was launched in 1994, Finland and Swedenimmediately joined in. By December the same year, the countrieshad, together with the soon to be members – the Czech Republic,Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia – also


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managed to conclude their first Individual Partnership Program, IPP,that is, a bilateral agreement of cooperation between the partner stateand NATO (Borawski, 1995, p. 239). Austria and Malta submitted tothe PfP program in 1995 – although Malta suspended in 1996 due toits neutrality policy – and Ireland in 1999.

Further, when looking at the ‘primary tool’ for achieving inter-operability, the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), the samepattern appears: Finland and Sweden joined the process in 1995,Austria in 1996, Ireland in 2001, and Malta is still considering futureparticipation after reactivating its PfP membership in 2008.

A third indicator of the level of reluctance to partnership amongthese countries is their contribution to NATO operations. In general,it can be argued that Sweden contributes most, followed by Finland,Austria, and Ireland. (Malta is, naturally, a special case. With itspopulation of approximately 400,000 citizens, and the fact that thecountry have not for very long been a PfP member, its present ambi-tions are, at present, restricted to develop and improve the ability tocontribute to peace-support operations in the future.)

In 1996, Austria, Finland, and Sweden contributed to the NATO-ledpeacekeeping force in Bosnia–Herzegovina – Austria with a trans-port element, Finland and Sweden with an infantry battalion each.From 1997, Ireland (not yet a PfP country), contributed with a mil-itary police company headquarters, a military police platoon, and anational support element. In other words, it can be argued that boththe quantity and the type of forces sent mirror the signals of reluc-tance to contributing to NATO operations between the countries:Finland and Sweden sent relatively large, combat (or combat-like)forces while Austria and Ireland sent relatively small support (orsupport-like) forces. And that pattern continued.

From 1999, Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden participated inthe NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR); Finland andSweden in a similar way as in Bosnia–Herzegovina (that is battalionlevel), Austria now for the first time with combat forces compara-ble to the Finnish and Swedish, including five small maneuver taskforces with a total strength of approximately 450 soldiers. From May2008 to May 2009, Austria also had a leading role in KFOR; it con-tributed with the biggest non-NATO member contingent (at mostup to 700 personnel), and commanded KFOR’s Multinational TaskForce South (MNTF-S). In the KFOR operation, Ireland also replaced


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its support units with combat units; at the beginning of the operationIreland contributed with a transport/logistics company, which later,in October 2004, was replaced by an armored infantry company.

Meanwhile, as the contribution to the International Security Assis-tance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan increased, Sweden downsized itsforces in Kosovo. Since 2006, Sweden has instead led a ProvincialReconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-i-Sharif in the northern part ofthe country, and contributed with approximately 450 troops to theISAF operation. Finland’s contribution to ISAF was approximately 100personal, mainly in the Swedish-led PRT. Austria and Ireland havecontributed to ISAF with a few staff officers.

Additionally, Finland and Sweden are the only non-member coun-tries participating in NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) initia-tive, which was established in 2008 and is under the command of amultinational military structure – the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW) –led by a US Air Force officer. That can be interpreted as a quiteunusual commitment for two non-aligned states and a clear signalfrom Finland and Sweden that they are prepared to be deeply inte-grated in NATO’s defense structures, even though they do not wantto be members.

In sum, it can thus be argued that the EU ‘neutrals’ – from a NATOperspective – in important respects, such as ideological/bureaucratic‘reliability’ and ‘maturity’ in general, are a homogenous group ofNATO partners that can be dealt with in a similar way. But whenit comes to the degree of reluctance to ‘harder’ issues in the part-nership, such as contributing troops, there are both qualitative andquantitative differences among these partners. It is, therefore, tempt-ing to differentiate between the EU ‘neutrals’ political and militaryintegration in the NATO PfP structure: Politically they stand outas homogenous but militarily they are a heterogeneous group ofpartners.

This impression is strengthened by interviews with NATO civil ser-vants as well as civil servants from partner countries. The Europeanpartner countries Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland(not an EU member) are both seen as and perceive themselves as afront group within the PfP program. Within that group, Finland andSweden stand out as the most willing countries, who cooperate onall levels and on all areas. In some ways they act as they were mem-bers, according to several of the interviewed, and sometimes they,


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informally, are even called ‘non-NATO allies.’ Austria, Ireland, andSwitzerland have a more restrictive policy, according to the inter-viewees, but are also seen as very valuable partners for NATO. Allthe EU ‘neutrals’ are, from a NATO perspective, seen as reliable, andeasy to communicate and cooperate with (Interview 1; Interview 3;Interview 4).

The EU ‘neutrals’ – A contributing group?

Formally, the PfP program was founded on – and still rests on –‘NATO centric’ conditions: PfP is under the North Atlantic Councilsauthority, partner countries can only contribute to policy decisionsindirectly (for example through silent diplomacy, consultation, influ-encing agenda setting, and so on) and the bottom line principal hasalways been that partners – especially partners that want to becomemembers – must show that they can be providers, not only consumers,of security (see, for example, Borawski, 1999, pp. 325–6).

How the principal of the balance between ‘providing’ and ‘con-suming’ security has been followed in practice is, however, widelydebated. Zoltan Barany, for example, argues that the seven formerpartners that wanted to be members, but did not live up to member-ship standard (that is Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,Slovakia, and Slovenia), were warmly welcomed as members in theaftermath of 11 September. He argues that the US ‘needed all thepotential allies it could get, regardless of their deficiencies’ and that‘some NATO aspirants jumped at the chance ingratiate themselveswith Washington by offering sympathy and solidarity while contin-uing to neglect the implementation of real reform’ (Barany, 2009,p. 172).

Even though it might not be fair to suggest that the balance ofsecurity providing and consuming is the only dimension of NATOpartnership, it might have something to say on a structural level.Partner countries that contribute much and consume little wouldmost likely be seen as more valuable partners. Contribution in rela-tion to the five objectives of the PfP program can, as suggested inthe introduction, be a good point of departure when ‘measuring’ thedegree of contribution. Following the pattern that appeared in thesection above, it seems reasonable to believe that Sweden – all in all –is the biggest contributor, followed by Finland, Austria, Ireland, and


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Malta. The discussion of the countries’ contribution will, therefore,be structured in that order.

According to Ryan Hendrickson, Sweden’s ‘activities in Afghanistan,Kosovo, in NATO training operations and in force modernizationmean Sweden has both the political will and the military capabilitiesto be a real “security provider” for the Allies’ (Hendrickson, 2007).The picture given by Hendrickson is well founded. Immediately afterSweden had joined the PfP program it started to engage in all sortsof activities, both ‘soft’ and ‘hard.’ In September–October that year,Sweden – together with Russia, Lithuania, Poland, and ten NATOmembers – took part in the maritime Exercise Cooperative Venture94 in Skagerrak, within the frame of PfP. The exercise was ‘[d]esignedto familiarize maritime forces of NATO and Co-operation Partnerswith each other and to enhance their capability to work together infuture peace-keeping operations’ (NATO, 1994b).

In 1994 Sweden also, for example, took part in a NATO-sponsoredmeeting in Turkey in July on technology transfer – particularly intel-lectual property rights and patent legislation (NATO, 1994a) – and aNACC/PfP workshop on material, technical, and operation standard-ization in December (NATO, 1994c). In July 1996, Sweden hosted aPfP seminar in Stockholm on the conversion and use of civil aircraftfor aero-medical evacuation (NATO, 1996b), and in November thatyear it hosted a Civil Emergency Planning seminar, with a focus oncivil and democratic principles, structures, and legislative frameworkfor emergency planning (NATO, 1996c).

Besides that, Sweden soon took initiatives to develop the PfP. InDecember 1996, in connection to the meeting of the North AtlanticCooperation Council (NACC) in Brussels, Under Secretary of State,Jan Eliasson, proposed a regional PfP center for pre-exercises, train-ing, and courses, and offered facilities for such a center in Swedento get a quick start. Another example was the Swedish minesweepingoperations in Baltic territorial waters in the 1990s, which includedtraining in minesweeping for the Baltic countries ‘in the spirit of PfP’(Eliasson, 1996).

Representatives for the Swedish Armed Forces have also beeneager, it seems, to describe the forces as adaptable, modern, and –not least – interoperable with NATO forces (Ericsson, 2004; Kihl,2005; Grenstad, 2006). In an article from 2005, Major General JanAndersson (Chief of the Swedish Air Force), put it in the following


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way: ‘For almost a decade, ongoing internationalization has put theissue of interoperability at top of the agenda; achieving EU, NATOand US interoperability in all perspective is a guiding objective’(Andersson, 2005, p. 174 – Emphasis added). And in another articlefrom 2006, the Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces,General Håkan Syrén, argued as follows:

Interoperability is a key concern in the further modernization ofthe Swedish forces. As a partner to NATO we are using the PARPas main tool for interoperability development. Our aim is to givealmost all our forces the capability to operate efficiently in a multi-national environment. NATO standards are broadly used withinour forces, not only in terms of equipment, but also in trainingand in the command system.

(Syrén, 2006, p. 116)

Finland’s contribution to NATO is quite similar to Sweden’s and itcontains ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’ components (Interview 6). Finlandalso, early on, took an active part in all sorts of activities within thePfP program. In December 1994 Finland attended the above men-tioned NACC/PfP workshop on material, technical, and operationstandardization in December (NATO, 1994c), and – together withAustria, Slovenia and Sweden – sent observors to a meeting of theNATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) inApril 1995 (NATO, 1995).

Finland also, on an early stage, was open to further developingand deepening PfP cooperation. A statement by the Under Sec-retary of State, Mr. Jakko Blomberg, in connection to the NACCmeeting in December 1996, underscored – inter alia – that Finlandsupported increased regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea region,participation in NATO’s command structures for interested partnercountries for crisis management planning purposes, and expandingand developing the PARP (Blomberg, 1996).

In an article from 2001, Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtorantacharacterized Finnish and Swedish contributions to the Alliance inthe following way: ‘In short, with regard to the cooperation withNATO, everything else seems to be acceptable except the mutual secu-rity guarantees of Article 5’ (Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 75).That seems like an accurate interpretation. And just like in the case


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of Sweden, representatives of the Finnish Defence Forces seem eagerto argue that the defense forces are modern and useful for NATOpurposes.

In an article from 2006, Admiral Juhani Kaskela, Chief of DefenceStaff, argued that the PfP program had been ‘a remarkable mutualsuccess,’ that the aim was to ‘continually improve Finland’s alreadyhigh level of interoperability,’ and that Finland, with more than 500troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan, hardly could be accused of ‘free-riding’ (Kaskela, 2006, p. 76).

In another article from 2008, Finland’s Minister of Defence, JyriHäkämies, argued that Finland’s main interest in the PfP programhad been ‘participation in the NATO-led crisis management opera-tions and thus the need to develop our interoperability and crisismanagement capabilities’ (Häkämies, 2008, p. 135).

Austria is also contributing much to NATO with regard to both‘soft’ and ‘hard’ issues. The actions taken by the Austrian’s within theframe of the PfP program can nevertheless – as mentioned above –be characterized as more restrained, less demonstrative, and lesspro-active than those of the Swedish and Finnish.

During the first years of the Austrian partnership with NATO,Austria was, in principal, engaged in ‘soft’ issues, such as hosting aworkshop on the use of military and civil defense assets in disasterrelief in 1996 (NATO, 1996a), and participating in an exercise to testand evaluate procedures for exchange of information on detectionand monitoring of radiation in 1997 (NATO, 1997). The subtle termi-nology used to describe the development of Austria’s participation inthe PfP in December 1998 is quite typical:

[ . . . ] Austria is now prepared to cooperate with NATO, its membersand the other PfP-participants in the full range of peace supportoperations, that is to say in areas beyond peace keeping.

(Schüssel, 1998)

Instead of declaring its willingness to participate in peace enforce-ment operations, the Austrian government chose to express itsengagement in terms of ‘areas beyond peace keeping.’ This more cau-tious, and less demonstrative, approach to cooperation with NATO isalso evident when representatives of the Austrian Armed Forces makestatements. The focus is rather on the transformation of the forces as


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such, than that the transformation – as in the Finnish and Swedishcases – makes the forces interoperable and relevant in a NATO context(Entacher, 2006; Darabos, 2008; Höfler, 2008).

Among the four ‘big’ partners in the group of EU ‘neutrals,’ Irelandseems – as already been discussed – to be the most reluctant, cau-tious, and ostentatiously ‘neutralistic’ NATO partner. Sometimes itseems that Ireland is doing its best to dissociate from the organizationthat it is formally associated with. The Irish arguments for joiningthe PfP program in the late 1990s was focused on to being ‘in keep-ing with Ireland’s role in the European Union’ and on the necessityto become an effective peacekeeping nation, rather than on being asolid and reliable contributor to the North Atlantic Alliance (Moran,1996; Horgan, 1999).

Doherty argues that ‘the importance of PfP as a forum for regionalpeacekeeping’ was ‘the primary reason’ for Irish membership. Thechanging nature of peacekeeping, she continues, made it necessaryfor Ireland to join if it wanted to keep its reliability as a peacekeepingnation. Since planning and conducting peacekeeping missions – alsoin an EU context – was made with NATO’s instruments and standards(the PARP, and so on), the PfP became necessary as an instrument fora country that wanted to be a better peacekeeper. However, accordingto Doherty, it also helped the Irish to overcome the domestic debateon PfP and neutrality (Doherty, 2000, p. 64).

Malta, lastly, seems to be very careful in connection to cooperationwith NATO. At the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Bucharest in2008 – when Malta reactivated its partnership with NATO – the PrimeMinister of Malta, Lawrence Gonzi, underlined that the PfP member-ship was ‘fully consistent with the Maltese Constitutional provisionson neutrality,’ and that it was a instrument to develop civilian andmilitary interoperability to be more effective in UN sanctioned cri-sis management and peace support operations (Office of the PrimeMinister, 2008).

In a draft to Malta’s IPP for 2008–09, the Maltese cautiousness iseven more prominent. It ‘reiterates’ that Malta ‘has no intent’ tobecome a member of the Alliance, and it excludes ‘participation inpeace enforcement operations’ (Maltese Parliament, 2008). Accordingto the newspaper Malta Today, the main reason behind the reactiva-tion of the PfP membership was that Malta had been excluded fromdiscussions between the EU and NATO, ‘because of confidentiality


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agreements between PfP countries and NATO over security policydocuments.’ The reactivation was, remarkably, necessary for the EUmember Malta to be able to ‘participate fully and unconditionally inEU organs,’ according to the author (Vassallo, 2008).

Despite the Maltese reluctance toward NATO partnership, it can beargued that, from a NATO perspective, it is ‘geo-politically’ impor-tant to have Malta as a partner country. With the words of John E.Tunbridge, ‘few other places on earth, proportionately to size, havebeen so greatly impacted by military geographies for so long as hasMalta.’ Its strategic location, between Sicily and Africa in the centreof the Mediterranean, has, as Tunbridge puts it, ‘virtually guaranteedits early human occupation and progressive influence or takeover byevery major power that sought to pass that way’ (Tunbridge, 2008,pp. 449–51).

In sum, it can thus be argued that the EU ‘neutrals’ all are providersof security to NATO through their partnership. Among the four ‘big’partners a rough division can be made between Finland and Swedenon the one hand, and Austria and Ireland on the other. Finland andSweden are very active and urgent partners contributing relativelyheavily and trying to develop the PfP program further. Austria andIreland are both great contributors, but have a much lower, and morerestrictive, profile. Malta is a very special case, since it is so smalland has not been part of the PfP program for a long time yet, butits actions up till the present can be seen as rather moderate andexpectant. But what, then, is NATO’s approach to these states?

NATO and the EU ‘neutrals’ – Instruments or symbols?

As outlined in the introduction, Weber’s concept of instrumentalrationality vs. value-rationality can be used as an analytical instru-ment when trying to get a grip on NATO’s partnership policy ingeneral, and policy against the EU ‘neutrals’ in particular. Weber’s dis-tinction between value-rational and instrumentally rational action isbased on intentions, that is ‘action is defined by the meaning theactor ascribes to it;’ ‘commitment to a binding conviction in the for-mer case, commitment to calculability in the latter’ (Oakes, 2003,p. 38).

Instrumentally rational action is, in principal, based on the assess-ment of relative costs and benefits, that is ‘the assessment is elaborate,


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covering the means of performing the action in comparison withother available means as well as the consequences of the actionperformed by the means selected, again in comparison with alter-natives.’ Value rational action, on the other hand, is defined bythe conviction of actors that a value can be ascribed to the actindependent of the outcome. As Guy Oakes puts it:

Weighing alternative means, comparing and assessing conse-quences, judging the impact of conduct on any range of objectivesor values, even considering immediate prospects for success, areall irrelevant to value rationality. The imperatives of value ratio-nality are categorical, not hypothetical; they are independent ofall contingencies that might have any bearing on results.

(Oakes, 2003, p. 39)

There is not much evidence that NATO has a very clear, structured,and systematically implemented policy toward the EU ‘neutrals.’ Thedevelopment of the ‘relation’ between NATO and its partners in gen-eral seems rather to be driven by the partners. As Stephan Frühlingand Benjamin Schreer put it: ‘The lack of political consensus on thescope and limits of many of its partnerships has led NATO to adopta “customer approach:” NATO largely leaves it up to its partnersto define their desired areas of co-operation’ (Frühling and Schreer,2010, p. 54). The EU ‘neutrals’ seem not to be an exception to thatrule (Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 6).

Strictly speaking, if NATO does not have any intention at all for itspartnership activities, there can be no rationality behind it – at leastnot in the Weberian sense. However, that is not really the case. Thereare elements of both value rationality and instrumental rationalityin NATO’s actions against its partners, although it might not alwaysbe so explicitly formulated. According to Frühling and Schreer, forexample, there are ‘particularly strong political and strategic com-monality’ between NATO and the EU ‘neutrals’ (Frühling and Schreer,2010, pp. 55–6) And the general impression is that the EU ‘neutrals’are seen by NATO and NATO members as unproblematic, reliablestates, easy to communicate and cooperate with – in short the typeof partners that NATO want and need.

The relation to the EU ‘neutrals’ is, however, by NATO civil servantscharacterized as mainly instrumental rather than value-oriented


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(Interview 3; Interview 4). That picture is strengthened by inter-views with civil servants from partner countries. The overall interestfrom a NATO perspective is, according to several actors interviewed,practical military cooperation and contribution of forces to NATOoperations based on common interests (Interview 1; Interview 2;Interview 5).

It seems, all in all, that the mainly instrumental rationalitythat characterizes NATO’s relation to the EU ‘neutrals’ differs –principally – from the relation to the Central and Eastern Europeanformer and present partners. Research has shown that PfP mem-bership at the prospect of NATO membership has promoted, forexample, democracy (Barany, 2009). In the Polish case, as anexample, Rachel Epstein argues that ‘the alliance’s engagementof Polish domestic reform [ . . . ] affected outcomes in everythingfrom civil-military relations to defense planning’ (Epstein, 2005,p. 66).

In sum, value rationality might have been a quite strong drivingforce for NATO in its approach to the Central and Eastern Europeanpartners that wanted to be members, many of them present mem-bers (Groves, 1999; Barany, 2009). But that seems not to be the casein connection to the EU ‘neutral’ partners. NATO seems to have aquite instrumental approach to these countries. They are, from a mil-itary perspective, seen as reliable contributors to NATO operationsand other activities and they are, from a political perspective, seen asboth a useful interface between EU and NATO, and as a leading groupthat develops the PfP concept (Barany, 2009, Interview 1).

Laurent Goetschel suggests that enhanced participation of PfPstates, ‘especially neutral ones [ . . . ] support NATO’s ambition toevolve into something more than a military alliance’ (Goetschel,1999, p. 130). It seems quite clear that NATO standards and pro-cedures for crisis management and peace operations is the onlyalternative today, and that states that want to take part in sucharrangements must adapt to these standards and procedures. The PfPprogram is, for that purpose, a necessity. In that sense, the PfP pro-gram makes NATO something more than a military alliance, and forthe EU ‘neutrals,’ and especially for Ireland, that aspect seems to bevery important.

The ability to develop interoperability through the PfP program,and aiming at being a better peacekeeper can, in sum, be a distinct


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feature for the relation between NATO and the EU ‘neutral’ partnercountries (plus Switzerland), compared to many of the EasternEuropean countries who see the PfP program, first and foremost, as away of becoming a NATO member.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, NATO does not seem to have a particularlyarticulated strategy for developing its relations with the EU ‘neutrals.’The relations seem mainly ad hoc driven and rather developed froma partner country perspective than from a NATO perspective. Theseresults correspond well with earlier research on the topic. It is oftenargued that NATO partnering after the Cold War has been a very suc-cessful project (see, for example, Salonius-Pasternak, 2007, p. 23). Butit is very seldom defined how this comes about. The focus has mainlybeen on the positive results as such, and not on the process and thestrategies behind these results.

NATO’s relation to the group of EU ‘neutral’ partner countries –Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden – has been scrutinizedin three ways in the chapter. First, it was investigated if these statescould be seen as a homogenous group of states that could be dealtwith in a similar way. The answer to this question was yes and no. Yesbecause the states share the same ambitions not to be NATO mem-bers, because there exists a ‘strategic commonality’ between NATOand the EU ‘neutrals,’ and because all the countries can be seen asquite similar in relation to the ‘soft’ objectives of the PfP program(democratic institutions, transparency in defense planning, and soon). No because their reluctance to contribute to the ‘hard’ objec-tives of the PfP program is quite different; Finland and Sweden arethe least reluctant, followed by Austria, Ireland, and Malta.

Second, the political and military contribution to NATO from thesestates was analyzed, and the same pattern appeared: Sweden is thebiggest contributor to both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ objectives of the PfPprogram, followed by Finland, Austria, Ireland, and Malta. Again,Sweden and Finland can be seen as a group within the group – veryeager to do ‘everything’ as a loyal partner except security guarantees –that leads and develops the PfP cooperation even further. Austria andIreland are more restrictive and passive. They contribute much, butdo so often without speaking so loud about it. Malta is a special


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case; the country is small and has not been a partner for so long.It is, anyway, quite cautious in its relations with NATO so far.

Third, the rationality behind NATO’s policy and attitude towardthe EU ‘neutrals’ has been discussed. Max Weber’s distinctionbetween instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalität) and value-rationality (Wertrationalität) has been used as a tool in thatconnection. NATO has been ‘accused’ for not having a strategy atall or – at least – a quite unarticulated strategy toward its partners ingeneral. There seems to be a lot of truth in that, but while there issome clear evidence that NATO’s partnership policy against the Cen-tral and Eastern European partners, some of them present members,can be said to be built on a good portion of value rationality, it ishard to find that pattern when looking at NATO’s policy and atti-tude against the EU ‘neutrals.’ It rather seems as if the NATO policyis driven mainly by instrumental rationality, especially contributionto NATO operations.

Goetschel argues that NATO could take advantage of the exis-tence of neutral states: ‘by staying outside the organization’s formalhard core, these states can contribute tremendously to openingthe alliance strengthening its non-collective defense tasks, whichwould ultimately ease the way for a move toward collective secu-rity’ (Goetschel, 1999, p. 133). The development of NATO’s relationsto the EU ‘neutrals’ so far strongly supports Goetschels argument,whether it has been a policy or not.

Frühling and Schreer suggest a more comprehensive and policy-oriented program to how NATO partnership policy should be for-mulated and developed to be more trustworthy and appropriate forthe Alliance, and at the same time create more security in gen-eral: namely, to focus on creating global collective goods in general,and develop the different types of partnership so that they are, inparticular, more explicitly in line with NATO’s strategic interests.

The logic of Frühling’s and Schreer’s general approach, to createglobal collective goods, is connected to practical defense assistanceand cooperation as well as a wider security dialogue reducing the riskfor conflicts in the international system. The logic of this particu-lar approach, to work more systematically and differentiated againstpartner countries and groups of partner countries with the Alliancestrategic interests in focus, is connected to collective defense, deter-rence, and stable global relationships, regional stability (especially


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in the south-eastern flank), and cooperation with other importantinstitutions to minimize the risk for armed conflicts. In connectionto the latter, Frühling and Schreer argue, the EU ‘neutrals’ shouldwarrant:

[A] dedicated partnership programme: It should comprise the fullgamut of functional partnership activities, with a special focus onpolitical dialogue on questions of common security, on increasedinteroperability and even eventual integration.

(Frühling and Schreer, 2010, pp. 56–7)

If implemented, the suggestions of Frühling and Schreer would meana more structured and focused NATO policy against the EU ‘neutrals’with quite visible value oriented and instrumental components. Thebig question is, however, if these partners want such a rational,focused, and visible NATO policy. It can be argued that the reluc-tance from all countries – and especially Austria, Ireland, and Malta –to be ‘too’ integrated with and steered by NATO indicates thatthey are more comfortable with a partner-country driven ‘customerapproach.’

Note

1. The ‘facts and figures’ in this section is mainly collected from the web pagesof NATO and the EU ‘neutrals’ ministries of defence and defence forces.

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Interviews

Interview 1 (civil servants from partner country, Brussels, 28 September 2009).Interview 2 (civil servants from partner country, Brussels, 29 September 2009).Interview 3 (NATO civil servant, Brussels, 30 September 2009).Interview 4 (NATO civil servants, Brussels, 30 September 2009).Interview 5 (Swedish civil servant, Stockholm, 5 October 2009).Interview 6 (Swedish civil servants, Stockholm, 19 October 2009).


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7Sweden and NATO – Partnershipin the Shadow of Coalitions andConceptsHåkan Edström∗

NATO in the Swedish context

When the Berlin Wall fell Sweden had no formal, defense-related,relations with the EC (European Communities) or NATO. Now, morethan 20 years later, the EC has developed into a union (EU) witha proactive agenda on security and defense. Sweden has become amember of this union and has, in addition, entered into a partnershipwith NATO. Mindful of the EU membership, what is the utility of thispartnership?

This chapter focuses on how the Swedish partnership with NATOhas developed and how it is likely to develop in the future.Sweden’s relations with NATO during the 1990s have been sub-jected to research by, among others, Ann-Sofie Dahl (1999) and UllaGudmundson (2000). How the relationship has developed after 11September 2001 is, however, relatively unexplored. This circumstancecan probably be explained by the fact that neither security policy norNATO relations are to be found at the top tier of the Swedish politicalagenda.

On the contrary, the partnership seems to be a political non-issue.Not a single reference to the partnership can be found in the pro-grams of the seven parties represented in the Swedish parliament.Moreover, three of the seven parties do not even mention NATO.The remaining four parties can be categorized along a scale. At oneextreme is the Left Party. This party perceives NATO as a threat. At theother extreme is the Liberal Party. This party seeks a prompt SwedishNATO membership. The Christian Democrats and the Moderate Party

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132 Sweden and NATO

are positioned in between these extremes. The former envisions that‘An open and close cooperation with NATO should be a natural partof Swedish security policy’ (Christian Democrats, 2001, p. 18). Thelatter is striving for membership but not at the same pace as theLiberal Party:

The cooperation with NATO should be further developed andgiven more depth. A Swedish membership of NATO wouldimprove our influence as well as our own security. Such a decisiondemands, however, a popular support and a broad parliamentarysupport.

(Moderate Party, 2007, p. 31)

The Moderate Party points to the cognitive remains of the formerneutrality-doctrine. A Swedish NATO membership requires not onlyapproval from the citizens but also support from a majority in theparliament. Since it is unlikely that one party will obtain such amajority in the foreseeable future, it is more relevant to analyze howdifferent coalitions might design their policy. The main purpose ofthis chapter is to outline the major alternatives to Swedish NATOpolicy for the future.

Policy formulation on security matters, including NATO relations,does not only consider domestic factors, developments within NATOmight also influence the design. Hence a secondary purpose ofthis chapter is to highlight how the outcome of NATO’s strategicconsiderations may affect the organization’s external relationships,exemplified with its partnership with Sweden.

The chapter continues with an analysis of the Swedish parliamen-tary context. The section presents the past Swedish views on theutility. In the subsequent section an analysis of the NATO strategicchoices is presented. In the fourth section, two alternative SwedishNATO policies are outlined. In the last section, conclusions related tothe Swedish views on future utility are drawn.

The parliamentary context

When the Berlin Wall fell Sweden had a Social Democratic (S) minor-ity cabinet. There was no concerted opposition. The situation pro-vided the S-Cabinet with opportunities to seek support not onlyfrom the Left Party, but also from any of the non-socialistic (nS)


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Håkan Edström 133

parties or the independent Green Party. After the election in 1991,a centre-right minority cabinet took office. The Green Party lostall its mandates while two new parties won representation: thenon-socialistic Christian Democrats and populist New DemocraticParty (NDP). The latter came to act as a passive supporter tothe nS-Cabinet. After the elections in 1994, NDP lost its rele-vance whereas the Green Party regained representation. The SocialDemocrats could form a minority cabinet with support from theex-Communists in the Left Party. In the area of security politics, how-ever, the S-Cabinet chose to cooperate with the non-socialistic CentreParty.

The 1998 elections led to a new parliamentary situation in Sweden.The Green Party gained a pivotal role since none of the previous cab-inet alternatives won enough support to form a majority. The SocialDemocrats achieved consensus with the Left Party and the GreenParty and formed a minority cabinet. Security policy was not, how-ever, included in the cooperation. Since the Centre Party no longersupported the Social Democrats, security issues became an open ques-tion. The 2002 election did not change the situation. Ahead of theelection in 2006, the four non-socialistic parties agreed on a commonmanifesto. Previously, such a platform had only been presented afterthe election. The initiative might have contributed to the first major-ity cabinet since 1981. Inspired by the success of the centre-rightcoalition, the Social Democrats joined forces with the Left Party andthe Green Party and established a red-green coalition. This indicatesthat Sweden will be governed by a majority cabinet, at least until2014, unless the Sweden Democrats hold the balance.1 The questionis how the alternatives, that is the two coalitions, will formulate theirrespective NATO policies.

At least three important methodological aspects – time, actors,and arguments – have to be taken into account before conductingthe examination. The Swedish entry into the EU took place in themid-1990s, that is concurrent to the establishment of the partner-ship. The lack of experience that characterized the political debateon the membership in the 1990s has today been replaced by a morenuanced discussion. My interpretation is that the situation is sim-ilar with regard to the partnership. The NATO partnership is not,however, being debated to the same extent as EU membership. Therhetorical development is, hence, not that obvious, but is neverthe-less partly justifies my omission of the 1990s as a period of study.


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134 Sweden and NATO

More importantly, the international relations changed significantlyafter the events in September 2001. Another factor considered isthe existing research. As mentioned, the 1990s has been object ofresearch while the period 2002–09 remains relatively unexplored.

Since the coalitions consist of several parties, and since the NATOpolicies of the two coalitions have not taken shape yet, the mainactors are considered to be the individual parties.

The red-green cabinet in Norway indicates that the parties, whilein opposition, adopted a strong rhetorical position when NATOwas debated. Once in office, the argumentation was more nuanced.Despite this observation I intend to include all statements in theempirical material. The main argument for this standpoint is myassumption that the coalitions are, to some degree, bound by all state-ments. The statements, in other words, frame the freedom of actionin designing the NATO policy.

These three overarching considerations determine the quest forempirical material. In addition to the party programs, I have exploredthe debate in parliament and protocols from the party conventions.Furthermore, I have studied the NATO reports presented by the cab-inet to the parliament in 2004 and 2009. Finally, I have studied theIndividual Partnership Program (IPP) decided by the cabinet in 2003,2005, 2007, and 2009. In addition to the text analysis, I have carriedout interviews with spokespersons for security politics of all parties.

The analysis generated extensive results. For the purpose of thischapter the presentation is limited when it comes to the result of thefirst step of the analysis. Each of the parties’ approach to the partner-ship has been categorized. A model introduced by Niklas Eklund inhis study of the Swedish EU membership (Eklund, 2005, pp. 32–41) isapplied to categorize the findings. I approached the question of utilityby studying how the parties argue for the necessity and the desirabil-ity of the partnership. It turned out that the parties’ argumentationin the written material does not always make a distinction betweenpartnership and membership. This finding underlines the importanceof using interviews. Figure 7.1 below reflects the outcome of thisfirst step.

The views in the figure above serve as an introduction to the nextsection in which the past argumentation is presented. The presen-tation follows the structure used by the cabinet in its reports toparliament in 2004 and 2009.


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Håkan Edström 135

��DESIRABILITYNECESSITY Yes No

Yes Moderate Party,Liberal Party, CentreParty, Christ. Democrats

No Social Democrats Left Party,Green Party

Figure 7.1 Views of the NATO partnership in the Swedish parliament: thefour non-socialistic parties are enthusiastic, the Social Democrats’ pragmatic,and the two other red-green parties skeptical

The red-green coalition

Sweden’s participation in the EAPC and subsequently PfP was,according to the previous S-Cabinet, based on the principles of mil-itary non-alignment. The S-Cabinet clarified that the partnershipshould not be seen as a precursor for NATO membership. The mostfundamental national security interest, which the S-Cabinet consid-ered to have met with the partnership, was to increase the Swedishinfluence in NATO (S-Cabinet, 2004, p. 3).

There is, however, an important difference between the SocialDemocrats’ reference to non-alignment and the Left Party’s demandsof neutrality. Different starting points for the considerations haveimpact on the conditions for the partnership. The Left Party, forexample, expressed demands for an independent Swedish securitypolicy, including an immediate withdrawal from the PfP cooperation(Left Party 2008/09: U17). To be or not to be a partner seems to bethe crucial question. Indeed, this fundamental consideration eclipsesthe subordinate aspects discussed below.

NATO-led operations

The previous S-Cabinet played down NATO’s specific importance ininternational operations. Instead, the general relevance of regionalorganizations was emphasized. The experience from internationalmissions was considered to contribute in developing the capability ofthe Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) to participate in international opera-tions, regardless of which organization was providing the framework(S-Cabinet, 2004, pp. 10–11).

In opposition, the Social Democrats argued slightly differently. Thereason why NATO was given the task from the UN to provide the


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136 Sweden and NATO

command structure depends, according the party, on NATO’s abil-ity to lead complex operations. Sweden’s cooperation with NATOis thereby closely linked to the UN and hence important (SocialDemocrats 2008/09: U18, U349). The party has an ambition to reduceSAF troops abroad. It also strives to balance the participation inUN-, EU-, and NATO-led operations. A Swedish participation in anArticle 5-based NATO operation is, according to the spokespersonAnders Karlsson, considered to be completely out of the question(Karlsson, 2009).

In contrast to the Social Democrats, the Left Party sees no meritin participating in NATO-led operations. In its extreme, the party’sarguments seem to be based more on a negative approach to theUSA than on NATO skepticism as such. The party relates, for exam-ple, the Swedish participation in ISAF to the American presence inAfghanistan and Iraq. Sweden should, therefore, according to theparty, immediately withdraw its military contribution to ISAF (LeftParty 2006/07: U226). The party’s spokesperson, Gunilla Wahlén,is arguing that Sweden should not provide troops to NATO-ledoperations at all (Wahlén, 2009).

The Green Party holds a position between its coalition partners.The party argues that undisputed facts, showing the necessity forSweden to cooperate with NATO, have to be presented before Swedenshould even consider providing troops to NATO-led operations.A prerequisite is, according the party, that the roles of all involvedorganizations are clarified. If this requirement is not met, Swedishtroops should not be deployed under NATO’s command. RegardingISAF, the party argues that unless the incentives for cooperating withNATO are better explained, it may be necessary to withdraw theSwedish forces. The Green Party has elements of negative approachto the USA in its argumentation. ISAF is, for example, considered tobe a part of America’s war in Afghanistan as a whole. According tothe spokesperson, Peter Rådberg, it is doubtful if the American war in2009 can be justified by a UN mandate from 2001. If Sweden can-not influence US warfare to be more defensive in nature, Swedenshould not, according the party, provide troops to ISAF (Green Party2007/08: U367; Rådberg, 2009).

Transparency and influence

The previous S-Cabinet stressed the importance of transparencyand influence in NATO activities to which Sweden contributes.


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Håkan Edström 137

The Swedish mission to NATO was, in this regard, considered tobe important. The S-Cabinet also observed the possibility of gain-ing transparency by using Partner Staff Elements (S-Cabinet, 2004,pp. 11–12).

In opposition, the Social Democrats continue to argue for moretransparency and influence. The party also emphasizes the need foraccess to intelligence and information. At the same time the partyargues that since the defense budget is tight, it may be necessary toput additional economic restrictions upon the delegation and theStaff Elements (Social Democrats 2008/09: U18; Social Democrats2008/09: U349).

If the Social Democrats seem to be ambivalent, the Left Party isabsolutely clear in its position. According to this party there is noneed for a Swedish mission to NATO headquarters. These effortsshould, therefore, be immediately phased out. This position mightbe related to the fact that the party does not acknowledge a need fortransparency, influence, and sharing of intelligence and information(Left Party 2008/09: U17).

The Green Party is not as dogmatic as the Left Party. This partyargues that this part of the cooperation is not necessary from a mil-itary perspective and warns that it can ultimately lead to negativeconsequences for the SAF, not least in financial terms (Green Party2008/09: U19).

Defense planning, capability development, and interoperability

The previous S-Cabinet argued that cooperation in defense planningwill help ensuring the interoperability the SAF need to participatein international operations. An important second-order effect of theplanning and review process (PARP) was, according to the S-Cabinet,increased transparency and confidence building (S-Cabinet, 2004,pp. 12–14).

In opposition, the Social Democrats argue for Sweden’s right to for-mulate its defense policy on the basis of its own security assessments.A closer NATO cooperation might force Sweden to take undesir-able aspects into considerations. The party nevertheless emphasizesthe necessity of the SAF to become increasingly interoperable withNATO standards (Social Democrats 2008/09: U18; Social Democrats2008/09: Fö293). Karlsson underscores the fact that the importance ofthe cooperation in these respects is based on Sweden’s non-alignment(Karlsson, 2009).


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138 Sweden and NATO

Similarly to the Social Democrats, the Left Party focuses on thenon-alignment policy. In order to make the policy credible, Swedenhas to ensure, according to this party, that any speculation of aSwedish NATO accession must appear to be unfounded. Accordingly,the party opposes any military cooperation agreements that extendover long time periods and argues that Sweden should phase outgeneral cooperation within the PfP and all specific cooperation suchas the strategic airlift capacity (Left Party 2002/03: U249, 2008/09:U17). Wahlén claims that the party wants to phase out this part ofthe cooperation entirely. For the sake of Swedish defense industry,however, this has to be carried out in an orderly manner (Wahlén,2009).

The Green Party has a slightly different point of departure in itsargumentation than its coalition partners. The party warns that thispart of the cooperation can cause unintended political consequencesand argues that the reaction of Russia has to be taken into account(Green Party 2008/09: U19; Rådberg, 2009).

Exercises and training

The role of NATO in international cooperation in exercises andtraining was played down by the previous S-Cabinet. The mainpurpose of the cooperation was said to be increased internationalmaritime and aviation safety. The S-Cabinet stressed Sweden’s needfor high interoperability. Cooperation in exercises and trainingwere considered to address these needs. The S-Cabinet gave generalapproval to SAF to take part in activities open to all PfP countries.An important reservation was, however, added: the activities mustbe consistent with the non-alignment policy and the participationhas in each case to be approved by the cabinet (S-Cabinet, 2004,pp. 14–15).

Karlsson stresses that Sweden, according to the Social Democrats,should only participate in these activities when it is beneficial tothe national interests and when Sweden can influence NATO policy(Karlsson, 2009).

The coalition partners of the Social Democrats are much more crit-ical of the collaboration. The Green Party argues that exercises canbe linked to specific political issues. An example of one such issueis related to the natural resources in the Arctic. The signals variousexercises send to Russia should, according to the Green Party, not


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Håkan Edström 139

be underestimated (Green Party 2008/09: U19). Rådberg argues thatSweden can participate in exercises with NATO, but only outsideSweden. NATO should not, according to Rådberg, be authorized toconduct exercises and training on Swedish territory (Rådberg, 2009).The Left Party demands that Sweden should not approve NATO exer-cises on Swedish territory (Left Party 2008/09: U17). Wahlén goesone step further and claims that Sweden should not participate inany of NATO’s exercise and training activities whatsoever (Wahlén,2009).

Dialogue and consultations

The previous S-Cabinet considered the EAPC to be an importantforum for dialogue between NATO and partner countries. The wideagenda of the EAPC contributes, according the S-Cabinet, to uphold-ing the current Euro-Atlantic security system. Not least, Russianparticipation was considered to be of particular Swedish interest(S-Cabinet, 2004, p. 15).

In opposition, the Social Democrats argue that the non-alignmentgives Sweden credibility in global disarmament efforts. The partyobserves that the use of nuclear weapons still is a part of certainNATO countries’ defense doctrines. The party sees the EAPC as anopportunity to, through dialogue, bring claims for the revision ofsome NATO members’ defense doctrines (Social Democrats 2008/09:U18; Karlsson, 2009).

The Green Party holds a similar position to the Social Democrats.Since the dialogues and consultations provide bridges to includeRussia in the European family, Rådberg prefers to maintain this partof the cooperation (Rådberg, 2009). In addition, the party sees par-ticipation in the EAPC as an opportunity to bring up its criticism ofthe American offensive warfare in Afghanistan (Green Party 2007/08:U367).

The Left Party also sees the Swedish participation in the EAPCas a venue to articulate its criticism of NATO’s nuclear strategyand how it addresses disarmament issues (Left Party 2006/07: U246,2007/08: U203, 2008/09: U254). Wahlén goes, however, one stepfurther and argues that this part of the cooperation should con-tinue until, through dialogue, it is agreed that NATO is no longerneeded, and that thereafter the organization should be replaced bynew agreements between Europe and Russia (Wahlén, 2009).


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140 Sweden and NATO

Security support

The previous S-Cabinet strived to intensify cooperation with NATOin areas in which the organization’s unique competence could beused in order to promote security. As an example, the S-Cabinetmentioned NATO’s trust funds, and the destruction of mines andconversion of former military bases to civilian use. The S-Cabinet alsomentioned that Sweden annually contributes to this part of the coop-eration by arranging security support exercises, which are open to allEAPC-partners (S-Cabinet, 2004, pp. 16, 20).

In opposition, the Social Democrats argue that Sweden, throughits EU membership, is part of a political alliance that has signif-icantly more tools at its disposal than NATO. When it comes tomeeting the new threats and to providing security support the EUis, according to the party, a more relevant actor (Social Democrats,2008/09: U18). Karlsson argues that this kind of activity should becarried out by the UN. Cooperation with NATO does not, how-ever, necessarily have to be excluded (Karlsson, 2009). Both theLeft Party and the Green Party are, however, striving to phase outthis part of the cooperation completely (Rådberg, 2009; Wahlén,2009).

Civil emergency planning

The previous S-Cabinet argued that civil contingency planning is animportant part of the cooperation. Civil collaboration is, accordingthe S-Cabinet, the part of the cooperation where partner countriesare most integrated and have the greatest opportunity to influence.The S-Cabinet also highlighted the cooperation between the UNand NATO and exemplified the statement with UN/OCHA’s staffat EAPC’s Disaster Response Coordination Centre. In addition, theS-Cabinet pointed out that NATO cooperates with the EU and regu-larly invites other organizations to seminars and exercises (S-Cabinet,2004, pp. 16–17).

Karlsson argues that, as far as Sweden is concerned, it is morenatural to cooperate in the EU context and with the UN. NATOmight, however, also have a role to play in these kind of activities(Karlsson, 2009). The coalition partners do not agree. According tothem, this part of the cooperation should be phased out (Rådberg,2009; Wahlén, 2009).


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Personnel at NATO HQs

The previous S-Cabinet pointed out that the Swedish mission toNATO was part of the embassy to Belgium. The S-Cabinet describedthe tasks of the delegation as follows: to represent Sweden in differentEAPC-committees, maintain contacts with the Secretariat concerningthe Swedish contribution to NATO-led operations, and monitor thedevelopment within NATO. The S-Cabinet welcomed NATO’s offerto place Swedish officers at NATO headquarters. The S-Cabinet drewattention to the several occasions when Sweden had sent personnelto serve at the International Secretariat of the NATO headquarters(S-Cabinet, 2004, pp. 17–18).

Karlsson argues that the Social Democrats consider it to be valuableto send Swedish personnel to NATO headquarters when, by so doing,this could be linked to Swedish interests. He underscores that theimportance of this cooperation is being based on the Swedish militarynon-alignment (Karlsson, 2009).

Rådberg argues that the Green Party does not exclude this kind ofcooperation with NATO. Since the activities have to be coordinated,the current activities of the delegation seem to be reasonable. Theparty wants, however, to phase out the Staff Element part of the coop-eration (Rådberg, 2009). In contrast to its coalition partners, the LeftParty sees no merit whatsoever in this part of the cooperation. Theparty argues that the Swedish delegations to all NATO headquartersimmediately should be withdrawn (Left Party 2008/09: U17; Wahlén,2009).

The centre-right coalition

Providing resources for international crisis and disaster managementis, according to the previous nS-Cabinet, a central Swedish interest.The nS-Cabinet considered NATO to be the organization with the bestcapability to coordinate and implement these efforts. Cooperationwith NATO is, the nS-Cabinet argued, fundamental to developingthe capabilities of the SAF. To deepen the partnership with NATOis hence, according to the nS-Cabinet, a Swedish interest in itself(nS-Cabinet, 2009, p. 22).

NATO-led operations

The main argument for the Swedish participation in NATO-led oper-ations is, according to the previous nS-Cabinet, the need for further


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142 Sweden and NATO

development of the SAF. The nS-Cabinet recalled that the parliament,in accordance with the nS-Cabinet’s proposal, had decided to increasethe maximum size of the Swedish contribution to ISAF from 600 to855 people (nS-Cabinet, 2009, pp. 11–13).

The Moderate Party argues that since the EU lacks the resourcesto act in more demanding peace-support operations, it warrantsSwedish participation in operations under NATO’s command. WithNATO, the party continues, comes the prerequisite to conduct peace-enforcement operations (Moderate Party 2002/03: U323, 2003/04:U208, 2007/08: U273). The Moderate Party‘s spokesperson, KarinEnström, believes that the partnership is fundamental for conceptualinteroperability. She argues that the cooperation already has con-tributed to the development of the SAF, especially when it comes tothe planning and evaluation of operations (Enström, 2009).

When developing the SAF, the point of departure should be,according the Liberal Party, to establish closer military cooperationwith NATO. Participation in NATO-led operations should, for exam-ple, not be restricted to activities outside Europe. The party considersintelligence operations in Sweden’s neighborhood as being of partic-ular interest (Liberal Party 2003/04: U20, U329). The Liberal Party’sspokesperson, Allan Widman, is not comfortable with the develop-ments of the partnership in these aspects. He argues that Sweden risksending up in a dependency without reciprocity (Widman, 2009).

The spokesperson of the Christian Democrats, Else-Marie Lindgren,does not exclude a Swedish participation in NATO-led operations,even without a UN mandate. Neither does she exclude a Swedish con-tribution to operations carried out within the framework of Article 5(Lindgren, 2009). The Centre Party does not go quite as far asArticle 5. According to the party’s spokesperson, Staffan Danielsson,situations that require an immediate response might arise and await-ing a UN resolution might, therefore, not be the proper action. Hestresses that a UN mandate is preferable, but not a requirement, forSwedish participation in NATO-led operations (Danielsson, 2009).


The previous nS-Cabinet argued that the safety and efficiency of SAFunits participating in NATO-led operations would increase if Swedenhad the same influence and access to information as the participat-ing NATO countries. In order to improve transparency and to gain


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Håkan Edström 143

further influence the nS-Cabinet mentioned the importance of giv-ing Swedish officers posted to NATO headquarters better access toinformation, and that more positions in NATO’s command structureshould be opened for Sweden (nS-Cabinet, 2009, pp. 13–14, 23).

The Liberal Party considers the Swedish representation at NATOheadquarters to be important for transparency in the activities inwhich Sweden participates. The party argues that Sweden, in termsof volume and quality, contributes more extensively to NATO-led cri-sis management than some NATO members. Hence, the party argues,increased influence is a reasonable Swedish demand (Liberal Party2002/03: U234, 2003/04: U329). The Moderate Party considers thatcooperation with NATO is a prerequisite for the strengthening ofSweden’s international influence (Moderate Party 2002/03: U323).


The main argument for the Swedish participation in PARP is that,according to the previous nS-Cabinet, the planning mechanism pro-vides a foundation for the development of military capabilities andinteroperability. The nS-Cabinet stressed in particular the rapid reac-tion capacity and staff methodology and regrets that Sweden, as apartner, is not in a position to affect the design of the commonstandards that are a prerequisite to achieve interoperability. To com-pensate, the nS-Cabinet intended to let the SAF participate activelyin all committees associated with the research and armaments coop-eration. Air Situation Data Exchange and Strategic Airlift Capabilityare two tangible examples mentioned by the nS-Cabinet (nS-Cabinet,2009, pp. 14–17, 22–3).

The Moderate Party would like to include counterterrorism andnuclear proliferation in the defense planning cooperation. The partyargues that NATO remains relevant in the management of traditionalthreats and that Sweden cannot remain outside this part of the coop-eration. The party points out the situation in the Baltic region andstresses that a Swedish participation in NATO’s defense planningwould strengthen Sweden’s security. The party does not exclude thepossibility that Sweden might be exposed to a military attack. Thetransformation of the SAF has, according to the party, led to a needof allies in case of an attack. Sweden must also consider, the partycontinues, to take its part of the responsibility for other countries’security and freedom. It is therefore high time, the party argues, that a


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144 Sweden and NATO

wide-ranging review of the Swedish cooperation with NATO is carriedout (Moderate Party 2002/03: U323, 2008/09: U230, U279). Enströmargues that Article 5 should not prevent Sweden from participatingin NATO’s defense planning (Enström, 2009).

The Liberal Party also stresses the role of NATO in the Balticregion. The party does not exclude the risks of Sweden being sub-ject to a military attack and argues that participation in NATO’sdefense planning would save Sweden from military pressure andthreats. The party finds a structural coordination of Sweden and indi-vidual NATO members to be desirable, in particular regarding bor-der surveillance. Moreover, Sweden should, according to the party,strengthen the cooperation with Norway and Denmark. In addi-tion, the party argues for increased cooperation between Sweden andindividual NATO countries in areas such as procurement and defense-related international trade (Liberal Party 2003/04: U20, Fö243, U329).Widman warns that Sweden, with regard to capability development,has become dependent on NATO without being compensated withguarantees from NATO (Widman, 2009).

According to Lindgren, the Christian Democrats prefer to developthe cooperation and argue that a strengthened cooperation wouldbe of mutual benefit (Lindgren, 2009). The Centre Party holds asimilar position and considers, according to Danielsson, this partof the partnership to be important. He argues that, not least forthe Swedish defense industry, the cooperation has to be furtherdeveloped (Danielsson, 2009).


The previous nS-Cabinet viewed international exercises as an impor-tant component of capability development. In addition, exercises are,according to the nS-Cabinet, of significant value in the preparationsfor operations. Exercises also help to maintain readiness of individualunits. Hence, the nS-Cabinet argued, participation in NATO’s exer-cises is important for the overall performance of the SAF. Sweden has,through the cooperation, the nS-Cabinet continued, access to a largenumber of relevant courses (nS-Cabinet, 2009, p. 17).

The Moderate Party argues that since the EU does not provide thiskind of venue, Sweden has to participate in military exercises underthe leadership of NATO (Moderate Party 2007/08: U273). Enströmwould like to develop this part of the cooperation. According to her,


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the party sees NATO exercises on Swedish territory as an opportunityto improve Sweden’s ability to receive international support in a timeof need (Enström, 2009). The Liberal Party agrees with these positionsbut includes, in addition, other aspects. An enhanced cooperationwith NATO regarding exercises and training would, according to theparty, provide important economic benefits for the SAF (Liberal Party2003/04: Fö243; Widman, 2009). The Christian Democrats agree withthe Liberal Party’s conclusions. Lindgren stresses the economic limi-tations and considers it necessary to prioritize Swedish participationin NATO exercises (Lindgren, 2009).

In contrast to its coalition partners, the Centre Party seems toconsider this part of the cooperation solely from NATO’s perspec-tive. According to Danielsson, the party also wants to develop thiscooperation. He considers it to be positive if Sweden could offerNATO good conditions for exercises and training on Swedish territory(Danielsson, 2009).


According to the previous nS-Cabinet, specific issues such as combat-ing human trafficking and terrorism were central to the Swedish dia-logue with NATO. In addition, projects to combat corruption in theparticipating countries’ armed forces were considered to be impor-tant. The nS-Cabinet welcomed the mutual efforts to reform formerCommunist countries in Sweden’s neighborhood. The nS-Cabinetconsidered this part of the cooperation to be vital in promotingSwedish interest to further develop the dialogue between the EU andNATO (nS-Cabinet, 2009, pp. 18, 23).

The Moderate Party warns that Sweden could be isolated if itdecides not to participate in the security policy dialogue with NATO.It is in Sweden’s national interest, according to the party, to partici-pate in all parts of the European security cooperation. The party con-siders NATO and the EU as the main actors in order to ensure stabilityand peace in Europe. It is therefore important, the party argues, tocoordinate the two organizations through dialogue and consultations(Moderate Party 2002/03: U323, 2003/04: U208, U268; Enström,2009). Both the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party hold simi-lar positions. According to Lindgren, the Christian Democrats wouldlike to develop this part of cooperation, particularly when it comes tonon-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Lindgren, 2009).


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146 Sweden and NATO

The Centre Party considers, according to Danielsson, that cooper-ation is providing Sweden with an additional forum (Danielsson,2009).

The Liberal Party holds a more pro-American position. The partyargues that Sweden should not be an isolationist. Dialogue and con-sultations with NATO are considered to be very important. The partybelieves that international security cannot be built without the US.Sweden must, therefore, according this party, participate in enhancedtransatlantic cooperation. The party warns that unilateral Europeandefense cooperation may weaken transatlantic relations. It stressesthe importance of dialogue and consultations to coordinate EUand NATO activities (Liberal Party 2002/03: Fö240, U234; Widman,2009).

Security support

The previous nS-Cabinet gave priority to cooperation on securityassistance to Ukraine and Georgia as well as to countries in theBalkans. The nS-Cabinet believed cooperation should continue inthose cases where it is considered to promote Swedish interests andwhen NATO’s special competence can be of benefit (nS-Cabinet,2009, pp. 18, 23).

In this area of cooperation, the Moderate Party gives priority tothe Baltic region. The party seems, however, to be more interested inthe prospect of receiving support as opposed to providing it to others(Moderate Party 2002/03: U323, 2008/09: U279). Enström warns thatthis part of the cooperation can lead to shortage in staff personnel.She therefore suggests determining Swedish participation on a caseby case basis (Enström, 2009). The Liberal Party is also concernedabout the situation in the Baltic region and stresses the desirabilityof Sweden being included in NATO’s security guarantees. The partyincludes all types of military threats in its standpoint (Liberal Party2003/04: U20; Widman, 2009).

The other two non-socialist parties hold a less realistic position.The Christian Democrats would, according to Lindgren, like todevelop the cooperation. She stresses the importance of continuouslycoordinating Sweden’s participation in EU and NATO efforts to getthe optimal effect (Lindgren, 2009). The Centre Party is even moremodest in its ambitions. The party prefers, according to Danielsson,to maintain the cooperation at the current level (Danielsson, 2009).


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The previous nS-Cabinet pointed out the cooperation in the SeniorCivil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC). The modern threatsimply, according to the nS-Cabinet, an increased importance of thecooperation. The SCEPC’s competence in cross-sector issues such ascritical infrastructure protection is, according to the nS-Cabinet, cru-cial for success. In addition, the nS-Cabinet considers deepened coop-eration on transport, health care, food, industrial, civil protection,and telecom issues to be desirable (nS-Cabinet, 2009, pp. 18–19).

The Moderate Party argues that the current global situation hasmade it necessary for Sweden to cooperate with NATO in civil mat-ters. To prevent human trafficking and terrorism and to conductevacuation operations after natural disasters are, according to theparty, examples of such cooperation (Moderate Party 2007/08: U273).The Christian Democrats have a similar opinion. The party welcomes,according to Lindgren, NATO’s efforts and would like to develop thecooperation in this area (Lindgren, 2009).

The Liberal Party seems to be less convinced of the merits ofNATO. Widman says that the party considers it to be more naturalto cooperate with the EU in these matters. The party does not, how-ever, preclude cooperation with NATO (Widman, 2009). The CentreParty is even less ambitious. Danielsson says that the party prefers tomaintain the cooperation on current level (Danielsson, 2009).


The previous nS-Cabinet also pointed out that Sweden’s missionto NATO has been reorganized, from being a part of Sweden’sembassy to Belgium to become an independent authority. In addi-tion, the nS-Cabinet presented, in relatively detailed terms, the threePfP-programs: Partnership Staff Elements (PSE), PfP internship, andNational Representation, and the options each of them brings. ThenS-Cabinet stipulated an enhanced Swedish national representationand the use of voluntary national contributions (nS-Cabinet, 2009,pp. 9, 20–1).

According to the Moderate Party, the intention of this part of thecooperation should be to increase the efficiency of the SAF and,at the same time, bolster security (Moderate Party 2008/09: U279).Enström explains that the party wants to develop this part of the


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148 Sweden and NATO

cooperation. She interprets the reorganization of Sweden’s missionto NATO as an indication of Sweden’s increased ambition to developthe partnership. Since the implementation of NATO’s staff methodol-ogy is important to the SAF, Enström argues, so is Swedish presence inboth allied command operations (ACO) and allied command trans-formation (ACT) (Enström, 2009). The Liberal Party holds a similarposition. According to Widman, the importance of Sweden’s rela-tions to NATO justifies the reorganization of Sweden’s mission toNATO. The party finds it desirable to increase the number of Swedishpersonnel in NATO’s military staffs. The party welcomes the opportu-nity for Swedish officers to gain experience from higher staffs and insenior positions (Liberal Party 2002/03: U234, 2003/04: Fö243, U329;Widman, 2009). Both the Centre Party and the Christian Democratsagree with their partners’ conclusions and want to develop theseactivities. They also consider it desirable to increase the number ofSwedish personnel embedded and in high ranks in NATO’s hierarchy(Danielsson, 2009; Lindgren, 2009).

NATO’s strategic choices

NATO is facing several strategic choices for the future. Most of themare addressed in the process of formulating and adopting a newstrategic concept. The considerations below are limited to this area.

NATO’s strategic concept is a document that identifies the mainfeatures of the security policy environment and specifies how NATOintends to respond to the challenges. The concept is, in other words,providing guidance for the continued political and military develop-ment. The extant concept for this study was agreed in 1999. Duringthe NATO summit in April 2009 it was decided that the concept of1999 would be replaced with a new concept to be agreed during thesummit in the fall of 2010 (NATO, 2009).

NATO’s concept of 1999 highlights partnership as an importantaspect in the Alliance. It points out certain areas of cooperationthat are considered of particular importance for the developmentof the various partnerships. These areas are very similar to theaspects addressed in the previous section (NATO, 1999, paragraphs10, 50).

Since the concept of 2010 is not agreed in the time of writing ofthis book, it cannot be used as point of departure for the analysis.


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Håkan Edström 149

I have instead used the concept of 1999 with support of secondarysources. The question is what secondary sources are most relevantto use in this context. What is actually being said about the newconcept? I consider the NATO library’s bibliography as helpful toidentify recently published, relevant documents.2

I limited my analysis to two documents. The first document wasthe Washington NATO Project (WNP). The WNP was launched in late2008 and was a collaboration by four different American think tanks.It was supported by NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, and wasintended to initiate a debate on NATO’s future prior to the Alliance’s60-year anniversary in April 2009. The project presented its finalreport in February 2009 and pointed out a number of key areas ofdevelopment. The latter document is an article, published in Survivalin the autumn of 2009, by the research director at the NATO DefenseCollege, Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp. Kamp points to a number of importantissues that he believes the new concept should address. Both thesedocuments have been drafted with links to the NATO organization,thus ensuring their validity. Furthermore, the documents are togetherconsidered to be adequate to serve the purpose of this section, thatis, to highlight how the outcome of NATO’s strategic considerationscan affect the Swedish NATO policy.

Key areas for Sweden – and NATO?

The similarity between the partnership areas highlighted in the 1999concept and the aspects of cooperation pointed out by the Swedishcabinets allows this section to be structured the same way as theprevious one.

Operations

The strategic concept of 1999 balances between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. The concept underlines that the former plays theprimary role while partners are included mainly in the latter (NATO,1999, paragraphs 31, 41, 43, 47, 49, 52, 53, 61). The WNP arguesthat the Alliance in practice has come to focus on ‘out of area’ opera-tions. The project calls for a better balance between ‘missions home’and ‘missions away’ (Hamilton et al., 2009, pp. 15, 21–3). Karl-HeinzKamp points to Article 5 as a main area to be developed in the newstrategic concept: ‘Members have yet to agree on [ . . . ] how to balancethe NATO role in defending NATO territory with its role in providing


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150 Sweden and NATO

security, particularly through expeditionary operations and specialmissions far beyond NATO’s borders’ (Kamp, 2009, pp. 23–4).


The 1999 concept stresses that one of the objectives of the part-nerships is ‘increasing transparency.’ The influence of the partnersis not, however, mentioned at all (NATO, 1999, paragraphs 10,34, 35, 50). The WNP argues that the NATO–EU relations are ofspecial importance. The EU non-NATO members, implicitly includ-ing Sweden, are singled out as particularly important partners. Toimprove transparency between the two organizations, the WNP sug-gests the creation of an EU–NATO Joint Operation Command. Threepartners, including Sweden, should, according to the WNP, be prior-itized regarding political influence. In addition, the WNP considersa modification of the consensus rule to be necessary. This sugges-tion is, however, not explicitly referenced to the precedent partnercountries (Hamilton et al., 2009, pp. 32, 35–8, 40, 43). Dr. Kampis more focused in his approach. He argues that ‘the amount ofinfluence over the NATO decision-making that can or should begranted to Russia is disputed.’ He does not mention any otherpartner country with regards to transparency and influence (Kamp,2009, p. 25).


The concept of 1999 emphasizes the need to include partners in theseactivities. Concerning individual partners’ ‘territorial integrity, polit-ical independence, or security’ the concept does not, however, offerany common defense planning (NATO, 1999, paragraphs 34, 35, 43,49, 52, 61). The WNP calls for the creation of a joint NATO–EU Plan-ning Staff to better coordinate joint defense planning and doctrinaldevelopment. In addition, the WNP calls for a joint force generationmechanism and a strong NATO–EU Capabilities Group to facilitatethe capability development (Hamilton et al., 2009, pp. 26, 37–9,44–6, 50). Karl-Heinz Kamp argues that there may be a need for com-mon defense planning related to the member’s territorial defense. Inaddition, he suggests an option to plan for preemptive actions, theuse of nuclear weapons, and the development of a missile-defense.Notably, Dr. Kamp does not elaborate on interoperability (Kamp,2009, pp. 24–6).


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The strategic concept of 1999 mentions the necessity of NATO forcessupporting partners in their preparation to participate in NATO-ledoperations. The concept points out the need for exercises and train-ing, but the participation of partners is (for implicit reasons) limitedto ‘appropriate areas’ (NATO, 1999, paragraphs 29, 41, 43, 49, 61).The WNP highlights the partnership between the EU and NATO,related to defense preparations. Training and exercises related to thedefense against WMD are emphasized (Hamilton et al., 2009, pp. 26,31, 37). Dr. Kamp does not exclude the need to carry out militaryexercises based on the territorial defense of NATO’s East Europeanmembers. However, his analysis does not include considerationsrelated to training (Kamp, 2009, p. 24).


The 1999 concept points out the importance of dialogue. Gener-ally, the argumentation concerns the need of dialogue related toarms control, disarmament, and WMD-proliferation. More specifi-cally, the need of dialogue and consultations is related to existingagreements such as CFE and START. The argumentation often con-nects to the various partnerships. The concept includes a pledge ofconsultation with individual partners that ‘perceives a direct threat’(NATO, 1999, paragraphs 9, 10, 12, 26, 32–3). The WNP calls for abroader dialogue between the West and Russia. This includes boththe NATO-related CFE, but also other issues such as the global finan-cial crisis. NATO is also given a role in the revitalization of the OSCE.It is considered to be suitable for the Alliance to provide a forum forconsultations regarding Crisis Prevention and Response (Hamiltonet al., 2009, pp. 18–19, 33). Dr. Kamp is exclusively focusing on theNATO–Russia Council when it comes to dialogue and consultations(Kamp, 2009, p. 25).

Security support

The concept of 1999 is parsimonious on comments regarding securitysupport. The few arguments to be found are related to arms con-trol. Partner countries should, according the concept, be given a rolein this context (NATO, 1999, paragraph 52). The WNP stresses theneed to take lessons from the management of the Balkan conflictin the implementation of stabilization and reconstruction missions.


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152 Sweden and NATO

Reorganizing the police forces and strengthening the rule of law areidentified as prioritized areas of support. Cooperation between NATOand the EU is considered to be important (Hamilton et al., 2009,pp. 25, 34–5, 39, 42).


The strategic concept of 1999 recognizes preparations to manage civildisasters and accidents as being of great importance. This includesthe coordination of military and civilian resources. Although theargumentation touches upon partnerships, the activities seem to besolely an internal matter (NATO, 1999, paragraphs 34, 35, 60). TheWNP contains a detailed argumentation on civil emergency plan-ning. To ‘build societal resilience’ is considered to be one of the fivemain tasks for the transatlantic allies to manage through partnership.The scope of this task is extensive and includes the management ofnatural disasters. The EU and the ‘EU non-NATO’ countries are sin-gled out as key partners. The WNP suggests the establishment of twojoint NATO–EU bodies: Civil Emergency Planning Committee andCrisis Management Centre (Hamilton et al., 2009, pp. 9–10, 12, 24,27–32, 38).


The 1999 concept does not mention the option for partners to assignpersonnel to NATO staffs. Neither is the partner countries’ missionsto NATO mentioned. As aforementioned, the WNP suggests a varietyof joint NATO–EU bodies. In addition, Sweden and other EU non-NATO countries are on several occasions mentioned as key partners.Although the assignment of partner countries’ personnel to NATO’sstaffs is not mentioned explicitly, the argumentation implies thatthe presence of Swedish personnel within the NATO hierarchy isexpected to increase.

NATO’s future direction

The argumentation indicates that NATO is facing a number of issuesrelated to each of the areas mentioned in section 2. The future direc-tion of the Alliance has most likely to balance between two extremes.On the one hand there is a club focusing solely on members. On theother hand there is a society focusing not only on members but alsoon partners and others (Figure 7.2).


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Håkan Edström 153

Club Society

Operation Article 5 Non-Article 5

Home Away

ExternalRelations

Reluctant transparency Influence sharing

InternalDecision-Making

Consensus Majority

Planning andExercises

Members only Partners by invitation

Armed attack Non-armed challenge

Capabilities Nuclear forces Conventional forces

Solely military Comprehensive approach

Dialogue andConsultations

Transatlantic Global

SecurityReform/Support

Driven by self-interests Affiliated to the UN system

NATO Staffs Members only Open to partners

Figure 7.2 Two possible extreme positions when it comes to NATO’s futuredirection

Each of these choices may impact on the development ofthe various partnerships. Consequently, Sweden’s relationship withNATO – and thus the Swedish NATO policy – is also considered to beaffected by the strategic choices of the Alliance.

Swedish NATO policies for the future

The red-green coalition will most likely focus on EAPCs as a tool to pro-mote a pan-European security arrangement. The coalition’s view onthe partnership as an instrument to protect the Euro-Atlantic securitysystem will probably be played down considerably.

A Swedish participation in a NATO-led operation must, with thered-green coalition in power, be based on international humanitar-ian law and a clear UN mandate. In addition, NATO subordination toUN will probably be required. Affiliation with separate US-led oper-ations must be avoided. At an extreme, Swedish participation mightbe excluded if a separate American operation is going on in the samecountry as the NATO operation. The greater the emphasis on Article 5


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within NATO, the less likely a red-green coalition will be eager toparticipate.

Although the Swedish emphasis of influence, transparency, andintelligence will remain with the red-green coalition in power, mostof these needs will probably have to be met in other ways thanthrough Swedish personnel deployed at NATO headquarters. The wayaround the problem might be an increased focus on the politicallevel of the cooperation. As long as the partner countries’ influencein the EAPC/PfP decision-making processes does not improve, thecoalition’s incentives for participation in NATO-led operations willcontinue to be low or even decrease. Hence, the arguments for trans-parency in military activities will also decrease. The least a morepositive red-green approach to the partnership demands is probablyNATO activities, not only pledges, in order to increase transparencyand influence for partner countries.

It is reasonable to assume that the overall adaptation to NATOstandards will continue with the red-green coalition in power. Spe-cific cooperation in strategic airlift capability might, however, becompletely ruled out. The focus on non-alignment might, in addi-tion, lead to demands from the Left Party and/or the Green Party tobalance the international cooperation. The coalition may, in otherwords, try to exchange current cooperation with NATO for newagreements with Russia. If it proves to be financially advantageousfor Sweden, the coalition will probably be positive regarding animproved NATO–EU cooperation on development.

There are reasonable grounds for believing that Swedish participa-tion in NATO exercises and training activities would be reduced by ared-green cabinet. NATO exercises on Swedish territory would prob-ably be out of the question. The participation of the SAF in exercisesoutside Sweden cannot be excluded. Probably, however, compatibil-ity with the non-alignment will be required. The red-green cabinetwill most likely have to approve the participation in each individ-ual case. Exercises based on territorial defense of Eastern Europe willprobably be out of bounds. The cabinet’s decision will presumablybe based on the consideration of Russian reaction. The relationshipbetween NATO and Russia could hereby be indicative.

Unlike most other areas of the partnership, it is reasonable toassume that Sweden’s participation could increase regarding dialogueand consultations with the red-green coalition in power. The content


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of these consultations might, however, be quite different to whatNATO presumably expects. The coalition would probably focus ondisarmament issues such as the CFE and START agreements. Thisprobably requires, however, that NATO focuses on Europe and itsrelations with Russia. If NATO instead takes a more global approach,the coalition will most likely focus its efforts toward the UN.

Sweden’s international cooperation on security support and civilcontingency planning will, with a red-green cabinet, most likely bechanneled through the UN and the EU. This applies regardless of thedesign of NATO’s new concept in these respects.

With the red-green coalition in power, the Swedish delegation toNATO will probably lose its independent role. The responsibilitieswill most likely be regained by the Swedish embassy to Belgium. Itis reasonable to assume that the presence of SAF personnel at NATOstaffs is not compatible with the Left Party’s position. The numbers ofSwedes serving at various staffs will, therefore, presumably be heav-ily decreased by a red-green cabinet. A NATO decision to limit theopportunities for partners to assign personnel to NATO staffs wouldprobably be welcomed by the red-green coalition as it thereby woulddo away with a potential internal problem.

With the centre-right coalition in power the Swedish contributionto NATO-led operations might not be limited to international crisismanagement. Presumably participation in NRF, intelligence opera-tions, and other types of operational cooperation will be put on theagenda. At the same time the volume of the traditional cooperationmight increase. Greater emphasis by NATO on Article 5 operationsand on collective defense might even be welcomed by the coalition.

The centre-right coalition considers political influence as a vitalSwedish national interest. NATO is viewed as a mean, along with theEU, to ensure such coveted influence. An active Swedish participa-tion in NATO-led operations is seen as a method to gain influencebut creates at the same time new requirements of transparency. Itis therefore reasonable to assume that Sweden’s efforts to assign SAFpersonnel at NATO’s staffs will increase with the coalition in power.More focus on EU–NATO relations and on measures to increasethe transparency and influence by ‘EU non-NATO’ partners wouldcertainly be welcomed by a centre-right cabinet.

There are circumstances which indicate that the coalition wishesto participate in NATO’s defense planning beyond the frames of


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156 Sweden and NATO

international operations outside Europe. This applies to operationssimilar to Article 5, where Sweden can be both the recipient anddonor of military support. The centre-right coalition might initi-ate an extensive cooperation with individual NATO countries, inparticular Norway and Denmark. This may lead to organization ofcommon units and coordination of production as well as opera-tional planning. Air and border surveillance will hence most likelybe prioritized. In a broader range of NATO countries, the coalitioncould try to deepen the cooperation in certain specific areas. Strate-gic air transport capability represents an already concluded project.Cooperation on research is another concrete example of bilateralactivities which are likely to increase in scope with a centre-rightcabinet. An invitation by NATO of selected partners to enhancedcooperation in defense planning would probably be endorsed by thecentre-right.

It seems likely that the centre-right coalition wishes to enhanceSweden’s participation in NATO exercises and training activities. Thespectrum of activities will probably expand and range from militaryrapid reaction to civil disaster response. Most likely NATO will receivean invitation from the coalition to conduct exercises in Sweden.The relations between NATO and Russia could also in this case beindicative, although in the other direction. The more antagonisticthe relations the more the cabinet would probably strive to cooperatewith NATO. The cabinet would thus have an opportunity to practice,for example, military assistance in accordance with the unilateralSwedish solidarity declaration.

It seems reasonable to assume that the centre-right coalition willuse the cooperation on dialogue and consultations as an instrumentto coordinate interorganizational NATO–EU activities. This applies ingeneral terms but also more specifically to reforms in Eastern Europe.Mutual challenges such as terrorism will most likely be put on theagenda by the coalition. Presumably the centre-right cabinet will tryto enhance the consultations with NATO regardless of the outcomesof the Alliance’s strategic choices.

The centre-right coalition might come to transfer Sweden’s inter-national cooperation on security support from NATO to the EU. Thecoalition might, furthermore, attempt to redirect the cooperationthat nonetheless is carried out within NATO toward some form ofsecurity guarantees to selected partner countries. If NATO decides to


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reinforce the opportunities already in place in these respects, it willprobably be affirmed by the coalition.

If the centre-right coalition is consistent with its arguments thatthe EU and NATO should not overlap each other’s responsibilities, itis possible that cooperation with NATO on civil emergency planningwill be phased out. On the other hand, it is possible that the generalNATO enthusiasm of the coalition forces it to reconsider. If NATOdecides to better coordinate its resources with partners, the coalitionmight hence very well be affirmative.

The coalition clearly considers the assignment of SAF person-nel to NATO as important. The coalition will presumably seek toincrease the Swedish representation at NATO. This applies not onlyto military staffs but to all parts of the NATO’s hierarchy. If NATOdecides to increase the opportunities for partners in this respect itwould, without any doubt, be warmly welcomed by the centre-rightcoalition.

Sweden and the future utility of NATO

The utility of NATO is in the eye of the beholder. The red-green coali-tion has a slight squint with a pragmatic Social Democratic approachon the one hand, and a skeptic Left/Green on the other. The red-greencoalition apparently prefers to see the problems rather than the pos-sibilities. The utility the coalition grants the partnership depends onthe fact that NATO:

• has the military capabilities an implementation of UN-sanctionedoperations requires. NATO might even be considered to be indis-pensable in order to fulfill higher purposes

• provides a standard that enables interoperability in internationalcooperation outside the Alliance

• provides a forum for dialogue and consultations, mainly betweenthe West and Russia, and primarily related to disarmament, armscontrol, and non-proliferation of WMD.

The centre-right coalition also has problem focusing. On the onehand, the Liberal Party and the Moderate Party see a Swedish NATOmembership in the horizon. On the other hand, the Christian


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158 Sweden and NATO

Democrats and, especially, the Centre Party seem to have some dif-ficulty in letting go of the traditional views. When they do, thecoalition have a vision of the future and a common enthusiasticapproach. The coalition’s inability to focus is, however, also relatedto the time perspective. The centre-right coalition has a tendencyto be overly eager on the membership issue and forget the present.The parties are aware that the lack of civil support makes it impos-sible for Sweden to join NATO in the near future. In spite of that,some of them are arguing for a membership in vain. Instead, theyshould, according to their preferences, be focusing on what can beimmediately achieved through the partnership. If they do, the centre-right coalition will be in a position to develop the relationship withNATO even further. The utility the coalition already now finds in thepartnership lies foremost in the fact that NATO:

• offers a platform to increase Sweden’s political influence• invites to consultations on the individual partner’s national secu-

rity and, at the extreme, offers a collective defense• provides opportunities to maintain and develop the Swedish

military capability.

To summarize, the red-green coalition seems to consider the utilityof the partnership based on idealistic norms and altruistic intentionswhile the considerations of the centre-right coalition seems to bebased on realistic values and ‘Realpolitik’ ambitions. One scenariois that NATO develops similar to the red-green perceptions of theworld. A Swedish centre-right cabinet would then probably have noproblem in adapting and continuing to foster the relations. Anotherscenario is that NATO instead affirms the centre-right conceptions.Presumably a Swedish red-green cabinet would then fall back to theprinciples of neutrality. A large-scale reduction of the cooperationmight hence very well be the result.

Finally, it is appropriate to revisit the methodological decisionsI initially made. I have chosen to use the declaratory statements fromthe debate in the Swedish parliament. In limiting the research to2002–09 I have probably excluded most of the controversy. Thereis, however, still a risk that the arguments expressed in oppositiondiffer from those formulated in official policy. The statements madeby the Moderate Party have, for example, not resulted in a Swedish


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Håkan Edström 159

application for NATO membership despite the fact that the party isdominating the centre-right cabinet.

On the other hand, I consider it to be questionable whether thecentre-right coalition actually has formulated a NATO policy. Neitherthe Moderate Party nor the Liberal Party has, for example, transferredtheir enthusiasm into any significant developments of the partner-ship. The extensive verbatim reuse of the previous Social Democraticcabinet’s statements reinforces the impression of the partnershipbeing viewed as an intermission in the quest for membership. There isundeniably potential for the centre-right coalition to take a strongerposition for the partnership with NATO.

There are grounds for believing that the NATO skepticism of theLeft Party and the Green Party may adopt more subtle shapes if thered-green coalition comes to power. The parallels with the red-greencabinet in Norway support this claim. On the other hand, NATOskepticism within the Social Democrats runs much deeper in Swedenthan in Norway. This might apply for the anti-Americanism as well.If these currents are gaining ground it cannot be ruled out that theNATO policy of a future Swedish red-green cabinet may be far moremodest compared with the policy of the previous Socialist minoritycabinets.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Dennis Gyllensporre and Charlotte Ingalls fortheir comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

Notes

∗The translation of the titles from Swedish to English is conducted by theauthor.

1. The new cabinet is elected to be in office from September 2010 toSeptember 2014.

2. See http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/strategic-concept-bibliograpy.html, date accessed 11 October 2009.

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160 Sweden and NATO

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Interviews

Staffan Danielsson (2009) Centre Party, member of The Defence Committeeand The Defence Commission (Stockholm, 8 September).

Karin Enström (2009) Moderate Party, member of The Defence Committee,chairman of The Defence Commission (Stockholm, 8 September).

Anders Karlsson (2009) Social Democrats, chairman of The Defence Commit-tee (Stockholm, 16 September).

Else-Marie Lindgren (2009) Christian Democrats, member of The DefenceCommittee and The Defence Commission (Stockholm, 8 September).

Peter Rådberg (2009) Green Party, member of The Defence Committee andThe Defence Commission (Stockholm, 8 September).

Gunilla Wahlén (2009) Left Party, member of The Defence Committee andThe Defence Commission (Stockholm, 7 September).

Allan Widman (2009) Liberal Party, member of The Defence Committee andThe Defence Commission (Stockholm, 15 September).


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8Potential NATOPartners – Political and MilitaryUtility for NATORyan C. Hendrickson

Introduction

First implemented in 1989 as a revision to the 1961 ForeignAssistance Act, the US Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) distinctionwas formed primarily as a means to improve American bilateralrelationships through improved defense trade relationships and toencourage and advance cooperative agreements for research anddevelopment on conventional weapons. To be clear at the onset,this distinction has nothing to do with NATO, provides no enhancedsecurity guarantee between the US and its identified MNNA, and bysome measures barely alters the existing relationship between theUS and the MNNA (Center for Defense Information, 2004). In manyrespects, the injection of ‘NATO’ into this term, as well as the term‘allies’ (at least in the Article 5 sense as understood in the NorthAtlantic Treaty), provides a false impression of the bilateral agreementin place.

Nonetheless, the MNNA distinction has been granted by the US to14 states from very different regions of the globe. Four of these states,however, differ considerably from the other states and NATO partner-ship arrangements considered in this volume. Argentina, Pakistan,the Philippines, and Thailand all have MNNA status, but do not haveany partnership affiliation of any sort with the Alliance. This chapterassesses three broad facets of the US/MNNA relationship through fourlimited case studies of these states to evaluate their potential utility toNATO, focusing primarily on military and strategic capabilities that

163


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164 Potential NATO Partners

each MNNA could potentially offer through a future (and enhanced)partnership with the Alliance.

In order to assess the potential utility of these MNNA states toNATO in the case studies that follow, the first element examined hereis their existing military partnership/relationship with the US. Thisvariable was chosen for analysis given that the MNNA status suggestsa very close bilateral military relationship. Within this relationship, akey element to examine here is each state’s response to recent securitychallenges for the US and each MNNA’s reaction to these challenges,which includes an assessment of the MNNA’s contributions to thewar in Iraq, and the US and NATO’s conflict in Afghanistan, as wellas NATO’s ongoing peacekeeping presence in Kosovo. This sectionseeks to address how each state responded to and viewed these prob-lems, which provides some insight on their military relationship withthe US and, more broadly, how they viewed two of NATO’s centralsecurity concerns at this time.

The second assessment area examines the existence of transna-tional terrorist threats facing the MNNA, which speaks to NATO’scalls for heightened attention to global terrorist challenges of the cur-rent era. Thus, this variable seeks to determine the MNNA’s efforts toaddress any terrorist challenges existing within each of these states,and how the MNNA has chosen to address this challenge.

The final category for analysis is each MNNA’s ability and willing-ness to cooperate in peacekeeping operations. NATO has consistentlycalled upon its current members, as well as membership applicantstates, to both increase and demonstrate their ability to project forcein order to meet existing and future security challenges. An analysisof this facet of each MNNAs’ foreign policy choices provides anotherperspective on the potential military utility of these states to NATO.In short, can these states provide a measurable and meaningful mil-itary contribution in peacekeeping that could have a consequentialimpact for the current NATO allies?

The methodological approach adopted here clearly does not evalu-ate all elements of the wider strategic and diplomatic implications ofa new NATO partnership with these MNNAs. Nor does this chapterevaluate the democratic development of each state or the degree ofdemocratic civil-military relations in each MNNA, the level of domes-tic political support in the MNNA for such a partnership, or variousEuropean allies’ independent bilateral relationships with the MNNAs,


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Ryan C. Hendrickson 165

all of which are legitimate measures for determining each MNNAs’utility to NATO. At the same time, these three broad perspectivesof Argentina, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan provide someinsight on their potential utility for an enhanced partnership withNATO. The MNNAs will be assessed in chronological order, basedupon when they received this distinction from the US. Argentina,which received the MNNA distinction in 1998, will be examined first,followed by the Philippines and Thailand, who were granted MNNAstatus in 2003. Pakistan is the final MNNA to be examined; it becamean MNNA in 2004, and has taken on heightened strategic importancegiven NATO’s military activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan in theObama administration.

Research on NATO partnerships and the MNNA

As has been demonstrated earlier in this volume, there has been verylittle research on the gamut of partnerships that NATO has createdthrough, for example, its Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Coop-eration Initiative, or through the Alliance’s ongoing relationshipswith ‘neutral’ countries who participate in NATO’s Partnership forPeace program.1 In contrast, much research has examined those part-ner states that seek and eventually have become full members of theAlliance. Much of this literature concludes that while the most recentmembers of the Alliance provide only marginal gains for the Alliancein terms of military force capabilities, there have been considerablegains through the promotion of democratic civil-military relationsin these new members. Moreover, NATO has had some success inhelping to modernize and professionalize these newly democraticmilitaries (Epstein, 2005; Gheciu, 2005; Barany, 2006; Moore, 2007;Polak et al., 2009). Yet it is clear that an important void exists inthe academic literature on the wider impact that NATO’s variouspartnerships have had.

Much the same can be said about the US Non-NATO Ally sta-tus. Apart from a small number of country-specific policy studies,almost no research exists on the history of this program, the politicalfactors that continue to drive this aspect of American foreign pol-icy, or on the goals that this program seeks to achieve (Larrinaga,2000). The MNNA distinction came in 1989 and was intendedto advance ‘cooperative research and development agreements,’ of


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its newly distinguished allies (US Public Law, Title 10, Section2350a).

The first states to be given this standing included Australia, Egypt,Israel, Japan, and South Korea. These states had already enjoyedexcellent military relationships with the US, and thus the MNNAdistinction did not suggest a substantive shift in American’s strate-gic relationship with these states. In 1996, the MNNA distinctionwas amended to allow the US to more rapidly export excess defensearticles to an MNNA, again in a general effort to build upon andenhance an existing bilateral military relationship. The MNNA ismade through a presidential determination, conditional upon a 30day advance notice to Congress (US Public Law, Title 22, Section2321k). In the Clinton administration, Argentina, Jordan, and NewZealand received this new status. In the presidential administration ofGeorge W. Bush, six additional states gained the MNNA distinction,which included Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco,and Pakistan.

While this distinction may be semantically striking at first glance,it is worth noting the substantive limitations of the MNNA, as wellas the views of senior White House officials across the administra-tions of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush on the MNNA distinction.First, the law requires that Congress be notified of this distinc-tion only 30 days prior to the actual designation. While Congresshas been viewed as a deferential body to the White House in for-eign policy affairs by many analysts, this legislative history suggeststhat Congress understood the minimal strategic impact the MNNAdistinction would have in both 1989 and 1996. Bill Clinton’s Secre-tary of Defense William Cohen largely confirmed this understand-ing of MNNA status when he noted upon granting Argentina thisdistinction in 1998:

The establishment of this major, of this Non-NATO Ally status,really was a reward in a sense. A recognition that Argentina hasbeen very helpful in peacekeeping efforts. It has been enormouslyhelpful in Bosnia, the Gulf, and other areas. And this is just a,really a gesture on the part of the US that we recognize that andwanted to establish it on that basis. It does not convey any majorstatus and should not be considered as such.



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In 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell reiterated this perspectivewhen Pakistan was in the process of receiving this distinction. Powellnoted about the MNNA: ‘In some instances it is more symbolic thanpractical. I don’t know if Pakistan, whether they’ll be able to takegreat advantage of it. But it is just a sign of strength of the relation-ship’ (Department of State, 2004). By one account, the MNNA statusis ‘a generally symbolic and placatory gesture’ (Center for DefenseInformation, 2004). Thus, it seems clear that the MNNA distinctionsays little about a new strategic direction for the US or the recipientcountry, but does indicate an interest upon building and enhancinga stronger bilateral relationship with the designated state, primarilyfor military export purposes. For this study, it is important to reiteratethat MNNA status has nothing to do with NATO, the US’s relation-ship with NATO, or the recipient state’s interest in cooperating withNATO. We begin with an analysis of Argentina.

Argentina

Argentina was designated an MNNA formally on 6 January 1998,and is the first and only South American state to receive this dis-tinction. As noted earlier, the Clinton administration provided thisstatus in appreciation for Argentina’s troop contributions to NATO’speacekeeping operation in Bosnia–Herzegovina and elsewhere, butalso noted that the newfound status was just a ‘gesture’ of itsthanks for Argentina’s support for American foreign policy and UNpeacekeeping (Department of Defense, 1998). The Clinton adminis-tration noted that it hoped that Argentina would serve as a modelstate to others in Latin America in the hopes that the world couldrely more upon Latin American states for peacekeeping assistance(Larrinaga, 2000).

In 1997, in the lead up to the eventual designation, the Clintonadministration notified the UK of its forthcoming decision, and alsowent to some lengths to assuage Chilean and Brazilian concerns thatthey had not been downgraded in American foreign policy impor-tance (AFP, 1997; IPS, 1997; White House, 1997). In this regard, thedistinction had a broader diplomatic impact.

The much improved relationship between Argentina and the USbegan in the early 1990s, when Argentina provided military assis-tance to the US in Operation Desert Storm. Moreover, at the startof the Balkan crisis, Argentina provided some 865 peacekeepers to


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the UN Protection Force in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croatia. Inthe late 1990s, these bonds continued to improve as the thenArgentinean Defense Minister Jorge Dominguez sought to fostermuch closer diplomatic ties to NATO. In his 1999 essay publishedin the NATO Review, Dominguez noted: ‘Argentina will continue toserve in the unique capacity of NATO’s South Atlantic partner, facingthe common challenges of the future together’ (Dominguez, 1999).And clearly, NATO appreciated the shared strategic perspectives andpeacekeeping assistance (SFOR Informer Online, 1998, 2000).

Despite the close bilateral relationship during the second Clintonadministration, Argentina was less supportive of the Bush adminis-tration in Afghanistan and Iraq. After al Qaeda’s 11 September attackon the US, Argentina shared its diplomatic support for the US, butat the same time struggled to manage its domestic economic cri-sis and thus remained primarily a diplomatic, rather than militaryally (Globe and Mail, 2001). In addition, Argentina, like many otherLatin American states, was unwilling to support the American mili-tary efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom. President Eduardo Duhaldenoted: ‘We are against this war and we are not going to support it ortake part in it’ (Quoted in Tagliabue, 2003). At this time, Argentinaalso has no peacekeepers in Bosnia–Herzegovina or Kosovo. Thus,some distancing is evident from the US during the Bush adminis-tration on two of its major strategic/military decisions, though jointtraining and naval exercises continued on an annual basis.

Despite this political distancing, Argentina got high marks fromthe US on its counterterrorism activities. In the 2008 US State Depart-ment Country Report on terrorism, it was indicated that Argentina‘cooperated well with the United States at the operation level.’ Itcoordinated its anti-money laundering efforts, and worked with theUS to take additional law enforcement steps to address terrorist activ-ities and networks that may function in its ‘tri-border’ area, whichconsists of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay (Department of State,2008). In 2009, Argentina also made another judicial effort to appre-hend a suspect allegedly associated with the 1994 terrorist strike thatoccurred in Buenos Aires (AFP, 2009).

With regard to its broader participation in UN peacekeeping,Argentina continues to support a number of missions, which includesmall troop deployments to Western Sahara, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire,and the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem. Its larger


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contributions, though, are far more substantial. At this time, it has262 troops in Cyprus and 576 troops in Haiti. In the latter mission,Argentina has been present for many years. In total, 861 Argentineansare deployed across six missions, which demonstrate an ongoing andsustained commitment to international peacekeeping (UN, 2009).

In sum, Argentina’s activities across these three security mattersindicate that it is capable of sustained peacekeeping operations, andcooperates well with the US in taking anti-terrorism measures atthe domestic level. However, it is also the case that it no longerhas as strong a bilateral relationship with the US as it did in theClinton administration, though this situation could change rapidlyin the Obama administration. Diplomatic language such as that usedby former Defense Minister Jorge Dominguez, when speaking aboutArgentina’s desire to be ‘NATO’s South Atlantic Partner,’ no longerappears in its strategic dialogue.

The Philippines

The Republic of the Philippines received its MNNA distinction fromthe Bush administration on 6 October 2003. The distinction camein part because of the Philippines’ strong backing of the US in Iraq,and due to the existence of at least four significant internal terror-ist threats, which included the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), JemaahIslamiya (JI), the New People’s Army (NPA), and the Rajah SolaimanMovement (RSM). For the most part, this distinction was positivelyreceived by the Philippines, and especially its military who wasenthusiastic to increase its weapons and force projection capabilities(AFP, 2003a, 2003b; Asia Pulse, 2003).

After the 11 September attacks on the US, Filipino President GloriaMacapagal-Arroyo offered almost immediate support to the US byoffering access to Filipino air bases and sea ports. The Arroyo gov-ernment also offered combat troops to the US, though none weredeployed nor are any stationed there at this time. In part, Arroyo’sstrong pledges of support to the US may have been motivated by thePhilippine’s own desire to gain additional American military assis-tance to tackle its own domestic terrorist challenges (Burton andLandingin, 2001; Gerleman et al., 2001). Regardless of the motive,it was clear that the Arroyo government proved to be an enthusias-tic ally of the US, and by January 2002, the US had already sent 25counterterrorism advisors to assist the Philippine’s military.


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Filipino diplomacy prior to and during the early phases of the Bushadministration’s war in Iraq was similar to its approach during theUS strikes on the Taliban in Afghanistan. The government quicklylent its backing to the US and was officially listed among the Bushadministration’s ‘coalition of the willing,’ the only ally studied inthis chapter to publicly join this group (White House, 2003a). Theirsupport came early and ostensibly without significant lobbying fromthe US (Landingin, 2003). The Philippines provided a small contri-bution of 100 soldiers to the mission. These forces, however, did notstay long. After a Filipino truck driver was taken hostage, the gov-ernment quickly agreed to withdraw its forces in a hostage exchange.This decision prompted a temporary strain in US–Filipino relations,but no long lasting diplomatic fissure (Lum and Niksch, 2009).

Along with their willingness and interest to receive militarytraining assistance on counterterrorism measures from the US, thePhilippines has actively cooperated with the US to improve its airand sea security through enhanced radar detection systems. Amongthese efforts is the ‘Coast-Watch South’ program, which has beenhighlighted by the state department as a significant step towardenhancing the Philippines’ counterterrorism capabilities. Their policeforces have also undergone training programs sponsored by the US,and the most recent US state department report on counterterrorismmeasures indicates ‘excellent cooperation’ from the Philippines and‘significant progress’ (Department of State, 2008).

Perhaps more importantly for this analysis, the level of militarycooperation between each country since 2001 has truly been signif-icant. Two major joint military operations were conducted in 2002and 2005. In 2002, approximately 1300 American troops teamedwith Philippine Armed Forces did significant damage to Abu Sayyaf.Another major joint operation occurred in 2005, again aimed atreducing and eliminating the influence of Abu Sayyaf. Althoughquestions over ad hoc killings conducted by the Philippines ArmedForces have been raised, and Arroyo’s decision to leave Iraq cer-tainly created diplomatic tensions, military-to-military cooperationremains extensive (Lum and Niksch, 2009).

With regard to global peacekeeping, the Philippines maintains atotal of 1062 peacekeeping troops deployed across eight differentmissions. Its largest contingents exist in Haiti, Darfur, the GolanHeights, Liberia, and East Timor, all of which have more than 150


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troops, with the largest numbers being in the Golan Heights, whereit has 337 people deployed (UN, 2009). These deployments indicatea clear and sustained interest in peacekeeping, and also demonstratethe Philippines’s global commitment to it given the wide geographi-cal distribution of troops, though it has no peacekeepers in Kosovo.These deployments square with the previously stated strategic direc-tion provided by Defense Secretary, Hermogenes Ebdane, in 2007,when he remarked: ‘We are looking forward to a larger Philippinepeacekeeping presence in conflict areas worldwide’ (Xinhua GeneralNews Service, 2007). It also had a significant peacekeeping presencein the 1999 crisis in East Timor (Cobb, 1999; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1999b). Though regional in this case, the deployment wasquite substantive in terms of numbers and their presence has beensustained when necessary.

Thailand

Thailand has a long history of military cooperation with the US dat-ing back to the Vietnam War. More recently, though, it first becamepublic that the Bush administration was considering Thailand asan MNNA on 11 June 2003, when President Bush and Prime Min-ister Thaksin Shinawatra issued a joint statement from the WhiteHouse, indicating that the US was ‘actively considering’ Thailand’sdesignation as a MNNA (White House, 2003b). This designation wasmade official on 30 December 2003. President Bush noted openlythat this new status was due to the friendship between the USand Thailand, and especially because of Thailand’s close coopera-tion with the CIA in their joint counterterrorism activities, mostnotably, for the Thai’s assistance in capturing Hambali, the organizerof the major terrorist bombing in Bali. Bush also thanked Thaksinfor his government’s assistance in Iraq (Sanger, 2003; White House,2003c). Some in Thailand criticized the new relationship, and uponthe announcement of Thailand’s MNNA status, the Thaksin govern-ment made some effort to downplay the significance of this decision(Macan-Markar, 2003).

Much like the Philippines, the level of military cooperationbetween the US and Thailand, both prior to and since the MNNA dis-tinction, has been extensive. This cooperation includes more than 40joint training operations annually, which have also included otherAsian militaries, as well as some Europeans. The most extensive of


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these missions is Operation Cobra Gold, which is the biggest jointtraining mission for the US in Asia. Thailand has also served as a keytransportation site for the American military through the use of Thaiseaports and airfields (Chanlett-Avery, 2009). Though some diplo-matic tensions do exist in US–Thai relations, the 2006 domestic coupagainst Thaksin had little long-term impact on these joint militaryventures, and cooperation and training levels remain far-reaching.

In 2002, Thailand deployed 130 troops to Afghanistan, most ofwhom focused on their efforts on reconstruction of an air runway inBagram. Thailand also permitted over flight rights, and allowed Thaiairbases to be used for refueling. American warships also used Thaiports. Prime Minister Thaksin also assisted the US after its invasion ofIraq through the deployment of 450 troops, who worked primarily onreconstruction efforts in Karbala. Thaksin did not publicly join Bush’s‘coalition of the willing’ prior to the war, and preferred to remain offi-cially unassociated with the group, but soon after the war’s initiationThailand became an active participant in the operation (Chambers,2004). In both cases, however, Thailand no longer is deployed ineither of these operations.

With regard to anti-terrorism measures, Thailand has received highmarks from the US Department of State. Thailand continues to expe-rience a major separatist movement in the south, which has claimedthe lives of thousands, but the separatists do not appear to havewider, transnational links with terrorist organizations. Thailand alsocontinues to cooperate with the US through a number of anti-terrorism programs, including measures to prevent money launder-ing, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and as notedabove, continues to actively cooperate with the American military ina wide range of joint training and educational efforts (Department ofState, 2008).

With regard to international peacekeeping, Thailand has a mixedrecord of global deployments. During the recent Bush administra-tion, in 2007 Thailand agreed to send 800 troops to the UN Missionin Sudan. In 2005, it also sent 175 army engineers to the UNpeacekeeping mission in Burundi. The Thai’s largest peacekeepingmission ever, however, was in East Timor, when it contributed 1581troops (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1999a; Associate Press, 2007). Inthis regard, it is clear that Thailand is willing to deploy its peace-keepers abroad and in fairly significant quantities. At the Bagram air


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base in Afghanistan, just as they did in Burundi, it is also clear thatthey have some technical skills that are useful to address differentlogistical/engineering needs in each mission. Yet it is also impor-tant to note that Thailand’s deployments appear limited in duration.As of 31 December 2009, it had only 27 troops in the UN mis-sions in Darfur and Sudan, and only 18 troops in East Timor fora total of 45 peacekeepers deployed (UN, 2009). Thus, the Thai’spattern of participation in multilateral peacekeeping follows a pat-tern that was evident in its military cooperation with the US inAfghanistan and Iraq, where these major deployments were not sus-tainable, and appeared to be susceptible to political pressures. In sum,however, these findings indicate the presence of a well-trained andmodernized military capable of conducting meaningful and signifi-cant military and peacekeeping operations. In addition, Thailand hasactively taken anti-terrorism measures that have been applauded bythe US.

Pakistan

Given the current war in Afghanistan, as well as the ongoing mil-itary efforts in western Pakistan to capture and/or kill al Qaeda andTaliban supporters, this MNNA is significantly different from the oth-ers considered in this chapter, and arguably more difficult to assesscomprehensively within this limited context. Nonetheless, this briefassessment still may provide some insight on its potential utility aspartner for NATO.

Pakistan received MNNA status on 16 June 2004. The politics ofthis distinction were markedly different from the previous threecases, in that some congressional opposition rose when this issuewas first raised by Secretary of State Colin Powell. Powell noted thatit was simply a sign of how strong Pakistan and American relationswere, but signified nothing beyond that (Department of State, 2004).Some members of Congress maintained that Pakistan was not doingenough to address terrorist challenges from within the state, andthus did not deserve this distinction (Congressional Record, 2004).In addition, India expressed much diplomatic angst for not beingconsulted or even informed of the Bush administration’s decision tomove in this direction (BBC News, 2004; Mahapatra, 2004). How-ever, as noted previously, Powell went to some lengths to downplaythe distinction.


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Since 11 September 2001, the level of cooperation between the USand Pakistan has been extensive, albeit significant debate exists overhow closely aligned Pakistan has been with American strategic goalsin the region (Fair, 2009). Pakistan provided much logistical supportfor the US in the first phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, butsince 2008 the US has placed considerable diplomatic pressure onPakistan to do more to root out elements of Taliban and al Qaedathat reside and operate out of northwest Pakistan, which has resultedin Pakistani military offensives. NATO cooperation with Pakistanalso increased after the devastating earthquake in 2005, when NATOdeployed forces in a limited capacity to assist with humanitarianrelief. Some joint training followed, and by some accounts, contin-ues to be pursued actively by the Pakistani military (Moore, 2010,p. 108).

Yet, by the end of the Bush administration, despite Pakistani coop-eration with the US and NATO, it was quite obvious that the securityconditions in Pakistan had deteriorated rapidly as the number ofsuicide terrorist attacks had increased substantially, as well as thenumber of terrorist strikes on government buildings. By a number ofmeasures, including the State Department’s own assessment, militantstrikes and terrorist activity across Pakistan had increased measurablyin 2008 (Department of State, 2008).

The Obama administration has attempted to cultivate a muchcloser relationship with Pakistan in its overall strategy in the region,which is evident though Obama’s initial appointment of a new spe-cial envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, and hisprovision of major increases in American foreign aid packages aimed,in part, at civilian projects and development. In addition, the UShas increased significantly the use of missile strikes from unmannedaerial vehicles (UAV) in Pakistani territory, all of which indicatesenhanced bilateral cooperation between the US and Pakistan (Shaneand Schmitt, 2010).

Apart from its strategic challenges with al Qaeda and the Taliban,and heightened cooperation between the US during the Obamaadministration, Pakistan also plays a unique role in the worldthrough its extensive commitment to international peacekeeping.For many years, Pakistan has been the largest troop contributor toUN peacekeeping missions among all UN member states. At thistime, it provides 10,764 peacekeepers to 11 different missions. In


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its two largest missions, in the DR Congo and Liberia, Pakistan has3646 and 3116 troops deployed in these operations. Otherwise, ithas troops and experts in Burundi, the Central African Republicand Chad, Western Sahara, Haiti, Darfur, Sudan, East Timor, andCote D’Ivoire. Pakistan is also the only MNNA who currently assistswith the peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, though it has only onepolice official deployed there. Thus, Pakistan has a long and extensivehistory of involvement in peacekeeping.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, this chapter provides only a partial assessment ofthe potential utility that may exist for NATO in four of America’sMNNAs. Clearly, ‘utility’ can be measured by many different stan-dards. Political variables that are not assessed here include the levelof democratic development in each state, the domestic support forNATO in each MNNA, individual European allies’ bilateral relation-ships with the MNNAs, each states’ human rights practices, whichmay not necessarily square with general norms evident across mostNATO allies, or the impact of improved trade relations between theUS and the MMNA related to military weaponry, which the MNNAstatus seeks to enhance. More specifically, a new NATO partnershipwith Thailand raises new diplomatic and human rights questions forthe Alliance to consider, given the sometimes aggressive actions ofthe Thai military. Moreover, a closer NATO partnership with Pakistaninvites new diplomatic tension between the NATO allies and India.Thus, for this group of MNNAs, new NATO partnerships would intro-duce the Alliance to a wider set of strategic concerns that the Alliancepreviously did not face.

Nonetheless, the findings provided here provide some insight onthe current strategic relationship between the US and each MNNA,the presence of terrorist challenges in the MNNA, and the MNNA’scommitment to international peacekeeping, which may providesome measure(s) of the MNNAs’ potential utility to NATO. Althougheach MNNA addressed here varies significantly in its current relation-ship with the US, a good case can be made that in each instanceNATO could find political and military utility through an enhancedpartnership with the MNNA. Much like former American NationalSecurity Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinksi, maintains, NATO’s range of


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interest is increasingly global, and thus demands additional inter-national cooperation to achieve its strategic objectives (Brzezinski,2009).

Among the MNNAs addressed here, Argentina has the least closemilitary partnership with the US at this time. Argentina is just oneof a number of Latin American states who has close military con-tacts with the US, but not necessarily a ‘preferred’ relationship akinto Thailand’s affiliation with the US in southeast Asia. Moreover, pro-found diplomatic differences were evident between Argentina andthe Bush administration over Iraq, though such tensions were evi-dent with many other states as well. Yet, despite these differences,Argentina continues to conduct joint military operations with the USon a regular basis. More importantly, the presence of terrorist activi-ties in Argentina’s tri-border region, coupled with Argentina’s interestin peacekeeping, especially considering its past contributions to theNATO mission in Bosnia–Herzegovina, provide solid justification forNATO to foster a closer relationship with Argentina, much as previ-ous Defense Secretary Jorge Dominguez maintained during the late1990s.

A good case for a NATO partnership with the Philippines canalso be made. Though they do not participate in the operation inAfghanistan, they have taken a number of counterterrorism mea-sures, no doubt due in part to their significant internal securitychallenges. In addition, their peacekeeping record demonstrates botha regional and global focus, where they have sustained their presence,much like that which NATO encouraged of its aspiring members.In addition, their recent history of joint military operations withthe US demonstrates that the Philippines is truly a ‘major’ ally inthe global effort to diminish terrorist threats, and thus ostensiblymakes the Philippines a natural direction for NATO to gravitatetoward.

Thailand similarly has many qualities that suggest much utilityfor the Alliance. Like Argentina and the Philippines, Thailand doesnot have a military presence in Afghanistan. Yet their extensivemilitary partnership with the US has proven to be a critical sitefor American foreign policy interests in southeast Asia, and theirrecord in peacekeeping, though ostensibly more vulnerable to domes-tic pressure, suggests some military utility for NATO. Given NATO’s


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broadening scope of interests, and the excellent relationship betweenthe US and the Thais, it would make much sense for NATO to increaseits dialogue with Thailand.

Pakistan too demands additional NATO attention, which has beenevident for a number of years given the strategic challenge of fightingthe Taliban and al Qaeda in northwest Pakistan. Along with its longrecord of international peacekeeping that potentially brings someutility to NATO, and the beginnings of heightened strategic dialogueand cooperation with the US and NATO, ongoing and improvedcooperation with Pakistan is critical to NATO’s future in Afghanistan.Thus, in all cases, the MNNAs potentially provide different degreesof political and military utility for the Alliance given the presence ofshared strategic concerns, each MNNAs’ military capabilities and pro-clivities toward international peacekeeping, or due to their existingdomestic security challenges. As NATO takes on more global and lessregional activities, the political and military utility of, at minimum,increased dialogue with these MNNAs increasingly makes strategicsense. In many ways, NATO’s decision to go ‘out-of-area’ definesthe Alliance as global, which then calls for the cultivation of morepartners and contributors. To remain ‘regional’ in outlook and ori-entation denies the existence of transnational threats that requiremultilateral solutions and diplomatic cooperation.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Nathan G. D. Garrett and Joshua Whitney for theirresearch assistance.

Note

1. For two exceptions, see Moore, 2010; Frühling and Schreer, 2010.

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Dominguez, J. (1999) ‘Argentina, NATO’s South Atlantic Partner’, NATOReview (Spring, 1999), pp. 7–10.

Epstein, R. A. (2005) ‘NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy:Evidence and Expectations,’ Security Studies, 14, pp. 59–98.

Fair, C. C. (2009) ‘Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations withPakistan’, Washington Quarterly, 32, 2, pp. 149–72.

Frühling, S. and Schreer, B. (2010) ‘Creating the Next Generation of NATOPartnerships’, The Russi Journal, 155, 1, pp. 52–7.


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Gerleman, D. J., Stevens, J. E. and Hildreth, S. A. (2001) ‘Operation EnduringFreedom: Foreign Pledges of Military and Intelligence Support’, Congres-sional Research Service (17 October 2001).

Gheciu, A. (2005) NATO in the ‘New Europe’ (Stanford, CA.: Stanford Univ.Press).

Globe and Mail (2001) ‘Latin American Leaders Support U.S.’ (9 October 2001).IPS-Inter Press Service (1997) ‘Argentina–Chile: U.S. Alliance Clouds Relations’

(17 August 1997).Landingin, R. (2003) ‘Manila Braced for Terror Attacks’, Financial Times

(6 February 2003), p. 6.Larrinaga, F. L. (2000) ‘Argentina, A New U.S. Non-Nato Ally’, Naval War

College Review, 53, 2, pp. 125–58.Lum, T. and Niksch, L. A. (2009) ‘The Republic of the Philippines: Background

and U.S. Relations’, Congressional Research Service (15 January 2009), p. 16.Macan-Markar, M. (2003) ‘Thailand: Premier Faces Storm Over Upgraded

Alliance with U.S.’, IPS-Inter Press Service (30 October 2003).Mahapatra, R. (2004) ‘India Disappointed with United States for not Sharing

Its Decision to Elevate Military Ties with Pakistan’, Associate Press (20 March2004).

Moore, R. R. (2007) NATO’s New Mission: Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold WarWorld (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International).

Moore, R. R. (2010) ‘NATO Partners in Afghanistan: Impact and Purpose,’UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 22, pp. 92–115.

NATO (2009) ‘Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration’, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease, date accessed 4 April2010.

Polak, N. M., Hendrickson, R. C. and Garrett, N. G. D. (2009) ‘NATO Member-ship for Albania and Croatia: Military Modernization, Geo-Strategic Factors,and Force Projection’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22, 4, pp. 502–14.

Sanger, D. E. (2003) ‘Bush Yields a Bit on North Korea’, International HeraldTribune (20 October 2003), p. 1.

SFOR Informer Online (1998) ‘Argentina and Romania Join MSU’, http://www.nato.int/SFOR/sfor-at-work/msu/MSU1.htm, accessed 4 April 2010.

SFOR Informer Online (2000) ‘SFOR Argentinean Contingent’, http://www.nato.int/SFOR/indexinf/100/s100p03a/t0011083a.htm, date accessed4 April 2010.

Shane S. and Schmitt, E. (2010) ‘C.I.A. Deaths Prompt Surge in U.S. DroneStrikes’, New York Times Online (23 January 2010).

Tagliabue, J. (2003) ‘Start of War condemned by many Government Leaders’,International Herald Tribune (21 March 2003), p. 3.

UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country (31 December 2009) at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/, date accessed 4 April 2010.

US Public Law, Title 10, Section 2350a, 1989.US Public Law, Title 22, Section 2321k, 1996.White House (1997) ‘President Clinton’s Bilateral Meetings with President

Carlos Menem of Argentina’ (16 October 1997).


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White House (2003a) ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Members’ (27March 2003a) http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/print/20030327-10.html, date accessed 4 April 2010.

White House (2003b) ‘Joint Statement Between the United States of Americanand the Kingdom of Thailand’ (11 June 2003).

White House (2003c) ‘Remarks by President Bush in a Photo Opportunity withPrime Minister Thaksin of Thailand’ (19 October 2003).

Xinhua General News Service (2007) ‘Philippines Plans to Contribute MoreTroops to UN Peacekeeping Missions’ (20 June 2007).


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9Political and Military Utilityof NATO for ArgentinaFederico Merke

Introduction

At first glance, NATO and Argentina may not seem to have muchin common. Argentina is a country far from Brussels, located at thesouthern tip of the Americas, which since 1865 has been at peacewith its neighbors on the continent. Its security agenda is closelylinked with the region and has little to do with rogue states, terroristthreats, or weapons of mass destruction. Rather, it has an agenda thatshares more with the problems facing developing countries and thusis more related to territorial control, natural resources, democraticstability, drug trafficking, and organized crime. NATO, meanwhile,is a Northern security arrangement, which has transformed its iden-tity from being a military alliance against the Communist threat tobeing a security community that promotes democracy and humanrights, not only in NATO’s territory but also along its nearest neigh-borhood. Yet, Argentina and NATO have crossed paths more thanonce on a number of issues, from UN peace operations to humanitar-ian intervention, to military cooperation in the areas of planning ordoctrine.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the Argentine case asa potential partner of NATO and the political and military utilitythat such a scenario might offer to Argentina. The general argu-ment of this chapter is that the utility of NATO for Argentina willbe conditioned by international, regional, and domestic variables.In particular, there are three elements which will shape the rela-tionship. The first, more global, has to do with the international

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182 Political and Military Utility of NATO for Argentina

security agenda and its development since the end of the Cold War.The second dimension relates to the specific relationship betweenArgentina and the US. The third one is linked to the regional contextof Argentina and the possibilities of articulating a regional securitystrategy with a strategy of cooperation with NATO.

The chapter is organized into three sections followed by a con-clusion. The first section considers the changes in the internationalsecurity agenda from the 1990s onward and how they were perceivedby Argentina. The second section focuses on the relationship betweenArgentina and the US since the end of the Cold War to the present.The third section provides an overview of the South American regionfrom the 1990s until today and asks how it would be possible forArgentina to articulate its role in the regional security arrangementswith a probable association with NATO. Finally, a brief summary ofthe argument will be presented together with some concluding obser-vations on the conditions of the possibility for a closer partnershipbetween Argentina and NATO.

International security, the role of NATO, and Argentina’sforeign policy

The overall argument running through this section is that the polit-ical and military utility of NATO for Argentina depends significantlyon the distinguishing traits of the international society and how itshapes Argentina’s foreign policy. This argument involves a necessarydistinction between the post-Cold War international environmentand the post-11 September order. Further, it also implies the needfor understanding Argentina’s international role, played during the1990s, the path that its foreign policy followed after 11 Septem-ber, and its domestic economic crisis that occurred between 2001and 2002.

The liberal interregnum

The end of the Cold War was supposed to bring a new order whichwould facilitate the action of international organizations. Further, italso assumed that the US would somehow be the guarantor of aninternational public good, security, on the basis of a renewed lead-ership. Regionally, the end of the Cold War served to consolidatedemocratic regimes recovered during the 1980s. It also pushed for


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the start of regional integration processes and state reforms. Thesechanges affected the perceptions of Argentine elites in two funda-mental ways. First, Argentina perceived that the most significant factof the end of the Cold War was not US military supremacy but ratherthe absence of an alternative ideological referent to political and eco-nomic liberalism. This was a crucial change in a country that hadtried several times to practice a kind of ‘third way’ located some-where between American capitalism and Soviet Marxism (Paradiso,2007). Argentina felt that this game would not be possible anymoreor at least would be much harder to sustain. Second, Argentina per-ceived that a strengthened UN would be of greater benefit to middlestates. Diplomacy and international law would go up, the balance ofpower/terror and the shadow of war would diminish. Thus, Argentinasaw its historic diplomatic and legal traditions could be useful innegotiating a more assertive role in the new international scenario.

That these changes had an impact on the international securityagenda is not contested. First, the US military power developed anddeployed during the Cold War was still intact. Second, the hegemonicadvancement of liberalism in the international order was built ona specific notion of peace, or rather a liberal idea of peace basedon democracy, economic interdependence, and respect for humanrights. Third, the renewal of the UN and the transformation of NATOsignaled a renewed trend toward collective security management. Itwas this combination of US leadership, liberal values, and collectivemanagement of security that shaped the international orientation ofArgentina in general and how it would look to NATO in particular.1

One of the structural problems that had confronted the UN inimplementing its peacekeeping operations was the lack of humanand material resources to meet the demands of international peaceand security. The increasing cooperation between the UN, US, andNATO suggested the deficit was coming to an end and now a state(US) and an organization (NATO) would help in bridging the gapbetween expectations and capabilities. The Gulf War of 1990–91 andthe role played by NATO in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 onwardpointed in this direction. Under Argentine President Carlos Menem(1989–99), the dominant trend was to think of NATO as a zone ofpeace and as the armed wing of the UN (Sánchez Mariño, 2005).In other words, there was the perception that international securitywould be addressed from a division of labor, in which the UN would


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do its job up to the peacekeeping level and NATO would do its partat the level of peace enforcement. Argentina conceived, then, thatan adequate international insertion demanded, on the one hand, anactive military participation in the UN and, on the other, a greatercommitment to NATO (Fontana, 1998).

With this picture in mind, President Menem’s foreign policyadopted the grammar of international security and placed defensepolicies in civilian hands. Thus, in the security field, Argentina valuedits national interests to the same degree as it valued its internationalresponsibilities. As a result, the military had to defend the countrybut also had to defend international law in the Persian Gulf, democ-racy in Haiti, and human rights in Kosovo. Menem went furthersaying that ‘the Argentine armed forces will be everywhere in theworld where peace is threatened’ (quoted in Norden, 1995, p. 332).

Compared to Argentina’s past security traditions, the change wasremarkable. In 1988 Argentina had only 20 soldiers participating inUN peace operations. By 1990 there were 60, in 1992 there were 975,and for 1994 the figure would reach 1600 (Fontana, 1998, p. 229).By 1998, Argentina had already sent more than 11,000 officers tomore than a dozen peace operations. By the same year, half the armyhad participated in a peace operation and Argentina’s share was 82per cent of the Latin American contribution (Fontana, 1998, p. 229)and was ranked in eighth place worldwide (Larrinaga, 2000, p. 131).

This substantive approach to the UN would not be made without aparallel rapprochement with NATO. In 1992 and then in 1994, GuidoDi Tella visited NATO’s headquarters in Brussels. In 1993, the For-eign Ministry hosted a seminar on international security to analyzethe role of NATO and Argentina’s participation in the new secu-rity schemes. This meeting was attended by Amedeo de Franchis,at that time NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General; Marcel Leroy, fromNATO’s Political Directorate; Jonathan Day, NATO’s Director of ForcePlanning Analysis Section, and Peter Woodhead, NATO’s DeputySupreme Allied Commander Atlantic. Opening the seminar, Presi-dent Carlos Menem said that ‘the presence of NATO in these latitudesdemonstrates the need of a worldwide effort in order to redesign thestructures of global security’ (Menem, 1994, p. 16).

Actually, it would be the first time NATO General Secretariatcrossed the equator and participated in an event of this magnitude inthe southern hemisphere. In this seminar, the then Defense Minister


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Federico Merke 185

of Argentina, Oscar Camilión, said that Argentina was ‘interestedin developing operational and political interactions’ and in hav-ing ‘more inter-operative capacities with NATO’s military structure.’Argentina, said Camilión, was interested in participating in globalsecurity and for that reason it was ‘necessary to have some level ofcoordination with NATO in relation to military activities’ (Camilión,1994, p. 33).

The first opportunity to cooperate with NATO came with thedecision to participate in 1998 in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia–Herzegovina (SFOR) through the Multinational Specialized Unit(MSU). On that occasion, the gendarmerie contributed 76 troops tothe MSU. A year later, the air force commissioned a chief staff mem-ber of SFOR in Sarajevo, and in July 1999 the navy and the armyfollowed suit (Larrinaga, 2000).

Kosovo was perhaps the place where the relationship betweenArgentina and NATO reached its peak level of collaboration. Despitemany legal doubts and political questions on the side of Russiaand China, NATO began its attack on Yugoslavia in March 1999.2

That same year, Argentina contributed troops, doctors, and engi-neers under the name of ‘Argentine Joint Grouping’ (ACAK) andunder the command of the Italian Brigade. Once the cease-fire wasagreed, Argentina even offered troops to integrate the peacekeepersthat would enter Kosovo (Corigliano, 2003, p. 75).

Why has Argentina been an attractive country for NATO? Accord-ing to Colonel Horacio Sánchez Mariño (2010), Argentina wasrequested in Bosnia–Herzegovina mainly due to its participationin the UN mission in Haiti. It was Wesley Clark, then Comman-der of troops in Haiti in 1995, who appreciated the work doneby the Argentine Gendarmerie in that country. Arriving in Bosnia–Herzegovina as Commander of NATO forces, Wesley Clark perceivedthat the scenario of the region was somewhat similar to that of Haitiand thus he believed necessary to count on Argentine Gendarmerie.Argentina did not hesitate to send troops into Bosnia–Herzegovinain 1998 and thereafter it was established that Argentina should havea liaison officer in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe(SHAPE).

Thus between 1998 and 2006, an Argentine officer served as liaisonbetween NATO and Buenos Aires. This was the only liaison that LatinAmerica had in NATO at that time. Likewise, it was agreed that the


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ambassador of Argentina to Brussels would be the diplomatic repre-sentative to NATO and the military attaché at the embassy would bethe military representative to NATO. The tasks the liaison developedincluded: 1. represent the Argentine interests before SHAPE, 2. coor-dinate the work of Argentina in NATO operations, 3. attend meetingsand receive NATO classified information about the state of differentmissions under NATO command, 4. coordinate the visit of Argentineauthorities to SHAPE and the operations theaters, and 5. coordi-nate with SHAPE the attendance of Argentine officers to the coursesoffered by the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany (SánchezMariño, 2010).

Colonel Sánchez Mariño served as liaison to SHAPE from July 2000to July 2002. For him, the usefulness of having a space at SHAPE wassubstantive and presented several opportunities. First, at the moreglobal level, Sánchez Mariño could see how NATO is far from beingsolely an instrument of American power and how Europe acts as atimely counterpoint to Washington on a number of issues. In aninterview, Sánchez Mariño commented that ‘We had access to anorganization in which it was clear to see the interaction among itsmembers and how political and strategic discussions always broughtto surface the cleavage between “hard” and “soft” power’ (SánchezMariño, 2010). For him, this actually represented an opportunity forArgentina to observe these tensions within NATO, listen to differ-ent voices and make known Argentina’s interests. Further, SánchezMariño noted, NATO, the European pillar of NATO in particular, isan organization that continually seeks to have the greatest possi-ble legitimacy within and outside Europe. For NATO, knowing thatArgentina was present in the organization and supported its actionsin Bosnia–Herzegovina and then in Kosovo was an important sourceof legitimacy, especially when international law did not seem to giveNATO a green light for its actions in Kosovo.

Second, at the regional level, Sánchez Mariño believed thatArgentina’s approach to NATO was a way, together with its rap-prochement with the US, to counterbalance the increasing role thatBrazil was having in the region and, of course, its global reach basedon the search for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. How-ever, this led to important costs. First, when Argentina was designated‘Major Non-NATO Ally’ by the US, and then later when it decided toparticipate in NATO forces in Kosovo, the region, including Chile


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Federico Merke 187

and Brazil, did not react well to such news, considering that it wouldaffect the balance of power in the Southern Cone.

Third, in the military dimension, Sánchez Mariño considered thathaving a hundred or more Argentine soldiers rotating every sixmonths in Bosnia–Herzegovina was an excellent opportunity to learnto work with forces from other countries, gain greater interoperabilitycapabilities, and learn more about NATO standards. Every year, NATOconducted two exercises in the Balkans, and the Argentine brigadesregularly participated alongside German, Italian, or British troops.Moreover, while there was a liaison at SHAPE, many Argentine offi-cers participated in seminars and training courses offered by NATOin Italy (NATO Defense College) and Germany (NATO School).

In short, at the global level, the political and military utilityof NATO for Argentina could be presented as follows. Politically,Argentina had the possibility of 1. directly contributing to the con-solidation of democracy, rule of law, and human rights advocacy, 2.increasing the credibility of Argentina in the international commu-nity in general and the West in particular, 3. gaining a wealth ofinformation of high quality, impossible to obtain outside of theAlliance, 4. acquiring greater political experience in managing inter-national crises and conflicts, 5. creating a climate of confidence toadvance the bilateral negotiation with the United Kingdom regard-ing Malvinas/Falklands and, finally, 6. providing a strategy of linkagesbetween the military and the economic sector. On the military level,for its part, Argentina could obtain at a relatively low cost: 1. trainingin demanding military environments involving the use of force, 2.access to classified military information, 3. training and professionalexperience at the individual level for all officers involved in oper-ations, 4. direct access to procedures and doctrines that are amongthe most advanced in the world, and 5. participation in courses atOberammergau (NATO School) and Rome (NATO Defense College).3

By 1999, Argentina had an MNNA designation by the US, a liai-son at SHAPE, and had participated not only in the NATO attackon Kosovo but also in the peacekeeping forces that followed theconflict. The next step for Argentina would be to ask to become amember of the Alliance, as an associate member or a similar cate-gory to be established. This initiative was expressed in a letter senton 8 July 1999 by President Carlos Menem to both President BillClinton and the NATO Council. Argentina’s proposal was to adopt


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a formula of transition in which the country could access the mech-anisms provided by the PFPs. The central argument was that NATOrepresented the vanguard of the new world order, based on a cooper-ative security framework that went beyond a military alliance andformed a political community based on values of democracy andhuman rights.

The reception of this letter in NATO and in Argentine public opin-ion caused some surprise. On the side of NATO, it was not clear thata Northern organization was able to accept a Southern country asa member. Locally, public opinion and opposition parties did notunderstand why there was so much interest in joining NATO and,more importantly, why the country had not prioritized its relation-ships with its neighbors, and was instead focusing on the relationshipwith US and Europe on security issues.

NATO’s response came quickly and on 23 July Solana said thatNATO was pleased to know that it had a partner like Argentina, readyto work with the organization. However, he noted, NATO was a Euro-Atlantic organization and it only admitted candidate members fromthe northern hemisphere. An admission of Argentina, said Solana,implied a reform of the NATO Charter, something which was seen asvery unlikely (Corigliano, 2003, p. 103).

The rejection of Argentina’s application caused intense debate inthe country and even created a conflict in Menem’s cabinet. The gen-eral idea of the critics was that Argentina’s request had clearly been amisperception. The mistake was to confuse a cooperative relationshipwith NATO with the possibility of actually obtaining NATO member-ship. By all accounts, Argentina was far away from NATO (La Nación,1999).

After 11 September and Argentina’s default

Shortly after the attacks of 11 September, President Bush addressedthe US Congress, declaring a ‘war on terrorism.’ This war wouldbe seen as the defining paradigm in the struggle for global order.Three months later, Argentina’s interim President Adolfo RodriguezSaá announced the country would suspend its foreign debt payments,triggering the biggest debt default in history.

The 11 September events dramatically altered the interna-tional security agenda. Argentina, in line with the international


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Federico Merke 189

community, condemned the attacks and expressed solidarity with theUS government and its people. It further accompanied Bush’s deci-sion to invade Afghanistan as a form of retaliation against al Qaeda.From this moment onward, however, both countries began to seethe problem differently. For the US this was a new war to be foughtin a preventive manner and based on coalitions of the willing. ForArgentina, terrorism had to be addressed multilaterally and throughinternational law. This meant, in practice, a firm opposition fromBuenos Aires to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It also implied a moregeneral criticism of the militarization of US foreign policy, particu-larly the increasing role of the Southern Command in Latin Americavis à vis the state department.

Between December 2001 and January 2002 Argentina had threeinterim presidents, declared default on its foreign debt, and aban-doned the peg between the peso and the dollar. The US had not beenpart of the problem but nor would it be part of the solution. Thepolitical elites sadly perceived that ten years of privileged relationswith the US had not served to avoid the financial and political crisisof the country. The US did little to intercede against the IMF or evento volunteer as a last resort lender, an offer that it had not hesitatedto do in Mexico or Brazil years before.

From 2001 onward, Argentina experienced a sharp deterioration inits material and symbolic resources to look at the world from a freshorganizing principle. Argentina dropped from the ‘unusual claim todiscuss its membership in alliances of developed countries (for exam-ple, requests for full membership in NATO) to the situation of beinga potential source of instability in the region after the events of 2001’(Tokatlian, 2004, p. 173).4

It was Néstor Kirchner, President between 2003 and 2007, whobegan to outline a new foreign policy, away from the US and closerto South America. The central line was to question the domesticand international pattern adopted by Argentina during the 1990s,criticizing the Washington Consensus for putting the country on aprecipice, and rejecting the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA).Further, Kirchner took on both a highly critical tone of the interna-tional financial agencies and a debt reduction plan, trying to get alarger margin of autonomy and independence from the IMF and theWorld Bank. Finally, Kirchner made the region the priority area of


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his foreign policy, emphasizing the importance of Mercado Comúndel Sur (MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market) and open-ing the possibility of adding up new members to the bloc (Russell,2008).

These changes in foreign policy would have an impact on thedesign of defense and security policies. Argentina slowly began tomove away from the discussion of the global agenda, placing moreof its emphasis on South America. In this new context, it was per-ceived, Argentina had little to do with the US in Iraq or with itsNATO partners cooperating in Afghanistan. The result was that after2006 Argentina stopped sending a liaison to SHAPE (Sánchez Mariño,2010). The rationale behind this decision is far from clear, apartfrom typical budgetary matters. Today, the potential for Argentina toregain a lost space within NATO is rather low. The international con-text has not become friendly to multilateralism nor has Argentina’sinternational identity been comfortable in working with an alliancewhich is perceived more as the soft wing of US power than thehard wing of UN missions. Furthermore, today NATO is undergo-ing a period of intense discussion about its future. What kind ofNATO will emerge is also a variable to consider, given what kindof utility it would have for Argentina. In particular, there are threeareas of debate that Argentina should follow closely (Belkin et al.,2009).

First, in defining its mission, some NATO members believe thatNATO should be ready to lead ‘out-of-area missions,’ such as when atask force provided logistical support in the Darfur region upon therequest of the African Union. Others, however, believe that NATOshould focus on the collective defense of its own territory.

Second, in terms of membership, some believe that NATO shouldcontinue to expand and include as many like-minded countrieswilling to commit to the preservation of a stable and democraticinternational order. Others fear, however, that this expansion willonly bring more difficult choices in defining tasks, making decisions,and allocating responsibilities.

Finally, some allies would like to include the whole social spec-trum related to security and post-conflict reconstruction, electoralassistance, humanitarian aid, health emergency, and conflict man-agement. Others believe that NATO should focus on its militarydimension and hard military power.


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Federico Merke 191

Depending on how this debate unfolds, there will be at least twopossible scenarios. The first scenario would be a NATO as a globalprojection force, with a growing membership and a security manage-ment that combines hard and soft power. The second scenario wouldbe a NATO more attached to its territory, with a more inclusive mem-bership and a security management based primarily on hard militarypower. These two scenarios are in line with the analysis proposed byHåkan Edström (see this volume), who distinguishes between a NATOthat functions as a ‘club’ based on Article 5 and transatlantic inter-ests, and a NATO that functions as a ‘society’ based on more partnersand global interests. It is likely that the new strategic concept will fallsomewhere in between these two positions, assuming a greater inter-est in caring for the neighborhood but admitting the possibility ofworking together with the UN and various regional organizations.

Although defining what is the most likely scenario exceeds the goalof this chapter, it is clear that the first option, NATO as a global force,will be viewed as having greater utility for Argentina than a defensiveNATO more secluded in its territory. Regardless of the results of thishypothetical debate, the hard fact is that NATO today is practically anon-issue in the defense policy of Argentina. This fact not only hasto do with the present role of NATO but also with the relationshipbetween Argentina and the US.

Argentina, the US, and NATO as a complement

The utility of NATO to Argentina was not only conditioned by thechanging nature of international security but also by the bilateralrelationship between Washington and Buenos Aires, in particularArgentina’s designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally.

During long periods of its history Argentina defined its relation-ship with the US in terms of autonomy, short of direct confrontationbut always seeking political independence both in domestic and for-eign policy decisions (Norden and Russell, 2002, p. 1). Ever since thearrival of Carlos Menem to the presidency, however, the bilateral rela-tionship between Argentina and the US took a turn that no one hadimagined. The end of the Cold War, on the one hand, and the riseto power in Argentina of an internationalist coalition, on the other,opened the door for both countries to initiate a new stage based ondialogue and on the convergence of values.


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The Gulf War in 1990–91 was undoubtedly the opportunity forArgentina to make explicit its new orientation and ‘marked the begin-ning of Argentina’s military partnership with the US’ (Norden andRussell, 2002, p. 84). Argentina’s decision to join the US-led militarycoalition may be explained as a desire to send a message to the USrather than any material interest that the country could have on theconflict between Iraq and Kuwait. With this cooperation, more sym-bolic than material, Argentina began a path of rapprochement withthe US in a manner never seen in its history. This partnership contin-ued through the support of the US proposed invasion and occupationof Haiti in 1995 and was further reflected in a number of concretemoves to match words with deeds.

First, Argentina significantly altered its pattern of votes at the UN.In 1989, when Menem took office, the percentage of coincidencebetween Argentina and the US was 13.3 per cent. In 1991 the figurewould go up to 41 per cent, reaching its closest match in 1995, withalmost 70 per cent of coincidence (Corigliano, 2003). Second, in thearea of nuclear non-proliferation, Argentina agreed in 1991 to dis-mantle the Condor II missile project, a major concern in the US atthat time. Third, Argentina became engaged in a number of multi-lateral regimes that would bind its security policies to those of theUS. It thus became a full member of the Australia Group (December1992), joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (November1993), adhered to the group of Nuclear Supplier Countries (March1994), and joined the Wassenaar Accord in Vienna (March 1996).Further, between November 1993 and December 1994 the ArgentineCongress approved the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT).

External recognition of this transformation came from Washingtonwhen, on 16 October 1997, Bill Clinton, on a visit to Argentina,announced his intention to designate Argentina as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Having been elected MNNA, Argentina became the eighthnation in the world to have this status and the first in Latin America.Jeffrey Davidow, at that time Assistant Secretary for Inter-AmericanAffairs at the state department, justified the designation of Argentinaas MNNA as a ‘recognition of the importance of Argentina’s lead-ership and cooperation in the field of international peacekeeping,notably during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, in Haiti, in


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Federico Merke 193

its role in supervising the peace between Peru and Ecuador, and innearly a dozen other international peacekeeping efforts.’ And thenhe commented on the implications this designation would have:‘Argentina would be eligible for benefits such as priority delivery ofexcess defense articles and participation in cooperative research anddevelopment projects. I wish to stress that granting MNNA status toArgentina does not establish any mutual defense obligation, nor doesit apply access to advanced weaponry, nor does it establish a strategicalliance’ (Davidow, 1997).

The MNNA category was created in 1989 by the US to appointallies who are not NATO members but cooperate very closely withWashington. Currently there are 14 states that enjoy this status.5

Countries designated as MNNA are eligible for a number of benefits.First, they are able to receive US-owned war reserve stockpiles on

their territory and obtain US foreign assistance to purchase depleteduranium ammunition. Second, US Foreign Military Financing (FMF)may be used by the country for the commercial leasing of certaindefense articles. Third, they can also enter into agreements withthe US government for the cooperative furnishing of training, on abilateral or multilateral basis, provided the agreements are based onfinancial reciprocity. Fourth, they have the right to loans of materials,supplies, or equipment for purposes of cooperative research, develop-ment, testing, or evaluation. Finally, they may enjoy expedited USexport license approval, as appropriate, for US companies to delivercommercial satellites, their components, and systems (Reficco, 1998,p. 82).

Reactions in Argentina to the new status granted by the US weremixed but the generally prevailing feeling was that, at the end of theday, little had changed for the country and for the US. For some it wasa designation that would hardly go beyond the symbolic. For others itmeant more a recognition for past achievements than a commitmenttoward the future. For the Argentine Foreign Minister, Guido Di Tella(1999), the granting to Argentina of MNNA status symbolized notonly a shift in the bilateral relationship but also the visible mark ofan Argentina that had returned to the West. NATO, thus, was neitherjust a military alliance nor a relic of the Cold War but represented oneof the world’s leading organizations of the post-Cold War inspired byWestern values. Put another way, Argentine incentives for acquiringMNNA status were not based on a logic of security, as may have been


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the case for Israel, South Korea, Egypt, or Japan, but on a logic ofidentity (Merke, 2008). The direct alliance with the US and the directrelation with NATO gave to Argentina an international image of astable, predictable country which was now fully integrated into theWestern structures. Furthermore, NATO was also seen as an institu-tion that could facilitate the new identity of the Argentine ArmedForces, further away from domestic issues and closer to internationalresponsibilities relating to collective and human security.

The US, meanwhile, would have several incentives for grantingArgentina the MNNA status (Larrinaga, 2000). First, Argentina hadbeen doing an excellent job in terms of responsibilities assumed inthe region and the world, particularly in the Gulf War (being theonly Latin American country to send troops), in the Haitian crisis,the Peru–Ecuador conflict, Rwanda, Mozambique, Cyprus, and theformer Yugoslavia. The US concluded that granting MNNA statuswould be an excellent way to recognize the job done by Argentinain the field of international security. Second, having an ally in theSouthern Cone would be vital to strengthen the US presence in theMERCOSUR trading bloc which had grown on the backs of Americanleadership. Third, Bill Clinton was determined at that time to con-tinue negotiations for the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) andthe alliance with Argentina would be a good foothold in the SouthernCone. Fourth, the US felt that this appointment could motivate othercountries in the region to follow the model of Argentine cooperationand commitment to the liberal international order.6

In sum, the US rewarded Argentina with MNNA status ‘at leastas much for Argentina’s role in the international community as forArgentina’s loyalty specifically to the United States’ (Norden andRussell, 2002, p. 89). Further, it represented a low-cost opportunityfor the US to seize its unipolar moment and extend its hemisphericgrip. On Argentina’s side, receiving the MNNA designation meant lessan increase in security than an opportunity to ascend to the West andjoin an alliance that represented the prime modernity.

The external reactions to this designation were not long in coming.At the global level, the UK did not receive this designation with openarms. After conversations with Washington, however, the ForeignOffice recognized that the military and political reality of Argentinahad changed substantially since the war in the Falklands/Malvinasin 1982 and therefore accepted the MNNA designation. As a result,


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Federico Merke 195

President Carlos Menem made use of the designation and visited UKwhere he was received by the Queen in October 1998. The follow-ing year, Prince Charles visited Buenos Aires. As a result of this newrelationship, the British embargo of arms to Argentina was lifted.

At the regional level, neither Brazil nor Chile received the des-ignation of MNNA with enthusiasm. On the Brazilian side, con-cern focused on the implications of increased US influence in theregion. Former President José Sarney said that it was all about a USattempt to destabilize the relationship between MERCOSUR members(Larrinaga, 2000, p. 143). On the Chilean side, the focus of con-cern was placed in security under the argument that the designationwould cause friction and instability in the military balance. Chile’sForeign Minister even traveled to Washington for an explanation.The response he received was that it was mainly a symbolic category,open to other countries in the region (Larrinaga, 2000, p. 143).

With the designation of Argentina as MNNA, bilateral relationswith Washington in the field of defense took a giant leap forward,increasing official visits, military contacts, cooperation agreements,and integration of forces at the hemispheric level. These relation-ships, however, did not have a correlate at the level of financialfacilities, transfer of arms, or military assistance (Sánchez Mariño,2010).


If during the 1990s the working assumption was that the best inter-ests of the US were analogous to those of Argentina, this assumptionhas been gradually abandoned since Argentina’s default in 2001. Infact, the common perception within the elite was that the Bushadministration had allowed Argentina to fall because it had neitherthe economic relevance of Mexico nor the strategic importance ofTurkey. This reality helped Argentina ‘to understand better its coun-try’s place within the US’ hierarchy of foreign interests, and thelimits of the alliance shaped in the 1990s’ (Norden and Russell, 2002,p. 129).

The growing gap between the interests of the two countries becameapparent in November 2005, during the Fourth Summit of theAmericas held in Argentina. The summit’s agenda was the discus-sion of a Free Trade Area, a project that had reached the summitalmost dead. On that occasion, Néstor Kirchner took the opportunity


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to criticize Bush for his unilateral policies and the US for promot-ing an economic model that had caused Argentina’s economic crisis.On this occasion, too, Kirchner hosted a civil society summit, ironi-cally led by Hugo Chávez, which took place while the official summitwas going on, and sought to rally the nationalist and left wing forcesaround a deep criticism to the US and the neoliberal ideology.

On the US side, Argentina started to be seen as an erratic, unpre-dictable country, difficult to pigeonhole in the ideological spectrumof South America. Further, in terms of material interests, Argentinais not in the migration agenda (now occupied by Mexico, CentralAmerica, and the Caribbean), nor is it in the trade and investmentflows (such as is the case for Mexico or Brazil) nor in the energy equa-tion (such as Venezuela) nor the flow of drugs (such as Colombiaand Mexico). Nor is it an important country in receiving help, likeColombia (Russell, 2008, p. 94).

From Argentina’s vantage point, there is the perception that US isa country that ‘weighs less on the fate of the country and its interna-tional margin of maneuver’ (Russell, 2008, p. 95). As for the materialinterests of Argentina, the agenda is related more to the region thanwith Washington, as is the case for the issues of energy, infrastruc-ture, development, production integration, or migration. Further, theincreased presence of China and India in the region stimulated theidea that the international system has become more multipolar andthat this is essentially something good for Argentina.

In summary, for various reasons, Argentina and the US seem toagree on the desire to leave the category of MNNA alone. On theone hand, the perception in Washington is that Argentina has ceasedto be a valuable ally to push an agenda of security based on liberaldemocracy and the war on terrorism. On the other hand, the per-ception in Buenos Aires is that the category of MNNA is part of aneoliberal past that nobody wants to bring back. As a result, the ideaof NATO as a complement to the US has lost its significance in anew environment in which it is the very relationship with the USthat is under scrutiny. Simply put, everything seems to indicatethat the designation of Argentina as a MNNA was the result of theunipolar moment, read as benign hegemony, and the WashingtonConsensus, understood as the construction of a neoliberal politicalidentity.


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Federico Merke 197

Regional security vis à vis the relation with theUS and NATO

Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003, p. 4) argue that most securitythreats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones.The Southern Cone is no exception to this logic. This means thatArgentina’s security agenda has to do essentially with what happensin South America in general and the Southern Cone in particular.Thus, part of the utility of NATO for Argentina will be given bythe impact that this NATO–Argentina cooperation may have in theregion.

Put briefly, the dynamics of interstate security in the region moreimmediate to Argentina have to do with two triangles of relationships(Hurrell, 2005). A first triangle is formed by Argentina, Brazil, andChile, the three countries with the highest relative weight in SouthAmerica in terms of economic development and international out-reach. This triangle was historically based on cooperation betweenChile and Brazil and continuing distrust between Argentina andChile, on the one hand, and Argentina and Brazil, on the other. Thedistrust with Chile was based essentially on territorial disputes, whichnearly ended up in war in 1978 and was only averted by Vaticanmediation. The distrust with Brazil, meanwhile, was based on thestruggle between the two states for regional leadership and served asthe main conflict hypothesis on each side.

The second triangle is formed by Argentina, Brazil, and the US.While the possibility of war never existed, very rarely have the threestates converged around a shared international orientation. Sim-ply put, the US was typically a state that balanced the relationshipbetween Argentina and Brazil. Thus, when Argentina had more rel-ative power than Brazil, Itamaraty (the Brazilian Ministry of ForeignAffairs) sided with Washington as a way to find an umbrella of pro-tection and, at the same time, gain legitimacy as a regional leader.Meanwhile, when the balance of forces favored Brazil, Argentinasought to align itself with the US, as happened during the 1990s.


The 1990s seemed to present a rosy picture which would enable avirtuous cycle between these two triangles. At the hemispheric level,


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the triangle with the US enhanced cooperation in the security sec-tor (such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism), whichenabled greater rapprochement between Argentina and the US. Thesewere the years of benign hegemony, neoliberalism, the promotion ofdemocracy, and open regionalism, all of them values which fosteredgreater cooperation on security issues.7

At the regional level, the 1990s consolidated the positive rela-tionship between democracy, economic integration, and desecuriti-zation of relations between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Buzan andWæver, 2003, p. 323). With Brazil, Argentina stepped up militaryexchanges and combined exercises aimed at complementing capac-ities and building a greater scope for interoperability. On 18 June1991, Argentina and Brazil signed at Guadalajara the Agreementfor the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and created theArgentine–Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC).The creation of ABACC was indeed a key arrangement implementedby Argentina and Brazil, which jointly defined nuclear policy in bothcountries. This explains why, after the setting up of ABACC, resis-tances to the signing of Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT would decline.In less than five years, Argentina and Brazil ratified both.

The relationship with Chile followed a parallel course. Between1990 and 1991, 20 border disputes were resolved, leaving two ofthem in the hands of international tribunals. On 9 November 1995both countries signed a memorandum of understanding coveringvarious topics such as confidence-building measures, mutual con-sultation processes, and greater transparency of information relatingto defense spending. As a result, a Permanent Security Committeewas established, charged with designing a work program betweenboth countries. One concrete result of this Committee was thejoint request made to the ECLAC (Economic Commission for LatinAmerica and the Caribbean) to come up with a methodology foranalyzing the development of defense budgets in each country, anda shared mechanism for comparing them. Finally, in July 1998,Argentina announced the elimination of a conflict hypothesis withChile.

It was not easy for Argentina during the 1990s to integrate bothtriangles, in particular the relationship with Brazil. First, the 1990sproved to be one of the greatest moments of convergence betweenLatin America and the US. On the other hand, however, Brazil


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Federico Merke 199

established a relationship with the region and with the US based onthe search for autonomy and on the definition of Brazil as a regionalpower with global projection seeking a permanent seat at the UNSecurity Council. Thus, Argentina and Brazil did not always have thesame outlook on international security.

For instance, although both countries concurred on the founda-tions of international security such as multilateralism, respect forinternational law, and respect for UN Security Council decisions,Brazil was more reluctant than Argentina in working with UN interms of humanitarian intervention. Brazil even opposed the inter-vention in Kosovo, arguing that use of force had been decided uni-laterally. Brazil also abstained from intervening in Rwanda and Haitiin 1994, arguing in favor of sovereignty and non-intervention. WhileArgentina hesitated less to work under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,Brazil has always sought to resolve disputes under Chapter VI. Last,the evolution of a more liberal agenda in Argentina (with the US) asopposed to a more orthodox one (with Brazil) found its most impor-tant sticking point when Bill Clinton designated Argentina MNNA in1997. From Argentina, the designation was used to balance the ris-ing power of Brazil and Chile in the region. By Brazil and Chile theappointment was viewed negatively; they argued that it would fur-ther US interference in the region and block any regional design inthe security sector.

As I showed in the previous sections, Argentina’s rapprochementwith NATO during the 1990s was furthered along two lines. Thefirst one was related to Argentina’s participation in peacekeepingforces in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo led by the Alliance. Thissignaled the beginning of increased diplomatic and military coop-eration which came to count on an Argentine liaison to Mons. Thesecond line had to do with the designation by the US of Argentina asMNNA. Although this was a bilateral move, it would open up morespace for dialogue and cooperation with other NATO members. Eventhough these two avenues of cooperation crossed at all times, Chileand Brazil made different assessments of them. On the one hand,while they did not share the enthusiasm for international securityand the imposition of democracy and human rights, both countriesaccepted that this was a decision to be respected. On the other hand,however, upon receiving the news of the designation of MNNA, theyperceived that there was more at stake than simple enthusiasm. Put


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simply, the problem was not NATO values but US power. Argentina,thus, had to pay a price for a regional alliance with Washington. Itthought it would be possible to balance both wheels of its foreignpolicy (Brazil/Mercosur and the US) but eventually found that theupgrade issued by Washington had more regional costs than globalbenefits.

The most important lesson to learn from these years was that therelationship with NATO will always be seen in the region through thelens of the bilateral relationship with the US. This means that everyrelation with NATO furthered by Argentina would be linked with aregional security design that does not involve zero-sum games. Inother words, the political and military utility of NATO for Argentinawill be even greater if the region perceives that this bilateral utilitycan be translated into a profit for the whole region.


And yet, five years after the designation of Argentina as MNNA, theselessons soon lost any ground from which they could be used. TheArgentine default, the regional disenchantment with the WashingtonConsensus, the turn to the right in Washington and the turn to theleft in the region were all factors that worked against an Argentineapproach to the US, much less to NATO. There are four dynamics toconsider that account for the new developments in regional securityand which have constructed obstacles to a close relationship betweenArgentina and NATO (Merke, 2009).

First, the triangle between Argentina, Brazil, and the US seems tohave lost weight in its interaction logic since the appearance of anew regional player, Venezuela, which poses a profound rejectionof the US presence in the region. Actually, it would be appropriateto speak of a triangle between the US, Brazil, and Venezuela, whereBrazil plays the role of bridge builder as a state capable of: 1. con-taining the US political pressures in the region, and 2. moderatingHugo Chávez’s radical postures toward the North. Having lost powerto Brazil, Argentina seems to be testing a closer relationship withVenezuela as a way to balance the rise of Brasilia.

Second, because of its global war against terrorism, the US has puta greater emphasis on the military dimension of its approach to theregion. Today much of the dialogue between Washington and thecapitals of South America is via the Southern Command, not the state


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Federico Merke 201

department. This trend partly reflects the divergent agendas betweenthe US, focused on terrorism, rogue states, and nuclear weapons, andthe agenda of the region, more concerned with development, energy,and natural resources. This gap between the US and South Americais also occurring with the loss of legitimacy of the Organization ofAmerican States (OAS) to resolve conflicts and the rise of the Unionof South American Nations (UNASUR), the Rio Group, and the SouthAmerican Defense Council as preferred venues for solving conflicts inthe region.8 Finally, the US decline in symbolic capital both explainsand reflects a trend in the region that seeks to find a place under thesun of the global South. Even though it is difficult to identify a coher-ent, organized pattern it is possible to locate different moves thathave led to the increased presence in the region of extra-hemisphericactors, such as Iran, China, India, and Russia. Although these are dif-ferent countries with varying weights and sizes and therefore withdistinct preferences, it is clear that the US is far from assuring itsultimate influence in the region.

The third dynamic is the global rise of Brazil and its impact on theregional security agenda. As a member of the G20, a guest at the G8meetings, IBSA member (India, South Africa, and Brazil), and part ofthe BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) Brazil is expandingits presence around the world. At the regional level, Brazil has beenthe chief grammatical builder of ‘South America’ as a cognitive regionthat needs to be thought of as a whole. This vision had its practicalside in late 2007 when Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silvaproposed the creation of a South American Defense Council (CSD) asa UNASUR Agency. Composed of 12 countries,9 the CDS was formallyestablished in March 2009 and aims to ‘consolidate South America asa zone of peace, to build an identity on defense matters and generatea consensus to strengthen regional cooperation.’ More specifically,the CDS aims to analyze and discuss a joint vision on defense, pro-moting the exchange of information, putting forward joint positionsin the region, and promoting military exchange and training (CDS,2010).

There are three logics to explain this regional security body. Thefirst logic, in tune with a realist lens, has to do with the rise of Brazilin the regional arena and its desire to legitimize hegemony, preventregional balance, and reduce the incentives for defection. With thislogic, the CSD excludes the US from the region in an attempt to gain


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greater autonomy. The second approach, drawn from political econ-omy, has to do with Brazil’s desire to boost industrial developmentby creating a Brazil-led regional market of defense. The third logic ismore in tune with the liberal or institutionalist script. The generalidea is that the CSD will channel cooperation in the defense sector,disseminate information among members, reduce uncertainty, andpromote a network of collective norms about the role of the militaryand the use of force. In short, power, regional development, and gov-ernance seem to be three strong incentives for the design of regionalsecurity bodies.

Finally, the fourth security dynamic is also tied to the creation ofthe CSD, although its development is further beyond the rising powerof Brazil. Put briefly, although the proposed establishment of the CSDhas been received positively by the various states in the region, therestill remains a major problem for consolidation: the different securiti-zation processes that hinder dialogue at the regional level. On the onehand, Brazil sees as its main security threat any external force (the USor NATO) that seeks to restrain sovereignty over the ‘green’ Amazon(the forest) and across the ‘blue’ Amazon (the Atlantic Ocean).

Chile, meanwhile, has two security problems, one with landlockedBolivia, which claims an exit to the sea, the other with Peru on seaborders in the Pacific Ocean. Further, Argentina considers it crucialto protect its natural resources in general and the Guaraní Aquiferin particular. It also has an ongoing conflict with a NATO member,the United Kingdom, for oil exploration the latter currently performsnear Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Moreover, for Colombia, the mainsecurity threat is the narco-guerrillas, who are more of an internalthreat than external. Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela, for its part, believesthere is permanent danger of being invaded by US troops, who wouldenter the country through a cooperative Colombia. Finally, Bolivia isin a process of national ‘re-foundationalism’ along ethnic, economic,and political lines and, therefore, its main object of security is thevery survival of the new political regime.

How all these security agendas will be articulated in a regionalforum such as the CSD is hard to predict. NATO had its point of cohe-sion in the shared securitization of the Soviet threat. With the end ofthe Cold War, its security agenda sought to find a consensus on thedefense of democracy and human rights within and outside Europe,at least in the near abroad. It is pretty clear that the CDS will notfollow NATO’s path, nor will it try to do so in the short to medium


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Federico Merke 203

term. Collective security implies a shared understanding about whatkind of force has been banned. It also implies a shared acceptancethat the threat to peace puts the interests of all states at risk, and thusit implies the willingness, at least in theory, to enforce the law and toprotect the interests of all states, even by the use of force. While theregion has a high level of cooperation in security matters, it is still farfrom achieving the kind of fundamental agreement that the librettoof collective security requires. Put simply, NATO is far from servingas a model for the region.

Although the CSD will not be a ‘Southern NATO,’ it is worth not-ing that today’s NATO does not look like yesterday’s NATO. The‘old’ NATO was a collective security alliance according to the librettoexplained above. However, the distinctive feature of the ‘new’ NATOis not its Article 5, but rather its regulatory power that has man-aged to socialize new members within a framework of democraticrules, rule of law, and desecuritization of relations among neigh-bor states. In this sense, the CSD could, albeit very slowly, resemblethis new feature of NATO and provide a space for socialization ofrules concerning the use of force, the relationship between civil-ians and military, transparency in military spending, acquisition ofarmaments, and cooperation on issues of regional and internationalsecurity.

At least in theory, regional organizations serve as an anchor ofshared norms, provide a voice to smaller states, and can serve torestrict the preferences of the most powerful. Further, regional orga-nizations raise costs of exclusion, particularly for smaller states. Theseideas partly explain why the Brazilian proposal enjoyed wide accep-tance and how different states saw in the CSD the possibility tocontrol or restrict potential unilateral moves by major states. Thesedynamics are crucial to understand the utility of NATO for Argentina.The development of the CSD would serve as a regional forum to gen-erate a productive dialogue with NATO, in particular lessons learnedin institutional building, military cooperation, and interoperabilityin the levels of command, control, and communication.

Conclusion

This chapter presented an analysis of the political and military util-ity of NATO for Argentina. Its main conclusions can be presentedaccording to three levels of analysis.


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Globally, the utility of NATO for Argentina had to do with theprojection of legitimacy of the country and the opportunity to partic-ipate in an active way in the reshaping of the international securityagenda. Second, the presence of Argentine officers in Belgium wasan excellent opportunity to closely observe the inner logic of theAlliance and Europe’s role in serving as a counterpoint to the US.Third, while the participation of Argentine troops in the NATO-ledmissions allowed them to gain experience in the field and get trainingat various levels of planning.

Regionally, the utility of NATO had to do with prestige and bal-ance of power patterns (vis à vis Brazil and Chile) and with anattempt to articulate regional dynamics in security with NATO’sagenda. Although some voices considered that the experience ofNATO could serve to develop regional security mechanisms, infact no state has been willing to go beyond a cooperative securityarrangement. The relationship of Argentina with NATO, either viaBrussels or Washington, only caused discomfort in Brazil and Chile,Argentina’s privileged partners in the regional integration of tradeand investment.

Whereas in 1990s, South America appeared headed toward apattern of convergence with the US, structured around FTAA andinspired by a Pan-American dimension of liberal values, today theregion presents a more diversified picture. And yet, public opinion inthe region is still more inclined to put forward strong critiques to USimperialism, neoliberalism, free trade, and globalization. This ‘post-liberal moment’ certainly does not work in favor of a rapprochementwith NATO, an Alliance that is no longer seen as the vanguard of thenew international order based on multilateralism and is now seen asthe armed wing of an international order based on unilateralism.

Regarding Argentine relations with the US, the designation asMNNA was seen as a recognition of a role that Argentina decided toplay during the 1990s. Argentina used this designation as a shortcutto becoming a full member of NATO, something which was clearlyvery difficult to achieve. Furthermore, Argentina also used the desig-nation to put pressure on the UK to sit at the UN table and negotiatethe conflict over the Malvinas/Falkland dispute.

Finally, at the domestic level, the utility of NATO had several faces.First, cooperation with NATO helped build the international identityof Argentina as a Western country committed to democracy, peace,


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Federico Merke 205

and human rights. Second, NATO, along with the UN, served to chan-nel the interest of the military beyond national security, under theframework of a democratic defense policy. This utility, however, lostweight in a country that began to shift its foreign and defense policiesaway from the lines of NATO and the US.

In summary, the increased participation of Argentina in interna-tional security arrangements, in general, and its collaboration withthe UN, the US, and NATO, in particular, was the result of twostructural changes, one at the international level, the other at thedomestic one. These two changes heightened the Argentine interestin the utility of NATO. As made clear throughout the chapter, todaythe interests of the US/NATO and Argentina seem to be on separatetracks and there are no signs that either the international environ-ment or Argentina’s international identity will operate a change inthe short term. This does not mean that NATO is no longer usefulfor Argentina. What it does mean is that the utility will be defined inpart by the international orientation of the Alliance and in part bythe country’s international orientation.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Mary Coffman for her comments on an earlierversion of this chapter.

Notes

1. President of Argentina Carlos Menem (1989–99) put it this way: ‘The newdirection of foreign policy turns Argentina into a fully integrated playerin a world that no longer allows isolation. In this new reality the world’sproblems are the problems of Argentina. And this means taking sides infavor of those who hold the principles of peace and freedom in the reso-lution of international conflicts [ . . . ] [because] the worst evil that we cansuffer in this decade is to get isolated from the great adventure of buildinga universal civilization’ (Menem, 1991, p. 8).

2. By that time, Argentina was one of the 12 member countries of theSecurity Council that rejected the Russian draft resolution demanding animmediate halt to the NATO attacks against Yugoslavia.

3. I am indebted to Colonel Horacio Sánchez Mariño for helping me put theseideas together.

4. The title of an article in Foreign Affairs (Pastor and Wise, 2001) captured per-fectly the passage from one state to another: ‘From Poster Child to BasketCase.’


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5. In 1989, Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, and Korea were designated asMNNAs. In 1996, Jordan; in 1997, New Zealand; in 1998, Argentina; in2002, Bahrain; in 2003, Philippines, and Thailand; and in 2004, Kuwait,Morocco, and Pakistan.

6. In Clinton’s words: ‘We accorded the major non-NATO ally status toArgentina because of the truly extraordinary efforts that have happenedjust in the 1990s [ . . . ] There is hardly a country in the world that has any-thing approaching the record of the Argentine military in being willing tostand up for the cause of peace. We believe that we should be sending asignal that this is the policy that other countries should follow’ (quoted inLarrinaga, 2000, p. 133).

7. The Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas held in Williamsburgin July 1995 marked somehow the positive climate in this direction by set-ting the principles of inter-American security in what later became knownas the ‘Williamsburg Principles,’ which acted as a sort of mirror to theNATO requirements for access to the Partnerships for Peace: 1. advocacy ofdemocracy as the basis for security, 2. reintegration of the military to demo-cratic life, 3. subordination of armed forces to the rule of law, 4. greatertransparency in defense matters (doctrines, budgets, operations, and soon), 5. negotiated resolution of conflicts in the region and, 6. defensecooperation and joint participation at the UN.

8. This became clear in the domestic political crisis faced by Evo Moralesin Bolivia (discussed in the UNASUR), the conflict between Ecuador andColombia after the Colombian incursion into Ecuadorian territory to cap-ture FARC troops (discussed in Rio Group), the concession of Colombia toprovide military bases to the US (discussed in a South American DefenseCouncil meeting), and the civilian-military coup suffered by ManuelZelaya in Honduras (discussed partly in the OAS and partly in the RioGroup).

9. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay,Perú, Surinam, Venezuela, and Uruguay.

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Sánchez Mariño, H. (2010) Colonel, Liaison to SHAPE from July 2000 to July2002 (17 March).


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Index

ABACC, see Argentine-BrazilianAgency for Accounting andControl (ABACC)

ABCA, 47Abkhazia, 74Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 169ACAK, see Argentine Joint Grouping

(ACAK)ACO, see allied command operations

(ACO)ADF, see Australian Defence Force

(ADF)Afghanistan

Australia’s role in, 41, 53–5Bagram air base in, 172–3COIN operations in, 34, 35ISAF’s role in, 40, 116NATO’s operations in, 451979 invasion of, 74Oruzgan province in, 40, 50PRT’s role in, 68QDR role in war with, 34summit meetings attended by,

44–5Sweden’s role in, 118Taliban of, strikes on, 170Thailand role in war with, 172United States’ role in, 28, 29, 32,

34, 35Africa, 34, 43, 122Agreement for the Exclusively

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy,198

Air Situation Data Exchange, 143Air Standardization Coordinating

Committee (ASCC), 47Albania, 27, 28, 71Alliance

Australia’s role in, 40–1, 48, 50benefits of, 44Finland’s role in, 119

Japan’s role in, 43Malta’s suspension from, 121–2NATO’s future with, 148, 149New Zealand’s role in, 43PfP’s relationship with, 165South Korea’s role in, 43Sweden’s role in, 119

allied command operations (ACO),148

al Qaedaattacks on September 11th, 2001,

28, 168Pakistan’s strategic challenges

with, 174United States’ mission to capture,

173Andersson, J., 118–19Anglo-Saxon allies, 43Ankara, 22anti-NATO camp, 87anti-piracy activity, 30ANZAC frigates, 47ANZUS, see US. Security Treaty

(ANZUS)Aquifer, G., 202Argentina, 181–205

Balkan’s partnership with, 6Bosnia-Herzegovina’s partnership

with, 186–7Brazil’s partnership with, 11,

197–201British embargo of arms lifted in,

195Chile’s partnership with, 11,

197–9, 202counterterrorism in, 168following September 11th, 2001,

188–91foreign policy in, 182–8Fourth Summit of Americas in,

195–6

209


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210 Index

Argentina – continuedgeographical location of, 181global peacekeeping by, 187,

192–4IMF’s independence from, 189Kosovo’s partnership with, 185liaisons’ in, 185–6as ‘Major Non-NATO Ally,’ 186–7,

191, 192MNNA’s role within, 6, 163, 166,

167–9NATO’s partnership, 11–2security agenda for, 181security threats in, 197tri-border of, 168United Nation’s partnership with,

168, 185United State’s partnership with,

13, 167–8, 191–203Argentine-Brazilian Agency for

Accounting and Control(ABACC), 198

Argentine Joint Grouping (ACAK),185

Armenia, 60Azerbadijan conflict with, 77IPAPs of, 72KFOR’s contributions to, 72, 78NACC’s role in, 72NATO’s partnership with, 5, 72,

77–8PfP’s role in, 72Russia’s role in, 60

ASCC, see Air StandardizationCoordinating Committee(ASCC)

ASEAN, see Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN)

ASG, see Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)Ashizawa, K., 83Asia-Pacific region, 51–2Asmus, R. D., 25Aspin, L., 25Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN), 24Atack, I., 114

AUSCANNZUKUS Naval C4Organization, 47

AustraliaADF’s role in, 51–2, 55Alliance’s role in, 40–1, 50Anglo-Saxon allies of, 46Asia-Pacific region’s relationship

with, 51–2Atlantic Alliance’s role in, 41,

51–3defense relationships with, 55following Vietnam War, 48FPDA’s role in, 47global security affairs in, 52Insensitive Munitions Information

Centre relationship with, 48military in, 40, 41, 50, 52, 53, 54MNNA’s role with, 166Multinational Interoperability

Council formed by, 49NATO’s partnership with, 2, 5, 6,

10, 47, 49–51, 54–5; allies,46–9; global, 43–5

PfP’s role in, 40policy of defense ‘self-reliance’ in,

41–2population of, 41quadrilateral dialogues of, 54Royal Navy’s role within, 46SEATO’s role in, 46–7self-government of, 46strategic policy of, 49United Kingdom Ministry of

Defence’s role in, 48United Kingdom’s partnership

with, 40United Nations role with, 48United State’s partnership with,

30, 40, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54in World Wars, 46

Australia Group, 192Australian Defence Force (ADF), 51Austria

CCMS, attendance to, 119ISAF’s role in, 116KFOR’s role in, 115


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Index 211

MNNA’s role in, 66NATO’s role in, 115, 120–1PfP’s role in, 112, 115, 117,

120reluctancy in, 114

Austrian Armed Forces, 120AWACS aircraft, 28Azerbadijan, 60

conflict in, 77IPAP’s role in, 72ISAF’s role with, 72NACC’s role in, 72NATO partnership with, 72, 77PfP’s role in, 72

Badrak, V., 97, 101, 103Bagram airbase, 172–3Bahrain, 5, 30, 166Balkans, 6, 26, 70, 71, 75–6, 78Baltic countries, 27, 71bandwagoning, 20Banja Luka airport, 76Barany, Z., 117, 124, 165Barnes, I., 65–6Barnes, P., 65–6Baylis, J., 61Beazley, K., 48Betts, R. K., 16Bezlushchenko, S., 93B&H, see Bosnia-Herzegovina (B&H)Bilmes, L. J., 32Biut, 87, 90Black Sea, 22, 88Blomberg, J., 119Bogdanov, D., 105Bolivia, 202Bondarchuk, S., 103Borawski, J., 115, 117Borisov, Y., 104Bosnia, 71Bosniacs, 76Bosnia-Herzegovina (B&H), 26, 75–6,

186–7Bougainville, 52Brazil, 11, 168, 187, 195, 197–201Britain, 47

British embargo of arms, 195British Empire, 46Brown, M. E., 19Bruni, J., 6Brussels, 40, 61Brzezinski, Z., 45, 176Bucharest Summit (2008), 4, 23,

44–5on Afghanistan, 44–5on Georgia, 70, 72, 73, 85–6on Ukraine, 85–6

Buenos Aires, 168, 185, 195Bukkvoll, T., 10–12, 15, 60, 69, 81,

83–108Bulgaria, 27, 71bureaucratic process, 5Burgess, L., 29Burton, J., 29Burundi, 172, 175Bush, G. W., 20–2, 28, 30, 36,

166, 168–74, 176, 188–9,195–6

Buszynski, L., 47Buzan, B., 63, 197–8

Cambodia, 48Camilión, O., 185Canada, 43, 47, 49CC, see Contact Countries (CC)CCEB, see Combined

Communications ElectronicsBoard (CCEB)

CCMS, see Challenges of ModernSociety (CCMS)

CENTO, see Central TreatyOrganization (CENTO)

Central African Republic, 175Central Asia, 43, 44, 60, 71Central European states, 71Central Treaty Organization

(CENTO), 1Centre Party, 133, 145–6centre-right coalition, 141–8,

155–7CFE, 151Chad, 175


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212 Index

Challenges of Modern Society(CCMS), 119

Chambers, P., 172Chanlett-Avery, E., 172Charter on a Distinctive Partnership,

23Chávez, H., 196, 200, 202Checkel, J., 83Chernyshov, O., 93Chile, 11, 186, 195, 197–9, 202China, 33

ASEAN’s role in, 24Britain’s partnership with, 24Communist Party of, 31economic growth in, 31–3European Union’s partnership

with, 24France’s partnership with, 24quadrilateral dialogues of, 54United States partnership with,

20–2, 24, 31Christian Democrats, 131–3, 142,

144–7Christopher, W., 20CIA, 171Civil Emergency Planning, 118Claes, W., 112Clark, W., 185Clinton, B., 20–1, 23, 26, 30, 166–9,

187, 192, 194, 199, 206Clinton, H., 22‘Closer Defence Relations’

agreements, 52‘Coast-Watch South’ program, 170Cobb, A., 171CoE, see Council of Europe (CoE)Cohen, W. S., 22, 37, 166COIN, see counterinsurgency (COIN)

operationsCollins, A., 47, 62Collins-class submarines, 47Colombia, 202Colston, J., 101Columbia, 34Combined Communications

Electronics Board (CCEB), 47

Combined Joint Task Forces, 113conditionality, 66Condor II missile project, 192Conference of National Armaments

Director’s Ammunition SafetyGroup, 48

Congo, 93contact countries, 44Contact Countries (CC), 4cooperation, 145, 147Cooperative Archer 2007, 72Copenhagen criteria, 65Cote D’Ivoire, 168, 175Council of Europe (CoE), 62–3Council of Ministers, 66Council on Foreign Relations, 33counterinsurgency (COIN)

operations, 34–5counterinsurgency warfare, 30counterterrorism, 30, 168Craig, G., 16Croatia, 27, 71Croats, 76CSD, see South American Defense

Council (CSD)Cyprus, 169, 194Czech Republic

Australia’s defense relationshipwith, 55

NATO’s enlargement in, 27NATO’s partnership with, 71PfP’s role with, 114socialization in, 63

Daalder, I., 29, 40Dahl, A.-S., 131Danielsson, S., 142Darabos, N., 121Darfur, 170, 173, 175da Silva, L. I. L., 201Davidow, J., 192Day, J., 184Dayton Agreement, 76Defence White Paper, 48, 51, 52, 54de Hoop Scheffer, J., 44, 50democratic peace theory, 63, 76–7


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Index 213

democratization, 63, 65Deni, J. R., 16Denmark, 144Desert Storm, 192Deudney, D., 19–20Deutsch, K. W., 16, 171–2Disaster Response Coordination

Centre, 140Di Tella, G., 184, 193Doherty, R., 112, 121Dominguez, J., 168–9, 176Downer, A., 50DP, see NATO-Ukraine Charter on a

Distinctive Partnership (DP)Duhalde, E., 168

EAPC, see Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil (EAPC)

Eastern European region, 3–4Eastern Partner’s Initiative, 66East Timor, 49, 52, 170, 171, 172,

173, 175Ebdane, H., 171ECLAC, see Economic Commission

for Latin America and theCaribbean (ECLAC)

Economic Commission for LatinAmerica and the Caribbean(ECLAC), 198

Ecuador, 193Edström, H., 191Egypt, 5, 30, 166, 194Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

22Eikenberry, K., 35Eklund, N., 134Eliasson, J., 118ENP, see European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP)Enström, K., 142Entacher, E., 121Epstein, R., 51Epstein, R. A., 124, 165Ericsson, J., 118Eritrea, 93Estonia, 27, 29, 117

Ethiopia, 93EU, see European Union (EU)EU-NATO Joint Operation

Command, 150Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

(EAPC), 3, 121, 135, 139, 140Euro-Atlantic region, 3European allies, 43European Commission (EC), see

European Union (EU)European international

organizations, 67European Neighbourhood Policy

(ENP), 2European rim, 60–70, 75–8

see also specific countriesEuropean Union (EU), 1

China’s partnership with, 24enlargement of, 65ENP’s role in, 66Ireland’s role in, 121membership policy of, 2, 65–6NATO’s role with, 5, 66partnerships in: to memberships,

64–5; policies on, 2, 62–3, 66Sweden’s role in, 134

European Union ‘neutrals,’ 112–27contributions of, 117–225history of, 113–4ISAF’s role with, 116PfP’s role with, 112, 114, 115, 117,

118rationality of, 122–5similarities within, 113–7

Evans, M., 46Exchange of Letters (2005), 50Exercise Cooperative Venture 94, 118

Fair, C. C., 174Falklands War, 48Fannie Mae, 31Ferreira-Pereira, L. C., 112Filipino diplomacy, 170Finland

Alliance’s role with, 119CCMS, attendance to, 119


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214 Index

Finland – continuedISAF’s role with, 116KFOR’s role with, 115MNNA’s role in, 66NATO’s role in, 115, 119PARP’s role with, 115, 119PfP’s role in, 112, 114, 115, 117,

119–20PRT’s role with, 116reluctancy in, 114SAC’s role in, 116

Finnish, 114Finnish Defence Forces, 120Five Power Defence Arrangements

(FPDA), 47, 52, 53FMF, see Foreign Military Financing

(FMF)Fogh Rasmussen, A., 54, 56force modernization, 118Foreign Assistance Act (1961), 163Foreign Military Financing (FMF),

193Forsberg, T., 119Fourth Summit of Americas, 195–6FPDA, see Five Power Defence

Arrangements (FPDA)France

China’s partnership with, 24European allies in, 43INTERFET intervention,

attendance to, 49Multinational Interoperability

Council formed by, 49SEATO, founder of, 46–7

Freddie Mac, 31Free Trade Area for the Americas

(FTAA), 189, 194, 195FTAA, see Free Trade Area for the

Americas (FTAA)Frühling, S., 10–11, 13, 15–16,

40–56, 123, 126–7

Garrett, N. G. D., 177Geda, E., 97geo-political power, 62, 64George, A., 16

GeorgiaBucharest Summit, issues

discussed at, 70, 72, 73, 85–6Eastern Partner’s Initiative

launched by, 66enlargement in, 62‘Intensified Dialogue’ with, 72IPAP’s role with, 72ISAF’s role with, 73KFOR’s role in, 72MAP’s role in, 27–8, 64, 74, 85–6NACC’s role in, 72NATO’s partnership with, 73nS-Cabinet security assistance to,

146PfP’s role in, 72Russia’s invasion of, 64, 70, 74United States partnership with, 23

Georgia-NATO Commission, 71Gerleman, D. J., 169German Leopard tanks, 47Germany, 29, 43, 49Gheciu, A., 63, 79, 165Gilpin, R., 31Giragosian, R., 74Glaser, C. L., 19global economic crisis, 31Global Partnership Forum, 44global trade agreements, 2Goetschel, L., 124, 126Golan Heights, 170–1Goldgeier, J. M., 29, 40Gonzi, L., 121Greater Middle East, 4Greece, 29, 71Green Party, 133, 136–8, 141Grenstad, A., 118Grey, J., 54–5Groves, J. R., Jr., 124Guadalajara, 198Guha, K., 31Gulf War, 194

Hague, 76Haiti, 169, 170, 175, 185, 192, 199

crisis in, 194


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Index 215

Häkämies, J., 120Hambali, 171Hamilton, D., 149–52HAW, see Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW)Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW), 116Hendrickson, R. C., 9–10, 14–15,

118, 163–77Hirst, C., 49Höfler, G., 121Holbrooke, R., 174Horbulin, V., 96, 98Horgan, J., 121Howard, J., 49Hrytsenko, A., 89Hungary, 27, 71Huon-class minesweeping vessels, 47hypothesis, 62, 63–4

ICI, see Istanbul CooperationInitiative (ICI)

IFOR, 26Ikenberry, G. J., 19–20, 35India, 54Individual Partnership Action Plan

(IPAP), 3, 71–2, 76, 77Individual Partnership Program

(IPP), 115Indochina, 47Indonesia, 53Insensitive Munitions Information

Centre, 48instrumental rationality, 122–3Integrated Air Defence System, 47Intensified Dialogue, 72, 75INTERFET intervention (1999), 49international campaign against

terrorism, 29International Criminal Tribunal, 75international organizations (IOs),

63, 67international security, 182–8International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF)Afghanistan’s role in, 40, 44–5Armenia’s role in, 78Australia’s role in, 40

Austria’s role in, 116Azerbadijan’s role in, 72, 77B&H’s role in, 76European Union’s ‘neutrals’ role

in, 116Finland’s role in, 116Georgia’s role in, 73Ireland’s role in, 116Left Party’s role in, 136NATO’s role in, 77Sweden’s role in, 142

IO, see international organizations(IOs)

IPAP, see Individual PartnershipAction Plan (IPAP)

IPP, see Individual PartnershipProgram (IPP)

Iraq, 28, 34, 76, 93, 171Ireland

EU ‘neutrals’ role with, 112, 115,117

European Union’s role in, 121ISAF’s role with, 116KFOR’s role with, 115–6North Atlantic Alliance’s role in,

121PfP’s role in, 112, 115, 117, 121reluctancy in, 114

Irish, 114ISAF, see International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF)Israel, 5, 30Istanbul, 44Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),

4, 165Istanbul Summit (2004), 4, 72Italian Brigade, 185

Jain, P., 6Janukovich, 60, 74Jemaah Islamiya (JI), 169JI, see Jemaah Islamiya (JI)Joint Multinational Readiness Center

(US. Army), 55Jones, J., 29Jordan, 5, 30, 166


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216 Index

Kamp, K.-H., 43, 149–51Karadžic, R., 76Karlsson, A., 136Kaskela, J., 120, 172Kastelli, V., 100Katzenstein, P. J., 83Kaufmann, C., 19Kay, S., 8–9, 13–16, 18–37Kazakhstan, 5, 60, 71–2KFOR (NATO-led peacekeeping force

in Kosovo), 72, 77, 78, 115–6Kiev, 85, 86Kihl, J., 118Kilcullen, D., 46Kirchner, N., 189, 195–6Kissinger, H., 16Koren, K. M., 88Kosovo, 23–4, 48, 93, 175, 185, 186Kucherk, V., 100Kuchma, L., 74, 86, 92, 102Kulish, N., 28Kulyk, V., 95Kuwait, 5, 30, 166Kyrgyzistan, 71

Landingin, R., 169–70Larrinaga, F., 184–5, 194–5, 206Larrinaga, F. L., 165, 167Latvia, 27Lebanon, 93Left Party, 131, 133, 135–9, 141Leroy, M., 184Levada centre, 90liaisons’, 185–6liberal democracy, 65liberalism, 5, 183Liberal Party, 131–2, 143,

144–7Liberia, 93, 168, 170, 175Lindgren, E.-M., 142Lithuania, 27, 114, 117, 118Lord, W., 21Lum, T., 170Luttwak, E., N., 16Lyon, R., 55

Macan-Markar, M., 171Macapagal-Arroyo, G., 169Macedonia, 28, 71Mahapatra, R., 173Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), 5, 6,

9–10, 163Argentina’s role with, 6, 163, 166,

167–9Australia’s role with, 166Austria’s role with, 66Finland’s role with, 66Foreign Assistance Act (1989)

formation of, 163military capabilities of, 10Pakistan’s role with, 6partnerships with, 163, 165–75,

194Philippine’s role with, 6purpose of, 165–6Sweden’s role with, 66Switzerland’s role with, 66Thailand’s role with, 6United State’s role with, 163

Malay Peninsula, 47Malaysia, 47Malta, 113, 114, 121–2Maltese, 114Maltese Constitutional provisions

on neutrality, 121Malvinas/Falkland Islands, 202MAP, see Membership Action Plan

(MAP)Mariño, H. S., 185, 186–7Markovic, N., 51Matlary, J. H., 1–16, 60–81Maximov, V., 99–100McCrum, S., 114McDermott, R., 60, 72, 80MD, see Mediterranean Dialogue

(MD)Mearsheimer, J., 20Medcalf, R., 54Mediterranean Dialogue (MD),

4, 165


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Index 217

Membership Action Plan (MAP)B&H’s role with, 75, 76creation of, 62criteria for membership into, 65,

67Georgia’s role with, 27–8, 64, 72,

74, 85–6Montenegro’s role with, 71NATO’s role with, 27–8Ukraine’s exclusion from

membership to, 74, 85–6Menem, C., 183–4, 187, 191, 195MERCOSUR, 194, 195Middle East, 30, 43Mirage III aircraft, 47Missile Technology Control Regime,

192MNNA, see Major Non-NATO Ally

(MNNA)MNTF-S, see Multinational Task

Force South (MNTF-S)Moderate Party, 131–2, 142,

143–8Moldova, 5, 60, 66, 93Montenegro in Balkans, 5, 60Moore, R., 63, 80Moore, R. R., 63, 165, 174,

177Moran, M., 121Morocco, 5, 30, 166Moscow, 18, 27Mostar airport, 76Mozambique, 194MSU, see Multinational Specialized

Unit (MSU)Multinational Interoperability

Council, 49Multinational Specialized Unit

(MSU), 185Multinational Task Force South

(MNTF-S), 115Munich, 112Munitions Safety Information

Analysis Centre, 48Myrli, S., 40, 51

NAC, 74NACC, see North Atlantic

Cooperation Council (NACC)Nagorna-Karabakh, 77Namibia, 48National Representation, 147NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO)NATO allies, 43, 46–9NATO Charter, 188NATO Council, 47, 187NATO enlargement, 27–8, 29–30, 70NATO-EU Capabilities Group, 150NATO-Georgia Commission, 3, 72,

74NATO-led peacekeeping force in

Kosovo, see KFOR (NATO-ledpeacekeeping force in Kosovo)

NATO partnershipsconcept of, 3‘consumer-driven’ approach to, 45debates over, 43–5in Eastern European region, 3–4in Euro-Atlantic region, 3external value of, 7, 8geopolitical influence of, 9in Greater Middle East, 4internal value of, 7, 8to MAP, 27–8military operations with, 2–3, 8,

28–30, 69to NATO enlargement, 27–8phases of, 24–5policy for, 61–4political advantages of, 69strategic restraint and, 25–7structure of, 1–2in Western Pacific, 4see also specific partnerships

NATO Rapid Reaction Forces, 87NATO-Russia Council, 3–4NATO-Ukraine Charter on a

Distinctive Partnership (DP), 3NDP, see New Democratic Party

(NDP)neighborhood policy (ENP), 66


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218 Index

Netherlands, 55Newby, A., 114New Democratic Party (NDP), 133‘new Europe,’ 29New People’s Army (NPA), 169New Zealand

Alliance’s partnership with, 43Australia’s partnership with, 47global partnerships with, 44MNNA’s role with, 166NATO’s partnership with, 5, 45operational reach following

September 11th, 2001, 43summit meetings, attendance to,

45United State’s partnership with,

30, 46, 52UNPROFOR, attendance to, 48

Niksch, L. A., 170Noetzel, T., 43, 53non-alignment policies, 138Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 192North Africa, 30North Atlantic Cooperation Council

(NACC), 3, 28, 118North Atlantic Council, 50, 117North Atlantic Treaty, 46, 49North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO)Afghanistan, operations in, 45Alliance’s partnership with, 148,

149Argentina’s partnership with, 2Australia’s partnership with, 6, 10Austria’s partnership with, 70,

120–1B&H’s partnership with, 76–7core mission of, 30‘customer approach’ of, 123decision-making process of, 1European rim’s partnership with,

75–8; effects of, 64–7; policyvs. strategy in, 61–4; role with,67–70; stipulations for, 60

European Union’s conditionalitywith, 66

Finland’s partnership with, 119France’s partnership with, 70Georgia’s partnership with, 73global partnerships with, 44headquarters of, 61Kazakhstan’s partnership with, 5longevity of, 1Malta’s partnership with, 113,

121–2military industry in, membership

of, 101–2MNNA’s role with, 165–75, 167–9New Zealand’s partnership with,

44official language of, 43–4operational reach following

September 11th, 2001, 43PfP’s role with, 117Prague, operation in, 44rationality of, 123strategic concept of, 3, 148–52summit meetings held by, 43–5, 50Sweden’s partnership with, 118,

131–7, 141–9, 152–7Turkey’s partnership with, 70Ukraine’s partnership with, 74,

85–9, 90, 92United State’s partnership with,

24–30Yugoslavia’s role, 183, 185

Norway, 134, 144NPA, see New People’s Army (NPA)NPT, see Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT)nS-Cabinet, 144–7Nuclear Supplier Countries, 192

Oakes, G., 122–3OAS, see Organization of American

States (OAS)Obama, B., 32, 165, 169, 174‘Old Europe,’ 29Olympics in Greece, 29Opall-Rome, B., 21Operation Cobra Gold, 172Operation Cooperative Light, 26


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Index 219

Operation Desert Shield, 192Operation Enduring Freedom, 174Operation Iraqi Freedom, 168Orange Revolution, 74, 86Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, 89Organization of American States

(OAS), 201Oruzgan province in Afghanistan,

40, 50OSCE, 62–3, 65Østerud, Ø., 63Our Ukraine, 90

Pakistan, 33, 173–5al Qaeda, strategic challenges

with, 174COIN operations in, 34international peacekeeping, role

in, 174–5MNNA’s partnership with, 6, 163,

166, 167, 173–5NATO’s partnership with, 2Taliban, strategic challenges with,

174United State’s partnership with,

173–4Pape, R. A., 31Paraguay, 168PARP, see Planning and Review

Process (PARP)Partnership for Peace (PfP), 3, 23

Alliance’s role with, 165Armenia’s role with, 72Australia’s role with, 40Austria’s role with, 120Azerbadijan’s role with, 72, 77B&H’s role with, 75Czech Republic’s role with, 114Estonia’s role with, 117EU neutral’s role with, 112, 114,

115, 117, 118Finland’s role with, 112, 114, 115,

117, 119–20Georgia’s role with, 72‘hard’ objectives of, 114

interoperability in, developmentof, 124–5

Ireland’s role with, 112, 115, 117,121

Lithuania’s role with, 114, 117Malta’s role with, 121–2members following September

11th, 2001, 117NATO’s role with, 117North Atlantic Council, founded

by, 117objectives of, 113operation Cooperative Light, role

in, 26PARP’s role with, 115partnerships with, 114principle for membership to, 117programs, types of, 147purpose of, 25Russia’s role with, 26–7‘soft’ objectives of, 114strategic restraint, adoption of,

25–6Sweden’s role with, 118, 135Ukraine’s role with, 85, 86

Partnership Staff Elements (PSE),147

Partner Staff Elements, 137Party of Regions, 87–8, 89, 90, 96Paulson, H., 31Pavlenko, A., 98Permanent Security Committee,

198Peru, 193Peru-Ecuador conflict, 194Pew Research, 32PfP, see Partnership for Peace (PfP)PfP internship, 147Philippines, Republic of, 169–71

COIN operations in, 34Filipino diplomacy in, 170FPDA role in, 53global peacekeeping in, role of,

170–1MNNA’s role with, 6, 163, 166,

169–41


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220 Index

Philippines, Republic of – continuedPhilippine Armed Forces, 170United States’ partnership with,

169–70Phillips, P. G., 48Planning and Review Process (PARP),

115Polak, N. M., 165Poland, 27, 28, 71

Exercise Cooperative Venture 94,attendance to, 118

NATO’s enlargement in, 27NATO’s partnership with, 71PfP’s role within, 114socialization in, 63Ukraine’s relationship with, 94–5

policy of defense ‘self-reliance,’ 41–2Powell, C., 167, 173Prague, 44Prague Summit (2002), 3Pravda, U., 87, 90Prince Charles, 195pro-NATO camp, 87Provincial Reconstruction Team

(PRT), 68, 116PRT, see Provincial Reconstruction

Team (PRT)Public Diplomacy Division, 149Public Policy Division, 72

QDR, see Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR)

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),33–4

Rada, 89Rådberg, P., 136, 138–41Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM),

169Rapid Reaction Forces, 87realism, 5, 62, 63red-green coalition, 135–41, 153–5Regional Command South, 40reluctancy, 114–5Republic of Korea, 45Riga, 44

Riga Summit (2006), 4Rio Group, 201Romania, 27Roth, S., 21RSM, see Rajah Solaiman Movement

(RSM)Rubin, J. P., 36Rudd, K., 50–1Rumania, 71Rumsfeld, D., 29Russia

Armenia’s partnership with, 60Exercise Cooperative Venture 94,

attendance to, 118Georgia, invasion of, 24, 28, 31,

64, 70, 74, 100Kazakhstan’s partnership with, 60PfP’s role within, 26–7Ukraine’s partnership with, 75, 86,

95–6United Russia party of, 90United State’s partnership with,

23–4Russia-Georgia war, 24, 28, 31, 64,

70, 74, 100Rwanda, 48, 194, 199

SAC, see Strategic Airlift Capability(SAC)

SACEUR, see Supreme AlliedCommander Europe (SACEUR)

Sakovskyi, G. A., 91Sakovskyi, H., 91Salonius-Pasternak, C., 125Samus, M. M., 100Sanger, D. E., 171Sarney, J., 195SCEPC, see Senior Civil Emergency

Planning Committee (SCEPC)Schake, K., 32Schmitt, E., 174Schreer, B., 10–11, 15–16, 40–56,

123, 126–7Schüssel, W., 120Schweller, R., 20Sea Sparrow Consortium, 47


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Index 221

SEATO, see Southeast Asia TreatyOrganization (SEATO)

security policy dialogue, 145–6Sedelmeier, U., 64–5Sedov, L., 90Senior Civil Emergency Planning

Committee (SCEPC), 147Sens, A., 26Serbia, 5, 60, 70, 71Serbs, 76Sevastopol naval base, 75SFOR, see Stabilization Force in

Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR)Shakasvilii, 74Shanahan, D., 51Shane, S., 174Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

24Shanker, T., 28SHAPE, see Supreme Headquarters

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)Shekhovtsov, V., 103Sherr, J., 97Shinawatra, T., 171–2Sicily, 122Silina, T., 87Simmons, R., 71Singapore, 45, 47Singer, J. D., 16Skagerrak, 118Slovakia, 27, 71Slovenia, 27, 71, 119Smith, M. A., 3–4Smith, S., 50Social Democrats (S), 132, 133,

135–40socialization, 63–4SOFA, see Status of Forces Agreement

(SOFA)Solana, J., 74Solomon, G. B., 62, 71Solomon Islands, 52Somalia, 48South American Defense Council

(CSD), 201–3South Caucasus, 71–2, 77, 78

South-East Asia, 52Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO), 1, 46Southern Command, 200Southern Cone, 187, 194, 197South Korea, 5, 43, 44, 166, 194South Ossietia, 74Spero, J. B., 94Stabilization Force in

Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), 185STANAGS, see Standardization

Agreements (STANAGS)Standardization Agreements

(STANAGS), 47START, 151State Program, 93Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),

76Stiglitz, J., 32Stockholm, 118Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC),

116, 143strategic restraint, 25–6, 25–7strategic thinking, 61strategic vision, 61Sudan, 93, 172, 173, 175summit meetings, 44–5Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(SACEUR), 29Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

Europe (SHAPE), 185, 187Sweden, 114, 131–59

Afghanistan’s partnership with,118

Alliance’s partnership with, 119CCMS, attendance to, 119Denmark’s partnership with, 144EAPC’s role within, 135, 139European Union’s partnership

with, 134Exercise Cooperative Venture 94,

attendance to, 118following fall of Berlin Wall, 131,

132ISAF’s role within, 142KFOR’s role within, 115, 116


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222 Index

Sweden – continuedLeft Party’s role within, 136MNNA’s role within, 66NATO’s partnership with, 115,

118, 131, 157–9; centre-rightcoalition’s role in, 141–8,155–7; following September11th, 2001, 131; IPP’s rolewithin, 134; methodologicalaspects of, 133, 134; red-greencoalition’s role within,135–41, 153–5; strategicchoices for, 148–9; strategicconcepts of, 149–52; Swedishpolicies for, 153–7

Norway’s partnership with, 144PARP’s partnership with, 115,

143PfP’s role within, 112, 114, 115,

117, 118, 135PRT’s role within, 116reluctancy in, 114SAC’s role within, 116Swedish, 114Swedish Armed Forces, 118, 135Swedish parliaments, 131, 132–5,

see also specific divisions ofparliament

Syrén, H., 119

Tagliabue, J., 168Taiwan, 31Tajikistan, 71Taliban, 170Tanker War (1988), 48Tashkent Pact, 87Tashkent Treaty, 89Tbiblisi, 72, 74Technical Cooperation Program

(TTCP), 47terrorist bombings in Bali, 171Thailand, 171–3

Afghanistan’s partnership with,172

anti-terrorism measures in, 172FPDA’s role in, 53

international peacekeeping, rolein, 172–3

MNNA’s role within, 6, 163, 166,171–3

United States’ partnership with,171, 172

Thaksin, 172Thayer, C., 52therapeutic membership policy, 62Timoshenko, Y., 87Titley, G., 114Tlatelolco Treaty, 198Tonga, 52transparency, 137, 143Treaty of Tlatelolco, 192Tsitsiurskii, M., 74, 95, 99Tsymbaliuk, R., 93Tsytsiurskii, M., 95, 99TTCP, see Technical Cooperation

Program (TTCP)Tunbridge, J. E., 122Turkey, 22–3, 70, 118Turkmenistan, 71Tuzla airport, 76

Ukraine, 83–108collective action in, 92–5Communist rule in, 94Eastern Partner’s Initiative

launched by, 66enlargement in, 62European rim partnerships in, 60Georgia’s partnership in, 93independence of, 83MAP’s exclusion of, 74, 85–6military industry in, 98, 100–5national level for, 95NATO’s partnership with, 3, 10,

27–8, 74, 85–9; action planfor, 85; with defense industry,10; establishment of, 85;membership policy for, 86–7;with military, 10; nationallevel for, 90; policies for, 92;political views on, 87

neutrality in, 87


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Index 223

parliament adopted in, 85, 89Party of Region’s role in, 90, 96PfP’s role within, 85, 86Poland’s partnership with, 94–5president of, 102as rationalists, 95–105Russia’s partnership with, 75, 86,

95–6sectoral actors in, 91self-identity of, establishment of,

89–92State Program’s development in,

93Turkey’s partnership with, 22Ukrainian military in, 97–102United State’s partnership with, 23

Ukraine in Caucausus, 60Ukraine-NATO Commission, 71Ukraine-NATO Joint Working

Group, 103Ukrainian military, 97–102Ukrainian Navy, 100UNASUR, see Union of South

American Nations (UNASUR)Union of South American Nations

(UNASUR), 201United Kingdom, 43, 46–7, 49UK Ministry of Defence, 48United Nations Mission, 172–3UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR),

48UN Security Council, 186, 199United Russia party, 90United States

Afghanistan, military role in, 28,29, 32, 35

Argentina’s partnership with, 13,167, 168, 191–203

Australia’s partnership with, 30,40, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54

China’s partnership with, 20–2,24, 31, 54

COIN’s partnership with, 34–5deficit of, 32economic decline in, 31–3Georgia’s partnership with, 23

global affairs, role in, 33NATO’s partnership with, 24–35,

43New Zealand’s partnership with,

30Persian Gulf, military

deployments to, 48Philippine’s partnership with, 169,

170QDR’s partnership with, 34quadrilateral dialogues of, 54Russia’s partnership with, 23–4SEATO, founder of, 46–7Turkey’s partnership with, 22–3Ukraine’s partnership with, 23US. Department of Defense, 33US. Department of State, 22US. grand strategy, 18–24US. Security Treaty (ANZUS), 1, 46,

47, 49, 53, 54US. State Department Country

Report on terrorism, 168US-Georgia Strategic Partnership

Commission, 23US partnerships, see specific

partnershipsUNPROFOR, see UN Protection Force

(UNPROFOR)UN Truce Supervision Organization

in Jerusalem, 168UXO, 76Uzbekistan, 71

Vaahtoranta, T., 119value rational action, 123value rationality, 122–5Van Evera, S., 19Vassallo, R., 122Vecherko, D., 96Vedernikova, I., 89Venezuela, 200, 202Vietnam War, 46, 171Visegrád states, 62

Wæver, O., 63, 197–8Wahlén, G., 136


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Walesa, L., 26Walt, S., 20Warsaw Pact, 14, 19Washington Consensus, 189Washington NATO Project (WNP),

149–50Washington Treaty, 46Wassenaar Accord, 192weapons of mass destruction, 55Weber, M., 113, 122–3, 126Wendt, A., 83Westernization, 98Western Pacific, 4Western Sahara, 168, 175White, H., 42, 51Widman, A., 142Wirtz, J., 61

WNP, see Washington NATO Project(WNP)

Woodhead, P., 184World Bank, 190World Wars, 46Woronowycz, R., 92–3

Yanukovych, V., 89Yaphe, J., 23Yekhanurov, Y., 89Yeltsin, B., 27Yemen, 33Young, T.-D., 47Yugoslavia, 48, 75, 183, 185, 194

Zemin, J., 21Zhurets, S. G., 103–4


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