nato: the prague summit and beyond...the countries of the warsaw pact.1 four more european countries...

RESEARCH PAPER 03/0516 JANUARY 2003

NATO: The PragueSummit and Beyond

This paper examines the main conclusions of theNATO Heads of State and Government Summit inPrague on 21 and 22 November 2002, and theprospects for the Alliance’s future.

It addresses the implications of enlargement, NATO’sresponse to new threats and challenges, the PragueCapabilities Commitment and the NATO ResponseForce. It also analyses the attitudes of some memberstates towards the Alliance.

Claire Taylor

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE SECTION

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Summary of main points

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, there has been much debate over the continuedrelevance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the new strategic securityenvironment. The NATO Heads of State and Government Summit on 21 and 22 November2002 has been seen as a pivotal point for the Alliance. Originally promoted as an enlargementsummit, Prague offered the opportunity for NATO’s leaders to either transform the Allianceand its ability to adapt to the challenges of the modern world, or risk becoming marginalised.

At Prague seven new members were invited to join the Alliance. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia will continue to work towards fulfilling theirMembership Action Plan (MAP) obligations as part of accession negotiations, with a view togaining formal membership in 2004.

The Prague Summit updated the Alliance’s Strategic Concept to take account of the changesin threat assessment. The new Concept included a commitment to the campaign againstterrorism, “out of area” operations and the establishment of a NATO Response Force,capable of rapid deployment for a period of up to 30 days in areas of high intensity conflict.

In order to underpin the New Strategic Concept, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)was launched to address, conclusively, the ongoing shortfalls in Alliance capability. Underthe initiative, NATO member states are committed to improving key capabilities within aspecified timeframe.

Measures were also taken at Prague to streamline the Alliance’s military command structure,to improve its ability to respond to nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) threats, to assessthe need for strategic missile defence, and to enhance co-operation with partners.

Yet, the question remains as to whether NATO will deliver on the commitments made atPrague. Some have argued that enlargement has the potential to undermine the Alliance’scohesion by making the political decision-making structure more complex. The militaryeffectiveness of the accession states has also been called into question. The rate of progress inthe accession negotiations, and the pace of NATO’s internal reform, will be importantfactors.

The enhanced role for NATO envisaged in the New Strategic Concept is at presenthypothetical. How that role materialises in practice will be determined by international eventsover the next six months. The extent to which the United States dictates policy and thewillingness of European members of the Alliance to engage in areas outside of NATO’straditional sphere of influence will determine NATO’s military relevance for the future.Underpinning the rhetorical commitment towards the NATO Response Force and improvingcapabilities under the PCC will help shape that debate. The application of political will andthe ability of member states to utilise domestic defence budgets effectively will be crucialelements in determining the future success of NATO as a military alliance rather than apolitical club.

CONTENTS

I Background 7

II The Prague Summit 9

A. Enlargement 9

1. Options for Enlargement 11

2. Enlargement to 26 13

B. New Threats and Challenges 15

1. The Prague Vision 18

C. Capabilities 20

1. Capability Commitments 21

2. The NATO Response Force 27

3. The New Command Structure 30

4. Defence against Terrorism 31

5. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons 32

6. Missile Defence 33

D. Co-operation with Partners 36

1. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace(PfP) 36

2. NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 38

3. Mediterranean Dialogue 40

4. NATO-Ukraine Commission 41

5. European Union 42

III Will NATO Deliver? 44

A. The Implications of Enlargement 44

1. Status of the Accession States 44

2. Military Effectiveness 52

3. NATO’s Open Door Policy 55

B. Future Theatres of Operation 58

1. Afghanistan 59

2. Iraq 60

C. Capabilities 61

1. Financial Considerations 61

D. Future Relationships 64

1. EU/ ESDP 64

2. NATO-Russia Council 68

IV National Attitudes 70

A. United States 70

B. United Kingdom 72

C. France 74

D. Germany 75

E. Russia 77

RESEARCH PAPER 03/05

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I Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was formed in 1949 with the signing ofthe North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. The Treaty created an alliance of ten Europeanand two North American nations, dedicated to ensuring their collective security andpreservation and intended to counter the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and laterthe countries of the Warsaw Pact.1 Four more European countries joined the Alliancebetween 1952 and 1982, followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland at theWashington Summit in 1999, bringing the number of NATO members to 19.2

The main tenet of the Alliance is Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which sets out theprinciple of collective security as laid down by the UN Charter. It states unequivocallythat an armed attack against one or more members shall be considered an attack againstthem all. Prior to 12 September 2001, the day after the terrorist attacks on New York andWashington, Article 5 had never been invoked.

NATO is not solely a military organisation. The Washington Treaty contains a number ofarticles and provisions which envisage a political and diplomatic role for the Alliance.Specifically, under Article 2, member states are committed to contributing to thedevelopment of a peaceful and friendly international community through thestrengthening of free institutions and promoting conditions of stability. The Treaty alsocalls for efforts towards eliminating conflict in the international economic policies ofmember countries and encouraging co-operation between them.

When the Cold War ended in 1989 and the threat of the Soviet Union diminished, somebegan to question NATO’s continued relevance. However, conflict in the Balkans andinstability throughout the former Soviet bloc countries in the early 1990s led NATO todevelop a new role. In addition to its original purpose of collective security, NATObecame a catalyst for extending security and stability throughout Europe via itspeacekeeping and peace-support operations.

In response to the changing security environment, the Alliance developed a new StrategicConcept, which was adopted at the Rome Summit in 1991. Radically different to allNATO strategic concepts that had gone before it, this evolved strategy maintained thenotion of collective security but also emphasised co-operation with former adversariesand a commitment to improving and expanding security in Europe as a whole. The NorthAtlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was launched in 1991, bringing together NATOallies with former Warsaw Pact countries in a forum for security dialogue and co-operation. In 1994 the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme was established to enable

1 A full copy of the Treaty can be accessed online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm2 NATO’s members are: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,

Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, theUnited Kingdom and the United States.

http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm


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NATO’s partner countries to develop individual programmes of practical co-operationwith NATO as a complement to the opportunities for multilateral political dialogueafforded by the NACC. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was created in1997 to replace the NACC and build on its achievements. Extending the “hand offriendship” to Central and Eastern Europe in this way laid the groundwork for laterenlargement of the Alliance. In 1997 the NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council (PJC)was also established to foster dialogue and co-operation between the Alliance and itsformer adversary.3

By the Madrid summit in 1997, NATO leaders also agreed that the Strategic Conceptshould be re-examined and updated to reflect the changes that had taken place in Europesince its inception and to address the security challenges of the 21st century. At theWashington Summit in 1999 a New Strategic Concept was adopted. This provided an“authoritative statement of the Alliance’s objectives and provided the highest levelguidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them”.4 It reaffirmedthe importance of collective security, the transatlantic link and maintaining the Alliance’smilitary capabilities. It also examined the role of other key elements in NATO’s securitystrategy, namely conflict prevention and crisis management, partnership, co-operation anddialogue, enlargement, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. As part of theNew Strategic Concept the Defence Capabilities Initiative was also launched to help themilitary forces of Alliance members become more interoperable, sustainable andeffective. Specifically, the DCI sought to strengthen European defence capabilities,thereby reinforcing the European pillar of NATO and addressing the perceived capabilitygap between the US and Europe.

The Washington Summit also reaffirmed the Alliance’s commitment to the PfPprogramme, the EAPC and partnership between NATO and a number of countries,including the Ukraine, Russia and those on the southern Mediterranean flank of theAlliance area, through the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Russia Council andthe Mediterranean Dialogue. Under the ‘Berlin-plus’ arrangements agreed at Washington,the first steps towards the EU use of NATO assets were also made.

3 Information on the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council(EAPC) can be accessed online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm

4 NATO Fact Sheet Background to the Strategic Concept, 9 August 2000. Available online athttp://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/stratcon.htm

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/stratcon.htm


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II The Prague Summit

Since the Washington Summit in 1999, the international arena has altered. The events of11 September 2001 marked a watershed in international relations that challenged theparameters of strategic thinking and led to a fundamental shift in threat assessment, withthe rise to predominance of the concept of asymmetric warfare.5

For NATO, the immediate consequences have been remarkably similar to those in 1990,when the end of the Cold War raised questions over the Alliance’s continued credibilityand legitimacy. The Prague Summit on 21 and 22 November 2002 was regarded as adefining moment for NATO. It represented the opportunity to enlarge the Alliance, whilealso giving it the chance to reinvent itself and carve out a new security role for the future.Alternatively, the Alliance faced the risk of becoming marginalised and ineffective.

At the previous NATO Summit in Reykjavik on 14 May 2002, NATO Secretary GeneralLord Robertson summed up this challenge:

NATO must change radically if it is to be effective…it must modernise or bemarginalised.6

A. Enlargement

Since the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949, seven additional countries havejoined the original twelve member states of the Alliance.7 Greece and Turkey joined in1952, Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982, and at the Washington Summit in 1999 the CzechRepublic, Hungary and Poland became members. NATO has continued to maintain,under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, an “open door” policy whereby “anyEuropean country in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty andcontribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance”.8

However, countries aspiring to NATO membership are also expected to meet certainpolitical, economic and military goals. At the Washington Summit in 1999, NATOlaunched its Membership Action Plan (MAP) as part of this “open door” commitment.Building on the dialogue process and experience of integrating Poland, Hungary and theCzech Republic into the Alliance, the MAP is designed to assist aspirant countries in theirpreparations by providing advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATOmembership. Specifically, under the MAP:

5 The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, Cm 5566, p.7 defines asymmetric warfare as “attack byunconventional methods which would have a disproportionate effect”.

6 “Time for NATO to Adapt” Jane’s Defence Review, 22 May 2002, p.217 The original twelve members were: USA, Canada, UK, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.8 Prague Summit Fact Sheet Enlarging the Alliance, 16 September 2002. Available online at

http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in-focus/enlargement/index.htm

http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in-focus/enlargement/index.htm


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a) Aspirant countries must submit, on an annual basis, a programme of theirpreparations for possible future membership, covering political, economic, defence,resource, security and legal aspects. These include settling any international, ethnicor external territorial disputes by peaceful means, demonstrating a commitment to therule of law and human rights, establishing democratic control of their armed forcesand promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice andenvironmental responsibility. Procedures must be in place to ensure the security ofsensitive information, while legal arrangements and agreements that govern co-operation within NATO must be compatible with domestic legislation. Each countrysets its own objectives, targets and work schedules.

b) Focused and candid feedback is provided on aspirant countries’ progress, includingboth political and technical advice as well as annual 19+1 meetings at Council level9

in order to assess progress. Throughout the year, meetings and workshops are alsoarranged with NATO civilian and military experts in order to address the entirespectrum of issues relevant to membership. An annual progress report is presented tothe NATO foreign and defence ministers every spring.

c) Assistance in the defence field is provided by NATO and by member states toaspirant countries. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, of which all aspirantcountries are members, allows candidate states to meet the military obligations of theMAP, including the development of interoperability with NATO forces through jointexercises and the preparation of their force structures and capabilities.10 Theallocation of resources to meet the defence and security commitments that futuremembership of NATO would bring is also addressed. Agreed targets are reviewed ona regular basis. 11

However, participation in the MAP is not a guarantee of future membership. Decisions toinvite aspirant countries to participate in accession talks are taken by consensus withinNATO and are determined on a case-by-case basis. Each aspirant country is assessedagainst its MAP criteria, although prior to Prague some analysts suggested that theattitude of candidates to the situation in Iraq and the International Criminal Court (ICC)could have shaped political thinking, particularly in the US.

In an article in The Washington Times, US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns refutedthese allegations:

9 19 + 1 refers to a meeting between all 19 NATO members and the aspirant country.10 For more information on the Partnership for Peace programme, refer to the NATO Fact Sheet

Partnership and Co-operation, 20 February 2002. Available online athttp://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm

11 NATO Fact Sheet NATO’s Membership Action Plan, 6 September 2000

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm


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We are taking great care to make sure that the decision is based on such criteriaas the applicants’ military readiness, institutional strength and human rightsrecord…We are not judging candidates on other issues like Iraq.12

Since its inception, ten countries have so far participated in the MAP process: Albania,Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

1. Options for Enlargement

Although they were formal candidates for NATO membership, Albania, Croatia and theFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were regarded as unlikely to be offeredmembership in this round of enlargement in view of ongoing instability in the Balkanregion and the relative newness of their candidacies. Therefore, prior to the Praguesummit, many analysts considered that two options for enlargement remained open to theAlliance.

a. A core group

On the basis of the achievements made in reforming both military and civil institutions, acore group of five countries was considered certain to be accepted for NATOmembership. Following an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers on 24-25September 2002, US diplomats were reported in the media as commenting:

Five countries– Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia are certain tobe admitted to the 19-strong Alliance.13

Inviting a core group to begin accession negotiations was viewed as essential formaintaining political momentum and reinforcing NATO’s “open door” policy, but suchan approach was also viewed as problematic, in that it would have raised the challenge ofdealing with the remaining uninvited candidates, in particular Bulgaria and Romania.Both countries had invested a lot of political capital in the reform process and in the caseof Romania, which was not admitted in 1997, the failure to gain membership for a secondtime was considered by many analysts as a potential catalyst for creating disillusionmentwith the enlargement process and undermining future co-operation with the Alliance.

An article in Jane’s Intelligence Review commented:

However problematic these countries’ [Bulgaria and Romania] early accessionmight be owing to their relatively low level of preparedness, it is preferable to

12 “NATO candidates aim to please US and Europe” The Washington Times, 13 September 2002 p.113 “NATO’s big push east will take in up to seven states” The Daily Telegraph, 27 September 2002


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alienating their electorates and political class and leave them vulnerable toincreasing Russia influence. 14

Jeffrey Simon, writing in the Strategic Forum, also argued:

NATO would need to persuade the excluded MAP partners that the invitednations had actually achieved reforms that justified inclusion.15

b. A ‘Big Bang’ Approach

The accession of seven members to the Alliance, which had been dubbed a ‘Big Bang’approach, was reported to be the favoured option of a number of NATO members,including the United States.

Leaders of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly issued a Declaration on NATOTransformation on 6 October 2002, which stated:

The leaders of the Assembly’s 19 member delegations have called on NATO toinvite seven nations– Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia andSlovenia– to join the Alliance at the NATO Prague Summit in November. TheDeclaration on NATO Transformation agreed by the Standing Committee of theAssembly…argues that the seven countries have proved their progress towardsNATO membership by pushing through radical reforms at home, supportingNATO operations in the Balkans and contributing to the fight against terrorism.16

The report on NATO enlargement by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations alsorecommended the accession of all seven prominent MAP candidates. However, thecommittee expressed several concerns and recommended that:

The MAP process continues for those countries who receive an invitation inPrague as was stated in the Reykjavik Final Communiqué (May 2002). Such aprogramme would ensure that there is no back-sliding in the significant reformsthat have been made by each of the countries.17

These sentiments were shared by the Defence Select Committee in its report The Futureof NATO:

We see no obstacle in principle to the issuing of invitations to each of the sevenapplicants (although in Slovakia’s case this must be with the caveat of the

14 “NATO looks forward to a big bang” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002 p.915 Jeffrey Simon “The Next Round of NATO Enlargement” Strategic Forum, No.176 October 200016 NATO Parliamentary Assembly Press Communiqué Declaration on NATO Transformation, 6 October

200217 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Letter to the Chairman on NATO Enlargement,

30 August 2002


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outcome of the September elections) with the proviso that applicants continue towork hard on defence and political reforms up to and beyond any invitationissued at Prague.18

In the January 2002 CER Bulletin, Andrew Cottey highlighted some of the advantages oflarge-scale enlargement of the Alliance:

Such a ‘big bang’ would consolidate pro-Western democratic politics, encourageco-operation among the states of the region, help them to reform their armedforces and provide reassurance that they will never again fall under Russia’ssway. Further advantages of a Big Bang would be to avoid the divisive issue ofchoosing among the candidates, and to remove once and for all a potential thornin NATO-Russia relations. The Alliance could then forget about enlargement andfocus on priorities such as peacekeeping in the Balkans, military reform andaddressing global security challenges.19

However, opponents of such a robust approach to enlargement argued that it would diluteNATO’s military capability, threaten its cohesion and ability to take decisions andincrease the debate over its relevance.

Neil Barnett summed up NATO’s dilemma in the July 2002 edition of Jane’s IntelligenceReview:

The simultaneous expansion of its roles and membership has caused somedisquiet within the Alliance over issues of decision making and unity…Thecoming enlargement presents a dilemma. On the one hand, it serves a politicalrole of consolidating the liberal-democratic identity of former communist states,and underwriting their territorial security. On the other, it complicates decisionmaking at a time when NATO should be grasping the opportunity to take aleading role in countering emerging threats such as terrorism, and expanding out-of-area operations.20

Observers believed that, for enlargement of NATO to be effective and provide newimpetus to the Alliance, a ‘big bang’ approach would have to be accompanied byinstitutional reform, new initiatives for addressing the capability gap and consensus onthe future of NATO’s remit and role.

2. Enlargement to 26

A fifth enlargement of NATO was confirmed at the Prague Summit on 21 November2002. This decision, involving the largest expansion of the Alliance in its history, willallow Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin

18 Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC 914 24 July 2002, p.6419 Andrew Cottey “NATO’s Big Bang” CER Bulletin, Issue 21 January 200220 “NATO looks forward to big bang” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002 p.8


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accession negotiations with a view to ratification and formal membership of NATO inMay 2004.

Announcing the decision, the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, stated:

We can say with complete confidence that this round of enlargement willmaintain and increase NATO’s strength, cohesion and vitality, and that it is notdirected against the security interests of any partner state…This is a cruciallyimportant decision where consensus among Allies has emerged gradually overthe last few months. I believe that consensus has now been reached.21

The Prague Summit Declaration, issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, alsostated:

During the period leading up to accession, the Alliance will involve the invitedcountries in Alliance activities to the greatest extent possible. We pledge ourcontinued support and assistance, including through the Membership Action Plan(MAP). We look forward to receiving the invitees’ timetables for reforms, uponwhich further progress will be expected before and after accession in order toenhance their contribution to the Alliance.22

US President George W. Bush welcomed the decision, but cautioned:

All NATO members– both new and old– must contribute military strength to thealliance, even if it means increasing defence spending.23

In a Statement to the Commons on 25 November 2002, the Prime Minister stated:

The summit reflected the extraordinary changes in the global securityenvironment in which all nations now operate. NATO itself has changed. Wedecided on seven new members: I congratulate Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia on their invitations; they are welldeserved, and they reflect the progress in reform that all seven countries havemade since the end of the cold war. All are on course to be in the Alliance by thenext summit in 18 months’ time, and to be contributors to European security.That enlargement will strengthen NATO and make the whole continent of Europemore secure…24

21 Prague Summit Announcement on Enlargement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 21November 2002. The full text of the speech is available online at:http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121c.htm

22 Prague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 21 November 2002. Afull copy of the declaration is available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm

23 “NATO embraces new members”, BBC News Online, 21 November 200224 HC Deb 25 November 2002, c35

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm

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On the implications of NATO enlargement, BBC News Online commented:

Although enlargement will be trumpeted as a sign of security and democracy inEurope, to some, it will be seen as proof that NATO is less a top-notch militaryalliance and more just a political club.25

John Simpson, former Foreign Affairs Editor at the BBC, also expressed scepticism:

As a result of the Prague summit last week, NATO is even more an alliance builtaccording to an American blueprint[…] NATO is now entirely dominant. Itincludes virtually all the most powerful and prosperous countries on earth. Unlikethe United Nations, it can be relied on – no matter how unenthusiastically at times– to do what Washington wants. Sure, it can hobble American policy; the Greeks,the French and the Italians made it much more difficult for the Pentagon to attackSerbia as hard as it wanted in 1999[…] Overall though, if the Americans wantNATO to do something, NATO does it. Much less pressure is required thanpersuading the UN Security Council to accept American leadership, for instance.The new candidates, coming as they do from the old Soviet Union, the WarsawPact and the Yugoslav Federation, all understand that they owe their membershipto the Americans[…] Their loyalty will be to Washington, not to Paris, London orBerlin.26

B. New Threats and Challenges

Following the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO’s strategic landscape has been definedby ethnic conflict and civil war, migration, organised crime, the proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction technology and the rise of asymmetric warfare.27

In a speech on 3 October 2002 NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson highlightedwhat he believed to be the threats and challenges for the next decade:

My first prediction: more instability[…] the Caucasus, Central Asia, NorthernAfrica and the Middle East all offer a rich current and potential cocktail ofinstability…My second prediction: more spillover[…] through migration, risingnumbers of people seeking asylum, a booming industry in people smuggling andall that goes with it…My third prediction: more terrorism[…] a special breed ofterrorism has come to the fore – driven not by achievable political aims but byfanatical extremism[…] My fourth prediction: more failed states[…] My nextprediction: more proliferation[…] the spread of weapons of mass destruction willbe a defining security challenge of this new century.28

25 “NATO embraces new members”, BBC News Online, 21 November 200226 “NATO marches on– to the beat of the US drum”, The Sunday Telegraph, 24 November 2002, p.3227 The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter defines asymmetric warfare as “attack by

unconventional methods which would have a disproportionate effect”. p.728 “NATO: A Vision for 2012” Speech by Lord Robertson to the NATO/GMFUS Conference, 3 October

2002


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The search for a new role for the Alliance was initially addressed at the Rome Summit in1991, with the adoption of a new Strategic Concept. This was developed eight years laterat the Washington Summit with a re-assessment of the challenges and priorities facing theAlliance at the beginning of the 21st century. Three years on, the strategic basis on whichthat Concept was founded has again shifted fundamentally and, as a result, has raisedquestions over NATO’s role in the world. That shift has also highlighted the disparities innational perceptions within the Alliance, particularly in terms of its military effectiveness.

The lessons of Kosovo, which were largely focused on the deficiencies in decision-making and the US-European capabilities gap, have shaped thinking, particularly in theUS, that the multilateral institutional structure of NATO is a hindrance to military andoperational effectiveness. As a consequence, the US has pursued a largely unilateraliststrategy, supported by only a few key allies, in its military operations against al-Qaedaand the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Gen. Klaus Naumann, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, commented:

European Allies see NATO as a collective defence and crisis managementorganisation, whereas the United States, its most powerful and indeedindispensable member, no longer looks at the Alliance as the military instrumentof choice to use in conflict and war.29

US Republican Senator, Richard Lugar, supported this view:

Rightly or wrongly, the legacy of Kosovo has reinforced the concern that NATOis not up to the job of fighting a modern war.30

Henry Nau, writing in the Royal Institute of International Affairs publication, The WorldToday, stated:

The United States made a mistake by not using NATO in some capacity in theAfghanistan war. After September 11, for the first time, NATO invoked Article 5to declare the attack against American territory as an attack against the territoryof all its members. This decision expressed the deepest ties that bind the membersand constitute the Alliance. America failed to validate these ties […] Thisdecision will come back to haunt the United States. NATO is being progressivelyweakened as a military organisation.31

NATO has been called on to provide little more than political support in the ongoingcampaign against terrorism, a development that some commentators believe to be

29 “Crunch time for the Alliance” NATO Review, Summer 200230 “NATO Obviously has to Move Ahead” BASIC Newsletter on International Security, April 200231 “Alliance at Risk” The World Today, May 2002 p.18


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indicative of the current prominence of the political and diplomatic role of the Alliance, atthe expense of the military dimension.

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly of 22 May 2002 commented that:

Despite constant public prodding of its European allies to increase militarycapabilities, the Bush administration has probably accepted that real defencebudget growth in Europe is unlikely to happen. NATO’s value then becomesincreasingly important as a mechanism for conflict management and security inEurope by virtue of its inclusiveness. Membership in NATO carriesresponsibilities and ties member countries into a system based on Western,democratic principles and transparent operating procedures. By co-opting EasternEurope and the Balkans through membership, the West can better influence thepolitical and economic development there and further the maturity of civil-military relations. This does not mean that NATO’s military role is consigned tohistory but it does imply that its diplomatic role becomes paramount.32

These questions over NATO’s military competence, and suggestions that it has beenfacing a crisis of confidence, have been an impetus for the Alliance to establish a new anddefinitive role for itself at Prague. In the run-up to the November 2002 summit, NATOSecretary General Lord Robertson had been forthright in laying down the challenge to re-establish NATO’s military and political credibility. In his opening statement to theinformal meeting of NATO defence ministers on 24 September he stated:

As we approach the Prague summit, we need therefore to think very carefullyabout the role of this Alliance in the future, not least in protecting our citizensfrom criminal terrorists and criminal states, especially where they are armed withweapons designed for massive and indiscriminate destruction…NATO played thekey role in defeating the threats of the Cold War and the instability that followedit. We must now transform our Alliance so it can play an equally pivotal part inthe war against terrorism and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.33

In a speech to the NATO/German Marshall Fund of the United States conference inBrussels on 3 October 2002, he went further:

It is hard to overestimate the importance of our Prague summit. It will invite newmembers to join, ending Europe’s Cold War division for good, and setting thestage for a wider NATO. It will deepen NATO’s partnerships with ourneighbours to our East and South. It will give NATO a clearer profile incombating terrorism, and in responding to the challenges posed by theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And it will meet the challenge of

32 “Time for NATO to adapt” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 May 2002 p.2133 Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, to the Informal Meeting of NATO Defence

Ministers, 24 September 2002. Available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020924a.htm

http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020924a.htm


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improving NATO’s defence capabilities, with new commitments, new targets andconcrete new improvements.34

1. The Prague Vision

The evolution of the NATO Strategic Concept has not been as profound at Prague as itwas at the Washington Summit in 1999. Rather than re-define a strategic vision for theAlliance, the decisions taken at the Prague Summit sought to build on, and strengthen, thepremises of the 1999 Strategic Concept.

The Prague Summit Declaration, issued by the North Atlantic Council, stated:

Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision toinvoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensivepackage of measures, based on NATO’s Strategic Concept, to strengthen ourability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations andterritory, from wherever they may come […]

We underscore that our efforts to transform and adapt NATO should not beperceived as a threat by any country or organisation, but rather as a demonstrationof our determination to protect our populations, territory and forces from anyarmed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad. We are determinedto deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attack on us, in accordance withthe Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.35

In a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on 12 December 2002, NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord Robertson reaffirmed this commitment:

When it came to defining the threats and challenges this Alliance faces, and themissions NATO should take on, there was no disagreement whatsoever.

NATO’s members all agreed completely that NATO must address head-on thethreat posed by terrorism…the key feature of this new terrorism is the massmurder of civilians– which is why the NATO countries also agreed to co-operateon defence against weapons of mass destruction…Prague also put an end totransatlantic debate on the “out-of-area” question. Allies agreed that in facingnew threats, artificial geographical limitations make no sense. They agreed thatNATO should deter, disrupt, defend and protect against threats from whereverthey come. And that our forces must be able to go wherever they are required tocarry out their mission.36

34 Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson to the NATO/ GMFUS conference on 3 October2002. Available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003a.htm


36 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on 12 December2002




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Specifically, the comprehensive package of measures agreed at Prague focused onboosting capabilities. These included:

• Creating a NATO Response Force (NRF), capable of rapid deployment to anytheatre of operation.

• Streamlining NATO’s military command arrangements.• Approving the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as a successor to the

Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI).• Endorsing the military concept for defence against terrorism.• Endorsing the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

defence initiatives.• Examining the options for addressing the missile threat to Alliance territory,

forces and population centres.

All of these issues are dealt with in more detail in Section C below.

Attitudes to the new proposals have generally been mixed. In his statement to the NorthAtlantic Council meeting on 21 November 2002, the British Prime Minister stated:

NATO’s founders had an unprecedented vision of how free nations could worktogether in the common cause of freedom and democracy. Some might questionwhether NATO can still play that vital role. I believe it can. Together with ournew Allies and our renewed Alliance, we can be confident that we are ready tomeet the many challenges we face.37

Yet, many analysts have questioned whether the Prague summit really established a long-term vision and role for the Alliance.

On 23 November 2002 an article in The Financial Times argued:

After Prague there is an ominous sense of anti-climax. There is no bigvision…The trouble is that neither the Americans nor their allies have a clearconcept. To the extent that they do, they differ. For Europe, the primary purposeof the alliance is to bind the US to Europe. For Washington, that is not a priority,for Europe is no longer the prime area of insecurity. If NATO is to have a pointfor the US, it must be prepared to operate out of area– in regions such as theMiddle East.

37 Statement by British Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, to the North Atlantic Council, 21November 2002


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That is the difference the summit failed to resolve…the fundamental lack ofclarity remains. Prague has provided some sticking plaster but it has not providedthe real glue needed to give the alliance cohesion and a sense of purpose.38

The Independent of 22 November 2002 commented:

They all [the NATO members] have their individual reasons for finding theorganisation useful at this particular moment. The Americans, having ignoredand, indeed, deliberately marginalised the institution over the year since 11September, now see it as a way of establishing the grand alliance to invade Iraq.The Europeans, having bravely talked of being a countervailing force to US‘unilateralism’ are now becoming distinctly nervous that America might go itsown way and they want NATO to keep the great power locked in. The newentrants look upon NATO as a means of consolidating their freedom from Sovietpower.

All these are valid short term uses. What they do not add up to is a long-termpurpose. And that…is the only thing that can keep an alliance alive. NATO’sgreat strength has always been that it has had a common enemy and an effectivesystem of military command. Now it has neither…Alliances are made and heldby self-interest not idealism, military alliances most of all. For half a century,NATO worked as one of the most successful multi-national organisations inhistory because the security interests of Europe and America were felt to be thesame– the containment of the Soviet Union.39

Jeffrey Gedmin, Director of the Aspen Institute, was also quoted in The Sunday Times assuggesting:

The summit was a near-last ditch attempt to save NATO. Maybe it will work,maybe it won’t…The Americans want a Europe that is militarily stronger and aEurope that moves closer to our strategic vision and responsibilities in the world.But even if they accomplish the first, it is unlikely they are going to welcome andembrace the latter.40

C. Capabilities

Bolstering the capabilities of the Alliance was one of the main features of Prague, andwas regarded as vital to the ability of NATO to meet future threats and challenges.

38 “No vision in Prague: The US and its allies have yet to find a purpose for NATO”, The Financial Times,23 November 2002

39 “NATO suffers from a terminal illness, but no one dares kill it off just yet”, The Independent, 22November 2002

40 “America dwarfs NATO’s new recruits”, The Sunday Times, 24 November 2002


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1. Capability Commitments

a. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI)

The capability gap between the US and its European allies has been one of the maindifficulties in the transatlantic relationship and a perceived hindrance to the operationaleffectiveness of the Alliance. Attempts to address the gap have been underway since thecollapse of the Soviet Union, although little progress was made until the launch of theDefence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington Summit in 1999. NATOSecretary General Lord Robertson stated at the time:

The Defence Capabilities Initiative is designed to ensure that all Allies not onlyremain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities toface the new security challenges.41

Specifically, the DCI sought to address:

• Mobility and the deployability of forces – including to those areas outside ofAlliance territory.

• Sustainability – ensuring forces are capable of operations of long-duration.• Effective engagement – allowing successful engagement in all types of

operations, from high to low intensity.• Survivability – the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and

future threats.• Interoperable communications – specifically command, control and information

systems.

Much of the focus of the DCI had been on lessening the capability gap in areas of keystrategic importance such as C4ISTAR,42 strategic lift, precision guided munitions and thesuppression of enemy air defences. In order to avoid duplication and overlap, the DCIwas also closely tied to progress made by EU members on the Helsinki Headline Goaland the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).43

However, as the Defence Select Committee report on The Future of NATO commented:

NATO carried out an assessment of progress in implementing the DCI for theNAC meeting of defence ministers in June 2001, which concluded that:‘Although progress has been made in certain areas, further efforts are required toachieve the necessary improvement.’ ‘Critical and long standing deficiencies’

41 NATO Fact Sheet NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative, 9 August 2000. Available online athttp://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm

42 C4ISTAR stands for: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, targetacquisition and reconnaissance.

43 Further information on the Helsinki Headline Goal is available in Library Research Paper RP00/84Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report.

http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-dci.htm


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remained in such areas as: suppression of enemy air defence and supportjamming; combat identification; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;day/night and all weather air weapons systems; all aspects of air defence, andcapabilities against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.44

Guillaume Parmentier in his article, “Rejuvenating the Alliance”, in the summer editionof NATO Review also argued:

A key lesson needs to be drawn from experience gained in implementing theDefence Capabilities Initiative…setting too many priorities means that there areeffectively no priorities. The 58 items identified for priority action diluted thefocus of the DCI, making it too easy for nations to find excuses for not coming upwith the essential goods.45

In light of criticisms of the progress made with the DCI, and the need to re-addressNATO’s military capabilities in the post-11 September environment, work towards a newDCI concept was begun in June 2002.

As Dr Jamie Shea, Director of Information and Press for NATO, pointed out in aninterview with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) in April2002:

11 September brings back to us an old problem in NATO which has not goneaway, but which requires urgent treatment: the question of defencecapabilities…we have seen the United States pull ahead spending $48bn morethan NATO, China and Russia combined. The danger is that there will be a kindof unbridgeable chasm between the Americans and the Europeans, which willmake coalition operations more difficult. We won’t be able to communicate, wewon’t be interoperable…The Europeans spend $150m a year, which was abouthalf of the US defense budget prior to 11 September, but it is calculated that theyonly get 10-12% of what the Americans get in terms of output.46

Consequently, the NATO Defence Ministers meeting on 6 June 2002 concluded:

A greater and more focused effort is now necessary. We therefore directed theCouncil in Permanent Session to prepare recommendations for a new capabilitiesinitiative, taking into account military advice and national proposals. This shouldfocus upon a small number of capabilities essential to the full range of Alliancemissions.47

44 Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC 914 24 July 2002, p.4945 Guillame Parmentier “Rejuvenating the Alliance” NATO Review, Summer 200246 “NATO Obviously has to move ahead” BASIC Newsletter on International Security, April 200247 NATO Press Release Statement on Capabilities, 6 June 2002. Available online at




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Four priorities for the new DCI were established:

• To defend against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks.• To ensure secure command communications and information superiority.• To improve interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat

effectiveness.• To ensure rapid deployment and the ability to sustain combat forces.48

The new initiative would also be based on national commitments with specific milestonesand target dates, a marked difference from the previous DCI. The intention would be toprovide the impetus for members to re-prioritise defence spending, reduce force numbers,shift resources towards the upgrading of equipment, and co-operate on a multinationallevel where possible, including, in some cases, the pooling of resources and rolespecialisation. A system of high-level monitoring was expected to be put in place.

In order to avoid the duplication of resources, the DCI would also continue to work intandem with the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), devised under the auspices ofthe EU, and its attempts to develop a rapid reaction capability.

At an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Warsaw on 24-25 September2002, proposals aimed at enhancing the Alliance’s military capabilities, and specificallythose identified in the four key areas, were reviewed. A set of commitments andprogrammes were put forward for discussion and adoption at Prague. Decisions on thestreamlining of NATO’s command structure were also expected to be taken at thesummit.

However, the question of whether a new DCI would provide the impetus required toaddress the capability gap remained open to debate. It is widely acknowledged amonganalysts that European defence budgets and investment in defence research anddevelopment (R&D) are inadequate to accommodate the procurement of required assets.Germany’s problems over the funding of the A400M transport aircraft and the Meteor air-to-air missile for the Eurofighter are regularly highlighted as examples of insufficienciesin European defence spending.

Plans for the new DCI would place emphasis on the pooling of assets, specialisation andco-operative procurement as a means of achieving economic viability. Thus far,multinational procurement has been acknowledged as problematic, as both the A400Mand Meteor projects have demonstrated, while the pooling of assets and rolespecialisation has implications for sovereignty in defence which could be unacceptable tosome European countries.

48 ibid


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As the Defence Select Committee pointed out in its report:

…those countries with significant Armed Forces, which have traditionally rangedacross all the main military tasks, for example the UK and France, would have tocontemplate giving up certain capabilities in order to focus on others. As aconsequence they would have to rely upon allies to provide the forfeitedcapabilities when necessary. This requires a willingness to accept a reducedcapacity to act alone in pursuit of national foreign policy.49

b. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)

The PCC was adopted at Prague as the successor to the DCI. Although one of the morehigh profile decisions of the summit, the declaration on the PCC has been largelysymbolic, with the parameters for the commitment having been laid down in June 2002.Focusing on the four priorities identified in June 2002 by NATO Defence Ministers, thePCC attempted to establish a roadmap towards creating niches of excellence rather thanattempting to sustain interoperability across the whole combat spectrum.

The Prague Summit Declaration stated:

Individual Allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improvetheir capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological, and nucleardefence; intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition; air-to-groundsurveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness,including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support andcombat service support units.50

The Declaration went on to state:

Our efforts to improve capabilities through the PCC and those of the EuropeanUnion to enhance European capabilities through the European Capabilities ActionPlan should be mutually reinforcing, while respecting the autonomy of bothorganizations, and in a spirit of openness.

We will implement all aspects of our Prague Capabilities Commitment as quicklyas possible. We will take necessary steps to improve capabilities in the identifiedareas of continuing capability shortfalls. Such steps could include multinationalefforts, role specialisation and reprioritisation, noting that in many casesadditional financial resources will be required, subject as appropriate toparliamentary approval. We are committed to pursuing vigorously capability

49 Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC 914 24 July 2002, p.5050 Prague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 21 November 2002. A

full copy of the declaration is available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm



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improvements. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session to report onimplementation to [NATO] Defence Ministers.51

A number of multinational efforts aimed at procuring key strategic assets have alreadybeen established.

A press release issued by the US administration on 21 November 2002 stated:

• Germany is committing to lease C-17 transport aircraft as an interimmeasure, and lead a consortium of nations aimed at pooling airlift resourcesand capabilities.

• Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey are individuallycommitting to buy UAVs.

• The Netherlands is leading a consortium with Canada, Denmark, Belgiumand Norway to pool purchases of precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

• Spain and the Netherlands are buying munitions for suppression of enemy airdefences (SEAD).

• Denmark and Norway are contributing to air-to-air refuelling and Spain isleading a consortium of nations interested in pooling their refuellingcapabilities.

• Norway and Germany have committed to improving maritime counter-minecapabilities.

• Poland and Hungary are improving nuclear, chemical, and biologicalidentification and defence capabilities.52

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly provided further detail on some of these capabilities:

Strategic Lift: Germany is organising an effort to lease between eight and 15“outsized aircraft” such as Boeing C17s or Antonov An-124s to bridge the gapuntil 2008 when the European-built Airbus Military A400M is expected to enterservice. A NATO official said 12 allies are already committed in principle to aplan to create a NATO agency similar to the one that operates the NATO-ownedfleet of E-3A Air Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, except that thetransports would be leased on a long-term basis.

Inflight refuelling: Spain is leading a plan to bridge another gap by securing some48 tanker aircraft by 2005. The NATO official said so far 10 countries areinvolved and “there are good long-term prospects for all nations increasing theirfleets of tankers” through leasing, refitting older aircraft and new purchases,including a special A400M tanker version that some nations, including Italy willbuy.

51 ibid52 “NATO: Building new capabilities for new challenges”, White House Press Release, 21 November

2002


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PGMs: The Netherlands is looking to expand a programme involving fivenations– Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal– that wish topurchase PGMs for their F16 fighters. This is a unique problem since US exportlaws prohibit the sale of the most sophisticated armaments abroad. “The Dutchare talking to the US on this and the Americans are probably going to come upwith something positive involving the same degree of accuracy as the US system”a NATO official said…53

In the week prior to the Prague Summit, the National Armaments Directors of France,Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States also signed a Statement ofIntent to assess co-operative development of a radar system that will be an essentialelement of an Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability. A press release issued byNATO on 21 November 2002, went on to comment:

The Statement of Intent is a practical demonstration of true and equitabletransatlantic co-operation and specifies that the participating nations will jointlydesign and build a radar sensor, leveraging, where possible, technology fromexisting programmes. Specific technology and information sharing agreementsare yet to be worked out, but the goal is to maximise the exchange of informationamong participants and their industries, within the constraints of each nation. TheTransatlantic Co-operative AGS Radar (TCAR) will be designed primarily for theongoing NATO core-owned and operated AGS project, but will also be availablefor participants’ use to meet other national defence requirements.54

During Commons defence questions on 9 December 2002 the Secretary of State forDefence, Geoff Hoon, stated:

NATO’s defence capabilities initiative, launched at the Washington summit in1999, has made good progress in a number of areas. To continue this progress, anew initiative– the Prague capabilities commitment, or PCC – was launched atthe Prague summit on 21 and 22 November, focusing on improvements inchemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence, information superiority,combat-effectiveness, and deployability and sustainability. Allies have made firmpolitical commitments to improve their capabilities in each of those areas.55

He went on to state:

The Washington defence capabilities initiative was an important step in thetransformation of NATO, but I agree that, with hindsight, it could be consideredtoo broad a programme. In the run-up to Prague, therefore, the United Kingdomargued consistently that any successor initiative should have a narrow focus withclear objectives, backed by high-level ownership. The Prague capabilities

53 “NATO’s build-up to Prague”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 November 2002, p.2754 NATO Press Release, 21 November 200255 HC Deb 9 December 2002, c1


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commitment is a good package that will focus nations on providing thecapabilities necessary for the alliance to perform the full range of its missions.56

In a speech to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on 12 December 2002, the NATO SecretaryGeneral, Lord Robertson, also commented on the achievements of Prague:

It is unacceptable that our countries spend hundreds of billions of euros ondefence every year, but cannot deliver the military capabilities we need, when weneed them. Over the years, various efforts to make improvements have beenmade, including within NATO. And they have delivered some results. But in theend, each initiative foundered on one of three shoals. Either the plan was unclear,or it did not have political support from the top, or it was deemed unaffordable.

At Prague we demonstrated that we had learned our lessons. NATO’s 19 Headsof State and Government undertook to make major changes to Alliancecapabilities…First, they made clear and precise commitments. Through what wecall the Prague Capabilities Commitment, each and every NATO nation pledgedto make specific improvements to the key military capabilities we need today,such as strategic air and sea lift, air refueling, and precision guided munitions.And these pledges came with specific timelines for development. Already afirst.57

2. The NATO Response Force

a. Initial US Proposals

At an informal meeting of NATO defence ministers in Warsaw on 24-25 September, USDefense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld unveiled proposals for the establishment of a NATOrapid reaction force.

The proposal envisaged a permanent 20,000-strong standing force of land, sea and airassets, capable of deploying quickly for a period of between five and thirty days. Theforce would function in small and highly mobile units under a new command and wouldbe used to help in the campaign against terrorism, and if necessary to operate in areas ofhigh intensity conflict beyond NATO’s borders. The rapid reaction force would be takenfrom existing forces, would be ready for training in 2004 and operational by 2006.

NATO already has an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) which is a high-readinessforce capable of rapid deployment. Unlike the ARRC, the proposed new rapid reactionforce would only be used for short-term operations at the high end of the conflictspectrum, whereas the ARRC can deploy for as many as 90 days and its remit is muchmore focused on peacekeeping missions.

56 HC Deb 9 December 2002, c257 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on 12 December

2002


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In a speech to the NATO defence ministers on 24 September 2002, Mr Rumsfeldsuggested:

If NATO does not have a force that is quick and agile, which can deploy in daysor weeks instead of months or years, then it will not have much to offer the worldin the 21st century.58

However, initial reactions to the US proposals were reported as mixed. BBC News Onlinestated in an article on 25 September 2002 that:

NATO ministers have given a generally positive response to American plans for anew NATO rapid reaction force.59

The International Herald Tribune reported:

Foreign diplomats and military officers at NATO complained that the proposalwas vague and the timing suspect. Senior diplomats said they had not beenbriefed in any detail by the Americans about the proposal. “We are waiting to seewhat kind of military requirements are involved” an ambassador to NATO said.“What will be the cost? What will be its mission? Its command arrangements?NATO is in the middle of expanding. Will this add to the burden and complicatethe issue?”60

The US proposals also sparked debate among EU members over the potential impact onthe EU’s own rapid reaction force (EU RRF), which is expected to become operational in2003. The remit of the EU RRF is currently defined by the parameters of the Petersbergtasks, which focus mainly on low-level peacekeeping operations.61 The intention is for theNATO force to operate in high intensity conflicts similar to the US action in Afghanistan.

UK Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon was quoted on 6 October 2002 as denyingthat there would be a conflict between the EU force and a planned NATO rapid reactionforce:

This is not the case…We believe that the EU and NATO’s work iscomplimentary…both initiatives need Europeans to fill the capability gaps that

58 “Russia joins NATO anti-terror talks” BBC News Online, 25 September 2002. Available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2280249.htm

59 “NATO warms to Rapid Reaction Force” BBC News Online, 25 September 2002. Available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2277578.stm

60 “NATO role in terror war” International Herald Tribune, 19 September 2002 p.361 More information on the Petersberg tasks is available in Library Research Paper RP00/20 European

Defence: From Pőrtschach to Helsinki.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2280249.htm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2277578.stm


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have been identified and ultimately with a similar aim to improve Europeanmilitary capabilities.62

French Defence Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie was, however, reported to have “warnedNATO about venturing out of its main geographic area of responsibility”.63 A senior EUdiplomat was also quoted as suggesting:

On the one hand we feel the Americans are robbing us of our plans for a rapidreaction force…on the other hand, what would you expect when the Europeansboth in the EU and NATO are dragging their feet over capabilities?64

b. Adoption at Prague

Formal approval of the US proposals was given at Prague. The Prague SummitDeclaration stated:

We have therefore decided to create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consistingof a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainableforce including land, sea and air elements ready to move quickly to whereverneeded, as decided by the Council. The NRF will also be a catalyst for focusingand promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities. We gavedirections for the development of a comprehensive concept for such a force,which will have its initial operational capability as soon as possible, but not laterthan October 2004 and its full operational capability not later than October 2006,and for a report to Defence Ministers in Spring 2003. The NRF and the relatedwork of the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respectingthe autonomy of both organisations.65

The air, maritime and ground units assigned to the NRF will be rotated every six monthsand will be under the command of a Combined Joint Task Headquarters. The size of theforce will be determined by operational necessity but it would theoretically consist of airassets and the command and control capabilities necessary to support up to 200 combatsorties per day, a brigade-sized land force and maritime forces up to the size of a NATOStanding Naval Force. This equates to approximately 21,000 personnel.66

62 “EU vows to go ahead with joint force, denies it will clash with NATO” AFX European Focus, 6October 2002

63 “Rumsfeld Presses for New NATO force” The Financial Times, 25 September 2002, p.1464 ibid65 Prague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 21 November 2002. A

full copy of the declaration is available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm66 “NATO: building new capabilities for new challenges”, White House Press Release, 21 November 2002



30

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly, on 27 November 2002, quoted a NATO militarysource as commenting:

In the past, when we began to contemplate missions to places like Bosnia andKosovo, we had to stand up a joint command from scratch…now the idea is tohave a generic joint force, a pool of national land, air and sea elements, fromwhich the military planners at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied CommandEurope) could draw on for a particular operation.67

The article also suggested:

An initial operational capability is to be ready no later than October 2004, whichis sooner than originally proposed by the USA and shows a high level of supportfor the concept […] Washington is not intent on the NRF force being entirelydistinct from the EU’s planned 60,000 strong rapid reaction force which is beingtailored to fulfil less robust tasks such as peace support operations and responseto civil emergencies […] in general the NATO and EU forces are meant tocomplement each other.68

3. The New Command Structure

NATO’s current command headquarters structure is a legacy of the Cold War, designedto fight in situ with a fixed contribution of forces. Restructuring of the commandarrangements has been motivated by the need to make it flexible enough to run joint taskforces of varying sizes and composition, reflecting the changes in operationalrequirements that have come about over the last decade.

North Atlantic Council leaders stated at the Prague Summit:

We have approved the Defence Ministers’ report providing the outline of aleaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a viewto meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. Itis based on the agreed Minimum Military Requirements document for theAlliance’s command arrangements. The structure will enhance the transatlanticlink, result in a significant reduction in headquarters and Combined AirOperations Centres, and promote the transformation of our militarycapabilities…We have instructed the Council and Defence Planning Committee,taking into account the work of the NATO Military Authorities and objectivemilitary criteria, to finalise the details of the structure, including geographiclocations of command structure headquarters and other elements, so that finaldecisions are taken by Defence Ministers in June 2003.69

67 “Lift-off for the Response Force”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 27 November 200268 ibid69 Prague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 21 November 2002. A




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At the highest military-strategic level, the new command structure will have twocommands, one for operations and one for the functional transformation of Allianceforces. The Strategic Command for Operations will be headquartered in Belgium and willbe supported by two Joint Force Commands able to generate a land-based CombinedJoint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a more limited standing joint headquartersfrom which a sea-based CJTF headquarters capability can be drawn. In the new structure,the strategic commander for operations will be responsible for the preparation andconduct of all operations, including defence of NATO territory previously under theresponsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT).

The Strategic Command for Transformation will be headquartered in the US, but with apresence in Europe. It will be responsible for the modernisation of forces and trainingthrough the transformation of military capabilities, reducing the capability gap andpromoting the interoperability of Alliance forces. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters AlliedPowers Europe (SHAPE) command will focus on the near-term operational requirements,while the Strategic Command for Transformation will focus on the longer-term shapingof the force.

A press release, issued by the US administration, went on to state:

ACT [Allied Command Transformation] will develop concepts and doctrine;design and conduct experiments; identify future force requirements; supervisemilitary education and training; and set and assess unit standards for jointness andtransformation. We expect the command to begin functioning by the summer of2003.

There will be some realignment of responsibilities between SHAPE and ACT.Allied Command Transformation will be NATO’s means of synchronising effortsacross our national programs and forces to create a more effective alliancefighting team. ACT will increase interoperability by ensuring that astransformation accelerates in the US and other militaries, our soldiers, sailors,airmen and marines are able to find solid, creative solutions to the operationalchallenges of coalition warfare against the new threats.70

A final decision on the full details of the new command structure is expected to be takenat the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in June 2003, and implemented by 2004.

4. Defence against Terrorism

The concept of ‘homeland defence’ has formed a large part of the campaign againstinternational terrorism which has dominated security policy and thinking since September

70 White House Press Release, “NATO: Building new capabilities for new challenges”, 21 November2002


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2001. The inclusion of measures to improve NATO’s capabilities in this area isfundamental to any new role for the Alliance.

The Prague Summit Declaration of 21 November 2002, stated:

[We] endorse the agreed military concept for defence against terrorism. Theconcept is part of a package of measures to strengthen NATO’s capabilities inthis area, which also includes improved intelligence sharing and crisis responsearrangements…

To combat terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted andcomprehensive. We are committed, in co-operation with our partners, to fullyimplement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan for the improvementof civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population withchemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents. We will enhance our ability tosupport, when requested, to help national authorities to deal with theconsequences of terrorist attacks, including attacks with CBRN against criticalinfrastructure, as foreseen in the CEP Action Plan.71

5. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons

Prompted by the increasing prominence of the terrorist threat and current internationalevents, NATO leaders endorsed at Prague the implementation of a number of measuresintended to counter the nuclear, biological and chemical threat.


[We] endorse the implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemicalweapons defence initiatives, which will enhance the Alliance’s defencecapabilities against weapons of mass destruction: a Prototype Deployable NBCAnalytical Laboratory; a Prototype NBC Event Response team; a virtual Centreof Excellence for NBC Weapons Defence; a NATO Biological and ChemicalDefence Stockpile and a Disease Surveillance system. We reaffirm ourcommitment to augment and improve expeditiously our NBC defencecapabilities.72

A press release issued by the US Department of Defense noted:

In February [2002], NATO accelerated work on NBC defenses. The idea was topool NBC capabilities from many member nations. This pooling of expertise,equipment and training created a multinational capability that didn’t existbefore…The Deployable NBC Laboratory and the NBC Event Response Team






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are the tangible results of this process. NATO will test the prototypes over thenext year…but the prototype teams can be used now. If an NBC event happens,the prototype team is available for deployment…The NBC event team would beused to asses the effects of an NBC event and advise NATO commanders on howto mitigate them. Also, the team would have the ability to maintaincommunications with other technical experts for advice. The laboratory is a smallsetup that can be flown to areas of operations. Personnel assigned to the labwould be able to investigate and collect suspect samples and quickly andaccurately identify them.

Part and parcel of these initiatives are a disease surveillance system, a chemical-biological defense “virtual” stockpile and NBC training. The disease surveillancesystem would collect battlefield information and correlate it with informationfrom other areas. Personnel would then be able to advise NATO commanders of abiological outbreak. The virtual stockpile allows NATO commanders to be ableto get antibiotics, vaccines or treatments where they are needed quickly.73

Defence against NBC threats are niche capabilities that the newest NATO member states,in particular, are keen to contribute to, in the absence of significant effective militaryforces.

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly commented:

Some nations, including the alliance’s three newest members the Czech Republic,Hungary and Poland, are keen to offer personnel and equipment for the initiativesand see it as a key niche of expertise to enhance overall alliance capability.74

Five exercises are expected to be undertaken in 2003 in order to test the various elementsof the NBC concept before a final validation phase is conducted during Exercise AlliedAction in Turkey in November 2003.

6. Missile Defence

The Strategic Concept agreed at the Washington Summit in 1999 first outlined theAlliance’s formal position on missile defence.

Paragraph 56 of the Strategic Concept stated:

The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential threats of theproliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery must continue to beimproved, including through work on missile defences. […] The aim in doing sowill be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military forces

73 US Department of Defense Press Release, “NATO showcases new nuclear, chemical and biologicaldefenses”, 21 November 2002

74 “Outlining NBC defence measures”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 27 November 2002, p.3


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while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness despite the presence, threat oruse of NBC weapons.75

As a result of the 1999 Strategic Concept, a number of national, multinational andNATO-wide Theatre Missile Defence (TMD)76 programmes and exercises have beenpursued. At the Alliance level this work has focused on the potential for deploying, by2010, a TMD capability on top of the planned Air Command and Control System(ACCS). The ACCS is an extended air defence system, which is intended to be fieldedlater this decade as a replacement for the NADGE integrated air defence system.

In August 2001 feasibility study contracts were let to two transatlantic consortia. Withadditional analysis from the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency(NC3A), a decision is expected to be taken in 2004 on taking this project forward into asecond phase.

Since 11 September 2001, however, attitudes to missile defence as a strategic Alliancecapability have changed. Robert Bell, NATO Assistant Secretary General for DefenceSupport, outlined in a speech in June 2002:

Last Fall, standing with President Bush in the Rose Garden only a few weeksafter September 11th, the Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, said that“defence against ballistic missiles is here to stay”.

And just two months ago, when the Secretary General was back inWashington…he said in an important speech to the Council on Foreign Relationsthat NATO needs to give “new emphasis” to missile defence, together with othercritically-needed warfighting capabilities, at its historic summit in Prague thisNovember.77

Following the formal end of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002, anopportunity for NATO allies to participate in the development of a multi-layered strategicballistic missile defence system was offered by the United States.

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly outlined:

The USA has presented NATO allies with a comprehensive invitation to helpbuild, host and share the protection of a multi-layered ballistic missile defencesystem up to and including the strategic level previously opposed byEuropeans…the broad options for allies to participate [were mapped out]. The

75 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, 23 April 1999. A copy of this document is available online at:http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm

76 Theatre Missile Defence refers to the missile defence capabilities used to protect forces in the field.77 Speech by Robert Bell, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support on 3 June 2002. A copy

of his speech is available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020603a.htm




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options ranged from simple political support to hosting a radar site to taking partin the industrial development or production phases.78

The article went on to comment:

There is a growing belief that the resources of terrorists should not beunderestimated and Bush’s argument that preparing a defence against missileattacks is prudent has struck a chord with allies. Washington has pressed on,doing away with the title NMD and adjusting the concept to include an umbrellaof protection for “allies and friends”.79

In a speech to the Foreign Policy Centre on 12 November 2002, the Secretary of State forDefence, Geoff Hoon, commented:

NATO is already examining the threat to deployed forces from ballistic missiles.It also needs to look carefully at the emerging threat to the territory andpopulation centres of NATO nations…as the threat grows, and technologiesdevelop, there may come a day when we need to decide to add a furthercapability to our current range of responses by acquiring missile defences for theUK and Europe as a whole, in the way the US has already decided.80

Conclusions reached at the Prague Summit confirmed the decision to broaden the focus ofthe Alliance from TMD towards the US concept of strategic missile defence as outlined inJuly 2002.

The Prague Summit Declaration of 21 November 2002, stated:

[We will] examine the options for addressing the increasing missile threat toAlliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient waythrough an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence.Today we initiated a new NATO Missile Defence feasibility study to examineoptions for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against thefull range of missile treats, which we will continue to assess. Our efforts in thisregard will be consistent with the indivisibility of Allied security.81

Many analysts consider that NATO’s current TMD feasibility studies will be incorporatedinto the larger missile defence study announced at Prague.

78 “USA pushes missile defence”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 24 July 200279 ibid80 Speech by Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon to the Foreign Policy Centre on 12 November

2002. A copy of this speech is available online at:http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=2143


http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?newsItem_id=2143



36

However, an article in Defense News commented:

Such a change in scope, however, could mean that two ongoing studies, expectedto be concluded in 2003, may not result in a theatre ballistic missile defence(TMD) architecture by 2004, as originally envisaged.82

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly also suggested:

Given the lag time in the NATO programme, it is too early to predict a link upwith US missile defence plans.83

D. Co-operation with Partners

Working with partners has been on NATO’s agenda since the end of the Cold War andhas emerged as one of the Alliance’s principal strengths. One of the main aims of thePrague summit was to deepen and enhance the relationships that exist between NATOand non-members.

NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson commented during a speech to the EuropeanParliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Defence and Common SecurityPolicy on 8 October 2002:

Enhancing NATO’s Partnerships will be another priority. The Partnership forPeace programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the MediterraneanDialogue have all served us well in the past. If we continue to develop thesemechanisms, they will serve us better still in the future…This is also true forNATO-Russia relations. If the Prague Summit will not showcase any grandiosenew initiative, it is simply because we already launched a new NATO-Russiarelationship five months ago in Rome. Since the Rome Summit, the workingatmosphere between NATO and Russia has constantly improved. This gives usthe confidence that we can build further on this momentum.84

1. Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP)

The EAPC evolved out of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in 1997. Thisreflected NATO’s desire to build a security forum that matched the success of co-operation under PfP and the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia andHerzegovina. The new body also broadened its focus to incorporate not only formeradversaries but also traditionally neutral countries such as Austria, Finland, Sweden andSwitzerland.

82 “NATO allies rethink ballistic missile defence”, Defense News, 2 December 2002, p.483 “French turnaround on NATO missile defence”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 November 200284 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to the EU Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human

Rights and Defence and Common Security Policy, 8 October 2002


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The EAPC is now the overarching framework for NATO’s co-operation with its partnersfrom Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. It brings together 27partners with NATO member states for regular discussions on issues encompassing allaspects of security in the Euro-Atlantic area.85 A two-year EAPC Action Plan provides forlong-term consultation and co-operation on regional issues, arms control, proliferation,peacekeeping, defence economic issues, civil emergency planning and scientific andenvironmental issues.

As a multilateral forum, the EAPC also acts as the political framework for the PfP, aprogramme focusing on bilateral co-operation between NATO and individual partnercountries (19+1).86 The basic aims of the PfP programme are to promote transparency innational defence planning and budgets, promote the democratic control of national armedforces and develop the capacity for joint action between forces from partner countries andNATO members in peacekeeping or civil emergency operations. Within the PfPFramework Document there is also a commitment by NATO members to consultbilaterally with any partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity,political independence or security.

At the Madrid summit in 1997 steps were taken to enhance PfP by giving partners anoperational role. The new arrangements ensured greater decision making opportunities forpartner countries, an increased role in planning and the strengthening of politicalconsultation.

Participation in the PfP programme has been particularly important to candidate countriesinvolved in the MAP. It has allowed each partner to address its military obligations withinthe MAP, develop interoperability with NATO forces through joint exercises andrestructure its forces and capabilities.

a. Measures Adopted at Prague

In the wake of 11 September, discussion at Prague on enhanced co-operation with partnercountries was expected to focus primarily on the campaign against terrorism.

The Prague Summit Declaration, issued by the North Atlantic Council, stated:

The Euro-Atlantic Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) havegreatly enhanced security and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Wehave today decided to upgrade our co-operation with the EAPC/PfP countries.Our political dialogue will be strengthened, and Allies, in consultation withPartners, will, to the maximum extent possible, increase involvement of Partners,

85 A full list of the 46 members of the EAPC can be located on the NATO website at:http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm

86 There are 27 members of the PfP, all of whom are members of the EAPC. A list is available online at:http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm

http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm

http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm


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as appropriate, in the planning, conduct and oversight of those activities andprojects in which they participate and to which they contribute. We haveintroduced new practical mechanisms, such as Individual Partnership ActionPlans, which will ensure a comprehensive, tailored and differentiated approach tothe Partnership, and which will allow for support to the reform efforts of Partners.We encourage Partners, including the countries of the strategically importantregions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, to take advantage of these mechanisms.We welcome the resolve of Partners to undertake all efforts to combat terrorism,including through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. We will alsocontinue to enhance interoperability and defence-related activities, whichconstitute the core of our partnership.

Participation in the PfP and the EAPC could be broadened in the future to includethe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina once necessaryprogress is achieved, including full co-operation with the ICTY.87

The importance of strengthening NATO’s partnerships was highlighted by the PrimeMinister, Tony Blair, in his speech to the Prague Summit. He stated:

Partnership has been one of the Alliance’s great successes, encouraging defencereform, transparency, and stabilisation to NATO’s east and south…We mustcommit ourselves to adapting our relations with our Partners to reflect thechallenges of the new security environment. This will involve identifying areaswhere practical co-operation can make a difference– for example, in counteringthe terrorist threat, promoting security sector reform and improving bordercontrol.88

2. NATO-Russia Council (NRC)

The NATO-Russia Council was formally established at the Rome summit on 28 May2002 in response to changes in the security environment post-11 September. Regarded bymany commentators as marking a new chapter in NATO-Russia relations, the new bodybrings together all NATO allies and Russia (a forum that is currently referred to as‘NATO at 20’) to work as equal partners in areas of common interest and in addressingfuture security challenges.

The Rome Declaration built on the goals and principles first laid down in the 1997Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security, which established theNATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Unlike the PJC, where all issues weredecided among the NATO allies before discussions took place with Russia, the NRC willwork from a position of consensus.


88 Speech by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Prague Summit, 21 November 2002



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The work remit of the NRC will continue to reflect those areas of interest identified underthe Founding Act, although co-operation is expected to intensify in a number of keyareas. These include the campaign against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control, theatre missile defence, sea search and rescue, military-to-military co-operation and civil emergencies.

Russia has no right of veto in the NRC and NATO reserves the right to keep discussionand decision-making on contentious or central issues, such as enlargement and collectivesecurity, among Alliance members.

The establishment of the NRC has been met with both optimism and scepticism fromanalysts and the media.

An analysis by Mark Galeotti in Jane’s Intelligence Review stated “some observers seethis as the beginning of the end for NATO as a distinctive western alliance”.89

He went on to argue:

Russia is still very much the junior partner in the Council…Putin will have toaccept that the Alliance with which he is now publicly identified will continue toenact a range of policies that are against stated Russian national interests.Furthermore, there are concerns in Moscow that closer alignment with the Westwill undermine relations with China.90

The Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta is reported in Jane’s Intelligence Review,as having stated that “Russia’s relations with the Alliance, even in the format of the ‘20’look like a sham”.91

In contrast, Andrew Cottey, writing in the January 2002 CER Bulletin, has suggested:

The new Russia-North Atlantic Council…should become a useful forum forpractical co-operation on matters of common concern– such as counter-terrorism,non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and research on missiledefence. NATO should also state that the door to Russian membership remainsopen for the longer term.92

At the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on 28 May 2002 question marks wereplaced over the future success of the Council after the Russian Defence Minister, SergeiIvanov, announced that:

89 “The View from the Kremlin” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002 p.1590 “The View from the Kremlin” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002 p.1691 ibid92 Andrew Cottey “NATO’s Big Bang” CER Bulletin, Issue 21 January 2002


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Russia does not plan to discuss with the Alliance issues that could in any wayimpose restrictions on the development of Russia’s armed forces.93

With the establishment of the NRC only six months prior to Prague, the summit had littleto offer on NATO-Russia relations, aside from a reaffirmation of the commitment to co-operate through the NRC.


We welcome the significant achievements of the NATO-Russia Council since thehistoric NATO-Russia summit meeting in Rome. We have deepened ourrelationship to the benefit of all the peoples in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATOmember states and Russia are working together in the NATO-Russia Council asequal partners, making progress in areas such as peacekeeping, defence reform,WMD proliferation, search and rescue, civil emergency planning, theatre missiledefence and the struggle against terrorism, toward our shared goal of a stable,peaceful and undivided Europe. In accordance with the Founding Act and theRome Declaration, we are determined to intensify and broaden our co-operationwith Russia.94

3. Mediterranean Dialogue

The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 as a political discussion forum aimedat contributing to regional security and stability and achieving mutual understanding. Itswork is organised through an annual Work Programme which focuses on practical co-operation in security and defence-related areas, information, civil emergency planningand science. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia joined the Dialogueinitially, with Algeria becoming a participant in February 2000. The Dialogue wasintended to complement similar initiatives conducted by the EU and OSCE.

In line with the agreements reached at Prague on the EAPC and PfP, NATO allies alsoconfirmed their commitment to enhanced co-operation with their Mediterranean partnersand with specific reference to terrorism-related activities.


We reaffirm that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability inthe Mediterranean. We therefore decide to upgrade substantially the political andpractical dimensions of our Mediterranean Dialogue as an integral part of theAlliance’s co-operative approach to security. In this respect, we encourageintensified practical co-operation and effective interaction on security matters ofcommon concern, including terrorism-related issues, as appropriate, where

93 “Russia’s NATO romance seems long over” The Russia Journal, Issue No. 22 14 June 200294 Prague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 21 November 2002. A




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NATO can provide added value. We reiterate that the Mediterranean Dialogueand other international efforts, including the EU Barcelona process95, arecomplementary and mutually reinforcing.96

Enhancement is expected to include a greater number of co-operative activities such asconferences, high-level visits, training and military exercises.

4. NATO-Ukraine Commission

Ukraine established co-operative relations with NATO in 1991, following the break-up ofthe Soviet Union. It became a participant in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council(succeeded by the EAPC in 1997) and in 1994 joined the PfP programme, becoming thefirst country of the Commonwealth of Independent States to do so. In 1997 co-operationwith NATO was intensified with the signing of the NATO-Ukraine Charter on aDistinctive Partnership. The Charter established the NATO-Ukraine Commission as aforum for discussion of issues of common interest and ways of improving co-operation.Conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support and humanitarian operations arehigh on the Commission’s agenda. The Charter also provides the framework for NATOassistance as Ukraine continues its efforts towards economic and democratic reform.

In the weeks prior to the Prague Summit the work of the NATO-Ukraine Commissionwas overshadowed by speculation that the Ukrainian President had approved the export ofa radar system to Iraq in contravention of a UN arms embargo. Concern over theallegations was reflected in the Prague statement by the North Atlantic Council onNATO’s continuing relationship with Ukraine.


We remain committed to strong NATO-Ukraine relations under the Charter on aDistinctive Partnership. We note Ukraine’s determination to pursue full Euro-Atlantic integration, and encourage Ukraine to implement all the reformsnecessary, including as regards enforcement of export controls, to achieve thisobjective. The new Action Plan that we are adopting with Ukraine is an importantstep forward; it identifies political, economic, military and other reform areawhere Ukraine is committed to make further progress and where NATO willcontinue to assist. Continued progress in deepening and enhancing ourrelationship requires an unequivocal Ukrainian commitment to the values of theEuro-Atlantic community.97

95 More information on the EU Barcelona Process is available online at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0497en01.pdf


97 ibid

http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/ en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0497en01.pdf 96

http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/ en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0497en01.pdf 96



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5. European Union

NATO has been taking steps to strengthen the security and defence role of its Europeanallies since the end of the Cold War. At the Berlin summit in 1996 NATO membersadopted an agreement which allowed NATO assets and capabilities to be made availablefor operations undertaken by European allies as part of the Petersberg tasks. Conductedunder the political auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), these were aimed atcrisis response and peacekeeping rather than collective defence.

The principle of allowing European access to NATO assets was taken a step further at theWashington summit in 1999. Under the ‘Berlin-Plus’ arrangements, the European Unionwould have ready access to NATO collective assets and capabilities for crisismanagement operations, where the Alliance as a whole chose not to be engaged. InDecember 1999, at the European Council summit in Helsinki, EU leaders also adoptedproposals to develop an EU rapid reaction force by 2003 and take political control of thePetersberg tasks from the WEU.

Immediately preceding the Prague Summit, progress on implementing the ‘Berlin-Plus’proposals remained at a standstill after two years of negotiation. Under the agreement, allNATO members retain a veto over the use of NATO assets if they object to a particularEU operation. Reservations were initially held by Turkey, a non-EU NATO member,over the lack of participation of non-EU members of NATO in EU crisis managementdecision-making. The Ankara Text proposed in December 2001 outlined measures thatwould allow Turkey a role in EU crisis management operations when NATOinfrastructure and assets would be used. However, Greece had raised objections over thetext, placing negotiations in a situation of deadlock.

Efforts to overcome the impasse over the EU use of NATO assets formed a main part ofthe relationship-building agenda at Prague.

Prior to the Summit, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson had stated:

NATO-EU relations...that is the area where momentum is currently lacking -- andhas been lacking for some time…let there be no mistake: The progress we havemade so far has been largely made by improvisation. These achievements couldall disappear in a second, if we cannot "lock them in" by putting in placepermanent arrangements between NATO and the EU. If we want to realise thefull potential of these relations, we must go beyond the status quo and agree onthe so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangements…we need to break the current impasse.We need to break it because it affects the credibility of both institutions. Howcan we confidently speak of a new NATO-EU relationship, when this relationshipcannot be institutionalised? And how can we argue in favour of more and betterdefence spending and improved crisis management capabilities, if NATO and theEU are perceived as being blocked over essentially procedural issues? It istherefore essential that the participation issue is resolved in a manner that issatisfactory to all. Simply put, we have to find the right balance between"assured access" to NATO assets for the EU-members, and "assured


43

participation" in the EU political-military decision process for non-EU Allies. Ido think this goal is within reach, even if some of our member countries still haveto walk the extra mile to achieve it.98

An article in European Report suggested on 9 October 2002:

Progress is being made on ending the deadlock between Greece and Turkeywhich has been preventing an agreement with NATO over access to theAlliance’s assets…Diplomats said that a deal could be announced at the NATOsummit in Prague on November 22.99

Despite optimistic predictions, however, the Prague Summit saw little progress made onthe EU-NATO relationship.

The North Atlantic Council concluded:

NATO and the European Union share common strategic interests. We remainstrongly committed to the decisions made at the Washington Summit andsubsequent Ministerial meetings, in order to enhance NATO-EU co-operation.The success of our co-operation has been evident in our concerted efforts in theBalkans to restore peace and create the conditions for prosperous and democraticsocieties. Events on and since 11 September 2001 have underlined further theimportance of greater transparency and co-operation between our twoorganisations on questions of common interests relating to security, defence andcrisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate militaryresponse and effective crisis management ensured. We remain committed tomaking the progress needed on all the various aspects of our relationship, notingthe need to find solutions satisfactory to all Allies on the issue of participation bynon-EU European Allies, in order to achieve a genuine strategic partnership.100

98 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to the EU Committee on Foreign Affairs, HumanRights and Defence and Common Security Policy, 8 October 2002

99 “Hopes rise of EU-NATO deal by end of November”, European Report, 9 October 2002.100 Prague Summit Declaration issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, 21 November 2002. A




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III Will NATO Deliver?

In the words of NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, the Prague Summit was a“transformation summit”. For other observers and analysts, Prague represented thedefining moment for the future of NATO and a test of the political will and commitmentof NATO’s leaders towards the Alliance.

The achievements of the Prague Summit have been regarded by some as an historic stepforward. However, the ability of NATO’s member states to deliver on their rhetoric willbe put to the test over the coming year. NATO’s future as a cohesive military alliance ormerely a political ‘talking shop’ is at stake.

A. The Implications of Enlargement

1. Status of the Accession States

The expansion of NATO to 26 members has provoked mixed reactions. For an indicatorof the success of enlargement, the progress made by each of the seven new members withits MAP commitments over the next year and a half will be crucial. As RUSI pointed outin its November 2002 RUSI Newsbrief:

A key question is whether NATO will be enfeebled by accepting countries withinferior military capabilities and relatively high levels of societal corruption.Moreover, there is some justifiable concern that by accepting candidate countriesin their current condition, the allies will lose any leverage to push through furtherreforms. While the three Visegrad countries have made some improvements since1997, the pace of military reform has been sluggish, particularly in Hungary.101

For some analysts, the contribution of the new members to military capabilities andoperations alone will be a benchmark against which success is measured.

In an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt in the week preceding the PragueSummit, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson sought to pre-empt this issue:

While it is true that the new members will not bring vast military resources orfinances to NATO, they have specialised capabilities that are very important.Most of these countries have experience in protection against biological andchemical weapons, which many current NATO countries have already givenup.102

101 “Can NATO be rejuvenated?”, RUSI Newsbrief, November 2002102 “Enlargement will strengthen NATO”, die Welt, 18 November 2002


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a. Bulgaria

NATO membership was regarded as a key foreign policy priority for the Bulgariangovernment for many years and its accession was considered probable by most analysts,despite the shortcomings in Bulgaria’s process of reform.

Progress has been made on Bulgaria’s legal obligations under the MAP. A ConfidentialInformation Protection Law has been passed, while amendments to an Arms and DualUse Goods Trade Law, putting in place stronger export controls, are currently pendingparliamentary approval.103

Progress on military reform remains a challenge in Bulgaria, however. Frequent changesin the post of civilian defence minister and an ongoing debate over political control of themilitary have slowed the reform process down. The country also has a legacy of large,conscripted armed forces and vast quantities of equipment which is becomingincreasingly outdated and fails to reach NATO standards of interoperability. As part ofits MAP obligations, Bulgaria has therefore earmarked 3% of GDP for defence spendingand has pledged to dispose of obsolete Soviet-era equipment by 2004, and to reduce itstroop numbers by 30-40% to 45,000 personnel by 2004.104 The first round of compulsorydischarges was undertaken in 2002, with a further round expected in 2003. An assessmentof Bulgaria, in the July 2002 edition of Jane’s Intelligence Review, suggested that:

the government has allocated most funds for the immediate personnel costsassociated with force reduction…only after 2003 will Bulgaria be able to investsignificantly in modernising its equipment to achieve interoperability with NATOforces.105

Limited progress in the reform of civil and political institutions in Bulgaria and the slowpace of economic development are also considered to be areas that will dominateaccession negotiations over the next eighteen months. A report on NATO enlargement bythe US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, prior to the Prague summit, argued:

As a general matter we found that those countries with strong assets to contributemilitarily– both in the form of troops, weapons, or strategic location (specificallyRomania and Bulgaria)– have more serious work remaining to develop andmodernise their democratic institutions.106

Bulgaria has, however, shown its willingness to participate as an international partner.The country opened its airspace to NATO during the Kosovo conflict, Bulgarian troops

103 “Bulgaria’s Regional Credentials” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002, p.15104 Information taken from: Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC 914 24 July 2002, p.27

and “Bulgaria’s Regional Credentials” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002, p.15105 ibid106 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,

p.2


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have been seconded to the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia (SFOR) and inKosovo (KFOR) and they have supported the International Security Assistance Force(ISAF) in Afghanistan. Bulgaria also supported the US in Operation Enduring Freedomby providing bases and access to its airspace.

Despite the lack of progress in reform to date, Bulgaria is considered by many analysts tobe geo-strategically important to NATO, in view of its location on the Black Sea and thestabilising role that it plays in the Balkan region. For many, this factor overrides anypolitical concerns over the pace of domestic reform. The Daily Telegraph argued inSeptember 2002 that:

Romania and Bulgaria, whose economic development and political processes arestill open to question, are likely to be admitted because of their strategicimportance on the Black Sea.107

Andrew Cottey, writing in the January 2002 edition of the CER Bulletin, expressed theview that:

Bulgaria’s and Romania’s strategic locations on Europe’s south-eastern fringemakes them essential allies in the battles against terrorism, weapons proliferationand organised crime.108

b. Estonia

Despite a recent change of government in Estonia, there has been continuity of supportfor NATO membership between administrations. Since the last wave of enlargement,Estonia has progressed well with its MAP commitments

In military terms, Estonia’s armed forces are small and have thus far continued to focuson territorial defence, a psychological legacy of the Cold War. The recent completion of aforce structure review to 2015 has, however, re-focused its military priorities. Thegovernment has expressed its intention to allocate 2% of GDP to defence expenditure, toprocure NATO compatible equipment and also to focus on developing a number ofspecialist capabilities including mine countermeasures and decontamination. In commonwith all NATO candidates, Estonia’s full participation in the PfP programme has allowedit to demonstrate its willingness to engage in NATO operations. Specifically, Estonia hascontributed troops to both KFOR and SFOR.

However, some analysts have argued that, in view of their size and location, the BalticStates do little to improve the military strength of the Alliance. An analysis in Jane’sDefence Weekly, in May 2002 argued:

107 “Nato’s big push east will take in up to seven states” The Daily Telegraph, 27 September 2002, p.13108 Andrew Cottey “NATO’s Big Bang” CER Bulletin, Issue 21 January 2002


47

Membership of the three Baltic States is riding on historical impetus and a senseof Cold War guilt and their admission will add no real defence benefits to theAlliance unless the security relationship with Russia evolves.109

The US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations also expressed concern that Estonia’scommitment to NATO might diminish following its anticipated accession to the EU in2004.110

c. Latvia

The economic and political transition of Latvia has been relatively untroubled, with theestablishment of a strong economy and free and contested elections. Public support forLatvian membership in NATO is approximately 60%, although the government has set agoal of 70% support.111

One of Latvia’s largest problems in terms of its MAP obligations remains the integrationof the sizeable ethnic Russian population into society. In 1993 the Organisation forSecurity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) established an observer mission in thecountry to assist in the social integration of some 700,000 people who had becomestateless with the demise of the Soviet Union. Although initially slow, sufficient progresswas made for the OSCE to close its mission in 2001. Nonetheless, it is recognised thatthere is still progress to be made.

With respect to its military, Latvia has been slow to push through reform. In May 2002legislation was passed by the Latvian Parliament, requiring 2% of GDP to be devoted tomilitary spending from 2003 to 2008. This will entail a 43% increase in defence spending,which many analysts have viewed with scepticism, calling for Latvia’s compliance to bemonitored.112

The restructuring of the defence budget is also expected. As the Commons Defence SelectCommittee outlined in its report on The Future of NATO:

In 2001, 89% [of the defence budget] was spent on personnel and operationalcosts and only 11% on investment; the intention is to increase expenditure oninvestment, procurement and infrastructure to 33% by 2005 and to 38% by2008.113

109 “Time for NATO to Adapt” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 May 2002, p.21110 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,

p.10111 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,

p.12112 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,

p.12113 Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC914 24 July 2002, p.25


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The committee also pointed out:

The number of land forces will be reduced, in order to streamline administration,although the total force size will remain steady…work is under way to integratethe General Staff and the Ministry of Defence. There are no plans to endconscription; conscripts are not deployed overseas and therefore do notparticipate in peacekeeping operations; all deployable forces will beprofessionals.114

Like Estonia, Latvia is focusing on developing niche capabilities in the areas of minecountermeasures, explosives disposal and naval diving. The two countries are alsoparticipating in a joint air surveillance radar procurement project.

In the international arena Latvia has contributed to KFOR and SFOR, and in the wake of11 September it agreed to double its contingent in the Balkans so that US and NATOassets could be freed up for use in Afghanistan.

d. Lithuania

Like the other two Baltic States, Lithuania is meeting its overall MAP requirements.Reform and modernisation in the defence sector has been the most significant, with thegovernment pursuing investment in personnel, the creation and training of a professionalcorps, the procurement of NATO interoperable equipment and the improvement in publicperception of the armed forces.

Forces have been streamlined significantly, with the intention of introducing a battalionsized unit for NATO Article 5 missions by 2003 and a rapid reaction brigade by 2006.115

The contribution of Special Forces and medical services is also part of the agenda. Atpresent, a Lithuanian medical team is deployed in Afghanistan as part of ISAF.

The Lithuanian government has committed itself to allocating 2% of GDP to defenceexpenditure up to 2004, although it has also been acknowledged that this level ofspending may be sustained beyond that date.

Despite these advances in military reform, the US Senate Committee on ForeignRelations argued in its report that: “Operationally, Lithuania will make but a modestmilitary contribution to NATO”. Instead, they commented that “Lithuania’s key asset forNATO is its role in securing stability in the Baltics”.116

114 Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC914 24 July 2002, p.26115 “Preparing for the Newcomers” European Defence, 6 August 2002. Available online at

http://www.european-defence.co.uk/article12.html116 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,

p.9

http://www.european-defence.co.uk/article12.html


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e. Romania

Romania’s failure to gain membership in the last round of enlargement in 1999 gave thecountry renewed impetus to push through reforms and establish a strong case formembership a second time around.

Levels of interoperability between the Romanian armed forces and NATO is high. Sincethe early 1990’s, Romania has been involved extensively in international operations (bothNATO and UN-led), in order to demonstrate its credibility as a security provider. Troopshave been deployed to Kuwait, Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo andmore recently to ISAF in Afghanistan. Romania also supported the US in OperationEnduring Freedom with the provision of 500 troops, bases and access to airspace. As anindication of Romania’s willingness to participate internationally, the US, UK, Germanyand Italy all have military co-operation advisers in Romania’s Defence Ministry.

Despite Romania’s extensive level of international participation, the Commons DefenceSelect Committee noted in their report, The Future of NATO, in July 2002 that:

Reform of the armed forces has really only got properly under way in the last twoyears, with a focus upon producing mobile, deployable units and reducing thenumber of conscripts…the armed forces number 98,000, with a plan to reducethem to 75,000.117

Plans to achieve interoperability with NATO are also evident at the equipmentprocurement level. In May 2002, the Romanian parliament gave the go-ahead for thepurchase of two UK frigates, while plans are on the table to upgrade the air force’s MiG-21 aircraft, modernise communications technology and procure a number of Hawkmissiles. In order to fund these proposals, on 5 April 2002 the Supreme Council onNational Defence approved the government’s action plan for accession. The planstipulated that 2.4% of GDP would be allocated to the defence budget over the next fiveyears.118

Although military reforms have been far-reaching, progress in developing civil andpolitical institutions in the country has been slow. The US Senate Committee on ForeignRelations stated in their report:

Corruption remains a pervasive and serious problem in Romania. Although notunique to their post-communist government, we were struck by a lack of resolveto tackle the problem head on…Romanian officials and other observers told us ofthe deteriorating effect of what goes on behind the scenes to influence

117 Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC 914 24 July 2002, p.27118 “Romania gears up to join ‘new’ NATO” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002, p.12


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government decisions, the troubling influence that business connections can haveon government, and the severe corruption of the judicial system.119

The Committee also suggested:

Much work has to be done to reform its civil institutions…reforming the processfor international adoptions before the senate considers potential Romaniamembership in NATO is essential.120

An article in Jane’s Intelligence Review in July 2002 argued:

The government has stepped up domestic reforms, with the left of centergovernment privatizing key industries and following broadly responsibleeconomic policies in order to demonstrate that the days of reform-ambivalenceare over.121

However, in common with Bulgaria, the progress of Romania’s reform process is seen bymany observers as less significant than the overriding political and geo-strategic factorsthat Romania’s membership of NATO would bring.

In an article in the Autumn 2002 edition of NATO’s Nations, Romania’s Prime Minister,Adrian Năstase, commented:

On 13 February 2002, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, together withtheir colleagues from Romania and Bulgaria, jointly endorsed the vision ofNATO enlargement expressed by the US President George W. Bush…andstressed the need for a geographically balanced enlargement of NATO. They alsounderlined that one of the central aims of the enlargement should be to extend thezone of stability and security to south-eastern Europe. NATO enlargementtowards this region will strengthen the military capabilities of the Alliance andenhance its ability to counter terrorism as well as illegal migration and traffickingin drugs, arms and human beings.122

f. Slovakia

The status of Slovakia in its candidacy for NATO membership had been the most volatile.The outcome of the September 2002 elections was seen as a defining moment in thecountry’s hopes for accession at Prague. Although former Prime Minister VladimirMeciar’s party (the HZDS) emerged from the election on 21 September as the largest

119 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,p.4

120 ibid121 “Romania gears up to join ‘new’ NATO” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002, p.12122 Adrian Năstase, Prime Minister of Romania, “Contribution and Performance Count” NATO’s Nations,

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single party, it was unable to form a governing coalition due to the lack of support frompotential partners. Four centre-right parties that back Slovakia’s integration into the EUand NATO, a policy not shared by Meciar, won 78 of the 150 seats in Parliament. Withlittle hope of Slovakia joining NATO under Vladimir Meciar, the election result pavedthe way for membership at Prague.

There has been progress in reform of the military and civil institutions. A ComprehensiveDefence Review undertaken in 2001 established specific planning and budget systemsthrough to 2010. The plan allocated funding for the modernisation or disposal of militaryequipment and sought to reduce the size of the military from 41,500 to 24,500 by 2006,end conscription, establish professional armed forces and develop rapidly deployableforces for multilateral operations. Defence expenditure is expected to remain at 1.9% ofGDP until 2006, after which there will be a small increase to 2%.123

Slovakia currently has troops deployed as part of KFOR and ISAF.

Although there has been significant reform within the civil institutions, concern stillremains at the levels of corruption within the Slovakian government.

g. Slovenia

Of the ten candidates for NATO membership, Slovenia is the one country that had longbeen deemed ready for accession. The country has a strong free market economy and astable democracy which many analysts consider appealing to NATO in terms of stabilityfor the Balkan region.

However, in contrast to the progress of reform in civil and political institutions, progressin implementing reform in the defence sector has been slow. Defence spending is not apriority, with 1.51% of GDP currently allocated to the defence budget. There are plans toincrease this figure to 1.6% by 2007 and then 2% in 2008. However, many believe thatthis target will not be reached, as there is little prioritisation of spending. Most of thedefence budget is focused on providing effective personnel rather than providing ormodernising military equipment to NATO standards. As the US Senate Committee onForeign Relations pointed out:

Of the additional funds it [Slovenia] is devoting to defence spending, it chose tospend millions on a private aircraft rather than on upgrading its militaryreadiness.124

123 Information from the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATOEnlargement, 30 August 2002, p.7 and from Defence Select Committee The Future of NATO, HC91424 July 2002, p.28

124 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on NATO Enlargement, 30 August 2002,p.3


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Slovenia has deployed a small contingent to both SFOR and KFOR.

2. Military Effectiveness

The greatest criticism of enlargement centres on the detrimental effect it may have onmilitary effectiveness and decision making.

An article in The Independent summed up the concerns:

It remains unclear whether, on a practical level, an alliance of 26 nations thattakes decisions by consensus will be able to agree on missions for a NATOresponse force. Opinions on this are divided because, with just 19 countries,NATO’s decision making during the Kosovo campaign was tortuous. The sevennewcomers may reduce military cohesion since only two have much militaryhardware. Most officials expect most work to be done informally in the corridorsbefore going to the ruling North Atlantic Council. One diplomat said “At leastthere is one dominant player in NATO– the US– which can usually whip theothers into line”.125

In much of the debate by analysts and the media, military effectiveness is discussed interms of the need for consensual decision making at the political level within NATO.However, military effectiveness of the Alliance is also linked to several other issues,including capabilities and interoperability, spending and training within the accessionstates. It is the impact that the addition of seven new members will have on these issues,and on the decision making structure, that will prove decisive.

a. Political Decision Making Structure

The problem of consensual decision making with an Alliance of 26 members has beenwidely acknowledged as an issue within NATO itself. Consequently, the enlargementdecision made at Prague was closely tied to a radical streamlining of the bureaucracyinside NATO Headquarters, in order to achieve effective decision making. Moreexecutive power was vested in the Secretary General and the Alliance’s 467 committeeswere reduced by 30%, while meeting formalities were also eliminated to gain moreflexibility.

However, some observers consider that reforms of the internal decision making structureneed to go further than this, in view of the potential for divergence of individual interestswithin the Alliance. An article in The Financial Times summed up this concern:

The biggest difficulty is that what used to unite NATO members is now whatdivides them– the perception of global threats and how to deal with them. In the

125 “Can NATO reinvent itself as a powerful force in the modern world?”, The Independent, 21 November2002


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cold war there were transatlantic squabbles aplenty but no one really differed onthe scale or the character of the Soviet threat, or how to confront it.126

In a speech on 5 December 2002, the Head of NATO Policy Planning, Michael Ruhle,outlined some potential changes for the future:

Future changes could involve having troop-contributing nations manage a givenmilitary operation. Although this might appear contrary to NATO's traditionalrule by consensus, it need not be. The idea of 'constructive abstention,'– thatcountries do not immediately work with others but have no problems with othersworking together– is an idea that will inevitably become part of NATO decisionmaking. This may put NATO in the position of becoming a "tool box," orspringboard, by which temporary "coalitions of willing" member countriesorganise to tackle a given security issue. I think the time has come to reconcilethis “tool box” idea with the need for continuing political cohesion. Such astreamlined NATO, I believe, could cope with a lot of new challenges. I believe itcould arguably cope with such new and very different ideas, such as pre-emption.127

The concept of having a committee or administrative council, similar to the UN SecurityCouncil, to take responsibility for the main decision making process has also been mootedby US Senator Christopher Dodd, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.In an interview with the Ottawa Citizen, he commented:

It should be left up to NATO to decide who would be on the council or what theirpowers would be, but…it would have to include the U.S., Britain, France andGermany to be workable. [However] if NATO becomes ensnared in the kind ofpolitical wrangling that has come to characterize the UN, the U.S. is likely tomove even further down the path of unilateralism.128

b. Capabilities, Interoperability and Spending

As outlined in the section above on the status of the accession states, all seven proposedmembers have identified capability improvements and potential spending increases overthe next few years, in an attempt to carry through military reform, acquire NATO-standard assets and achieve interoperability with other Alliance members.

In terms of spending, five out of the seven accession states are committed to the 2% ofGDP which NATO has set down as a minimum for defence expenditure. Slovakia hasexpressed its intention to raise defence expenditure from 1.9% to 2% of GDP in 2006,while Slovenia intends to raise defence spending from 1.51% to 2% of GDP by 2008.Even at present levels, these figures place all seven accession states ahead of some NATO

126 “NATO is not dead but missing in action”, The Financial Times, 21 November 2002127 “Initiatives from Prague address new security challenges”, Aerospace Daily, 6 December 2002128 “Rapid growth risks NATO effectiveness”, Ottawa Citizen, 2 December 2002


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allies, including Germany which allocates 1.5% of GDP to defence, Canada whichallocates 1.1% and Spain which spends 1.2% of GDP on defence.129

The acquisition by the new members of capabilities that reflect NATO’s emphasis on out-of-area operations and the NRF will also be vital.

An article in The Sunday Times commented:

It is not just a matter of how much is spent. Alliance officials remain frustrated atthe amount wasted on heavy weaponry more suited to seeing off Soviet tanksthan to tracking al-Qaeda fighters through the mountains of the Middle East.130

The focus of many of the accession states on developing further niche capabilities andexpertise, such as NBC defence, could, many commentators have observed, provide anopt out for them on spending significant amounts of money on expensive but greatlyneeded assets such as C4ISTAR131 and strategic airlift.

The implementation of both the spending and capability plans of all seven countries,however, will be the greatest test. Assessments, by many analysts, of the progress madeby Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic since 1999 have been far from positive.

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly highlighted:

In describing NATO’s dissatisfaction with the country’s defence reforms sincejoining the alliance in 1999, [Deputy Defence Minister] Ivancsik said that NATOSecretary General Lord Robertson has told the new Prime Minister that Hungarywas nowhere near NATO standards […] NATO sources said Robertson pointedout that Hungary’s performance had significantly declined since the commitmentsit gave at the time of NATO accession.132

Concerns are high that domestic issues affected by candidates’ accession to the EU willcome to dominate the political agenda and shift the emphasis away from fulfilling thespending and capability commitments given to NATO.

c. Training

One of the basic aims of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme is to promote thecapacity for joint action between forces from partner countries and NATO members inpeacekeeping or civil emergency operations. Therefore, as longstanding members of the

129 Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (1980-2002). A copy of this document is available online at:http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-139e.htm

130 “America dwarfs NATO’s new recruits”, The Sunday Times, 24 November 2002131 C4ISTAR refers to Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,

Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance capabilities.132 “Hungary reviews defence to mollify critics”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 7 August 2002



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PfP programme, the seven accession states have undertaken a series of joint militaryexercises with NATO allies over the past few years.

In 2003 this activity will be consolidated through a number of major exercises which havebeen planned. These include NATO war games in Armenia in June, Exercise AlliedAction in Turkey in November and a joint NATO-EU exercise which was announced atthe Prague summit.

3. NATO’s Open Door Policy

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty maintains an “open door” policy to future waves ofenlargement of the Alliance.

In its report, The Future of NATO, the Defence Select Committee commented:

NATO should maintain its support and encouragement of all applicants, boththose who are invited to become members at Prague and those who are not. Thisis crucial to ensuring that the countries which are invited to join are not temptedto slow or halt the considerable progress they have made to date and that theycome into NATO as planned in 2004 with the maximum achieved. It is equallyimportant that those who are disappointed at Prague are not left with any sense ofhaving been abandoned and that NATO continues to work with them to ensurethat they develop into suitable candidates in the medium term.133

In a statement to the House on 25 November 2002, the Secretary of State for Defence,Geoff Hoon, reaffirmed the commitment of the Washington Treaty:

…enlargement will strengthen NATO and make the whole of Europe moresecure. Those invitations will not be the last. The United Kingdom will help thosewho want to join, and who meet the criteria, to succeed in the future.134

a. Current MAP members

Croatia, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will continue asmembers of the MAP, which is generally regarded as a fundamental process fordemocratisation and reform, regardless of the eventual goal of NATO membership. TheForeign Secretary, Jack Straw, reportedly told the Commons Foreign Affairs SelectCommittee in November 2002 that:

Croatia and Albania were both future possible candidates, and that theiraccessions could be an “engine of change for better in those countries”.135

133 Defence Select Committee, The Future of NATO, HC 914, 30 July 2002134 HC Deb 25 November 2002, c35135 “Alliance adapts to new times”, The House Magazine, 18 November 2002, p.46


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Many observers consider their involvement in NATO’s PfP programme as a valuablemeans of promoting military reform and fostering co-operation and interoperability. Theongoing presence of a NATO force in Macedonia is also regarded as essential inconsolidating political stability and promoting reform in the Balkan region as a whole.

b. Finland and Sweden

The possibility of neutral European countries, such as Finland and Sweden, taking adecision to join NATO within the next few years also continues to be a subject of debate.In early December 2002 the Finnish Minister of Defence, Jan-Erik Enestam, expressedthe opinion that:

Finland will have to adopt a position on the question of seeking membership ofthe NATO alliance during the next couple of years… decisions will have to bemade in the next government report on defence and security policy which is duein the year 2004.136

However, public opinion in Finland remains strongly opposed to Finnish membership ofNATO, with a recent poll by Gallup Finland suggesting 62% of the public were againstthe idea.137 The Finnish President, Tarja Halonen, has also rejected the idea, stating that“what Finland really needs is good co-operation between NATO and the EuropeanUnion”.138

The Swedish government is also against the idea of Swedish membership of the Alliance.In a recent comment to the Swedish Parliament, the Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, stated:

Non-alignment gives us the freedom to act as we wish in a crisis and we do nothave to be bound by our defence expenditures as we would be forced to if wejoined NATO.139

c. Central Asia, the TransCaucasus and Beyond

Analysts have questioned whether future enlargement beyond the borders of EasternEurope and the South-East Mediterranean is a viable possibility. The NATO-RussiaCouncil has consolidated Russia’s relationship with NATO allies to an unprecedenteddegree, while the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistanand Azerbaijan and the TransCaucasian states of Armenia and Georgia are all members ofthe PfP and the EAPC. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisiaform the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. At the Prague summit Georgia also submitted

136 Helsingin Sanomat web site and reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 2 December 2002137 “Majority of Finns approve of NATO transiting Finland”, Agence France Presse, 11 December 2002138 “Finnish President says Finland does not need NATO now”, Nordic Business Report, 17 December

2002139 “Swedish Foreign Minister: No reason to join NATO”, Dagens Nyheter, and reported by BBC

Worldwide Monitoring, 4 December 2002


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a formal application for NATO membership. On 13 September 2002 the GeorgianParliament had preemptively approved an army reform plan aimed at preparing thecountry for NATO entry.140 To many observers, the eventual expansion of NATO toinclude these countries seems a logical step.

President Putin has, however, dismissed suggestions of possible Russian membership ofNATO. In an article from the Russian News Agency Interfax Putin is reported to havestated:

For providing Russia's security in itself, I am sure the prospect of fullmembership of NATO is irrelevant, at least for us.141

Others have noted, however, that further enlargement in this direction and to this degreeadds more resonance to the criticism of NATO as a political club rather than a militaryalliance. China’s formal request at the end of October 2002 for regular bilateral dialoguewith NATO has, some argue, come as a result of the Alliance’s increasing politicisation.For others, a constructive relationship between China and NATO is regarded as importantto help shape the campaign against terrorism by targeting political and economicinstability in the Central Asian states.

An article in the International Herald Tribune commented:

China’s outreach to NATO appears to be part of a much larger effort to establisha more constructive and less critical international presence. A more positiveassessment would attribute this change in tone to a more confident and matureforeign policy in Beijing. A more cautious view acknowledges such potentiallyconstructive adjustments in Beijing’s outlook but recognises that they may bemotivated by tentative and short term interests. Either way, an interestingconvergence of sorts is under way between China and Western interests inCentral Asia, particularly since the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September2001…By working together to bring stability as well as political and economicdevelopment to Central Asia, China, Western nations and their partners in theregion can counter problems of terrorism and political instability in the area. Co-operating to help establish a more secure and prosperous Central Asian regionwould bring long term strategic and economic benefits to all involved…142

140 “President Shevardnadze is soon to announce Georgia’s bid to join NATO”, Atlantic News, 16 October2002

141 “Russia's Putin sees NATO enlargement of no use against terrorism threat” Interfax, 29 November 2002142 “A romance worth entering”, International Herald Tribune, 22 November 2002


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B. Future Theatres of Operation

One of the main thrusts of the Prague Summit was to enable the Alliance to contribute toessentially “out-of-area” operations. This was achieved at both the policy level and alsothrough adoption of the proposals for a NATO Response Force.

However, for many analysts, the Alliance’s military relevance for the future will bedetermined by international events over the next six months and the extent to whichNATO is engaged. A key question will be the extent to which the US will dictate policyand the willingness of European allies to engage in areas outside of the Alliance’straditional sphere of influence.

An article in The Guardian stated:

Critics fear that it [the NRF] may become an instrument to force European alliesto pursue US policies against groups such as al-Qaida or “states of concern” suchas North Korea.143

Strobe Talbott, writing in Foreign Affairs, commented:

NATO’s long-term potential is virtually limitless, but its cohesion is at imminentrisk. That is largely due to another paradox. The strength of the alliance hasalways derived from American power, which has never been greater, and fromAmerican leadership, which has never been more assertive. Yet these days manyallies are feeling not so much led by the United States as bossed around; for themthe exercise of American power has become less a source of protection and morea cause of resentment and a problem to be managed.144

The Independent also suggested:

In the long term, NATO faces a classic squeeze if the US fights big campaignsalone or with selected allies only, and the EU realises its ambitions of taking oversmaller-scale peacekeeping operations…They key will be whether the US trulyengages the new NATO, giving allies a significant stake in campaigns andconsulting them before decisions are taken. Anything less will consign theworld’s most powerful military alliance to a lingering and long-predicteddemise.145

143 “NATO summit: leaders agree to multinational strike force”, The Guardian, 22 November 2002144 Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad”, Foreign Affairs, November-December 2002145 “Can NATO reinvent itself as a powerful force in the modern world”, The Independent, 21 November

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1. Afghanistan

An initial indication of the possible theatres of operation in which a NATO force couldoperate is reflected in the limited role the Alliance took up in December 2002 in supportof the international peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. To date, NATO support hasconsisted of military planning, but is expected to include communications, logistics andintelligence gathering and assessment when the German-Dutch command of ISAFformally takes over in February 2003.

The presence of NATO in Afghanistan is symbolic in light of the apparent snub by theUS after 11 September and Washington’s determination to pursue a mainly unilateralistapproach in tandem with a few key allies in the campaign against terrorism.

In the long term, speculation has increased among analysts and the media that NATOcould take on a heightened role following the German-Dutch command of ISAF, whichwill last for six months. Some NATO countries are understood to be pushing for theAlliance to take direct command of ISAF.

An article in The Washington Post, commented:

Chief among the reasons why NATO is examining taking command of thepeacekeepers in Afghanistan is to avoid disruption of the current system. Many ofthe countries capable of commanding a large and complex multilateral operation–Britain, for example, followed by Turkey– have already completed six-monthrotating turns in command, and few other countries have expressed a willingnessto take over. NATO taking over would give the ISAF command structure somelongevity and continuity without a disruptive changeover every six months. Also,it would show the Bush administration’s commitment to keep the organisation atthe forefront as its main military coalition.146

There is, however, a lack of consensus within NATO on taking up command of ISAFtowards the end of 2003, and France is understood to be opposed to any direct NATO rolein Afghanistan. This raises questions as to whether the need for unanimity will hinder theability of NATO to take up these kind of operations in the future.

Some analysts have also commented that associating NATO in the long term withoperations of this kind would lay the groundwork for the Alliance to become a tool forpost-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping, rather than a body capable of conductingoperations at the high-intensity end of the spectrum.

Thomas Friedman, writing in The New York Times, suggests, on the other hand, thatNATO should pursue this level of operation:

146 “NATO steps quietly into Afghan mission”, The Washington Post, 12 December 2002


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A NATO rapid reaction force?...A NATO expanded to 26 countries is not goingto be reacting rapidly anywhere. NATO already has a rapid reaction force, theonly one it needs. It’s called the US Army Special Forces. What NATO needs tobe relevant is not a new rapid reaction force, it’s a NATO peacekeeping army.We don’t need a NATO that can run. We need a NATO that can sit– in moreplaces than Bosnia and Kosovo. And today there is no more important a place forNATO to sit than between Israel and the Palestinians.147

2. Iraq

At the Prague Summit NATO expressed its full support for the implementation of UNSecurity Council Resolution 1441. A Declaration by NATO leaders on 21 November2002 stated:

NATO Allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assistand support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance byIraq, without conditions or restrictions, with UNSCR 1441. We recall that theSecurity Council in this resolution has warned Iraq that it will face seriousconsequences as a result of its continued violation of its obligations.148

In a series of remarks on 26 December 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertsonstated his belief that:

NATO is very supportive of the UN process and if that breaks down, clearly thereis a moral obligation to NATO to give what support is required.149

Operational involvement in Iraq by NATO as an alliance has not been suggested andwould be unlikely to be agreed by the 19 NATO Allies. Political and diplomatic supportand military assistance from individual NATO members has, however, been sought by theUS. Nonetheless, many observers have suggested that, in order to keep NATO engagedand relevant for the future, a role in any potential conflict with Iraq needs to be found.

Strobe Talbott, writing in Foreign Affairs, commented:

The US administration’s success after September 11 in crushing the Talibanstoked the President’s confidence in the ability of the American armed forces,acting largely on their own, to bring down enemy regimes. In planning andexecuting the campaign in Afghanistan, the administration gave NATO shortshrift. Many in Canada, Europe and some in the United States, worry that if theadministration is similarly dismissive of NATO when push comes to shove in

147 Thomas Friedman, “Israel, Palestine and NATO”, The New York Times, 12 December 2002148 Prague Summit Statement on Iraq, 21 November 2002149 “NATO must back war with Iraq”, The Express, 27 December 2002


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Iraq, the alliance might never recover, since NATO must be taken seriously by itsstrongest member if it is to be taken seriously by anyone.150

One possibility would be a role for NATO in any post-conflict reconstruction andpeacekeeping mission. This would be particularly appealing if NATO were successfullyto assume command of ISAF at some point in the future.

C. Capabilities

The commitment to capabilities made at Prague was a decisive step forward for thestalled Defence Capabilities Initiative and a demonstration of solidarity by member statestowards underpinning previous rhetoric with practical action.

However, to avoid the PCC, NRF and other initiatives becoming a symbolic gesture, bothmember states and accession states must deliver on defence spending and, in the absenceof expenditure increases, spend more effectively.

1. Financial Considerations

Membership of NATO brings with it a number of financial costs.

a. Common Costs

NATO operates a common budget, to which all members contribute on an annual basis,which funds those expenditures that reflect the interests of all member countries. Theseinclude costs related to maintaining buildings and personnel at NATO Headquarters and afew permanent military commands, maintaining the NATO AWACS force and collectiverequirements, such as air defence, command and control systems, or Alliance-widecommunications systems and the common-funded elements of Peace Support Operationsand PfP activities.

The common budget is divided into three main parts: the Civil Budget, Military Budgetand the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). For 2002 the Civil Budgetamounts to approximately €124.7 million (approximately £78.2 million); the MilitaryBudget is around €746 million (approximately £463.7 million) and the ceiling for theNSIP has been agreed at the equivalent of $624 million (approximately £433.3 million).151

By convention, the agreed cost-sharing formula which determines each member country’scontributions reflects each country’s financial capabilities and economic and politicalconsiderations, including the degree of participation in the integrated military commandstructure.

150 Strobe Talbott, “From Prague to Baghdad”, Foreign Affairs, November-December 2002151 NATO Handbook, Chapter 9. This document is available online at:

http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#CH9

http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/index.htm#CH9


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Enlargement of the Alliance will prompt a review of the cost-sharing arrangements andthe ability of the seven accession states to contribute.

b. National Costs

Only a relatively small portion of NATO expenditure and activity is funded from thecommon budget. The majority of military forces and assets are nationally owned andfunded, including those seconded to forces such as SFOR and KFOR. Nationaldelegations and military missions to NATO HQ and the various NATO agencies are alsoa national responsibility.

For the capabilities debate, it is the allocation of funding by NATO allies and the sevenaccession states, in order to maintain these national costs and responsibilities, which isimportant. However, there is some debate among analysts and the media over thecredibility of the political commitments made at Prague and some suggestion thatdomestic budgetary concerns may come to the fore, at the expense of member states’defence budgets. This is not a new argument, since European defence budgets havedeclined steadily since the end of the Cold War, with little political enthusiasm orexpediency to be gained in allocating more to defence expenditure.

Daniel Keohane, Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform, was quoted inDefense News as commenting:

The commitments they [NATO member states] made are the right ones and itwould be fantastic if they provide the funding, but DCI demonstrated that nationsfind it easier to make commitments than follow through on them…It’s virtuallyimpossible for NATO leaders to force nations to meet the commitments they havemade. Absent such enforcement, and with only modest budget increases by somecountries, it’s unclear how these capability improvements will be paid for.152

The article went on to comment:

According to Keohane and other analysts, the commitments outlined in Prague–shaped in part by the Sept 11 2001 terror attacks– are no different from pastpromises driven by other crises. For example, DCI was adopted to bridgecapability gaps between European and US military forces during combined airoperations over the Balkans. “Kosovo is what really drove DCI, but it’s not clearto me why the Europeans would do any better now than in the past” Keohanesaid. “Spending is up a little bit in some countries, acquisition monies are notincreasing with the exception of France and Britain. The point is that it’s time forthe Europeans to spend better, not necessarily more. That’s why it’s soencouraging that some countries are taking the lead in spearheading keycapabilities…153

152 “Prague summit seeks to transform alliance”, Defense News, 25 November 2002, p.4153 ibid


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Robert Bell, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Support, has suggested:

Success or failure in enhancing NATO’s defence capabilities will…depend ingreat measure on the willingness of governments to invest more resources toacquire more defence capabilities, quickly and efficiently. It goes without sayingthat the defence procurement community, and in particular the defence industry,will need to be able to react speedily to these requirements…To ensure thesuccess of the Prague Capabilities Initiative, we need to have an understanding ofwhat defence expenditures are really going to be made available. Otherwise, theyrisk the danger of the PCC becoming largely a theoretical, paper, exercise.154

He also argued that:

One main reason for defence capability asymmetries as between the two sides ofthe Atlantic is the difference in the size of the defence input, which is growing.Europe’s defence spending for some years has been running at about 60% that ofthe US, but its military research and development spending is only one quarter ofthe US level, and these ratios have not improved in Europe’s favour, given therecent significant increase in the US defence budget…

Secondly, a fundamental question before the European and Canadian allies…ishow they view their future military operational partnership with the UnitedStates. Do Europe and Canada wish to be a full partner of the United Statesacross the full spectrum of transformational warfighting capabilities nowassociated with high-intensity conflicts?...and thus have forces which can jointhose of the US in high-intensity, high-tech, long-range coalition expeditionaryoperations? Or will Europe and Canada end up opting– perhaps by default– forfar more modest (and less expensive) crisis management and peacekeeping tasksincluding post conflict reconstruction tasks? I hope the former will be the case.155

However, the reluctance of member states to increase their defence budgets is not auniversal trend. Both the UK and France increased their defence budgets during 2002.Under the UK Government Spending Review in July 2002 an additional £3.453 billionover three years was allocated to the defence budget.156 In September 2002 the FrenchMilitary Programme Bill for 2003-2008, allocated an average of €14.64 billion(approximately £9.63 billion) to equipment appropriations, which reflects a rise ofapproximately 12.4% between 2002 and 2003, and 7.5% between 2003 and 2004.157

154 Robert Bell, “The Pursuit of Enhanced Defence Capabilities”, NATO’s Nations, Edition 4/2002155 ibid156 Ministry of Defence Press Release, 15 July 2002. Available online at:

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/files/d140/index.htm157 French Ministry of Defence, Military Programme Bill of Law 2003-2008. This is available online at:

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/files/d140/index.htm

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/files/d140/index.htm

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/files/d140/index.


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However, as an article in The Sunday Times commented:

Gerhard Schröder, the German Chancellor, made it clear that his country’sparlous economic state meant that there could be no increase in military spendingthis year or next. Other countries, such as the Netherlands and Italy, are equallyreluctant to spend more, citing constraints on borrowing under EU rules on thesingle currency.158

D. Future Relationships

For many observers, the development of relationships between the Alliance and the EUand Russia will dominate NATO’s agenda in this area over the next few years.

1. EU/ ESDP

The inability to reach a decision at Prague on the ‘Berlin-Plus’ arrangements was, formany analysts, indicative of the prevailing state of EU-NATO relations. The future of thisrelationship will depend to a great extent on reaching an agreement over the EU use ofNATO assets and on how the NATO Response Force develops with respect to the EU’sown Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

a. ‘Berlin-plus’ Agreement

On 13 December 2002 the North Atlantic Council finally approved a deal on ‘Berlin-plus’ that will pave the way towards the use of NATO assets in EU-led operations wherethe Alliance as a whole is not militarily engaged.

Agreement on the NATO-EU Accord came followed the EU Summit in Copenhagen on12 December 2002 where, in a concession to Turkey, EU leaders agreed that EU-ledoperations using NATO assets would only be open to states that are NATO allies orpartners under the PfP. Thus, Cyprus and Malta, which are due to join the EU in 2004,would be excluded. They would, however, be involved in decision-making on issuesrelated to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) more generally.

The Declaration of the Copenhagen European Council stated:

1. As things stand at present, the ‘Berlin plus’ arrangements and theimplementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which arealso either NATO members or parties to the ‘Partnership for Peace’, and whichhave consequently concluded bilateral security agreements with NATO […]

3. The fact that, as things stand at present, Cyprus and Malta will not take part inEU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they have become

158 “America dwarfs new recruits”, The Sunday Times, 24 November 2002


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members of the EU will not, within the limits of the EU Security Regulations,affect the right of their representatives to participate and vote in EU institutionsand bodies, including COPS, with regard to decisions which do not concern theimplementation of such operations.

Likewise, their right to receive EU classified information, within the limits of theEU Security Regulations, shall not be affected, provided the EU classifiedinformation does not contain or refer to any classified NATO information.159

The deal struck at Copenhagen builds on the proposals agreed during the BrusselsSummit on 24 and 25 October 2002, on the implementation of the provisions on theinvolvement of non-EU European allies in ESDP. Under that agreement, non-EUEuropean Allies such as Turkey would be able to raise concerns if an autonomous EUoperation was conducted in its geographic proximity or risked affecting its nationalsecurity interests.

Annex II of the Brussels European Council Conclusions stated:

12. In the case of any EU-led operation not requiring NATO assets andcapabilities, non-EU European Allies will be invited, upon a decision by theCouncil, to participate […] In a specific case when any of the non-EU EuropeanAllies raises its concern that an envisaged autonomous EU operations will beconducted in the geographic proximity of a non-EU European Ally or may affectits national security interests, the Council will consult with that Ally and, takinginto consideration the outcome of those consultations, decide on the participationof that Ally…160

The NATO-EU Accord will allow the EU to take over Operation Allied Harmony(formerly Operation Amber Fox) in Macedonia as early as February 2003, followingNATO’s review of its presence there.

The possibility of the EU assuming command of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force(SFOR) in Bosnia has also been suggested, following an EU offer at the CopenhagenSummit in December 2002.

An article in Jane’s Defence Weekly commented:

Lord Robertson [has] cautioned that more work needed to be done to formaliseNATO-EU relations. Still outstanding is a security agreement on the handling ofsensitive documents and intelligence between the organizations, due to befinalised by 1 March [2003]…this should not bar the EU assuming command of

159 Annex II of the Copenhagen Presidency Conclusions. These are available online at:http://www.eu2002.dk/news/upload/conclusions_uk20021216111046.pdf

160 Annex II of the Brussels Presidency Conclusions. These are available online at:http://www.eu2002.dk/ewebeditpro2/upload/OW.Headline/237/PresidencyConclusions.doc

http://www.eu2002.dk/news/upload/conclusions_uk20021216111046.pdf

http://www.eu2002.dk/ewebeditpro2/upload/OW.Headline/237/PresidencyConclusions.doc


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operation ‘Allied Harmony’ in Macedonia before then. NATO will study theEU’s offer to assume command of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) inBosnia…but [Lord] Robertson noted that SFOR is “a highly complexoperation”.161

Therefore, transfer of command to an EU-led force is considered by many observers to beunlikely before 2004, despite the fact that the majority of SFOR troops are alreadyEuropean. The EU High Representative for the Common and Foreign Security Policy,Javier Solana, is expected to report to the European Council on SFOR in February 2003.

The success of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, which was launched on 1January 2003, may determine the EU’s suitability to take over SFOR in the long term.162

The decision was also taken at the Prague Summit to plan a joint military exercisebetween NATO and the EU during 2003.

b. NRF v. EU RRF

With the end of the deadlock over the use of NATO assets for EU-led operations,development of the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) can at last move forward.

However, since the adoption of proposals for a NATO Response Force at Prague, manycommentators have raised concerns over the ability of European allies to evolve andimplement both concepts at the same time.

The main concerns are over funding and the consequences of simultaneous deploymentby both the NRF and the EU RRF, with the fear that commitments to NATO will takepriority.

An article in Defense News summed up the dilemma:

How NATO intends to develop its new rapid-response force alongside EU effortsleaves many questions unanswered….such as finding equipment and funding forthe two forces in a period of austere spending in Europe. While allied officialssuch as NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson claim that there will be nocompetition between the forces regarding missions or equipment, such statementsare misleading, a Danish official said. “Both forces need expensive protectionagainst weapons of mass destruction, both need strategic airlift, both needadvanced communications systems and intelligence gathering assets…Thesethings are not cheap and they are not available in abundance in Europe…we relyon Washington to provide them, and you know where the assets are going to ifboth forces have to deploy to different locales: to NATO.163

161 “EU gets NATO backing for military missions”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 January 2003162 The EU Police Mission took over from the UN International Police Task Force.163 “NATO, EU rapid reaction programs raise doubts”, Defense News, 2 December 2002


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The article goes on to quote Hartmut Buhl, Director for EU defence policy and NATO atEuropean Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS), who disagrees with this assessment:

There will be no competition in assets or deployment schedules between the twoforces. “NATO’s force is geared to a three-day, seven-day, 30-day deploymentcascade. The EU’s deployment will be 60 days. The military assets and commandstructures lying behind them are completely different”.164

An assessment of NATO and the EU in Jane’s Defence Weekly commented:

The impression that NATO holds the higher ground is inescapable. By apparentlystealing a march on the Headline Goal work, the new NRF strengthens aperception that NATO has seized back the initiative […] It might seem logical toconclude that the EU’s erstwhile promise in the defence and security sphere hasfallen from its high-water mark and that NATO has been left firmly in theascendant. However an alternative reading suggests that NATO’s decisions arejust as likely to re-energise activity in the EU.

The EU Headline Goal and the NRF have the same end goal: for membercountries to develop the capabilities to perform tasks as required. Commenting ina NATO context, Gen. Schuwirth, said “the fact that…programmes have run inparallel has possibly contributed to confusion about their nature amongcommentators, some of whom have even speculated about competition betweenthe two organisations”.

The truth is quite the contrary. Any capabilities France or Germany get, forexample, whether it be strategic airlift, PGMs or secure deployablecommunications, can be used as part of an EU or NATO-led operation: samepersonnel and same equipment. The proposal and subsequent commitment to theNRF has actually helped to bring the ESDP back into the public eye. NATO’sdefence ambitions in fact further the EU’s defence ambitions. The NRF and theEU Headline Goal are merely two different structures under which member statescan get capabilities, like two horses pulling the same cart.165

In evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 14 November 2002, ForeignSecretary Jack Straw commented in response to a question on whether the NATOrequirement would come first:

Almost certainly, yes, it would do. It would come first. The truth is, as iscurrently under discussion, in practice the issue of the EU moving will only arise

164 ibid165 “Sharing the reigns”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 January 2003


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if NATO for one reason or another decided not to be directly involved or wishesto withdraw from involvement.166

A report on the progress of NRF planning is due to be submitted to NATO DefenceMinisters in Spring 2003. More detail on how the force will work in tandem with the EURRF is expected to be provided in that report.

However, the real test of the complementarity of the NRF and the EU RRF will be wheneither of those forces is deployed and, in particular, when the type of operations that theNRF is involved in has been resolved.

2. NATO-Russia Council

Many analysts agree that prospects for the future of the NATO-Russia Council lookpositive, following the unprecedented level of collaboration achieved to date and theagenda for further co-operation and reform that has been put in place for the next fewyears.

In a speech to the Royal Society of Edinburgh on 13 December 2002, NATO SecretaryGeneral Lord Robertson outlined some elements of that future agenda:

We have made a quick start in ensuring that this revolutionary new relationshipdelivers substantial new security. First and foremost we have dramaticallydeepened our co-operation in the struggle against terrorism… Of course militaryreform goes beyond preparing for terrorism. It means fundamental adaptation: tojettison out-dated Cold War heavy metal armies and to create modern, light andflexible forces that are trained and equipped to meet the 21st century threats…Weare exploring options for co-operating in this area as well– to share best practices,and to see where we can co-operate to make best use of our collective resources.

Our new partnership extends to many more areas. For example, we are deepeningour military-to-military co-operation– including talks about having Russia airtankers refuelling NATO aircraft. We are also laying the groundwork for futurejoint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations. We have already agreed broadpolitical guidance for such future missions. And we are discussing holding acrisis management exercise together in the coming year.

We are deepening our co-operation on short range Missile Defence, and to betterprotect our deployed forces against attack. We are jointly assessing the threat toRussia and NATO nations posed by chemical, biological, radiological weapons,and their means of delivery. And we are preparing to work together in the eventof such an attack, or indeed in any civil emergency.

166 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Evidence Session on the Prague Summit, 14 November 2002, Section15


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We are also deepening our co-operation on search and rescue at sea…we aim tosign a framework document…in the next few weeks.167

Political support in Russia for the NRC is also strong. President Putin is quoted in anarticle from the Russian news agency Interfax as stating:

The NATO-Russia Council has been set up and we are currently satisfied withhow our co-operation is proceeding. Moreover, we do not rule out that we couldexpand co-operation with that organisation even further…168

However, he went on to caution:

[Co-operation will be expanded]…only if NATO itself, as the leaders of NATOmember states are saying, gradually transforms, adapts itself to addressing newtasks, and prepares to respond to new threats, and if the activity of thisorganisation meets Russia’s national security interests.

167 Speech by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, 13 December2002

168 “Russia’s Putin sees NATO enlargement of no use against terrorism threat”, Interfax, 29 November2002


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IV National Attitudes

A. United States

Many analysts considered that the perspective and attitude of the US towards NATOwould shape either the success or failure of the Prague summit. This view has arisen fromthe Bush administration’s unwillingness to use NATO in the campaign against al-Qaedaand the Taliban in Afghanistan and its perceived reluctance to involve the Alliance in anypossible planning for a potential conflict against Iraq.

An article in The International Herald Tribune on 24 September 2002 suggested:

The prospect of NATO again being sidelined in an important military operation–as it was in Afghanistan– has deepened concerns on both sides of the Atlanticabout the Alliance’s relevance in the age of terrorism…part of the reason forNATO’s lack of involvement is political, reflecting the difficulty of winningconsensus in the 19-member group from controversial US initiatives outsideEurope…but there is also a practical reason for NATO’s apparent irrelevance inthe Iraq showdown: the growing gap in capabilities between the US and Europe.[US Defence Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld’s main message is that if the Allianceis ever to joint the fight against new threat, it needs to acquire new capabilitiesand streamline its command structure.169

The IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002 agreed with this assessment:

…influential US officials and politicians have indicated that a big-bangenlargement alone would no longer be sufficient to ensure NATO’s ongoingstrategic relevance for the US. Instead, an active global military role for NATO inthe campaign against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction would berequired.170

At Prague, however, President Bush highlighted his country’s commitment to NATO,calling it “America’s most important global relationship”. He also hailed enlargement ofthe Alliance as a “decisive and historic moment” and sought to allay Russian fears bycommenting that “a larger NATO is good for Russia as well…it will gain from thestability and security of nations to its West”. 171

For the US, one of the more profound achievements of Prague has been the adoption ofthe proposals for a NATO Response Force, put forward by US Defense Secretary DonaldRumsfeld on 24 September 2002. The NRF could give the Alliance the type of capabilitythat critics have determined is essential to keep the US militarily engaged in the Alliance

169 “US cold-shoulders NATO in planning for attack” The International Herald Tribune, 24 September2002, p.4

170 “Europe’s Evolving Strategic Role” Strategic Survey 2001/2002 p.132171 “Bush calls for new NATO commitment”, BBC News Online, 20 November 2002


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and NATO militarily engaged in the campaign against terrorism. The NRF is also seen bythe US as important for giving impetus to addressing the capability gap between the USand Europe. Donald Rumsfeld commented in his speech at the 24 September meeting:

The United States wants NATO to be important…we believe in this Alliance andwant it to succeed.172

Following the Prague Summit, Mr Rumsfeld went on to state:

The idea of the response force was that NATO ought to have standing forces inhigh readiness able to function in the 21st century security environment…It issomething that will contribute a great deal to NATO’s relevance and ability tofunction in the world.173

However, some in the US Department of Defense reportedly remain sceptical. An articlein The Guardian suggested:

Pentagon hawks are still deeply suspicious of NATO, arguing that the missionshould determine the coalition and not the other way round.174

The Independent went on to comment:

At the Pentagon, the Hawks argue that the US must never again pool control ofoperations with nations that contribute so little. Yet the diplomats in the StateDepartment value a big multinational institution which is so clearly dominated byWashington.175

An article in RUSI Newsbrief agrees with the State Department view of the Alliance andpredicts that NATO will remain valuable to the US for more than military reasons:

The Alliance is unlikely to disappear any time soon, not least because it remainsvaluable for numerous reasons. It sustains America’s political engagement withEurope and promotes Western standards and values on members and candidatesfor future accession. On both sides of the Atlantic, public opinion favoursmultilateral solutions to security problems and supports strengthening theAlliance.176

172 “NATO warms to rapid reaction force” BBC News Online, 25 September 2002173 US Department of Defense Press Release. 22 November 2002174 “Threat of war: NATO puts on heavy display of forces as leaders seek role in Bush’s plans”, The

Guardian, 21 November 2002175 “Can NATO reinvent itself as a powerful force in the modern world?”, The Independent, 21 November

2002176 “Can NATO be rejuvenated?”, RUSI Newsbrief, November 2002, p.125


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B. United Kingdom

The UK regards NATO as the cornerstone of its defence and security policy. Franco-British initiatives to develop a European defence capability have, for the UK, been inpursuit of strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

The 1999 Defence White Paper outlines the UK’s position:

NATO is crucial for Britain because a vigorous and relevant Atlantic Alliance,including an effective European pillar, is essential to our security interests…Onlyby acting with our Allies in Europe and North America can we safeguard ourfuture and ensure that no major new military threats emerge.177

The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter confirms the importance of NATO andoutlines what the Ministry of Defence regards as important for the future of the Alliance.

Key to success will be the continued development of modern and effectiveAlliance military capabilities, the creation of more flexible command structures(with the focus on deployable headquarters) and the implementation of a newforce structure capable of generating, deploying and sustaining NATO forceswherever they are needed. Also important will be the exploitation of NATO’sstrategic partnerships, particularly with the EU and Russia - but also throughPartnership for Peace and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue.178

In an interview with the BBC on 30 September 2002, Secretary of State for DefenceGeoff Hoon outlined the Government’s hopes for Prague:

The British government views NATO as the main transatlantic guarantor ofsecurity for its member states and defender of the values written in theWashington agreement on democracy, personal freedom and supremacy of law.We are convinced that the transatlantic link plays an important role in defendingpeace and maintaining security in the whole world. Together with other NATOcountries we are working on achieving such an outcome of the Prague summitwhich would ensure that NATO, based on the commitment to collective securityas written in Article 5 of the NATO Charter, would remain the foundation ofEuropean security in the 21st century in the same way as during its successfulactivities in the 20th century. More specifically, we suggest that in Prague theAlliance achieve agreement on the following issues:

• NATO's effective role in combating new threats, such as internationalterrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

177 Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper 1999, CM 4446 December 1999 p.12178 Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, CM 5566 Vol 1, July 2002

Section 4.2


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• Renewed work on strengthening the possibility of more flexibledeployment, which would make it possible to move NATO forces wherethey are required.

• Invitation to all the countries that want to become members of NATOand meet NATO standards.

• Definite mutual advantages from the new relationship between NATOand Russia.

• Deeper and mutually advantageous relations between NATO andUkraine, based on the values shared by both sides.

• Closer attention to the region south of NATO, in particular, within theframework of the Mediterranean dialogue.

• Internal restructuring which will ensure effective functioning of theenlarged Alliance.179

On the basis of the decisions adopted at Prague, the summit has been considered by manycommentators as largely successful for the UK Government in terms of achieving itsobjectives. The progress made at Prague has, however, been met with the criticism thatthe conclusions and initiatives launched at the Summit are lacking in detail.

During a debate in the House on 25 November 2002, the Opposition Leader, Iain DuncanSmith, commented:

The Prague commitment to transform NATO with its new members, newcapabilities and new relationships with our partners is a step in the rightdirection…However, there are practical questions…when will Europeanmembers of NATO start increasing defence spending instead of cutting it?

The Prague summit is long on capabilities but short on specific spendingcommitments…how [does] the Prague statement differ from the previous NATOdefence capabilities initiative? What guarantees are there that Prague will deliverwhere previous initiatives have so far failed?

We also welcome the commitment to the new NATO response force, which isvital to enable NATO nations to contribute effectively to the war againstterrorism…The Army, however, now finds itself committed to both the Euroarmy and to NATO. Can he [the Prime Minister] confirm that NATOcommitments, rather than those of the Euro army, will always have priority? Thatquestion underlines the failure of the summit to deal with the relationshipbetween the Euro army and NATO.180

179 Interview with Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 30 September 2002180 HC Deb 25 November 2002, c37-8


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The Leader of the Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, welcomed the “success of thesummit” and went on to comment:

…it is hard to imagine any British Prime Minister making a statement confirmingthat seven new accession countries, based on the principles of democracy, arejoining NATO. That is a great justification for the entire raison d’être of NATOand its success over the years.181

The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has expressed the opinion that:

NATO has lost focus as a defensive alliance and has not found a substantive rolewith which to replace it. Is this necessarily bad? A world where the West does notneed NATO to fight its wars might plausibly be seen as an improvement on theCold War. Moreover, NATO’s relative decline is tolerable provided the leadingWestern powers retain the capacity to operate effectively in ad hoc coalitions. Inthis respect, NATO performs a valuable role in promoting interoperability andcommon doctrine […]

Yet, if the reformers are sufficiently bold, they have every chance of enhancingthe ability of Alliance members to collectively address the new securityenvironment. Whether they choose to so by utilising the formal decision makingprocesses of the Alliance is unclear, but also, perhaps, of secondaryimportance.182

C. France

France is a member of NATO but withdrew from the integrated military structure of theAlliance in 1966 in order to retain national control over military planning and nuclearissues. However, in recent years France has increased its participation in the Alliance. Itis a member of the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee and participated in theDefence Capabilities Initiative which was replaced at Prague by the Prague CapabilitiesCommitment (PCC).

France’s foreign policy goals, and therefore its attitude to NATO, are based primarily onindependence of action. The two main tenets of French foreign policy are to pursueEuropean integration in order to guarantee stability and prosperity on the continent; andto encourage progress towards peace, democracy and development within theinternational community.183 France is less favourably disposed towards NATO and is anadvocate for an independent European defence capability through the development of theEuropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). More recently, France has been pushingfor further integration in European defence. In November 2002 France, in conjunction

181 HC Deb 25 November 2002, c39182 “Can NATO be rejuvenated?”, RUSI Newsbrief, November 2002, p.125183 Website of the French embassy in the UK can be located at:

http://www.ambafrance.org.uk/asp/service.asp?LNG=en&SERVID=100&PAGID=80

http://www.ambafrance.org.uk/asp/service.asp?LNG=en&SERVID=100&PAGID=80


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with Germany, submitted a proposal to the Convention on the Future of Europe, outlininga future strategy for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The proposalincluded support qualified majority voting in defence matters.184

Consequently, France’s attitude to the US proposals for a new NATO rapid reaction forcehas been reticent. In response to Mr Rumsfeld’s initial proposals, French defence ministerMichèle Alliot-Marie expressed the view:

We will study it, but we will continue to focus our activities within the Atlanticterritory and we will always act with the consent of the United Nations.185

Following the Prague Summit, French President Jacques Chirac warned that the NRFcould conflict with the EU’s plans to set up the EU rapid reaction force based on theHelsinki Headline Goal. On adopting the NRF he commented:

Terrorism could not be the only reason for NATO’s reorganisation. “Nothingjustifies terrorism but there cannot be an exclusively military response to thisscourge”.186

France has recently increased its defence budget for the next financial year by €1.4bn inorder to shore up European defence capabilities, and has called on other Europeangovernments to follow suit.

D. Germany

Since the beginning of the Cold War Germany has always sought a balance betweenNATO, on the one hand, and closer defence and foreign policy ties with its Europeanpartners on the other.

The German Ambassador to the UK, Dr von Ploetz, outlined in a Chatham House lectureon 17 June 2002:

The relationship with the United States has always been a defining factor in thedebate on Europe, after 11 September perhaps even more so than before. On thisissue there has for decades been a deep-seated difference between Britain andGermany. In London, the dominant attitude was until St Malo defined by classiczero-sum thinking - that is, the idea of having to choose between Europe andalliance with the US. Where as all German governments have persistently said“we need both”…We share the overriding interest in the alliance with the

184 More details of the Franco-German proposal are available online at:http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=8518

185 “NATO cautiously welcomes elite force plan” United Press International, 25 September 2002186 “NATO summit: Leaders agree to multinational strike force”, The Guardian, 22 November 2002

http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=8518


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US…we equally know that European nations can only safeguard their vitalinterests by acting together.187

In a similar vein to the UK, the German government has been supportive of a strongforeign and security policy within Europe as a means of strengthening the NATOAlliance.

Many analysts observed that the downturn in Germany’s diplomatic relations with theUnited States since the German elections in September 2002 could affect Germany’sfuture attitude towards the NATO Alliance, but in an interview with The New York Timeson 24 September 2002 German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stated:

We’ll work very hard to improve relations [with the US], they are crucial to bothsides, especially for us.188

The concern remains, however, that Germany’s opposition to any involvement in apossible conflict in Iraq may continue to undermine that relationship. Nonetheless, anarticle in RUSI Newsbrief, suggested:

Although Germany has already contributed troops to operations in Afghanistan,including as part of ISAF, the high-profile assumption of commandresponsibilities signals Germany’s commitment to the peace support operationand offer the government an opportunity to repair the damage with Washington.Germany’s biggest contribution to a campaign in Iraq will be to reduce theoperational burden on the allied forces that actively participate in that[Afghanistan] theatre.189

According to some observers, Germany’s military credentials are in question in view ofits ongoing budgetary difficulties. Defence budgets are set to fall by up to €100 million(approximately £65.9 million) over the next fiscal year, while reductions in keyprocurement programmes such as A400M and the collaborative Meteor missile have ledto speculation that cuts or cancellations in other procurement projects will follow.

An article in RUSI Newsbrief commented:

In its commitments to NATO and to the nascent Common European Security andDefence Policy (CESDP), Germany has pledged to address the fundamentalweakness at the heart of European defence: the absence of key capabilities. Butits membership of the single European currency and its attendant fiscal stabilitypact threaten to hamstring Germany’s ambitions for a more prominent foreignpolicy role… The very fact of defence cuts at a time of expanding commitments

187 The speech by Dr von Ploetz can be accessed online at: http://www.german-embassy.org.uk/speech by ambassador dr von pl.html

188 “President rebuffs moves by Germany to mend relations” The New York Times, 24 September 2002, p.1189 “Germany: Europe’s penny pinching peacekeeper”, RUSI Newsbrief, December 2002, p.134

www.germanembassy. org.uk/speech by ambassador dr von pl.html

www.germanembassy. org.uk/speech by ambassador dr von pl.html


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sends out the wrong signal about Germany’s resolve to play a leading role in theglobal security sphere.190

E. Russia

The attitude of Russia to NATO is mixed. Politically, President Putin recognises the valueof closer ties with the Alliance. His government has actively encouraged co-operationthrough the new NATO-Russia Council and has voiced little opposition to enlargement,despite long-standing concerns over the expansion of NATO into the Baltic States.

An analysis in Jane’s Intelligence Review suggested:

There is a grudging consensus that Russia lacks the ability and opportunity tostop the process [of enlargement] and can only hope to extract as favourable adeal as possible in return for its blessing.191

On the future of the NRC, Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov commented in aninterview on 31 December 2002:

The new format of international relations in the NATO-Russia Councilstrengthens security and stability worldwide. While expanding these ties, Russiawants to obtain more information on the goals behind the alliance’s enlargementand be actively involved in its political decisions.192

Nonetheless, some areas of disagreement remain, as Mr Ivanov outlined:

The discussion key military threats would be incomplete without mentioning theUS invalidation of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the ongoing expansion of NATO.Although these steps do not pose and immediate threat to Russia’s nationalsecurity, they undermine the existing strategic stability system.193

President Putin still faces domestic opposition to his pro-Western policies, particularlyamong the military establishment, where opposition to the developing NATO-Russiarelationship remains prominent.

The IISS Strategic Survey 2001/2002 states:

A majority in both the Russian political elites and the Russian public would liketo see NATO’s identity transformed not towards a greater military role in theglobal campaign against terrorism but towards a political organisation in whichRussia can play a more equal role. Russia’s Ministry of Defence and many

190 ibid191 “The View from the Kremlin” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2002 p.16192 “Russian defence needs reorientation in view of terrorist threat”, Interfax, 31 December 2002193 ibid


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members of the Duma have spoken against greater Russian military co-operationwith NATO on the grounds that it would entail greater transparency and thusexpose many failures of Russia’s decade-long programme of military reforms.Moreover, Russia is still committed to keeping NATO and any Westerninstitutions from interfering in Russia’s own counter-terrorist campaign inChechnya.194

It is possible, however, that progress made within the NRC at the level of military chiefsmay help ease some of the internal military opposition to closer ties between Russia andthe Alliance. Following a meeting of the NRC on 3 December 2002, Chief of the RussianArmed Forces General Staff General Anatoliy Kvashnin commented:

A broad range of practical deeds and areas of work was discussed at the Councilto provide for regional and European security and an efficient fight againstinternational terrorism…Russian military representatives may also be assigned toNorfolk, the location of a NATO strategic command authorised by NATO’sPrague summit to tackle the problems in the development of the alliance’s armedforces…Russian military diplomats should be there to provide for mutualunderstanding.195

At the political level, the Russian Communist Party leader, Gennady Zyuganov, wasquoted in The Daily Telegraph as suggesting that:

NATO’s expansion will pose the most serious military threat to Russia since theNazi invasion.196

194 “Russia Moves Westward” The Strategic Survey 2001/2002 p.146195 ITAR-TASS News Agency, reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 3 December 2002196 “Alliance extends to Russia’s borders”, The Daily Telegraph, 22 November 2002

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