1. Oh Cho vs Director of Lands 75 Phil 890G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946OH CHO vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.

Facts: Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940,Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed the registration on theground thatOh Cho lacked title to saidland and also because he was an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain .

Issue: Whether or notOh Cho isentitled to a decree ofregistration. Ruling: No. Petitioner failed to show thathe has title to thelot, which may be confirmed under the LandRegistration Act. All lands that were not acquired from theGovernment, either by purchase or bygrant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would beany land that should have been inthe possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for suchpossession would justify the presumption that the land had never been partof the public domain or that ithad been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. Theapplicant does not come under the exception, for theearliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.Under the Public LandAct,Oh Cho is not entitled to adecree of registration of the lot, becausehe is an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho predecessors in interest would have beenentitled to a decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land wasa condition precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagdameos who was not able. Hence,the most they had wasmere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was transferred to OhCho, but since the latteris an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien,Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

2. Director of Lands vs. IAC and ACME 146 SCRA 509

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner,vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC.,respondents.

Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp.represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,acquired 5parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., from Marianoand Acer Infiel, members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29, 1962. Thiswas accordingly only registered on July 17.

Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribeson landoccupied by them or their ancestrallands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within thepublic domain.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements. The government and the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela also recognized ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered,Acme also donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela.

Issues:1. Whether or not the land is already a private land ?1. Whether or not theconstitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies?

Ruling:YES the land is already a private land. Lands already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that acertificate of titleshould be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient.It had already ceased to be of thepublic domainand had become private property, at least by presumptionThe applicationfor confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law2. NO. Theconstitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations does not apply. The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural landsin excess of 1,024 hectares

1. Meralco vs. Castro Bartolome 114 SCRA 799G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESFacts:The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.)at Tanay, Rizal onAugust13, 1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation of imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the corresponding appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following arguments; firstly, the land in question had essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription as a result of open continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more than thirty years by the original owner, OlimpiaRamosand his predecessor in interest, Piguing, spouses whom Meralco acquired thedisputedland,andfinally,thesubstantialrights acquiredbyRamos spouses and Piguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.

Issue:1. Whether or not Meralco asa juridical person,allowedunder the law tohold landsof public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.2. Whether or not the possessiontacked topredecessor Private Corporation automatically guarantee its rights to possession and title of the land.3. Whetheror notit iscontingent fora judicial confirmationof title beforeany grant would be extended to a juridical person.

Ruling:1. No. Private corporations or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law to hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands not exceeding one thousand hectares.

2. No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who occupied the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land for more than thirty years, does not automatically amount to rights and possession.

It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino Citizen claiming itunderthelaw thisconclusionis anchoredontheprinciplethat all lands that were notacquiredfromthe Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-interest possess and occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.

3. Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title before juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until the certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought tobe confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void.

As between the State and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The Court also took noticethattheconstitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the otherhand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.

4. Suzi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 48 Phil 427G.R. No. L-24066December 9, 1925VALENTIN SUSI vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDSFacts: On December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same . After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it. Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land. The court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon. Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer. After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the Valentin Suzi entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took made an appeal.Issue: Whether or not Valentin Suzi is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land and annul the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon.Ruling: It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. When Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumptionjuris et de jureestablished in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.5. Mc Daniel vs. Apcible and Cuisia 42 Phil 749G.R. No. L-17597 December 29, 1922E. W. McDANIEL,petitioner,vs. GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and JUAN CUISIA,respondents.Facts: On June 7, 1916, the plaintiff and his associates located, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three association petroleum placer claims, each of an area of 64 hectares on the public domain in the Philippine Islands, and that such locations were duly recorded in the office of the Mining Recorder as "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2" and "Maglihi No. 3." Also, that the plaintiff and his associates remained in the open and continuous possession of the three petroleum placer claims from June 7, 1916, until the 17th day of October, 1917, at which time his associates conveyed their respective interests in the claims to the plaintiff. That ever since October 17, 1917, the plaintiff has remained in the open and continuous possession of the claims and that in the year 1917 and each year thereafter, he has performed not less than P200 worth of labor on each of them.It is stipulated that on October 17, 1917, the plaintiff's associates conveyed their interests in the claims to him for P100. The pleadings admit that the locations by plaintiff and his associates of the petroleum placer claims were made in accord with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission. Such acts specify and point out how and by whom and the conditions under which a mineral location can be made, and, hence, it must follow that any mineral location made in accord with those provisions is a valid location. This legally carries with it the existence of every element, prerequisite and condition necessary or required for the making of a mineral location. Hence, we must assume that the plaintiff and his associates made a good and valid mineral location upon the public domain of the Philippine Islands.Section 2 of the Act No. 2932 provides that "All such lands may be leased by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the manner and subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of State.Under the provisions of this Act, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to make such a lease is confined to lands "containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the Philippine Islands."In the instant case, the stipulation shows that the mining claims are situated in a comparatively uninhabited district four miles from any port, and that they can only be reached over mountain trails which have been maintained at the expense of the plaintiff. If it be a fact that the claims do contain petroleum in paying quantities, it would be of immense value to the commercial interests of the Philippine Islands. As evidence of his good faith, the plaintiff has expended P12,000 in the development of the property, and has found evidence tending to show that the claims do contain petroleum and other mineral oils. At this time and under such circumstances, it would be a gross injustice to deprive him of his property rights through forms and technicalities. The locations were made upon the unappropriated public domain, and to maintain them, and as evidence of good faith, the law requires the performance of the annual assessment work, and that question is not disputed or presented in the record.In the instant case, we hold that, even though a valid mineral location was made prior to the passage of Act No. 2932 and the annual assessment work had not been performed since the passage of the Act, and that question is raised and presented by an appropriate plea and sustained by the proof, any prior rights under the location would then be forfeited, and such lands would then be subject to, and come under, the provisions of Act No. 2932.

6. Reavis vs. Fianza 40 Phil 1017JOHN F. REAVIS, Appt., v. JOSE FIANZA et als.215 U.S. 16(30 S.Ct. 1, 54 L.Ed. 72)Decided: November 1, 1909.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:This is a bill in equity, brought by the appellees to restrain the appellant from setting up title to certain gold mines in the province of Benguet, or interfering with the same, and to obtain an account of the gold heretofore taken from the mines. The trial court rendered a judgment or decree granting an injunction as prayed. Then the case was brought here by appeal.The appellees are Igorrots, and it is found that, for fifty years, and probably for many more, Fianza and his ancestors have held possession of these mines. He now claims title under the Philippine act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, 45, 32 Stat. at L. 691. This section reads as follows:that where such person or association, they and their grantors, have held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act, in the absence of any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be deemed to impair any lien which may have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance of a patent.Fianza testified, that his grandfather and father had owned the mines in question, and that he and the other appellees owned them in their turn; that they had all worked the mines, that no one else had claimed them, and that the appellant had interfered with his possession, and, when he put up a sign, had torn it down. No doubt his working of the mines was slight and superficial according to our notions, and the possession may not have been sharply asserted as it would have been with us, whether from Igorrot habits or from the absence of legal title under Spanish law. But it sufficiently appears that the appellee's family had held the place in Igorrot fashion, and to deny them possession in favor of Western intruders probably would be to say that the natives had no rights under the section that an American was bound to respect. Whatever vagueness there may have been in the boundaries, it is plain that the appellant attempted to locate a claim within them, and Fianza testified that the plan to which we have referred followed the boundaries that his father showed to him. It is said that the claim is larger than is allowed by 22. But the limitation of that section applies only to claims 'located after the passage of this act.'It is to be assumed, then, that the appellees and their ancestors had held possession and had worked their claims for much more than the period required by 45, before the moment when the statute went into effect. It is to be assumed that the possession and working continued down to within two months of that moment. The bill, to be sure, alleges that Reavis, in 1900, illegally entered and deprived the appellees of their mines, and that he still continues to maintain his unjust claim. But further on it alleges that, in the spring of 1902, Reavis was directed by the governor of Benguet not to molest the appellees; that he then waited in Manila, and, after the promulgation of the law, 'again entered,' set stakes, and filed a notice of location. So that the bill does not mean that he was continuously in possession, or that he was in possession when the law took effect. We are of opinion that there was no adverse claim that would have prevented the appellees from getting a patent under 45. It is suggested that the possession of Fianza was not under a claim of title, since he could have no title under Spanish law. But, whatever may be the construction of Rev. Stat. 2332, the corresponding 45 of the Philippine act cannot be taken to adopt from the local law any other requirement as to the possession than the length of time for which it must be maintained. Otherwise, in view of the Spanish and American law before July 1, 1902, no rights could be acquired, and the section would be empty words; whereas, as we have said before, another section of the act, 16, still further shows the intention of Congress to respect native occupation of public lands.7. Abaoag vs. Director of Lands 45 Phil 518

G.R. No. L-20875 December 13, 1923VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL.,applicants-appellants,vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL.,opponents-appellees.Facts: On February 28, 1919, appellants presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan to have parcel of land of more than 77 hectares registered under the Torrens system. Accompanying said petition there was an official plan prepared by the Bureau of Lands presented. Various oppositions were presented to the registration of said parcel of land. The record shows that at the time of the delivery of said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since their entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and their ancestors have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same, believing in good faith that they were the owners; that the petitioners had cleared, improved, and cultivated the land and have constructed and maintained their homes thereon, exercising every requisite act of ownership, for a period of more than thirty-nine years, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation, without any interruption whatsoever; that the land in question was never partitioned among the petitioners because it was the custom of theBagos, Igorots, or non-Christians to occupy and possess their land in common; that the petitioners believed, and had a right to believe, from the fact that the land was given by thegobernadorcilloandprincipaliaof the municipality, that they thereby became the owners, to the exclusion of all others, and are now justified in their petition to have the said land registered under the Torrens system in their names, as the owners in fee simple,pro indiviso.Issue: Whether or not the registration of the land be granted.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the judgment entered dismissing the petition of the applicants, should be reversed and the record remanded to the court a quo, with permission on the part of the petitioners to make such amendment to their petition as they may deem wise and necessary and to present such additional evidence as they may desire; and that the oppositors be permitted to present whatever evidence they may have in opposition, with the understanding that the evidence which has heretofore been adduced shall stand as a part of the evidence of the main trial. The present case is not altogether unlike the case of Cariovs.Insular Government (7 Phil., 132). In the course of that decision, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said: We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native, who had not a paper title, a trespasser and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. Whatever the law upon these points may be, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in the case like the present." Mr. Justice Holmes adds: "If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt."In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid title by prescription." We may add that every presumption of ownership under the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of subsequently enacted registration land act.In view of the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariovs.Insular Government, we are forced to the conclusion that the lower court committed the errors complained of by the appellants in dismissing the petition. As was said by this court in the case of Rodriguezvs.Director of Lands (31 Phil., 272, 279): ". . . only under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry in the court of land registration be dismissed over the objection of the applicant, and without giving him an opportunity by the grant of new trial, or otherwise . . . to submit additional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe that he is the owner of all or any part of the land described in his application. This is specially true when the only ground for the dismissal of the application is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to the chain to title upon which applicant relies, etc."8. Carino vs. Insular Government 441 SCRA 3

MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Error v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT February 23, 1909.

Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation. Mateo Carino, contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error. Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title. The lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4, 1904.

An appeal was filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US having taken possession of property for military and public purposes. Thus the application of registration was dismissed.

Respondents argues that given that Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired. No prescription against the Spanish Crown. Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title good and US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris). Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser. Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spanish laws. Plaintiff argues that it seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon.

Issue: Whether Or Not Carino owns the land.

Ruling: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain times shall be deemed owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years. Here, plaintiffs father was the owner of the land by the very terms of this decree.- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.

The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain. The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

9. Director of Lands vs. Funtilar 142 SCRA 57

G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT,petitioners,vs.MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR, HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Cases Division),respondents.Facts: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and the Heirs of Felipe Rocete applied for the registration of a parcel of land, originally belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lifetime and extended until 1936 when she died. The present applicants are the grandchildren of Candida Fernandez. In 1936, after the death of Candida Fernandez, her real property was declared in the name of the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty (30) hectares.Sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of Candida Fernandez, who was then the administrator of the property. A final deed of sale was executed by the Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas in 1944 in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs that the property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others until such time that partition among them was effected. The heirs of Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among themselves. The particular lot now disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor of the applicants-respondents. The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an opposition alleging that they have registrable title on account of their possession since time immemorial.Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was no actual survey of the land applied for; and that he is entitled to registration on account of his occupation and that of his predecessor.On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its decision adjudicating the land to applicants. The IAC affirmed said decision.Issue: Whether or not the IAC is correct in granting the land registration.Ruling: Yes. The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33 years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged. The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land in favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the property is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of the deceased in the possession of their family, thus continuing prior possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than the required period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses testified to their personal knowledge of more than 50 years possession.More important is the petitioners' allegation that the property sought to be registered was unclassified public forest until September 15, 1953 when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it alienable and disposable.It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified forest zone. The ruling inHeirs of Amunategui vs.Director of Forestry(126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.

10. Oposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 792Oposa et.al , petitioners v. Fulgencio s. Factoran, Jr., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON. Eriberto u. Rosario, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,respondents.Facts: The principal plaintiffs therein, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of,inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The complaintwas instituted as a taxpayers' class suitand alleges that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

On 22 June 1990, the defendant Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruled that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

Ruling:The instant petition is granted, and the challenged order of respondent Judge dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is set aside.

1.) Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

2.) Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

3.) The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

11. Miners Association vs. Secretary Factoran 240 SCRA 100MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner,vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau,respondents.Facts: On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral resources.On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279."Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."

Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc.to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before the SC.

In a petition forcertiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate thenon-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity

Ruling: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.The SC ruled that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted intoproduction-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.

12. Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 181 SCRA 445Sunbeam Convenience Foods inc., Coral Beach Development Corp., and the Register of Deeds of Bataan,petitioners,vs. Court of Appeals and the Republic of the Philippines,respondents.Facts: On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more particularly described and bounded as Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq. m ) and Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m. On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register of Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued OCT No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-described. Subsequently, OCT No. Sp-24 was cancelled and TCT No. T-12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while TCT No. 12422 was issued over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach Development Corporation. On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062.SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH filed a Motion to Dismiss on the action for reversion. The then CFI of Bataan dismissed the complaint adopting mainly the theory that since the titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of the land.In the CA, it gave due course to the petition for certiorari by the Republic, set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance, and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the action for reversion. Hence, Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed a petition for review.Issue: Whether or not he CA is correct in setting aside the order of dismissal by the CFI BataanRuling: The petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The SC finds nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals to give due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a matter of public concern which is the disposition of the lands of our matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy. Also, it agreed with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the Republic charging the then CFI with grave abuse of discretion. The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic.An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied specificallyby the petitioners Sunbeam and Coral Beach. If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.The adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State.Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest. The only way to resolve this question of fact as to the classification of the land is by remanding the case to the lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved.

13. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 228

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT),petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.,petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY,petitioner,vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA,respondents.Facts: Jose de la Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on February 11, 1965 on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. Both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.3Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.Issue: Whether or not the application for registration of de la Rosa granted by the CA is correct.Ruling: No. Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposessimultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

14. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 201 SCRA 3G.R. No. 48327August 21, 1991REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY,petitionersvs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULINA PARAN, ELISA PARAN MAITIM and SINA PARAN,respondents.

Facts: Private respondents are applicants for registration of a parcel of land situated in Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet, containing an area of 34,178 square meters claiming to have acquired the land from their father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession thereof since time immemorial.On 18 November 1970, the Office of the Solicitor General filed on behalf of the Director of Lands an Oppositioncontending that: (1) private respondents have no registrable title; (2) the parcel of land sought to be registered is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines; and (3) the application for registration was filed after expiration of the period provided for in R.A. No. 2061, hence the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismissbased solely on the ground that the application made by private respondents was filed beyond 31 December 1968, the extended period for filing of applications for registration provided for by R.A. No. 2061. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet later filed another Oppositionfirst time in representation of the Director of Forestry, stating that the parcel of land sought to be registered is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated 16 February 1929.On 7August 1974, the land registration court rendered a Decisiongranting the application for registration of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the granting of the application for land registration is valid.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioners are entitled to judicial confirmation of their imperfect title.

The applicants in the instant case are natives of Benguet and members of the Ibaloi tribe. They are members of a cultural minority whose application for registration of land should be considered as falling under Section 48(c) of C.A. No. 141. At the time private respondents filed their application, the text of Section 48 read:Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:xxx xxx xxx(c)Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation oflands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under abona fideclaim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

It is clear to the Court that the addition of subsection (c) was intended to create a distinction between applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles bymembers of national cultural minoritiesand applications byother qualified persons in general.Members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of the public domain,whether disposable or not; they may therefore apply for public lands even though such lands are legally forest lands or mineral lands of the public domain, so long as such lands arein fact suitable for agriculture. The rest of the community, however, "Christians" or members of mainstream society may apply only in respect of "agricultural lands of the public domain," that is, "disposable lands of the public domain" which would of course exclude lands embraced within forest reservations or mineral land reservations.

It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect title was filed in 1970 and that the land registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c) was in legal effect. Private respondents' imperfect title was, in other words, perfected or vested by the completion of the required period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private respondents' right in respect of the land they had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073.

The Court stressed inDirector of Lands vs. Funtilar The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle.It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.

15. Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines 40 Phil 10G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919J. H. ANKRON,petitioner-appellee,THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,objector-appellant.

Facts: A certain piece or parcel of land situated is sought to be registered under the Torrens system.The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands alleging that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands.After hearing and considering the evidence, the lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions mentioned in said decision. From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify the land in question; second, contends that the appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926; third, contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares.Issue: Whether or not the granting of registration of the land was valid.Ruling: Yes. The Government under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry,supra.)The important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural publicland as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of said Act. In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action. Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include all unreserved landscoveredwith trees of whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character."The fact that the land is amanglar[mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land.