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Review: [untitled]Author(s): Jeremy NeillSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Sep., 2007), pp. 145-147Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130910 .

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SUMMARIESNDCOMMENTS 145

On the basis of his claim that Kierkegaard is to be understood as a

pragmatist, Mehl argues, in the spirit of Louis Pojman's The Logic of

Subjectivity, that he be read as giving reasons why one should become a

Christian (p. 115). However, according to Mehl, Christianity is not the

only "objective nonsense" Kierkegaard's pragmatism can be used to li

cense, and so Mehl ends up willing to affirm a plurality of ends to human

life. On this point Mehl envisages himself as in contention with Kierke

gaard (presumably, with his Cartesian hat on), with Kierkegaard schol

ars such as Anthony Rudd and Merold Westphal, and with Alasdair

Mclntyre and Charles Taylor. For Mehl thinks that all of the above re

quire a transcendental point of departure, or final framework, in order

to justify the human telos, and furthermore all hold that without such a

point we cannot be full integrated persons. Against this Mehl claimsthat we can justify our beliefs on the one hand, avoid relativism on the

other, and function as persons with a relatively stable identity and set of

commitments without holding that we are in possession of the final

truth about human well-being.For anyone interested in an attractive contemporary pragmatic posi

tion, or any serious Kierkegaard scholar interested in how his ideas

might be applied to contemporary philosophical problems, this book is

essential reading. As a consideration of Kierkegaard's epistemological

views, and in bringing Kierkegaard's pseudonyms into dialogue with

each other, Mehl's book is to be commended. Is Kierkegaard really a

tool that can be usefully thought through? Does his thinking really serve

to solve problems in contemporary debate about personal identity and

ethics? I shall, in true Kierkegaardian fashion, leave these questions to

the reader.?Jamie Turnbull, University of Hertfordshire.

MURPHY, Mark. Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics. Cambridge

Studies in Philosophy and Law. New York: Cambridge University Press,2006. xiv + 188 pp. Cloth, $75.00?This book is the third installment in

the loosely-related series that Mark Murphy began with the publicationof Natural Law and Practical Rationality in 2001 and continued with

the publication of An Essay on Divine Authority in 2002 (Natural Law

and Practical Rationality: Cambridge University Press, 2001; An Essayon Divine Authority: Cornell University Press, 2002). As a piece of the

oretical legal philosophy, the book is an impressive accomplishment. It

engages in a lengthy and sophisticated dialogue with interlocutors from

a large cross-section of the contemporary legal and philosophical world.

Among Murphy's virtues as a writer are his meticulously organized man

ner of presentation and his penchant for driving straight to the heart of

the relevant philosophical argument. Readers who are familiar with and

appreciative of this straightforward analytic style will find Murphy's

painstaking modus operandi a welcome infusion of clarity in an alreadydifficult philosophical field.

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146 THERESE SCARPELLI AND STAFF

The intellectual heart of the book isMurphy's theory of natural law ju

risprudence. The chief feature of law, on Murphy's account, is that it is

backed by decisive reasons for compliance. Murphy considers two related theoretical formulations of this claim. The first of these he calls

the strong natural law thesis, and the second, the weak natural law the

sis. On the strong thesis, law that is unbacked by decisive reasons for

compliance is no law at all. On the weak thesis, law that is unbacked bydecisive reasons for compliance is defective precisely as law. Murphy'sown preference is for the weak thesis. The weak thesis depicts the rela

tionship between the law and decisive reasons for compliance as a rela

tionship of capacities which are capable of being more or less well

developed. When a particular legal dictate is not backed by decisive rea

sonsfor compliance,

onthe weak thesis it is

notnecessarily the

case

that that legal dictate is not an instance of law. Rather, itmight also be

the case that that legal dictate is defective precisely as law.

Non-defective law, of course, is law that is backed by decisive reasons

for compliance. The purpose of non-defective law, on Murphy's view, is

the promotion of the common good of the political community. Mur

phy's theory of the common good is predicated on an aggregative view

of social participation: the common good is a state of affairs in which all

of the members of the political community are fully flourishing. Inter

estingly, Murphy argues that there is a normatively binding principle of

individual participation which appears to be entailed by this aggregative

conception of the common good. He calls it the common good princi

ple, and claims that it binds each person to do his or her share for the

community's overall flourishing. The common good principle is the

practical basis for the legal authority of the political community.One way inwhich Murphy could expand on his account of the transi

tion from natural law jurisprudence to natural law political philosophyis in his minimalist depiction of the relationship between consent-based

theories of legal authority and the deliverances of traditional natural law

accounts. The fact that the legal code is predicated on the common

good is, Murphy believes, sufficient evidence to suggest that there is tan

giblemerit in the

practicaldeliverances of consent-based theories of le

gal authority. Whether in fact the belief that the law is developed for the

sake of the common good also entails that the will of the members of

the political community ought to function as its authoritative basis is

not as readily apparent to me as it is to Murphy. Nevertheless, Murphy

presses on to develop a nonstandard consent-based view of the author

ity of law, one that is almost wholly predicated on the principle of indi

vidual acceptance. If contemporary neonatural law theorists are to

make progress on the reconciliation of their views with the democratic

procedures of modern governments, they will almost be forced to de

velop amore robust account of popular consent. Murphy's account is as

good as any that is currently available at fulfilling this charge.Some of the book's secondary theses might also be in need of a more

careful articulation. For instance, Murphy's account of the connection

between punishment and the authority of law, while refreshingly original with respect to traditional natural law theory's view of justifiable

punishment, is almost too logically nimble in the way inwhich it ties the

nonconsenting citizen's punishment to the common good of the political

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SUMMARIESNDCOMMENTS 147

community (Murphy's somewhat peculiar claim is that citizens who

carryout

legal requirementsto submit themselves to be

punishedfor

breaking the law are doing their share to promote the common good).

Nevertheless, the general theory of social authority advanced in this

book is an exciting and much-needed development of the political views

of neonatural law theory. I confidently recommend it as such.?Jeremy

Neill, Saint Louis University.

PANICHAS, George A, ed. The Essential Russell Kirk. Wilmington, Del.: ISI

Books, 2007. xxv + 641 pp. Cloth, $21.00; paper $14.00?Russell Kirk

(1918-1994) is not known as a professional philosopher although it

would be difficult to understand him apart from his love for Plato, Aris

totle, and the Stoics. He is known primarily as a seminal figure in the

political, post-World War II conservative movement. The essays se

lected and introduced for this volume by George Panichas show clearly

why Kirk deserves the title, "advocate of the permanent things." Kirk is

clearly rooted in antiquity. His indebtedness to classical philosophy is

apparent in nearly every one of the forty essays selected for this volume.

The subtitle of one of hisessays,

"From Mount Sinai to Massachusetts

Bay," indicates the historical range of his intellect. The volume openswith an essay on "The Law of the Prophets" and ends with an appreciation of Max Picard.

Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Eric Voegelin, T. S. Eliot, Irv

ing Babbitt, and George Santayana are among Kirk's favorite 19th- and

20th-century authors. He is largely appreciative of the time

transcending character of their work. Even when critical, Kirk is com

pletely free from malice. His aim, says Panichas, was unmistakably

clear, "to improve the life of mind and of the spirit and to foster discrim

inations and judgments." Inmany respects, Kirk reminds one of Santay

ana, for whom he had a muted admiration, in Kirk's words, for the

"something Hellenic" that suffuses his thought. In the essay, "George

Santayana Buries Liberalism," Kirk finds that "after the theistic human

ism of Babbitt and More, the materialism of Santayana may seem a

weakening of the conservative fiber." Yet he approvingly quotes from

The Winds of Doctrine (1926) wherein Santayana writes: "That comfort

able liberal world was like a great tree with the trunk already sawed

through but still standing with all the leaves quietly rustling, and with us

dozing in its shade. We were inexpressibly surprised when it fell and

half crushed us; some are talking of setting it up again safely on its sev

ered roots."Santayana

continues: "The shell of Christendom has been

broken, and a new spirit, that of an emancipated, atheistic, international

democracy, is dragging us to an industrial socialist future." Kirk recog

nized, like Santayana, that the liberalism that once professed to advo

cate liberty, is now "amovement for control over property, trade, work,

amusements, education, and religion; only the marriage bond is relaxed

by modern liberals."